Making Chosǂn's Own Tributaries
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International Journal of Korean History (Vol.15 No.1, Feb.2010) 29 G Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries : Dynamics between the Ming-centered World Order and a Chosǂn-centered Regional Order in the East Asian Periphery Chong Da-ham* Introduction The conventional understanding of a particular type of royal envoy called Kyǂngch’agwan (箾觥籒) in early Chosǂn was that it was one of the king’s envoys sent to local provinces to deal with specific state’ affairs.1 They have been understood as the Chosǂn Kings domestic envoy. However, many historical records show Kyǂngch’agwan envoys were not only sent to domestic regions, but were also dispatched to the regions such as Tsushima and southern Manchuria where those Jurchen tribes lived.2 In fact, according to primary sources, sending out this particular type of Kyǂngch’agwan envoy to Jurchen regions and Tsushima was a very conspicuous phenomenon in 15th century Chosǂn. So, why were those Kyǂngch’agwan envoys dispatched to those regions which remained beyond Chosǂn’s administrative or “territorial” control? What were the roles of Kyǂngch’agwan in these regions? Why has this practice not been scrutinized in modern Korean historiography for a long time? What meaning does it hold regarding Chosǂn’s interstate GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG * HK Research Professor in RICH Transnational Humanities at Hanyang University This work was supported by National Research Foundation Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2008-361-A00005). I would like to thank Matthew Wright at RICH for the revision of this paper. 30 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries policy between the so called “Sino-centric world order” which Chosǂn basically belonged to, and its own ambitious imagined position inside it? How did the Chosǂn royal house and ruling elites establish and legitimize this practice? What did Chosǂn Royal house and the ruling elites ultimately try to imagine with this whole process? My problematization of existing researches and epistemological frames came from those simple questions. In the following chapters, to search for the answers to those questions, I will first go over the cases of Kyǂngch’agwan dispatch in the fifteenth century. I will focus on fundamentals of those cases. And I will assert that those envoys were sent to specific regions for particular purposes relating to interstate relations. Then, I will take a look at why this particular historical phenomenon has not been scrutinized in modern Korean historiography. I will try to critique the existing perspectives and frames that have prevented scholars from paying more attention to Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches to the Jurchen and Tsushima regions. I will scrutinize how modern context of Korean historiography enabled Korean historians to appropriate the traditional concept Kyorin (粂翧) as their modern perspective and I will reveal what kind of logic lies underneath the disguise of the seemingly “reciprocal,” “horizontal” and “non-nationalistic” Kyorin concept. The next step will be to reveal the historical background and ideological basis that enabled Chosǂn to carry on this practice for more than one hundred years. In order to do that, I will be analyzing some military practices of Koryǂ and Chosǂn in northeastern Asia in areas where Ming could not fully exercise its “suzerainty.” Then, I will take a closer look at the process of using those military victories to historically legitimize Chosǂn’s influence on Tsushima and the Jurchen regions. Lastly, I will try to explain the origin of Chosǂn Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches. Chinese imperial policy model will be compared to Chosǂn’s. That will lead us to discover the historical meanings of the Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches, which were practiced for a long time in the Chong Da-ham 31 periphery of the “Sino-centric” East Asian order. The Dispatches of Kyǂngch’agwan to the Jurchen Regions and Tsushima For a basic survey, I examined various cases of Kyǂngch’agwan sent beyond the regional boundaries of Chosǂn dynasty. It turned out that the only time that Kyǂngch’agwan envoys were sent to “foreign” regions is when they were dispatched to Jurchen regions and to Tsushima.3 Those Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches were mostly concentrated in the fifteenth century. Regarding Jurchen issues, the first Kyǂngch’agwan was sent to the Jurchen chieftain 纲耼竓詵職葥 (Kr. Tongmaeng’gach’ǂpmok’a), in the fifth year of T’aejong’s reign (1405).4 According to my research, after that, Kyǂngch’agwan were sent at least 25 times until the eighth year of Yǂnsan’gun’s reign (1502). To Tsushima, the first Kyǂngch’agwan was dispatched in the eighteenth year of T’aejong’s reign (1418). 5 Including this, Kyǂngch’agwan were sent at least 9 times until 1510. Then, why did Chosǂn send Kyǂngch’agwan to these regions out of its own “territory?” Chosǂn normally sent envoys titled with ShƱh (Kr. Sa 艈) which can be translated as emissary or envoy to its superior the Ming empire and equal diplomatic counterpart the Japanese Bakufu. However, to Tsushima and the Jurchens, it was very rare for Chosǂn to send normal ShƱh ( 艈 ) envoys. 