International Journal of Korean History (Vol.15 No.1, Feb.2010) 29 G

Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries : Dynamics between the Ming-centered World Order and a Chosǂn-centered Regional Order in the East Asian Periphery

Chong Da-ham*

Introduction

The conventional understanding of a particular type of royal envoy called Kyǂngch’agwan (箾觥籒) in early Chosǂn was that it was one of the king’s envoys sent to local provinces to deal with specific state’ affairs.1 They have been understood as the Chosǂn Kings domestic envoy. However, many historical records show Kyǂngch’agwan envoys were not only sent to domestic regions, but were also dispatched to the regions such as Tsushima and southern Manchuria where those Jurchen tribes lived.2 In fact, according to primary sources, sending out this particular type of Kyǂngch’agwan envoy to Jurchen regions and Tsushima was a very conspicuous phenomenon in 15th century Chosǂn. So, why were those Kyǂngch’agwan envoys dispatched to those regions which remained beyond Chosǂn’s administrative or “territorial” control? What were the roles of Kyǂngch’agwan in these regions? Why has this practice not been scrutinized in modern Korean historiography for a long time? What meaning does it hold regarding Chosǂn’s interstate

GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG * HK Research Professor in RICH Transnational Humanities at Hanyang University This work was supported by National Research Foundation Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2008-361-A00005). I would like to thank Matthew Wright at RICH for the revision of this paper. 30 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries policy between the so called “Sino-centric world order” which Chosǂn basically belonged to, and its own ambitious imagined position inside it? How did the Chosǂn royal house and ruling elites establish and legitimize this practice? What did Chosǂn Royal house and the ruling elites ultimately try to imagine with this whole process? My problematization of existing researches and epistemological frames came from those simple questions. In the following chapters, to search for the answers to those questions, I will first go over the cases of Kyǂngch’agwan dispatch in the fifteenth century. I will focus on fundamentals of those cases. And I will assert that those envoys were sent to specific regions for particular purposes relating to interstate relations. Then, I will take a look at why this particular historical phenomenon has not been scrutinized in modern Korean historiography. I will try to critique the existing perspectives and frames that have prevented scholars from paying more attention to Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches to the Jurchen and Tsushima regions. I will scrutinize how modern context of Korean historiography enabled Korean historians to appropriate the traditional concept Kyorin (粂翧) as their modern perspective and I will reveal what kind of logic lies underneath the disguise of the seemingly “reciprocal,” “horizontal” and “non-nationalistic” Kyorin concept. The next step will be to reveal the historical background and ideological basis that enabled Chosǂn to carry on this practice for more than one hundred years. In order to do that, I will be analyzing some military practices of Koryǂ and Chosǂn in northeastern Asia in areas where Ming could not fully exercise its “suzerainty.” Then, I will take a closer look at the process of using those military victories to historically legitimize Chosǂn’s influence on Tsushima and the Jurchen regions. Lastly, I will try to explain the origin of Chosǂn Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches. Chinese imperial policy model will be compared to Chosǂn’s. That will lead us to discover the historical meanings of the Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches, which were practiced for a long time in the Chong Da-ham 31 periphery of the “Sino-centric” East Asian order.

The Dispatches of Kyǂngch’agwan to the Jurchen Regions and Tsushima

For a basic survey, I examined various cases of Kyǂngch’agwan sent beyond the regional boundaries of Chosǂn dynasty. It turned out that the only time that Kyǂngch’agwan envoys were sent to “foreign” regions is when they were dispatched to Jurchen regions and to Tsushima.3 Those Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches were mostly concentrated in the fifteenth century. Regarding Jurchen issues, the first Kyǂngch’agwan was sent to the Jurchen chieftain 纲耼竓詵職葥 (Kr. Tongmaeng’gach’ǂpmok’a), in the fifth year of T’aejong’s reign (1405).4 According to my research, after that, Kyǂngch’agwan were sent at least 25 times until the eighth year of Yǂnsan’gun’s reign (1502). To Tsushima, the first Kyǂngch’agwan was dispatched in the eighteenth year of T’aejong’s reign (1418). 5 Including this, Kyǂngch’agwan were sent at least 9 times until 1510. Then, why did Chosǂn send Kyǂngch’agwan to these regions out of its own “territory?” Chosǂn normally sent envoys titled with ShƱh (Kr. Sa 艈) which can be translated as emissary or envoy to its superior the Ming empire and equal diplomatic counterpart the Japanese Bakufu. However, to Tsushima and the Jurchens, it was very rare for Chosǂn to send normal ShƱh ( 艈 ) envoys. 6 As we have seen above, Chosǂn dispatched Kyǂngch’agwan instead. Then, what fundamental purposes or intentions did Chosǂn hide inside this unusual practice? Why did they not send ShƱh envoys but rather Kyǂngch’agwan envoys titled with Guan (Kr. Gwan 籒) to those regions? Previous studies provided some elaborate explanations for each case, but they only came up with the conventional conclusion that these envoys were sent to deal with serious issues in Chosǂn-Jurchen and Chosǂn- Tsushima relations.7 However, the real significance of Kyǂngch’agwan dispatch rather lies in its symbolic rhetoric and rituals performed in each 32 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries case than in those individual issues themselves, since under the surface of each issue, there was always the simple fundamental that all those issues should be accord with Chosǂn’s dynastic interests and the Chosǂn royal house’s own imagined position above Jurchen chieftains and the lord of Tsushima. Accordingly, proclamation of those fundamental principles was deliberately and repeatedly expressed in the symbolic rhetoric of the official documents sent to the Jurchens and to Tsushima. Either delivered by a Kyǂngch’agwan or carried back by Jurchen and Tsushima envoys on their way back home, the documents contained symbolic rhetorics such as “Kyǂngbongwangji (箾膬蘌覄),” “Kyǂngbongsamyǂng (箾膬艈聑),” and “Iljunwangji (螐襢蘌覄).” These expressions are to simply express that “this is Chosǂn King’s order or messenger and you have to comply with it with reverence.”8 According to this sort of rhetorics, the significance of Kyǂngch’agwan is clear. They were the Chosǂn king’s envoys to deliver his orders reverently to the lord of Tsushima and Jurchen chieftains. By sending them, Chosǂn enforced compliance with its own imagined hierarchy where the Chosǂn king was high above them. This characteristic of Kyǂngch’agwan dispatch was also deeply embodied in the ritual ceremonies of reception. A Kyǂngch’agwan embodied the Chosǂn king’s orders to the lord of Tsushima and Jurchen chieftains. Therefore, Chosǂn’s Kyǂngch’agwan forced them to show their loyalty and reverence by urging them to follow a sophisticated manual of ritual ceremonies.9 Before a Kyǂngch’agwan would deliver the document written by the Board of Rites on behalf of the Chosǂn King, the lord of Tsushima and the Jurchen chieftains had to stand facing north, which symbolized the Chosǂn King’s location, had to get down on their knees, and had to prostrate themselves toward the king’s location three or four times.10 Since this was humiliating to the Jurchen chieftains and the lord of Tsushima, it seems that they tried to avoid this ritualistic ceremony by coming up with excuses. However, it was not easy to avoid it because the Chong Da-ham 33

Kyǂngch’agwan insisted that the ritual should be observed even in under dire circumstances such as when the lord of Tsushima was mortally ill.11 We have seen that Chosǂn obliged the Jurchens and Tsushima to comply with its own interstate policy by continuously dispatching Kyǂngch’agwan envoys. That practice, was conducted according to sophisticated ritualistic manuals wherein the Chosǂn King’s superior position was clearly expressed. In this practice, it was always imagined that there was a vertical hierarchy where Chosǂn identified those Jurchen chieftains and the Tsushima lord as its vassals. Inevitably, more fundamental questions are raised here. That is to say, the aspects of this vertical hierarchy revealed by Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches, actually contradict the dominant “Kyorin (粂翧)” frame of modern Korean historiography which has conceptualized early Chosǂn- Tsushima and early Chosǂn-Jurchen relations as seemingly horizontal and reciprocal. Then, why have modern Korean historians been unable to recognize those vertical aspects of early Chosǂn-Tsushima and early Chosǂn-Jurchen relations despite all the evidence of these hierarchical relations in the primary sources and still keep sticking to their old Kyorin frame even now?

“Kyorin (粂翧)” as a Nationalist Frame in Modern Korean Historiography

Korean modern historians have used the “Sadae (艃繗)” and “Kyorin” frame for a long time. Even though these Sadae and Kyorin frames originated in the traditional East Asian context, it is doubtlessly true that these frames or terms have been used by modern Korean historiography in the modern context, too.12 In this modern context, regarding Ming-Chosǂn relations, Korean modern historiography has provided the very conventional explanation that early Chosǂn became a Ming tributary by gladly accepting its “suzerainty” according to the Sadae frame. On Chosǂn-Jurchen and 34 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries

Chosǂn-Tsushima relations, use of the Kyorin frame, enabled Korean modern historiography to come up with a very comfortable and conventional explanation, that Chosǂn tried to maintain peaceful and reciprocal relations with “uncivilized barbarians” such as the Jurchens and Japanese under Muromachi Bakufu including Tsushima, by opening up trade and cultural exchange. It was this seemingly horizontal perspective of Kyorin that made it harder for scholars to rediscover and reconceptualize the hierarchical facets of 15th century Chosǂn-Jurchen and Chosǂn-Tsushima relations, including Kyǂngch’agwan. Chosǂn frequently launched military expeditions against the Jurchen regions and Tsushima, those “barbarians” paid frequent tributary visits to Chosǂn court, and they were given official titles by the Chosǂn court. These aspects are the reflections of a regional hierarchy headed by Chosǂn. Even though Korean scholars obviously knew there were many vertical aspects in Chosǂn’s relationship with the Jurchen and Tsushima, they could not break away from this hypocritically reciprocal concept of Kyorin frame. I believe that there are two major dilemmas that prevented Korean modern historians from abandoning Kyorin frame. One is that they were too aware of Korea’s “traditional” Sadae policy toward “Middle Kingdom.” Knowing all too well that Chosǂn accepted Ming “suzerainty,” they could not state that Chosǂn disobeyed one of the most salient principles of the “Sino-centric” East Asian world order that there should be no inter-vassal relations (蝸葆肚蘑粂). Even though Korean modern historiography has been quite nationalistic, they have failed in overcoming “Sino-centric perspectives” such as the “Chinese World Order” and the “Tributary System.” Especially regarding the Chosǂn period, this dilemma was worse. While modern Korean historiography has put entire “5000 years” of Korean history into one single lineal evolutionary time frame, Chosǂn had to be defined as “Kǎnse (紭荃)” which is closer to modern Korea than Koryǂ it defined as “Feudal (Kr. Chungse 襦荃)” or “middle age.” And when modern Korean historians have tried to prove and naturalize this Chong Da-ham 35 evolutionary development of “Korean History,” there was no other option other than choosing the dissemination of Neo-Confucianism which they thought was very conspicuous in the transition from late Koryǂ to Chosǂn. Then, it was the same dilemma again, where modern Korean historians who were very nationalistic, had to choose this “Foreign Influence,” Neo Confucianism as a main driving force in the evolution from Koryǂ to Chosǂn. It seems to me that, rather than trying to resolve this dilemma, modern Korean historians have tried to conceal this by arguing that Neo- Confucianism was better developed in Chosǂn than in Ming and finally the uniqueness of Chosǂn’s Confucianism appeared. Then, in this context, as modern Korean historians tried harder to imagine and essentialize Chosǂn’s own uniqueness, the Confucian elements of Chosǂn which they thought were basically “foreign,” ironically became much more prominent. Eventually, the Sino-centric perspective and Chosǂn’s Sadae policy which Korean historians have desperately tried to overcome, became a wall impossible to go beyond. And this whole context, inevitably, made it impossible for them to reframe those vertical aspects between Chosǂn and Tsushima or Jurchens in a new way other than the Kyorin frame and theoretically conceptualize how it was possible for Chosǂn which was a “vassal” of Ming to claim its own “vassals.” They never realized that they were confined by egocentrism based on national and civilizational biases. The other reason for the persistence of the Kyorin frame is that Korean modern historians were not free from dogmatic evolutionary perspectives including “Inner Development Theory (Naejaejǂk Paljǂnron)” either. Possessed by their own nationalist evolutionary theory, they could only criticize Japanese Imperialism for the failure of Chosǂn’s own modernization. This overly sensitized historians to the “foreign” forces or influences at work in “Korean History.” Especially, when it comes to modernization which has been essentialized as the final destination of the evolution of “Korean History” by the vast majority of modern Korean historians, and the nationalist discourses driven by them, the consequences of the Japanese colonial 36 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries period were perennial issues in Korean politics and academia. The perennial issue preoccupying Korean historians became the assessment of the damages done by the Japanese imperialists. Since modern Korean historians desired to continuously criticize Japanese Imperialism, all Koreans in the long history of Korea, especially Chosǂn, which is direct lineal predecessor of Modern Korea, should always be cast as innocent and always kind to its neighbors. In this context, the reality and the natures of early Chosǂn’s military attempts to increase its influence and finally claim “lesser suzerainty” over many Jurchen tribes and Tsushima, which Chosǂn royal house believed became the “vassals” of its dynastic founder Yi Sǂng’gye since Koryǂ king Kongmin’s era, had to be concealed as much as possible. Consequently, even those with the most nationalistic persuasion, normally very keen to celebrate expansionist policies and actions such as Koguryǂ’s subjugation of Malgal tribes had to take exception to the vertical aspects of Chosǂn-Jurchen and Chosǂn-Tsushima relations. Having to admit Chosǂn’s traditional “Sadae” policy, still embracing their nationalistic aspirations, and having to ascribe the failure of Chosǂn’s own modernization to the imperialists’ invasion in accordance with their “hereditary victimhood,” 13 they have compromised by elaborately developing further the shrewd logics of the Kyorin frame. Pretending to emphasize the seemingly horizontal and reciprocal nature of the Kyorin policy of early Chosǂn when they explain Chosǂn’s interstate relations with the Jurchens and Tsushima on the one hand, they began to enhance this frame with another version of nationalistic beautification, to conceal what this seemingly horizontal Kyorin frame could not explain, on the other hand. That version has implied that early Chosǂn’s interstate policy toward the Jurchens and Tsushima was based on “civilized” Confucian notions such as Li (薰) and Ren (蝹). Vertical aspects of Chosǂn–Jurchen relations and Chosǂn-Tsushima relations now began to be explained rather on a “cultural” level. In Korean modern historiography, it became a common idea that Chosǂn pursued peaceful relationships with neighbors Chong Da-ham 37 such as the Jurchens and the Tsushima “Wako” through trading and cultural exchange. However, this seemingly horizontal and reciprocal view was actually based on the very nationalistic and civilizational biases of modern Korean historiography against Jurchen tribes and Tsushima. As I pointed out before, modern Korean historians have interpreted the Confucianization of Chosǂn in nationalistic ways so that they could hide their discomfort with the strong Chinese influences on traditional Korean society and emphasize the blossoming of a “uniquely Korean” Confucian culture. And this enabled modern Korean historiography to argue that, as the most civilized state aside from Ming, Chosǂn could claim “cultural” superiority over them and helped to “civilize” them. Consequently, this resulted in the establishment of a “cultural” hierarchy centered on Chosǂn under the surface of this seemingly horizontal and reciprocal Kyorin frame of modern Korean historiography. It has been commonly and repeatedly argued that those Jurchen tribes, Tsushima, and even the Muromachi Bakufu were culturally inferior benefiters, which depended upon “superior” cultures of Chosǂn. Based on this, the vast majority of the research of modern Korean historiography have naturalized the Sojunghwa (荐襦贫) concept of the Chosǂn period and used it to justify their nationalistic views on the superiority of traditional Korean culture. There has been no effort to reconsider this egocentric Korean view that Chosǂn’s civilization was more advanced than that of the Jurchen and Tsushima, and questioning the natures of Chosǂn’s cultural legacy that actually originated from a “foreign” culture has been deliberately avoided. It was as a result of this that the vast majority of modern Korean historiography and the Korean studies of “Western” academia were destined to focus on dealing with trading, treaties, and diplomatic practices under the hypocritical logics of the Kyorin frame.14 In this context, the nationalistic and civilizational biases of modern Korean historiography against the Jurchens and Tsushima, culminated in several typical arguments of Korean modern historians, which have highlighted 38 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries that the dissemination of early Chosǂn’s advanced agricultural technologies into Jurchen societies through trading, enabled those “nomadic” Jurchen tribes to develop their agriculture,15 and which have highlighted that this kind of process eventually resulted in assimilation of “Korean” cultures in many Jurchen societies.16 Also, in this Kyorin frame, the nature of Koryǂ and Chosǂn’s military influence over the Jurchens and Tsushima was not to be scrutinized, and was merely seen as random demonstrations of Chosǂn’s power in its heyday or military “self-defense” to protect “Korean” people in the name of “History of Resistance (Kr. Hangjaengsa 豤蠖艋).” From the beginning of the dynasty to the end of fifteenth century, Chosǂn launched seven full- scale military expeditions into Jurchen regions. From the last phase of Koryǂ in King Ch’ang’s reign to Sejong’s reign in Chosǂn, a span of about three decades, there were three military expeditions to Tsushima. In spite of the clear expansionist nature of those military expeditions, modern Korean historiography has defined those military expeditions as righteous “self-defense” or “punishment” for vandalism of those “barbarians.”17 And behind this collective mind-set of Korean historians, there has certainly been “hereditary victimhood.” In this way, under the disguise of the horizontal modern concept of Kyorin, modern Korean historians didn’t have to be uncomfortable with the fact that Chosǂn actually invaded its neighbors, and they didn’t have to be too ashamed of Chosǂn’s having been a vassal to Ming either. Therefore, early Chosǂn’s expansionist policy toward its neighbors except Ming and the semi-imperial implications of Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches and military expeditions, inevitably were left unscrutinized. In this context, Kyorin, in fact, has been a very nationalistic frame hiding its true nature and logic behind a seemingly horizontal and reciprocal mask. The nature and logic of the Kyorin frame, which have signified that early Chosǂn advanced cultures helped the Jurchens and Tsushima to be more civilized, and which have deliberately downplayed early Chosǂn’s aggressive military and interstate policies toward the Jurchens and Tsushima, ironically takes exactly after the nature and logic of the Chong Da-ham 39

Japanese Imperialist justification of the colonization of Chosǂn, which most Korean scholars have resisted and rejected. The following scrutinization of early Chosǂn’s military influence over the Jurchens and Tsushima is an attempt to rebut this hypocritical Kyorin frame.

Koryǂ and Chosǂn’s Military Influence on Jurchens and Tsushima

If the nature of Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches to the Jurchens and Tsushima signifies Chosǂn’s superior position over them as I point out, unlike Kyorin-based still dominating arguments that Chosǂn-Jurchen and Chosǂn-Tsushima relations in 15the century were “horizontal,” “reciprocal,” and rather “cultural,” I believe I need to explain how it was possible for the early Chosǂn ruling elites to claim that the Chosǂn king was in a superior position to the Jurchen chieftains and the lord of Tsushima by dispatching Kyǂngch’agwan to them. What was historical justification that the early Chosǂn royal house and ruling elites utilized, to enable them to legitimize that practice and the imagination of this small, Chosǂn- centered world? A clue is that both the Jurchens and Tsushima had at various times surrendered to the military power of Koryǂ and Chosǂn. So here, especially focusing on military issues, I will try to show that Koryǂ and Chosǂn’s military influence on the Jurchens and Tsushima was the historical background for Chosǂn’s Kyǂngch’agwan dispatch to those regions. Since King Kongmin succeeded in militarily reclaiming Koryǂ’s northeastern border region, known as Ssangsǂng Ch’ong’gwanpu (葡茱誹籚臉) from the waning Yuan empire at the late 14th century and declared the re-establishment of Koryǂ’s own autonomous kingship, some Jurchen tribes on Koryǂ’s northern border regions began to surrender to Koryǂ.18 Koryǂ’s military victories against Jurchen invasions leaded by Samsǂn (芓苻), Samgae (芓筈) and Hobaldo (贀脆纋) seemed to motivate more Jurchen tribes to surrender to Koryǂ.19 40 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries

