Does China's Economic Expansion in South Asia Constitute Imperialism

Does China’s Economic Expansion in South Asia Constitute Imperialism?

Huzaifa Ejaz

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Prerequisite for Honors in the Department of Political Science under the advisement of Professor Christopher Candland

May 2020

ABSTRACT

The dawn of the “Century of Asia” has begun to announce its arrival and the center of gravity of economic and political might is beginning to shift from the West to the East. As regional powers bid for power and current contenders watch with inhibition, China’s rise to the forefront is worrisome to a fair share. China’s ambitious infrastructure investment project, the Belt and Road

Initiative (BRI) seeks to expand its economic and political soft power across the globe. Some of these collaborations have occurred in South Asia and port holdings are particularly crucial to

China’s endeavors of increasing connectivity, influence, and profits; and decreasing costs and travel times. The two ports within South Asia that Chinese companies have stakes in are the

Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and the Gwadar Port in Pakistan. The two are cited as emblems of

Chinese imperialism within current popular discourse. The former is currently on a controversial

99-year lease to the China Merchants Port Holdings Company while the latter is being forewarned of a similar fate. By evaluating whether these ports are imperial possessions, as is popularly insinuated through the vernacular of “debt-trap diplomacy”, this thesis explores the arguments espoused in favor of and in opposition to the notion of Chinese imperialism within South Asia.

The thesis contextualizes the debate within intellectual tradition as well as the geopolitics of the region and performs a myth-busting of simplistic arguments employed for Chinese imperialism in the process. The thesis concludes that the two port holdings do not currently qualify as imperial possessions and identifies aspects that could lead to a revision of this conclusion in the future. It also makes a brief note of the importance of popular political rhetoric in informing perceptions of the Initiative around the world. This thesis deliberates on concerns regarding imperialism with deliberate concentration on the South Asia, a region still reeling from an imperial past, as it interacts with China with its own complex history of interaction with imperialism.

Acknowledgements

No expression of gratitude will do justice to the sheer kindness and magnanimity I have received in the process of writing this thesis and in living my days. This is my humble token of appreciation to the village that has broken my falls and allowed me to stand mountains tall, even at 5’3.

I am sincerely grateful to my thesis advisor, Professor Christopher Candland. Thank you so much for your encouragement, guidance, and genuine investment in my ideas. I am particularly touched by your willingness to advocate on my behalf. I am also thankful to Professor Paul MacDonald and William Joseph for agreeing to join my committee and providing their invaluable guidance along the way. Professor Joseph, thank you so much for entertaining my last-minute pleas of help with utmost grace and generosity. I am also indebted to Professor Neelima Shukla Bhatt for doing me the honor of becoming the Honors Visitor for this thesis and always extending me kindness throughout my time at Wellesley. Her thoughtfulness, prayers, and genuine commitment to my success will forever award me joy and awe. I am particularly grateful to Professor Moon for agreeing to join the committee on short notice and for offering her time and guidance. No words will convey the sincere gratitude I have for the entirety of my thesis committee. This thesis would not exist without their guidance, and more importantly, their empathy and kindness. I am forever indebted.

I would be remiss not to mention professors whose classes within the department substantially changed my life. Professor Katharine Moon’s gentle but disciplined guidance to a timid first- semester student enrolled in an intimidating 300-level course did her plenty good. Thank you for restoring my confidence whenever I lacked it and for always inspiring me to strive for nothing but the best. Professor Paul Martorelli’s “Human Rights” course truly altered my worldview and allowed me to develop a critical eye in every sense of the word. Most importantly, his dedication to the craft and his students will forever inspire faith and confidence in me. He deserves the world and a tenured position at Wellesley, the latter of which would only be to his students’ best fortune. Thank you for believing in me. I am also incredibly indebted to the Barnette Miller Committee for awarding me a Barnette Miller Honors Grant, which allowed me to travel and timely address my biases before I committed them to page and my subconscious.

To teachers who saw potential in me in the days of my youth in Pakistan, Farah Malik, Sofia Irfan, Fatima Shaukat, Tahira Hashmi, Naheed Akhtar, Mrs. Nusrat and countless others at BMI, this is a reminder that your teaching and your vote of confidence is weaved into the fabric of my being and will forever remain a part of everything I do. I am particularly grateful to Mrs. Nusrat and Mrs. Naheed for inspiring in me a love for history and critical thought so early on but more so for the unwavering faith in their eyes whenever they spoke to me. To Mushtaq uncle and in loving memory of Perveen aunty who would always offer a thoughtful prayer at every encounter in the hallways at BMI, I hope you consider this some semblance of the acceptance of those directed at my success.

Sir Fahd, thank you for all the wonderful history lessons in your cozy study and all your kind support thereafter. A special note of gratitude for inspiring within my peers and me the notion that Political Science is a cool-kid endeavor with plenty of clout.

Friends I made in college and now the family I bear in my heart were instrumental in ensuring that this thesis was completed in the comfort of knowing that help and reassurance were always nearby. Sarah Yaser ’19 and Maryam Chloe Pervaiz ’19, thank you so much for taking me under your wings as your little sister and putting up with my shenanigans. Maryam and her lovely family kindly hosted my family and me during travel for research. Maryam is also the main reason this thesis is not an utter pain to everyone reading. Thank you for everything, Maryam. I aspire to be a fraction of what you are someday. Thank you to Sidikha Ashraf ’19 for her reassurance and the reminder that one person’s trash can potentially be a thesis committee’s treasure. Potentially. A special note of gratitude to Zainab Jafiq ’20 and Minhal Gardezi ’20 for appreciating the thought and effort poured into the memes about my thesis and their gentle reminders of support for everything I have endeavored to at Wellesley. I am also grateful to the underclasswomen in ALM and PSA for feigning awe at the accounts of the mundane intricacies of the thesis-writing process.

A very special thank you from the deepest depths of my heart to Sarah Noor Malik and Lyba Khan for what seems like a lifetime of friendship, laughs, sincerity, and support. Sarah, thank you for hosting me at Princeton and for being on standby for all life situations. Your reminders of support and the milkshake you ordered to my door in support of this thesis were especially needed and particularly appreciated. Lyba Khan, you can have my left kidney should you ever need it. You have been the single most instrumental friend in seeing this thesis through, from beginning to end. I would not have wanted to do this without you. I salute your endurance in bearing with me. I love you. Every moment spent with you two was the highlight of my time at college.

My best friends from home who render all the time and distance between us meaningless; you are the shining light of my life. Noor Fatima, Iman Basit, Fatima Asad, Mahoor Khalid, and Abdullah Memon, thank you so much for being the best family of peers one could possibly ask for. No words will convey my gratitude for your constant encouragement, love, reassurance, and support. To receive that from you all every single day is my greatest fortune. Noor and Iman, thank you for your bravery in enduring painstaking detail of every thesis development from its very inception and for your unwavering support for everything I have ever set my mind to. Fatima Asad provided the beautiful illustrations included in the thesis, along with a caring reminder every day in its support. Your talent and kindness astound me. Abdullah Memon deserves a separate thesis for always exceeding expectations as my honorary elder brother. Thank you for all the help, care, and concern. Mahoor, your and Urooba Ahmed’s reminders of misplaced confidence in me always warm my heart and award me light when I need it the most. Ushna Mashal, Mahnoor Fatima Saad, and Mah Rukh Anwar, your compassion will forever perplex me, and I can only thank my lucky stars for you. The Blue family from BMI is always at the heart of the work I undertake. My honorary siblings, Mashal Ashfaque, Alisha Tahir, and Tasweebullah Cheema, and Fahad Ullah, I can only attempt audacious undertakings such as this one because you inspire me.

Members of my extended family who opened their loving homes and arms to me at the slightest chance, this is for you. My aunts, khala Moona, khala Rizwana, khala Rehana, Shamim phupho, Shakila phupo, Nabila phupho and Saima mamee showered me with all the affection in the world. You are the women I look up to every single day. To my uncles, Ashfaque chacha, Sajjad

mamoo and Shehzad mamoo, I am forever grateful for your generosity. A very special nod to a very special uncle, Ayaz mamoo, for having unwavering faith in my ability for as long as I can remember. I will forever cherish that sentiment. This is another note of particular appreciation for Aunt Shafat Mobeen and Uncle Shahbaz Sikander for being my honorary parents throughout my time at college and for providing a loving home. I sincerely apologize for you having to witness the weeks leading up to the completion of this thesis and am sincerely grateful for everything you have done for me. Altaf Uncle, thank you for believing in dreams that were far- fetched until you drove me to them. Many other loving cousins, uncles and aunts are also in my thoughts. Shehroz Malik, thank you for the kindest words of support and incessant reassurance. They were greatly needed and appreciated.

No fraction of this thesis would exist without the relentless support of my parents, Naghmana Ejaz and Ejaz Ahmed Bajwa, as well as my loving brother, Mohammad Ibrahim Bajwa. I thank you for being my greatest cheerleaders. Mama and baba, anything and everything I will ever accomplish will be for you and from you. Ibrahim, your constant reminders of love and support are always cherished. You’re the best sibling one could ask for. Baba, you deserve the most special mention for your guidance, affection, and support.

I love you all with every morsel of my being.

INTRODUCTION ...... 8 METHODOLOGY ...... 13 SIGNIFICANCE ...... 12 CHAPTERS ...... 16 THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE ...... 18 OVERVIEW...... 19 COST AND FINANCING ...... 25 IMPERIALISM 101 ...... 35

LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 36 IMPERIALISM DEFINED ...... 48 CHINA AND THE QUESTION OF EMPIRE ...... 53

CONTEXT ...... 54 FOREIGN POLICY...... 61 CASE STUDIES ...... 68

HAMBANTOTA, SRI LANKA ...... 68 Context...... 69 The Case for Debt-Trap Diplomacy ...... 70 Mythbusting ...... 75 GWADAR, PAKISTAN ...... 81 Context...... 82 The Case for Debt-Trap Diplomacy ...... 90 The Case Against ...... 96 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ...... 108

ABSTRACT ...... 109 METHODS...... 110 FINDINGS ...... 111 VISUAL REPRESENTATIONS ...... 115 DISCUSSION ...... 131 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ...... 132 ARTICLES ANALYZED ...... 136 CONCLUSION ...... 143 BIBILIOGRAPHY ...... 148

Introduction

As mundane a thing as the very entrance of the

train station I was at as part of my thesis

research is emblematic of far more than

immediately meets the eye. A small date-plate

underneath the middle window reads 1896 -

1898. The date merely reiterates what the

Victorian architecture emanates: a colonial past.

Karachi Cantt Train Station, Karachi, Pakistan. Jan 21, 2019 At the same time, it is a symbol of

eventual triumph, the ideological and political founding fathers now watching over

Pakistanis as they go about their travels.

Once known as Frere Street station, Karachi

Cantt Station is now a National Heritage Site.

Wishing to preserve it on Pakistan’s own terms is telling. It is both a reminder of subjugation to a foreign power as well as eventual redemption. As odd as it is to admit, it is also a reminder of the value that some, to this day, ascribe to the positive externalities of foreign rule. Reminders such as these have been sprawled across the kaleidoscope of memories I recount as part of my upbringing. No account,

personal or academic, of the country’s history, present or future is devoid of mention of an imperial past that our foremothers witnessed firsthand.

As a nation with an imperial past frequently caught in the throes of global power struggles amongst challenges of governance at home, a wariness of foreign rule and a cautionary stance is embedded within the Pakistani psyche. Nevertheless, China enjoys a distinct status as

Pakistan’s “all-weather-friend” with anthems celebrating Pak-Cheen Dost Zindabad

(Translation: Long live the Pakistan-China Friendship) etched into my own memory to the extent that I hear the jingle as I commit the words to page. Suspicions of Chinese intent, if at all, have only recently begun to brew within Pakistan as Chinese presence and influence becomes increasingly imminent. In sharp contrast, discussions on the matter of China’s economic expansion within South Asia are frequently and vehemently projected as decided imperialism and a premeditated ploy to upset the current World beyond the national confines. This discrepancy piqued my interest in the debate on the question of imperialism within South Asia at large. Much of the debate is focused around the Gwadar Port in Pakistan cautioned to be the next

Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka.

Wang Huiyao, writing for the World Economic Forum, insists that “the re-emergence of

Asia is among the most important shifts that will occur in our lifetimes”.1 A Financial Times article by Valentina Romei and John Reed insists that the Asian Age begins this year. The Age, they insist, is marked by “an inflection point when the continent becomes the new center of the world”.2 Their analysis finds that, for the first time since the 19th century, Asian economies will be larger than the rest of the world in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms in 2020. Not only is

1 Wang Huiyao. “In 2020, Asian Economies Will Become Larger than the Rest of the World Combined - Here's How.” World Economic Forum, July 25, 2019. 2 Valentina Romei and John Reed. “The Asian Century Is Set to Begin”. Financial Times, March 26, 2019.

Asia rising as an economic force, it is “also coalescing as a constructive force for global governance”.3 China is at the heart of these developments and the locomotive of growth in the region. According to IMF projections, China’s contribution to global growth will be an approximate 30 percent of the world by 2023.4 China continues to fortify its status as an economic and political giant in the region and the world through a web of interconnected trade relations.

In 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative was announced by President Xi Jinping to formalize some of these trade relations and expand them further. Phrased as “the Silk Road of the 21st

Century”, the initiative involves predominantly bilateral agreements between the Chinese government or its state-owned enterprises and the governments of other nations. These agreements intend cooperation for projects pertaining to elements of trade and related infrastructure such as developing ports, road networks, energy plants etc. to name a few.

Nevertheless, this cooperation grants China varying degree of presence and influence within these countries. The expansion of China’s trade networks is being admonished by some experts for having an uncanny semblance to the beginnings of British imperialism that began with trade expansion and ended with the Sun never setting on an empire that embedded itself into the legacies of all the countries that are the subject of this thesis. Concerns of potential Chinese imperialism are predominantly expressed through the vernacular of “debt-trap diplomacy”. Debt- trap diplomacy connotes the idea that China deliberately funnels an excessive amount of investment into countries that cannot afford to service this debt and must cede control of territory

3 Wang Huiyao. Asian Economies Will Become Larger than the Rest of the World. 4 Alexandere Tanzi,, and Wei Lu. “Where Will Global GDP Growth Come From in the Next Five Years?” Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, October 28, 2018.

for a debt-for-equity swap as a result. The degree of accuracy of the term is an entirely different matter altogether.

Fearing the repetition of a history of hegemony and exploitation is an understandable and worthwhile endeavor. Nevertheless, care must be exercised in ensuring that interdependence or cooperation between nations, as well as Chines influence is not exaggerated to make this case.

Furthermore, the perceptions of Chinese economic expansion must be contextualized within

China’s own foreign-policy predilections and the geopolitics of the South Asian continent, where nations hostile to Chinese interests such as the United States and India also have stakes.

Significance

While the literature on the Belt and Road Initiative is extensively available, hardly any comments on South Asia as its central focus. Furthermore, the extant literature primarily treats the BRI as a consolidated whole (while acknowledging its lack of centralization). The study of ports as exclusive units of study is rare. This thesis addresses all these concerns. Furthermore, though concerns of debt burdens consistently arise, this thesis is unique in suggesting that “debt- trap diplomacy” is the vernacular through which debates around imperialism are navigated. The terminology conveys an underpinning power imbalance and concerns of domination. By specifying a threshold for imperialism within my own work, this thesis dispels various popular myths about Chinese imperialism while maintaining that developments could occur in the future within the region that could warrant a revision of this conclusion. Bruno Maçães in his recently published book, “Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order”, insists that China’s BRI is a “plan to build a new world order replacing the US-led international system” by “waging an ideological

war”. 5 Maçães argues that China’s current foreign policy seeks to revive an imperial China of a bygone era by seeking to reinstate a 21st-century version of the ancient tributary system

(described in chapter 3) with China as the predominantly hierarchical power at the center. To this end, he argues that the BRI is “deliberately intended to be informal, unstructured and opaque” in establishing China’s stronghold in Eurasia. Those within Maçães’ deliberate hegemony camp include the authors Sam Parker and Gabrielle Chefitz, authors of “Debtbook Diplomacy”; “Mind of Empire” author, Christopher Ford among a slew of others. My personal theorization and argumentation are closer to the camp that combines the work of Arif Rafiq; Shireen Rehman; and John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance among others who argue for a nuanced treatment of the debate around debt-trap diplomacy and ultimately conclude that China is not currently pursuing imperial ends while identifying clear thresholds. Along with emphasizing the geopolitics at play to correct common misconceptions on this side of the debate as per the camp’s predilection, this thesis also emphasizes the importance of rhetoric in informing our understanding of these developments and the resulting debate.

Methodology

To determine an answer to the fundamental research question, I rely on small-n case studies of BRI projects in South Asia utilizing qualitative comparative analysis. The chosen case studies are the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, currently on a controversial 99-year lease to a

State-Owned Enterprise in China and the Gwadar Port in Pakistan warned to become China’s next “acquisition”. With the definitive case of asset seizure in Sri Lanka’s case and a developing story in Pakistan’s, a comparative analysist is possible to elucidate on the elements that are

5 Bruno Maçães. “Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order”, (New York: Oxford University Press US, 2019), 5.

currently imperial and trace trajectories that can confidently be hypothesized to be imperial in the future, if at all. The specific nuances and contexts of each case are respected in order to present an accurate, valid and rich account.

This discussion is foreshadowed by a clear criterion for imperialism within the current world order so as to provide a baseline standard for the evaluation of the two case studies. To contextualize the developments in the region, it is also essential to highlight the Chinese perspective. This is done by historically tracing the course of the development of China’s current foreign policy. The two cases are put into perspective by a broader discussion on the Belt and

Road Initiative, at large, with a deliberate focus on economic considerations. Since discourse drives perceptions, particularly in the case of the Initiative, popular coverage by leading news outlets in the world must be analyzed to identify trends and patterns in global reporting. To this end, digital text mining was performed on the content of eighty-three articles from 2013-present within the leading four news publications in the world: the Economist, the New York Times, the

Wall Street Journal, and Financial Times.

A significant challenge in evaluating the case studies arose from the fact that the bilateral agreements between Chinese State-Owned Enterprises and specific governments are not publicly available. Though this may be telling in and of itself, it nevertheless created a challenge to determine the precise terms and conditions driving the contractual obligations between the partnering entities. Where possible this information has been inferred, extracted and quoted from other sources. This may still, therefore, leave some portions of the portrait out. Evaluating the case studies within the broader context of questions of Chinese intent as a rising power in the region, the financial and political imperatives of the Belt and Road Initiative all the while defining imperialism to adapt it to the current international order where colonies and annexations

are less common allows for a fair and holistic treatment of the subject. Furthermore, discourse analysis adds another dimension to contextualize the perceived Western threat as well as determine the validity of the claims made by this thesis in determining the degree to which concern around imperialism is manufactured or influenced by rhetoric alone rather than actual concern and substance.

Acknowledging an initial blind spot in hindsight and admitting my blanket wariness of foreign dominance, I must divulge that my initial predilection was that the Chinese Belt and

Road Initiative (BRI) was an imperial project in essence and entirety, in spite of my stated commitment to objectivity. A trip to Gwadar6 later, I was inclined to treat elements of Chinese economic expansion in South Asia with greater nuance. I was eager to reconsider and conceptualize what imperialism entails in the international order today; contextualize developments in the region at the local and global level; rather than treat the entirety of the project as a monolith with presumed suspicion, consider individual elements in mapping those that may qualify as imperial or lack thereof; and distinguish specific trajectories from the entirety of projects in my considerations.

Peter Hall’s emphasis on aligning ontology with methodology for social science research informs my need to share this information. He states:

“I use the term [ontology] to refer to the fundamental assumptions scholars make about the nature of the social and political world and especially about the nature of the social and political world and especially about the nature of causal relationships within the world. If a methodology consists of techniques for making observations about causal relations, an ontology consists of

6 Pakistani port rumored to be the next acquisition to be added to China’s “string of pearls” in popular discourse. See Headlines such as “Gwadar: Emerging Port City or Chinese Colony?” https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/gwadar-emerging-port-city-or-chinese-colony/

premises about the deep causal structures of the world from which analysis begins and without which theories about the social world would not make sense”7.

The methodology I apply and the arguments I employ rely on the underlying ontology, on my perception of the social and political makeup of the world I live in and attempt to understand.

