Jangi Paltan: Moments of Glory (1St Battalion Maratha Light Infantry)

scholar warrior Jangi Paltan: Moments of Glory (1st Battalion Maratha Light Infantry) SATISH NAMBIAR Preamble In early January 1971, I was posted from the Military Operations Directorate of the Army Headquarters to the 1st Battalion, Maratha Light Infantry (Jangi Paltan). The Paltan was then in Nagaland and was part of 95 Mountain Brigade under 8 Mountain Division. In early September, my name came up for attending the Senior Command course at the then College of Combat (now Army War College). As war clouds gathered over the subcontinent, the course was terminated prematurely, and we were directed to return to our units post-haste. I rejoined the battalion on November 5, 1971, at a location south of Tura in Meghalaya on the border with Bangladesh, to which location it had moved as part of 95 Mountain Brigade operationally under 101 Communication Zone Area. I was asked to assume command of ‘Y’ Company (also referred to in the battalion as ‘VC’ Company in context of the fact that Sepoy Namdeo Jadhav of the company had been awarded the Victoria Cross at the battle of the Senio river in Italy during World War II). A Copy-Book Ambush The battalion was actively engaged in patrolling, raids and ambushes across the border in preparation for the war that was to inevitably follow. Though the citation for the award of the Vir Chakra is specific to my actions during the intense battle at Jamalpur on December 10-11, 1971, it would be of interest to the readers 120 ä SPRING 2020 ä scholar warrior scholar warrior to be made aware of the details of an ambush undertaken by the battalion on the night of November 13/14, 1971. Consequent to a pattern followed by the Pakistani forces in the area in moving up a battery of heavy mortars to deal with the brigade’s futile efforts to subdue an outpost on the border, the Brigade Commander, Brigadier H S Kler, later awarded the Mahavir Chakra, asked our Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel K S Brar (who was also awarded the Vir Chakra and later commanded the division that undertook Operation Blue Star, and went on to become Eastern Army Commander), to execute an ambush of the heavy mortar battery. It was decided that to enable the ambush, the Brigade Commander would ask one of the other units (13 GUARDS) to simulate another attack on the Kamalpur border post. “Bulbul” Brar decided on a two company ambush on the road leading from the Pakistani position at Bakshiganj to the Kamalpur border post, with another company to be deployed on the Jamalpur-Bakshiganj road to deal with, or delay, reinforcements, and the fourth company in reserve with the battalion headquarters, about a kilometre and a half from the ambush site. As the senior Company Commander, I was asked by “Bulbul” to coordinate and oversee the ambush that was to be executed by ‘Y’ and ‘C’ Companies (the latter commanded by Keshav Puntambekar, who was to become my second-in- command when I assumed command of the battalion from “Bulbul” in mid-April 1972 after the war). The two of us and our Platoon Commanders, carried out a detailed reconnaissance of the ambush site on the night of November 8-9, 1971, being guided to the area by a few of our local Mukti Bahini colleagues; through a hip-deep marsh and paddy fields to avoid villages that were frequented by armed Razakars, the loyalists to the Pakistani regime. An appropriate site was selected that comprised sugarcane fields that permitted some concealment from the road. Detailed locations of each platoon were decided and a proposed plan of action with regard to the signal for opening fire was agreed upon. The reconnaissance party returned to the battalion location before dawn on November 9. The next four days were spent in briefings, rehearsals and fine-tuning the details of the operation. The battalion set out immediately after dusk on November 13, 1971, with ‘Y’ Company in the lead, with myself right up in front, followed by ‘C’ Company, then ‘D’ Company which were to take up positions on the Bakshiganj-Jamalpur road, and, finally, the Battalion Headquarters and ‘A’ Company (reserve). The route followed was the same taken by the reconnaissance party through the marsh and paddy fields to avoid the villages and civil population. We reached scholar warrior ä SPRING 2020 ä 121 scholar warrior the ambush site at about midnight and set about taking up positions within the sugarcane fields approximately 75 metres from the road, by digging slit trenches at about the third row of cane. I had positioned myself with the platoon nearest to the Bakshiganj position with a medium machine gun detachment and a 57 mm recoilless gun detachment next to me, whose crew