november 2013 . Vol 6 . Issue 11-12

Contents Syria Proving More Fertile Than

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Syria Proving More Fertile Than Iraq Iraq to Al-Qa`ida’s Operations to Al-Qa`ida’s Operations By Brian Fishman By Brian Fishman

Reports 5 Tracking Australian Foreign Fighters in Syria By Andrew Zammit 9 The Capture of Abu Anas al-Libi: Reactions and Militancy in Libya By Alison Pargeter 12 Increase in Taliban Efforts to Recruit from Afghan Government and Security Forces By Jami Forbes and Brian Dudley 15 The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters: The Newest Obstacles to Peace in the Southern Philippines? By Peter Chalk 17 The Evolution of Jihadism in Italy: Rise in Homegrown Radicals By Lorenzo Vidino

21 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Members of Jabhat al-Nusra take part in a parade in Aleppo calling for an Islamic state in Syria. - Photo by Karam al-Masri/AFP/Getty l-qa`ida’s operation in Syria became nearly dominant in 2006 and is both its most dangerous 2007, and then suffered a dramatic and dysfunctional. Al-Qa`ida series of setbacks at the hands of the chief Ayman al-Zawahiri’s U.S. military and the famed Sunni Arebuke of the Islamic State of Iraq and Awakening. Those setbacks were a the Levant (ISIL), in which he ordered result of endogenous conditions and it to focus solely on Iraq and defer exogenous factors.2 They were enough authority in Syria to Jabhat al-Nusra to deeply damage al-Qa`ida in Iraq About the CTC Sentinel (JN), is evidence that terrorist groups (AQI),3 but not enough to destroy it. The Combating Terrorism Center is an can still pose a significant threat even As a result, when the uprising against independent educational and research when plagued by internal divisions.1 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad institution based in the Department of Social Moreover, despite al-Qa`ida’s internal turned violent in Syria, AQI was ready Sciences at the United States Military Academy, strife in Syria, the context in which it West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses operates is deeply advantageous compared the Center’s global network of scholars and to other environments, including Iraq. 2 This framing borrows heavily from Assaf Moghadam practitioners to understand and confront and Brian Fishman eds., Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Or- contemporary threats posed by terrorism and The dramatic growth of al-Qa`ida ganizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures (London: other forms of political violence. affiliates in Syria is a direct result of Routledge, 2011). its preexisting networks in Iraq. These 3 For the purpose of clarity, this article refers to the 2006- networks were built in 2004 and 2005, 2007 al-Qa`ida affiliate in Iraq as al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) The views expressed in this report are those of rather than the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which was its the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, formal appellation from October 2006 until changing its the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 1 “Al-Qaeda’s Zawahiri Disbands Main Faction Operating name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in in Syria,” al-Arabiya, November 9, 2013. 2012.

1 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 to take advantage in a country where For obvious reasons, federating what it operational success, and its personnel the context was quite different than meant to define ideological purity made vetting and training programs were Iraq. it difficult for AQI to build coalitions inadequate despite collecting a wide with other militant groups—even those range of information on its volunteers.10 This article compares the AQI of 2006- with similar ideologies, such as Ansar When fighters with Western passports 2007 to JN and the ISIL4 today with al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna—or entered Iraq, they were funneled directly the objective of estimating the relative tribal factions. This isolation deeply into the suicide bomber pipeline, just danger of the latter two groups. It first undermined AQI’s ability to govern looks at the endogenous and exogenous territory that it seized.7 constraints on AQI during its zenith, “Compared to AQI’s before examining whether those same Expansive and Shifting Strategic Goals earlier incarnation, JN and factors will weaken JN and the ISIL AQI had expansive strategic goals. in Syria. The article finds that the After October 2006, AQI aimed to the ISIL are more likely growth of JN and the ISIL in Syria govern areas it controlled in Iraq, and to sustainably control poses a significantly larger global celebrated that shift by changing its threat than their precursor, AQI, name to the Islamic State of Iraq (an territory, project power during the height of its strength in obvious precursor to the ISIL).8 The around the region, possibly 2006-2007. Moreover, there are signs determination to build an Islamic state, that JN and ISIL are likely to remain however, put AQI out-of-step with sponsor global terrorist powerful militant actors for a sustained many Iraqi Sunnis who felt a sense of attacks, and catalyze a period, unlike the earlier iteration of nationalism even as they were isolated AQI, which was significantly weakened from governing institutions. AQI’s new generation of jihadist by the Sunni Awakening just as its attempts to impose draconian social insurrection.” power was peaking. Compared to AQI’s policies on a population unaccustomed earlier incarnation, JN and the ISIL to them alienated AQI from their are more likely to sustainably control would-be constituency, and that led the territory, project power around the group to spend as much time fighting like others with less useful credentials.11 region, possibly sponsor global terrorist its potential allies as it did trying to Moreover, AQI’s lack of safe haven in attacks, and catalyze a new generation overthrow the Shi`a-led government of Iraq meant that foreign fighters posed of jihadist insurrection. Iraq. AQI’s strategy aimed to provoke serious security risks because their a Shi`a backlash against Sunnis that accents and lack of local knowledge AQI’s Endogenous Weaknesses AQI would rebuke, thereby winning the stood out.12 AQI suffered from three primary hearts and minds of that constituency. endogenous weaknesses that constrained Yet attempting to establish a jihadist AQI’s Exogenous Weaknesses its operations: ideological extremism, state in a majority Shi`a country by The U.S. strategy to apply exogenous expansive and shifting strategic goals challenging the existing tribal social pressure on AQI exploited these and limited operational capacity. framework was a course fraught with endogenous weaknesses. The United risk from the start.9 States succeeded in four key areas to Ideological Extremism limit AQI’s success: seizing operational From its founding in 2004, AQI Limited Operational Capacity initiative and battlespace control, embraced an expansive notion of takfir— AQI’s strategy was ultimately limiting foreign support, giving AQI excommunication, or the act of declaring undermined by its operational weakness. allies alternatives, and reining in the that a Muslim is not truly a Muslim— Although AQI was strong enough to sectarian fight. both in terms of the types of people who provoke a Shi`a backlash, it was too were eligible for this designation and weak to adequately defend Iraqi Sunnis. Seizing Operational Initiative and Battlespace by virtually eliminating any standard Additionally, AQI had few mechanisms Control for who was qualified to make that to improve its human capital. AQI The U.S. Special Operations Forces weighty declaration.5 By doing so, depended on foreign fighters for the campaign against AQI meant that no AQI established a predilection for suicide bombers that were central to its AQI base or safe house was secure. extreme violence conducted by largely From 2006 to 2008, AQI did not have independent operating commanders.6 ton, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007). an operational safe haven in Iraq, 7 Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self Destruction (New let alone a strategic one. By killing 4 This article uses the name the Islamic State of Iraq and York: Columbia University Press, 2010). the Levant to refer to the Iraq-based al-Qa`ida organiza- 8 Brian Fishman, “Fourth Generation Governance: 10 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qaeda’s Foreign tion that operates in both Iraq and Syria and was recently Sheikh Tamimi Defends the Islamic State,” Combating Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West chastised by al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri. Terrorism Center, March 23, 2007. Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007). 5 For more, see Mohammed Hafez, “Tactics, Takfir, and 9 See Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi’s letter to al-Qa`ida’s 11 Ibid. Anti-Muslim Violence,” in Assaf Moghadam and Brian leadership, which was released to the media in February 12 For example, see the Combating Terrorism Center’s Fishman eds., Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions 2004. The relationship between Ansar al-Sunna and AQI Harmony document collection, including: NMEC-2007- Within al-Qa`ida and Its Periphery (West Point, NY: Com- was occasionally hostile. For example, see Brian Fishman, 657700, NMEC-2007-657739, NMEC-2007-612449. bating Terrorism Center, 2010). “Ansar al-Sunnah Threatens al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” Combat- These documents are available at www.ctc.usma.edu/ 6 Mohammed Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq (Washing- ing Terrorism Center, February 26, 2007. programs-resources/harmony-program.

2 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 key AQI leaders and disrupting themselves against Shi`a oppressors Syrian Army (FSA), that has hampered communications, the United States who would kill their families. The jihadists from Algeria, Kunar Province, denied AQI the ability to effectively Baghdad security plan that separated and Iraq.19 train its recruits or communicate Sunni and Shi`a neighborhoods, with its operational leaders, which targeted Shi`a militias along with AQI, Expansive and Shifting Strategic Goals exacerbated the extremist tendencies and efforts to cleanse key Iraqi state In Syria, the problem is less that al- built into AQI’s ideology.13 This was institutions—such as the Ministry of Qa`ida’s affiliates have expansive true even after AQI’s leadership Interior—weakened AQI’s argument goals, but that they have divergent intended to moderate its interaction to Iraqi Sunnis that they were the only ones. Whereas JN remains focused with other Sunni groups in Iraq. counterforce to Shi`a domination. primarily on evicting Bashar al-Assad Without such guidance, and considering from power, the ISIL is increasingly AQI’s ideological disposition, it is not The ISIL’s and JN’s Endogenous Weaknesses content to consolidate governing surprising that operational leaders When comparing AQI’s weaknesses in control over areas of Syria outside of often defaulted toward radical—and Iraq with the ISIL’s and JN’s in Syria, al-Assad’s control.20 This is consistent often counterproductive—conflict with it becomes clear that the combination of with AQI’s approach to state building other Sunni groups. In other words, endogenous weaknesses and exogenous in Iraq, but is being implemented in an AQI’s operational extremism—and pressure that led to AQI’s setbacks in environment much more conducive to the backlash it caused—was likely the 2008 was unlikely to be replicated in the that goal. Whereas Iraq’s population result of both endogenous ideological near-term. Although the jihadist groups was 60% Shi`a, Syria’s population is radicalism and bad training and in Syria have significant endogenous 74% Sunni.21 Nonetheless, the ISIL’s guidance encouraged by exogenous weaknesses, they generally operate in strategy of partition seems out-of-step pressure from counterterrorism forces. a more permissive environment, and with Syrians who initiated the uprising applying effective exogenous pressure with the nationalist goal of keeping Limiting Foreign Support against them is proving more difficult. Syria unified by evicting al-Assad. Despite widespread opposition to the invasion of Iraq, foreign fighters joining Ideological Extremism Limited Operational Capacity AQI were engaged in an illicit endeavor. JN and the ISIL are both disposed to Perhaps the simplest and most obvious Governments allied with the United extreme ideological positions out of step explanation of JN’s and the ISIL’s States criticized the U.S. invasion, but with Syria’s more secular traditions.16 prospects for power projection and intelligence around the region worked Nevertheless, neither has engaged in sustainability is that these groups are to stem the flow of fighters and funds, mass declarations of takfir and systematic stronger than AQI was in Iraq. They often at U.S. urging.14 repudiation of Syrian social structures now include up to 12,000 fighters like AQI did in Iraq. Although this may combined.22 The ISIL is also bringing Giving AQI Allies Alternatives be simply a temporary tactical effort, it in much larger numbers of foreign The Sunni Awakening in Iraq did not nonetheless illustrates a predilection fighters—including Europeans—many of destroy AQI, but U.S. financial and for moderation not often shown by AQI. whom are learning to use sophisticated military support for tribal groups did JN in particular touts a hybrid Syrian weapons and small unit tactics rather encourage rebellion against jihadist and jihadist character. Nevertheless, than simply being ushered into suicide elements.15 The efforts by the United the ISIL continues Abu Mus`ab al- States were productive, just not Zarqawi’s tradition of conflict with 19 Lauren Williams, “Islamist Militants Drive Free Syr- decisive. other jihadists, both asserting control ian Army Out of Raqqa,” Daily Star [Beirut], August 15, over JN in Syria and repudiating 2013. Reining in the Sectarian Fight Ayman al-Zawahiri’s authority over 20 See, for example, Bruce Hoffman’s quote: “They want 17 AQI’s ideology was inherently its actions. This intransigence has led to carve out a jihadi state or a jihadi territory and obvi- sectarian, and the specter of Shi`a- to the ISIL falling out with Ayman al- ously anything above that is gravy, like overthrowing the 18 supremacist and Iran-affiliated Zawahiri. Therefore, although JN, and Assad regime. I don’t think they have ambitions of taking elements in the Iraqi government even the ISIL, have surpassed AQI’s over the entire country, although they’d be happy to.” See was useful for AQI’s outreach strategy efforts to relate to non-jihadists, they Ben Hubbard, “Qaeda Branch in Syria Pursues Its Own to recalcitrant Sunnis, pushing a nonetheless fall into the same fighting Agenda,” New York Times, October 1, 2013. narrative that saw Sunnis defending against other militants, such as the Free 21 “The World Factbook: Iraq,” Central Intelligence Agency, November 5, 2013; “The World Factbook: Syr- 13 See NMEC-2007-612449 in particular. Also see the 16 Kristen Chick, “Veil Ban: Why Syria Joins Europe in ia,” Central Intelligence Agency, October 25, 2013. story of AQI’s clash with the Islamic Army of Iraq in Barring the Niqab,” Christian Science Monitor, July 20, 22 Charles Lister, “Syria’s Insurgency Beyond Good Brian Fishman, Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned 2010; “In Secular Syria, Top Muslim Cleric Picks Sides in Guys and Bad Guys,” Foreign Policy, September 9, 2013. from Inside al-Qa’ida in Iraq (West Point, NY: Combating Civil War,” National Public Radio, March 12, 2013; Omar Estimates of AQI fighters range considerably, from Terrorism Center, 2009). Hossino, “Syria’s Secular Revolution Lives On,” Foreign about 1,000 up to several thousand. See Ned Parker, 14 Anthony Cordesman, Iraq and Foreign Volunteers Policy, February 4, 2013. “Iraq Insurgency Said to Include Many Saudis,” Los An- (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Internation- 17 Despite al-Zawahiri’s order that the ISIL should be geles Times, July 15, 2007. Thomas Hegghammer estimat- al Studies, 2005). abolished, the group continues to operate in Syria under ed that 4,000 foreign fighters entered Iraq. See Thomas 15 See, for example, David J. Kilcullen, “Field Notes on that name. Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Is- Iraq’s Tribal Revolt Against Al-Qa`ida,” CTC Sentinel 1:11 18 “Al-Qaeda’s Zawahiri Disbands Main Faction Oper- lam and the Globalization of Jihad,” International Security (2008). ating in Syria,” al-Arabiya, November 9, 2013. 35:3 (2010/2011).