Needless to say, there is still an attempt to remain unbiased, albeit with the acknowledgement that our worldview informs our comprehension of what occurs therein.

Chapters

In pursuit of answering the central thesis question, the first chapter introduces the objectives and considerations of the Belt and Road Initiative as a whole, beyond South Asia.

Since arguments tethering China to imperialism, or “debt-trap diplomacy” revolve around financial concerns, the section details the cost and financing structure in detail. A brief discussion on the importance of ports to the initiative is included to clarify their importance as the primary units of study for this thesis.

The second chapter traces the evolution of the concept of Imperialism over the course of little over 101 years. Traditional political and economic theories are presented owing to their relevance. The brief historical mapping begins with John A. Hobson (1902) and concludes with

Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper (2010). This second section of this chapter delves into my criteria for imperialism: the attainment of effective sovereignty as evidenced by the power to

7 Hall, Peter. “Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics” in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.), (Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, Chapter 11, Brown University, Rhode Island, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 373-404.

make decisions on another sovereign’s behest. This provides a yardstick to measure the case studies against.

The third chapter traces China’s history as both an imperial entity and one that was the anti-imperial subject of foreign Western imperialism. After providing this context, the chapter elucidates upon China’s current foreign policy approach and clarifies the degree to which

China’s future trajectory draws on its past.

This comprehensive context setting allows for the subsequent discussion of the two case studies. Each case is treated in its own right with the specific context of its dealings introduced, the common misgivings around it laid bare and an evaluation of the facts in light of the core framework to determine the answer to the central question.

The thesis concludes with a brief note on the importance and sway of discourse in considerations around these questions.

Chapter 1

The Belt and Road Initiative

To better understand the scale and implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)’s projects in

South Asia, it would be helpful to become acquainted with the terminology, ideology, plans, and the debate pertaining to the entirety of the initiative. This chapter provides an overview of the Initiative, tracing its history and objectives along with major developments that have occurred along the way.

Questions of funding and debt burdens on countries that China invests in consistently arise, this chapter provides a breakdown of the related information that provides necessary context for the debate on “debt- trap diplomacy” that appears in the later sections of the thesis.

Overview

The Belt and Road Initiative was announced by President Xi Jinping in 2013 “[w]hen

Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Central Asia and Southeast Asia in September and October of 2013, [and] raised the initiative of jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-

Century Maritime Silk Road”8. Since its announcement, the Silk road reboot has met a share of intrigue, enthusiasm, and angst.

The official Action plan on the Belt and Road Initiative issued by the National

Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China summarizes the goals of the BRI as:

“Accelerating the building of the Belt and Road can help promote the economic prosperity of the countries along the Belt and Road and regional economic cooperation, strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between different civilizations, and promote world peace and development. It is a great undertaking that will benefit people around the world”9

8 “Action Plan on the Belt and Road Initiative.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Mar. 2015, english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm. 9 China Unveils Action Plan on Belt and Road Initiative, english.www.gov.cn/news/top_news/2015/03/28/content_281475079055789.htm.

President Xi echoed a similar gist of the BRI in his 2017 Opening Speech for the Belt and Road

Forum for International Cooperation:

“China will actively promote international cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative. In doing so, we hope to achieve policy, infrastructure, trade, financial, and people-to-people connectivity and thus build a new platform for international co-operation to create new drivers of shared development”10.

The Initiative is an open arrangement that welcomes all to countries join a network of transportation, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure linking Europe, Africa, and Asia.

The announced investment into these projects is upwards of $8 trillion11. The World Bank estimates that at least 71 countries are currently located around BRI transport corridors12. The infrastructure financing initiative will also serve important economic, foreign policy, and security objectives for the Chinese government.

10 Xi, JSecure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in all Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, Delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 October, 2017. 11 John, Scott, & Gailyn. “Examining the debt implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a policy perspective.” (Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development Washington, DC, 2019), 3,139. 12 World Bank. “Belt and Road Economics : Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors”. (Washington, DC: World Bank. © World Bank, 2019), 74.

“The Belt and Road Initiative includes includes 1/3 of world trade and GDP and over 60% of the world’s population”. The World Bank, March 29, 2018.

The 13th Five-Year Plan clearly outlines the intended objectives of the Initiative in Chapter 5113 and are quoted directly:

Section 1 Cooperation Mechanisms We will improve the bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms of the Belt and Road Initiative focusing on policy communication, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation, capital flow, and people-to- people exchanges. We will increase cohesion between the development plans and technological standards of China and those of other countries along the routes of the Belt and Road Initiative, make further efforts to facilitate transport among countries along the routes, and simplify customs clearance procedures along the routes. We will establish a diversified, project-based financing model that includes the participation of enterprises and institutions with enterprises as the main actors and that is led by investment funds of various types. We will strengthen cooperation with international organizations including international financial organizations and institutions, work actively to promote the development of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, put the Silk Road Fund to effective use, and attract international capital for the creation of a financial cooperation platform

13 The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic And Social Development of the People's Republic of China. (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, China, 2017), 141-143.

that is open, pluralistic, and mutually beneficial. We will give full play to the role of overseas Chinese, returned overseas Chinese, and the relatives of overseas Chinese who live in China in fostering bridges of communication and bonds of friendship.

Section 2 Economic Corridors We will actively advance the development of international economic cooperation corridors, such as the China-Mongolia-Russia corridor, the China-Central Asia-West Asia corridor, the China- Indochina Peninsula corridor, the new Eurasian Continental Bridge, the China-Pakistan corridor, and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corridor. We will increase infrastructure connectivity with neighboring countries and work with them to build infrastructure networks that connect sub-regions within Asia as well as Asia, Europe, and Africa. We will strengthen international cooperation on energy and resources and production chains, and increase local processing and conversion. We will support the development of international container shipping services and postal train routes such as those between China and Europe. We will build an international logistics park for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and a China-Kazakhstan logistics cooperation center. We will actively advance the construction of strategic maritime hubs along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, participate in the building and operation of major ports along the road, and promote the joint development of industrial clusters around these ports to ensure that maritime trade routes are clear and free-flowing. We will advance the development of multi- modal transportation that integrates expressways, railways, waterways, and airways, build international logistics thoroughfares, and strengthen infrastructure development along major routes and at major ports of entry. We will work to develop Xinjiang as the core region for the Silk Road Economic Belt and Fujian as the core region for the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. We will work to develop the Maritime Silk Road Index into an influential international shipping indicator.

Section 3 Open and Inclusive Cultural Exchanges We will work to ensure the success of the International Summit for the Belt and Road Initiative and give expression to the role of the Silk Road (Dunhuang) International Culture Expo. We will conduct extensive international cooperation in the areas of education, science, technology, culture, sports, tourism, environmental protection, health care, and traditional Chinese medicine. We will create mechanisms for official and nongovernmental cultural exchanges that involve the participation of multiple parties; hold events such as culture years, art festivals, film festivals, and expos with other countries; encourage diverse kinds of folk culture exchanges; and give full expression to the positive role of folk cultures such as Mazu culture. We will coordinate China’s efforts with other countries to develop unique tourism products and increase the convenience of tourism. We will strengthen international exchanges and cooperation on health care and epidemic prevention and enhance our capacity to jointly handle public health emergencies with other countries. We will promote the establishment of think tank associations.

The direct presentation of China’s intentions for the project will allow for informed contrast with claims of deliberate Chinese imperialisms presented in later sections of the thesis.

72 counties across various continents have cooperation agreements with China as part of the Initiative:

Their intended interconnectedness can be visualized as such:

The Initiative classifies these networks into six broad Economic Corridors. Infrastructure investment along these corridors is concentrated in energy- and resource-rich regions in the world. These corridors can be seen in the OECD map as well as enumerated as such:

BRI Cost and Financing

Estimates for Chinese investment under the BRI range from US$1 trillion to US$8 trillion14. The investment within projects in all sectors that are already executed, in implementation, or planned is already estimated to exceed US$575 billion. Upon completion, the projects are expected to reduce travel times along economic corridors by 12%, increase trade between 2.7% and 9.7%, increase income by up to 3.4% and lift 7.6 million from extreme poverty. This potential increase is testament to the fact that many of these countries are currently underserved by their existent infrastructure. The BRI corridors by reducing travel time and increasing trade and investment will reduce losses incurred from the fact that these countries currently under trade by 30 percent and fall short of their FDI potential by 70 percent. Travel times for the rest of the world will also be reduced by 3%. Quite importantly, low-income countries are expected to see a significant 7.6 percent increase in foreign direct investment due to the new transport links15.

The figure below outlines the breakdown of BRI investments. Nearly a sizable 20% of the investments are in South Asia. Overall, transportation and shipping, as well as energy and electric power, constitute the highest industries by investment. Nearly all of the expected financing will be to lower and upper-middle-income countries, with only 1 percent to low- income countries and 11 percent to high-income economies. The most substantial BRI investments are in energy. The energy and transport industries absorb 71 percent of the total costs of the BRI. Only US$66 billion were allocated to projects already completed by the end of

2016; most BRI investment is on projects in the construction or planning phase.16

14 Jonathan Hillman “How Big Is China’s Belt and Road?” Blog post, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. Available at: https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-bigchinas-belt-and-road, 2018. 15 World Bank, Belt and Road Economics : Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridor, 5. 16 World Bank, Belt and Road Economics : Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridor, 37-40.

Because infrastructure financing through the BRI involves lending to sovereigns or the use of sovereign guarantee creates concerns for sovereign debt sustainability. “[W]hen the creditor itself is a sovereign or has official ties to a sovereign as do China’s policy banks—China

Development Bank (CDB), the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank), and the

Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC)—these challenges often affect the bilateral

relationship between the two governments.”17 The plan has the potential to boost business and trading as well as growth and development. At the same time, there is concern regarding the inability of developing countries to service BRI-related debt, leaving them with stranded infrastructure, adversely affected communities and environments on one end of the consequence spectrum and imbalanced trade relations and compromises on sovereignty, on the other. The

World Bank Report comments:

“[the] Belt and Road transport corridors have the potential to substantially improve trade, foreign investment, and living conditions for citizens in the initiative’s participating countries— but only if China and corridor economies adopt deeper policy reforms that increase transparency, expand trade, improve debt sustainability, and mitigate environmental, social, and corruption risks”18.

The primary concern, however, is that debt burdens will create an unfavorable degree of dependency on China as a creditor. Debt sustainability is, therefore, vital for ensuring that the initiative yields the results it intends. For low-income developing countries, the degree of concession of a loan is linked to the risk incurred by the borrower. Since the Chinese

Development Bank and the China Exim Bank do not disclose the terms of their loans, it is difficult, if not impossible in some cases to assess the value of debt owed by a country to China at any given time. Anecdotal evidence from media and IMF reports indicate that the terms vary widely from project to project. The discrepancies range from interest-free loans in the case of some Pakistan projects to a fully commercial rate in the case of the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway19.

17 John Scott, & Gailyn, Examining the debt implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a policy perspective, 1. 18 World Bank, Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridor, xiii. 19 See IMF, July 2016 for grant elements calculated for select Djibouti projects, and Mughal, 2017 for reporting on Pakistan.

Expected BRI investments are exceptionally large for some countries and BRI investment takes place in countries with very different debt sustainability situations. The World Bank informs that:

“one-third of BRI-recipient LIDCs with a recent debt sustainability analysis, have a high risk of debt distress. Nearly two-thirds of BRI-recipient EMEs face elevated debt vulnerabilities, requiring high scrutiny, with debt above the indicative thresholds of 50 percent of GDP or gross financing needs above 15 percent of GDP.”20

Countries with already vulnerable debt situations may have minimal fiscal space to take on new borrowing.

Current and expected BRI investments are disproportionately distributed. Around 66% of the entirety is expected to accrue to just seven countries, with Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the

Russian Federation accounting for 50 percent of the total (Belt and Road Economics, 2018).

Similarly, the investments constitute a range of the share of their respective GDP. According to the WIND database, the investment does not exceed 6 percent of GDP for most countries scaled

20 World Bank, Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridor, 40.

by the 2017 GDP of these countries dispersed over multiple years. The median annual BRI financing in the WIND database amounts to a little over 1 percent of GDP if disbursed over five years until 2023. The disparities between countries, however, both in terms of investment and percentage of GDP are evident. In some countries, the investments surpass 20 percent and beyond. The share of GDP is an important indicator of the ability of these countries to repay their debts.

Credit Rating Score by BRI-participating economy versus construction project investment

StatLink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933786401 The figure shows the sovereign credit ratings calculated by scoring the ratings from Moody’s and

S&P/Fitch (the grey area) and the investment by China in construction projects for each economy. There are 17 economies with investment-grade at or above BBB- (with a score of 12 or above). There are 29 economies rated below investment grade and 14 with no rating at all

graph 21. Over half of the cumulative total investment since 2005, USD 253.8 billion, has been in these latter economies. This calls into question the viability of the projects in below investment- grade economies.

The BRI is being financed in the context of rising public and corporate debt, according to the World Bank. Public debt in emerging market economies (EMEs) has been rising and has reached levels not seen since the 1980s. Additionally, changes in public debt composition and rising corporate debt add to the financial risks and vulnerabilities facing these economies. Debt risks have also risen substantially for low-income developing countries (LIDCs) in recent years.

“The share of countries at high risk of debt distress or in debt distress has doubled since 2013— to about 40 percent”.22 Although external debt has been historically small in corridor economies, it has risen for countries at a higher risk of debt distress, particularly the low-income developing countries (LIDCs). “Debt from multilateral and traditional bilateral creditors represented more than 70 percent of all external public debt of BRI-recipient LIDCs in 2016.”23

At the same time, the analysis conducted by Hurley, Morris, and Portelance finds that the

BRI is unlikely to cause a systemic debt problem in the regions of the initiative’s focus. When the investment amounts are assessed in the context of the size of individual economies, the costs are consistent with current levels of infrastructure investment in contrast to aggregate numbers appearing disparagingly large. They state that “[o]ver a 20-year span, an $8 trillion investment program for BRI countries would amount to less than 1.5 percent of GDP per annum, and about

2.5 percent excluding China” while qualifying this with the assertion that “there are some countries, most of whom are small and relatively poor, that face a significantly increased risk of

21 OECD, "The Belt and Road Initiative in the global trade, investment and finance landscape", (in OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2018), 21. 22 World Bank, Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridor, 40. 23 World Bank, Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridor, 42.

a sovereign debt default if planned BRI projects are implemented in an expeditious manner and financed with sovereign loans or guarantees”24. They also provide an excellent summary of the costs of debt unsustainability for countries as well as the significance of ensuring otherwise due to the far-reaching consequences (page 29).

24 John Scott, & Gailyn, “Examining the debt implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a policy perspective”. (USA: Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development, 2019), 144.

Source: John Scott, & Gailyn, “Examining the debt implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a policy perspective, 2019, 3.

While the debate about the sustainability and sovereignty implications of Chinese investment rages on, China claims to remain committed to pursuing her goals on the basis of

“Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence” that aims to honor the sovereignty of all participating countries:

“China will enhance friendship and cooperation with all countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. We are ready to share practices of development with other countries, but we have no intention to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs, export our own social system and model of development, or impose our own will on others. In pursuing the Belt and Road Initiative, we will not resort to outdated geopolitical maneuvering. What we hope to achieve is a new model of win-win cooperation. We have no intention to form a small group detrimental to stability, what we hope to create is a big family of harmonious co-existence.”25

Although a multifaceted initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative prioritizes ports as strategic business holdings (see figure on page 31). China is currently involved in the construction or cooperation of 116 ports in 62 countries26. Lucrative investments for trade, nearly two-thirds of the world’s top 50 ports had some degree of Chinese investment in 2015. Of the top

10 port operators worldwide, Chinese companies handled 39 percent of all volumes27. Concerns of China’s economic expansion within South Asia also revolve around port holdings. The attaining of a share by a Chinese state-owned enterprise in the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka in

2017 became the centerpiece of controversy surrounding the Belt and Road Initiative. Recently, the Chinese interest in Gwadar in Pakistan is being viewed with similar suspicion and caution.

These are the only two mainland South Asian ports at the moment and, therefore, viable case

25 Xi Jinping, Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, Opening speech, The Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, Beijing, China, May 2017. 26 Deborah Brautigam, “A Critical Look at Chinese ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy’: the Rise of a Meme.” (USA: Area Development and Policy, vol. 5, no. 1, 2019), 8. 27 James Kynge, et al. “How China Rules the Waves.” The Financial Times, 2016.

studies for evaluating concerns of Chinese economic expansion, as part of the Belt and Road

Initiative in South Asia.

Source: Financial Times, 2017

This chapter provides a brief overview of the Belt and Road Initiative, the specifics of its funding, a presentation of its core ideology, a foreshadowing of the debt-distress debate to follow and the BRI’s maritime focus. In addition to serving as essential background information for contextualizing the remainder of the thesis, this chapter should also drive home the fact that the

BRI is a series of bilateral agreements rather than a concerted mammoth of a monolith.

Chapter 2

Imperialism 101

Prior to deliberating on the question of Chinese imperialism, the standards for imperialism must be defined. Imperialism is a charged term today with a heavy connotational burden even in everyday usage. This chapter provides an overview of the extant theorization on it before presenting my own humble model for understanding what imperialism entails. There is no dearth of theories, models, and frameworks aimed at identifying the motivations for and characteristics of imperialism. The rich literature spanning over more than 101 years is briefly summarized in the following section, oftentimes in the terminology employed by the scholars themselves to retain the authenticity of their models. The literature review is by no means exhaustive albeit it is comprehensive in nodding at least to the giants and imminent scholars within the canon in chronological order. The second subsection includes my own humble attempt at providing a theoretical framework for conceptualizing imperialism.

Literature Review

John A. Hobson (1902) is the first to comment on imperialism, particularly as a nationalistic business enterprise. He argues that the large economic gains attributable to foreign investment for certain classes within a nation serve as the primary motivation for engaging in imperialism. He insists that special interest groups, led by financiers, are self-interested in an expansionist foreign policy that promotes the needs of capital investors for investment outlets.

He states:

“Certain definite business and professional interests feeding upon imperialistic expenditure or upon the results of that expenditure are thus set up in opposition to the common good, and instinctively … are united in strong sympathy to support every new imperialist exploit.”28

28 John A. Hobson, “Imperialism: A Study”, (New York: James Pott & Co., 1902), 53.

Colonies are, therefore, what James Mill terms, “a vast system of outdoor relief for the upper classes” 29 to Hobson. To him, “by far the most important economic factor in Imperialism is the influence relating to investments.” 30 He postulates that every advanced industrial nation stands to profit from income produced from investments in colonies. Commenting on the British

Empire as grounds for his theory, he concludes that “[i]mperialism has been coincident with remarkable growth in the income from external investments” in Britain’s case.31 In 1893, the

British capital invested abroad represented 15 per cent of their total wealth: “nearly one-half of this capital was in the form of loans to foreign and colonial Governments.”32 The income, derived through interest on these investments easily exceeded the income derived as profit on regular import/export trade for the United Kingdom and, therefore, provided sound economic incentive for engaging in imperialism (to provide avenues for foreign investment and the resulting income).

He values the pure profit from British investments in 1899 at £90,000,000 to £100,000,000 to support his assertion. He insists that investors take on significantly high-risk but potentially high-reward risk and, therefore, desire to use “the resources of their Government to minimize these risks and so to enhance the capital value and the interest of their private investments”33.

This is precisely the motivation for seeking further expansion as well. He qualifies this with a brief allusion to the fact that imperialism is not entirely financial:

“Finance manipulates the patriotic forces which politicians, soldiers, philanthropists, and traders generate; the enthusiasm for expansion which issues from these sources, though strong and genuine, is irregular and blind; the financial interest has those qualities of concentration and clear-sighted calculation which are needed to set Imperialism to work.”34

29 Quoted in Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, 56. 30 Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, 56. 31 Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, 57. 32 Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, 59. 33 Hobson, Imperialism: A Study. 63. 34 Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, 66.

Hobson’s imperialism is thus a holistic endeavor fueled by various classes within a

“metropole” incentivized primarily by a variety of self-interested gains to be derived from foreign investment.