had strict instructions that they would only open fire on my specific orders. The plan agreed upon was that the platoon of ‘C’ Company deployed towards the Kamalpur post direction on the far side (west) of the road would open fire when the leading vehicle of the Pakistani heavy mortar column came within a range of about 50 metres. The idea being that this would cause the Pakistani personnel to dismount and take up positions on the east side of the road where the main ambush force was deployed, thus, making them totally vulnerable targets. At about 0400 hours of November 14, 1971, 13 GUARDS launched a simulated assault against the Kamalpur border post, and shortly before dawn, we received a radio message from the Brigade Commander that the heavy mortar battery had commenced its move forward from Bakshiganj to deploy in support of the post. As it happened, the complete area was enveloped by a thick fog that had reduced visibility to barely 30 to 40 metres. Being located closest to Bakshiganj, I heard the sound of vehicles approaching and alerted my own company as also ‘C’ Company, all of us being on a common radio net set. I was soon able to see the hazy outline of the first vehicle and noticed that it was led by a few Pakistani soldiers on foot apparently looking for possible landmines or improvised explosives on the road. Indicating to my men to hold fire, I whispered on the radio to alert my colleague Keshav Puntambekar, and, more importantly, his Platoon Commander, Captain Suresh Patil, who was designated to open fire first on seeing the leading vehicle within range. The first vehicle went by; then the second, third, fourth, and fifth, all towing the mortars. But there was no action by Suresh Patil, who on being queried by me on the radio, responded to say that no vehicle had come within sight. In the meanwhile, we could hear a lot of clanging noises, the cause for which did not then register. By then, the sixth vehicle was going past my position and the seventh was approaching. I whispered on the radio for all to remain alert and as the seventh vehicle arrived in sight, I ordered ‘Ganpat’ manning the 57 mm recoilless gun in the trench adjacent to me to open fire on that vehicle. He did so with great accuracy, and as it happened to be the vehicle carrying ammunition, it went up in flames with a loud explosion. All hell then broke loose, with our weapons opening up to the shouts of “Bol Shri Chhattrapati Shivaji Maharaj Ki Jai”, and the Pakistanis not knowing 122 ä SPRING 2020 ä scholar warrior scholar warrior what had hit them. By a strange coincidence and a stroke of good fortune at that very time the fog lifted, and we were able to determine that the Pakistanis had actually begun to deploy their mortars at the very site of the ambush. They had no chance! The choice of the ambush site could not have been better. The Pakistani battery was decimated though some of the personnel probably managed to get away. As the senior person at the site, in order to assess the situation, and coordinate further actions, I moved from my company position (accompanied by Sopan, my ‘bodyguard’, as our buddies were called in the Paltan, carrying my radio set), to the gap between my company’s position and that of ‘C’ Company. While doing so, I was frantically cautioned by my second-in-command Captain Rajendra Dafle (who was also later awarded the Vir Chakra), as also by ‘A’ Company Commander, Major Shashi Pawar of the presence of a Pakistani medium machine gun team within the gap firing at our troops. I located their presence about 75 yards from where I was and in an almost reflex action, threw a 36 hand grenade at them, and as it exploded, jumped towards them, firing my sten gun, and killing them in the process. I got to know later as we were on our way back to base, that my ‘bodyguard’ had retrieved the .50 inch calibre machine gun from the site as a war trophy. I then turned my attention towards disengagement and extrication before we could become targets of an air attack, as it was broad daylight by then. At about that time, I overheard a radio communication from the Brigade Commander to my colleague, the ‘C’ Company Commander, asking him to get hold of a mortar barrel so that “we could drink beer from it” on our return to base. I immediately interjected, in the full knowledge that what I was saying would be heard by the Brigade Commander and my Commanding Officer, to instruct Keshav Puntambekar, “not to push our luck”, and that he should immediately disengage and commence return to base, which we did in an orderly fashion, much to the delight of our “Mukti” colleagues who were overawed by what we had done to the Pakistanis.

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