3 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 attacks.23 Lastly, it is far easier for real difference, however, is that they Giving JN/ISIL Allies Alternatives foreign fighters to enter Syria than face much less exogenous pressure. In Iraq, providing alternatives to it was Iraq.24 Larger numbers, better Sunni militants meant providing training and a higher survival rate are Seizing Operational Initiative and Battlespace military support for tribal militias, likely to produce a larger “bleedout” of Control which was both useful practically and foreign fighters from Syria than Iraq. JN and the ISIL have more safe havens an important symbol of U.S. intent, Despite reasoned claims that the vast than AQI ever had in Iraq. The Syrian while simultaneously working with majority of foreign fighters will not military has been denied access to vast the Iraqi government to legitimize go on to become active jihadists, the swaths of Syria for months and there is their role in society.29 In Syria, fear of not a U.S. Special Operations campaign accidentally supporting jihadist groups or drone program to keep JN and the has restrained U.S. policymakers “Larger numbers, better ISIL unbalanced. Those safe havens from providing weapons and there training and a higher mean that JN and the ISIL can mitigate is no indication that a sustainable their ideological extremism through accommodation between FSA units survival rate are likely to better training, and foreign fighters can and the al-Assad government is near. produce a larger ‘bleedout’ be vetted and trained more thoroughly A program to support the FSA with because they are less of a security weapons would be useful, although of foreign fighters from hazard than foreign fighters were in it would be prone to abuse by jihadist Syria compared to Iraq.” Iraq. That capability both improves JN’s groups. and the ISIL’s effectiveness in Syria, but it also increases the possibility that Reining in the Sectarian Fight elements in these groups will attempt Much of the U.S. effort to prevent scale of jihadist veterans from Syria to operate outside of Syria and Iraq. sectarian war in Iraq boiled down to significantly raises the risk that some In the past, pressure from al-Qa`ida’s segregation. The United States has no will pursue al-Qa`ida’s ends in the core leadership prevented AQI from ability to separate the combatants in future.25 The ISIL’s command-and- expanding its area of operations—most Syria, but a de facto—and very bloody— control capability is mixed. The group notably in late 2005 after AQI attacked separation is occurring.30 Despite increasingly clashes with other militants Western hotels in Jordan. The ISIL the ISIL’s focus on consolidating in a manner reminiscent of the ISI, but it in particular has rejected Ayman al- governance in territory it controls, has also avoided such confrontation and Zawahiri’s authority and implicitly the group will not allow for a cease- engaged in a coherent public relations asserts that their vision extends to the fire with the al-Assad regime. The strategy to improve its image among entire Levant.27 specter of continued conflict with al- Syrians and outsiders alike.26 Assad significantly bolsters al-Qa`ida Limiting Foreign Support in Syria, contrary to the notion advanced The ISIL’s and JN’s Exogenous Weaknesses Whereas U.S. allies generally supported by some that the conflict bleeds and On balance, AQI’s Syrian descendants efforts to prevent foreign fighters weakens jihadist groups. face fewer endogenous weaknesses from flowing to Iraq (Bashar al- when compared to AQI: demographics Assad, ironically, turned a blind eye Conclusion favor them, external support is more as jihadists flowed through Damascus Al-Qa`ida in Iraq was always fighting forthcoming, and they are perceived as airport to Iraq), even close U.S. allies an uphill battle: it “incorporated” legitimate actors outside of al-Qa`ida’s such as Turkey, which has allegedly in a country dominated by a sect it usual band of narrow supporters. The backed JN skirmishes against Kurds despised, while 100,000 of the most in Syria, and Qatar have tolerated or capable soldiers in the world vigilantly 28 23 Michael Birnbaum and Souad Mekhennet, “As Son supported jihadist activity in Syria. attempted to crush it. The dissolution Heads to Syrian Front, Family in Germany Plots Kid- This policy dramatically increases the of Syria has dramatically changed that napping to Bring Him Back,” Washington Post, November risk of bleedout in the future and has context. 11, 2013. In July 2013, Hegghammer and Zelin estimated bolstered Bashar al-Assad politically that more than 5,000 foreign fighters have traveled to by allowing him to use the threat of JN and the ISIL are far more likely than Syria, a number that has certainly increased since then. sectarian jihadists to maintain cohesion AQI was during the U.S. occupation of See Thomas Hegghammer and Aaron Zelin, “How Syr- within his regime. Iraq to sustain control of territory. Safe ia’s Civil War Became a Holy Crusade,” Foreign Affairs, havens—such as those in Afghanistan July 7, 2013. and Pakistan, for example—have notably 24 There are a number of reasons for this. Europeans and been a precondition for well-organized other foreign fighters are able to take a train or airplane to 27 For more on this argument, see Brian Fishman, “Re- al-Qa`ida attacks against Western Turkey, and then enter across the Turkey-Syria border. defining the Islamic State of Iraq: The Fall and Rise of targets. Indeed, the controversial drone The Iraq-Syria border is another major crossing route. al-Qaeda in Iraq,” New America Foundation, August 18, tactics used in Pakistan and Yemen 25 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? 2011. were designed to prevent the sort of safe Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice be- 28 Dan Murphy, “US Designates Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra tween Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American Politi- Front a ‘Terrorist’ Group at Lightning Speed,” Secu- 29 Greg Bruno, “The Role of the ‘Sons of Iraq’ in Improv- cal Science Review 107:1 (2013). rity Watch, December 10, 2012; “Turkey and the Syrian ing Security,” Washington Post, April 28, 2008. 26 Ben Hubbard, “Rebels Push for Ceasefire in Border Kurds: A Little-Notice Battle,” Economist, September 25, 30 Arthur Bright, “Baghdad’s Sunni/Shiite Security Stand-Off,” New York Times, October 5, 2013. 2013. Wall,” Christian Science Monitor, April 20, 2007.

4 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 haven now developing in northeastern Tracking Australian The three most plausible cases are those Syria. of Roger Abbas, Yusuf Toprakkaya and Foreign Fighters in Syria a suicide bomber known only as “Abu These safe havens increase the risk Asma al-Australi.” that al-Qa`ida affiliates in Syria will By Andrew Zammit project power abroad. The ISIL’s Roger Abbas was an Australian citizen regional re-branding, despite Ayman the syrian civil war has resulted in one killed in Syria in October 2012.4 He al-Zawahiri’s determination to roll of the largest mobilizations of foreign was 23-years-old, from Melbourne, of that back, means it now publicly fighters since the Soviet occupation of Lebanese background, and had been a acknowledges regional aspirations Afghanistan in the 1980s.1 At that time, champion kickboxer.5 He was initially in Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, and Western countries were largely unaware reported to have entered Syria through the Palestinian territories. These of the threat that foreign fighters could Turkey to carry out aid work.6 A aspirations have always been latent pose to their own security. Today, martyrdom notice, however, referring to in AQI, but were suppressed in earlier governments in Europe and North him as “Abbas Rajah al-Tartousi,” was years when al-Qa`ida central ordered America have expressed fears that placed on official jihadist forums such the group to focus on Iraq.31 Bleedout foreign fighters in Syria will return as Ansar al-Mujahidin and Shumukh from Syria is likely to be significantly to their home countries as committed al-Islam and claimed he fought with worse than Iraq as well. Not only are jihadists with deadly skills and the al-Qa`ida affiliate Jabhat al- far more foreign fighters entering violent intent. This concern extends to Nusra.7 A documentary exploring the conflict, they are playing much Australia, where the Australian Federal the circumstances of his death found more complex roles as fighters and Police have described the activities evidence supporting the claim that he commanders rather than simply as in Syria as “a real game changer” that was carrying out aid work, and arrived fodder for suicide attacks. Considering will dramatically increase the threat of without prior connections to Syrian that the most important role of a veteran violent jihadism at home.2 armed groups, but also found evidence jihadist is as a trainer and motivator, that he had become involved with Jabhat this outflow is worrisome. Although This article examines the role of al-Nusra.8 the worst fears of Iraq in 2006 were Australians in the Syrian insurgency, avoided, they have the potential to be including the impact on Australia’s In December 2012, another man from realized in Syria. domestic threat environment. It gathers Melbourne, Yusuf Toprakkaya, was what is currently known about the killed in Syria.9 He was 30-years-old, Brian Fishman is a Counterterrorism Australians involved in Syria, places married, of Turkish background and Research Fellow at the New America this in the context of past Australian had been monitored by Australian Foundation. He previously served as the jihadist activity, and shows how the authorities since at least 2010.10 A Director of Research at the Combating Syrian conflict has the potential to YouTube clip posted by the al-Farouk Terrorism Center at West Point, where he increase the domestic terrorism threat Brigades referred to him as “Abu remains a Non-Resident Fellow. to Australia. al-Walid al-Australi” and showed him handling weapons and priming The Australians in Syria detonators.11 Toprakkaya arrived There have been six reported cases in Turkey in mid-2012, and like of Australians dying while fighting Abbas appears to have had no prior in the Syrian insurgency, but current connections to Syrian rebel groups information is limited and fragmentary. In most cases, it is difficult to confirm tions in this article about the activities of particular indi- whether the six individuals were in fact 31 Brian Fishman, “Redefining the Islamic State: The viduals may require revision as more information comes involved in combat, and in some cases Fall and Rise of al-Qaeda in Iraq,” New America Founda- to light. whether they were actually Australian.3 tion, August 18, 2011. Al-Qa`ida in Iraq also had regional 4 Angus Thompson, “Melbourne Kickboxing Champion aspirations, attacking outside of Iraq five times before it Roger Abbas Killed in Crossfire in Syria,” Australian As- was compelled by al-Qa`ida central to focus on Iraq: the 1 For Malet’s definition of foreign fighters as “noncitizens sociated Press, October 31, 2012. failed chemical attack in Amman, Jordan, in April 2004; of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil con- 5 Ibid.; “Lost in Syria,” Head First, ABC Television, May the attempted cross-border suicide attack in Jordan flicts,” see David Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational 15, 2013. in December 2004; rockets fired at the Red Sea port of Identities in Civil Conflicts (New York: Oxford University 6 Thompson. Aqaba; the attack on Western-owned hotels in Amman Press, 2013), p. 9. Also see Thomas Hegghammer and 7 Personal interview, Aaron Zelin, May 2013. On the in November 2005; and a rocket strike from southern Aaron Zelin, “How Syria’s Civil War Became a Holy Cru- importance of such forums for the global jihadist move- Lebanon into northern Israel in December 2005. See sade,” Foreign Affairs, July 7, 2013. ment, see Aaron Zelin, “The State of Global Jihad Online: “Jordan Was ‘Chemical Bomb’ Target,” BBC News, April 2 Cameron Stewart, “Is Syria Turning our Idealistic A Qualitative, Quantitative and Cross-Lingual Analy- 17, 2004; Sahar Aloul, “Zarqawi Handed Second Death Youth into Hardened Jihadis?” Australian, April 27, sis,” New America Foundation, January 2013. Penalty in Jordan,” Lebanon Wire, December 18, 2005; 2013. 8 “Lost in Syria.” “Al-Zarqawi Group Claims Attack on U.S. Ships,” MSN- 3 Much of the information about their alleged combat 9 Stephen Drill, “Mother’s Grief After Yusuf Toprakka- BC, August 23, 2005; “Al-Zarqawi Group Claims Attack roles comes from jihadist forums and social media. Schol- ya’s Death in Syria Battle,” Herald Sun, January 3, 2013. on U.S. Ships,” MSNBC, August 23, 2005; Ilene Prusher ars in the area tend to consider information derived from 10 Ibid.; Dan Box and Pia Akerman, “Syrian Rebels Eu- and Nicholas Blanford, “Al-Qaeda Takes Aim at Israel,” the official jihadist forums and social media accounts as logise Aussie ‘Martyr,’” Australian, January 2, 2013. Christian Science Monitor, January 13, 2006. often reliable, but not authoritative. Consequently, sec- 11 Ibid.

5 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 before his arrival.12 Once in the region, security agencies believe the bomber a 22-year-old Melbourne man named he wandered along the border with was Australian.18 He is reported to Sammy Salma, who had traveled to Syria until he found a group willing to be a 27-year-old man from Brisbane, Syria with Roger Abbas, was killed.27 smuggle him into the warzone. He then of Lebanese background, who was He was described as a martyr on jihadist hitched a ride to a village near the city married, and was already the subject of websites but there is little to confirm of Maarat al-Numan, met members a terrorism investigation.19 that he had a combat role.28 of a local brigade and declared his willingness to fight.13 He had no There have been three other reported In all, six Australian men are reported cases of Australians dying while to have died in the Syrian conflict thus “In all, six Australian men actively supporting Syrian rebels, but far, some while fighting for Jabhat less information is available for these al-Nusra. They have tended to be so far are reported to have incidents. In August 2012, for example, 30-years-old or younger, of Turkish, died in the Syrian conflict, a well-known Sydney shaykh, Mustapha Syrian and Lebanese heritage, and al-Majzoub, was killed in Syria.20 Al- several were known to authorities some while fighting for Majzoub was of Syrian heritage but before leaving. They generally entered Jabhat al-Nusra.” born in Saudi Arabia, and his brother, Syria through Turkey. Shaykh Fedaa al-Majzoub, was the only Australian member of the opposition There are reportedly many other Syrian National Council.21 It was Australians fighting in Syria, with previous military experience but over initially reported that he was killed estimates ranging from 70 to over the following months developed skills in a rocket attack while delivering 200. The 200 figure first appeared as a marksman and bomb-maker, humanitarian aid.22 Syrian rebel in a newspaper article in April 2013, before being killed in battle by a sources online, however, claimed that sniper.14 he died while commanding a military “In the case of Syria, many unit.23 Reports also suggested that The most controversial incident Australian authorities had monitored of the Australian fighters involving an Australian in Syria him prior to leaving Australia.24 In appear to be entering occurred in mid-September 2013, November 2012, a man named Marwan when Jabhat al-Nusra stated that al-Kassab died in an explosion in via the Turkish border a man known as “Abu Asma al- northern Lebanon while making bombs with few pre-existing Australi” executed a suicide bombing for Syrian rebels.25 There were claims in the town of al-Mreiya, near Deir al- that the man was Australian, and a connections to Syrian Zour.15 The martyrdom notice claimed man by that name had previously been armed groups.” the man drove a truck loaded with 12 monitored by Australian authorities, tons of explosives into a school with but whether it was the same person soldiers stationed in it,16 and that the remains unconfirmed.26 In April 2013, attack killed 35 Syrian soldiers and which cited an Australian government helped Jabhat al-Nusra seize the city’s 18 Paul Maley, “Terror Fight Returns as A-G’s Focus,” official, and has been used widely 17 military airport. Australian Attorney Australian, November 18, 2013. by the media since, but it was later General George Brandis confirmed that 19 Ibid.; Paul Maley and Dan Box, “Australia’s First Sui- disavowed by the Australian Security cide Bomber Believed to be 27-Year-Old Brisbane Man Intelligence Organization (ASIO) and 29 12 Tracey Shelton, “An Australian in Syria: The Journey Named on Social Media as ‘Abu Asma al-Australi,’” Aus- former Foreign Minister Bob Carr. of a Foreign Fighter,” Global Post, March 4, 2013. tralian, September 20, 2013; Renee Viellaris, Kris Crane A more credible estimate, reported in 13 Ibid. and Kate McKenna, “Muslim Community in Logan De- September 2013 and attributed to an 14 His death occurred during a battle for the Wadi al- nies Suicide Bomber in Syria Was One of Their Own,” anonymous senior official, is that 80 Dayf military base. The assault against the base was led Courier-Mail, September 21, 2013. Australians are fighting or “involved by Jabhat al-Nusra, but Toprakkaya was reported to be 20 Will Ockenden, “Sydney Sheikh Dies in Syria,” ABC in on-the-ground organisational part of a separate group involved in the offensive. See AM, August 22, 2012; Leesha McKenny, “Sydney Sheikh Shelton. Also see “Australian Killed Fighting Alongside Killed in Syria: Reports,” Sydney Morning Herald, August 27 Nino Bucci, “Father’s Anguish Over Son’s Death in Syrian Rebels: Activists,” Daily Star [Beirut], January 2, 21, 2012. War-Torn Syria,” Sydney Morning Herald, April 19, 2013. 2013. 21 Ibid. 28 Nino Bucci, “Claims Australians Killed in Syria Were 15 Natalie O’Brien and Nick Ralston, “Australian Man 22 McKenny. Fighters, Not Aid Workers,” Sydney Morning Herald, in Syria, ‘Abu Asma al-Australi,’ Suspected to be Suicide 23 Mansour al-Hadj, “Contradicting Statements On The May 12, 2013; Caro Meldrum-Hanna, “Are Young Aus- Bomber,” Sydney Morning Herald, September 14, 2013; Mission Of Slain Prominent Australian Sheikh Mus- tralian Muslims Being Radicalised on Home Soil?” ABC Paul Maley and Dan Box, “Aussie in Syrian Suicide At- tapha Al-Majzoub In Syria,” Middle East Media Re- 7:30, May 30, 2013. tack as Fears Mount over Terror Training,” Australian, search Institute, August 30, 2012. 29 Paul Maley and Cameron Stewart, “Australians An- September 13, 2013. 24 Paul Maley, “Sydney Sheik Killed in Syria ‘An Ex- swer the Syria Jihad Call,” Australian, April 13, 2013; 16 O’Brien and Ralston; Michael Brissenden, “Austra- tremist,’” Australian, August 22, 2012. Andrew Zammit, “About the Estimated 200 Australian lian Man Reportedly Blew Himself up in Suicide Bomb- 25 Paul Maley, “Death of Extremist Second Syria Link,” Fighters in Syria Again,” The Murphy Raid blog, July 18, ing at Syrian Military Airport,” ABC News, September Australian, November 1, 2013. 2013; Sam Caldwell, “‘G’Day Damascus’: Does Australia 14, 2013. 26 Paul Maley, “Dual-National Aussies Answer Syria Really Have the Biggest Contingent of Rebel Fighters in 17 Ibid. Rallying Call,” Australian, November 7, 2012. Syria?” The Point Magazine, August 2013.