For Vladimir Lenin (1917), imperialism is not the product of the special interests of high finance in the colonizing country. To Lenin, imperialism is the manifestation of capitalism in its financial, monopoly, and final stage driving overseas expansion in search of raw materials, markets, and profits. Lenin summarizes his own argument as follows: “[i]f it were necessary to give the briefest possible definition of imperialism we should have to say that imperialism is the monopoly stage of capitalism”. Such a definition, he adds:

“would include what is most important, for, on the one hand, finance capital is the bank capital [i.e., the money capital] of a few big monopolist banks, merged with the capital of the monopolist associations of industrialists; and, on the other hand, the division of the world is the transition from a colonial policy which has extended without hindrance to territories unseized by any capitalist power, to a colonial policy of monopolist possession of the territory of the world, which has been completely divided up.”35

Lenin notes five essential features of the imperialist stage of capitalism:

“the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation on the basis of this “finance capital”, of a financial oligarchy; the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; the formation of international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves; and the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed. Imperialism is capitalism in that stage of development at which the dominance of monopolies and finance capital is established; in which the export of capital has acquired pronounced importance; in which the division of the world among the international trusts has begun; in which the division of all territories of the globe among the biggest capitalist powers has been completed”36.

35 Vladimir Ilʹich Lenin, “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline.” (New York: International Publishers, 1939), 10. 36 Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 10-11.

Joseph Schumpeter (1919) conversely contests the relationship between capitalism and imperialism and insists that the two are antithetical rather than complementary. He defines imperialism as “the objectless disposition of a state to unlimited forcible expansion.”37

Schumpeter’s imperialism therefore has two characteristics: it is both atavistic and forced. Since

Schumpeter insists upon the irrationality of the exercise in contrast to the rationality of capitalism, he concludes that “[i]t would never have been evolved by the ‘inner logic’ of capitalism itself.”38 Since this contradicts with the individualistic and rational tendencies of capitalism which are better served by peacemaking, he insists that two are indirectly corelated.

The greater degree of capitalism, ought to diminish imperial tendencies which are pre-capitalist according to Schumpeter. He asserts that “export monopolism” is not imperialism in “Sociology of Imperialism” written in 1919 in the following terms:

“It would never have been evolved by the ‘inner logic’ of capitalism itself. This is true even of mere export monopolism. It too has its sources in absolutist policy and the action habits of an essentially pre-capitalist environment. That it was able to develop to its present dimensions is owing to the momentum of a situation once created, which continued to engender ever new ‘artificial’ economic structures, that is, those which maintain themselves by political power alone. In most of the countries addicted to export monopolism it is also owing to the fact that the old autocratic state and the old attitude of the bourgeoisie toward it were so vigorously maintained. But export monopolism, to go a step further, is not yet imperialism.”39

John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson (1953) famously define the Imperialism of Free

Trade as “a sufficient political function of this process of integrating new regions into the expanding economy; its character is largely decided by the various and changing relationships between the political and economic elements of expansion in any particular region and time.”40

37 Joseph Schumpeter, “The Sociology of Imperialisms” (Ohio, World Publishing Company 1919), 6. 38 Joseph Schumpeter, The Sociology of Imperialisms, 97. 39 Joseph Schumpeter, The Sociology of Imperialisms. 97. 40 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson. “The Partition of Africa.” (London: International Journal 17, no. 2, 1962), 155-159.

They further contend that for economic development to qualify as imperialism, there must be a clear government-backed action to protect it strategically from the imperial power’s end. They contest that ‘[t]he usual summing up of the policy of the free trade empire as “trade not rule” should read “trade with informal control if possible; trade with rule when necessary.”41 They add two caveats as qualifications:

“First, imperialism may be only indirectly connected with economic integration in that it sometimes extends beyond areas of economic development but acts for their strategic protection. Secondly, although imperialism is a function of economic expansion, it not a necessary function”.

They emphasize that imperialism is not only restricted to the economic or political sphere but also includes the social and world context to operate. For Gallagher and Robinson, both formal and informal empire “appear as variable political functions of the extending patters of overseas trade, investment, migration and culture” and are “essentially interconnected and to some extent interchangeable.”42 They importantly note that “the type of political lien between the expanding economy and its formal or informal dependencies as it might be expected has been flexible”. They insist that the most common political technique of British expansion was the treaty of free trade and friendship made with or imposed upon a weaker state. Gallagher and

Robinson’s definition of imperialism of free trade is, therefore, free trade crossing the threshold of mere economic considerations and becoming a holistic national endeavor supported politically, socially, and militarily by the home front.

Kenneth Waltz (1979) insists that motives for empire vary but the disparity of power between the dominant and subordinate state remains a constant feature among them all. He draws attention to the opportunities for imperial control present within the international order.

41 Gallagher and Robinson, The Partition of Africa, 155-159. 42 Gallagher and Robinson, The Partition of Africa, 155-159.

Waltz summarizes imperialism as “[w]here gross imbalances of power exist, and where the means of transportation permit the export of goods and of the instruments of rule, the more capable people ordinarily exert a considerable influence over those less able to produce surpluses.” 43 Another commonality among imperial movements is the incentive of seeking a surplus of people, goods, and capital and these three imperialisms are compatible with a variety of regimes, including republics (Rome), monarchies (Bourbon France, and modern democracies

(United States). These common grounds, therefore, constitute the central characteristics and motivations of an imperial power.

Michael Doyle (1986) defines empires as:

“relationships of political control imposed by some political societies over the effective sovereignty of other political societies. They include more than just formally annexed territories, but they encompass less than the sum of all forms of international inequality. Imperialism is simply the process of establishing and maintaining an empire.”44

The forces and institutions that drive and shape imperialism can be political, military, social and cultural. “When these forces and institutions actually connect the societies of metropoles with the societies of peripheries, they generate opportunities and incentives for domination by the metropole as well as vulnerabilities to conquest and incentives for collaboration in the periphery”. He elaborates his central argument in his own words as:

“Imperial control is distinguished by its domain. It controls the lives of individuals without necessarily sharing their values. It is also distinguished by its scope. It engages in politics, not merely in war or diplomacy. The agents of empire shape, formally or informally, the political life of the subordinate periphery. Those agents control both the domestic and the foreign issues that affect the populations subject to imperial rule. In governing those populations, they employ a range of rewards and punishments considerably beyond those of conventional international relations. They thereby achieve more weight than influence or constraint; they control effective sovereignty.”45

43 Kenneth Waltz, “Theory of International Politics,” (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), 26. 44 Michael W. Doyle, “Empires”. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1986), 19. 45 Michael W. Doyle, Empires, 45.

Ronald Hyam (1999) presents a mutually interactive, “two-levels” model which represents “an effective interaction between the inner and outer opinions of imperial political power.” 46 The model “allocates economic motives primarily to the periphery level,”47and

“political or strategic considerations” primarily to the elite level. He states that within the model:

“metropolitan policies (at one level) are handed down from the elite group at the center or political apex, and (at another level) local pressures- set in motion by concessionaries, colonial adventurer, missionaries, settlers. Revenue-seeking army officers, etc.- are being transmitted upwards from the base-line of the geographic periphery”.

Source: Hyam, 1999

Neither the metropolitan not the local level of action is unilaterally decisive. The effective interaction between the two spheres “is mediated or funneled through an individual”. In this

46 Ronald Hyam. “The Primacy of Geopolitics: the Dynamics of British Imperial Policy, 1763–1963.” (Understanding the British Empire, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 71-97. 47 Ronald Hyam. The Primacy of Geopolitics, 71-97.

model, a key role thus exists for the “man on the spot”- the proconsuls, the ambassadors, the high commissioners, the governors, the viceroys, the commanders-in-chief.

Source: Hyam, 1999

These aggregate of these individual interactions at the level of the elite at the center and those at the periphery (in relation to the imperial power) as they interact through mediators, meeting each other half-way while incentivized by their own self-interests represents the process of imperialism. The model includes forces at play at three levels and the intersection represents the imperial process.

Source: Hyam, 1999

David Abernethy (2000) defines empire “in political terms as a relationship of domination and subordination between one polity (called the metropole) and one or more territories (called colonies) that lie outside the metropole’s boundaries yet are claimed as its lawful possessions”. For Abernathy, the distinctive core of imperialism is political control and imperialism “is the process of constructing an empire.”48 For Abernethy, a dominant state is an imperial metropole and a weaker territory a colony when:

“the dominant state formally claims the right to make authoritative decisions affecting the weaker territory’s domestic affairs and external relations; the weaker territory is not recognized as a sovereign state by major actors in the interstate system; the dominant state establishes and staffs administrative structures that extract resources, allocate resources, and enforce regulations within some economically or strategically significant portion of the weaker territory.” 49

48 David B Abernethy. “The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980.” (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 20. 49 David B. Abernethy. The Dynamics of Global Dominance, 20.

Notably, his definition includes “unequally powerful entities in which a stronger state does not advance formal claims to control the weaker territory’s domestic or foreign affairs.” 50

He includes the subtlety of the weaker state’s continued recognition as a sovereign state even though “the stronger state’s institutions [can] exert marked influence over affairs in the weaker territory.” 51 These elements of covert subjugation as a result of a power imbalance also inform my own definition. Furthermore, his commentary on ports and hinterlands is particularly relevant to this thesis. My own theory presented later in the chapter allows for the evaluation of territories and ports as imperial possessions. He elaborates on the qualifying conditions for these twrritories to still be regarded as imperial posessions:

“Administrative control might be exercised over a port and its hinterland, for example, or over a coastal zone or transport networks linking a port to zones of mineral and agricultural wealth. A territory can be considered an imperial possession even if a metropole is unable effectively to govern its entire area.” 52

This definition excludes relationships among unequally powerful entities in which a stronger state does not advance formal claims to control the weaker territory’s domestic or foreign affairs; the weaker territory is widely recognized as a sovereign state; yet the stronger state’s institutions exert marked influence over affairs in the weaker territory53. A colony to Abernathy is, thus, a penetrated polity that has its domestic and foreign affairs monopolized or territorial sovereignty compromised.

50 David B. Abernethy. The Dynamics of Global Dominance, 20. 51 David B. Abernethy. The Dynamics of Global Dominance, 20. 52 David B. Abernethy. The Dynamics of Global Dominance, 20. 53 David B. Abernethy. The Dynamics of Global Dominance, 20.

Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper (2010) state that “[e]mpires are large political units, expansionist, or with a memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain distinction and hierarchy as they incorporate new people”54. “Imperial repertoires” are flexible to improvise when constrained by geography and history. They alter and adapt their capacity and strategies.

Empires historically sought to draw on “human and material resources beyond the reach of any national polity, seeking control over both contiguous and distant land and peoples”. This drive for expansion is rooted in the logic of enrichment through this means. All historical empires share five key themes within their framework:

Difference within empires

They highlight that each empire is reliant on incorporation and differentiation, depending

on the specific context for the most effective strategy. “The politics of difference, in some

empires, could mean recognizing the multiplicity of peoples and their varied customs as

an ordinary fact of life; in others it meant drawing a strict boundary between

undifferentiated insiders and ‘barbarian’ outsiders”55.

Imperial Intermediaries

Intermediaries from the homeland or skilled/knowledgeable imperial agents who are

“expected to act in the imperial interest.”56 Coopting indigenous elites, sending settlers,

and settling slaves or individuals detached from the communities of origin are tactics

54 Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, “Empires in world history: Power and the politics of difference”. (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2010), 8. 55 Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History, 12. 56 Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History. 14.

employed by empires. They emphasize a vertical relationship between the empire and

these agents with both tugging in their own respective directions.

Imperial Intersections: Imitation, Conflict, Transformation

“Relationships among empires were critical to their politics and to their subjects’

possibilities”57. The interaction of empires with one another produce competition,

imitation, innovation, transformation, and both conflict and peace.

Imperial Imaginaries

Imperial context and prior experience informs the politics of empires at any given time.

This allows empires to adapt and improvise in light of their historical lessons as well as

their current contexts.

Repertoires of power

Empires could redefine their allocations of power and privilege to add ambiguity

allowing them to adapt and maintain resilience as a political system.58

There is evidently a rich history of debate on the motivations and criteria for imperialism throughout the past century and beyond. An array of possible explanations are presented for why empires engage in not only expanding but also seeking to dominate territories well beyond their own expanses. There is also lively disagreement on what constitutes the direct locomotives of

57 Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History, 14. 58 Burbank and Cooper. Empires in World History, 16.

imperialism and what merely the fuel. The term itself represents everything from incentives,

processes and ideas to practices, interactions and political realities. There is, therefore, a need to

clearly demarcate the meaning of the term before proceeding to weigh its considerations within

South Asia.

Defining Imperialism

I strongly concur with two of Abernethy’s assertions: one, that a weaker state can be

subjected to the imperialism of a stronger state while retaining its overall status as a sovereign

state; and two, ports and hinterlands can qualify as imperial possessions even if they are not

under the absolute administrative control of the stronger state. Nevertheless, I argue that merely

the presence of a stronger power within these territories or an interaction with it does not

constitute imperialism. My definition identifies the threshold for the power imbalance between

two states to qualify as imperialism. Like Robert Dahl, I argue that this power imbalance ranges

on a spectrum from complete independence between two states to one exercising hegemony over

the other (see Figure 1). In port terms, one state exercising hegemonic control of a port. All

degrees prior to that can qualify as imperial trajectories, as put forth by Burbank and Cooper, but

they do not qualify as imperialism.

Figure 1: The Spectrum of Power Imbalance

Hegemony / Independence Interdependence Dependence Imperialism

Source: Author’s personal illustration

My conceptualization of imperialism presupposes anarchy within the international order. The founding father of the notion of anarchy, Hobbes insists upon a state of the “war of every one against every one” on the basis of a disposition of expected threat in the future. No state can be certain of the intentions of other, possibly hostile states, which “[have] their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another.”59 This state of mutual hostility is derived from the uncertainty of other states’ and presents an ever-present security dilemma within International

Relations literature. Even if Hobbes’ state of “war” is somewhat exaggerated, scholars can seldom deny the underlying anarchy and pursuit of self-security by states. For instance,

Benjamin Cohen, 1973, insists that the very anarchic nature of the international order gives rise to the regularity of incentives to pursue imperialism.

Implicit in this assumption are these truths: a) an absence of an overarching sovereign, an ultimate judicial authority, a guarantor of equal rights and consequently b) a resulting sense of self-preservation among states acting in their self-interest. In the absence of an ultimate sovereign, all states are effective, equal, and rational sovereigns in so far as the motivation to guarantee security for their own state is concerned. This “security” extends beyond merely procuring the physical safety of the territory of a state. I argue that the provision of economic security is also considered obligatory on states and an extension of political safety since the two are closely intertwined, now more so than ever. This necessitates the security of employment, raw materials, markets, capital, investment opportunities, and employment for the comfortable sustenance of the citizenry. A government failing to do so not only loses legitimacy, resources, and clout at home but also witnesses a waning of political soft and hard power abroad.

59 Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan”. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), 90.

Although states interact as sovereigns, political and economic inequalities exist among

them. These gaps or divergences ultimately represent a power imbalance between them. Robert

Dahl, for instance, insists that international political inequality is a continuum that ranges from

diplomacy or interdependence to imperial or hegemonial control.60 The middle ground is

occupied by considerable foreign dependence or influence. In the same spirit, I argue that these

inequalities of power, are a spectrum rather than absolutes. The spectrum ranges from

independence between two states to the final stage where one has obtained hegemony over the

other. To reiterate, the power differential is a spectrum ranging from states being entirely

independent of another; to engaging in a mutually dependent relationship; to one state being

dependent on another; to the final stage whereby one has attained hegemony and therefore

decision-making power on its own behest and its own interests, it has attained effective

sovereignty.

Hegemony / Independence Interdependence Dependence Imperialism

The final stage is the ideal, best case scenario for all states in their interaction with other states

albeit not the most realistic. Therefore, it is a goal pursued with rationality. States weigh the

benefits and detriments in progressing from one stage to another. The process of progression

from one stage to another indicates an imperial trajectory if hegemony (synonymous to effective

sovereignty for the hegemonic power) is intended or attained as in the final stage.

60 Robert Dahl, “Polyarchy”, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 231.

The difference is between the degree of political control exercised at each stage. With each progression, it should increase and simultaneously erode the sovereignty of the subordinate.

Sway in decision-making, effective political control, is the most prominent marker of the stage at which the imperial process is complete. Although gradual influence and domination do not constitute imperialism as standalones, they can indicate possible imperial trajectories. This potential subjugation of one polity by another is possible through an array of means: political, economic, religious, cultural and most likely a concoction or cocktail of the base ingredients.

The end goal, however, is attaining decision-making power in the best interest of the dominant polity. I argue that this general framework also applies to specific territories such as ports.

Should a state attain hegemonic control over such a territory, the port can qualify as an imperial possession since this control awards decision-making power exclusively to the stronger state.

Mutual cooperation or interdependence would not meet the threshold for imperialism.

Nevertheless, a growing degree of control that indicates the progression of the power imbalance from one stage to the next between two states can indicate an imperial trajectory.

Burbank and Cooper elaborate:

“An imperial repertoire was neither a bag of tricks dipped into a random nor a preset formula for rule…They also had their habits [and were]…shaped by past practices and constrained by context- both by other empires with their overlapping goals and by people in places empire- builders coveted.”61

The same logic applies to what I am terming imperial trajectories. Recognizing that these trajectories are inherently born out of politico-economic inequality and are adaptive mechanisms helps to avoid “the false dichotomies of continuity, change contingency or determinism”62. It also allows for recognizing the historical and contextual influence of imperial motivations on the

61 Burbank and Cooper. Empires in World History, 3. 62 Burbank and Cooper. Empires in World History, 3.

politics of today as well as granting us the possibility to reimagine empires with their 21st century update. Theorizing in this manner allows us to recognize that political control and imperialism may be disguised in subtleties and that acquiring such political control is a process rather than an absolute end. This has an important implication: polities today can still have imperial characteristics and trajectories without being Empires. This adds nuance in determining what is imperialist and otherwise instead of dealing in absolutes.

Chapter 3

China and the Question of Empire: Imperial History and Modern Foreign Policy

China enjoys a unique status within the world order as a polity that has both an imperial legacy of its own and a history of subjection to Western imperialism. China’s current borders are approximately the same vast expanse as the Chinese Empire under the Qing Dynasty’s rule.

Furthermore, the authoritarian and ideological rule by the Communist Party of China within the confines of its borders compels scholars to distinguish it from modern democratic states. Some even consider China to be an empire to this day. Before delving into the debate on Chinese imperialism, the thesis intends to provide context for the ideology and history that informs

China’s foreign policy through this chapter. The chapter, therefore, traces the historical developments that lead us to modern-day China and its foreign-policy predilections as well as shedding light on the debate regarding China’s status as a modern-day empire.

Context

Historian, Odd Arne Westad defines China as a “culture, a state and a geographical core, around which identities, boundaries and definitions of purpose have shifted and adjusted for a very long time.”63 The history of modern China’s foreign-relations trajectory, however, begins with the Qing dynasty which ruled from 1644 to 1912. In the time since, the historical legacies surrounding strong identification with the state, Confucian culture, and regional geography continue to define a sense of direction for modern-day China.64

The sense of centrality has historically informed the Chinese mindset. China originated in the Yellow river valley, first as many states that collectively called themselves the Central

Kingdoms, Zhongguo— the Chinese name for China. Imperial China’s sense of superiority was

63 Odd Arne Westad, (Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750, United Kingdom: Basic Books, 2012), 4. 64 Jonathan Spence, (The Search for Modern China, New York: Norton, 1990), 140.

a fundamental and cosmological given.65 As Terrill states, “the doctrine behind the confidence was cosmological, hierarchical, and based on a social ethic, yet with a dose of realpolitik”.66 At the same time, Westad insists that “justice, rules, and centrality—these three crucial concepts should always be borne in mind when considering the past, present, and future of Chinese foreign policy”.67

China’s present-day borders closely resemble those during the Qing dynasty’s, when

China was at the zenith of power. The empire consolidated its rule over all of China and expanded its imperial government into Central Asia, Tibet, and Mongolia. Smaller states from

Korea to Burma explicitly recognized the preeminence of the Qing and their Central Kingdom although sometimes to their own strategic benefit:

“By the 1750s, it had crushed the political and military independence of all the smaller nations on its northern frontier and begun incorporating them into a much-enlarged China. It had regulated its relations with its remaining neighbors, from the Russian empire in the north to the kingdoms in Southeast Asia and in the Himalayas, according to Chinese preconditions and based on a Chinese sense of superiority. By the middle part of the eighteenth century, the Qing empire had created a world in eastern Asia that was almost entirely its own”.68

The Qing empire was convinced that it “reverently [held] the mandate of Heaven to rule both China and foreigners.”69 The Qing empire was committed to making China a multicultural dynastic state with universalistic pretensions.70 This goal stressed the coordination of the economic, technical, and ideological wings of the empire. To this end, the Qing adapted their foreign policy approaches to the regions they dealt with:

65 Alain, Peyrefitte. (L’Empire Immobile ou Le Choc des Mondes. Paris: Librarie Arthème Fayard, 1989), 444. 66 Ross Terrill, (The New Chinese Empire: and What It Means for the United States, Cornelia and Michael Bessie, 2004), 56. 67 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire, 6. 68 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire, 6. 69 Joseph F. Fletcher. (China and Central Asia. In John K. Fairbank,ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 56. 70Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire, 7.

