The Presbyterian and Reformed Review

0F PR,rmS^ ^LOGICAL PER BR 1 . P624 v.l The Presbyterian and reformed review Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2016 with funding from Princeton Theological Seminary Library https://archive.org/details/presbyterianrefo1318warf THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW No. 3—July, 1890. I. RECENT DISCUSSION IN MATERIALISM. HERE are phases of contemporary materialism which have T little in common with the doctrines of ancient and mediaeval materialists, and which in point of subtlety and philosophical attrac- tiveness are quite in accord with the advanced position of nineteenth century thought. The idealist of to-day flatters himself that he avoids the inconsistencies of Berkeley and Fichte, so the materialist smiles at the mention of Priestly, D’Alembert, and Holbach. But these growths respectively in idealistic and materialistic thought have not been parallel. Idealism has tended in the last thirty years to withdraw its gaze from the thought-ultimate as a monistic con- ception, to perception as a dualistic relation, that is from cosmic to psychological idealism while materialism has tended in quite the ; opposite direction, i. e., from the crude postulate of matter in bulk to the search for an ultimate materialistic principle, that is from psychological to cosmic materialism. Each has strengthened its flank and the battle is now joined between psychological idealism and metaphysical materialism. Spiritualism has gained vastly by this change of base. As long as the ontology of spirit rested upon a dogmatic assertion of universal mind, there was no weapon at hand wherewith to attack the corresponding assertion of universal matter. I have as good right to assert an universal as you have and chacun a son gout is the rule of choice. But now that philosophy is learning to value a single fact more than a detailed system, and is sacrificing its systems to the vindication of facts, it is spiritualism and not materialism which is profiting by the advances of science. Materialism has appealed to the metaphysics of force, spiritualism has appealed to consciousness 24 358 1HE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW. as fact. Which is more in harmony with the scientific spirit of the day? The successive positions which modern materialism has taken in its necessary retreat into metaphysics, are interesting from a his- torical point of view. First it was matter and no mind; then matter with a function, mind then matter, a force manifested in extension ; and mind then force, which is doubtless matter but may be mind. ; — First mind was brain then mind was a function of brain then mind ; ; and brain were manifestations of a material principle; then the material principle became force, which may be mind. I. In stretching the lines of defense of the spiritualistic principle in psychology, we turn at once to the method of knowledge as a process, and we shall find it valuable for more than defense. For if we discover the independence of the thinking subject as regards the method, we may at once pass to its autonomy as regards the matter of the knowing process. That is, if we find a refutation of materialism in the psychology of knowing, we have so much the more ground for its refutation in the metaphysic of knowing, and the two considerations will present a consistent philosophy of knowing. What then is the materialist’s doctrine of the method of knowledge? There are four cosmological doctrines of knowledge, arising from four types of world-theory, assuming that the parties to the contro- versy are only mind and matter. First, monism of thought; second, dualism ol thought and matter (or force); third, absolute phenomenalism or agnosticism and fourth, monism of matter (or force). ; On the first hypothesis, perception is a purely thought relation, and by definition the materialist cannot accept it. On the second, we have a realistic theory of knowledge in which the thought element rests upon the ultimate presupposition of thought and the materialist is again excluded. Upon the hypothesis of absolute phenomenalism the support is cut equally from both subject and object. If both be phenomenal, there can be no question as to which is real, and the materialist and idealist are both defeated. The fourth supposition, monism of matter or force, is then the materialist’s only alternative, and the first problem we propound to him is this : Given matter or force, how do you account for thought ? Is mind a function of organized matter? The grounds upon which materialists have been led to assert that mind is motion, or in general some function of matter, are the prin- ciples of cosmic economy and uniformity of law, and they are in part justified as scientific. But the law of cosmic economy is ; RECEN1 DISCUSSION IN MATERIALISM. 359 inoperative, except when cosmic outlay is purely hypothetical and when the phenomena in question may be explained in terms of the known. And the law of the uniformity of nature rests upon the principle of the conservation of energy, in this case upon the position that mental energy is convertible into physical force and vice versa. Just here we reach the question crucial to psychological materialism, Has physiological psychology led to the discovery of any process of transition from nerve force to thought? We answer unequivocally and emphatically, no : and we make this reply in the full presence of the latest researches in this department. II. Schiff’s Expekiments : Maeique. Much has been made of the experiments of Schiff, whereby he has shown that mental operations are accompanied by a discharge “ of heat.* M. Luys says :f These experiments show us, on the one hand, that sustained intellectual work is accompanied by a loss of phosphorized substance on the part of the cellular cell in vibration that it uses it up like an ignited pile which is burning away its own essential constituents and that, on the other hand, all moral emotion ; perceived through the sensations becomes at the same time the occasion of a local development of heat.” All this may be perfectly true and yet valueless for the debate. Every one admits that there is a loss of phosphorized substance during thought but this phos- ; phorus is found passing off in the ordinary channels of the body (Byasson and Beaunis), and this latter fact is used by Luys to prove the passage of thought back into a material form. In the first case, accord- ing to this ingenious thinker, phosphorus is expended during the intellectual operations, therefore (p. 78) “it (thought) uses it (phosphorus) up but phosphorus is also found passing from the body in the form of sulphates and phosphates and in increased quantities after periods of wakefulness and thought (Hammond), therefore (p. 70) these “serve as a chemical measure of the intensity of cerebral work done in a given time.” But, although it is a pity to interfere with this twofold transformation of energy, we deem it a much more credible hypothesis that the phosphorus of the cerebrum is the phosphorus of the passages, and that there has been no transformation at all. On either of the hypotheses equally a development of heat is possible during the play of intellectual forces. If mind and brain are distinct, and brain a necessary organ of mind, heat may be the equivalent in’ whole or in part of cerebral activity. In short, the * "Archives de Physiologie,” 1870, p. 451. t "Brain and its Functions,” pp. 78 and 79 360 TEE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW. evolution of heat means only that molecular change is going on in the brain, and this is no very startling discovery. That there is a transfer of influence of some kind from mind to body, we are constrained to admit; that is, the facts do not sustain the position advocated by Tyndall and Dubois Reymond, and stated strongly by Fiske, t. e., “ The dynamic circuit is absolutely complete without taking psychical manifestations into account at all. No conceivable advance in physical science can get us outside of this closed circuit and into this circuit psychical phenomena do ; not enter.’'* If this be true, we have indeed deprived the materialist of all participation in the things of the spirit and have accomplished, with Mr. Fiske, in so far, “ the final and irretrievable overthrow of the materialistic hypothesis but we have to the same degree deprived the spiritualist of all participation in the things of the body and given the lie to the psycho-physical connection. It is un- doubtedly true that nervous and cerebral action are the elements of a complete dynamic circuit, but this circuit is not closed; otherwise what is the difference between reflex and voluntary activity, and why is it that a particular nerve reaction follows a stimulation whose impulse is open to a thousand courses of equal associative readiness? Why is it that I grow pale at the news of the death of my father ? Why is it that there is a constant ratio of growth in intensity between sensation and external stimulus? There is either a direc- tive interaction or a preestablished harmony more elaborate and imposing than any ever conceived by Malebranche or Leibnitz. When we remember that pure thought exhausts the cortical layer, we must admit the possibility of central innervation from an agency entirely subjective, at the same time that we remember that the cells must be in a state of functional etherization purely physical, to sustain the nervous discharge. Assuming this etherization in a given case as a state of advanced cerebral potential, the question at once occurs, What leads to its discharge? What is the character of the agency which closes the circuit? For example, let us suppose an eye and hand reaction in which a movement of the right hand indicates the appearance to the subject of a red light.

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