6 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 roles” and that up to 20 are fighting With the Syrian conflict, however, the with few pre-existing connections to with Jabhat al-Nusra.30 The fighters scale is far greater. Even the lower Syrian armed groups. are reported to be primarily Lebanese- estimates of Australians fighting exceed Australian dual citizens, with 70% of the highest estimates of Australian Third, the Syrian conflict has broad them previously known to authorities, jihadists previously involved in conflicts appeal. The continuing massacres and and as having entered mainly through overseas. This is unusual because the clear failure of the international Turkey but some through Lebanon—all Australia does not tend to have many community to prevent them has of which is consistent with the above people involved in jihadist activity (less generated widespread outrage and information on those killed.31 than two dozen people in Australia have allowed jihadist groups, including the been convicted over involvement in The Syrian Jihad in the Context of Past jihadist terrorism plots).36 Australian Jihadist Activity “While the overwhelming The Syrian conflict is not the first Several factors contribute to the majority of jihadist foreign foreign fighter mobilization to involve unusually high level of Australian Australians. From 1998-2003, roughly involvement with Syrian jihadist fighters globally do not end 20 Australians traveled to train in al- groups. First, jihadist activity in up attacking their home Qa`ida camps in Afghanistan and Lashkar- Australia has strong historical links i-Tayyiba (LeT) camps in Pakistan.32 From with Lebanon, demonstrated by the countries, a small number 2002-2012, at least 16 Australians have familial connections of many previously do, and they prove more been arrested in Lebanon, or charged in convicted men as well as the numerous absentia, for alleged jihadist activities, cases of Australians involved in such capable than those without mainly for involvement with Asbat al- activity in Lebanon.37 The Lebanon military experience.” Ansar and Fatah al-Islam.33 Following connection means that the conflict in the 2006 invasion of Somalia by Syria, a state that shares a border with Ethiopia, several Australians traveled Lebanon, has had greater relevance to Somalia to fight for al-Shabab, with for potential Australian jihadists than al-Qa`ida affiliates Jabhat al-Nusra estimates ranging from 10 to 40.34 There insurgencies in Kashmir, Somalia, or and the Islamic State of Iraq and the are also indications of Australians being Yemen. Levant (ISIL), to present themselves involved in jihadist activity in Yemen, as the best capable forces to defend mainly during 2010.35 Second, the Syrian theater is much Sunni Muslims and to attract people easier to access because Turkey has who may initially have had no

30 A small portion of the fighters, however, are reported been functioning as a “launching intention of joining these groups. This 38 to be fighting for the al-Assad regime. See Paul Maley pad.” In Australia’s previous foreign can draw new people into jihadist and Dan Box, “Aussie in Syrian Suicide Attack as Fears fighter mobilizations, well-connected activity, broadening the Australian Mount Over Terror Training,” Australian, September 13, individuals were usually needed to jihadist scene beyond the previous 2013. facilitate access to camps and conflict cluster of small, interconnected and 39 31 Maley and Box, “Aussie in Syrian Suicide Attack as zones. In the case of Syria, however, closely monitored networks. Fears Mount Over Terror Training”; Maley and Stewart, many of the Australian fighters appear “Australians Answer the Syria Jihad Call.” to be entering via the Turkish border The Threat at Home 32 David Irvine, “Protecting Secrets, Protecting People,” The involvement of Australians in the speech delivered at the Australian Institute of Inter- Yemen Jihadist Connections,” The Murphy Raid blog, Syrian insurgency has increased the national Affairs Victoria, November 10, 2013; Andrew June 10, 2012. potential for violent extremism on Zammit, “Explaining a Turning Point in Australian Ji- 36 Shandon Harris-Hogan, “The Australian Neojihadist Australian soil in two ways. First, the hadism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36:9 (2013). Network: Origins, Evolution and Structure,” Dynamics of conflict has already prompted sectarian 33 Fatah al-Islam is a militant Sunni Islamist group Asymmetric Conflict 5:6 (2012); Andrew Zammit, “Who violence in Australia, with Shi`a and that is inspired by al-Qa`ida’s ideology. Its members are Becomes a Jihadist in Australia? A Comparative Analy- Alawites being targeted by supporters of mostly Arabs from various Middle Eastern countries. It sis,” ARC Linkage Project on Radicalisation – Confer- the rebellion and Sunnis being targeted 40 emerged in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp ence 2010, Monash University, 2011. by its opponents. There have been 17 in Lebanon in November 2006. Its goals are unclear but 37 Harris-Hogan and Zammit, “The Unseen Terrorist publicly reported incidents of Syria- include the establishment of an Islamic state in northern Connection: Exploring Jihadist Links Between Lebanon related violence in Australia since early 41 Lebanon. Asbat al-Ansar is a Palestinian Salafi-jihadi and Australia.” 2012. The violence has mostly been group that was involved in a number of terrorist opera- 38 “Turkey a Launching Pad for Syria-Bound al-Qaeda by Sunni supporters of the insurgency tions against Lebanese official targets in the past. Also Jihadists, Experts Say,” Sydney Morning Herald, October see Shandon Harris-Hogan and Andrew Zammit, “The 31, 2012. 40 Sunni-Shi`a violence was rare in Australia prior to Unseen Terrorist Connection: Exploring Jihadist Links 39 On the need for facilitators in past cases of Austra- 2012. Between Lebanon and Australia,” Terrorism and Political lians engaging in jihadist activities overseas, see Zammit, 41 Andrew Zammit, “List of Syria-Related Violent In- Violence, in press, 2014. “Explaining a Turning Point in Australian Jihadism.” cidents in Australia,” The Murphy Raid blog, June 30, 34 Richard Kerbaj, “Somalia ‘Jihad Drive’ Probed,” Only in rare cases, such as David Hicks in Pakistan, did 2013. As this list is based on events reported in the me- Australian, December 5, 2007; Alison Caldwell, “Somali an Australian turn up with no known previous connec- dia, it may miss some incidents that were unreported, Refugees Being Recruited by Terrorists: Islamic Expert,” tions and manage to join a jihadist group. See Leigh Sales, and there is also a chance that some incidents were mis- ABC PM, April 13, 2007. Detainee 002: The Case of David Hicks (Melbourne: Mel- reported as being Syria-related when they may have had 35 Andrew Zammit, “Sabirhan Hasanoff and Australia- bourne University Press, 2007), pp. 20, 24–25. other motives.

7 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 targeting Shi`a and Alawite businesses, out a mass shooting against Sydney’s There is no apparent legal basis for homes, and places of worship. The Holsworthy Army Barracks in 2009 such a ban, however, and Australia has attacks have mainly occurred in Sydney involved Melbourne men who had the intelligence capabilities and legal and Melbourne and involved members functioned as a support network for tools to take a more targeted approach. of the Syrian, Lebanese and Turkish al-Shabab, and who had dispatched communities.42 The incidents include others to train and fight in Somalia.46 Conclusion assaults, property damage, arson and Given the greater scale of the Syria The Syrian conflict is having an impact shootings. This violence decreased in mobilization, it has the potential to well beyond its borders, by drawing 2013, but communal tensions and fears have an even greater impact on the in neighboring countries like Turkey remain.43 domestic security threat. and Lebanon, becoming a magnet for jihadists around the world, and The second danger is that some veterans Several options have been posited to exacerbating sectarian tensions. For of the war in Syria may attempt address this risk. The Federal Police’s Australia, this has resulted in a foreign domestic terrorist attacks. While the Deputy Commissioner for National fighter mobilization on a scale not overwhelming majority of jihadist Security Peter Drennan has said that previously seen, sparked sectarian foreign fighters globally do not end control orders, which place various violence in Sydney and Melbourne, and up attacking their home countries, a restrictions on liberty and have only provided a cause that could expand been used twice in Australia before, the country’s traditionally small “Given the greater scale of may be necessary against some jihadist scene. This has been a dramatic suspected returning fighters.47 Both development for jihadist activity in the Syria mobilization, it the Federal Police and the Attorney Australia, and therefore poses a key has the potential to have an General’s Department have released concern for security agencies. official statements warning that it is even greater impact on the illegal to join the fighting, and in June The actual extent of the threat, domestic security threat.” 2013 the government proscribed Jabhat however, remains unclear. For example, al-Nusra as a terrorist organization.48 local sectarian violence has recently ASIO continues to confiscate declined despite continuing tensions. passports from Australians suspected The most serious threat posed is that small number do, and they prove more of traveling for terrorist purposes, some returning fighters will have the capable than those without military and it confiscated 18 passports from intention, and increased capability, experience.44 Australia’s past jihadist mid-2012 to mid-2013, the largest to attack Australia. This possibility, terrorism plots were all closely number in any year.49 Former Foreign however, depends on the numbers of tied to the earlier foreign fighter Minister Bob Carr had explored people actually fighting, the groups mobilizations. An al-Qa`ida plot in ways of banning suspected fighters with which they are fighting, and Sydney during the 2000 Olympics, from returning, and the current to who else they may be connected. an LeT plot in Sydney in 2003, and immigration minister, Scott Morrison, Reliable information on these details is two self-starting cells disrupted has expressed support for the idea.50 currently limited. What is clear is that in Melbourne and Sydney in 2005 the Syria mobilization could radically all included individuals who had the 2003 Sydney plot, see R v. Lodhi, 2006; Stuart Ko- reshape jihadist activity in Australia, a trained in al-Qa`ida and LeT camps in schade, “The Internal Dynamics of Terrorist Cells: A So- security concern that needs to be closely Afghanistan and Pakistan in the late cial Network Analysis of Terrorist Cells in an Australian monitored. 45 1990s and early 2000s. A plot to carry Contex,” Ph.D. dissertation, Queensland University of Technology, 2007, pp. 222-247; Sebastian Rotella, “The Andrew Zammit is a Research Fellow at 42 Zammit, “List of Syria-Related Violent Incidents in Man Behind Mumbai,” ProPublica, November 13, 2010. Monash University’s Global Terrorism Australia.” For the 2005 Melbourne cell, see R v. Benbrika & Ors, Research Centre. 43 Of the 17 incidents reported in the media, if the four 2009; R v. Kent, 2009. For the 2005 Sydney cell, see R v. events for which the year of occurrence is unclear are Elomar & Ors, 2010. excluded, 11 incidents occurred in 2012 and only two oc- 46 R v. Fattal & Ors, 2011. curred this year. This suggests that 2012 was the peak 47 Paul Maley and Cameron Stewart, “Federal Police year and the violence has not escalated since. There have Braces for New Terror Phase,” Australian, June 22, 2013. been several arrests and prosecutions, and ASIO has 48 “The Syrian Conflict: Australian Government Ad- noted that “strong leadership by the Islamic community vice,” Australian Federal Police, August 29, 2012; “On- leaders has so far helped largely contain communal ten- going Violence in Syria: Important information for Aus- sion of this sort in Australia.” See Zammit, “List of Syria- tralian communities,” Australian Attorney General’s Related Violent Incidents in Australia”; “ASIO Report Department, 2012; “Syria Group Listed Under Local Ter- to Parliament 2012-13,” Australian Security Intelligence ror Laws,” Australian Associated Press, June 28, 2013. Organization, October 2013, p. 3. 49 “ASIO Report to Parliament 2012-13,” p. 16. 44 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I 50 Paul Maley, “Carr Considered Banning Syria Fight- Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice ers from Returning to Australia,” Australian, October 28, between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” American Po- 2013; Jared Owens, “Morrison Flags Move to Shut Out litical Science Review 107:1 (2013). Australian Veterans of Syrian War,” Australian, October 45 For the 2000 Sydney plot, see R v. Roche, 2005. For 29, 2013.

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The Capture of Abu Anas suggesting that they saw in al-Libi’s as it struggles to pull itself through the apprehension another means by which political transition. al-Libi: Reactions and to attack the prime minister. Militancy in Libya Ansar al-Shari`a’s Local Preoccupations Wider and more forceful condemnations Ansar al-Shari`a members staged a By Alison Pargeter emanated from those of a more militant demonstration in Benghazi against al- bent. Most notably, Libya’s Ansar al- Libi’s capture, and the group dedicated the apprehension of libyan militant Shari`a4 issued a strident statement its Eid al-Adha charitable drive to Nazih al-Ruqai, better known as Abu on October 8, asserting, “we must the former al-Qa`ida operative. The Anas al-Libi, by U.S. forces from seek to free the captive brother Abu Benghazi branch erected a large tent outside his Tripoli home on October 5, Anas Nazih al-Ruqai from those sporting a banner emblazoned with al- 2013, shook Libya to its core. Not only unjust disbelievers who have seized Libi’s name above it in the city, to which were many Libyans outraged at what the lands and violated the sanctities, impoverished locals were expected to they perceived to be an infringement with every legitimate way allowed by come to pay their respects in return for of national sovereignty, but many also the pure Shari`a.”5 The group also receiving a sheep.7 The group also posted turned their wrath against their own attacked the government, stressing, videos dedicated to al-Libi on its Twitter government, assuming that it must “The Libyan government today seeks feed and Facebook page showing its have played some kind of role in the only to strengthen its existence and members distributing sheep, as well as operation.1 The government’s notably power through presenting loyalty foodstuffs and glossy leaflets packed up muted response to the incident, as well to these belligerent countries and in branded plastic bags, to the poor.8 In as assertions by al-Libi’s wife that offering them facilities in the country… some ways, therefore, al-Libi’s capture some of the commandos who seized Their planes watch us and violate our seemed to serve primarily as a tool her husband had local accents,2 only sanctities and spy on the private lives of in Ansar al-Shari`a’s latest publicity fueled such perceptions and prompted a Muslims without supervision as if this drive. proliferation of angry responses. government forgot what happened to Qadhafi after he abandoned the Shari`a Indeed, given the forcefulness of Predictably, some of the most vocal and allied with the disbelievers and Ansar al-Shari`a’s rhetoric over al- responses came from within the fought against Islam.”6 Libi’s seizure, it is perhaps surprising Islamist camp. The ultraorthodox Dar that it has not launched a more robust al-Ifta—Libya’s most senior official This article examines the response of response to the incident, especially religious authority—issued a statement Ansar al-Shari`a and other Libyan given that it is operating in such condemning the capture and hinted at Islamists to the apprehension of Abu a lawless environment. It is true possible government collusion.3 The Anas al-Libi. It finds that while much that a bomb exploded outside the Muslim Brotherhood and its Justice and of the international focus has been on joint Swedish-Finnish consulate in Construction Party took a similar line, Ansar al-Shari`a, there are in fact many Benghazi on October 11; however, both condemning the operation, but also different groups and brigades operating there is no evidence to suggest that demanding that the government explain across the country whose ideological the attack was the work of Ansar rumors that it had prior knowledge of outlook is not altogether dissimilar. al-Shari`a or that the blast had any the incident. Indeed, it was notable that More importantly, some of these groups direct link to al-Libi’s capture.9 In the criticisms by these organizations are bound deep into the tapestry of addition, like many of the other bomb were directed more against the Libyan the Libyan state. While these elements attacks carried out in Libya in recent government than at the United States, may have condemned al-Libi’s seizure, months, this explosive was detonated their main preoccupation—for the time around 11:30 PM—suggesting that it