“By 1750, the Qing operated in three distinct spheres of foreign affairs: Central Asia, where the theme was expansion; coastal Asia, where the theme was trade and tribute; and Russia, where the theme was diplomacy. Policy on all of these fronts was coordinated to leave the Qing emperors time to fully impose their rule on China, while exterminating those enemies at the frontiers whom Beijing thought capable of threatening its rule.”71

A Beijing historian reiterates this approach by highlighting that the Qing Dynasty ruled its borders by “being flexible according to the region concerned (yindi zhiyi)” and “controlling according to the customs pertaining (yin su er zhi).”72 Every Chinese dynasty is stated to follow the pragmatic two pronged policy of “a hard core of wei (force) surrounded by a soft pulp of de

(virtue), the iron fist tucked into a velvet glove.”73 Until the arrival of the British and the French in the nineteenth century, Russia was China’s only regional imperial neighbor. China seldom sent envoys abroad intending to do anything but “bestow[ing] rank and symbols of office upon submissive tributaries.”74 The notable exceptions were at the time of the Ming dynasty and even these were not analogous to the European voyages of conquest.

China’s eventual subjection to Western powers began with the fissures created by the

Opium Wars. The first Opium War in 1840-1842 against the British resulted in a military confrontation. The battle resulted in the British shutting down Chinese ports and China ceding the island of Hong Kong to the British with the signing of the Chuenpi Convention on January

20, 1841.Thereafter, the Second Opium War (1856-1860) resulted in the British and French invasion of Guangzhou and advance to Beijing. Compelled by the need to end the conflict, China signed a treaty granting the West more business power and control of various ports. This ushered

71 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire, 9. 72 Li Shiyu.“Qing zhenfudui Yunnan de guanli yu kongzhi,” Zhongguo bian-jiang shidi yanjiu, (cited by Ross Terrill, The New Chinese Empire, 2000), 1. 73 Wang Gungwu. “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia.” (In John K. Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), 36. 74 J. D. Frodsham, Songtao Guo, Xihong Liu. (Journals of Kuo Sung-t’ao, University of Michigan: Clarendon Press, 1974), xxv.

an era of treaty relations with an array of Western powers and Japan. From 1860 to 1885, China signed treaties with Germany (1861), Portugal (1862), Denmark (1863), the Netherlands (1863),

Spain (1864), Italy (1866), Austria-Hungary (1869), Japan (1871), Peru (1874), Brazil (1881), the Congo Free State (1898), Mexico (1899), Chile (1915), and Switzerland in 1918. Norway and Sweden, also entered respective treaties post separation in 1905. Russia got new treaties in

1879 and 1881. Japan received a treaty revision in 1874, Germany a revision in 1880, the US in

1880, and the British their own in in 1876.75

This escalated into China entering concessionary port-treaties as Qing power declined.

Port-treaty concessions were unwieldy and situational responses to standoffs with Western powers rather than a premeditated plan for Chinese colonialism by the Western powers.

Nevertheless, by the first World War, there were forty-eight treaty-ports across the expanse of

China where foreign residents settled and conducted trade. Many treaty ports were extra- territorial possessions, subject to their own administration and consults, under foreign jurisdiction. “This intricate system of exploitation produced micro-versions of informal empires within China. The concessions were almost entirely secured by blackmail.”76 Manpower connecting the trade routes and labor for factories was, nevertheless, Chinese. Although it is difficult to demarcate the precise tipping of power out of Chinese hands, the German seizure of

Kiaochow Bay in 1897 marks the beginning of a subsequent race by other Western powers to secure similar lucrative commercial and territorial concessions from the Chinese. Through the

Kiaochow Convention of 1898, Germany was not only given a ninety-nine-year lease on the territory its forces occupied but also railway concessions on Chinese territory in Shantung as

75 Min-ch’ien Tuk Zung and Tyau Zung, (Legal Obligations Arising Out of Treaty Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972) referenced in Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire, 33. 76 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire, 60.

well as the right of refusal in infrastructure projects, a first.77 Shortly thereafter, Russia secured a lease on Port Arthur and Talien-wan (Darien), France obtained Kwangchow-wan for ninety-nine years, and Britain acquired both Kowloon and Weihaiwei for ninety-nine years.78 Thus, what

Ford terms, “the battle of leases” was on as foreign powers clambered to acquire greater territorial possession and establish their own spheres of exclusive influence within China, including profitable concessions.79 France claimed a sphere in Yun nan, Kweichow, and

Kwangsi provinces, including preferential rights for French mining companies in Yunnan,

Huangsi, and Kuantung, while the British obtained for themselves preferential rights in the

Yangtze Valley. Germany got Shantung, Japan the province of Fukien, and Russia the

Manchuria.80 These agreements also commonly included nonalienation provisions. This resulted in the inevitable erosion of Chinese sovereignty as China “mortgaged itself in bits and pieces to foreign sovereigns and commercial concerns”81. A map of foreign landholdings in 1920 China is included on the next page to gauge the gravity of the situation.

77 Mingchien Joshua Bau, (The Foreign Relations of China, South Carolina: Nabu Press, 2010), referenced in Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire, 61. 78 Min-ch’ien Tuk Zung and Tyau Zung, (Legal Obligations Arising Out of Treaty Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), referenced in Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire, 33. 79 William L. Tung, (China and the Foreign Powers: the Impact of and Reaction to Unequal Treaties, University of Michigan: Oceana Publications, 1970), 48. 80 Tyau Zung. (Legal Obligations Arising Out of Treaty Relation), referenced in Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire, 33. 81 Christopher A. Ford, (The Mind of Empire: China's History and Modern Foreign Relations, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 155.

Map 1: Treaty Ports in 1920 China

Source: Christopher A. Ford, The Mind of Empire, 2010.

This erosion of power and sovereignty eventually resulted in China being left out of foreign negotiations deliberating on rights and privileges over Chinese property altogether, eventually. Japan’s victory in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War resulted in the latter’s acquisition of

Taiwan. For instance, in the wake of a dramatic victory for the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese

War of 1905, the Treaty of Portsmouth transferred Russian-controlled ports Arthur and Talien directly to Japan without Chinese consultation82. Similarly, a few years prior, with the Scott-

Muravieff agreement of 1899, Britain and Russia agreed on railway interests without Chinese involvement. In 1907, the French and Japanese also negotiated terms of cooperation for security provision in their respective territories without Chinese overview or involvement.83

The Celestial Empire had thus begun to lose the Mandate of Heaven and the “Chinese could, thus, perhaps be forgiven for continuing to believe, in effect, that there were only two choices in China’s relationship with the world: being on top or being in subjugation”84. The

Chinese Communist Party therefore came into being in 1919 against the backdrop of these developments with a vision for a unified and free China. The Party considered itself, Edward

Friedman notes, as “the embodiment of heroic anti-imperialist nationalism” in a “nationalist tale of modern Chinese resistance to foreign marauders . . . imagined as one with the struggle of

China’s people throughout history to defend their land from foreign invaders. It links time, place, and people in a unifying grand narrative that begins with the building of a Great Wall of stone in

82 Tyau Zung, (Legal Obligations Arising Out of Treaty Relations referenced in Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire), 33 83 Werner Levi, (Modern China’s Foreign Policy, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1953), 35. 84 Ford, Christopher A. (The Mind of Empire: China's History and Modern Foreign Relations. University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 156.

ancient times”85. The CCP historically sought to present itself as “totally Chinese, nationalistic, and patriotic, opposed to the foreign aggression that weakened China so severely”.86

Foreign Policy

Hegemony (pa or ba) is a recurring term in the classical canon and a concern the

Communist Party actively addresses. The term has historical baggage and a pejorative connotation as it is used in the Chinese sense to allude to unjust and excessive international domination. China strongly emphasizes the resistance to hegemony both external and within her own pursuits. “China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind.”87 Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China echoed a similar sentiment in insisting that China “will never be a superpower, neither today nor in the future.”88

This assertion outlines two underlying premises: a) superpowers are inherently selfish, acquisitive states within the international system striving for hegemony and b) China’s foreign policy does not entail or intend such pursuit of preeminent domination and hegemony and its motivations are axiomatically noble.89 Theorizing along these virtue-centric themes echoes the self-exoneration articulated by Nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen, for example, in the early years of the Republic. He insisted that the Chinese governance of its peripheries was not imperial because influence was exercised through the “kingly way” (wangdao) whereas imperialism relied on

“military conquest and hegemony” (badao)90. This anti-hegemonic rhetoric is similarly espoused

85 Edward Friedman, (National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China, Armonk, New York: Sharpe, 1995), 1. 86 Anne-Marie Brady, (Treat Insiders and Outsiders Differently: The Use and Control of Foreigners in the People’s Republic of China, China: China Quarterly, no.164, 2000), 313. 87 USA and PRC, Shanghai Communiqué, 1972. 88 Christopher Ford, Mind of Empire, 226. 89 Christopher Ford, Mind of Empire, 68. 90 Michael H. Hunt, (The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 117.

and emphasized in BRI discussion by the Communist Party today. A central theme of China’s current foreign policy is said to “ mollify the concerns and suspicions about China’s intentions that others had begun to develop—a concerted effort to allay fears about the international role a rising China would play in the future.”91 Beijing seeks to present China’s rise post the Cold-War as an “evitable, non-threatening, ‘win-win’outcome for everyone and a natural part of the emergence of a new, more just, and prosperous future world.”92 Deng Xiaoping insists that

“China’s strategy is to engineer its great-power rise through a path alternative to traditional power transition marked by hostile balancing, escalating zero-sum competition, and the ineluctable outcome of war.” Deng insists that this approach is evidence for the fact that China exercises a “heightened sensitivity to the social and structural dynamics of the fear of a China threat” in formulating its foreign policy.93

There is active debate on the validity of tracing the future trajectory of China’s foreign policy from its imperial past. Since modern China is rooted in the legacy of the Qing dynasty, another vernacular is that of discussing whether there are any continuities between “empire”

(diguo) and “nation” (minzu) or if modern-day China has sought an altogether unique arrangement not bound to these binaries. Terrill insists that China is an:

“authoritarian state [that] builds selectively and opportunistically on a nearly 3000-year- old tradition of imperial rule. Many countries have an autocratic past, but no ancient monarchy survived into the twentieth century as China’s did. The dynastic Chinese state saw itself as a moral agent, the guardian of a higher doctrine. Mandated by heaven itself, the state’s jurisdiction was coterminous with the civilized world. The Chinese imperial state was a civilizer of peripheral peoples not yet blessed with the Chinese empowers direct rule.”94

91 Avery Goldstein, (Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 204. 92 Christopher A Ford, (The Mind of Empire: China's History and Modern Foreign Relations, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 233. 93 Yong Deng, (China’s Struggle for Status: the realignment of International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 21-68. 94 Ross Terrill, (The New Chinese Empire), 8.

According to Terrill, the Chinese empire is characterized by three key traits: its driving force comes from above, it sees itself as the guardian of truth, and the compromises it makes with other great powers are tactical in nature and predicated on its own inherent moral superiority.

This implies that China continues to ingrain these ideals within its foreign policy today.

Those on the continuity side of the spectrum such as Terrill insist that the People’s

Republic of China had maintained imperial continuity and merely reinvented an age-old autocracy. The endurance of the Chinese empire well into the 20th century fuels these lively debates. Terrill insists that modern day Beijing “consolidates its far-flung imperial realm” by focusing attention on five variables “socioeconomic change, Communist doctrine, foreign relations, the evidence from history and archaeology, and the daily opportunities of governance in peripheral or non-Han areas.”95 He draws a direct parallel between the Qing Dynasty’s policy of a “calculus of security, cost, and revenue potential” and PRC’s current foreign policy.96

Terrill maintains that China “state retains an imperial sense: it seeks a string of compliant states around its borders” and utilizes economic and military methods to do so. “Its aim unchanged to make Beijing the centerpiece of Asia”. He insists that this leads to prioritizing the following within Beijing’s foreign policy: control of the regime’s own people; economic development; managing security issues around China’s borders; plans for China’s rise to replace the United States as the dominant power in Asia.97 Terrill’s China is a party-state that combines revanchism, traditionalism of style to maximize influence and one vying for legitimacy within the region and international order at large. To those along Terrill’s line of thinking, China is a

“half-empire and half modern nation”. It is a communist state relying on elements of an

95 Ross Terrill, (The New Chinese Empire), 181. 96 Ross Terrill, (The New Chinese Empire), 181. 97 Ross Terrill, (The New Chinese Empire), 254.

autocratic past to revive an imperial legacy in its neighborhood as a state constrained by the international order of our time.

An effective counter to the continuity argument is put forward by Peter Perdue who insists that:

“[w]e cannot draw direct conclusions about contemporary China from an analysis of her imperial strategy unless we believe either that leaders of the People’s Republic actually rely on Ming and earlier texts for their strategic planning, or that an unconscious set of assumptions has been transmitted to them unchanged over many centuries”98.

The Chinese leadership can be ill-expected to draw its foreign policy entirely from ancient texts and practices. Even the argument that China seeks to revive an imperial legacy that is at least a few centuries, if not longer within the past, with a strong anti-imperial experience in the recent past ought to be contested.

Concerns around China’s economic expansion espouse tensions, some understandably so.

Others require a closer scrutiny and contextualizing within broader bids for power within the region. India’s concern of being surrounded by a rival state’s expanding economic, communication, transportation, naval99, and power networks as well as USA’s concern of being overthrown as the center of gravity for power and influence within South Asia drives the suspicion of Chinese intent in the region. Alarmed and presumptuous concerns of China establishing naval bases in trading ports is a recurring concern at the Pentagon100. Similarly, New

Delhi’s direct competitor for political clout and influence is an understandable and apparent worry to it.101 The wariness is further expounded by the knowledge that the Silk Road is more

98 Peter C. Perdue. (Boundaries, Maps, and Movement: Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian Empires in Early Modern Central Eurasia , USA: International History Review, vol.20, no. 2, June 1998), 2. 99 The Economic Times, “China’s Growing Presence in Indian Ocean a Challenge for Indian Navy: Navy Chief Lamba,” Times of India, 14 March, 2019 100 “China to Increase Overseas Military Bases,”Al-Jazeera, 3 May, 2019. 101 Harsh V Pant, “China’s Clout Grows in South Asia, but can India raise it’s Game?” China Morning Post, 19 January, 2019.

than a brick-and-mortar pathway102 and a channel for expounding and expanding China’s cultural outreach and soft power in the region. It may also double as an “Information Silk

Road”103 with increased digital connectivity, an overarching theme of the Belt and Road

Initiative regardless. Yet another security concern for nations and the region as well as those vying for power within it.

China’s centrality to the dawn of the Asian Century entails its pursuit of soft power as well as protecting the value, security and integrity of supply chains as much as investing in military hard power. Nevertheless, China’s increase in influence within the region is a cause of imminent concern to its key competitors. These inhibitions drive the discourse around China’s foreign policy, especially the Belt and Road Initiative. An array of reporting, commentary and argumentation revolves around “debt-trap diplomacy” on the Chinese end. The term connotes the simple idea that the Chinese government premeditates to funnel an egregious amount of investment into developing economies and bank on their defaulting on repayment of debt to convert the debt to equity through asset seizure. Deborah Brautigam traces the term to its roots and, in the process of doing so, contests the underlying assumptions it insinuates as well. She comments:

“On 23 January 2017, a Chinese debt trap diplomacy meme was born in a think tank in northern India and was furthered by a paper written by two Harvard University graduate students who called it Chinese ‘debt book diplomacy’. The student paper was enthusiastically cited by The Guardian and The New York Times and other major media outlets as academic proof of China’s nefarious intentions. The meme began to take deep root in Washington, DC, and ricocheted beyond Delhi to Japan, all along the Beltway and again into The New York Times and beyond. Later, it was amplified, it was thundered by a US Secretary of State, it walked quietly into intelligence circles, it hovered in the US Congress and it settled in the Pentagon. All these people became very worried about this idea, about this meme. By November 2018, a

102 Sherry, Rehman. (CPEC 2.0: The Promise and the Peril. Islamabad: Jinnah Institute, Oct. 2019), 6. 103 Chan Jia Hao, “China’s Digital Silk Road: A Game Changer for Asian Economies,” The Diplomat, 30 April, 2019.

Google web search generated 1,990,000 results in 0.52 seconds. It was beginning to solidify as firm conventional wisdom and to be accepted as a deep historical truth.”104

The term “debt-trap diplomacy” serves as a euphemism for concerns of “imperialism” within discourse. It is merely the vernacular through which the idea of hegemony and premediated domination is espoused. There is, therefore, a need to contextualize both the

Chinese intent and manifestation of China’s foreign policy approach from China’s end as well as the international perception that informs the interpretation of concerns related to BRI and debt- trap diplomacy. The international interpretation currently is one of hesitation, it presupposes a

Western understanding of imperialism and expansion all the while imposing Western fears of waning influence and power in the region.

On China’s end, by contrast, the Belt and Road Initiative is not a monolith. The Initiative spans an array of projects that include the obvious infrastructure, transportation, and energy projects but also includes soft power social projects spanning everything from student exchanges to hospitals. Furthermore, all projects are negotiated on personalized terms with individual governments on distinct terms and should, therefore, be scrutinized individually within their specific context rather than assigning a blanket imperial or philanthropic designation to the entirety of an entire subsection of China’s broader foreign policy.

China’s history as an empire as well as one subjected to the imperialism of multiple

Western powers places it in an entirely unique frame of mind when formulating its foreign policy where quintessential Western understandings of hegemony and imperialism would be insufficient in grasping the essence of a virtue-centric power that is nevertheless a force to be

104 Deborah Brautigam, (A critical look at Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy’: the rise of a meme, Washington: Area Development and Policy, vol. 5 no. 1, 2020), 1-14.

reckoned with. The Belt and Road Initiative as well as its implications for imperialism within

South Asia, deserves consideration with this acknowledgement in mind. By tracing the progression of Chinese foreign policy as well as contemporary debates on the degree of imperial predilections embedded within it, this chapter shows that simplistic and West-oriented notions of imperialism and domination do not apply directly to China’s case. In fact, it warrants informed scrutiny of the history of China’s foreign-policy progression as well as an awareness of the broader power tensions within the continent.

Context

In December 2017, Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremsinghe formally signed a

Concession Agreement with the China Merchants Port Holdings Company. The agreement marked the beginning of the joint operation of the port between the Sri Lanka Ports Authority

(SLPA) and two new auxiliaries of the China Merchants Port Holdings Company: the

Hambantota International Port Group (HIPG) and Hambantota International Port Services

(HIPS). More importantly, the opaque agreement granted the latter an 85% stake in the port on a

99-year lease105. The agreement prompted concern and debate well beyond the port and even the country itself. The deal begs the critical question of whether it is a textbook example of what some are beginning to call China’s “debt-trap” or “debt book” diplomacy or a diversion from the norm of purely economic investment. Then-US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson insisted that

Chinese economic diplomacy “encourages dependency using opaque contracts, predatory loan practices, and corrupt deals that mire nations in debt and undercut their sovereignty, denying them their long-term, self-sustaining growth”106. For those holding the view, the Hambantota deal whereby large debt holdings were converted to majority-equity holdings meets the outlined criterion. This camp understands the technique to be an economic tool, meeting a strategic end.

China’s acquisition of the port also aligns with strategic interests in the region. Hambantota is seen to be China’s latest addition to its “String of Pearls”: controlling a series of ports within the

Indian Ocean to project power and ensure economic access across vital South Asian trading routes as well as resolving its “Malacca Dilemma”107.