What interests me is that, behind all these historical scenes, it was repeatedly emphasized in almost every primary source that there was huge contribution made by Yi Sǂng’gye who was becoming a formidable war lord and eventually founded Chosǂn dynasty. His family already had great influence on Jurchen tribes from his ancestor’s generation, inheriting the hereditary titles given by Yuan court.20 His father must have used this influence when he secretly became a King Kongmin’s agent from the inside the Ssangsǂng Ch’ong’gwanpu (葡茱誹籚臉).21 Then Yi Sǂng’gye made one of his rival in the region who was one of the greatest Jurchen chieftains, 纾绪詵職葥 (Kr. Turanchǂpmok’a) surrender to him and Turanchǂpmok’a who was later renamed as Yi Chiran (翎襺绪) began to serve Koryǂ court from then on.22 Samsǂn· Samgae, sons of Yi Sǂng’gye’s aunt who were also one of his rivals in the region, invaded Koryǂ’s northern peripheries with the Jurchens, but they were defeated by Yi Sǂng’gye himself in 1364.23 In 1383, he also defeated another Jurchen chieftain Hobaldo who kept invading Koryǂ’s northwestern border regions.24 Those military victories enabled him to increase his influence on Jurchen tribes in the northern border regions. In the end, he became the most powerful subject of the late Koryǂ court. Koryǂ’s northern policy seemed to be planned and carried out entirely based on his personal influence on those Jurchen tribes. In third year of King Kongyang (1391), Yi Sǂng’gye proposed to send an envoy and induce those eastern Jurchen tribes to submit to the Koryǂ court. This policy soon produced fruitful results for Koryǂ since more than three hundred Jurchens surrendered that year.25 Koryǂ kept contriving to win over the rest of the Jurchen tribes who didn’t pay tributary visit and receive official titles from the Koryǂ court.26 Basically, this policy was bequeathed to the Chosǂn dynasty after Yi Sǂng’gye founded it. As a result, during T’aejo (譭裲) Yi Sǂng’gye’s reign, Chosǂn was able to hold down many Jurchen tribes and enjoy their allegiance.27 Chosǂn’s relationship with the Jurchens began to be challenged by Ming,28 and weakened by Chosǂn’s own political turmoil.29 However, T’aejong and his successor Sejong succeeded in maintaining their grasp Chong Da-ham 41 on Jurchen tribes. Many of those Jurchen tribes who became Ming’s tributaries, still continued to pay tributary visits to Chosǂn, received official titles and pledged their allegiance to the Chosǂn court.30 Many Jurchen tribes still lived outside the wall of Chosǂn’s northern border fortresses and they served Chosǂn court as tributaries called Sǂngjǂ Yain (茱蠟蓄蝸). Repetition of military campaigns against hostile Jurchen tribes was also a way of perpetuating this relationship for Chosǂn.31 This relationship of Chosǂn and Jurchen was sustained for more than a century. Known as a bastion of “Wako” pirates since the late Koryǂ period, Tsushima came to undergo similar experiences as Jurchens. Even though they continued to plunder towns in coastal regions and even further inland, Koryǂ succeeded in defeating those “Wako” pirates in several major battles.32 Those victories spurred Koryǂ to more aggressive military action, and they launched a military expedition directly against Tsushima in 1389.33 After Yi Sǂng’gye ascended the throne as the founder of Chosǂn, Tsushima was to experience two more major military invasions from Chosǂn. First, in the fifth year of T’aejo Yi Sǂng’gye’s reign (1396), T’aejo sent his fleet led by chief commander Kim Sahyǂng.34 In the first year of Sejong (1419), T’aejong who was still in charge of significant state affairs above Sejong, sent another huge expeditionary force again. Led by Yi Chongmu, the Chosǂn armies landed on Tsushima and unleashed their attack.35 Similar to the Jurchen cases, Yi Sǂng’gye was a central figure again. In history writing and literature, he was constantly glorified for playing a major role in Koryǂ and Chosǂn’s military subjugation of Tsushima. As a field commander, he won the greatest victory against Wako pirates when they came with more than five hundred ships in 1380.36 After he reached the position of taking complete charge of entire military affairs in the Koryǂ court, he commanded the military expedition to Tsushima in 1389.37 In 1396, Yi Sǂng’gye, as the first king of his own dynasty, carried out another major military expedition to Tsushima.38 After this, some Wako 42 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries chieftains began to surrender to Chosǂn. They began paying tributary visits and received official titles from Chosǂn court.39 His hard line policy was continued over by T’aejong. T’aejong successfully completed this mission by delivering the final blow to Tsushima and a military expedition in the first year of Sejong was designed to assure Tsushima’s complete surrender.40 The three major military expeditions against Tsushima since Yi Sǂng’gye took power in late Koryǂ, finally ended with the surrender of Tsushima and this major stronghold of “Wako” piracy was made a vassal of Chosǂn.41 Thus far, we have taken a closer look at the phases of Koryǂ and Chosǂn’s subjugation of Jurchen chieftains and the lord of Tsushima. Since late Koryǂ, the dynasties on the Korean peninsula had suffered from those two major threats. However, along with the remarkable military contribution of Yi Sǂng’gye, Chosǂn removed their threats and confirmed their surrender. This was something that the Chosǂn royal house and ruling elites made use of in order to legitimize and perpetuate this imagined Chosǂn-centered regional hierarchy. We can identify that the Jurchen regions and Tsushima, which were the only two “foreign” regions where Chosǂn’s Kyǂngch’agwan envoys were dispatched, shared the common historical experiences of military invasion and subjugation by Chosǂn.

Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries

Chosǂn’s military subjugation of Tsushima and the Jurchens is more significant than previous scholars suggested. It was more than just random demonstrations of Chosǂn’s power in its heyday or illustrations of self-defense in Korean history. So what is its deeper significance then? Between the waning Yuan and the rising Ming empire, Koryǂ and Chosǂn tried to secure a favorable position in the East Asian world order.42 With this in mind, Chosǂn’s military subjugation of Jurchen and Tsushima and especially Yi Sǂng’gye’s huge contribution to it, could be Chong Da-ham 43 used as valuable historical sources to legitimize their desired place in the East Asian interstate hierarchy. Consequently, the elites of Chosǂn began using those historical experiences in order to legitimize and perpetuate their superior position over the Jurchens and Tsushima. One of the most ambitious projects for this was writing Chosǂn’s own history in the fifteenth century.43 In this state level project, most of all, the dynastic founder Yi Sǂng’gye’s contribution to interstate relations in late Koryǂ, had to be glorified as the historical origin of Chosǂn’s current position over the Jurchens and Tsushima. Finally, Koryǂ and Chosǂn’s military subjugation of some Jurchen tribes and Tsushima became hallowed historical memories in the light of the contribution of Yi Sǂng’gye. Regarding Turanchǂpmok’a (纾绪詵職葥) who was once Yi Sǂng’gye’s rival as one of the most powerful Jurchen chieftains around the Tumen river region and finally became the closest follower, it was repeatedly emphasized that Turanchǂpmok’a devoted his life to Yi Sǂng’gye and followed wherever he went from then on as his most loyal servant.44 Samsǂn and Samgae who were sons of Yi Sǂng’gye’s aunt and were also influential in the region were described negatively in contrast with Yi Sǂng’gye. It was highlighted that they were local bullies and their Jurchen forces were easily defeated by Yi Sǂng’gye whom both of the Koryǂ and the Jurchen people really wanted to obey from their hearts.45 As Yi Sǂng’gye’s great reputation grew bigger, more and more Jurchen tribes began to surrender to the Koryǂ court. Perennial tribal conflicts between them were beautified as though those Jurchen envoys from each tribe admired him so much that they even fought each other with the only goal of taking favorable seat to see him in the Koryǂ court.46 As the first king of the new Chosǂn dynasty, his inspiring influence on Jurchen societies was glorified in a more sophisticated way. His influence was spread to the far northeast and shone the light of Chosǂn’s Confucian civilization on those “barbarians” who lived in those regions. It was he who corrected their “savage” manners and customs by building schools and teaching them. More and more Jurchens became ashamed of being 44 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries ruled by their own chieftains and finally surrendered to become Chosǂn’s subjects.47 At the same time, dozens of those Jurchen chieftains including Turanchǂpmok’a were described as true servants of Yi Sǂng’gye. Scattered across the vast Manchurian regions, they came to serve him even before he founded his own dynasty. They gladly served him whenever he went wars.48 In fact, in the Chosǂn’s histories, T’aejo Yi Sǂng’gye was not the only important figure claiming Chosǂn’s “lesser suzerainty” over the Jurchens. 49 Sejo (荃裲) who resumed the line of Chosǂn kings by usurpation, was also glorified as a great king who received loyalty and respect of the Jurchens even before he ascended the throne.50 After all, Chosǂn kings and the ruling elites continuously reproduced these historical glorifications of the Chosǂn king’s influence on the Jurchens, since they wanted to perpetuate their imagined “lesser suzerainty” over them. In such an occasion as usurpation, it was even more necessary. The same glorification of Yi Sǂng’gye’s roles in Koryǂ and Chosǂn’s relationship with Tsushima, also appeared in the history writings of 15th century. Rhetoric to glorify T’aejo Yi Sǂng’gye’s role was added. He was described as an unprecedented field commander who wiped out thousands of “Wako” pirates with divine military talents, and they feared to engage his army.51 What he did after he took complete charge of Koryǂ military affairs was emphasized too. Reinforcement of Koryǂ’s naval force was praised as Yi Sǂng’gye’s brilliant strategy and also it was emphasized that it was upon his order that Koryǂ navy sailed across the sea and attacked the Tsushima Wako stronghold in 1389.52 He was admired as the one who gave Koryǂ people’s peaceful lives back to them.53 After he founded Chosǂn, he ordered another military expedition to Tsushima in the fifth year of his reign.54 After this expedition, many Wako chieftains surrendered to the Chosǂn court. In return for their surrender, they were given new names and official titles from the court.55 Moreover, some of them even served as military officials of Chosǂn, Chong Da-ham 45 fighting against other “Wako” pirates.56 What is most important here is that all these historical legitimization of Chosǂn’s “suzerainty” over Jurchens and Tsushima enabled Chosǂn’s ruling elites to develop the idea of their own Chosǂn-centered regional order, making those “barbarians” Chosǂn’s vassal. Even though Chosǂn’s ruling elites still looked down on Jurchens and Tsushima as “barbarians,” they began to identify those two groups as Chosǂn’s own tributaries which have belonged to them ever since their dynastic founder. By the end of Yi Sǂng’gye’s reign, these historical terms, FƗnlí (Kr. Pǂnli 腐翗) or FƗnpíng (Kr. Pǂnpyǂng 腐腺) which originally means vassals or tributaries in Sino-centric world order, began to be used frequently identify Chosǂn’s own tributaries, the Jurchens and Tsushima.57 Upon this, the idea that in Northeast Asia, Chosǂn has its own vassals or tributaries, was established and shared by Chosǂn’s ruling elites. Then, did chieftains of Jurchen and the lord of Tsushima accept this idea and comply with it? It seems that they did, at least when they needed to. It was very common for them to call themselves vassals or tributaries of Chosǂn in official diplomatic records.58 Sometimes, they even called the Chosǂn king an emperor.59 As far as Chosǂn maintained strong military power and allowed them to benefit from Chosǂn, they comply with this idea. Now, let’s go back to Kyǂngch’agwan issue. As the result of the creation of idea that the Jurchen and Tsushima were Chosǂn’s own vassals, Chosǂn’s policy to dispatch Kyǂngch’agwan instead of ShƱh (艈) envoys to those regions was now naturally legitimized. After all, Kyǂngch’agwan were the specially designed envoys of Chosǂn Kings to deliver their order to their vassals, the Jurchens and Tsushima. In other words, dispatch of Kyǂngch’agwan was a representation of Chosǂn’s idea of having vassals in its interstate relations. Undeniably, it appears that the Jurchen chieftains or the lord of Tsushima knew all too well the significance of Kyǂngch’agwan. Take a Jurchen chieftain’s case who received Sejo’s Kyǂngch’agwan for instance. This chieftain called 绽馻葥豃 (Kr. Nangpal’ahan), clearly showed his 46 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries understanding on this by saying, “lying to a Kyǂngch’agwan is lying to the Chosǂn court.” 60 This illustrates that they were fully aware of significant meanings of Chosǂn’s Kyǂngch’agwan. Yi Sǂng’gye’s contribution to Koryǂ and Chosǂn’s military subjugation of the Jurchen and Tsushima was glorified in the process of Chosǂn’s writing its own history. Through that historical glorification, Chosǂn’s ruling elite’s tried to legitimize and perpetuate their superiority over the Jurchen and Tsushima. As a result, the idea that those two forces were Chosǂn’s own vassals were created and shared by the ruling elite’s of early Chosǂn. Based upon this idea, Kyǂngch’agwan was frequently dispatched to those ‘vassals’ to deliver the Chosǂn king’s order.