1 Condemnations came from an array of groups and in- being, at least—is with entrenching was not meant to inflict mass casualties. dividuals. The National Council for Public Freedoms themselves deeper in their own local Its likely purpose was to serve as a and Human Rights—a civil society organization—for areas, a development that may have message, reminding foreign entities that example, condemned the incident, which they described serious repercussions for the country they could be targeted at any time. as a violation of national sovereignty and for which they held the government responsible. Abdelbaset al-Shehai- 4 Ansar al-Shari`a (Partisans of Shari`a) has emerged Ansar al-Shari`a’s limited response bi, a senior member of the Libyan intelligence service, as a significant force in eastern Libya since the toppling may be attributable to the fact that meanwhile, accused the government, declaring, “I can’t of the former regime. It is more of a group or current than while still a symbolic figure, al-Libi did imagine that America would do such a thing without the a specific militia or brigade. Like its counterparts in Tu- not appear to be an active member of the knowledge of the Libyan state.” The spokesman of the nisia and Yemen, its adherents follow an extremist ideol- Libyan militant scene or al-Qa`ida. He General National Congress read a statement on behalf of ogy. Although the Libyan group insists it is not linked to returned to Libya at the time of the 2011 the 200-seat parliament, describing the incident as “a fla- al-Qa`ida, its leader in Benghazi, Mohammed Ali al-Za- revolution, but according to his family grant violation of national sovereignty.” See Libya Focus, hawi, has expressed his approval of al-Qa`ida’s strategy Menas Associates, October 2013. as well as statements issued by Ayman al-Zawahiri. See 7 Personal interview, former Libyan Islamist, London 2 “Libya Demands Explanation for US ‘Kidnapping’ of “Meeting Mohammad Ali al-Zahawi of Libyan Ansar al- November 2013. al-Qaida Leader al-Liby,” Guardian, October 7, 2013. Sharia,” BBC, September 18, 2012. 8 For Ansar al-Shari`a’s Twitter feed, see www.twitter. 3 “Libya: Dar Al-Ifta Demands that the Transitional 5 The statement, dated October 8, 2013, is available at com/AnsarShariaa_ly. Government and the GNC Protect Libyans,” al-Manara, www.tinyurl.com/nldktm4. 9 Esad Mohamed, “Car Bomb Hits Swedish, Finnish October 10, 2013. 6 Ibid. Consulates in Libya,” Associated Press, October 11, 2013.

9 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 had not been involved with militant campaigns in Benghazi and promotes Thus, while the leaders of the various groups since his return. Rather, he “Islamically appropriate” behavior Ansar al-Shari`a branches in Libya may seems to have wanted to put his militant on university campuses. As the head have a more transnational agenda, past behind him. Former Libyan Islamic of preaching of the Benghazi group as reflected in the group’s official Fighting Group (LIFG) amir-turned- explained, “We noticed a lot of people discourse,19 it seems that on the politician Abdelhakim Belhadj told the in the university not wearing proper ground its main focus is on expanding media in November that after Libya’s clothes and violating what Allah has its presence locally and on pushing liberation, al-Libi went to the general banned and not following religious for the implementation of Shari`a— prosecutor to inform him that his name rulings…We demand that women wear its primary concern. As one witness was on the list of those wanted by the religious clothes, that the youth wear attending a graduation celebration U.S. government and that he wanted respectable clothes, and that women are for 150 “reformed” individuals at to hand himself over to the Libyan segregated.”14 the group’s al-Dawa Wal Ihsane authorities so that his file could be Rehabilitation Center in Derna declared, closed.10 According to Belhadj, al-Libi Ansar al-Shari`a, however, is going “Their main demand is that Libya is wanted to deal with his past and live a further than simply urging Libyans ruled by Islam.”20 normal life. to conform to its rigid interpretation of the faith. The group is also fully It is not clear whether the bloody More importantly, Ansar al-Shari`a engaged in running rehabilitation clashes that erupted between Ansar al- appears for the moment to be far centers for those who have strayed from Shari`a and members of Libya’s special more preoccupied with developing its the “straight path.” This rehabilitation forces in Benghazi on November 25, presence and entrenching itself further is generally undertaken with the 2013, will have any sustained impact in the areas where it is dominant. While agreement of the families concerned, on the group or the extent to which it has had bases in Benghazi and Derna who call on Ansar al-Shari`a to “arrest it is tolerated.21 It is still too early more or less since the fall of the former their sons” and “revive them from their to determine exactly what sparked regime, it has expanded in recent months drunkenness.”15 the violence. If the violence heralds a into Qadhafi’s former hometown of new push by Libyan authorities to try Sirte. The group is clearly making use More interestingly, and in a further to curtail Ansar al-Shari`a’s activities, of the space it is being allowed to focus example of just how far Ansar al- then the group may decide to strike its activities on the kind of charitable Shari`a has been able to root itself back, creating further instability in the and preaching work traditionally in the local community, the group east. associated with groups such as the has allegedly even been tasked with Muslim Brotherhood. It recently rehabilitating some members of Ansar al-Shari`a Not Alone in Calls for established a cultural and preaching the official security establishment. Shari`a center for women in Benghazi, for According to one Libyan special Ansar al-Shari`a is not alone in its example, that runs courses in religious forces commander writing in calls for Shari`a. Libya’s chaotic teaching, English and computing.11 In Libya al-Mostakbal, special forces Islamist scene is full of groups an indication of the extent to which the personnel are being sent to Ansar demanding the full implementation group is accepted among some parts of al-Shari`a to be cured of their vices of Islamic law. Some of these groups the local community, more than 400 and to be “qualified religiously.”16 are waiting to see what will happen in women are reported to have enrolled The commander explained that this respect when Libya’s constitution at the center on its first day.12 Ansar these individuals are detained by is finally crafted, which is proving to al-Shari`a has also set up a women’s Ansar al-Shari`a for a minimum of be a long, protracted process.22 While and children’s health clinic behind two weeks during which time they there is a broad consensus across the the Jala’a hospital in Benghazi where undergo intensive religious teaching.17 country that Shari`a should be the services are provided free of charge, as The commander described, “We found main basis of the new legislation, some well as a clinic for countering magic, amazing results. Those we sent told us Islamist groups are demanding that jinns (genies) and infertility through use about their psychological relief.”18 It is Shari`a be the sole source. of the Qu’ran.13 unlikely that the Libyan government

approves of such “rehabilitation,” and 19 In some of its official discourse, Ansar al-Shari`a Ansar al-Shari`a is also heavily it highlights how the government does and its members voice support for Usama bin Ladin and preoccupied with issues of morality. not effectively control its individual maintain a typically anti-Western stance. It runs anti-drug and anti-alcohol forces and brigades. 20 “A Report About the Situation in Derna,” Aroos El- Bahr, August 15, 2013. 10 “Belhaj: The Absence of the Government Contributes 21 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Militia in Benghazi Flees After to the Proliferation of Al-Qa’ida,” Correspondents, No- Deadly Gun Battle,” New York Times, November 25, 2013. vember 6, 2013. 14 This was posted on the Ajwa al-Bilad Facebook 22 Elections have still to be held to select the 60-mem- 11 This was posted on the Ajwa al-Bilad Facebook page page in October 2013, available at www.facebook.com/ ber committee that will draw up the draft constitution. in October 2013, available at www.facebook.com/ ajwanews. These elections are proving fractious already given that ajwanews. 15 “The Absent Fact.” the country’s Amazigh population is boycotting them on 12 Ibid. 16 Ibid. the grounds that they have not been given a guarantee 13 “The Absent Fact,” Libya al-Mostakbal, September 11, 17 Ibid. that their linguistic and cultural rights will be enshrined 2013. 18 Ibid. in the text.

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The Abu Slim Martyrs Brigade in Derna, Libya Shield brigade may not have such country that was mandated by Head for example, which was established by a rigid ideological outlook as some of the of the National Congress Nouri Abu former LIFG militant Salim Derbi but above-mentioned groups, and may, for Sahmaine in July 2013 to bring security brought itself, nominally at least, under pragmatic reasons, be more willing to to Tripoli. the command of the Interior Ministry work within the framework of the state in 2012, is still intent on seeing Shari`a than groups such as Ansar al-Shari`a, The commander of the chamber is implemented in its fullest sense. In an some of their leaders, such as Ben Shaykh Shaban Masoud Hadia, known uncompromising statement issued on Hamid, are clear that they want Shari`a as Abu Obeida Zawi, a jihadist preacher October 29, 2013, the brigade declared, to be the sole source of legislation for who lived in Yemen for many years.31 the new state. According to Libyan sources, Hadia is You patient, courageous people, a well-known Islamist extremist and in this critical stage you have to To this end, some of these groups in is particularly influential among the embrace your genuine jihadist the east are working to prevent the revolutionaries of Zawia.32 In an article sons and real revolutionaries… establishment of a national armed in January 2012, Hadia insisted, “We Take support from your Lord, forces. Islamist brigades and groups won’t accept anything other than Islam. put support for Shari`a at are widely believed to be behind the It is our life, our constitution and our the front of your mind and be weekly assassinations of official leader.”33 prepared for death for the sake security personnel in Benghazi.27 This of its implementation, not just is certainly the view taken by some Given the orientation of its leader, it is in the punishment side, but in Libyans. In October 2013, members of perhaps unsurprising that the LROC every field. Only by Shari`a can the Barghathi tribe in Benghazi attacked reacted to the capture of al-Libi in a we rise with the country and and torched the home of Wissam Ben fashion that was almost as extreme as preserve blood, honor, wealth and Hamid after gunmen assassinated a that of Ansar al-Shari`a. The group sovereignty.23 member of their tribe, military police declared a state of high alert in all chief Colonel Ahmed al-Barghathi.28 Libyan cities “because foreign powers Likewise, the recently established are infringing the sovereignty of the Army of the Islamic State of Libya in Others, however, hold the view state.”34 It also called on its members Derna that is headed by Yousef Ben that more shadowy, takfiri-style29 to “go into the streets to kick out all Taher, which the Abu Slim Martyrs groups are carrying out these attacks. foreigners who are in Libya illegally,” Brigade dismisses on its Facebook page Ultraconservative member of the warning, “whoever was complicit with as “fighters mounted on donkeys rather General National Congress, Shaykh foreign intelligence [services] has to bear than horses,” aspires to an Islamist Mohamed Bu Sidra, who is from full responsibility.”35 It then threatened state under Shari`a law.24 Benghazi and is allegedly close to hard to go after all such accomplices.36 line Islamist groups in the east, spoke Even some of the Libya Shield brigade, of the presence of a rejectionist group It is also perhaps unsurprising that forces that come nominally under the that he described as “extremist” that it was elements from the LROC that Ministry of Defense and that receive had a list of names of military personnel were allegedly responsible for the huge amounts of state support and that it wanted to eliminate. Bu Sidra is kidnapping of Libyan Prime Minister funding, are open about their desire quoted as having remarked, “If they Ali Zidan from the Corinthia Hotel on to see Shari`a as the sole source of worked their way through that list… October 10 (Hadia has denied that the legislation. Wissam Ben Hamid, the Libya wouldn’t stand on its feet.”30 leadership of the chamber had anything Islamist commander of the Libya Shield to do with the abduction).37 While it is One brigade that is based in Benghazi It is not only in the east that Islamist and that in June 2013 opened fire on a brigades are asserting their authority 31 “Libya: Militias, Politicians Meld in Explosive Mix,” crowd of allegedly unarmed protestors on the ground. Other cities, including Associated Press, October 22, 2013. 25 calling for its dissolution, is alleged the capital, are also host to an array of 32 “The Libyan Revolutionaries Operations Chamber to have declared in October 2011, “The brigades, some of which are Islamist in and Anti-Crime Commission…Mysterious Entities in the Islamic Shari`a is a red line, we will orientation. This includes the powerful Libyan State,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 11, 2013. not cede one rule of it, and Islam is the Libyan Revolutionary Operations 33 “The Danger of Scarecrow Islamists,” al-Manara, only law-giver and not (merely) the Chamber (LROC), a body comprising January 8, 2012. 26 foundation (of the law).” Although the revolutionaries from across the 34 This is from statement #12 issued by the LROC and posted on their official Facebook Page on October 7, 23 See the Facebook page for the Abu Slim Martyrs’ Bri- counter Books, 2013). 2013, available at www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid= gade, available at www.tinyurl.com/p37dhap. 27 See the many articles in the Libya Herald detailing 492193937543499&set=a.433642643398629.1073741828 24 Ibid. While both of these Derna-based groups are call- these attacks. .427077124055181&type=1&theater. ing for Shari`a, they are engaged in a kind of turf battle 28 “Benghazi Tense as Shield Commander’s Home 35 Ibid. for local influence. This is reflective of the relationships Torched Following Barghathi’s Assassination,” Libya 36 Ibid. between many of the brigades and forces operating in Herald, October 18, 2013. 37 Although both Nouri Abu Sahmaine and Shaban post-Qadhafi Libya. 29 In this instance, “takfiri” refers to hard line Islamist Masoud Hadia have denied that the leadership of the 25 “Benghazi Libya Shield Protests: At Least 27 Dead,” groups that act as political rejectionists. chamber had any involvement in Zidan’s apprehension, Libya Herald, June 9, 2013. 30 “Is Ansar Al-Sharia Behind What is Happening in elements from this chamber identified themselves to 26 John Rosenthal, The Jihadist Plot (Jackson, TN: En- Benghazi?” Libya al-Mostakbal, November 10, 2013. hotel staff and were also present when Zidan was being