105 Freymann, Eyck. (The Invention of the New Silk Road: Mapping Xi Jinping’s Strategic Vision, USA: Harvard Kennedy School Working Paper, 2018), 4. 106 Rex W. Tillerson,. “U.S.-Africa Relations: A New Framework.”, Remarks at George Mason University, Fairfax, VA. 6 March 2018. 107 President Hu Jintao's used the term to describe the problem of sea routes crucial to China's trade especially the Malacca Straits being subject to interdiction from another state.

The Case for Imperialism: Debt-Trap Diplomacy

Sam Parker and Gabrielle Chefitz of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Centre for

Science and International Affairs articulate the arguments of those convinced of China’s deliberate debt trap or what they refer to as its “debtbook” diplomacy. They argue that Sri

Lanka’s economic needs, valuable assets, and diplomatic isolation made it an ideal “target” for

China at the time. They describe the ideal mix in Sri Lanka’s case as: “a poor country desperate for investment and infrastructure development; shunned by the international community over its civil war; and sitting in a strategic location astride the Indian Ocean trade routes that China depends on.”108 They also identify three distinct stages of the Chinese debt trap cycle across multiple Chinese BRI projects. The first stage is the investment stage. Since the government works through the China Development Bank and Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of China—which together hold more assets than the combined sum of all Western-backed multilateral development banks109 — China is able to provide terms that appeal to countries struggling economically, particularly those unable to secure international financing as well as corrupt and/or authoritarian leaders seeking political legitimacy and/or financial gain. The second stage is the construction and operation stage. They contest that “Chinese projects have a reputation for running over budget, with poor construction quality and lax safety standards. Once completed, many of these projects have yielded underwhelming returns, which are mostly routed back to

China, making debt repayment all the more challenging.”110 The final stage is the debt collection stage. Parker and Chefitz argue that at this stage, the Chinese government will offer debt

108 Sam Parker and Gabrielle Chefitz, (Debtbook Diplomacy: China’s Strategic Leveraging of Newfound Economic Influence and the Consequences for U.S. Foreign Policy, Policy Analysis Exercise, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center, May 2018), 28. 109 Bretton Woods “China Goes Global with Development Banks.” Observer, 5 April 2016. 110 Sam Parker and Gabrielle Chefitz, (Debtbook Diplomacy), 4.

forgiveness in exchange for politically and economically strategic equities. Analyst, Xiaochen Su comments on this stage of the process: “by ensuring that these debts are paid in some form or the other, whether it is economic concessions, political agreements, or a combination of both, China may in the long term formulate a new kind of diplomatic relationships with these foreign countries”111. These stages constitute the process of what Parker and Chefitz consider deliberate debt-trap diplomacy.

Eyck Freymann also furthers the idea of a Chinese debt-trap. The Chinese engagement with Hambantota began in 2007, while Sri Lanka was in the midst of a brutal civil war. The political instability at home led to the severing of diplomatic ties and foreign investment. The Sri

Lankan government under Rajapaksa contacted Japan, India, the IMF, the World Bank and the

Asia Development Bank to fund the construction of the Hambantota port as political leverage for the President in his hometown of Hambantota, all of which were denied.112 China, however, agreed to finance the project through three phases. The first phase began in 2008 with an estimated investment of U.S. $361 million, ultimately totaling $508 million.113China’s Export-

Import Bank (EXIM) funded 85% of the first phase at the fixed interest rate of 6.3%, and the Sri

Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) funded the remaining 15%.114 Freymann insists that it is not the initial investment of $361million but the failure of the port to generate revenue that eventually

“trapped” Sri Lanka.115 From 2009-2014, Sri Lanka borrowed an additional $1.9 billion in loans from China to upgrade the port, create an economic zone, and build an airport now infamously

111 Su Xiaochen. “Why Chinese Infrastructure Loans in Africa Represent a Brand-New Type of Neocolonialism.” The Diplomat. 9 June 2017. 112 Eyck Freymann. “The Invention of the New Silk Road: Mapping Xi Jinping’s Strategic Vision.” USA: Harvard Kennedy School Working Paper, 2018. 113 “Leasing of Hambantota Port: Rationale, Economic Benefits and Way Forward”, Daily Financial Times, Jan. 27, 2017. 114Anjelina Patrick, (China - Sri Lanka Strategic Hambantota Port, India: National Maritime Foundation, Apr. 13, 2017), 3. 115 Eyck Freymann. The Invention of the New Silk Road: Mapping Xi Jinping’s Strategic Vision.

deemed as “the world’s emptiest”. The Sri Lankan government also granted tax concessions to the joint venture for its further development116. By 2015, however, around 95% of Sri Lanka’s government revenue was going toward servicing its debt, and the government-initiated debt renegotiations with China.117 By 2017, however, Sri Lanka had accumulated more than $8 billion in debt to Chinese-controlled firms. In return for writing off the debt, China requested a dominant equity share in the Hambantota Port.118 The port had, therefore, become a debt trap:

“Once Sri Lanka made the initial commitment, the sunk cost and need to generate profit to pay off the original loans drove it to take out additional loans, a cycle that repeated itself until it gave up the port in a debt-for-equity swap.”119

The deal concluded in CMPort retaining a 58% share of HIPS while SLPA would hold the remaining 42%. HIPS and HIPG, the two auxiliaries of CMPort, retain an 85% share of the latter while SLPA holds the remaining 15%.120 The SLPA is thus a de facto minority shareholder in both companies currently operating the port. The deal also states that China will invest another

USD 1,120 million in the port and will lease not only the port itself but, more controversially, an expanse equaling a total of 15,000 acres of land.121 Constantino Xavier, then a fellow at the

Carnegie Endowment for Peace remarked:

“The lease is part of a larger modus operandi by China in the region . . . . Beijing typically finds a local partner, makes that local partner accept investment plans that are detrimental to their country in the long term, and then uses the debts to either acquire the project altogether or to acquire political leverage in that country”122.

116 Eyck Freymann. The Invention of the New Silk Road: Mapping Xi Jinping’s Strategic Vision. 117 Yogita Limaye, “Sri Lanka: A Country Trapped in Debt”, BBC News, May 26, 2017. 118 Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port”, New York Times, June 25, 2018. 119 Sam Parker and Gabrielle Chefitz, Debtbook Diplomacy. 120 Skandha Gunasekara, “Last-Minute Amendments to Hambantota Concession Agreement”, Sri Lankan Financial. Times, Dec. 7, 2017. 121 Maria Abi-Habib, How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port

Ranga Sirilal, Chinese Firm Pays $584 Million in Sri Lanka Port Debt-to-Equity Deal, Reuters, June 20, 2018,

122 Kiran Stacey, “China Signs 99-Year Lease on Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port.” Financial Times, 11 Dec. 2017.

The Hambantota Concession Agreement also grants “(i) to HIPG, the sole exclusive right to develop, operate and manage the Hambantota Port and (ii) to HIPS, the sole and exclusive right to develop, operate and manage the Common User Facilities, for the operation of the

Hambantota Port”123. Moreover, for the first 15 years of the agreement, SLPA and GOSL are contractually bound to ensure that:

“there shall be no, and shall not obtain any fresh tenders, grant any right to any third party, or discuss, negotiate or enter into any arrangement or agreement with any third party in relation to the development of port/terminal directly in competition with the port services and activities carried out at the Hambantota Port within 100 km perimeter from the periphery of the Hambantota Port”124.

Finally, the agreement also grants CMPort the “exclusive right to develop, operate and manage the Hambantota Port” and more specifically “collect revenues for all port and marine- related operations covering container, ro-ro [sic], general cargo, bulk cargo, bunkering, LNG, drydock, warehousing, etc., as well as common user services such as navigation, wharfage, tug, etc.”125 Although other terms remain undisclosed at the time, even these conditions made publicly available grants an insight into the expansive rights the Chinese company has managed to obtain. Though the CMPort activity cannot be considered synonymous to that of the Chinese state, I second Maria Adele Carrai’s (2018) assertion that it cannot be excluded a priori since

CMPort is a major Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) and “it acts in name of and in the interests of Chinese central state and the lease of Hambantota in particular was a debt-to-equity

123 Press Release, China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, Potential Disclosable Transaction Concession Agreement in Relation to Hambantota Port, Sri Lanka, Jul, 25, 2017. 124 Press Release, China Merchants Port Holdings Company. 125 Press Release, China Merchants Port Holdings Company.

deal to repay Sri Lanka Debt to China”126. The alarm and suspicion are, therefore, understandable, if not justified.

The sustained durability of the debt cycle is another concerning factor to those viewing the dealings as China’s premeditated imperial ploy. Maithripala Sirisena, the new Sri Lankan

President, ran for office with the intent of distancing Sri Lanka from China, but even during his tenure, Chinese companies are involved in a $1.4 billion development project of Colombo Port

City and a possible $3 billion oil refinery project near Hambantota where they remain present.

Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, executive director of the Centre for Policy Alternatives in Colombo, cautioned that “given the agreements entered into by the previous regime and the colossal debt incurred, I do not think the government has much choice but to continue with Chinese investment”127. Continued government reliance on Chinese loans plunged Sri Lanka even deeper into the “trap”. Economic growth is at its slowest in 16 years, and the Sri Lankan rupee has depreciated to its weakest ever. This continues to increase the country’s debt obligations since half of its loans are denominated in foreign currency. In 2018, debt repayments totaled 14.1 percent of GDP, while revenue was only 14.4 percent128. Since this vast majority of the country’s revenue services debt, Sri Lanka has no alternative to borrowing even more to finance infrastructure costs. In May 2018, it received a new $1 billion loan from China’s EXIM bank to build a highway129. Unlikely to escape the cycle soon, Sri Lanka is becoming increasingly more tethered to the “trap”. Parker and Chefitz (2018) and those in agreement are concerned that

China may leverage this growing debt for expanding control within and beyond the port,

126 Maria Adele Carrai. (China’s Malleable Sovereignty Along the Belt and Road Initiative: The Case of the 99-year Chinese Lease of Hambantota Port, New York: N.Y.U. Journal Of International Law & Politics 51, 2019), 1080. 127 Russell Blinch, “China’s Lucrative Embrace of Sri Lanka Stirs Unease.” The Straits Times, 16 Oct, 2017. 128 Yuji Kuronuma, “Sri Lanka’s Currency Suffers as Debt Trap Deepens.” Nikkei Asian Review, 29 Apr, 2018. 129 Ranga Sirilal, “Chinese Firm Pays $584 Million in Sri Lanka Port Debt-to-Equity Deal”, Reuters, June 20, 2018.

potentially establishing a naval base or a logistical aid to one. They worry that “[i]f China can convert its debt leverage to gain a naval presence in regional ports, it will be in striking distance of the worlds’ trade artery, potentially challenging the U.S. navy’s effective monopoly and worrying Asian neighbors dependent on those routes.”130

Myth busting

Although analysis along these lines of near-certain Chinese debt-trap diplomacy has its merits, it paints a rather passive and somewhat simplistic picture of the dynamic exchange between the two countries. How does a framework such as that of Parker and Chefitz’s three stages of debtbook diplomacy contest with statements such as:

“I asked for it. China didn’t propose it. It was not a Chinese proposal. The proposal was from us; they gave money. If India said. Yes, we’ll give you a port, I will gladly accept. If America says, We will give a fully equipped airport—yes, why not? Unfortunately, they are not offering to us”131. President Rajapaksa (Thottam, TIME, 2009)

“If anybody is saying that the Chinese government gave its money to put Sri Lanka into a ‘debt trap’, I don’t agree with that. It’s an absolutely wrong conclusion. . . . The Chinese government [has] never asked to hand over the Port to the Chinese government or to the Chinese venture. It was a proposal that came from Sri Lanka, asking partnership from China . . . .”132 Sri Lanka’s Ambassador to China Karunasena Kodituwakku (Sunday Times, 2018)

Experts such as Neil DeVotta also opine that the government’s own strong assertion on these investments warranted “little reason for China to superimpose its wishes on Sri Lanka”133. The

President was insistent on a large infrastructure project in his hometown of Hambantota as a

130 Sam Parker and Gabrielle Chefitz, Debtbook Diplomacy, 24. 131 Jyoti Thottam, “The Man Who Tamed the Tamil Tigers”, TIME, July 13, 2009. 132 “What the Mattala Airport Says about the India-China Rivalry" Sunday Times, December 5, 2017. 133 Neil DeVotta, “China’s Influence in Sri Lanka, in Rising China’s Influence In Developing Asia” (Evelyn Goh ed., 2016), 129, 134.

political point-scorer in the wake of a looming election. In spite of feasibility studies that concluded that the project was financially unviable, he remained insistent on it as well as to his political ambitions.134 It is, therefore, only understandable that other countries that were approached prior to China, such as India, refused to fund. This leads to the important conclusion that China was the lender of last resort for Sri Lanka. Perhaps it could also be argued that this erodes the case for deliberate imperialist inclinations on China’s side in this case. However, it is all the more reason to question why China was willing to invest in Rajapaksa’s white elephant infrastructure project deemed financially unviable by feasibility reports as well as other countries.135

Constructing a new port near Hambantota had been a Sri Lankan plan for decades prior to

China’s involvement.136 As stated earlier, China’s EXIM bank provided a US$307 million commercial buyer’s credit at a fixed rate of 6.3% in the first phase and a second phase at a 2% concessional rate loan from China EXIM Bank.137 In the period since 2010, when the port was opened, the Sri Lanka Port Authority lost US$300 million. A fraction of the incurred loss can also be apportioned to the delaying of the service provisions such as oil bunkering due to political infighting which may otherwise have generated greater revenue for the port.

Furthermore, the initial cost of laying infrastructure and incurring losses in the initial years of establishing a port is hardly unusual for a new port. Thirty-Four ships arrived at Hambantota in

2012, but this number rose to 281 ships in 2016.138 The port, argued to be a strategic acquisition for nefarious intent and said to have little economic value is thus beginning to show potential and

134 “Feasibility Study for a New Major Seaport in Sri Lanka”, Ramboll Group, 2007. 135 Wade Shepard. "Done Deal: China Buys Strategic Sri Lankan Seaport; The Belt And Road Reigns Victorious." Forbes, July 27, 2017. 136 Deborah Brautigam, “Misdiagnosing the Chinese infrastructure push”. The American Interest, 2019. 137 China EXIM bank provided a US$307 million commercial buyer’s credit at a fixed rate of 6.3% (Sri Lanka was offered a variable rate but selected the fixed rate as interest rates appeared to be increasing at that time). 138 Deborah Brautigam, A Critical Look at Chinese ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy, 1-14.

could potentially award Sri Lanka economic gains to repay its debts. Whether business booms to this extent remains to be seen and strategic consensus within the Sri Lankan government itself.

The widely accepted narrative that the Hambantota Port deal is a debt-equity swap by the

Chinese for cancelling debt that Sri Lanka defaulted on is factually inaccurate and unfounded.

The Sri Lankan government remains obliged to repay five loans obtained from the EXIM Bank of China and the agreements pertaining to these loans remain unchanged139. In August 2017, the

Sri Lankan cabinet of ministers decided to sign an agreement awarding China Merchants Port

Holdings Company Limited (CM Port) a 70 percent stake of the port for 99 years for an upfront payment of $1.12 billion as a Private Public Partnership (PPP) project140, with the remaining 30 with SLPA. The most noteworthy detail to acknowledge is that this amount was not used to service debt accrued to construct the port. It was used to strengthen Sri Lanka’s foreign reserves to service other short-term foreign debts repayments. Thus, the Sri Lankan government was utilizing the significant dollar flow to address a broader Balance of Payment issue resulting from soaring debt servicing while Sri Lanka’s export and FDI growth remained sluggish141. At the time of the agreement, CM Port invested $1.12 billion in the port valued at $1.4 billion. A complimentary equity equivalent would, therefore, be an 80 percent stake rather than the 70 percent stake held by CM Port. At the time of the negotiations, the monthly debt servicing costs pertaining to loans obtained for the construction of the port amounted to less than 5 percent of

Sri Lanka’s total foreign debt repayments. Furthermore, of the five loans obtained from 2007 to

2014 to construct the port, just two loans worth $357 million out of a total of $1.263 billion were obtained at commercial rates (some as high as 6 percent), the rest were concessionary142. Sri

139 Umesh Moramudali, “The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities.” – The Diplomat, 16 Jan. 2020, 140 Deborah Brautigam, A Critical Look at Chinese ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy, 1-14. 141 Umesh Moramudali, The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities, 1-14. 142 Umesh Moramudali, The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities, 1-14.

Lanka retains control of the port and there has been no change in ownership. The Sri Lankan

government is still obligated to repay over $100 million per annum in loan repayments143. The

short payback period resulted in high loan installments prior to the completion of the grace

period, but this is nevertheless hardly the deliberate debt-trap the deal is slated out to be in

popular discourse and commentary.

It is helpful to return to my criteria for imperialism. The process of progression from one

stage to another indicates an imperial trajectory if hegemony (synonymous to effective

sovereignty for the hegemonic power) is intended or attained in the final stage.

Hegemony / Independence Interdependence Dependence Imperialism

In Sri Lanka’s case, some would argue that the sovereignty of Hambantota has been

breached or disrupted. Lassa Oppenheim, one of the most influential international lawyers of the

early twentieth century confirms that in the case of leases, until a lease expires, the leaseholder is

the sovereign over a territory.144 It is, however, important to distinguish between legal

sovereignty and effective sovereignty. The Chinese SOEs are dependent on legal jurisdiction of

the Sri Lankan government which still retains ownership while the Sri Lankan government is

dependent upon the Chinese companies to primarily generate revenue as the majority

stakeholders. The relationship is mutually interdependent and hardly crosses the threshold into

hegemony and, therefore, imperialism.

143 Umesh Moramudali, The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and Realities, 1-14. 144 Alexander Cooley, (Imperial Wreckage: Property Rights, Sovereignty, and Security in the Post-Soviet Space. Johns Hopkins: International Security, vol. 25, no. 3, 2001), 100-127. Lassa Oppenheim, Francis Lawrence and Hersch Lauterpacht. (International Law: a Treatise. New York: Longmans Green, 1912), 276.

Currently, the rights awarded to HIPG are restricted to business privileges. The Chinese auxiliary possesses the sole and exclusive right to develop, operate and manage the Hambantota

Port as well as the related Common User Facilities.145 Should the company or the Chinese government attain hegemonic control over the territorial or operational elements of the port and its vicinity, a case for an imperial trajectory as well and possibly imperialism can be made.

Although purely speculative, the following scenarios can serve as examples of what would suffice as examples of greater Chinese control and/or hegemonic control:

1. The Chinese auxiliaries attain effective control over the port and its surroundings, out of

the reach of the Sri Lankan government.

2. HIPG predominantly or exclusively determines trade terms for transshipment occurring

through the ports.

3. HIPG utilizes the port to its advantage beyond the terms contained within the Concession

Agreement

4. Chinese citizens are awarded privileges not granted to other Hambantota residents

5. HIPG influences political decisions with the area, or in the extreme case, directly

influences them.

Although a purely imaginative exercise, it does serve to indicate scenarios that actually entail a power imbalance in the favor of the Chinese auxiliary to the extent that a decisive call can be made regarding their nature as imperial trajectories or as proof of the completion of the process, effective Chinese imperialism. As of now, the case at Hambantota fails to reach the designated

145 Press Release, China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, Potential Disclosable Transaction Concession Agreement in Relation to Hambantota Port, Sri Lanka (Jul. 25, 2017), http://www.cmport.com.hk/UpFiles/bpic/2017-07/20170725061311456.pdf.

qualifying threshold as demonstrated. Whether this changes with further developments in the region remains to be seen as events unfold.