6 As we have seen above, Chosǂn dispatched Kyǂngch’agwan instead. Then, what fundamental purposes or intentions did Chosǂn hide inside this unusual practice? Why did they not send ShƱh envoys but rather Kyǂngch’agwan envoys titled with Guan (Kr. Gwan 籒) to those regions? Previous studies provided some elaborate explanations for each case, but they only came up with the conventional conclusion that these envoys were sent to deal with serious issues in Chosǂn-Jurchen and Chosǂn- Tsushima relations.7 However, the real significance of Kyǂngch’agwan dispatch rather lies in its symbolic rhetoric and rituals performed in each 32 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries case than in those individual issues themselves, since under the surface of each issue, there was always the simple fundamental that all those issues should be accord with Chosǂn’s dynastic interests and the Chosǂn royal house’s own imagined position above Jurchen chieftains and the lord of Tsushima. Accordingly, proclamation of those fundamental principles was deliberately and repeatedly expressed in the symbolic rhetoric of the official documents sent to the Jurchens and to Tsushima. Either delivered by a Kyǂngch’agwan or carried back by Jurchen and Tsushima envoys on their way back home, the documents contained symbolic rhetorics such as “Kyǂngbongwangji (箾膬蘌覄),” “Kyǂngbongsamyǂng (箾膬艈聑),” and “Iljunwangji (螐襢蘌覄).” These expressions are to simply express that “this is Chosǂn King’s order or messenger and you have to comply with it with reverence.”8 According to this sort of rhetorics, the significance of Kyǂngch’agwan is clear. They were the Chosǂn king’s envoys to deliver his orders reverently to the lord of Tsushima and Jurchen chieftains. By sending them, Chosǂn enforced compliance with its own imagined hierarchy where the Chosǂn king was high above them. This characteristic of Kyǂngch’agwan dispatch was also deeply embodied in the ritual ceremonies of reception. A Kyǂngch’agwan embodied the Chosǂn king’s orders to the lord of Tsushima and Jurchen chieftains. Therefore, Chosǂn’s Kyǂngch’agwan forced them to show their loyalty and reverence by urging them to follow a sophisticated manual of ritual ceremonies.9 Before a Kyǂngch’agwan would deliver the document written by the Board of Rites on behalf of the Chosǂn King, the lord of Tsushima and the Jurchen chieftains had to stand facing north, which symbolized the Chosǂn King’s location, had to get down on their knees, and had to prostrate themselves toward the king’s location three or four times.10 Since this was humiliating to the Jurchen chieftains and the lord of Tsushima, it seems that they tried to avoid this ritualistic ceremony by coming up with excuses. However, it was not easy to avoid it because the Chong Da-ham 33 Kyǂngch’agwan insisted that the ritual should be observed even in under dire circumstances such as when the lord of Tsushima was mortally ill.11 We have seen that Chosǂn obliged the Jurchens and Tsushima to comply with its own interstate policy by continuously dispatching Kyǂngch’agwan envoys. That practice, was conducted according to sophisticated ritualistic manuals wherein the Chosǂn King’s superior position was clearly expressed. In this practice, it was always imagined that there was a vertical hierarchy where Chosǂn identified those Jurchen chieftains and the Tsushima lord as its vassals. Inevitably, more fundamental questions are raised here. That is to say, the aspects of this vertical hierarchy revealed by Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches, actually contradict the dominant “Kyorin (粂翧)” frame of modern Korean historiography which has conceptualized early Chosǂn- Tsushima and early Chosǂn-Jurchen relations as seemingly horizontal and reciprocal. Then, why have modern Korean historians been unable to recognize those vertical aspects of early Chosǂn-Tsushima and early Chosǂn-Jurchen relations despite all the evidence of these hierarchical relations in the primary sources and still keep sticking to their old Kyorin frame even now? “Kyorin (粂翧)” as a Nationalist Frame in Modern Korean Historiography Korean modern historians have used the “Sadae (艃繗)” and “Kyorin” frame for a long time. Even though these Sadae and Kyorin frames originated in the traditional East Asian context, it is doubtlessly true that these frames or terms have been used by modern Korean historiography in the modern context, too.12 In this modern context, regarding Ming-Chosǂn relations, Korean modern historiography has provided the very conventional explanation that early Chosǂn became a Ming tributary by gladly accepting its “suzerainty” according to the Sadae frame. On Chosǂn-Jurchen and 34 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries Chosǂn-Tsushima relations, use of the Kyorin frame, enabled Korean modern historiography to come up with a very comfortable and conventional explanation, that Chosǂn tried to maintain peaceful and reciprocal relations with “uncivilized barbarians” such as the Jurchens and Japanese under Muromachi Bakufu including Tsushima, by opening up trade and cultural exchange.