MADISON’S MISSING BRANCH Bruce M. Owen Stanford University April, 2021 Working Paper No. 21-018 Draft 8 MAR21 Madison’s Missing Branch Bruce M. Owen* Abstract The role of the U.S. federal government in regulating economic and social interactions has grown exponentially since the establishment of Madisonian democracy in 1788. This has undermined one of the Founders’ key assumptions—that the role of the federal government would be small. The three-branch structure of government is inadequate to control the vastly increased opportu- nities for private interests to influence policy. The power of private interests is unbalanced; eas- ily organized influencers have far more weight than large, poorly organized interests. This leads to policies that promote inequality. In addition, political decisions are dominated by the reliance of legislators and administrators on interest group information and resources. There is little in- centive for policymakers to consider their impact on the “general welfare,” however measured. Also, there is little effective quality control of federal policies. The standard remedy for these im- perfections is regulation of campaign financing and lobbying. Unfortunately, such regulation is constrained by First Amendment freedoms. I propose creation, within the Madisonian frame- work, of a fourth branch with the power to veto policies that reduce aggregate welfare and equality of means. Bruce M. Owen is the Morris M. Doyle Centennial Professor in Public Policy, Emeritus, Stanford University School of Humanities and Sciences and Senior Fellow, Emeritus, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. Contact:
[email protected] 1 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3800374 Draft 8 MAR21 Acknowledgements: I am grateful to my super research assistant, Vincent Myron Hao, who turned out to be not only an imaginative and resourceful researcher but also a first-rate editor.