Nuclear Weapons Surety

UNCLASSIFIED Document No: DP-20.1/ 9-21·89 Document Consists of 72 Pages Cy No . ....L, of ..5_ Cys. Series B SEPTEMBER1~ Joint Report by the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of Energy :. Nuclear Weapons Surety Annual Report to the President(u.) 1988 NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION This document contains information that may be subject to the provisions of Section 148 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 USC 2158). Review prior to release is required. CLASSIFIED BY: CG-W-5, Jan 84 ,,.. ·".( ·-y (" • . ·;L'f.- ,- .\,!. .Ji. -~ .... : UNCLASSIFIED F { "THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK." .It - UNCLASSIFIED SEPTEMBER 1989 Joint Report by the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons S~rety Annual Report to the President 1988 Prepared by: The Associate Director for Weapons Program Safety Defense Programs Department of Energy U CLASSIFIED l "THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK." .. SSIFIED JOINT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE/DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SURETY, 1988 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY At the request of the President, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) report annually on the status of nuclear weapons surety. · This report responds to guidance in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 309 and summarizes surety progress made during 1988 in the areas of: nuclear weapons safety, security, use control; personnel reliability and assurance programs; emergency preparedness and response; and, inspection and evaluation programs. Budget constraints are also discussed. As part of its preparation, this report was reviewed by the Nuclear Weapons Council. There are no significant issues of disagreement between DoD and DOE concerning dual-agency judgments and responsibilities for safety, security, and control of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) is now a key player in nuclear weapon surety. The NWC considers policy matters and safety rules for nuclear weapon system operations as appropriate prior to Secretary of Defense approval. The NWC considers tradeoffs between safety and improved deterrence acquisition actions in the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Plan. The Stockpile Improvement Program Review examines those nuclear weapons planned for retention by the Department of Defense. In this process, a review is performed of all deployed weapons, their operating environment, present stockpile improvement efforts, Service retirement plans/replacement programs, and recommendations and suggested priorities for nuclear safety improvements are made. The NWC also recommends the development of new warheads, approves their safety design requirements, and reviews DOE warhead safety development performance. These recommendations are consistent with the fiscally constrained 1999-1994 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Plan. Nuclear weapon testing is an important aspect of the continuing program to enhance the safety of new warheads. Safety features such as insensitive high explosives, fire-resistant pits to contain plutonium, and electrical safety devices integrated in the nuclear package are basic features of new warheads and improve the safety, security, and reliability (surety) responses in all credible environments. The introduction of these and ---------------·. --··----------- ~UNCLASSIFIED other safety features into the stockpile is only possible if continued underground nuclear testing is permitted to assure proper performance. Significant nuclear surety improvements took place in 1988, including actions to address all concerns identified in the 1987 report. Specifically: Field retrofits have been completed on those B28 and B53 strategic bombs used in SAC ALFA Alert operations. These bombs are now equipped with improved nuclear detonation safety subsystems. However, these retrofits still do not meet modern nuclear design safety criteria. Prior to the retrofit, these bombs had been judged by the DoD/DOE to have unpredictable or undesirable safety behavior in credible abnormal environments. The DoD has restricted nonretrofitted B28s from being used in the high risk environments of ALFA Alert and force generation exercises. All B28 and B53 bombs are scheduled to be retired in the early ' 1990s and replaced with modern weapons (B83 bombs and ACM[EPWJjW61). B6l-7s have replaced all of the B61-ls on ALFA Alert aboard B-52 and B-lB aircraft. Retrofit of remaining B61-l bombs to the B6l-7 with a modern nuclear detonation safety subsystem, insensitive high explosive, and category D PAL continued. Full-scale engineering development was authorized for both the W89 warhead for the .. SRAM II missile and the B90 Nuclear Depth/Strike Bomb. These weapons are replacements for the SRAM A/W69 and the • Navy B57 bomb