Between the Empire and the Vassal: Rhetorics of Kyǂngch’agwan

With all the above regarding Chosǂn’s idea of having vassals and Kyǂngch’agwan dispatch, there is still one last question. It is obvious that Chosǂn served Ming as its tributary in their official relationship. This theoretically means that Chosǂn should abide by one of the most salient principles of the “Sino-centric” East Asian world order, that there should be no unauthorized inter-vassal relations, especially hierarchical ones among vassals (蝸葆肚蘑粂).61 Then how can we explain this feature of Chosǂn’s interstate policy which Korean modern historians have suffered as a contradiction or dilemma? How can they accept Ming’s “suzerainty” and claim its own “suzerainty” over the Jurchens and Tsushima at the same time? In other words, did Chosǂn deny Sino-centric East Asian world order? Then, is this Kyǂngch’agwan Chosǂn’s own creation? Tracing the origin of Kyǂngch’agwan, what interests me is that Ming dispatched similar envoys to its tributaries such as Chosǂn. Chosǂn sent ShƱh (艈) envoys to its “suzerain” state Ming, or to its equal diplomatic counterpart, the Japanese Bakufu. On the other hand, Ming did not Chong Da-ham 47 usually send ShƱh envoys to its vassal states such as Chosǂn. Instead, they sent low-level officials or eunuchs with the title, Qinchai (跈觥) which meant those envoys are to deliver the emperor’s venerable order to the vassals. Ming envoys sent to Chosǂn were always called 跈 觥: (跈觥緉艋, 跈觥詍賫 and 跈觥籒). In other words, Ming’s sending Qinchai envoys to Chosǂn signifies Ming’s superior position as the suzerain state and Chosǂn’s lower position as a vassal in the Sino-centric East Asian hierarchy. Now, we can identify the similarity between the Ming emperor’s Qinchaiguan (跈觥籒) and the Chosǂn king’s Kyǂngch’agwan (箾觥籒). Those two terms have almost the same characteristics and meanings. The only difference lies in those rhetorical adjectives Qin (Kr. Hǎm 跈) and Kyǂng (箾). After all, the origin of dispatching Kyǂngch’agwan to the Jurchen and Tsushima, which Chosǂn believed were its own tributaries, came from Ming’s imperial interstate policy model of sending Qinchai envoys to its vassals. Then, by sending out those Kyǂngch’agwan, did Chosǂn kings want to be like the Ming emperors? Chosǂn may have wanted to use the term Qinchai (Kr. Hǎmch’a 跈觥) for its envoys to the Jurchen and Tsushima, but the Chosǂn king was not equal to the Ming emperor in the East Asian Sino-centric order.62 Qin (跈) is the most typical rhetorical word symbolizing Chinese emperors’ heavenly authority. Accepting Ming’s “suzerainty,” Chosǂn needed to come up with a new term for its envoys that still could signify Chosǂn’s dominant position over its vassals such as the Jurchen and Tsushima. A similar rhetorical word with lesser grade to correspond with the Chosǂn kings’ lesser authority was needed. So following the Ming model, they chose their rhetorical word Kyǂng (箾) which they thought suited the Chosǂn King’s position in Northeast Asia without offending Ming emperor’s authority.63 In conclusion, even though early Chosǂn adopted Ming Imperial model of interstate policy and tried to use it toward the Jurchens and Tsushima, Chosǂn royal house and ruling elites were able to avoid running afoul of the Ming-centered world order by moderating and downgrading their 48 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries practices regarding the creation and enforcement of their imagined Chosǂn-centered regional order.64 In other words, Chosǂn was seeking de-Sinicization through overall Sinicization process, and because of this, the de-Sinicization was destined to converge eventually into Sinicization. Chosǂn’s dispatch of Kyǂngch’agwan to the Jurchen regions and Tsushima is a symbolic practice of Chosǂn idea of having its own tributaries in real interstate politics. It is also a symbol of Chosǂn’s position as the regional power in Northeast Asia, which complied with Ming “suzerainty” and still maintained a grasp on the Jurchen and Tsushima.65

Conclusion

So far, trying to rebut the conventional understanding of Kyǂngch’agwan as the solely Chosǂn kings’ domestic envoys, I have looked at the various aspects of Kyǂngch’agwan dispatch including its practices and its ideological basis. It was shown that Chosǂn’s Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches were the diplomatic practices that symbolized Chosǂn’s own idea of having vassals such as the Jurchens and Tsushima. Rather than redundantly summarizing, I would like to give some final remarks regarding Chosǂn’s interstate policies including Kyǂngch’agwan in East Asia with the hope of stimulating further researches and discussions. First of all, Kyǂngch’agwan, conventionally known as Chosǂn kings’ domestic envoys, were the envoys who also delivered the Chosǂn kings’ orders to their vassals such as the Jurchens and Tsushima. This fundamental characteristic is borne by the rhetoric of the term itself, which means an official who respectfully carries the Chosǂn Kings’ order to the Jurchen regions and Tsushima, which are regarded as inferior. This characteristic culminated in the ceremonial rituals of receiving Kyǂngch’agwan, which signified Chosǂn’s “lesser suzerainty” over its vassal, under the umbrella of Ming “suzerainty.” Next, the historical origin of this regional hierarchy where Chosǂn was Chong Da-ham 49 able to force this practice on Jurchens and Tsushima, was Koryǂ and Chosǂn’s military subjugation of them and Chosǂn’s founder Yi Sǂng’gye’s contribution to it. According to the changes in the East Asian interstate frame, the ruling elites of early Chosǂn used these subjugations as useful historical sources for legitimizing their superiority over those two non-Chosǂn polities in writing its own history. Through this, the ideological basis of Chosǂn’s having its own vassals such as the Jurchen and Tsushima was created. And on the basis of this idea, Chosǂn’s ruling elites tried to perpetuate their imagined “suzerainty” over them. The dispatch of Kyǂngch’agwan was one of the typical diplomatic practices to symbolize this relationship. The institutional origin of Kyǂngch’agwan shed light on this symbolic meaning of Chosǂn’s Kyǂngch’agwan more clearly. Ming sent its low- level envoys called Qinchaiguan (跈觥籒) to its vassals such as Chosǂn. Following the Ming’s imperial mode of interstate policies, Chosǂn began to send Kyǂngch’agwan (箾觥籒). However, this doesn’t mean that Chosǂn denied the “Sino-centric” East Asian order. Rather, by modifying its original model according to Chosǂn’s own position under Ming, Chosǂn could still signify its suzerainty over the Jurchen and Tsushima, without violating Ming suzerainty. I have one final remark. I believe the existing frame of Chosǂn’s “Kyorin” policies toward the Jurchens and Tsushima should be questioned. In modern Korean historiography, Kyorin as a frame implies that Chosǂn tried to maintain peaceful relations with the Jurchens and Tsushima, based on its Confucian orientation. Korean historians couldn’t conceptualize what didn’t fit in that frame, because they were too overwhelmed by traditional “Sino-centric” perspective to provincialize and de-centralize it, on the one hand. And they were also stuck in the mythology of a peace-loving and innocent Korea produced by their single lineal evolutionary frame of “Korean History (Kr. Hanguksa)” such as “Inner development theory,” which is based on the hereditary victimhood of modern Korean historiography, on the other hand. With their eyes blinded, unable to provincialize both the “Sino-centric” and “Korea- 50 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries centered” perspectives, they were not able to re-conceptualize the various active dimensions of regional dynamics that constituted Chosǂn-Jurchen and Chosǂn-Tsushima relations in 15th century. In this context, Kyorin has been a very nationalistic frame, hiding its true nature and logic behind a seemingly horizontal and reciprocal mask. And the nature and logic of the Kyorin frame, which argued that early Chosǂn’s advanced cultures helped the Jurchen and Tsushima to be more civilized and which have deliberately downplayed early Chosǂn’s expansionist military and interstate policies toward the Jurchens and Tsushima, ironically takes exactly after the nature and logic of Japanese Imperialist’ justifications of the colonization of Chosǂn, which Korean scholars have continued to reject up to the present. Based on my research and my readings of sources, Chosǂn’s ruling elites who carried out interstate policy in 15th century were very shrewd, aggressive, and even mean. Was Chosǂn ruling elites’ superiority to the Jurchens and Tsushima only “cultural” as those Korean scholars have implied with the Kyorin frame? It seemed to be far more realistic than “cultural,” since those Confucian scholar officials were shrewd enough to create their own “suzerainty” over the Jurchens and Tsushima by utilizing military influence and history writing. In doing so, Chosǂn imitated the Ming’s imperial mode of interstate policies such as dispatches of Qinchaiguan to its vassal, and came up with Chosǂn’s own version of Ming imperial mode, such as Kyǂngch’agwan dispatches to the Jurchens and Tsushima that Chosǂn identified as its vassals. However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that Chosǂn rejected Ming-centered East Asian order. Rather, by adapting its original imperial model to Chosǂn’s own position under Ming, Chosǂn could still signify its suzerainty over the Jurchens and Tsushima, without violating Ming suzerainty. Based upon this process, Chosǂn’s ruling elites tried to perpetuate their imagined superior position over the Jurchens and Tsushima at least in 15th century. The dispatch of Kyǂngch’agwan was one of the typical diplomatic practices to symbolize this relationship. Chong Da-ham 51

