COMMENT 180 – Sino-Sri Lankan Relations and the Hambantota Port
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COMMENT COMMENT 180 – Sino-Sri Lankan relations and the Hambantota Port By Deshika Elapata 28 April 2020 - ISSN NUMBER: 2406-5617 Deshika Elapata is SADF’s Research Assistant. She graduated with a Master’s Degree in International Relations with a specialisation in Global Conflict in the Modern Era, from the University of Leiden in The Netherlands. Her dissertation focused on the (de) securitization of climate induced migration and the recognition of climate refugees. She obtained a Bachelor of Science Degree in Social Science from the University of Tilburg. She joined SADF after an internship at the European Institute for Asian Studies. Debt trap diplomacy? In Sri Lanka, the Hambantota Port project funded and initiated under the - government led by President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2007, is by far the most salient project. China’s involvement and considerable impacts on the Sri Lankan economy since the 2000s are well documented (Panda, 2014, September; Chaudhury, 2019, December). Thus, and unsurprisingly, Sri Lanka is one of the many recipients of Chinese investment in infrastructure – notably, investment linked to the Belt and Road Initiative which started in 2013. The BRI, deemed – either out of contempt or approval -, a bold development project of our era, was introduced in 2013 by President Xi Jinping’s Government, claiming to promote multidimensional connectivity between China and Asia as well as other regions of the world (Wolf, 2019, p. v). The Hambantota Port project began as part of Sri Lanka’s own developmental plans. Mahinda Rajapaksa was keen on establishing a commercial port in the South of the island as it lay across vital sea lanes. Sri Lanka required a considerable amount of investment, which China was willing to provide . Sri Lankan authorities viewed this as an opportunity for national gain: this investment not only enhanced the country’s economic relations with China, but by also giving Sri Lanka a strategic location in the Indian Ocean - the Hambantota Port being positioned in a tactical and vital shipping route between Asia and Europe making it a prominent investment in re-establishing Sri Lanka’s place and importance. SADF Comment N.180 1 COMMENT The Hambantota Port, as a pre-BRI project had already accumulated a considerable amount of debt, however, as Sri Lanka engaged with China in developing projects under the BRI umbrella in 2013, the Port, was perceived as a part of the BRI vision – therefore receiving further investment. This resulted in yet a bigger debt by Sri Lanka to China, what most of the international community viewed as Sri Lanka being a victim of debt trap diplomacy. The 99 year lease by the Sri Lankan government - Maithripala Sirisena government, which preceded the current government of Gotabhaya Rajapaksa - of the Port to China Merchant Port Holdings Company (CMP) in 2017 was due to Sri Lanka’s inability to repay China. In Sri Lanka, the debt accumulation from International Sovereign Bonds,1 amounts to 39 percent of total foreign debt as of 2017, and the debts incurred by the island could be mainly attributed to structural weaknesses of the economy pertaining to an overall reduction in trade, government revenue and the increased practice of protectionism. Debts to China are, in comparison, 6 percent of Sri Lanka’s GDP. Thus, the current Sri Lankan authorities have some resistance in considering Sri Lanka to be in a debt-trap situation vis-à-vis China. In this line, in April 2019 Sri Lanka’s Ambassador in Beijing, Dr Karunasena Kodituwakku rejected the concept of ‘debt trap diplomacy’ stating that Sri Lanka would have experienced debt regardless of China’s involvement. The Ambassador further dismissed the wide consensus that China is using the BRI to grow its influence and power in global trade - using Sri Lanka to achieve its strategic aims. Similarly, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa argued against the notion of Sri Lanka being trapped by China through debt. Rajapaksa defended that Sri Lanka and China have always had a close and cordial relationship and intended on continuing this trend. On China’s side, the government very much echoed Sri 1 An international bond is a debt obligation that is issued in a country by a non-domestic entity. Generally, it is denominated in the currency of its issuer's native country. Like other bonds, it pays interest at specific intervals and pays its principal amount back to bondholder at maturity. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/internationalbond.asp SADF Comment N.180 2 COMMENT Lankan officials’ words, stating that the development of projects in Sri Lanka was carried out with a ‘win-win spirit’ and ‘equal footed consultation’. Military aspects – Sri Lanka’s strategic moves Otherwise, the Port deal heightened military-related concerns. Despite Ambassador Kodituwakku’s assertion that Colombo and Beijing agreed that the Port would not be utilised for military purposes, current President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa gave emphasis to the importance of ensuring the implementation of a substantial security structure and policy at the Port and its surroundings in order to prevent the Chinese utilising of the port for Chinese military purposes in the Indian Ocean. Thus it is evident, that there is a conflict of interest especially because the Hambantota Port is a vital strategic location between East and West, attracting interest from other powers, such as India and the US. President Rajapaksa is seeing that border control and security will be vested by Sri Lankan authorities alone – so that only they can have the capacity and responsibility of admitting access to the Port. Thereby, also preventing the rise of any challenges in global geopolitics and maritime security issues. In December 2019, President Gotabhaya – expressed a differing view to that of Ambassador Kodituwakku, who gives assurances that Beijing will not take advantage of the Port for its own military profit – demonstrates that establishing a stringent security policy practice remains a priority. The predisposition to install an effective security policy at the Hambantota port, stems from news of fears of the establishment of a Chinese military base and the introduction of a Chinese run industrial zone in Sri Lanka that have been soaring following the handing over the Port in 2017. Such fears of the results of the industrial zone were largely visible when villagers protested the expropriation of land and resources for the development of the industrial zone, voicing their fears of the formation of a Chinese colony. Thereby, extending uncertainty and insecurity, depriving the local economy from creating jobs and limiting the control held by the Sri Lankan government. The continued Chinese support to the Hambantota Port through the provision of commercial loans to encourage the development in Sri SADF Comment N.180 3 COMMENT Lanka, could be primarily viewed as methods to advance Beijing’s vision. It is perceived to cause detrimental effects to the environment and population, but most importantly, fears of resource exploitation and subjugation. There has been, of course, disagreement between Sri Lankan officials on the actions of the 99 year leasing of the Hambantota Port under the Sirisena government in 2017. In response, Sirisena’s government stressed the necessity to do so, in order to compensate for the debt incurred for the construction of the Port, which commenced with Rajapaksa, known for his pro-Beijing stance. The elements exposed above, provide perhaps a more ambiguous take to the consensus surrounding Sri Lanka’s diplomatic debt-trap. It would be unquestionably disingenuous to take upon China’s investments as uninterested and void of their own agenda. However, it may also be of naivety to assume that the Sri Lankan authorities were completely blind towards Chinese interests when they accepted to be indebted. For this and the reasons presented in this Comment, when Sri Lankan officials refute claims of China’s investments leading the country into a debt trap diplomacy situation – their logic may not completely flawed. Undoubtedly, it is also beneficial to Sri Lanka, to continue contradicting the deb- trap narrative – avoiding, a self-fulfilling prophecy. In this, Sri Lanka clearly needs to focus on developing a better debt management system and address the institutional and structural weaknesses of its economy in order to grow and achieve a better standing. The Sri Lankan government can deny that the Hambantota port is a debt trap project, but it is pressing, and there is a need to remain vigilant and reinvent Sri Lanka’s domestic security policy practices. Especially in relation to having control, responsibility and a strong grip over the governance of assets such as the Hambantota port, ensuring its operations will not be dictated by Chinese authorities. Only this, will also prevent the likelihood of the rise of any potential global rivalries in the region. SADF Comment N.180 4 COMMENT References Chaudhury, D. R. (2019, December 26). Chinese investments in Sri Lanka compromises Colombo's sovereignty. Economic Times. Retrieved from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/chinese-investments-in- sri-lanka-compromises-colombos- sovereignty/articleshow/72975247.cms?from=mdr Ferchen, M., & Perera, A. (2019). Why Unsustainable Chinese Infrastructure Deals Are a Two-Way Street. Carnegie-Tsinghua Centre for Global Policy. Retrieved from https://carnegieendowment.org/files/7-15-19_Ferchen_Debt_Trap.pdf H’tota Port agreement will not be revised: President. Daily FT. (2019, December 22). Retrieved from http://www.ft.lk/front-page/H-tota-Port-agreement-will-not-be- revised-President/44-691996 Moramudali, U. (2019, May 14). Retrieved from The Diplomat: https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/is-sri-lanka-really-a-victim-of-chinas-debt- trap/ Panda, A. (2014, September 16). China Courts Sri Lanka. The Diplomat. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2014/09/china-courts-sri-lanka/ Protest over Hambantota port deal turns violent.