CONTEXT

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is one of the largest bilateral investment projects in the world. Initiated in 2013,146 it was officially launched in April 2015 as a flagship of

China’s Belt and Road Initiative.147 With an estimated $62 billion intended investment in a combination of infrastructure and energy projects, it stands as the “main plank” of the Initiative and makes Pakistan the biggest debtor to China.148 The project is intended to connect the expanse from the Chinese city of Kashgar to the Pakistani Sea port of Gwadar, located “near Iran and

Persian Gulf shipping lanes”.149 The Planning Commission of Pakistan, the primary government body on Pakistan’s side, divides CPEC into four phases: “early harvest projects, to be completed by 2018; short-term projects, to be completed by 2020; medium-term projects, to be completed by 2025; and long-term projects, to be completed by 2030”.150 64 percent of all expenditures proposed as of May 2017 are commercial contracts designated towards the generation and transmission of electric power.151 Projects geared towards education, public health, and telecommunications constitutes 35 percent, while infrastructure is allocated 1 percent based on the Planning Commission of Pakistan data compiled by Rafiq (see figure 1). Infrastructure projects are funded by concessionary government loans with an average interest rate at 2 percent, while some, such as the $230 million international airport at Gwadar, are funded entirely by grants (see figure 2).152

146 Salman Siddiqui, “CPEC investment pushed from $55b to $62b,” Express Tribune, April 12, 2017. 147 “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor at Five.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 13, 2020. 148 “The Perils of China's ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy.’” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper. September 6, 2018. 149 Arif Rafiq. (The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact. USA: United States Institute of Peace, October, 2017), 55. 150 Rafiq, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact”, 9. 151 Rafiq, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact”, 16. 152 Rafiq, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact”, 10.

Figure 1: CPEC Project Types

______

Figure 2: CPEC Project Financing Types ______

Source: Arif Rafiq’s compilation of Planning Commission of Pakistan data as presented in “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact”, 2017.

All in all, China has already committed $46 billion to CPEC projects in Pakistan.153 The first phase of Early Harvest Projects received $18.9 billion154 and was financed at a 1.6 percent interest rate.155 China is not the only foreign power contributing to the project. Saudi Arabia has invested in a deep-water oil plant at Gwadar,156 while the United Kingdom has provided grants for road construction complementing CPEC plans.157 Plans for CPEC Projects include the development of infrastructure within the energy, transportation, communication, and industrial sectors; direct provincial investment; Special Economic Zones (SEZ); social-sector development projects; and “other areas of interest mutually agreed upon.”158 The deep-sea Gwadar port, however, is the shining jewel of the plans as well as the focal point of attention, investment, and debate.

Located on the Arabian Sea coast of the Balochistan province, Gwadar was purchased from Oman in 1958 for $8.4 million.159 In January 2007, “the operations of the port were handed over to the Port of Singapore Authority, followed by a formal inauguration on March 23, 2007” after China also agreed to finance the port intended to be a naval base by Pakistan at the

Pakistan’s request.160 Shortly thereafter, internal socio-political conditions within Pakistan began to decline as “Pakistan was hit by a perfect storm of political instability, terrorism, a global economic crisis, climate change-induced natural disasters, and the effects of poor policymaking, resulting in steep declines in economic growth and foreign direct investment”.161 As a result, the

153 “CPEC Quarterly”. Centre of Excellence for CPEC Publication. Autumn Issue, 2019), 38. 154 Rehman, Sherry. CPEC 2.0: The Promise and the Peril, 5. 155 CPEC Projects, PAKISTAN BO, http://boi.gov.pk/InfoCenter/CPEC.aspx, 2019. 156 Yousafzai, Gul. “Saudi Arabia to Set up $10 Billion Oil Refinery in Pakistan.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 12 Jan. 2019. 157 Shahbaz Rana, “UK to Partner in CPEC, Provide $121.6 Million Grant”, The Express Tribune Sept. 1, 2015. 158 Jamal Nasir. “The Cost of CPEC.” Dawn, June 21, 2017. 159 Rafiq, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact”, 6. 160 Rafiq, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact”, 6. 161 Rafiq, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact”. 7.

Port of Singapore Authority redacted its commitment to approximately $550 million in the

Gwadar port.162 The leasing rights for the Gwadar port as a commercial venture were subsequently transferred to the China Overseas Port Holdings Company on February 18, 2013.163

The development of road and rail networks linking both Xinjiang in China and the remainder of

Pakistan to Gwadar is of central importance to the CPEC leg of the broader Initiative.

The immediate vicinity of Gwadar is intended to be a “Special Economic Zone” (SEZ).

The joint quarterly publication on CPEC by Pakistan and China defines these zones as areas that award financial and non-financial incentives to investors. “Financial incentives include exemption from taxes, duties on goods imported to and exported from SEZs, etc. Non-financial incentives of SEZs are a one-stop-shop at each SEZ, investment approvals and trade facilitation, etc.” 164 In Gwadar’s case, the free zone grants investors complete (i.e. 100 percent) ownership, a twenty-three year tax break, and exemption on custom duties on materials imported for the construction and operation of the port.165 The Gwadar Free Zone, is one of nine planned SEZs and is intended to focus on fruit processing, mining, livestock, ceramics, and service-provision industries (see Figure 3).

162 “Gwadar Port needs change of hands,” The News, October 27, 2010. 163 Syed Irfan Raza, “China given contract to operate Gwadar port,” Dawn, February 18, 2013. 164 CPEC Quarterly, 17. 165 China Overseas Ports Holding Company, “Gwadar Free Zone Investment Guide”, September 2016.

Figure 3: Planned SEZs

Source: CPEC Quarterly

The port itself is on a 43-year term to the China Overseas Port Holdings Company.166

Complementary projects include plans to replace the Karakoram Highway with a six-lane

Gwadar Eastbay Expressway funded through an interest-free loan167 as well as an accompanying railway. The developments around Gwadar include an array of goodwill projects such as the plan to inaugurate Pakistan’s largest airport by 2022, costing $246 million168 but funded entirely by a

Chinese government grant. Other projects include the construction of a fresh-water treatment plant, a public hospital, a primary school, and other technical and vocational institutes.169 These

166 Asif Qureshi, (China/Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Critical National and International Law Policy Based Perspective, 14(4) Chinese Journal of International Law, 2015), 777. 167 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 16. 168 Ahmed Ashfaq. “Pakistan's Gwadar International Airport Will Be the Largest in the Country.” Pakistan – Gulf News. Gulf News, March 31, 2019. 169 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 16.

projects are overseen by the Gwadar Development Authority: the provincial government, the

Gwadar Port Authority alongside other federal ministries at the federal government level on the

Pakistani end, and by the Chinese SOEs and authorities on the complementary end. The China

Overseas Ports Holding Company “manages the Gwadar Free Zone; the provincial government operates two others: the Gwadar Export Processing Zone and the Gwadar Industrial Estate, both located at a distance from the port but along the Makran Coastal Highway”.170

The port is particularly attractive for its geographical position on the Arabian Sea, which would significantly reduce travel times for Chinese passing through the port. The port features a newly operational LNG terminal, offers freight traffic facilities, and plans for an oil refinery and automobile-production plant, among others. See Appendix __ for the most recent updates, as of

Fall 2019, on current projects pertaining to the Gwadar Free Zone.

Most negotiations between Pakistan and China are conducted through publicly unavailable Memoranda of Understanding, which contributes to the controversy around the arrangements and makes the analysis of terms and conditions difficult. The opacity of the agreements, along with geopolitical considerations, gives wind to debates around debt-trap diplomacy and a cry for repetition of Pakistan’s colonial past, although notably mostly by entities beyond Pakistan’s confines.

170 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 24.

Figure __: Pakistan’s Declining Exports and Rising Trade Deficit.

Source: Arif Rafiq’s compilation of Ministry of Finance data as presented in “The China-

Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact”, 2017.

Figure ___: Pakistan’s Trade with China

Source: World Bank World Integrated Trade Solution, 2017

The Case for Debt Trap Diplomacy

1. The Debt Trap

News coverage as well as the scholarly debate is rife with assertions of China embroiling

Pakistan in a debt-trap. Pakistan has received 13 bailouts in 30 years from the International

Monetary fund171, only one indication of the dire struggle to level the Balance of Payments.

Furthermore, Pakistan’s exports have recently been declining while imports have been increasing, leading to an increasing trade deficit (see Figure__). This posits an economic imbalance between China and Pakistan. This imbalance then implies that China, in its dealings with Pakistan, is at an undue advantage used to manipulate Pakistan into taking on more Chinese debt than it can afford to repay. The speculation is that such a position will leave Pakistan with no option but to be at the mercy of the diplomatic, political, and economic whims of their “all- weather” friend. Those skeptical of China’s plans argue that some diplomatic compromise(s) will inevitably have to be made should this become the case, if the concessions do not already include a territorial concession. Another incredibly common inhibition is that Chinese sway, if not eventual pressure, will lead to Pakistan allowing Gwadar’s use as a naval base for China, as a bright yet coerced pearl within China’s supposed collection of naval ports, its String of Pearls in the region.

Pakistan is currently expected to pay $40 billion in debt repayments and dividends to

China over the next twenty years.172 In November 2019: US ambassador Alice Wells warned that

“China is going to take a growing toll on the Pakistan economy” insisting that “even if loan

171 James Griffiths. “Pakistan Agrees to 13th Bailout in 30 Years from the IMF.” CNN. Cable News Network, May 13, 2019. 172 Farhan Bokhari. “Pakistan Revives Belt-and-Road Projects under Chinese Pressure.” Financial Times, December 11, 2019.

payments are deferred, they’re going to hang over Pakistan’s economic development potential, hamstringing prime minister Khan’s reform agenda”.173 The IMF has also forewarned of a

Balance of Payments crisis as a result of Chinese loans174 and an Economist article, one among others representative of this line of thought, places China at the center of blame for Pakistan’s

2018 Balance of Payment crisis: “…the CPEC frenzy had contributed by pumping up domestic demand, pushing up the value of the currency and sucking in imports. This resulted in the bubble bursting in 2018 due to which “the Pakistani rupee slid and the economy slowed sharply” while

“Mr Khan, cap in hand, garnered help from China with conditions attached.” 175 Bruno Macaes’ in his book, “Belt and Road: the Sinews of Chinese Power” seconds the assertion that BRI contributes to Pakistan’s balance of payments crisis. He argues that the construction of infrastructure requires raw materials and heavy machinery has to be imported before the economic gains from the projects begin to accumulate. The concern applies to the construction and development at Gwadar as well where a bulk of raw material arrives by COSCO containers through regular shipments during periods of active construction. The debt accrued for Gwadar alone is rumored (since this is publicly unavailable data) to be around $10 billion out of the

$21.8 billion owed to China, a sizeable bulk.176 This leads the proponents of those arguing for deliberate Chinese hoodwinking to conclude that Pakistan is the subject of China’s debt-trap.

173 Bokhari. “Pakistan Revives Belt-and-Road Projects under Chinese Pressure.” Financial Times, December 10, 2019. 174 Massive Chinese Investment Is a Boon for Pakistan.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, September 9, 2017. 175 “Chinese Investment in Eurasia Is Not Always Smooth.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, February 6, 2020. 176 “CPEC's Narrative Conundrum.” Daily Times, October 5, 2019.

2. The Balochistan Question

The second line of argument frequently employed in arguing for China’s neo-imperialist venture is the impact that the Gwadar port will have on the province of Balochistan. Proponents argue that China will yield undue power over the territory, and the arrival of Chinese nationals will upset the current demographic makeup of the region and are expected to eventually outnumber the Baloch locals. Local Baloch are also wary of the additional security-checks and suspicion expounded by the Pakistani security forces, in place to ensure the safety of the Chinese individuals currently living at the port side. Some already feel alienated from the developments occurring within Gwadar. “What good is any of this ‘development’ if we [the Baloch] don’t get any share?” stated a local Baloch worker who preferred not to be named during an interview for my research. “Our lives are as they were, if anything, all these security check posts at every corner are making it harder for us to live in our own home”, he added. Already disenfranchised among other Pakistani provinces, many in Balochistan fear the developments at Gwadar will lead to further exploitation of Balochistan’s natural resources as a benefit to “others”. The disparities are abundantly apparent on the route to the port itself. The route runs through the “old city” seems untouched by the pomp of the Gwadar Free Zone it leads to (contrast Photograph 1 and 2; photograph 3 combines the two with the former in the background). Locals still lack access to basic necessities such as safe and clean water, hospitals, schools, and the like. This understandably causes some resentment.

Chinese projects and workers have sometimes borne the brunt of these sentiments in its extremes, as at least forty-four workers have been killed since 2014 while working on CPEC projects in Gwadar’s vicinity. 177 Although Baloch insurgency has subsided since 2013,

177 Massoud Ansari, “Interview: Sherbaz Mazari,” Newsline, February 2003.

“separatist sentiment continues in areas along the CPEC route”178 and remains a significant security threat within the area. More than 10,000 army troops are deployed in Gwadar to counter the security threat in the face of attacks.179 Although attacks geared at Chinese workers are occasional and workers reside in a cordoned area, the security threat continues to loom. As recently as May 2019, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) gunmen stormed the Pearl

Continental Hotel. In a statement claiming responsibility, Jihand Baloch, a BLA spokesperson explained that “[the] fighters carried out this attack on Chinese and other foreign investors who were staying in [the] PC hotel”.180 The pushback against “foreign” presence in the region is, therefore, evident.

Balochistan’s history as the recipient of disproportionate resources, even when sourced from within the province, understandably heightens wariness of a similar fate with China’s endeavor in the area. For instance, the Balochistan provincial government received a mere 2 percent of revenue from the Saindak Copper Mine Project181 while the Chinese Metallurgical

Corporation of China, received 50 percent and the federal government the remaining 48 percent.182 The provincial government has been advocating for greater control of the port to abate these threats of unfair resource exploitation. In addition to concerns of inequitable resource extraction, there is the concern that the arrival of Chinese and migrant workers from other provinces will shift the demographic of the province, some fearing an inevitable outnumbering of the Baloch population, thereby rendering Balochistan a “compromised” territory on the metric of population and lead to their further subjugation to other powers.

178 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 37. 179 Syed Raza, Hassan. “To Protect Chinese Investment, Pakistan Military Leaves Little to Chance.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters, February 8, 2016. 180 Asad Hashim, “Gunmen Attack Hotel in Pakistan's Gwadar, Kill Five People.” News | Al Jazeera, May 12, 2019. 181 Peer Muhammad, “Saindak Copper-Gold Project: Govt moves to transfer ownership to Balochistan,” Express Tribune, October 27, 2013. 182 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 39.

Although there are other issues espoused by those arguing for the case of Gwadar’s status as an imperial possession, the aforementioned ones constitute the bulk and rank highest in significance.

Photograph 1: The Old City of Gwadar

Source: Daily Times, 2018.

Photograph 2: The CPEC Gwadar Business Center

Source: CPEC Facebook Page, 2019.

Photograph 3: The Gwadar Free Zone Overlooks the Old City

Source: Author’s personal photograph, January 2020.

The Case Against

“Debt-Trap Diplomacy” and concerns regarding Chinese presence in Gwadar are the main arguments expounded by those insisting on the case of Chinese imperialism in Gwadar. This section corrects some misgivings within those lines of argumentation and provides counter argumentation to that view. This section sheds light on the embedded incentives for both Pakistan, the local community, and China within the developments at Gwadar so as to highlight the competing and interlocking incentives for the project; it awards clarity on legal protections that render the seizure of territory or the establishment of effective Chinese sovereignty highly unlikely and elucidates the counters to the two key arguments that the imperial case rests on.

Mutual Benefits and Incentives

In its extreme, the developments at Gwadar are characterized as a predominantly Chinese ploy to string together different maritime ports in its “string of pearls” along the Indian Ocean. On the contrary, Pakistan’s government has its own set of incentives in pursuing the project. As noted on page 3, the development of the port at Gwadar was initiated by Pakistan. Intended to be of dual-use, the port can serve a commercial purpose as well as a military one at times of emergency. A

Government of Pakistan report in 2016 counted Gwadar as “a significant addition to our maritime infrastructure” while recognizing that it is “primarily a commercial venture [that] affords substantial operational flexibility to the Navy.”183 Addressing the apprehensions that Gwadar is intended to be a naval base (that will at some point facilitate the Chinese navy) is the fact that even the Pakistani navy prioritizes other ports for its operations. Furthermore, since the Pakistani

183 Government of Pakistan, “Visit & Meetings of Senate Standing Committee on Defence at Pakistan Navy Installations Karachi, Ormara and Gwadar,” Report No. 10, Islamabad, April 2016.

navy is the least funded of Pakistan’s three military services, Rafiq opines that Pakistan is unlikely to devote “a considerable number of naval assets to Gwadar”.184 He insists that such endeavors are “well beyond Pakistan’s budgetary capabilities”.185 This is a significant correction because it qualifies the argument that Gwadar was developed as a naval port from its inception or for serving as a Chinese base in the future.

China is more likely to incentivize by considerations such as developing infrastructure and industries in its Xinjiang region. Since these developments will result in an increase in freight traffic along the China-Pakistan border, the Gwadar port could be used to facilitate these exchanges.186 Furthermore, the port also offers China unique transshipment advantages. Since

Gwadar’s immediate competitor, the Karachi port, suffers from congestion, demurrage charges can be costly.187 Furthermore, goods in high demand within Pakistan frequently have to wait for seven to eight days at the Karachi port. “As a result”, continues Rafiq, “Gwadar [is] a cheaper option even when factoring inland shipping to and from Gwadar”.188 An additional benefit for

China includes the possibility of Chinese freight companies to use Gwadar instead of Dubai as a transshipment hub for some of its eastern seaboard traffic189. Both parties stand to benefit from the fact that “Gwadar also has the only roll-on or roll-off facility in Pakistan and could serve for automobile imports and exports”.190

Pakistan has an array of interests it pursues in relation to the Gwadar port. In initially approaching the Chinese government to invest in Gwadar, the Musharraf “government” in

184 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 29. 185 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 29 186 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 24. 187 GDA officials as quoted by Rafiq state that demurrage charges could reach $300,000 per day for a 100,000 DWT ship at Karachi port. 188 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 25. 189 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 15. 190 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 25.

Pakistan hoped to attain assistance with the finance required for building the port. Rafiq insists that this initial push was for it to be done “as a favor” to Pakistan—not out of recognition of the port’s commercial or strategic value”.191 Eventually, however, the Pakistani government is incentivized by the possibility of bridging its infrastructure and energy gaps through related products, with financial and expert assistance from their “all-weather” friend. The port is touted as the harbinger of a new wave of henceforth unseen development within Balochistan. Although inhibitions exist, local Baloch are also hopeful that the development of the port will contribute to the employment opportunities and finally award Balochistan its rightful attention and share of resources. Rafiq insists that “CPEC could help Pakistan move toward and sustain higher GDP growth rates of 7 to 8 percent” through multiple prongs including “ending the country’s electric power shortages, making its ground transport system more efficient, improving the competitiveness of its value-added exports…”,192 among others. Since many prongs of the wider initiative are connected to the port at Gwadar, the port can, directly and indirectly, contribute to these variables that contribute to the country’s GDP. Moreover, pragmatic concerns such as

Gwadar easing the rush at the busy Karachi port are another simple incentive to develop it further. As mentioned, the port at Gwadar can bridge logistical and business gaps between the services currently rendered by the Karachi port.

Gwadar also features an LNG terminal to serve natural gas pipelines as well as a planned refinery that can service the freight traffic at the port as well as the broader local market.193 The possibility of revenue-generation and service-provision is complimented by the fact that Gwadar can also seize a sizeable regional transshipment market. Gwadar’s location, in the Arabian Sea

191 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 6. 192 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 22. 193 Shahrukh Syed, “China to set up refinery at Gwadar,” Pakistan Observer, January 23, 2017.

region has convenient access to Eurasia.194 Former minister of commerce Khurram Dastgir-Khan was optimistic that it would become the “port of choice” for Central Asian countries. Though this may be an ambitious goal for the still-humble port, the potential for capturing international transshipment market share and generating value through service provision is at the port.

Additionally, the Gwadar port also serves as to counter Indian presence at its own ports as well as that at “Iran’s Bandar Abbas and Chabahar—the port that lies seventy miles from Gwadar and is being constructed by India”.195 Rafiq insists this counters the chance of a complete Indian naval blockade as Pakistan decides on considerations of security and strategy at the geopolitical level.

Moreover, committing to the port at Gwadar can have potential externalities for

Pakistan’s energy crisis as the overall CPEC commitment claims to

“prioritize all those projects which would provide the fundamental pre-requisites to initiate the economic activities like the provision of infrastructure to improve the connectivity and energy projects including wind, coal, hydel solar, etc. depending upon the available potential of the region to meet the initial energy requirements.”196

The Chinese government’s social-sector work geared at earning local goodwill usually comes with no or very low price tags, to the benefit of the Pakistani populace. A Financial Times article summarizes the cumulative benefits for Pakistan in the following terms:

“For a country that has struggled to nudge its capital-investment ratio to 15% of GDP— compared with around 30% for India and 28% for Bangladesh in recent years—this gush of Chinese money comes as a godsend. Not only does it promise to energize the economy and fix such problems as chronic power shortages; it represents a strategic insurance policy against India.”197

194 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 8. 195 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 25. 196 CPEC Quarterly, 36. 197 “China Makes Pakistan an Offer It Cannot Refuse.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, July 24, 2017.