Keywords a Kyǂngch’agwan, Qinchaiguan, Qinchai, Jurchen, Tsushima, Suzerainty, Suzerain, Empire, Vassal, Lesser-Suzerainty, Lesser Suzerain, Yi Sǂng’gye, Fractal Sino-centrism, Chinese World Order, Tributary System, Sino-centrism, Chosǂn, Ming, Fanli, Fanping, Interstate relation, Inter-vassal relation, Envoy, Emissary, Sinicization, De-Sinicization, Manchuria, Manchus

Notes :

1 Chǂng Hyǂnjae, “Chosǂn Ch’ogi ǎi Kyǂngch’agwan e taehayǂ,” Kyǂngbuk sahak 1 (1979); Yi Chang’wu, “Chosǂn Ch’ogi ǎi Sonsil Kyǂngch’agwan kwa Yangchǂn Kyǂngch’agwan,” Kuksakwan’nonchǂng 12 (1990); Yim Sǂnbin, “Chosǂn Ch’ogi OebangSasin e taehan shiron,” ChosǂnShidaesahakpo 5 (1998). 2 Han Moon-jong’s work was the first and still the most interesting one that particularly focused on dispatches of Kyǂngch’agwan to Tsushima. However, his study does not seem to situate their political and diplomatic significance in a larger frame. See Han Munchong, “Chosǂn Chǂn’gi ǎi Taemado Kyǂngch’agwan,” Chǂnbuk sahak 15 (Dec. 1992). 3 For clarification, this article is based on an article I published in Korean in 2008 as shown below. However, I felt I needed to carry out further researches on related issues and I decided to add my recent research results to my earlier works in here. Regarding the overall statistics including frequency of Kyǂngch’agwan dispatch to Jurchens chieftains and Tsushima lord, see my previous work, Chong Daham, “Chosǂnch’ogi Ya’in kwa Taemado e taehan Pǂnli·Pǂnpyǂng Insik ǎi Hyǂngsǂng kwa Kyǂngch’agwan ǎi Pagyǂn,” Tongbanghakji 141 (2008): 224-229. 4 Tongmaeng’gach’ǂpmok’a had been identified as a “vassal” of Chosǂn’s dynastic founder Yi Sǂng’gye since the late Koryǂ. When the Ming began to reach him, he refused to be Ming’s vassal and tried to remain exclusively loyal to Chosǂn, in the beginning of his engagement with the Ming. 5 It was to send T’aejong’s Royal gift to the funeral of Tsushima lord who was 52 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries

loyal to T’aejong. This lord prevented “Wako” pirates around the region from plundering Chosǂn’s coastal areas. See T’aejongsillok 35: 42a14-b2. 6 In fact, there were a few cases of sending envoys titled with ShƱh (艈) to Tsushima. For example, when the Chosǂn royal house needed to show the condolence of the Chosǂn king for the death of a Tsushima lord, officials with higher rank were sent. Then, they were called with ShƱh (艈) in Chosǂn because of their position in the official rank system of the Chosǂn court. However, even in those cases, they were still commonly and conventionally called Kyǂngch’agwan by Chosǂn officials or Tsushima officials and in the same historical records of the time because they were sent to Tsushima. So I believe we can assume that any Chosǂn envoy sent to Tsushima was basically seen as Kyǂngch’agwan by both sides. For more details, see Chong Daham, “Chosǂnch’ogi Ya’in kwa Taemado e taehan Pǂnli·Pǂnpyǂng Insik ǎi Hyǂngsǂng kwa Kyǂngch’agwan ǎi Pagyǂn,” Tongbanghakji 141 (2008): 229-230. 7 See Han Munchong, “Chosǂnchǂn’gi ǎi Taemado Kyǂngch’agwan,” Chǂnbuk sahak 15 (Dec. 1992). 8 For example, a letter sent to the Tsushima lord before Chosǂn’s military invasion in 1419, said, “Ones who are truly royal will be treated generously through their next generation. Ones who betray our grace and invade us will be killed with their wives and children … You, lord of Tsushima, embody our king’s order to arrest all those pirates and maintain your father’s allegiance to me …” See Sejongsillok 4: 10b8-11a11. A letter sent to the lord of Tsushima in first month of 1459, said, “… the ruler of Okinawa returned our castaways to us by sending his subject Toan (纊蒃). I commend him for his loyalty and have sent gifts to repay him. Now, I heard Toan was plundered in Tsushima and it is extremely rude … Also I order to arrest every one of those pirates and to return what they have taken. You lord of Tsushima must hold the king’s order in high esteem and carry it out right away.” See Sejosillok 15: 4b5-12. 9 Ritual Manual of Reception of King’s Order (薛聑蜹) was designed and sent by Chosǂn to Tsushima when Kyǂngch’agwan was dispatched in seventh month of 1461. See Sejosillok 25: 7b6-10. 10 See Sejongsillok, 116: 13a3-b7; Sǂngjongsillok 103: 1b10-2b14; Yǂnsan’gunilgi 19: 1a2-3b14. 11 See Sǂngjongsillok 292: 4b6-7b9. Chong Da-ham 53

12 Scrutinizing the modern invention of “Sadae” and “Kyorin” in modern Korean historiography and tracing them back to their origins requires great effort and time. It actually goes far beyond the national boundaries of Modern Korean historians such as Koh Pyǂng-ik and Chun Hae-jong, since Sadae and Kyorin or other similar English terms such as “Chinese world order” and “Tributary system” are still used by the vast majority of the scholars of Korean studies in the world. I am preparing another article to deal with this issue in transnational context. 13 Regarding this “hereditary victimhood” in modern Korean historiography, See Lim Jiehyun, “Kuksa ǎi Taeyǂnswǂe wa Orientalism,” Hankuk Sahaksa Hakpo 10 (2004): 163-173. 14 Ever since Chun Hae-jong and Koh Pyǂngik, established scholars such as Kim Kujin, Yi Hyǂnhǎi, Yi Hyǂnjong, Ha Woobong, Son Sǎng-chǂl, and Kenneth Robinson have focused on dealing with trading, treaties, diplomatic practices, and cultural exchanges in early Chosǂn-Jurchen and early Chosǂn-Tsushima relations, within the Kyorin frame. 15 See Kim Kujin, “Chosǂnchǂn’gi Taeyǂjinkwan’gye wa Yǂjinsahoe ǎi Siltae,” Tongyanghak 14 (1984): 520-521. 16 See Kim Kujin, “Chosǂnch’ogi e Hanminjok ǎro Tonghwatoen T’ochakyǂjin,” Paeksanhakpo 58 (2001): 176-178. 17 See Kim Kujin , “3. Yǂjin kwaǎi kwan’gye,” Hanguksa 22: Kuksa P’yǂnch’an Wuiwǂnhoe P’yǂn, 1995, 335-341. 18 Koryǂsa 41: 2a3-4; Koryǂsa 42: 2a5-6; Koryǂsa 43: 1b1-3. 19 Koryǂsa 40: 35a1-5; Koryǂsa 40: 35b6-8; Koryǂsa 135: 2a3; Koryǂsa 135: 7b9. 20 Kim Kujin, “Oǎmhoi ǎi Altari Yǂjin e taehan Yǂn’gu,” Sach’ong 17·18 (1973); Ch’ang’gyu Yu, “Yi Sǂng’gye ǎi Kunsajǂk Kiban-Tongbukmyǂn ǎl Jungshim ǎro-,” Chindan hakpo 58 (1984). 21 Regarding the details on the relationship between King Kongmin and Yi Sǂng’gye’s father, Yi Chach’un, See Min Hyonku, “Koryǂ Kongminwangǎi Panwǂnjǂk Kaehyǂkjǂngch’I e taehan Il Koch’al,” Chintanhakpo 68 (1989): 69-72. 22 Koryǂsa 43: 1b1-3. 23 Koryǂsa 40: 35a1-5; Koryǂsa 40: 35b6-8. 24 Koryǂsa 135: 7b9; Koryǂsa 116: 22b6-23b4. 25 Koryǂsa 46: 22b4-6. 26 Koryǂsa 46: 35a5-b8. 54 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries

27 T’aejosillok 8: 15b14-17a6. 28 Traditionally, some Korean historians who specialized in Chinese history had a tendency to overestimate Ming’s influence on the Jurchens. For example, without considering Chosǂn’s policy and the Jurchens’ motivations, it was often said that ever since Ming began to reach those Jurchens around the northern border of Chosǂn, Chosǂn simply lost their control on them. For details, see Park WonHo, Myǂngch’o Chosǂn Kwan’gyesa Yǂn’gu (Seoul, Ilchogak, 2002). 29 When T’aejo Yi Sǂng’gye was practically dethroned by his own son who later became the third king T’aejong (譭褒), some of those Jurchen joined the rebellion of Cho Saǎi against T’aejong’s coup. For details, see Ahn Junhǎi, “Chosǂn Ch’ogi T’aejong ǎi Chipkwǂn’kwajǂng kwa Cho Saǎi ǎi Nan”, Oetae sahak 5 (1993): 198-205. 30 Many Jurchen chieftains who received official titles from Ming court, still paid tributary visits to Chosǂn and received Chosǂn’s court titles too. Some Korean historians recently tried to highlight this bilateral position of many Jurchen tribes in order to rebut nationalistic attempts of Modern Chinese historiography to highlight only Ming influence on those Jurchen tribes. See Han Sǂngju, “Chosǂnch’ogi Cho·Myǂng Ichungsujik Yǂchinin ǎi Yangsǂkmunche,” Chosǂnsidaesahakpo 40 (2007). It seems to me that both sides remain incorrigible and are not aware of the significance of this bilateral position of Jurchen toward Ming and Chosǂn. What lies in this Jurhen’s positioning themselves into vassal to Ming and Chosǂn both, are the clues which would enable us to break away from existing concept of “Sino-centric” world order shared by Imperialist tradition of Asian Studies and nationalistic academia of many nations in East Asia. The real aspects of “Sino-centric world order” of East Asia in the 15th century were not hierarchically one-sided. These complicated relations were basically the results of invisible compromise among all three parties which were Ming, Chosǂn, and the Jurchens. Chosǂn wanted to maintain its control over Jurchens as it used to do. Ming could not reach far up to the northeastern Manchuria. In fact, Ming depended on Chosǂn’s help to certain extent when they needed to persuade or attack those Jurchens who have plundered Liaotung regions. Jurchens wanted to benefits from both sides of Chosǂn and Ming. 31 Major military expeditions of Chosǂn into Jurchen regions counted 7 alone in fifteenth century. Mobilizing at least more than ten thousand up to thirty Chong Da-ham 55

thousand soldiers required expensive costs. All those major attacks were accompanied by historical justification in terms of “suzerain and vassal” relation of Chosǂn and Jurchens, and Chosǂn was tenacious enough not to give up punishing or killing those “traitor” vassals easily. 32 In the seventh month of the second yearof king Wu (1376), Ch’oe Yǂng defeated Wako pirates in the Hongsan area. In the sixth year of king Wu (1380), the Koryǂ navy burnt five hundred “Wako” ships using newly invented firearms. Those Wako pirates, who showed infamous vandalism in the southern provinces, losing their way out, were eventually wiped out by Yi Sǂng’gye’s army around Mt. Jiri. 33 Koryǂsa 116: 20b5-21a8. 34 T’aejosillok 10: 10a11-b13. 35 Sejongsillok 4: 17b8-18a6. 36 T’aejosillok Ch’ongsǂ 1: 14b9-17a7. 37 Sejongsillok 48: 5b3-7a2. 38 It was obvious this expeditionary fleet left from the capital city. Other fleets were supposed to meet at the place of departure in Kyǂngsang province. However, there is no entry that shows specific information on the actual engagement at Tsushima, in the Veritable Records of Chosǂn dynasty. There is a strong possibility that the Chosǂn’s fleet was kept on standby in southern coastal regions because of the surrender of those Wako who had plundered before, or because of the adverse weather conditions. 39 T’aejosillok 13: 6a2-5. 40 Sejongsillok 4: 24a12-25b3; Sejongsillok 5: 25b8-26a16. 41 It was on the twentieth day of the sixth month of 1419 when Chosǂn armies landed on the island and began to attack. Tsushima officially surrendered to Chosǂn in the first month (a leap month) of 1420. As a result of the surrender, Tsushima finally came to be identified as a county which belonged to Kyǂngsang province of Chosǂn. This was the historical origin of the idea of Chosǂn’s subjugation of Tsushima, which Chosǂn’s ruling elites maintained until the very end of 15th century. For details, see Sejongsillok 4: 17b8-18a6; Sejongsillok 7: 16b2-9; Sejongsillok 7: 19b1-8; Yǂnsan’gunilki 42: 10a1-14. Interestingly, Japanese historian Nakamura (襦課薅赿) already has studied Chosǂn’s subjugation of Tsushima and argued that during Sejong’s reign, Chosǂn played major roles in East Asian interstate relations, which I will question in the near future, regarding his motivation and perspective of his 56 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries

arguments. For the details he asserted, see 襦課薅赿, 螔茗籟篜艋࿾蕍粽 芟 (纫箯: 綋詐贙肫籠, 1965). 42 Basically, Ming set out non-interference policy and demanded only a nominal acceptance of Ming suzerainty. See Edward L. Dreyer, Early Ming China: A Political History, 1355-1435 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982). See also Peter I. Yun, “Rethinking the tribute system: Korean States and Northeast Asian Interstate Relations, 600-1600” (Ph.D. dissertation , UCLA, 1998). 43 Min Hyonku already pointed out that, by writing the formal history of the dynasty, the Koryǂsa, Chosǂn intended to legitimize its position as a second “civilized” state right next to Ming, while accepting Ming suzerainty at the same time. However, he didn’t show how it was possible for Chosǂn, in a vassal position to do so, on a theoretical level in the Ming-centered world view of that time. See Min Hyonku, “Koryǂsa e Panyǂng’toen Myǂngbunron ǎi Sǂng’gyǂk,” Chintanhakpo 40 (1975). 44 T’aejosillok Ch’ongsǂ 1: 12b6-9; T’aejosillok Ch’ongsǂ 1: 17a8-b8; T’aejosillok Ch’ongsǂ 1: 19a8-b2; T’aejongsillok 3: 20b2-7. 45 T’aejosillok Ch’ongsǂ 1: 9b9-10a5. 46 Koryǂsa 46: 34a1-8. 47 T’aejosillok 8: 15b14-17a6. 48 T’aejosillok 8: 15b14-17a6; Yongbiǂch’ǂn’ga 7: 21b4-24: b1. 49 Wang Gungwu came up with the term “Lesser Empire” to explain the relationship between Sung dynasty and neighboring states and this shed light on my understanding of early Chosǂn’s interstate policy in the 15thcentury. In early Chosǂn’s case where Chosǂn tried not to challenge the Ming empire’s Sino-centric order accepting its “suzerainty” on the one hand and also trying to establish its own “suzerainty” over Jurchen chieftains and the lord of Tsushima on the other hand, I suggest it would be useful to use this term “Lesser Suzerainty” in order to understand the natures of early Chosǂn interstate policies. See Wang Gungwu, “‘The Rhetorics of a Lesser Empire’: Early Sung Relations with Its Neighbors” in China among Equals, ed. Morris Rossabi (Berkeley·Los Angeles·London: University of California Press, 1983), 47-65. 50 Tanjongsillok 5: 18a7-20a12. 51 T’aejosillok Ch’ongsǂ 1: 13a15-b13; T’aejosillok Ch’ongsǂ 1: 13b13-14a11; T’aejosillok Ch’ongsǂ 1: 14b9-17a2; T’aejosillok Ch’ongsǂ 1: 17a8-b8; T’aejosillok Ch’ongsǂ 1: 20a3-21a1. Chong Da-ham 57

52 “… Since our dynastic founder, the great king T’aejo took part in the Koryǂ court, he began to build battleships and prepared to fight back … In the year of Imsul, those pirates came with many ships to take the revenge of their defeat in the year of Kyǂngshin, and our border commanders took them on with a dozen battleships. They laughed at our forces. However, our ships burnt them all with firearms … Since then, they have never dared to fight our battleships. Even though they still raided our coast from time to time, they were nothing more than petty thieves … In the year of Mujin, they came to Chinpo and plundered inland of Kyǂngsang province, catching us off guard and attacking Liaotung. Our T’aejo took charge of state military affairs at that time. T’aejo raged against those pirates and sent our border commanders with battleships to Tsushima in the year of Kisa. They attacked them and burnt hundreds of enemy ships and returned …” ( Sejongsillok 48: 5b3-7a2) 53 “In the year of Kyǂngshin, those Wako pirates landed at Chinpo and plundered Yangkwang, Chǂlla, and Kyǂngsang provinces … While other generals were reluctant to fight back, only you Yi Sǂng’gye valiantly led your army and destroyed every one of them. Our people could continue their lives in peace relying on you …” (Koryǂsa 137: 41a1- 42b) “… Humbling their faces, the barbarians of the islands came to our court and began trading. Our people of southern provinces safely settled down and the households kept increasing. Sounds of chickens and dogs were heard. Coastal lands and islands were all cultivated. They just kept eating and drinking, never knowing a war …” ( T’aejosillok 8: 15b14-17a6) 54 T’aejosillok 10: 10a11-b13. 55 T’aejosillok 13: 6a2-6 56 T’aejongsillok 11: 6a1-2; T’aejongsillok 11: 2b12-15; T’aejongsillok 11: 12a15-b4. 57 T’aejongsillok 9: 9a5-8; Sejongsillok 90: 14b2-16a7; Munjongsillok 4: 50b8- 52a12; Tanjongsillok 2: 14a4-b5; Sejosillok 8: 25a5-14; Sejosillok 14: 21a11- b2; Sǂngjongsillok 215: 1a15-4a6. 58 Sejosillok 33: 27a11-b6; Sejosillok 33: 28b9-29a8; Sǂngjongsillok 36: 7a1-5; Sǂngjongsillok 69: 15b8-24a11. 59 Sǂngjongsillok 45: 11a11-b13. 60 Sejosillok 17: 4a6-b10. 61 Originally, this came from one of the Confucian cannons, Liji (薰絽). 62 The hierarchical order of the two terms, Qin (跈) and Kyǂng (箾) was clearly illustrated in the Qinlong emperor’s angry reaction, when he first found out 58 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries

that English envoys called themselves as Qinchai (跈觥) in their diplomatic documents. Qinlong actually insisted that Qinchai should be corrected as 箾觥 or 簽觥. For details on this event, see Chong Daham, “Chosǂnch’oki Ya’in kwa Taemado e taehan Pǂnli·Pǂnpyǂng Insik ǎi Hyǂngsǂng kwa Kyǂngch’agwan ǎi Pagyǂn,” Tongbanghakji 141 (2008): 260-261, footnote 84. 63 In this sense, the case of the Jurchen chieftain Tongmaeng’gach’ǂpmok’a, who had to receive Ming’s Qinchaiguan and Chosǂn’s Kyǂngch’agwan at the same time in 1405 is amazingly illustrating. He was one of the most influential Jurchen chieftains in southern Manchuria and was a vassal of Chosǂn’s dynastic founder Yi Sǂng’gye from late Koryǂ. Even when Ming began to reach him, he refused to be Ming’s vassal and try to remain only loyal to Chosǂn. Ming sent a Qinchai envoy, Wangjiaohuade (蘌粊财蠿), to order Chosǂn to persuade him to surrender to Ming court. Then, Chosǂn shrewdly sent a Kyǂngch’agwan to force Tongmaeng’gach’ǂpmok’a not to follow Ming’s order. When Chosǂn realized it was not possible to restrain him any longer, Chosǂn sent another Kyǂngch’agwan to pretend to cooperate with Ming. After all, the roles of the Ming emperor’s Qinchaiguan and the Chosǂn king’s Kyǂngch’agwan in this case of Tongmaeng’gach’ǂpmok’a, clearly demonstrate the very dynamic interstate relations in northeast Asia, where the Ming-centered “Sino-centric” world order and the Chosǂn-centered regional order were overlapped based on their “fractal” structure. For details, See T’aejongsillok 9: 8b3-13; Taejongsillok 9: 9a5-8; Taejongsillok 9: 19a1-b6; Taejongsillok 10: 13a11-12. 64 In fact, this kind of tendency where early Chosǂn seek de-Sinicization in overall Sinicization process without offending the existing logics of “Chinese World Order” or “Tributary System,” was not only the characteristics of early Chosǂn interstate policy, but also the universal characteristics of major cultural and political projects of King Sejong including Hunminchǂng’ǎm promulgation. For the details on the two inseparable faces of Hunminchǂng’ǎm, Sinicization and De-sinicization, see Chong Daham, “Yǂmalsǂnch’o ǎi Tong’asia Chilsǂ wa Chosǂn esǂǎi Han’ǂ, Hanlimun, and Hunminchǂng’ǎm,” Hanguksahakpo 36 (2009). 65 In this sense, what Anders Karlsson suggested recently is theoretically useful to understand the interstate policies and world-views in Chosǂn period. Anders Karlsson suggested this new term “Fractal Sino-centrism” borrowing its concept from Jack. A Goldstone, in order to understand how late Chosǂn Chong Da-ham 59

intellectuals assimilated the structure of “Sino-centric” world view and modified it into their own version centered on Chosǂn. See Anders Karlsson, “Chosǂnhugi Sasǂ e Natanan Segyegwan kwa Yǂksainsik ǎi Chaejomyǂng: Pukpang kwa Parhae rǎl Chungsim ǎro,” Seoul National University 27th Kyujang’gak Coloquium paper (2009. 3): 16-17.

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Kyǂngcha’gwan, conventionally known as Chosǂn kings’ domestic envoys, were the envoys who also delivered the Chosǂn kings’ orders to their vassals such as the Jurchens and Tsushima. This fundamental characteristic of Kyǂngcha’gwan culminated in the ceremonial rituals of receiving Kyǂngcha’gwan, which signified Chosǂn’s “lesser suzerainty” over its vassal, under the bigger umbrella of Ming “suzerainty.” The reason why these vertical dimensions of Chosǂn-Jurchen and Chosǂn-Tsushima relations in 15th century have not been scrutinized actually lies in the “Kyorin” frame, which was modern invention of the same term in modern Korean historiography. “Kyorin” as a modern frame implies that Chosǂn tried to maintain peaceful relations with the Jurchens and Tsushima, based on its Confucian orientation. Korean historians could not conceptualize what did not fit in that frame, because they were too overwhelmed by traditional “Sino-centric” perspective to provincialize and de-centralize it, on the one hand. And they were also stuck in the mythology of a peace-loving and innocent Korea produced by their single lineal evolutionary frame of “Korean History (Hanguksa)” which is based on the hereditary victimhood of modern Korean historiography, on the other hand. With their eyes blinded, it was unable for them to provincialize both the “Sino-centric” and “Korea-centered” perspectives, they were not able to re-conceptualize the various active dimensions of regional dynamics that constituted Chosǂn-Jurchen and Chosǂn-Tsushima relations in 15th century. Furthermore, the nature and logic of the Kyorin frame, which argued that early Chosǂn’s advanced cultures helped the Jurchen and Tsushima to be more civilized and which have deliberately downplayed Chong Da-ham 61 early Chosǂn’s expansionist military and interstate policies toward the Jurchens and Tsushima, ironically takes exactly after the nature and logic of Japanese Imperialist’ justifications of the colonization of Chosǂn, which Korean scholars have continued to reject up to the present. In fact, the historical origin of this regional hierarchy where Chosǂn was able to force this practice on Jurchens and Tsushima was not something just mainly “cultural.” Rather, it was Koryǂ and Chosǂn’s military subjugation of them and Chosǂn’s founder Yi Sǂng’gye’s contribution to it. According to the changes in the East Asian interstate frame, the ruling elites of early Chosǂn used these subjugations as useful historical sources for legitimizing their superiority over those two non-Chosǂn polities in writing its own history. Through this, the ideological basis of Chosǂn’s having its own vassals such as the Jurchen and Tsushima was created. And on the basis of this idea, Chosǂn’s ruling elites tried to perpetuate their imagined “suzerainty” over them. The dispatch of Kyǂngcha’gwan was one of the typical diplomatic practices to symbolize this relationship. The institutional origins of Kyǂngcha’gwan shed light on this symbolic meaning of Chosǂn’s Kyǂngcha’gwan more clearly. Ming sent its low-level envoys called Qinchaiguan (漸懩従) to its vassals such as Chosǂn. Imitating the Ming’s imperial mode of interstate policies, Chosǂn came up with Chosǂn’s own version of Ming imperial model, such as Kyǂngcha’gwan (楧懩従) dispatches to the Jurchens and Tsushima that Chosǂn identified as its vassals. However, this does not necessarily mean that Chosǂn denied the “Sino-centric” East Asian order. Rather, by modifying its original imperial model according to Chosǂn’s own position under Ming, Chosǂn could still signify its suzerainty over the Jurchen and Tsushima, without violating Ming suzerainty. Chosǂn’s ruling elites who carried out interstate policy in 15th century were very shrewd, aggressive, and even mean. Was Chosǂn ruling elites’ superiority to the Jurchens and Tsushima only “cultural” as those Korean scholars have implied with the Kyorin frame? It seemed to be far more realistic than “cultural,” since those Confucian scholar officials were shrewd enough to create their own “suzerainty” over the Jurchens and Tsushima by utilizing military influence and history writing. It was based upon this process that Chosǂn’s ruling elites tried to perpetuate their imagined superior position over the Jurchens and Tsushima at least in 15th century. The dispatch of Kyǂngcha’gwan was one of the typical interstate policies to symbolize this relationship. 62 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries

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(ᱶ݅⧉(⦽᧲ݡ⦺Ʊ እƱᩎᔍྙ⪵ᩑǍᗭ HK ᩑǍƱᙹ

ḡɩʭḡ ᵝಽ ᳑ᖁ Ğԕᨱ ❭čࡹᨩ޹ äᮝಽ ᦭ಅᲙ ᪵޹ Ğ₉šᮡ ᪽ ᳑ᖁ᮹ Ğԕ(㊎ョ)ෝ ჸᨕӽ ḡᩎᨱʭḡ ❭čࡽ äᯝʭ? ᪽ Ğ₉š ❭čŝ zᮡ ᳑ᖁ-᧝ᯙ(ᩍḥ), ᳑ᖁ-ݡษࠥ šĥ᮹ ᙹḢᱢ ḩᕽa ᱽݡಽ ᩑǍࡹḡ ༜⧩޹ äᯝʭ? əౝ ᩍḥᯕӹ ݡษࠥᨱ ݡ⦽ Ğ₉š ❭čᮡ ᳑ᖁ᮹ ᯱʑᵲᝍᱢᯙ ḡᩎḩᕽ ᯙ᜾ŝ ᨕਁ⦽ šಉᯕ ᯩ۵ äᯝʭ? ⦥ᯱ᮹ ྙᱽ᮹᜾ᮡ ᯕ్⦽ ᖙ aḡ᮹ ᮹ྙᨱᕽ ⇽ၽ⦽݅. ᔍᝅ ᳑ᖁᮡ ᯕᖒĥ᮹ ᩍḥ ၰ ݡษࠥᨱ ݡ⦽ ᜚ญෝ ᩎᔍ⠙₍ᮥ ☖⧕ ᮁƱᱢ ⧪໦ᇥುᮝಽ ᇥ᜾(㮗䄺)⦹ᩍ, ᳑ᖁᮥ ᯕॅ᮹ ᔢǎ(⿦㈽)ᮝಽᕽ Ŗ᜾⪵⦹۵ ᯲ᨦᮥ ḥ ᜽⎑Ł, ษ⊹ ໦(㘙)ᯕ ᳑ᖁᮥ ჩǎ(㶲㈽)ᮝಽ Ƚᱶ⦽ ä⃹ౝ, ᔍᝅᔢ ᯕॅᮥ ᳑ᖁ᮹ ჩญ⻰ჩᄲ(㶲㮔⻰㶲㎒)ᮝಽ Ƚᱶ⦹ᩡ݅. ᯕᨱ ঑௝, ໦(㘙)ᯕəჩᄲ(㶲㎒)ᯙ ᳑ᖁᨱ č⦹۵ Ⲱ⯁₉š(㝬㏘㌿)ⲱᮥ ₉ᬊ(ゔ㨉)⦹ᩍ, ᩍḥ᳒ŝ ݡษࠥᨱ ᳑ᖁᨱ ݡ⦽ Ⲱᔍݡ(》㊷)ⲱ❬ ෝ ᳦ᬊ⦹ಅ ❭č⦽ äᯕ ⲰĞ₉š(㗞㏘㌿)ⲱᯕᨩ݅. ,ᯕ్⦽ ⩥ᔢᯕ ᱽݡಽ ᩑǍࡹḡ ༜⧩޹ äᮡ ၵಽ ⦽ǎ᮹ ⦽ǎᔍ⦺ĥӹ ࠺᧲ᔍ⦺ĥ əญŁ ᕽǍ⦺ĥᨱᕽ ᩍᱥ⯩ ᔍᬊࡹŁ ᯩ۵ ⲲƱฑⲳᯕ௝۵ ✡ ভྙᯕ݅. 15ᖙʑ ᳑ᖁ-ᩍḥ əญŁ ᳑ᖁ-ݡษࠥ šĥ᮹ ᙹḢᱢ ḩᕽ᮹ ᅙḩᯕ ᱽݡಽ ᩑǍࡹḡ ༜⦹Ł, ⲲƱฑⲳ᮹ ✡ᮥ ə šĥa ᙹ⠪ᱢᯕŁ ⪙⩽ᱢᯕᨩ݅Ł ᯕ⧕⧕ ᪵޹ ႑Ğᨱ۵ ݅ᮭŝ zᮡ ॽ౩ษa ⧔☖ ᯩᨩ݅. ຝᱡ ⦽ǎ᮹ ⦽ǎᔍ⦺ĥӹ ࠺᧲ᔍ⦺ĥa ᵲǎ ᵲᝍᱢᯙ Ⲱᔍݡ(》㊷)ⲱ᪡ ၝ᳒ᵝ᮹ᱢᯙ šᱱ ༉ࢱෝ ɚᅖ⧁ ᙹ ᯩ۵ ┩ᵲᝍᱢ šᱱᮥ ษಉ⦹ḡ ༜⧩݅۵ ᱱᯕ݅. ၝ᳒ᵝ᮹ᱢ ᯦ᰆᨱᕽࠥ ᳑ᖁᯕ ໦(㘙)ᮥⲰᔍݡ(》㊷)ⲱ⦹ᩡ݅۵ šᱱᮥ ɚᅖ⦹ḡ ༜⦹ᯱ, ᵲ⪵(⿰㵍)᮹ ᯙᝁ(〡㳋)ᮝಽ ݅ෙ ᖙಆŝ ᔍᔍಽᯕ Ʊඹ⧁ ᙹ ᨧ݅۵ Ⲳᯙᝁྕ᫙Ʊ(〡㳋㣾㊲〘)ⲳ᮹ ᬱ⊺ᮥ əݡಽ ၼᦥॅᯝ ᙹၷᨱ ᨧŁ, đǎ ᳑ᖁᯕ ᩍḥ(䉭㪈)ŝ ݡษࠥ(㍹䅓㎯)ෝ Chong Da-ham 63