respectively. Both the W89 and B90 will incorporate modern design safety features including insensitive high explosive, fire-resistant pits, category D PAL devices, and modern electrical nuclear safety subsystems. When deployment begins in 1993, a significant improvement in the nuclear safety of the stockpile will be recognized with the phased removal of the W69 and B57 from the stockpile. ii NCLASSIFIED The DoD and the DOE agreed, that by the year 2000, all u.s. nuclear-capable tactical aircraft will be equipped with cockpit Unique Signal Generation capability. This capability permits the aircraft to fully utilize the nuclear detonation safety features designed into modern weapons in all operations including alert and flight. This capability will be compatible with all B6l-6,8,9 and B90 bombs. Until this capability is achieved, the Navy concept of operation for tactical aircraft will be procedurally constrained. Older tactical B6l bombs (B6l-O, 2, and 5) are planned for upgrade as part of the Stockpile Improvement Program to incorporate modern safety, security, and control features for Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps aircraft applications. These improvements will result in all B61 bombs incorporating insensitive high explosives, modern electrical safety subsystem, command disablement, and Category 0 Permissive Action Link devices as appropriate for overseas deployment. In 1988, the Navy accelerated the retirement of remaining W45 Terrier Missiles and nearly all of the W44 Anti-Submarine Rocket-Thrown Depth Charge (ASROC), with the balance to be retired in FY' 1989. (b) (3) (b) (3) This improvement increases" sacutity, reauee! security manpower, enhances weapon survivability, and improves operational readiness by collocating weapons and delivery _aircraft • . DNA physical security technology is also being applied in laser engagement training tor security forces, detection and assessment systems for mobile weapons, and pier-side;water side detection. iii u· C_ ASSIFIE (b) (3) Recommendations from the joint DoD/DOE Stockpile Improvement Program (SIP) 1988 review meeting and current initiatives responding to each of those recommendations have been reviewed by the NWC. Among these initiatives is the establishment of a 1989 joint DoDjDOE study to investigate additional measures that r could reduce the possibility that weapons without modern nuclear design safety features could be involved in an air transport accident. Technical solutions for the following major nuclear surety concerns have been developed for both new production and stockpile improvement programs and depend on adequate continued funding for completion. The two departments will continue to provide adequate support for stockpile safety modernization of: SRAM II missiles and W89 warheads; B6l, B83, and B90 bombs; ACM(EPW) missiles and W61 warheads; Follow-on-To-LANCE missiles and replacement warheads; and initiatives to lift Artillery-Fired Atomic Projectile (AFAP) production restrictions so that older projectiles can be replaced. Some older weapons designed prior to the mid-1970s do not meet the design criteria for modern nuclear weapons that assure, by themselves, that DoD Safety Standards are met. Both Secretaries will continue to pursue expeditious replacement of these older systems through stockpile modernization and, until that time, will continue to require the addition of restrictive operational rules and procedures to achieve maximum safety consistent with operational requirements. iv ~UNCLASSIFIED TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . i TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 I. Introduction .. 5 II. Background . 7 A. Roles and Responsibilities 7 B. Glossary of Acronyms . 7 c. Review of Major Concern from the 1987 surety Report. .... 9 l. B2SFI. 9 2. B53 . ..... ' . I •• 9 3. W69. I • • ' • • • • • • • • • 9 D. 1988 Major Actions, Concerns, and Issues .. 10 1. Guidance Actions .... 10 2. SRAM A/W69 Concern ..... 10 J. Air Transport Issue ... 10 E. Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) . 10 l. Background ...... 10 2. Activities ...... lO r. Nuclear Command and Control. 11 III. Department of Defense Programs . lJ A. Security . .... l3 1. Background . ..... 13 2. Programs . • . 13 3. Management of Physical Security R&D. 22 4. Impact of Budget constraints 22 5. Security Appraisal .... 23 B. Nuclear Safety and Use Control 23 1. Background ....... 23 2. Nuclear Detonation Safety .. , ... 24 3. Radioactive Material Dispersal Safety .. 25 4. Use Control •..... ......... 26 5. Nuclear Weapons System Safety Studies .. 27 6. Safety, Control, and Evaluation Appraisal. 29 UNC ASSIFIED TABLE Of CONTENTS (Continued) c. Personnel Reliability Program .. 30 1. Background ........... 30 2. Progress • . • . 30 3. Appraisal ............. 30 D. DoD Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection (NWTI) Program

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