11 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 impossible to ascertain whether Zidan’s With power in post-Qadhafi Libya Increase in Taliban Efforts kidnapping was a direct response to al- atomized to such an extent, it is to Recruit from Afghan Libi’s capture or whether it was simply still difficult to make sense of these part of the ongoing and bitter political different forces and their agendas, Government and Security struggle between Islamist and liberal as well as their relationship to each Forces forces, al-Libi’s seizure is likely to have other. For the most part, however, served as an additional incentive to these groups appear preoccupied By Jami Forbes and Brian Dudley attack the prime minister. primarily with their own local issues. That is not to say that some of these on october 13, 2013, in his annual Meanwhile, the Supreme Security groups are not involved in training and message marking the holiday of Eid al- Committee (SSC) that comes nominally sending recruits to the Syrian conflict. Adha, Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad under the Interior Ministry and whose Evidence suggests that there is a flow Omar offered an olive branch to Afghans Tripoli branch was headed until of recruits to the Syrian opposition that who oppose the Taliban, saying that the recently by Islamist Hisham Bashar, have come through Libya.39 In general, Taliban would welcome them into their continues to comprise brigades that though, these Islamist brigades and ranks.1 Media coverage of the statement are militant Islamist in orientation. militias appear to be focused mainly largely ignored these words, instead Some of these brigades are engaged in on entrenching themselves further in focusing on Mullah Omar’s denunciation their own vigilante style practices. This their local areas and in playing out local of the upcoming presidential elections includes the Nawasi Brigade that used power struggles. and the prospect of international forces to be headed by hard line militant Abdul remaining in Afghanistan post-2014.2 Raouf Kara, who now heads the Support Yet while many of these elements do not Since 2010, however, the Taliban have and Backing Battalions in the SSC and have a transnational agenda or do not increasingly emphasized their efforts whose base is at the Mtigha Airport in voice support for al-Qa`ida in the same to recruit Afghan government officials, Tripoli. In January, the Nawasi Brigade way that Ansar al-Shari`a does, they particularly members of the Afghan clashed with locals from the Souq al- continue to pose a serious challenge to National Security Forces (ANSF). This Juma’a and Fashloum areas of Tripoli Libya and its future. This challenge is includes repeated public statements after a man it had arrested for dealing likely to become all the more apparent detailing an amnesty program, drugs was tortured to death.38 when the constitution writing process which provides forgiveness for these finally begins and when the role of individuals’ previous support for the Following the events of Bloody Friday Shari`a in the new state is decided. government and the opportunity to join on November 15, 2013, however, when the insurgency without retribution. brigades from Misrata opened fire More importantly, if the state collapses, The Taliban have not always pursued on protestors in Tripoli, the Nawasi an outcome that is not unimaginable in such initiatives. For instance, in 2006, Brigade along with other militias agreed light of the crises that are fast closing Taliban public statements indicated to hand over their headquarters to the in on the political arena, there is a real that they preferred to bring Afghan state. This followed the agreement risk that some of these militant groups government supporters “to justice” by the Misrata brigades to withdraw may seek to demonstrate their power in rather than offering them an opportunity from the capital in response to a public an ever greater fashion. Given that they for engagement. outcry. It is too early to tell whether this are so embedded in their own areas and new realignment of forces in Tripoli will that they are determined to see nothing There is a limited understanding of the hold. It seems unlikely that any of these short of an Islamic state, this could evolution of the Taliban’s campaign forces, including those of an Islamist spark serious conflict, dragging Libya to steal manpower from their enemies bent, will be willing to remain outside of even deeper into the quagmire. because Western forces have mostly the heart of affairs for too long. It may focused on analyzing and preventing well be that, just as occurred in Benghazi Alison Pargeter is a Middle East and North Taliban attacks. This article, therefore, in 2012 after the Islamist brigades were Africa analyst who specializes in political identifies how the Taliban’s efforts to chased out of their headquarters, these Islamist movements. Her books include: The recruit and extend amnesty to Afghan forces will also either return or re- Muslim Brotherhood: From Opposition government officials and members of invent themselves. to Power (2013), Libya: The Rise and the security forces have expanded since Fall of Qadhafi (2012), The Muslim 2010. It finds that these activities are Conclusion Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition These hard line Islamist figures and (2010), and The New Frontiers of Jihad: 1 Mullah Omar’s statement read, “We call on all those forces are woven deep into the fabric Radical Islam in Europe (2008). She is who support the invaders, or who have joined their of the new Libya and their presence a Senior Research Fellow at RUSI and a ranks but not deliberately, to disband their support like demonstrates the complexity and Senior Research Associate at the global thousands of your fellows have done so far. The vast em- fluidity of Libya’s Islamist scene. consultancy firm Menas Associates. brace of the Islamic Emirate is always open to you. Is it not rational to side with your people where your death detained. See “The Prime Minister and the Militant: Two and life will become a symbol of pride for all, instead of Kidnappings Spark Crisis,” Libya Focus 16:10 (2013). losing your life in the ranks of the non-believers, where 38 “Fashloum Youth Demand Government Action 39 “Rami Bil Tayebi: 100 Tunisian Terrorists Trained you will lose both your faith and your worldly life?” against Nawasi Brigade; Others Support It,” Libya Her- in Libya in Abu Ayadh’s Camp,” al-Jarida, November 12, 2 Bill Chappell, “Taliban Rejection of US-Afghan Secu- ald, January 12, 2013. 2013. rity Deal,” National Public Radio, October 14, 2013.

12 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 becoming an increasingly important How much of an impact the Taliban’s time, the Taliban’s recruitment and component of the Taliban’s strategic recruitment and amnesty programs have amnesty effort received a new level of plan for recapturing control of on this attrition is unclear. The Taliban command emphasis when the Taliban Afghanistan, as evinced by the leadership’s increased emphasis on leadership announced the creation creation of a senior Recruitment and these programs during the past year, of a special commission tasked with Amnesty Commission to oversee the however, indicates that they see them handling these issues, referred to as effort. As such, it is a strategy that as effective. the Taliban Recruitment and Amnesty warrants greater research, not only Commission.7 with regard to the current conflict, but Taliban Increasing Emphasis on Amnesty and for insurgencies globally. Recruitment The Taliban have publicized the Since 2010, the Taliban have called defection of government soldiers Limited Understanding of Insurgent Efforts to on government officials to join the and police to its ranks since early Recruit Government Officials insurgency with increasing frequency. 2012. Over the past year, however, Insurgencies throughout history This includes offers of amnesty for the organization’s messaging has have sought to recruit from the officials who wanted to either quit increasingly attributed these defections local populace, particularly among their positions, stay in the government to the efforts of the Recruitment and young men. A body of research has to support the Taliban, or seek new Amnesty Commission. This commission been devoted to understanding how positions with the insurgency. This has was highlighted in the Taliban’s Khalid insurgents accomplish this, and not always been a tactic emphasized bin Walid campaign announcement in numerous academic models are available by the Taliban. For instance, in his April 2013, which stated: to estimate which civilians are the most Eid al-Fitr message in 2006, Taliban likely to be recruited into insurgent leader Mullah Omar said of government During this year’s Khalid ranks. Less attention, however, has officials: “We will never give them bin Walid operation, all the been placed on understanding how exit. They will be brought to Islamic stipulations, guidance and an insurgency specifically targets justice.”5 statements of Call and Guidance/ and mobilizes recruits from within Recruitment Commission will government forces—despite the cues Exactly why the Taliban changed their also be exercised in which from authorities on insurgency such as position remains unclear. The new protection has been guaranteed Mao Tse-tung.3 strategy, however, has clear advantages. for those workers of the stooge First, “turning” Afghan government regime who surrender or join up Within Afghanistan, this lack of officials and enemy soldiers is more with the mujahidin just as the life, attention could be problematic for cost effective than attacking them. property and honor of the large NATO’s International Security Second, recruiting from the ANSF group of people was protected who Assistance Force (ISAF), as the weakens the Taliban’s most enduring left the ranks of the enemy and Taliban have increased their efforts to enemy while simultaneously providing joined up with mujahidin during extend amnesty to Afghan government the insurgency with well trained (and the previous year.8 officials, even as the ANSF has taken possibly equipped) recruits. Finally, the lead in providing security. The the strategy has the potential to foster After announcing the Recruitment Taliban’s efforts to recruit Afghan or inspire “insider attacks.” and Amnesty Commission’s creation government officials have been on May 3, 2012, the Taliban’s press overshadowed by their efforts to attack In 2010, the Taliban’s senior releases mentioned it an average of 1.57 or intimidate such officials. Yet some leadership published an updated times per month for the rest of 2012.9 In data released by ISAF indicates that version of the layeha, or code of 2013, the Taliban have mentioned the as many as 5,000 Afghan soldiers are conduct, which included guidance commission an average of 3.18 times per quitting their posts every month, calling regarding the offering of amnesty month, marking a 103% increase.10 into question the ability of the Afghan to those who surrendered to the government to sustain its forces.4 Taliban. This was the first known Of particular note are several monthly instance of Taliban leaders providing summaries published by the Taliban 3 In On Guerrilla Warfare, Mao outlined the benefits of specific instructions concerning the which advertise the commission’s turning opposition forces into recruits. He wrote, “it is recruitment of government officials success by enumerating the purported always possible to produce disaffection in their (enemy) and ANSF soldiers to the lower number of defectors the Taliban have 6 ranks, and we must increase our propaganda efforts and echelons of the Taliban leadership. foment mutinies among such troops. Immediately after This was followed by the formalization mutinying, they must be received into our ranks and and expansion of amnesty and 7 “Statement of Leadership Council of Islamic Emirate organized. The concord of the leaders and the assent of recruitment initiatives in 2012. At this Regarding the Inception of al-Farooq Spring Operation,” the men must be gained, and the units be rebuilt politi- Voice of Jihad, May 3, 2012. cally and reorganized militarily. Once this has been ac- Handover Looms,” Independent, March 31, 2013. 8 “Statement of Leadership Council of Islamic Emirate complished, they become successful guerrilla units. In 5 “Taliban Leader Eid Message,” Afghan Islamic Press, Regarding ‘Khalid bin Waleed’ Spring Operation,” Voice regards to this type of unit, it may be said that political October 22, 2006. of Jihad, April 27, 2013. work among them is of the utmost importance.” 6 Thomas Johnson and Matthew DuPee, “Analyzing the 9 This is according to analysis of the statements released 4 Brian Brady and Jonathan Owen, “NATO Alarm Over New Taliban Code of Conduct,” Central Asian Survey 31:1 by the Afghan Taliban via its official website. Afghan Crisis: Loss of Recruits Threatens Security as (2012). 10 Ibid.

13 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 received into their ranks that month.11 In June 2013.13 The video posted on the of their opponents. As the Taliban shift the early months of 2013, the Taliban’s Taliban’s official website on March their focus to the ANSF (which they public statements also sought to 28, 2013, meanwhile, was specifically likely perceive to be their greatest and associate insider attacks—then a major addressed to “those Afghans who work most enduring military challenge in the theme of Taliban propaganda—with the with foreign invaders.”14 post-ISAF period), they are embracing actions of the commission.12 a variety of methods, including Although it is difficult to say with recruitment and amnesty initiatives, to Analyzing Taliban Public Statements certainty, a second goal of the Taliban’s undermine the ANSF. As a consequence An analysis of the Taliban’s public messaging campaign may be to of the limited focus on non-violent messaging regarding these recruitment publicize the work of the Recruitment Taliban initiatives, it is likely that the efforts indicates that the campaign and Amnesty Commission to a Taliban Afghan government has done little to has two basic goals. The first goal is audience, reiterating the senior counteract the Taliban’s recruitment to highlight the Taliban’s increasing leadership’s policy of recruiting from and amnesty efforts. strength and organizational depth and the ranks of the government and the to contrast it with the government’s security forces, and building internal Although it is difficult to determine weakness. Publicizing the defection support for those policies. Stories of exactly how much the Taliban’s efforts to of government officials, soldiers, and government officials, soldiers, and subvert the ANSF through recruitment policemen contributes to an overall policemen joining the insurgency are and amnesty initiatives are affecting narrative that portrays the Taliban’s undoubtedly encouraging to most ANSF readiness, the initiatives could power as steadily increasing while the Taliban commanders and fighters. play a role in causing attrition. This government’s power weakens. Nevertheless, there are also strong could become increasingly problematic reasons that Taliban commanders for units with low morale, or confidence, Additionally, since 2006 the Taliban may be reluctant to recruit from the particularly as the ISAF withdrawal have regularly announced the formation government or the security forces. comes to a close. Members of the Afghan of new administrative bodies and The act of approaching a potential government will likely do a cost- published in-depth interviews with recruit exposes the recruiter to the benefit analysis of the Taliban program commission heads, “governors” of threat of capture or death. Individuals compared to their current positions. various districts and provinces, and defecting from the government or Should they perceive that joining the other insurgent leaders. Such messaging especially the security forces may in Taliban or at least complying with helps propagate the image of the Taliban fact be double agents.15 On an emotional their demands is more advantageous, as a sophisticated, coherent organization level, Taliban commanders may be they could change their allegiances. with specialized departments all personally reluctant to welcome former As such, monitoring how the Taliban answering to a central authority. The enemies into their ranks. The increased proceed with this line of effort could emphasis the Taliban currently place emphasis on the Recruitment and provide valuable insight into not only on the actions of the Recruitment and Amnesty Commission in the Taliban’s the progress of the insurgency, but Amnesty Commission should be seen public messaging, therefore, may also the viability and sustainability of the in this context. The Taliban have an be an attempt to quell some internal ANSF. obvious interest in communicating controversy. these messages to both an international Jami Forbes is an analyst with the and an Afghan audience—including, Conclusion Department of the Army who specializes in of course, to more potential defectors Insurgents look to overthrow a studies regarding southern Afghanistan. in the government and in the security government through a variety of She has traveled to Afghanistan on several forces. The Taliban’s desire to means, including both armed conflict occasions, and most recently spent several reach an international audience is and non-violent efforts aimed at months in Kandahar Province. underscored by the publication of undermining an opponent’s authority an article about the rising number of and legitimacy. With regard to the Brian Dudley is an analyst with the government defectors in the Taliban’s Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, Department of the Army who specializes in Arabic-language magazine al-Sumud in much is known about the methods insurgent messaging. He graduated from and tactics the Taliban use against the U.S. Military Academy at West Point

11 In a January 2013 statement via its publication al- the government militarily. Less is in 1993. Sumud, the Afghan Taliban claimed that 1,300 Afghan known, however, about how they use government officials had left their positions as a result of subversion to diminish the effectiveness The views presented are those of the the efforts of the Recruitment and Amnesty Commission. authors and do not necessarily represent Separate monthly accounts of those the Taliban claimed 13 “Extensive al-Sumud Interview Given With the Offi- the views of the Department of Defense, it had inspired to defect have oscillated between tens and cial Spokesman of the Islamic Emirate,” al-Sumud, Janu- the U.S. Army, or any of its subordinate hundreds of individuals. ary 15, 2013. commands. 12 “Zabiullah Mujahid: The Invaders Are On Practi- 14 Imran Khalil, “New Film Dawat Released by al-Hijra cal Abscondence [sic],” Voice of Jihad, January 5, 2013; Studio,” Voice of Jihad, March 29, 2013. “Extensive al-Sumud Interview Given With the Official 15 These possibilities and the ways that militant groups Spokesman of the Islamic Emirate,” al-Sumud, January might avoid them are considered in Thomas Heggham- 15, 2013; Imran Khalil, “New Film Dawat Released by al- mer, “The Recruiter’s Dilemma: Signalling and Rebel Re- Hijra Studio,” Voice of Jihad, March 29, 2013. cruitment Tactics,” Journal of Peace Research 50:1 (2012).