ᱢɚᱢᮝಽ Ğఖ⦹ಅ ⧩޹ ᮹ࠥ᮹ ᅙḩᮥ ᱶ⪶⦹í ᖅ໦⦹ḡ ༜⧩݅. ݅ᮭᮝಽ ⦽ǎ ᔍ⦺᮹ ᐭญ ʫᮡ ⦝⧕᮹᜾ᯕ ᯲ᬊ⧩݅. ḥ⪵ುᱢ šᱱᨱᕽ ⦽ǎᔍ⦺ᮡ ᳑ᖁᮥ ɝݡᨱ aʭᬭḥ Ⲱɝᖙ(㾂⿬)ⲱಽ Ƚᱶ⦹Ł ə ᜽᯲ᮥ ᖙ᳦(⿬㌾)ᮥ ᦿᖙᬭ ᮁಡᨧ۵ ྙ⪵ᱢ ŝ⦺ᱢ ၽᱥ᮹ ᜽ʑಽ ཹᔍ⦹ᩡʑ ভྙᨱ, Ⲱɝᖙ(㾂⿬)ⲱ᮹ Ҿᨱ ʑ݅ญŁ ᯩ۵ ɝݡ⪵᮹ ᝅ➉ᨱ ݡ⧕ᕽ۵ ݚ⪚ᜅ్ᬙ ᙹၷᨱ ᨧᨩ݅. ঑௝ᕽ ɝݡ⪵ ᝅ➉᮹ ᬱᯙᮝಽ ۹ ᯝᅙᱽǎᵝ᮹᮹ ఖᮥ v᳑⧕᪵݅. ᯕ౨í ⦽ǎᔍ⦺ᯕ ۹ Ⲱ⦝⧕ᯱⲱ᮹ ᯦ᰆᮥ v᳑⧩ʑ ভྙᨱ, ɝݡ᪡⋊ ⦽≉Ḣᱲ ᩑđࡹ۵ Ⲱɝᖙ(㾂⿬)ⲱ௝۵ 15ᖙʑᨱ, ᳑ᖁᯕ ᩍḥ(䉭㪈)ŝݡษࠥ(㍹䅓㎯)ᨱ .ಆ᮹ ᅙḩᮥ ᯙᱶ⦹ʑa ̥ҥ్ᬭḡ۵ ॽ౩ษᨱ ዁ḩ ᙹၷᨱ ᨧᨩ݅⡎ đǎ ⲲƱฑⲳᮡ ᯕ్⦽ ॽ౩ษෝ ᮡ⠱⦹۵ ✡ᯕᨩ݅. ⦽ǎ᮹ ᩎᔍ⦺ĥ۵ ⲲƱฑⲳᯕ௝۵ ᖁప⧕ ᅕᯕ۵ ✡ಽ ᳑ᖁᯕ ᩍḥŝ ݡษࠥ᪡ ๛ᮡ šĥa ᙹ⠪ᱢᯕŁ ⪙⩽ᱢᯙ äᯕᨩ޹ ä⃹ౝ ᖅ໦⦹۵ ⦽⠙, ə ᗮᨱᕽ ๅᬑ Ʊཹ⦹í ᳑ᖁᯕ ᯕॅᮥ Ǒᔍᱢᮝಽ ŖĊ⦽ äᮡ ᱶݚႊ᭥᮹ ᮲Ḷᯝ ᐱᯕᨩŁ, ੱ⦽ ᳑ᖁ᮹ ྙ໦, ྙ⪵, ŝ⦺ʑᚁᯕ ᩍḥŝ ܭⲰ⋉ఖⲱᯕ ᦥ ݡษࠥ᮹ əäᅕ݅ ḥᅕ⦽ äᯕᨩᮝ໑ ᯕäᯕ đǎ ᩍḥ᳒ŝ ݡษࠥෝ ၽᱥ᜽┅۵ ߑ .ญෝ ⠕᪵ʑ ভྙᯕ݅ם ᱢᮝಽ ᵲ᫵⦽ ᩎ⧁ᮥ ⧩݅۵, ᔍᝅᔢ ๅᬑ ၝ᳒ᵝ᮹ᱢᯙ⪵ྙ ⦽ญ۵ ⦽ǎ᮹ ⦺ĥa ҫᯥᨧᯕ እ❱⧕ ᪉ ᯝᅙ ᱽǎᵝ᮹᮹ ᳑ᖁ⋉ఖᨱ ݡם əญŁ ᯕ ᄡ໦ŝ ཹ⦹í ݏᮡ Εᯕᨩ݅. əౝ ᱽǎᵝ᮹᮹ ᯱʑᵲᝍᱢ ᜽bᨱ ᯦b⧕ Ⲳᔍݡⲳෝ v᳑⦹۵ ᜽bŝ ၝ᳒ᵝ᮹a ᯕෝ -ᱥᮁ⦹۵ ੱ ݅ෙ ᯱʑᵲᝍᱢ ᯙ᜾ᯙ ⲲƱฑⲳᯕ௝۵ ✡ᮥ ჸᨕӹ, ᷪ ┩ᵲᝍᱢᮝಽ ᳑ᖁ ᩍḥ əญŁ ᳑ᖁ-ݡษࠥ šĥෝ ᯕ⧕⧁ ᙹ ᯩ۵ ႊჶᮡ ྕᨨᯝʭ. ə ݉ᕽ۵ Ğ₉š čᮥ ᵲᝍᮝಽ ӹ┡ӹ۵ ໦ ᵲᝍ᮹ ࠺ᦥ᜽ᦥ ḩᕽ᪡ ə ᗮᨱ ᭥⊹⦹۵ ᳑ᖁᵲᝍ᮹❬ ࠺ᇢᦥ᜽ᦥ ḩᕽ᮹ ᝅᱽ᧲ᔢ ᗮᨱ q∑Კ ᯩ݅. ᷪ᳑ᖁᮡ໦(㘙)᮹⯁₉š(㝬㏘㌿)ᮥ ₉ᬊ⦹ᩡᮝ໕ᕽࠥ ᯕෝ Ğ₉šᮝಽ ⦽ ݉ĥ ԏ⇵۵ ᙹᔍᱢ(め㽺㩥) ʑƱෝ ☖⧕, ᩍḥ᳒ŝ ݡษࠥᨱ ݡ⦽ ᬑ᭥ෝ ⪶ᅕ⦹໕ᕽࠥ ࠺᜽ᨱ ໦(㘙)᮹ ᝁ⦹ಽ ᔍᔍಽᯕ ݅ෙ ᖙಆŝ Ʊඹ⧁ ᙹ ᨧ݅۵ ໦(㘙) ᵲᝍ᮹ ḩᕽෝ Ñᜅ෕ḡ ᦫ۵ (ᩢᦦ⧉ᮥ ၽ⭹⦹Ł ᯩᨩ݅. đǎ ᳑ᖁⅩʑ ᩍḥŝ ݡษࠥᨱ ݡ⦽ ჩญ⻰ჩᄲ(㶲㮔⻰㶲㎒ ᯙ᜾᮹ ⩶ᖒŝ ᯕᨱ ʑၹ⦽ Ğ₉š(㗞㏘㌿) ❭č᮹ š⧪ᮡ, ໦(㘙) ᵲᝍ᮹ ࠺ᦥ᜽ᦥḩᕽෝ ⦽v᳑⦹۵ ᜽bอᮝಽ ᖅ໦⦹ʑ ᨕಖŁ, ੱ⦽ ᫙ᖙ᮹ ⋉ఖᮝಽ ᯙ⦽ ɝݡ⪵ ᝅ➉ᨱ ݡ ᮹᜾ᮝಽ ᯙ⧕ ᳑ᖁ᮹ ᩍḥŝ ݡษࠥᨱ ݡ⦽ ⋉ఖᮥ ᯙᱶ⦹ḡ ᦫ۵ ⲲƱฑ(〘䂼)ⲳᯕ௝۵⧔⦝ ᜽bอᮝಽࠥ ᩎ᜽ ᖅ໦⦹ʑ ᨕಅᬕ, ࠺ᦥ᜽ᦥ᮹ ᄡႊᯙ ᳑ᖁŝ ᩍḥ ၰ ݡษࠥ ᔍᯕᨱᕽ ᩎ࠺ᱢᮝಽ ḥ⧪ࡹ޹ ┩ᵲᝍ᮹ šĥෝ ᔾᔾ⦹í ᅕᩍᵡ݅. 64 Making Chosǂn’s Own Tributaries

G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G