Phillip T. Rutherford. Prelude to the : The Nazi Program for Deporting Ethnic Poles, 1939-1941. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007. xv + 328 pp. $34.95, cloth, ISBN 978-0-7006-1506-3.

Reviewed by Thomas Kühne

Published on H-German (February, 2008)

Since Jan T. Gross's book on the massacre of the Germanization of Nazi governor Arthur Greis‐ the Jews in Jedwabne by their Polish neighbors, er's model Gau, the Wartheland. both scholars and the public have spent much at‐ Because of the Ribbentrop-Molotow pact, tention on Polish grassroots antisemitism and the multitudes of Volksdeutschen from eastern and collaboration of "ordinary" Poles in . southeastern Europe followed 's ap‐ Phillip Rutherford's detailed account of National peal--"Heim ins !"--and were to be accommo‐ Socialist policies of "" in dated in the newly conquered Polish territories. from the fall of 1939 to the spring of 1941 rows To enable the rapid resettlement of hundreds of into the opposite direction. Assuming that the thousands ethnic Germans, the local population "fate of Polish Jews under German occupation has was expelled. Such nationalist politics (Volkstum‐ been well documented," Rutherford seeks instead spolitik) was part of the much larger Nazi plan to to reveal the "wartime ordeal of non-Jewish restructure the ethnogeography of eastern Europe Poles," as the jacket blurb says. He does so not by along the lines of politics. "As origi‐ focusing on the victims' perspectives, on their suf‐ nally framed," Rutherford writes, "Nazi German‐ fering, or their agency, however. Drawing on both ization schemes demanded the complete elimina‐ German and Polish sources, he investigates the tion of Poles and Jews from the incorporated east‐ decision-making, course, and organization of de‐ ern territories, and ... the Jews certainly emerged portation operations. Particular attention is paid in the long run as the primary victims of the oper‐ to the Staf for the Evacuation of Poles and Jews to ation" (p. 6). However, as Rutherford points out, the Generalgouvernement, renamed the Umwan‐ following earlier assessments by Christopher dererzentralstelle (UWZ) in April 1940. The UWZ Browning, Götz Aly, and Ian Kershaw, "this horrif‐ was established under 's ic truth should not obscure the conspicuous anti- Sicherheitspolizei and 's Reich‐ Polonism of Nazi Volkstumspolitik during the ini‐ skommissariat für die Festigung des deutschen tial phase of the occupation" (p. 6). Most of the ar‐ Volkstums in Posen in November 1939 to organize H-Net Reviews riving Volksdeutschen were peasants; they would vised version of the second Nahplan, thus laid the require new agricultural homesteads. Very few ground for the deportation of 173,636 individuals Jews, however, worked in agriculture. As a conse‐ in all, primarily Polish farmers and their families, quence, Rutherford notes, "Polish farmers, by ne‐ from the Warthegau in the months between Feb‐ cessity, would have to make the bulk of those dis‐ ruary 1940 and January 1941. Despite all the logis‐ possessed and deported to provide the new ar‐ tical difculties, ideological disputes, and person‐ rivals with the farms they had promised" (p. 113). al feuds, "the deportation system in Wartheland Such a change in priorities was never without had expanded and evolved far beyond the quag‐ its problems. Rutherford confrms this state of af‐ mire of December 1939. 'Absolute organizational fairs by documenting "the day-to-day activity of defciency' became largely a thing of the past" the UWZ in the Warthegau" (p. 12) in carrying out (pp. 130f). It must be noted, however, that the pri‐ the four major deportation actions, which led to ority conficts of Nazi racial and nationalist poli‐ the evacuation of nearly 300,000 individuals, most tics abated somewhat in 1940 for another reason. of them ethnic Poles, in 1.5 years. In October 1939, The conquest of France and hopes of defeating Himmler, Heydrich, and 's plan to Britain allowed the Nazis to become fascinated deport the Austrian and Bohemian Jews to Nisko with the idea of deporting all European Jews to near Lublin had to be suspended to in favor of the Madagascar. frst Nahplan, which served as the basis for ex‐ Between September 1940 and March 1941 the pelling more than 80,000 Poles (and Jews) to make next wave of Volksdeutschen--roughly 275,000 room for approximately 40,000 , thousand individuals from , , and to give priority to resettlement of the frst ar‐ and --were to be brought "home to the riving Volksdeutschen. Concluded in less than Reich." The frst part of the third Nahplan was three weeks, "the Nazi's frst major experience in scheduled to run from February to April 1940, but systematic mass deportation" nevertheless re‐ did not keep pace with its predecessors. Instead of vealed "absolute organizational defciency" (p. hundreds of thousands, only 25,000 Poles, includ‐ 86). ing 9,000 Jews, were resettled through March Learning from the experience proved dif‐ 1941. At that point another priority--preparation cult, though, not only due to Governor-General for the attack on the --took over. 's constant resistance, but also be‐ Three million German soldiers in 157 Wehrmacht cause major National Socialist leaders continuous‐ divisions eventually needed transport to the East. ly worked to reestablish the anti-Jewish priorities Such needs compelled Himmler to truncate the of their racist politics. The initial version of the goals of the third Nahplan; it was called of second Nahplan, issued by Heydrich on December abruptly on March 15, 1941. "Great plans had 21, 1939, did not call for the expulsion of Poles, come to naught" (p. 190), as Rutherford remarks, but rather for the evacuation of 600,000 Jews, but at the same time much larger and much more which would take three trains six to seven horrible plans were about to be carried out. months, with each train carrying 1,000 deportees Where, then, does the program for deporting per day, as SS-Sturmbannführer Albert Rapp, the ethnic Poles ft into Nazi racial politics? In an in‐ leader of the UWZ, calculated. That plan, howev‐ fuential assessment on the development of the er, was delayed before it actually started. The exi‐ "Final Solution," Browning has pointed out the gencies of the resettlement of the Volksdeutschen frustration of Hitler and the SS's demographic en‐ once again claimed priority. Poles, not Jews, had gineers with the "repeated failure of German to be expelled. First a Zwischenplan, then the re‐ plans for massive population transfers, especially