14 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12

that has fueled violence in the region It was in reaction to this more The Bangsamoro Islamic since 1972.2 compromising and accommodating Freedom Fighters: The stance that the BIFF was established. Newest Obstacles to The BIFF emerged as a splinter Ustadz Ameril Umbra Kato, a Saudi faction of the MILF in December Arabia-trained scholar and the former Peace in the Southern 2010. The parent movement is, itself, leader of the MILF’s 105th Command Philippines? a breakaway group from the Moro (which now falls under the responsibility National Liberation Front (MNLF), of Zacaria Goma, a member of the By Peter Chalk originally established in 1984 under Front’s Central Committee), formed the hardline leadership of Hashim the new organization.6 He had defected in september 2013, approximately 150 Salamat with the aim of creating an from the MNLF along with Salamat—a militants from the Abu Sayyaf Group independent Islamic state in all areas committed Salafi-jihadi ideologue who (ASG) and the Bangsamoro Islamic of the southern Philippines where was strongly influenced by the Muslim Freedom Fighters (BIFF) joined forces in Muslims have traditionally been a Brotherhood’s Sayyid Qutb—and had an attack against government troops in majority.3 consistently sought to bring about the village of Lamitan on Basilan Island an Islamic state for Muslims in the in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Following Salamat’s death in 2003, southern Philippines.7 Mindanao (ARMM). Although much is this objective was gradually moderated known about the former organization, under the more pragmatic and Kato charged that Al Haj Murad the latter is a relative newcomer to the politically astute guidance of Salamat’s Ebrahim had departed from the original conflict in the southern Philippines and successor, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim. The goals of the Bangsamoro movement could serve to heighten the tempo of new leader appreciated that a guarantee and had effectively sold out the Moro violence in the region. of comprehensive autonomy—rather Islamic cause by negotiating for than outright independence—was the Mindanao’s autonomy rather than full This article provides background on the most realistic concession that could independence.8 He further accused the BIFF, its cadre and weapons, and the be extracted from Manila. To this end, MILF leadership of undercutting his implications of its formation. It finds he committed to a mutual cessation own position by: 1) refusing to insist that the group could play a decisive of hostilities agreement in 2003 and that Manila lift a bounty of 10 million role in determining the future status has since participated in Malaysian- pesos for his arrest as a condition for of Mindanao, irrespective of any peace sponsored talks aimed at resolving a continuing with peace talks; and 2) deal that the Moro Islamic Liberation broad array of concerns pertaining to a by failing to support his troops from Front (MILF) concludes with the Aquino future self-governing Moro homeland.4 concerted onslaughts by government administration. troops in the area around Tubag Alisan Most of these issues have since been in North Cotabato.9 In addition, he Background worked out with the two sides reaching asserted that the Bangsamoro Islamic The BIFF, also known as the agreement on a number of consensus Armed Forces (BIAF)—the armed wing Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom points that are meant to eventually form of the MILF—were no longer worthy Movement (BIFM), is the latest the basis of a so-called Bangsamoro of the title “mujahidin” given their manifestation of organized militancy Judicial Entity (BJE)—a final increased involvement in anti-jihadist derived from Bangsamoro Muslim autonomous region for Muslims created activities such as kidnapping and drug grievances in Mindanao.1 Although and operating within the constitutional trafficking.10 constitutionally part of the Philippine ambit of the Philippine state.5 state, the Islamic population of this region has never subscribed to the 6 Datu Unsay, “Hardline Philippine Rebel Vows to Derail concept of an integrated Catholic 2 Peter Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to South- Peace,” al-Arabiya, August 29, 2011; “7 Reported Dead in polity, defining themselves, by east Asia: A Net Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Ambush,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 14, 2013; Jacob contrast, on the basis of a unique Corporation, 2009), pp. 33-34. Fighting in the southern Zenn, “Rebel with a Cause in Mindanao,” Asia Times On- ethno-religious identity. This sense Philippines has left more than 150,000 people dead and line, September 13, 2011; Eid Kabulu, “BIFF: Origin and of separation has been exacerbated by plunged many provinces into deep poverty. Prospect,” kampilantroopers.com, undated, available at blunt attempts to alter the historically 3 Salamat broke from the MNLF in opposition to the lat- www.kampilantroopers.com/news.php?readmore=224. Muslim centric demographic balance ter’s more nationalist (as opposed to Islamist) stance and 7 Zenn; “MILF Leader to Nida’ul Islam: ‘Perhaps the in the southern Philippines through willingness to negotiate for autonomy rather than full Moro Struggle for Freedom and Self-Determination is Christian transmigration as well as by independence in the southern Philippines. the Longest and Bloodiest in the Entire History of Man- economic neglect and crushing poverty. 4 For background on the evolution of these talks, see kind,’” Nida’ul Islam, April-May 1998. Combined, these factors have ingrained Benedicto R. Bacani, The Mindanao Peace Talks: An- 8 Kabulu, “BIFF: Origin and Prospect.” a sense of victimization and oppression other Opportunity to Resolve the Moro Conflict in the Philip- 9 Ibid.; “Philippines: BIFF Gets Banged Around,” Strat- pines (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2005); egy Page, August 22, 2012; “A Day With the Mujahideen 1 The Bangsamoro people, or Moros, are a population of “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and of the BIFF (Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters) – 2,” indigenous ethnic Muslims in the southern Philippines the Peace Process,” International Crisis Group, July 13, Jamadi-Us-Sani, April 24, 2012; Kabulu, “BIFF: Origin who constitute the country’s largest non-Catholic demo- 2004. and Prospect.” graphic sector (10%). For further details, see “Muslim 5 Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast 10 “The Philippines: Back to the Table, Warily, in Mind- Filipinos,” U.S. Library of Congress, undated. Asia: A Net Assessment, p. 37. anao,” International Crisis Group, March 2011.

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BIFF’s Cadre and Weapons merely empower Moro hardliners.17 No Implications of BIFF’s Formation On announcing the emergence of the evidence has ever surfaced to support BIFF carries important implications for BIFF, Kato claimed that as many these speculations, however. Indeed, in both the MILF and the general peace as 5,000 members of the MILF February 2011, MILF’s chief negotiator process in the southern Philippines had followed him, although most Mohagher Iqbal publicly acknowledged despite the small size of the group. commentators believe this number Kato as a problem, which, if not dealt Kato was well respected and there is was considerably inflated and that with, would result in his permanent a realistic possibility that others in the true figure was probably no more expulsion from the front’s fold: 18 the MILF hierarchy will subscribe than 300 fighters.11 The movement to his non-compromising stance of was originally based mostly in North On the part of the MILF, we have full independence should talks with Cotabato, Maguindanao and strategic problems. Ustadz Ombra Kato the present Aquino administration areas around the Ligusan Marsh (which is one of those problems, but the breakdown or fail to deliver promised is valuable territory because it holds MILF leadership is still hopeful dividends within the next couple of abundant gas reserves).12 Following the that we can manage and solve this years.23 No less importantly, the BIFF capture of its main stronghold at Camp problem; otherwise we will tell the raises legitimate questions about Omar in 2012, however, the organization government, the facilitator and has regrouped around two main barangays the international community that “The BIFF raises (hamlets): Ganta in Shariff Saydona he has already burned his bridges legitimate questions about Mustapha town and Damabla in Datu with the MILF. He is not one of us; Piang town (Kato’s birthplace), both in he is not with the MILF.19 Murad’s overall control Maguindanao.13 of fighters under his BIFF has also periodically clashed BIFF is thought to have access to a with the BIAF—the armed wing of the command, which could relatively large armory composed of MILF—particularly for control over cause potential spoilers to pistols, M-60 machine guns, modified territory around Datu Piang, with one long-arm sniper rifles, .50 caliber confrontation in August 2011 leaving challenge his credibility heavy weapons, mortars, improvised several guerrillas dead on both sides.20 explosive devices (IEDs), landmines These skirmishes would strongly as a representative of the and various types of automatic assault suggest that the splinter group’s Bangsamoro people.” weapons.14 Kato siphoned off most of formation was no ploy. these munitions after he defected from the 105th Command—the largest and In November 2011, BIFF was hit with an best equipped of the MILF’s various important setback after Kato suffered a Murad’s overall control of fighters field divisions.15 major stroke. A replacement, Ustadz under his command, which could Mohammad Ali Tambako, was quickly cause potential spoilers to challenge When BIFF first emerged, a number appointed, an ulama and graduate of his credibility as a representative of commentators in Manila alleged religious studies undertaken in Sudan of the Bangsamoro people.24 This is that MILF leader Murad had tacitly and Saudi Arabia.21 Despite a challenge particularly true of the MNLF, which endorsed its formation as leverage from Mohiden Ananimbang (also known has become increasingly concerned that in ongoing peace talks with Manila.16 as Kagi Kadialen), the group’s chief a settlement with the MILF will come According to this line of reasoning, the of staff, the transition was relatively at the expense of its own autonomous MILF chairman was calculating that smooth and Tambako appears to have region (the ARMM).25 the government would show greater since consolidated his rule.22 flexibility in acceding to the demands of Furthermore, BIFF has shown itself his group for fear that not doing so would willing and capable of engaging Philippine security forces, targeting 11 Zenn; “Rogue MILF Commander Forms Splinter both military and police outposts. Group,” Associated Press, August 19, 2011; “Rebels 17 Rabasa and Chalk, p. 15. In line with its raison d’être, the Armed with Chainsaws Attack Maguindanao Towns,” 18 “The Philippines: Back to the Table, Warily, in Min- stated objective of these attacks is to Agence France-Presse, June 8, 2012. danao,” p. 6; “The Philippines: A New Strategy for Peace sabotage the peace process between the 12 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Non-Traditional Threats in Mindanao?” International Crisis Group, August 2011, government and the MILF as part of the and Maritime Domain Awareness in the Tri-Border Area of p. 7. Southeast Asia: The Coast Watch System of the Philippines 19 See “Every Step Brings Us Closer to Our Destination,” 23 Zenn. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), p. 13; Ka- opening statement of Mohagher Iqbal, chairman, MILF 24 “The Philippines: Back to the Table, Warily, in Min- bulu, “BIFF: Origin and Prospect.” peace panel, during opening program of the 20th GPH- danao,” p. 8; “The Philippines: Breakthrough in Mind- 13 Alexis Romero, “86 Dead in Army-BIFF Clashes in MILF Exploratory Talks in Kuala Lumpur, February anao,” International Crisis Group, December 2012, p. 16. Maguindanao,” Philippine Star, July 8, 2013. 9-10, 2011. 25 See, for instance, “MNLF May Quit the Peace Process 14 Personal interview, Manila, Philippines, August 2011. 20 “6 Killed in Maguindanao Clash Between MILF, in the Philippines,” Terrorism Focus 4:3 (2007). For more 15 “A Day With the Mujahideen of the BIFF (Bangsam- Splinter Group,” GMANews.tv, August 10, 2011; Zenn. on the ARMM agreement and what it entailed, see Peter oro Islamic Freedom Fighters) – 2.” 21 “A Day With the Mujahideen of the BIFF (Bangsam- Chalk, “The Davao Consensus: A Panacea for the Mus- 16 Personal interviews, Moro sources, Manila, Philip- oro Islamic Freedom Fighters) – 2.” lim Insurgency in Mindanao?” Terrorism and Political pines, January 2008. 22 Kabulu, “BIFF: Origin and Prospect.” Violence 9:2 (1997).

16 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 long-term goal of achieving Bangsamoro The existence of potential ties between The Evolution of Jihadism independence. One especially intensive the ASG and BIFF became apparent and prolonged clash occurred in August in the aforementioned attack in in Italy: Rise in Homegrown and September 2012 when the Army’s September 2013, when around 150 Radicals 1st Mechanized Brigade attempted rebels besieged army positions in the to retake several key highways that village of Lamitan on the restive island By Lorenzo Vidino rebels under the command of Ustadz of Basilan. According to Philippine Carialan had seized to temporarily seal Colonel Rodrigo Gregorio, a military jihadist terrorism in italy has recently off Maguindanao Province. Hostilities spokesman in the area, the assault undergone significant demographic and dragged on for weeks (amid suspicions came on the heels of an earlier tactical operational changes. The first generation that Kato’s forces were receiving material alliance that had been concluded of foreign-born militants with ties to assistance from local politicians),26 between the two groups.30 Ominously, various jihadist groups outside Europe causing 7,865 families, or 39,325 people there has been speculation that the ASG/ is still active in Italy, albeit with less in 18 barangays, to flee their homes.27 BIFF attack may have been connected to intensity than in the past. During the last Fighting and confrontations typically the simultaneous seizure of Zamboanga few years, however, Italian authorities escalate in the run-up to the holy month City, an important trading hub of have increasingly noticed a shift toward of Ramadan, and violence in 2013 800,000 people just off Basilan that forms of homegrown radicalization involved strikes against both civilian was stormed by 300 MNLF rebels.31 If similar to that experienced in other communities and military detachments, confirmed, this could indicate that the Western European countries. Two with one landmine attack in Shariff two groups have additionally forged recent incidents highlighted this Saidona Mustapha town leaving six ties with renegade elements in the trend: the conviction of a young soldiers dead.28 MNLF. The existence of a tripartite man from Brescia who, without any union of this sort would represent a connection to established jihadist Finally, there are indications that BIFF major obstacle to peace in Mindanao and groups, formed an online network of has made common cause with members would potentially position the BIFF to jihadist enthusiasts; and a Genoa-born of the ASG. The latter entity is another play a decisive role in determining the convert to Islam who was killed in splinter of the MNLF that emerged in province’s future—irrespective of any Syria. These two incidents marked some 1991 under the leadership of Ustadz settlement that is concluded between of the first cases of homegrown jihadist Abdurajak Janjalani. The organization the Philippine government and the radicalization in Italy.1 similarly claims to be fighting for the MILF. creation of an Islamic state in Mindanao, This article looks at the first although since the death of Janjalani in Dr. Peter Chalk is a Senior Policy Analyst generation of jihadists in Italy, and 1998, and later his brother Khadaffy in with the RAND Corporation, Santa then shows how the jihadist scene in 2006, it has increasingly devolved into Monica, CA. He has worked on a range of Italy has progressively changed with more of a decentralized criminal kidnap- projects examining soft power “diplomacy,” the formation of a new generation of for-ransom outfit than an integrated, civil-military relations, security sector homegrown radicals. It finds that truly religiously-inspired movement. reform, international peace operations although the recent instances of That said, the ASG continues to engage and unconventional sub-state threats in homegrown jihadist radicalization in periodic acts of political violence, the Asia-Pacific, Latin America and sub- are worrisome, it still remains a small allegedly retains ties with fugitives Saharan Africa. He is author of numerous phenomenon in Italy compared to some of Jemaah Islamiyya (JI) hiding in the books, book chapters and journal articles other European countries. southern Philippines and has yet to be on these subjects and has testified on removed from the U.S. list of designated several occasions before the U.S. Congress. The First Generation Foreign Terrorist Organizations.29 Dr. Chalk is Associate Editor of Studies Jihadist networks have been active in Conflict and Terrorism, one of the in Italy since the late 1980s.2 Even foremost journals in the international though small clusters of militants security field. from several North African countries 26 See, for instance, “MILF: 2 Maguindanao Polls Sup- established themselves in various port Kato,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 2012; areas of the country, the northern Ferdinandh B. Cabrera, “‘A Big Lie,’ Mayor Ampatuan city of Milan has always been the Says of Reports they Abandoned Towns and Supported undisputed hub of jihadist activity BIFF,” Minda News, August 18, 2012. in Italy. The city’s Islamic Cultural 27 Rene Acosta, “Philippines Rebel Group Bangsamoro Institute (ICI), a former garage turned Islamic Freedom Fighters Undermines Peace Talks,” mosque, was controlled by members of Asia Pacific Defense Forum, September 24, 2012; “The Philippines: Breakthrough in Mindanao,” p. 16; “MILF: 1 With the exception of Domenico Quaranta, which was 2 Maguindanao Polls Support Kato.” 30 Floyd Whaley, “New Clash in the Philippines Raises an isolated incident, every case seen in Italy from 1995 28 Romero. It should be noted that overall, the bulk of Fears of a Wider Threat,” New York Times, September 12, until Mohamed Jarmoune in 2012 involved first genera- fatalities were on the side of the rebels. 2013. tion immigrants (and most linked to established jihadist 29 Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast 31 For more on the seizure, Floyd Whaley, “Fighting in networks). Asia: A Net Assessment, pp. 49-52; “Annual Country Re- Southern Philippines Kills 8,” New York Times, Septem- 2 Lorenzo Vidino, “Islam, Islamism and Jihadism in Ita- port on Terrorism 2012,” U.S. Department of State, 2013. ber 9, 2013; ibid. ly,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 7 (2008).