This is by no means an exhaustive list of Chinese and Pakistani incentives for the investment in

Gwadar, but this does provide a more detailed account to contrast the contesting claims.

Legal and Precedential Protections

Shireen Rehman cautions against incessant worry regarding asset seizures along the lines of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota citing Sri Lanka’s graver balance of payments crisis as the differentiating factor. Pakistan’s Trade Laws, the Foreign Private Investment Act (FPIA) of

1976, and the Protection of Economic Reforms Act (PERA) of 1992 prevent government acquisition of Pakistani land. PERA prohibits the seizure of privatized property198. The China-

Pakistan Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) of 1989 also awards arbitration priority over judiciary methods in the event of dispute resolution.199

Legal protections aside, asset seizure is also not the most probable outcome for Chinese infrastructure deals. This is confirmed by the Rhodium Group’s recent study of 40 cases of

Chinese debt renegotiations where asset seizure was found to be a rather rare occurrence.200 A lot more common are deferment, change of lone terms or due dates, refinancing or write-offs, and debt forgiveness. China has renegotiated around $50 billion worth of debt with countries including Ecuador, Ethiopia, Mongolia, and Ukraine, among others. Rehman nevertheless qualifies this by reminding that that the “country’s ballooning external debt, questions surrounding the country’s capability to repay its loans without risking the country’s assets are not

198 Ahmad Gouri, “Towards Greater Integration? Legal and Policy Directions of Chinese Investments in Pakistan on the Advent of the Silk Road Economic Belt, 4 Chinese Journal of Comparative Law 36, 45, 2016. 199 China-Pakistan BIT, at Investment Policy Hub, http://investmentpolicy hub.unctad.org/IIA/country/1 60/treaty/952, Feb. 12,1989. 200 Agatha Kratz, Allen Feng, and Logan Wright. “New Data on the “Debt Trap” Question, Rhodium Group, April 29, 2019.

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unfounded” and a reminder that “the real risk lies in Pakistan’s ability to stabilize its balance of payments”201. Therefore, the trade imbalance between Pakistan and its largest trading partner is hardly negligible. Pakistan’s trade deficit with China stood at $9.7 billion in 2018, accounting for

30 percent of the entire trade deficit202.

Revisiting the Debt-Trap

The scale of the promise and potential reward for Pakistan invites both an invitation to participate as well as concerns around transparency, repayment and capacities. While concerns around intent are relatively dim within Pakistan, they do occasionally arise, especially as they pertain to concerns regarding Pakistan’s burgeoning public debt and sovereignty over its territory. Rehman insists the concerns over the Pakistani debt burden are not as grave as perceived. She concludes that “CPEC makes up for 6% of Pakistan’s total external debt worth

$105.84 billion whereas other multilateral loans run about 4-5 times more, dwarfing CPEC loans in comparison”.203 She also provides a detailed breakdown of Pakistan’s CPEC debt, undermining assertions that CPEC is a direct and significant cause of debt distress:

“According to official Chinese statements, early harvest projects are worth $ 18.9 billion in investments which is made up of $6 billion in government loans with a 2% interest rate and private investments in the form of equity worth $3 billion and $9.8 billion in commercial loans with a 5% interest rate204. So far, the government of Pakistan only needs to repay $ 6 billion over the span of 20-25 years.”205

201 Sherry Rehman, CPEC 2.0: The Promise and the Peril, 9. 202 Iqbal Shahid. “Trade Gap with China Rises to $9.7 billion in FY18”. DAWN. 29 July, 2018. 203 Sherry Rehman, CPEC 2.0: The Promise and the Peril, 8. 204 Statement from Chinese Embassy. December 29, 2018. http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/t1625941.htm 205 Sherry Rehman, CPEC 2.0: The Promise and the Peril, 8.

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Concerns around other elements cited as contributors to Pakistan’s debt distress also warrant a revisit. For instance, the burden induced by the import of construction material and machinery on

Page 10 is effectively countered by the fact that CPEC-related construction has contributed to the growth of related industries within the country, especially the cement and steel industries.206

Rafiq highlights the fact that the majority of raw materials will still continue to be sourced from local Pakistani industries, even though China actively imports raw materials from China as well.207 He reiterates that “a construction boom in Pakistan is providing short- to medium-term support for the local cement industry. Local consumption grew by 17 percent in 2015–16

[even]as exports continued to decline.”208

Revisiting the Balochistan Question

There can be no denying of the reasonability of the Baloch population’s concerns granted the long history of rightful grievances with the federal government. Nevertheless, the local population is not in blanket opposition to the developments at Gwadar. The concern is directed at the equitable distribution of resources and rewards. The government’s attention to Gwadar could also mean that Balochistan is finally receiving its share. Rafiq confirms the desire for human development through the Gwadar project and insists that “[i]t is imperative that the Baloch receive a disproportionally high benefit from infrastructure, industrial, energy, and mining projects related to CPEC.”209

206 Parvez Jabri, “CPEC Pushes Steel Demand in Pakistan,” Business Recorder, February 24, 2016 207 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 21. 208 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 26. 209 Rafiq, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Barriers and Impact, 39.

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Furthermore, the concern that the sparsely populated province may be outnumbered by

“outsiders” is fairly palpable. Primary data collected by the government of Pakistan, nevertheless, claims that over 90 percent of the 81,121 workers employed by 12 CPEC projects are Pakistani.210 This ought to be qualified with the awareness that Baloch concerns of being outnumbered within their own territory are extended even to Pakistanis of other ethnicities. The onus is, therefore, on the Pakistani government to acknowledge and accommodate these concerns. The demographic shift, however, is not likely to happen any time soon. Current

Chinese workers hardly number the estimates produced. An article by the Economic Times insists that by 2022, half a million Chinese workers will be residing in Gwadar211 whereas the current total population of Gwadar currently numbers 85,000.212

Discussion

By revisiting the main arguments expounded for the case of imperialism as manifested by debt-trap diplomacy in Pakistan, this chapter sheds light on the actual fissures within the arguments for it. However, Pakistan’s debt-burden concerns and Baloch inhibitions are not at all unfounded. In order to maintain this relationship at the “interdependence” threshold, Pakistan must ensure that its

Balance of Payments is in order, particularly through increasing exports which have consistently been falling in recent years.213

210 “Pakistan Owes China $18 Bn out of Total $74 Bn Debt, Planning Minister Rebuffs Accusations against CPEC.” China Pakistan Economic Corridor, November 25, 2019. 211 Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy. “As Part of CPEC, 'Chinese Only' Colony Coming up in Pakistan.” The Economic Times, August 21, 2018. 212 Matt Harris. “What Is Gwadar's Population Expected to Be in the next Five Years?” CPIC Global, April 26, 2019. 213 Bokhari, Farhan. “Pakistan Revives Belt-and-Road Projects under Chinese Pressure.” Financial Times, December 11, 2019.

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Currently Gwadar is hardly a bustling trade or military acquisition. The lack of

infrastructure and concerns around security still render Gwadar a relatively futile acquisition to

those ends. With one COSCO container arriving to harbor, the only Chinese presence and

influence in the area is restricted to a business center at the port. In accordance with the standard

for imperialism, the two parties, both the Chinese SOE and Pakistan are interdependent. Chinese

products and trade cannot flow without sufficient cooperation from the Pakistani government to

deliver on the infrastructure front. There is sufficient wait, in the interim, before an imperial

trajectory could be mapped out, should there be one.

Hegemony / Independence Interdependence Dependence Imperialism

As with Sri Lanka, the Pakistani government and the Chinese SOE are yet to be embroiled in

farther stages of the imperial trajectory, if at all. As with Sri Lanka, should the Chinese parties

acquire greater control and influence beyond the current confines of their gated community, this

conclusion can and ought to be revisited.

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Appendix 1: CPEC Gwadar Project Updates Fall 2019 ______

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Source: CPEC Quarterly, Fall 2019

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Chapter 7

Discourse Analysis

Rhetorical Political Analysis

Source: Author’s Analysis of BRI Coverage from 2013-2020 in the New York Times, the Wall

Street Journal, the Economist, and Financial Times.

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Abstract

Concerns regarding Chinese neo-imperialism or debt-trap diplomacy in South Asia are significantly influenced by popular rhetoric. Deborah Brautigam’s work highlighting the coming-to-prominence of the term “dept-trap” highlights the significance of rhetoric in informing the interpretation of and reaction to these developments. She traces the origin of the term to a think tank in India and its subsequent usage by Parker and Chefitz in their “Debtbook

Diplomacy” publication at Harvard. Thereafter, she reminds us that the term catches on like wildfire once multiple news outlets begin using the term as a factual given. This indicates that the popular discourse and academic scholarship were mutually reinforcing in this case.

In order to determine the extent of impact of this rhetoric, Glynos, Howarth, Norval, and

Speed suggest using Rhetorical Political Analysis. They state that the “analysis of the particular content of an argument – whether it is concerned with, for instance, education, health policy or foreign policy” ought to be done “with regard to the manner in which certain objects are emphasized/de-emphasized”.214 The analysis of BRI coverage indicates an emphasis on elements such as the use of the Hambantota and Gwadar ports as naval/ military bases, potential debt-traps as a result of Chinese investment, China’s premeditated ploy to upset the current geopolitical world-order and a de-emphasis on terms such as development, infrastructure, and trade. This hints at the priorities within reporting and discourse. This methodology reiterates the emphasis on broader geopolitical considerations expounded in other sections of the thesis in line with

214 Glynos Jason, David Howarth, Aletta Norval, and Ewen Speed. (Discourse Analysis: Varieties and Methods, United Kingdom: Economic and Social Research Council, August 2009), 15.

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Aletta J. Norval’s methodological insistence that “analysis of the content of arguments cannot be done without reference to the broader ideologies of which they form part”.215

The analysis finds that every publication makes explicit use of the terms “colonialism” or

“imperialism”. Across all articles, mentions of imperialism occur a total of 26 times while colonialism closely follows with 22. A vast majority of articles, if not all, make some mention of the implications of the debt accrued to China by the participating BRI countries. Mentions of the military and navy occur more than 70 times altogether as well as mentions of India and the US are also present, though not to the same degree and the former surfaces even less freuquently than the latter. This is in sharp contrast to the Chinese and local (to Sri Lanka and Pakistan) narrative that emphasizes terms and notions such as “development”, “infrastructure”, “win-win”, and “trade” etc when commenting on the Initiative although a small overlap does exist between the two types of narratives. The findings are presented thematically, aggregated findings are presented first with and accompany specific breakdowns by publication in graphical form in the

Visual Representations Section.

Methods

Coverage by news outlets of the Belt and Road Initiative including the reporting of recent developments, special reports, opinion pieces and statements from leaders and specialists were analyzed from the top four news outlets in the world. Approximately twenty articles per publication were accumulated in the process of sorting by relevance to the Initiative at large as well as developments within Sri Lanka and Pakistan. A total of 78 articles were selected from the

215 Norval, Aletta J. “Review Article: The Things We Do with Words – Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology.” British Journal of Political Science 30, no. 2 (2000): 313–46.

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Financial Times, the Economist, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal from 2013, when the when the Initiative was formally announced, to present. Using a digital text-mining software, the relative frequency of the use of certain key terms was determined to determine patterns within the coverage of the Initiative. Although an attempt at fairness of the sample has been made, the analysis would benefit from casting a wider net and using local news sources within China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and India. This would increase the validity of the results through an increase in sample size as well as award a rich contrast to the coverage offered by these global, West-based, media outlets. While frequency is being used as the main unit of measurement, the analysis would also profit from the study of correlation between these terms to arrive at a more nuanced understanding.

Findings

1. Implications of imperialism/Colonialism & Debt-Trap Diplomacy

Less 20 percent of the articles analyzed refer to the developments through the lens of, and use of the terms, “imperialism” and “colonialism”. Terms related to “imperialism” appear 26 times while those pertaining to “colonialism” appear a total of 22 times across all the articles.

The Wall Street Journal uses terms related to “imperialism” 17 times while both the Financial

Times and the New York Times use terms referring to elements of “colonialism” seven times. A clear instance of this is Jamil Anderlini, writing for the Financial Times states in his article titled,

“China is at Risk of Becoming a Colonialist Power”. He writes, “[t]oday, China is at risk of inadvertently embarking on its own colonial adventure in Pakistan-the biggest recipient of BRI

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investment and once the East India Company’s old stamping ground.” He also insists that

Pakistan is “now virtually a client state of China”. 216

A far greater majority, however, insinuate the idea through the use of the term “debt- trap”. For instance, an approximate 67 percent of Financial Times Articles make explicit mention of the term while the idea of the indebtedness of borrowing countries appears in roughly

50 percent of The Economist articles. The Economist, for instance, quotes a Pakistani economist expressing a similar sentiment: “[w]hether those billions [of dollars] come in loans or FDI, the outflow will start within four or five years of the inflow,” quoting Kaiser Bengali, who continues that this is “ a blueprint as clear as can be for colonisation.”217

Similarly, coverage awarded to Sri Lanka and Pakistan resoundingly espouses concerns of debt-trap diplomacy. A vast majority of the publications and their articles maintain the stance that “a Chinese company has taken over operation of Sri Lanka’s $1.3bn Hambantota port on a

99-year lease after that country defaulted on payments.”218 There are multiple reiterations of this stance across all publications. The Economist also employs similar language in reporting on

Hambantota: “…Hambantota, a port built by China in Sri Lanka that passed into Chinese hands in 2017, along with 69 square kilometres of land, after the Sri Lankan government could not service debts incurred in its construction.”219 The trouble with this narrative has already been discussed in the chapter on Sri Lanka. These examples, however, serve as clear instanes of the very verbiage Deborah Brautigam pushes back against. This is not to overstate the case for bias

216 Anderlini, Jamil. “China Is at Risk of Becoming a Colonialist Power.” Financial Times. September 19, 2018.

217 “China Makes Pakistan an Offer It Cannot Refuse.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper. July 24, 2017.

218 Hornby, Lucy. “Belt and Road Debt Trap Accusations Hound China as It Hosts Forum.” Financial Times, April 23, 2019.

219 “China Has a Vastly Ambitious Plan to Connect the World.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, July 26, 2018.

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or imply that all outlets refer to these developments exclusively through this sentiment.

Arguments tackling the sentiment also routinely appear, just not as frequently. For instance, the very same publication that insists upon Hambantota’s passing of hands, clarifies on another occasion that:

“The Asian Development Bank, a multilateral organisation, estimates that the continent requires $26trn in infrastructure investment between 2017 and 2030 to maintain today’s growth rates and adapt to climate change. Set against those numbers, the size of Chinese investment does not in itself signal a plan for global domination.” 220

For visual representation, see Figures 6-10.

2. Geopolitical Concerns

Another important theme that emerges from the analysis seconds the emphasis on geopolitics informing perceptions of the BRI. Concerns around the ports at Hambantota and

Gwadar eventually being transformed into naval ports or military bases appears across all publications. In spite of the commentary’s focus on Sri Lanka and Pakistan, concerns mounted by the United States and India make appearances nevertheless, though this is understandably not the main focus. One Economist article traces the predominance of “debt-trap diplomacy” concerns amidst American rhetoric in the following terms:

“The most extreme [concern about the BRI’s financial consequences] is that the scheme involves what is pithily described as “debt-trap diplomacy”. In this view, China is deliberately overloading weak countries with loans; when they buckle, it seizes their assets and influences their politics. This idea has featured in speeches by some American officials, including the vice- president, Mike Pence, who see bri as an attempt to undermine America’s global influence.”221

220 “China Has a Vastly Ambitious Plan to Connect the World.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, July 26, 2018.

221 “China Tries to Calm Jitters about the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, April 25, 2019.

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Another Economist article titled, “China Wants to Put Itself Back at the Centre of the World”, acknowledges these power plays afoot by insisting that some American assertions of Chinese predatory economics are overstated:

“The harshest criticism comes from the incumbent superpower, whose global dominance the project is challenging. America’s National Security Strategy claims that the BRI is “predatory economics”; to borrow money from China is to fall into a well-laid trap. In December Adam Boehler, the head of the new us International Development Finance Corporation, told the Financial Times that China’s overseas investments were “100%” like a house of cards, because of heavy debts, badly built infrastructure, corruption and lack of transparency. That is an overstatement.”222

Thus, commentary on geopolitics is also a regular feature of the commentary on the BRI despite its personal branding emphasizing development and “win-win” cooperation. For visual representation see Figures 1 to 5 and 11-15.

222 “China Wants to Put Itself Back at the Centre of the World.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, February 6, 2020.

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Visual Representations

Aggregated Coverage

Figure 1: Aggregated Country Lines

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Figure 2: Financial Times Country Lines

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Figure 3: The Wall Street Journal Country Lines

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Figure 4: New York Times Country Lines

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Figure 5: The Economist Country Lines

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Debt-Trap Coverage

Figure 6: Aggregated Debt Coverage

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Figure 7: Finance Times Debt Coverage

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Figure 8: Wall Street Journal Debt Coverage

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Figure 9: New York Times Debt Coverage

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Figure 10: The Economist Debt Coverage

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Military and Ports

Figure 11.1: Aggregated Frequency of Military Concerns

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Figure 11.2: Aggregated Frequency of Military Concerns

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Figure 12: Financial Times Frequency of Military Concerns

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Figure 13: Wall Street Journal Frequency of Military Concerns

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Figure 14: New York Times Frequency of Military Concerns

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Figure 15: The Economist Frequency of Military Concerns

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Discussion

While China touts the BRI as a mutually beneficial and cooperative development project, the volume of the opposing argument, that of potential Chinese imperialism, is not negligible.

The analysis of reporting by the four most reputable news sources, the Financial Times, New

York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Economist from 2013-2020 provides information regarding which elements are emphasized and others that are de-emphasized within popular discourse.223

The relative frequency of terms representative of the diverging arguments reaffirm my insistence that concerns of “debt-trap diplomacy” and geopolitical considerations (as discussed with a foci on military use of ports and the power dynamics between regional contenders for power) foreshadow discussions of the BRI at the global level. I will qualify this with the acknowledgement that though this discourse may not form an overwhelming majority of the discussion, it forms a noteworthy bulk nevertheless. This has two important implications of the assertions already presented: a) participating BRI countries must face and address rhetoric that has a slight bias for caution against Chinese debt on the global stage and b) as players contend for influence within the region, rhetoric is an important tool in their arsenal.

223 As per the emphasis/deemphasis methodology presented by Glynos, Jason, David Howarth, Aletta Norval, and Ewen Speed. “Discourse Analysis: Varieties and Methods,” August 2009.

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Additional Information: Word-Frequency Maps

Financial Times

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The Wall Street Journal

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New York Times

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The Economist

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Appendix 1: Articles Analyzed

Financial Times:

1. Anderlini, Jamil. “China Is at Risk of Becoming a Colonialist Power.” Financial Times, Financial Times, 19 Sept. 2018, www.ft.com/content/186743b8-bb25-11e8-94b2- 17176fbf93f5. 2. Bokhari, Farhan. “Pakistan Revives Belt-and-Road Projects under Chinese Pressure.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 11 Dec. 2019, www.ft.com/content/ab809f2c-1101-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a. 3. Hornby, Lucy. “Belt and Road Debt Trap Accusations Hound China as It Hosts Forum.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 23 Apr. 2019, www.ft.com/content/3e9a0266-6500-11e9-9adc-98bf1d35a056. 4. Smyth, Jamie. “China Warned to Reform Its Lending to Indebted Pacific Islands.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 20 Oct. 2019, www.ft.com/content/3a53131a-f2d5-11e9-b018-3ef8794b17c6. 5. “Maldives Fears China Belt and Road Debt Trap.” Edited by Trixia Abao, Financial Times, Financial Times, 11 Feb. 2019, www.ft.com/video/27254658-6cfe-485d-8ab0- 993ca89b7392. 6. . “China Is More Likely to Lend to Pakistan.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 31 July 2018, www.ft.com/content/224c41e8-93f8-11e8-b747- fb1e803ee64e. 7. “Corridor Plan Is a Priority for Pakistan and China.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 13 Sept. 2018, www.ft.com/content/7a4b503e-b75f-11e8-bbc3- ccd7de085ffe. 8. Bokhari, Farhan. “China Pledges Economic Aid for Pakistan - but Not Yet.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 3 Nov. 2018, www.ft.com/content/8ad00e52- df52-11e8-a6e5-792428919cee. 9. Bokhari, Farhan. “Pakistan Revives Belt-and-Road Projects under Chinese Pressure.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 11 Dec. 2019, www.ft.com/content/ab809f2c-1101-11ea-a7e6-62bf4f9e548a. 10. Bokhari, Farhan. “China to Lend $2bn to Pakistan to Shore up Rupee.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 1 Jan. 2019, www.ft.com/content/bd083b78-0d70- 11e9-acdc-4d9976f1533b. 11. Yu, Sun. “China Faces Wave of Calls for Debt Relief on 'Belt and Road' Projects.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 30 Apr. 2020, www.ft.com/content/5a3192be-27c6-4fe7-87e7-78d4158bd39b. 12. Weinland, Don. “China to Tackle Corruption in Belt and Road Projects.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 18 July 2019, www.ft.com/content/a5815e66- a91b-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04. 13. Aamir, Adnan. “China's Efforts to Speed up Belt and Road in Pakistan Falter.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 24 Sept. 2019, www.ft.com/content/ece55ddc-da7d-11e9-8f9b-77216ebe1f17.