2 H-Net Reviews those for solving the Jewish Question," from late ated. As brutal as it was, Germanization of Polish 1939 to spring 1941. At that time, deportation-- territories in Imperial still meant assim‐ rather than killing the Jews--was the plan. But ilation; in , obsessive racism left few from the spring of 1941 on, deportation seemed alternatives to exclusion. no longer possible, and the resulting frustration Rutherford's book valuably supplements our fueled what became known as the "Final Solution" understanding of the early steps toward the Holo‐ beginning in the summer of 1941 on.[1] Ruther‐ caust. Any overstatement of continuities between ford takes a diferent view. "Brutal though it was," these measures and the past of the German-Polish he writes, "Nazi Polenpolitik in the eastern prov‐ relationship results from Rutherford's laudable inces apparently grew more rational and less concern for the Polish victims of Nazi politics. racially motivated as the regime came to realize Even so, readers should keep in mind the limited the military and economic value of its Polish sub‐ perspective of his account. At the same time as the jects. In efect, it apparently 'de-radicalized' as UWZ was organizing the deportation of mostly time passed, gradually evolving from the initial non-Jewish Poles, hundreds of thousands of Jews unrealistic plans to deport approximately 80 per‐ were herded into ghettos or had already been cent of the Polish population in the incorporated murdered, not only by members of the Einsatz‐ territories immediately ... to the point that all gruppen, but also and often by Wehrmacht con‐ Poles capable of work were exempted from evac‐ scripts--ordinary Germans. As recent research uation in early 1941" (p. 215). Thus, the program into the Wehrmacht's war on Poland has shown, it of "ethnic cleansing" in Poland did not just fail; on was the Jews, more than non-Jewish Poles, who the contrary, it became increasingly successful were considered its primary targets.[2] Outside and proved, from a long-term perspective, a valu‐ the UWZ, the Holocaust had was no longer simply able treasure of experiences, as "the perpetrators' being logistically prepared. It had already been apprenticeship at the school of mass transfers, an launched. educational experience that ... ultimately proved Notes instrumental to the expeditious destruction of Eu‐ ropean Jewry" (p. 12). [1]. Christopher R. Browning, The Path to Genocide: Essays on Launching the Final Solution The burden of the activities that we call the (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), "Final Solution," however, were not merely the 23. consequence of logistical issues. The shift in poli‐ cy from ethnic cleansing to genocide required [2]. Jochen Böhler, Auftakt zum Vernich‐ more elaborate planning than mass deportations. tungskrieg. Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939 (Frank‐ Moreover, the lines of continuity that Rutherford furt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006). draws between the relocation of the Poles and the prehistory of intensifying German-Polish friction in the after 1871 are dubious. "Imperial and Nazi authorities," he says, "endeav‐ ored to increase the German population of the Area at the expense of the Polish" (p. 34). Even so, neither the expulsion of 32,000 Russian and Aus‐ trian subjects between 1885 and 1887, nor the ac‐ tivities of the Colonization Commission from 1886, nor the suppression of the Polish language can be equated with the anti-Polish terror the Nazis initi‐

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Citation: Thomas Kühne. Review of Rutherford, Phillip T. Prelude to the Final Solution: The Nazi Program for Deporting Ethnic Poles, 1939-1941. H-German, H-Net Reviews. February, 2008.

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