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Egyptian Jama`a al-Islamiyya after its By the late 1990s, jihadist networks, and in a Milan metro station in the foundation in 1988.3 The ICI acquired many of which had connections to the span of seven months.13 Quaranta left importance for the global jihadist ICI, were present in various Italian at the scene messages threatening to movement when the conflict in Bosnia cities, particularly in the north.10 continue his actions until “you will erupted in 1992. Not only was the ICI’s Most of these networks were involved submit to worshipping the one God.”14 imam, Anwar Shabaan, the commander in quintessential logistical support Two similar incidents took place in of foreign mujahidin in Bosnia, but the activities for various jihadist outfits Modena in 2003 and Brescia in 2004. network in Milan was an important operating outside of Europe. Their In each case, a Muslim man detonated node supplying documents, money and demographics mirrored migration other forms of logistical support for patterns, as the vast majority of volunteers worldwide seeking to reach individuals were first generation “A handful of cases that the battlefield in the Balkans.4 immigrants from Tunisia, Algeria and have surfaced over the Morocco.11 Many of them were in the Throughout the 1990s, the ICI remained, country illegally and lived in conditions last few years present in the words of the U.S. Department of of socioeconomic disenfranchisement. clear characteristics of the Treasury, “the main al Qaeda station house in Europe.”5 The ICI established The Scene Changes homegrown radicalization, various businesses, which provided By the mid-2000s, several aggressive underscoring how the money and the possibility to sponsor security investigations that led to the visa applications for militants.6 Radical dismantling of dozens of cells and phenomenon has arrived in preachers of global stature routinely the voluntary departure from Italy Italy.” visited the ICI.7 Forged documents, of many hardened jihadists caused a funds and recruits from Milan went to significant decrease in jihadist activity. support jihadist groups from Algeria to Some of the long established networks Afghanistan.8 Particularly noteworthy and some new actors (Pakistanis, for explosive materials in a car in front was the contribution of Milanese example) continued their activities, of a synagogue and a McDonalds jihadists in Iraq, where several but with a markedly lower intensity. respectively.15 Both men died in the individuals recruited within the ICI In that regard, it is noteworthy that ensuing blast, but there were no other scene carried out suicide operations.9 other than a few improbable plots, no injuries.16 All three episodes were attacks against Italy were planned by characterized by the rudimentary 3 See the report on the searches at the ICI, published established networks in this period nature of the explosive devices and by the Italian General Investigations and Special Op- despite a number of plots targeting by the fact that the perpetrators were erations Division (DIGOS), September 15, 1997; “DIGOS other European countries. not connected to any known militant 17 Memorandum on the ICI,” Italian General Investigations circle. and Special Operations Division, May 20, 1994. The ICI Yet, somewhat preceding a trend later is also known as the Viale Jenner mosque from the street seen in the rest of Europe, Italy in on which it is located. the early 2000s witnessed a handful 12 4 See the report on the searches at the ICI, published by of lone actor plots. In July 2002, the Italian General Investigations and Special Operations authorities arrested Domenico Division (DIGOS), September 15, 1997. Also see Evan F. Quaranta, a handyman who had 13 “Arrestato presunto responsabile attentati Milano e Kohlmann, Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bos- converted to Islam in prison, for Agrigento,” La Repubblica, July 17, 2002; Francesco Cas- nian Network (Oxford: Berg, 2004). detonating four primitive explosive cini, “Il fenomeno del proselitismo in carcere con riferi- 5 David S. Hilzenrath and John Mintz, “More Assets on devices in the vicinity of various mento ai detenuti stranieri di culto islamico,” in La Radi- Hold in Anti-Terror Effort; 39 Parties Added to List of Al targets in the Sicilian city of Agrigento calizzazione del Terrorismo Islamico, June 2012. Qaeda Supporters,” Washington Post, October 13, 2001. 14 “Arrestato presunto responsabile attentati Milano e 6 “DIGOS Memorandum on the ICI.” Also see the DI- Lorenzo Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground Agrigento,” La Repubblica, July 17, 2002. GOS reports on Muhajiroun 2, dated October 5, 2001, of International Jihad (Amherst, MA: Prometheus, 2005), 15 For the Modena incident, see Stefano Dambruoso and and Muhajiroun 3, dated November 21, 2001. pp. 215-290; “Milano, l’imam di viale Jenner condannato Vincenzo R. Spagnolo, Un Istante Prima (Milan: Monda- 7 Ibid.; Stefano Dambruoso, Milano Bagdad: Diario di un a 3 anni e 8 mesi,“ La Repubblica, December 20, 2007. dori, 2011), p. 121. For Brescia, see the Brescia DIGOS re- magistrato in prima linea nella lotta al terrorismo islamico in 10 See the DIGOS reports on Muhajiroun 2, dated Oc- port on Mostafa Chaouki, July 12, 2004. Italia (Milan: Mondadori, 2004). tober 5, 2001, and Muhajiroun 3, dated November 21, 16 Ibid. 8 See, for example, the indictment of Lased Ben Heni 2001. 17 Some have questioned whether these incidents should and others, Tribunal of Milan, October 1, 2001; verdict 11 Mass immigration to Italy is a recent phenomenon in be labeled “terrorism.” On the one hand, it is apparent against Essid Sami Ben Khemais and others, Tribunal of comparison to most other Western European countries, from their modus operandi, possible targets and, at least Milan, May 13, 2002; indictment of Abdelhalim Hafed as it began in the late 1980s/early 1990s. in the Brescia case, from the letter claiming responsibil- Remadna and others, Tribunal of Milan, November 21, 12 With a few exceptions, most European countries were ity for the attack sent by the perpetrator to the police that 2001; indictment of Muhamad Majid and others, Tribu- targeted by “lone actor” plots beginning in the second- there was a political/religious nature behind the actions. nal of Milan, November 21, 2003. half of the 2000s until the present. See, for example, the On the other hand, the psychological conditions of men- 9 Indictment of Muhamad Majid and others, Tribunal lone actor attacks in Stockholm (Taimour Abdulwahab, tal instability and deep depression of the perpetrators of Milan, November 21, 2003; indictment of Osama Mo- 2010), London (Roshonara Choudhry, 2010), Frankfurt cannot be ignored and are possibly the main reasons for stafa Hassan Nasr, Tribunal of Milan, April 4, 2005; Giu- (Arid Uka, 2011) and Toulouse (Mohammed Merah, their actions. It is difficult to fully understand these dy- lio Meotti, “Italian Jihad,” Il Foglio, February 26, 2009; 2012). namics ex post facto.

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Then, in October 2009, Libyan It is debatable whether Game can Facebook group and openly discussed national and long-time Milan resident be considered a case of homegrown his jihadist sympathies.28 Mohammed Game attempted to enter radicalization. Although his a military base in Lombardy.18 When radicalization may only have taken In an essay, Jarmoune summarized his confronted by a guard, he detonated place in Milan, Game grew up in life as follows: an explosive device, severely injuring Libya and moved to Italy only as an himself and lightly wounding the guard. adult. Yet a handful of cases that have I am 20, I have lived in Italy since surfaced over the last few years present I was 6 and I started following “Italian authorities clear characteristics of homegrown Islam when I was 16 and initially radicalization, underscoring how the found only books and files in considered the attack on phenomenon has arrived in Italy. Italian, written by modern, phony the barracks in Lombardy and moderate Muslims…I read The Brescia Cases them in depth and later I found a watershed event.” By the second half of the 2000s, Italian the truth thanks to God and so I authorities had begun monitoring began translating books and files an online-based network of jihadist for Italian Muslims but later these sympathizers.23 The cluster was led by Italian brothers abandoned me The ensuing investigation led to two a handful of Italian converts based in and I don’t know why. Maybe Milan-based North African men who various Italian cities and in London.24 they are afraid…and so I stopped had helped Game with his plot.19 Game, In 2012, authorities decided to act, speaking to Italian Muslims…and who had recently begun attending the and charged some of the network’s I began helping Muslims and the ICI, operated mostly independently and most active members under article nation all over the world. And his radicalization process had occurred 270 quinquies of the penal code. The later I worked with important largely online.20 article criminalizes the provision of jhd [jihad] as video producer and terrorist training and has been used other important projects. Now I Italian authorities considered the with increasing frequency to prosecute am the moderator of the jhd forum attack on the barracks in Lombardy cases in which more or less operational of God, a great challenge for me a watershed event. The 2009 annual materials are exchanged online. and I am very happy about this.29 report sent by Italian intelligence to Members of the network had translated parliament clearly stated that “in the into Italian and disseminated online After months of monitoring, authorities proximity of structured groupings texts ranging from jihadist philosophy to arrested Jarmoune after he conducted active in logistics and propaganda manuals on weapons and explosives.25 online surveillance of Jewish targets can operate isolated individuals in Milan.30 In May 2013, Jarmoune was or micro-clusters ready to act in The investigation led authorities sentenced to five years and four months complete independence.”21 It also to Mohamed Jarmoune, a young in prison for disseminating terrorist raised concerns about the arrival of Moroccan-born man living in Niardo, a propaganda.31 the phenomenon of internet-driven quiet mountain town in the province of homegrown radicalization in Italy—in Brescia.26 Living a secluded life between As they wrapped up the case against this case, mirroring a dynamic seen in work and his parents’ house (and not Jarmoune, authorities stumbled upon Europe years before.22 attending a mosque), Jarmoune spent all another young man of Moroccan his time—up to 15 hours a day—online, descent who, like Jarmoune, lived disseminating jihadist materials and with his well-integrated family in a 18 “Libyan in Milan Bomb Attack,” ANSA Press Agency, connecting with like-minded individuals small rural town near Brescia. Anas 27 October 12, 2009. around the world. Together with the El Abboubi, who idolized Jarmoune 19 Verdict against Mohamed Game and Hady Abdelaziz London-based wife of a known Algerian but had no connections to him, had Mahmoud Abdel Kol, Tribunal of Milan, verdict 10/1583, militant, he administered a private allegedly embraced jihadist ideology October 4, 2010. and spent most of his time online 32 20 Personal interview, Italian Interior Ministry official, 23 Personal interviews, Italian Interior Ministry of- communicating with kindred spirits. Milan, Italy, July 2013; verdict against Mohamed Game ficials, Milan, Italy, August 2013; 2009 Annual- Re Without ever leaving Italy, El Abboubi and Hady Abdelaziz Mahmoud Abdel Kol, Tribunal of port to the Italian Parliament (Relazione sulla politica had managed to build contacts with the Milan, verdict 10/1583, October 4, 2010. dell’informazione per la sicurezza), pp. 19-21. 21 2009 Annual Report to the Italian Parliament (Relazi- 24 Personal interviews, Italian Interior Ministry offi- 28 Personal interviews, Italian police and Interior Min- one sulla politica dell’informazione per la sicurezza), pp. cials, Milan, Italy, August 2013; attachment number 1 in istry officials, Brescia and Milan, Italy, September and 19-21. the Jarmoune case, Brescia DIGOS, p. 3. October 2013; verdict in the Jarmoune case, Tribunal of 22 Cases predating Game’s attack in which the internet 25 Verdict in the Jarmoune case, Tribunal of Brescia, ver- Brescia, verdict 613/13, May 16, 2013. played a key role in the radicalization process included dict 613/13, May 16, 2013. 29 Verdict in the Jarmoune case, Tribunal of Brescia, ver- that of the so-called “Irhabi 007” network, a network of 26 Personal interviews, Italian police and Interior Min- dict 613/13, May 16, 2013, pp. 10-11. jihadist sympathizers spanning several countries that istry officials, Brescia and Milan, Italy, September and 30 Ibid. formed online, and the Hofstad group, the Dutch net- October 2013; verdict in the Jarmoune case, Tribunal of 31 Ibid. work of militants that was behind several failed attacks Brescia, verdict 613/13, May 16, 2013. 32 Personal interviews, Italian police officials, Brescia, and one successful attack (the Theo van Gogh assassina- 27 Indictment of Mohamed Jarmoune, Tribunal of Cagli- Italy, October 2013; indictment of Anas El Abboubi, Tri- tion) in the early 2000s. ari, case 984/2012, March 13, 2012. bunal of Brescia, case 28496/12, June 10, 2013.

19 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 leaders of various extremist groups, developed Salafi-jihadi scene. By 2011, Conclusion from Germany-based Millatu Ibrahim Delnevo was actively seeking to join The arrival of homegrown jihadist to Sharia4Belgium.33 El Abboubi had jihadist groups, yet was struggling to radicalization in Italy does not mean apparently taken it upon himself to find the right contacts.38 After an initial, that “traditional” networks are no establish the Italian branch of the unsuccessful attempt in the summer of longer operating.42 Yet lone operators franchise, starting the blog Sharia4Italy 2012, Delnevo managed to enter Syria and small clusters of “sociological and involving a handful of local a few months later. He reportedly died Italians”43 who radicalize on their friends. Authorities decided to arrest while fighting alongside a Chechen-led own, operate independently from El Abboubi after becoming concerned brigade of foreign fighters.39 mosques and traditional groups, and by the increased militancy of his online are prolific online are active in Italy. activities and by the fact that he had Like Jarmoune and El Abboubi, Nevertheless, they still represent a allegedly used the internet to research Delnevo’s profile is not characterized smaller threat than in other Western various iconic sites in Brescia.34 He was by any socioeconomic marginalization. European countries.44 later released, as the court did not deem Rather, it seems more appropriate to his behavior a violation of article 270 search for the roots of their radicalization Authorities have so far contained this quinquies.35 There are indications that, in their psychological profiles and their developing threat with remarkable upon release, El Abboubi traveled to quest for a personal identity.40 It is success. Yet the phenomenon of Syria, where he reportedly remains.36 noteworthy that all three individuals homegrown terrorism, as the experience had been at some point fascinated of other Western countries has shown, is From Genoa to Syria by other alternative ideologies and by nature unpredictable and extremely Another active member of the Italian lifestyles (including fascist militancy difficult to control. online jihadist scene gained the and hip hop culture).41 spotlight in June 2013 after news broke Dr. Lorenzo Vidino is a Senior Fellow at the that Giuliano Ibrahim Delnevo had died Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. in Syria. Born in Genoa in 1989, Delnevo This article is part of an extensive study had grown up in a middle class family on the development of jihadism in Italy and had converted to Islam in 2008.37 sponsored by the European Foundation He had been active in the local Islamic for Democracy (Brussels) and the Istituto scene, but as his views radicalized he per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale could not find like-minded individuals (Milan). in Genoa. He sought them online and in European countries with a more 38 Personal interviews, Italian police and judicial of- ficials, Genoa and Rome, Italy, September and October 33 Personal interviews, Italian police officials, Brescia, 2013. Italy, October 2013; Laura Damiani, “Manette al padre 39 Personal interviews, Italian police and judicial author- di ‘Sharia4Italy,’ terrorista internazionale,” Corriere della ities, Genoa, Italy, September 2013; personal interview, Sera, June 12, 2013; Wilma Petenzi, “L’aspirante bom- Carlo Delnevo, Giuliano’s father, Sestri Levante, Italy, barolo sgridato dal padre per cento euro spariti,” Corriere October 2013; Gabriele Piccardo, “Giuliano Ibrahim Del- 42 In May 2013, for example, the Carabinieri ROS dis- della Sera, June 14, 2013. nevo: l’amico Umberto Marcozzi: ‘Mi scrisse che in Siria i mantled a cell of North African militants between Apulia 34 Indictment of Anas El Abboubi, Tribunal of Brescia, martiri profumano,’” Huffington Post, June 18, 2013; An- and Sicily. The men were first generation immigrants case 7456/11, June 10, 2013; Wilma Petenzi, “Nel mirino drea Cortellari, “Siria, Delnevo indagato per terrorismo a with connections to Milan’s ICI. Authorities accused dello studente pure questore e piazza Loggia,” Corriere Genova già dal 2009,” Il Giornale, June 18, 2013. them of recruiting and planning attacks against Ameri- della Sera, June 13, 2013. 40 Fernando Reinares, “Es que integración social y can, Israeli and Italian targets. See “Italian Police Arrest 35 In November 2013, the Italian Supreme Court af- radicalización yihadista son compatibles?: una reflexión Four Suspected Islamist Militants,” Reuters, April 30, firmed the decision. See personal interviews, Brescia sobre el caso de Mohamed Jarmoune en Brescia,” Real 2013. prosecutor Antonio Chiappani and El Abboubi’s lawyer, Instituto Elcano, April 17, 2012. 43 Since Italy’s current legislation does not automati- Nicola Mannatrizio, Brescia, Italy, September and Octo- 41 Since an early age, Delnevo was fascinated with fas- cally give citizenship to individuals born on Italian soil ber 2013; Wilma Petenzi, “‘Terrorista’ a Vobarno, la pro- cism and some of his closest friends upon converting if at least one of their parents is not Italian and it is very cura pronta a ricorrere in Cassazione,” Corriere della Sera, were former right-wing activists who had converted. difficult to obtain Italian citizenship, few individuals of July 2, 2013; “El Abboubi resta libero, ma è ‘scomparso,’” See personal interview, Carlo Delnevo, Giuliano’s father, immigrant origin are Italian citizens. The term “sociolog- Brescia Oggi, November 9, 2013. Sestri Levante, Italy, October 2011; personal interview, ical Italians” is therefore used to describe all those indi- 36 Personal interviews, Italian police officials, Rome and Italian police, Genoa, Italy, September 2013. Jarmoune viduals who have grown up in Italy, irrespective of their Brescia, Italy, October 2013; “El Abboubi resta libero, ma collected Nazi memorabilia. See “Woman, 40, Arrested citizenship status. è ‘scomparso.’” in London Terror Raid as Police Probe ‘Secret Facebook 44 There are only a handful of court cases against 37 Personal interview, Carlo Delnevo, Giuliano’s father, Plot to Blow up Italian Synagogue,’” Daily Mail, March “homegrown” jihadists in Italy, and most of them have Sestri Levante, Italy, October 2013; Marco Imarisio, 15, 2012. El Abboubi was a rapper in his teens under the been charged with article 270bis, a very broad charge of “Quei 40-50 jihadisti partiti per la Siria dalle città ital- pseudonym McKhalif. Under that name he operated a disseminating propaganda that does not exist in many iane,“ Corriere della Sera, June 19, 2013; Bruno Persano, YouTube channel (www.youtube.com/user/MCKHA- European penal codes. Moreover, counterterrorism au- “Mio figlio è morto da eroe e oggi sono orgoglioso di lui,” LIF) that, after radicalizing, he used to post religious thorities in Italy estimate that only a handful of Italians La Repubblica, June 19, 2013; personal interviews, Ital- lectures instead of rap videos. One of El Abboubi’s old are fighting in Syria, a smaller number when compared ian police and judicial officials, Genoa, Italy, September rap performances can be seen at www.youtube.com/ to the participation rate of foreign fighters in Syria from 2013. watch?v=uPJXqAsUEPE. other European countries.