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14. Hornby, Lucy. “China Pledges to Address Debt Worries over Belt and Road.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 25 Apr. 2019, www.ft.com/content/f7442058-66f9-11e9-9adc-98bf1d35a056. 15. “The Belt and Road Initiative Is Short of 'Chinese Characteristics'.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 21 May 2019, www.ft.com/content/ed53a1d0-7b13- 11e9-81d2-f785092ab560. 16. Financial Times. “Maldives Fears China Belt and Road Debt Trap.” Financial Times, Financial Times, 11 Feb. 2019, www.ft.com/video/27254658-6cfe-485d-8ab0- 993ca89b7392. 17. Crabtree, James. “China Needs to Make BRI More Transparent and Predictable.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 25 Apr. 2019, www.ft.com/content/3c5d6d14-66ac-11e9-b809-6f0d2f5705f6. 18. Palma, Stefania. “China and Malaysia in Talks to Cut Cost of Belt and Road Project.” Subscribe to Read | Financial Times, Financial Times, 20 Feb. 2019, www.ft.com/content/12ea931e-34f0-11e9-bb0c-42459962a812. 19. Financial Times. “China and Sri Lanka Support Each Other.” Financial Times, Financial Times, www.ft.com/content/ba139546-ef13-11e8-8180-9cf212677a57.

The Wall Street Journal:

1. Taplin, Nathaniel. “One Belt, One Road, and a Lot of Debt.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 2 May 2019, www.wsj.com/articles/one-belt-one-road-and-a- lot-of-debt-11556789446?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=4. 2. Peaple, Andrew. “China's Economic Diplomacy Only Paves a Bumpy Road.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 9 Oct. 2018, www.wsj.com/articles/chinas- economic-diplomacy-only-paves-a-bumpy-road- 1539084179?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=17. 3. Mead, Walter Russell. “Opinion | Imperialism Will Be Dangerous for China.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 17 Sept. 2018, www.wsj.com/articles/imperialism-will-be-dangerous-for-china- 1537225875?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=16. 4. Wen, Philip, and Drew Hinshaw. “China Asserts Claim to Global Leadership, Mask by Mask.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 1 Apr. 2020, www.wsj.com/articles/china-asserts-claim-to-global-leadership-mask-by-mask- 11585752077?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=2. 5. Gayou, Gerard. “Opinion | Who's Afraid of the Belt and Road?” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 9 June 2019, www.wsj.com/articles/whos-afraid-of-the-belt- and-road-11560108561?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=2. 6. Taplin, Nathaniel. “One Belt, One Road, and a Lot of Debt.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 2 May 2019, www.wsj.com/articles/one-belt-one-road-and-a- lot-of-debt-11556789446?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=6.

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7. Board, The Editorial. “Opinion | More Belt and Road Backlash.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 24 Sept. 2018, www.wsj.com/articles/more-belt-and-road- backlash-1537832714?mod=searchresults&page=3&pos=14. 8. Mead, Walter Russell. “Opinion | Imperialism Will Be Dangerous for China.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 17 Sept. 2018, www.wsj.com/articles/imperialism-will-be-dangerous-for-china- 1537225875?mod=searchresults&page=3&pos=17. 9. Board, The Editorial. “Opinion | Another 'Belt and Road' Hostage.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 19 Aug. 2018, www.wsj.com/articles/another-belt-and- road-hostage-1534717019?mod=searchresults&page=4&pos=1. 10. Trivedi, Anjani. “The Danger in China's Dual Debt Cycle.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 18 Apr. 2017, www.wsj.com/articles/the-danger-in-chinas-dual- debt-cycle-1492489801?mod=searchresults&page=6&pos=18. 11. Page, Jeremy. “Pakistan Looks to China for Big Energy and Infrastructure Projects.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 18 Feb. 2014, www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-looks-to-china-for-big-energy-and-infrastructure- projects-1392730784?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=20&tesla=y. 12. Shah, Saeed. “China's Belt-and-Road Initiative Puts a Squeeze on Pakistan.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 3 Apr. 2019, www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-belt- and-road-initiative-puts-a-squeeze-on-pakistan- 11554289201?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=20. 13. Haqqani, Husain. “Lowering Expectations for China's Pakistan Push.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 22 Apr. 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/lowering- expectations-for-chinas-pakistan-push- 1429718222?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=17. 14. Shah, Saeed, and Jeremy Page. “China Readies $46 Billion for Pakistan Trade Route.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 17 Apr. 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-unveil-billions-of-dollars-in-pakistan-investment- 1429214705?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=16. 15. Shah, Saeed. “Pakistan Turns to China in Energy Binge.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 18 Dec. 2016, www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-turns-to-china-in- energy-binge-1482062404?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=7. 16. Shah, Saeed. “With U.S. Aid Cut, Pakistan Drifts Closer to China.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 10 Jan. 2018, www.wsj.com/articles/with-u-s-aid-cut- pakistan-drifts-closer-to-china-1515580200?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=3. 17. Shah, Saeed. “Pakistan Pushes China to Realign Goals in Its Belt-and-Road Initiative.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 12 Sept. 2018, www.wsj.com/articles/pakistan-pushes-china-to-realign-goals-in-its-belt-and-road- initiative-1536773665?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=4. 18. Page, Jeremy, and Saeed Shah. “China's Global Building Spree Runs Into Trouble in Pakistan.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 22 July 2018, www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-global-building-spree-runs-into-trouble-in-pakistan- 1532280460?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=2. 19. Page, Jeremy, and Saeed Shah. “China Disputes Infrastructure Projects Are Swamping Pakistan With Debt.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 24 July 2018,

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www.wsj.com/articles/china-disputes-infrastructure-projects-are-swamping-pakistan- with-debt-1532445474?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1. 20. Parkinson, Joe, et al. “As Africa Groans Under Debt, It Casts Wary Eye at China.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 17 Apr. 2020, www.wsj.com/articles/as- africa-groans-under-debt-it-casts-wary-eye-at-china- 11587115804?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=3. 21. Kaplan, Robert D. “'Belt and Road' Review: A Chinese World Order.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 2 June 2019, www.wsj.com/articles/belt-and-road- review-a-chinese-world-order-11559507481?mod=searchresults&page=3&pos=5.

The New York Times:

1. Bradsher, Keith. “China Renews Its 'Belt and Road' Push for Global Sway.” The New York Times, January 15, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/15/business/china- belt-and-road.html?searchResultPosition=3.

2. Bradsher, Keith. “China Proceeds With Belt and Road Push, but Does It More Quietly.” The New York Times, January 22, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/business/china-foreign- policy.html?searchResultPosition=4.

3. Abi-Habib, Maria. “China's 'Belt and Road' Plan in Pakistan Takes a Military Turn.” The New York Times, December 19, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/world/asia/pakistan-china-belt-road- military.html?searchResultPosition=12

4. Perlez, Jane, and Yufan Huang. “Behind China's $1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up the Economic Order.” The New York Times, May 13, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/china-railway-one-belt-one-road-1- trillion-plan.html?searchResultPosition=22.

5. Abi-Habib, Maria. “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port.” The New York Times, June 25, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka- port.html?searchResultPosition=38.

6. Krauss, Clifford, and Keith Bradsher. “China's Global Ambitions, Cash and Strings Attached.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 24 July 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/business/international/chinas-global-ambitions-with- loans-and-strings-attached.html?searchResultPosition=1.

7. Millward, James A. “Is China a Colonial Power?” The New York Times, The New York Times, 4 May 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/opinion/sunday/china-colonial- power-jinping.html?searchResultPosition=2.

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8. Schultz, Kai. “Sri Lanka, Struggling With Debt, Hands a Major Port to China.” The New York 9. Times, The New York Times, 12 Dec. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/sri-lanka-china- port.html?searchResultPosition=16.

10. Brautigam, Deborah. “Is China the World's Loan Shark?” The New York Times, The New York Times, 26 Apr. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/opinion/china-belt-road- initiative.html?searchResultPosition=1.

11. Larmer, Brook. “Is China the World's New Colonial Power?” The New York Times, The New York Times, 2 May 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/magazine/is-china-the- worlds-new-colonial-power.html?searchResultPosition=2. 12. Board, The Editorial. “China's Big Plunge in Pakistan.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 23 Apr. 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/04/23/opinion/chinas-big-plunge-in- pakistan.html?searchResultPosition=5.

13. “The World, Built by China.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 18 Nov. 2018, www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/18/world/asia/world-built-by- china.html?searchResultPosition=37&mtrref=undefined&gwh=42FC2E9151A23442746 8FBBE3C48E1B0&gwt=pay&assetType=PAYWALL.

14. Myers, Steven Lee, and Chris Horton. “As Taiwan Loses Influence, China Gains Ground in Race With U.S.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 20 Sept. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/09/20/world/asia/taiwan-kiribati- china.html?searchResultPosition=2.

15. Millward, James A. “Is China a Colonial Power?” The New York Times, The New York Times, 4 May 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/opinion/sunday/china-colonial- power-jinping.html?searchResultPosition=1.

16. Bradsher, Keith. “China Taps the Brakes on Its Global Push for Influence.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 29 June 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/06/29/business/china-belt-and-road- slows.html?searchResultPosition=22.

17. Schultz, Kai. “Sri Lanka, Struggling With Debt, Hands a Major Port to China.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 12 Dec. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/sri-lanka-china- port.html?searchResultPosition=2.

18. Bradsher, Keith. “China Proceeds With Belt and Road Push, but Does It More Quietly.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 22 Jan. 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/01/22/business/china-foreign- policy.html?searchResultPosition=6.

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19. Krugman, Paul. “Belts, Roads, and Strategic Trade Policy.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 20 May 2017, krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2017/05/20/belts-roads- and-strategic-trade-policy/?searchResultPosition=8.

20. Perlez, Jane, and Yufan Huang. “Behind China's $1 Trillion Plan to Shake Up the Economic Order.” The New York Times, May 13, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/13/business/china-railway-one-belt-one-road-1- trillion-plan.html?searchResultPosition=22.

The Economist:

1. Economist, The. “Our Bulldozers, Our Rules.” The Economist, 2 July 2016, www.economist.com/china/2016/07/02/our-bulldozers-our-rules. 2. Economist, The. “China's Battle for Influence in Its Region.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 20 Apr. 2017, www.economist.com/special- report/2017/04/20/chinas-battle-for-influence-in-its-region. 3. Economist, The. “Chinese Investment in Eurasia Is Not Always Smooth.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 6 Feb. 2020, www.economist.com/special- report/2020/02/06/chinese-investment-in-eurasia-is-not-always-smooth. 4. Economist, The. “China Faces Resistance to a Cherished Theme of Its Foreign Policy.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 4 May 2017, www.economist.com/china/2017/05/04/china-faces-resistance-to-a-cherished-theme-of- its-foreign-policy. 5. Economist, The. “Will China's Belt and Road Initiative Outdo the Marshall Plan?” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 8 Mar. 2018, www.economist.com/finance-and- economics/2018/03/08/will-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-outdo-the-marshall-plan. 6. Economist, The. “Chinese Loans to Poor Countries Are Surging.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 12 July 2019, www.economist.com/graphic- detail/2019/07/12/chinese-loans-to-poor-countries-are-surging. 7. Economist, The. “China's Belt-and-Road Plans Are to Be Welcomed-and Worried About.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 26 July 2018, www.economist.com/leaders/2018/07/26/chinas-belt-and-road-plans-are-to-be- welcomed-and-worried-about. 8. Economist, The. “Massive Chinese Investment Is a Boon for Pakistan.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 9 Sept. 2017, www.economist.com/asia/2017/09/09/massive- chinese-investment-is-a-boon-for-pakistan. 9. Economist, The. “Pakistan Faces a Currency Crisis. Who Will Help?” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 14 June 2018, www.economist.com/asia/2018/06/14/pakistan-faces-a-currency-crisis-who-will-help. 10. Economist, The. “In South Asia, Chinese Infrastructure Brings Debt and Antagonism.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 8 Mar. 2018,

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www.economist.com/asia/2018/03/08/in-south-asia-chinese-infrastructure-brings-debt- and-antagonism. 11. Economist, The. “Chinese Investment in Infrastructure Is Often a Diplomatic Trap.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 2 Feb. 2019, www.economist.com/asia/2019/02/02/chinese-investment-in-infrastructure-is-often-a- diplomatic-trap. 12. Economist, The. “China Tries to Calm Jitters about the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 25 Apr. 2019, www.economist.com/china/2019/04/25/china-tries-to-calm-jitters-about-the-belt-and- road-initiative. 13. Economist, The. “China Wants to Put Itself Back at the Centre of the World.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 6 Feb. 2020, www.economist.com/special- report/2020/02/06/china-wants-to-put-itself-back-at-the-centre-of-the-world. 14. L., M. “What's in It for the Belt-and-Road Countries?” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 19 Apr. 2018, www.economist.com/the-economist- explains/2018/04/19/whats-in-it-for-the-belt-and-road-countries. 15. Economist, The. “A New Study Tracks the Surge in Chinese Loans to Poor Countries.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 13 July 2019, www.economist.com/finance- and-economics/2019/07/13/a-new-study-tracks-the-surge-in-chinese-loans-to-poor- countries. 16. Economist, The. “The Perils of China's ‘Debt-Trap Diplomacy.’” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 6 Sept. 2018, www.economist.com/asia/2018/09/06/the-perils-of- chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy. 17. Economist, The. “China Has a Vastly Ambitious Plan to Connect the World.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 26 July 2018, www.economist.com/briefing/2018/07/26/china-has-a-vastly-ambitious-plan-to-connect- the-world. 18. Economist, The. “China Makes Pakistan an Offer It Cannot Refuse.” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 24 July 2017, www.economist.com/special- report/2017/07/24/china-makes-pakistan-an-offer-it-cannot-refuse. 19. Economist, The. “What Is China's Belt and Road Initiative?” The Economist, The Economist Newspaper, 24 July 2017, www.economist.com/the-economist- explains/2017/05/14/what-is-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative.

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Conclusion

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This thesis concludes that China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a multifaceted project that warrants a more nuanced and contextualized evaluation than it is usually awarded. The question of China’s economic expansion as a manifestation of Chinese “imperialism” in itself raises a slew of other inquiries such as: what constitutes imperialism within the current world order; does

China constitute an empire or have imperial inclinations; how does China’s history as a former imperial territory and current global power factor into its foreign policy today; how do regional geopolitical considerations play into these developments; and how are perceptions influencing our understanding of the project’s realities among many others. By evaluating whether Sri

Lanka’s Hambantota Port and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port are China’s imperial possessions as is popularly cautioned, the thesis provides an overview of both sides of the debate and identifies the shortcomings of arguments expounded for Chinese imperialism within South Asia. At the same time, the thesis humbly notes that the developments within the region are still unfolding and will unravel in the forthcoming years. It is, therefore, impossible to be conclusive about the findings.

This thesis concludes, however, that the two ports do not currently meet the standard for imperial possessions, qualifying this conclusion with the acknowledgement that developments could occur in the future that render this conclusion incorrect.

In order to arrive at this conclusion, I begin by presenting an overview of the Belt and

Road Initiative beyond the two port projects that are the units of study for this thesis. This chapter provides a general overview of the Initiative’s origins, plans, funding structure, objectives, and awards sufficient background information to contextualize the forthcoming discussion regarding Chinese dealings within South Asia. The chapter emphasizes the importance of maritime projects to the greater whole and makes a note of the fact that the BRI is hardly a centralized endeavor. It is, in fact, a series of personalized deals with an array of

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bilateral partners. This contrasts the presentation of the narratives of premeditated Chinese imperialism that follow. The chapter also includes China’s personal plan for the BRI verbatim.

This allows for entertaining the authentic Chinese stance on the matter. Doing so also allows for a glimpse of the rhetoric on the Chinese side.

Then the thesis continues to lay the groundwork by delving into the definition of

“imperialism” before tackling the grander question it sets out to address. In order to do so, I trace over a hundred years of political theory development on imperialism from Hobson (1902) to Jane

Burbank and Frederick Cooper (2010) in chronological order to mark the progression of the development of a variety of frameworks for understanding imperialism. I then present my personal framework that argues for a spectrum of political inequality between two states at any time. I argue that hegemony that awards political or economic control to a state upon another, or upon possessions within it, constitutes imperialism. Mere dependence or interdependence do not suffice as thresholds for imperialism.

After presenting my personal framework, I proceed to present the historical development of China’s foreign policy from the time of the Qing Dynasty as well as the contemporary debate on China’s states as an imperial power. This chapter acknowledges that China’s worldview is influenced by its own imperial legacy as well as its past that includes subjugation to other empires. This awards nuance in interpreting China’s policies within the region.

With all the contextualization in place, the thesis proceeds to analyze the two “textbook” cases of Chinese “debt-trap” diplomacy within South Asia. Sri Lanka’s case is presented first as the Hambantota Port’s controversial 99-year-lease has an uncanny familiarity with the fate that

China suffered at the hands of Western imperialists on multiple occasions. The chapter, however, corrects the arguments at the heart of the assertion for debt-trap diplomacy to conclude that the

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Hambantota port is not an imperial holding. The chapter evaluates the concern of Chinese imperialism by employing the central framework I introduce at the beginning. The chapter concludes with speculation regarding possibilities that would render a port, especially

Hambantota, an imperial possession.

I then proceed to present the second case study, on Pakistan, that is being forewarned to avoid a fate similar to that of Sri Lanka’s. Within the context section, this chapter provides detail of interconnected and complementary incentives for both China and Pakistan to enter into a partnership over Gwadar. These reasons serve slightly better rationale than the mere unadulterated pursuit of dominance and hegemony. This chapter also highlights the issue of possible Baloch alienization in conjunction with the concern of a debt-trap signaling the status of

Gwadar as an imperial possession. Though the chapter provides counter-argumentation, it concedes that Pakistan’s Balance of Payments is worrisome and that the Baloch concerns are understandable, valid, and place the burden of protection on the federal government to ensure that the benefits of BRI do not come at the Balochi cost.

Finally, the brief chapter on Discourse analysis performs a political rhetorical analysis on

78 articles from the top four leading newspaper outlets in the world: the Wall Street Journal, the

Economist, the Financial Times, and the New York Times. This analysis shows that regional power politics as it pertains to Indian and US influence informs some of the coverage while an overwhelming majority views the Initiative with some degree of suspicion.

This journey reiterates the priorities of this thesis once more. It contextualizes all stakeholders within their own unique history, geography, ideology, and circumstance. At the same time, it views their interactions from a local, continental, and world lens. Arguments pertaining to the different sides of the debate are presented where possible, and multiple metrics

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and/or lines of argumentation are utilized to arrive at the conclusion that the two Chinese port- partnerships within South Asia do not constitute imperialism. Since the subject of this thesis does not award me the benefit of hindsight, this thesis acknowledges that a change in circumstance or variance in the degree of power asserted by China within these port holdings or in its dealings with these countries at large could potentially lead to a revision of this conclusion in the future.

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