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October 3, 2013 (UNITED STATES): October 5, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide Recent Highlights in Nizar Trabelsi, a former Tunisian bomber detonated his explosives at a Terrorist Activity professional soccer player who was checkpoint in Baghdad, killing 48 Shi`a later convicted of being a member of al- pilgrims on their way to visit a shrine. October 1, 2013 (IRAQ): According Qa`ida, was extradited from Belgium – Reuters, October 5 to the United Nations, 887 civilians to the United States to face suicide and 92 members of the Iraqi Security bombing charges. Trabelsi was arrested October 5, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide Forces died in Iraq during the month in Belgium only two days after the bomber detonated his explosives inside of September. The death toll was one 9/11 attacks, and he was sentenced to a café in the mainly Shi`a town of Balad, of the highest in years, but still lower 10 years in jail in 2003 for planning a killing 12 people. – AP, October 5 than July’s, which stood at 1,057 killed. suicide truck bombing against a Belgian – BBC, October 3 air base where U.S. soldiers were October 5, 2013 (IRAQ): Gunmen killed stationed. – AFP, October 3 two Iraqi television journalists as they October 1, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide were filming in Mosul. – Reuters, October 5 bomber attacked the counter-explosives October 3, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A police headquarters in Tikrit, Salah al- suicide bomber in an explosives-laden October 6, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide Din Province, killing five police officers. vehicle targeted the headquarters bomber drove an explosives-laden truck – AFP, October 1 of rival Taliban commander Mullah into the playground of a primary school Nabi Hanafi in Orakzai Agency of the in Tal Afar, Ninawa Province, killing October 1, 2013 (FRANCE): French Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 14 children and their headmaster. intelligence officers arrested a 21-year- The explosion killed 15 people and According to Reuters, “The majority old Paris woman suspected of having destroyed the headquarters. Hanafi was of Tal Afar’s residents are from Iraq’s links to al-Qa`ida in the Arabian not present at the time of attack. – Dawn, Shi’ite Turkman minority, which in Peninsula. – AFP, October 1 October 3; Guardian, October 3 recent years has been the target of killings and kidnappings.” Authorities October 2, 2013 (KENYA): Al-Qa`ida October 4, 2013 (UKRAINE): A man suspect that al-Qa`ida’s Islamic State affiliate al-Shabab threatened to being interviewed by guards at the of Iraq and the Levant was responsible. increase attacks against Kenya after Russian-Ukraine border blew himself – Reuters, October 6 the country refused to withdraw its up, wounding two guards. The incident troops from Somalia. “We will strike occurred on the Ukrainian side of the October 6, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide Kenyans where it hurts the most, border, close to the village of Bachevsk. bomber targeted a group of Shi`a turn their cities into graveyards…The – UPI, October 4 pilgrims heading to a shrine in Baghdad, Kenyan government’s decision to keep killing at least 14 people. – Reuters, its invading force in Somalia is an October 5, 2013 (LIBYA): U.S. forces October 6 indication that they haven’t yet learnt launched a raid in the Libyan capital, any valuable lessons from the Westgate apprehending Abu Anas al-Libi, a October 7, 2013 (IRAQ): Militants attacks,” the group said. – al-Arabiya, suspected al-Qa`ida operative wanted executed a wave of attacks across October 2 for his role in the 1998 U.S. Embassy Iraq, including a series of coordinated bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. Al- evening bombings in Baghdad, killing October 2, 2013 (SYRIA): The Islamic Libi’s legal name is Nazih al-Ruqai. at least 45 people. – AP, October 7 State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), He is to face trial in the United States. which is an al-Qa`ida affiliate, fought – Reuters, October 5; New York Times, October 5 October 7, 2013 (EGYPT): A suicide rival Syrian rebels from the Northern bomber wearing a police uniform Storm brigade on the outskirts of Azaz, October 5, 2013 (SOMALIA): U.S. detonated an explosives-laden car inside near the border with Turkey. – Reuters, military forces launched a raid in a security base in el-Tor town in the October 2 the Somali coastal town of Barawe Sinai Peninsula, killing four policemen. against an al-Shabab terrorist known The town is close to the resort area of October 2, 2013 (IRAQ): Militants as Ikrima. The operation, however, Sharm el-Sheikh. The Salafi-jihadi shot down an Iraqi military helicopter failed to capture or kill the al-Shabab group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis later between Kirkuk and Salah al-Din target, and U.S. forces disengaged after claimed responsibility. – AP, October 7; Province, killing all four crew members. causing some al-Shabab casualties. Bloomberg, October 8 – New York Post, October 2 Ikrima, considered a top al-Shabab leader, reportedly planned the recent October 8, 2013 (EGYPT): Gunmen on a October 2, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A suicide terrorist attack on the Westgate Mall motorbike opened fire at customs police bomber killed eight people at Pakistan’s in Nairobi, Kenya. No U.S. personnel in Port Said near the Suez Canal, killing southwestern Chaman border crossing were wounded or killed in the military one person. – Bloomberg October 8 in Baluchistan Province. The bomber operation. – Reuters, October 5; CNN, arrived at the border from neighboring October 7 October 8, 2013 (IRAQ): A car bomb Afghanistan. – Dawn, October 2 exploded in front of a restaurant in the mainly Shi`a neighborhood of Zafaraniyya, killing three people. – AP, October 8

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October 9, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): A October 10, 2013 (EGYPT): A suicide October 11, 2013 (LIBYA): A car bomb suicide bomber in a vehicle killed two bomber drove a vehicle packed with exploded outside a building housing civilians and two policemen in Helmand explosives into a checkpoint outside the Finnish and Swedish consulates in Province. – AP, October 9 el-Arish in the Sinai Peninsula, killing Benghazi. The building was damaged, three soldiers and one policeman. but there were no casualties. – AP, October 9, 2013 (SYRIA): A French According to authorities, the bomber October 11 Muslim man reportedly carried out a waited for soldiers and police to start suicide attack on a Syrian army position searching his vehicle before he detonated October 11, 2013 (PAKISTAN/ near Aleppo on behalf of the Islamic the explosives. – Daily Star, October 10 AFGHANISTAN): Tehrik-i-Taliban State of Iraq and the Levant and Jabhat Pakistan (TTP) confirmed that one al-Nusra. The attack allegedly killed October 10, 2013 (YEMEN): Gunmen of its top leaders, Latif Mehsud, was 10 Syrian soldiers. According to Radio killed a Yemeni intelligence officer in apprehended in Afghanistan’s Khost France Internationale, this was “not Mukalla, Hadramawt Province. – AFP, Province four days earlier. The U.S. the first French national to die fighting October 11 Department of State said that U.S. forces against Assad. A French convert to Islam captured Latif. – CNN, October 12 was killed in 24 September and another, October 10, 2013 (TURKEY): Turkish a 22-year-old identified as Jean-Daniel, authorities announced that they October 11, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A suicide was killed last August. French Interior have imposed financial sanctions on bomber drove an explosives-laden car Minister Manuel Valls said last month approximately 350 people and dozens into a Pakistani military convoy, killing that as many as 300 French citizens of organizations that are on the UN at least two soldiers in Wana, South or residents were currently fighting in blacklist for entities having links to al- Waziristan Agency. – AFP, October 11 Syria, planning to go and fight or had Qa`ida or the Taliban. – AP, October 11 recently returned.” – RFI, October 11; AFP, October 11, 2013 (YEMEN): A suicide October 11 October 11, 2013 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida bomber wounded three members of the chief Ayman al-Zawahiri released a new separatist Southern Movement in Lahij October 9, 2013 (EGYPT): Suspected audiotape, in which he blamed moderate Province in southern Yemen. – AFP, militants bombed an empty military Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia for their October 11 intelligence office in Rafah in the recent political setbacks, saying that Sinai Peninsula. The Ansar Bayt al- they have been too conciliatory. He also October 12, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): A Maqdis Salafi-jihadi group claimed said that jihadists in Syria must “rise suicide bomber drove an explosives- responsibility. – AFP, October 9 above organizational loyalties and party laden vehicle into a police headquarters partisanship” and unite around the goal in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province, October 9, 2013 (THAILAND): Explosions of establishing an Islamic state. – AFP, killing two policemen. – Dawn, October 12 tore through more than 20 locations October 11; AP, October 12 in southern Thailand. Many of the October 13, 2013 (SYRIA): A suicide bombs occurred at ATM machines. October 11, 2013 (UNITED STATES): bomber in an explosives-laden truck According to the Wall Street Journal, “For U.S. authorities arrested Sinh Vinh killed at least 31 people on a busy road years, Thailand’s three southernmost Ngo Nguyen at a Santa Ana bus in Hama. The intended target was provinces have been under attack by station in California and charged him reportedly a Syrian army checkpoint, insurgency groups who seek to establish with supporting al-Qa`ida. Nguyen, but most of the dead were civilians. an independent Malay speaking, Muslim 24-years-old, is a Garden Grove resident – Reuters, October 20 state in the predominately Buddhist who is also known as Hasan Abu Omar country.” – Wall Street Journal, October 9 Ghannoum. He was about to board October 13, 2013 (SYRIA): Two car a bus bound for Mexico at the time of bombs—possibly with suicide bombers October 10, 2013 (UNITED STATES): his arrest. He was raised Catholic but at the wheel—exploded near the The New York City Police Department reportedly recently converted to Islam. Syrian state television headquarters in arrested two men from Queens on – CBS, October 11 Damascus. The building was damaged, charges that they attempted to help send although it is not clear if anyone was supplies to Taliban-linked operatives in October 11, 2013 (FRANCE): French injured. – Time, October 14; Business Standard, Afghanistan. According to NBC, “One authorities charged Naamen Meziche, October 14 suspect was recorded telling an NYPD who was once connected to al-Qa`ida’s informant he wanted to help kill U.S. Hamburg cell that planned the 9/11 October 13, 2013 (ETHIOPIA): A bomb soldiers in Afghanistan because he hated attacks on the United States, with exploded in Addis Ababa, killing at the United States and ‘wanted to take a terrorism offenses. Meziche was recently least two people. The incident occurred stand.’” The two men were identified as deported from Pakistan. According to in the city’s Bole district, home to a large Humayoun Ghoulam Nabi and Ismail Dawn, “Meziche had been in Pakistani Somali population. – Voice of America, Alsarabbi. Court papers said that Nabi custody since being arrested in May October 13 is an immigrant from Pakistan while 2012 in the southwest of the country Alsarabbi is a Palestinian immigrant. along with three other suspected French October 14, 2013 (IRAQ): A series of car – NBC, October 10 jihadis, who were sent back to France in bombs and roadside explosions across April and charged on the same count.” Baghdad killed at least 34 people. – Dawn, October 11 According to CNN, the explosions

22 november 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 11-12 primarily targeted “amusement parks October 18, 2013 (YEMEN): Dozens of October 21, 2013 (RUSSIA): An where families and children typically go militants from al-Qa`ida in the Arabian explosion, possibly caused by a female to celebrate the Islamic holiday of Eid Peninsula attacked a military base in suicide bomber from Dagestan, tore al-Adha.” – CNN, October 18 Abyan Province, killing seven soldiers. through a passenger bus in Volgograd, According to CNN, “the militants killing at least five people. There was October 14, 2013 (SYRIA): A car bomb attacked the compound from three no immediate claim of responsibility, exploded at a market in the rebel-held sides, drove a bomb-laden vehicle inside but Russian authorities suspect that town of Darkoush, Idlib Province, and detonated it. The compound’s main the incident was related to the Islamist killing at least 15 people. – Time, October building was heavily damaged.” – CNN, insurgency in the North Caucasus 14 October 18 region. – Telegraph, October 21; CNN, October 21 October 15, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): October 18, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): A A bomb planted inside a mosque suicide bomber detonated an explosives- October 22, 2013 (IRAQ): A wave of microphone killed Arsala Jamal, the laden vehicle outside a compound suicide bombings and other attacks governor of Logar Province. – al-Jazira, where many foreign workers are based targeting security forces across Iraq left October 15 in Kabul, killing at least two Afghan at least 17 people dead. – RT, October 22 civilians. – The News International, October 18 October 15, 2013 (IRAQ): A bomb October 23, 2013 (MALI): A suicide exploded near a Sunni mosque in October 19, 2013 (EGYPT): A car bomb bomber in a vehicle killed two UN Kirkuk, killing 12 worshippers. – al- exploded outside a military intelligence peacekeeping soldiers from Chad and Jazira, October 15 headquarters in the Suez Canal city of a civilian at a checkpoint in Tessalit in Ismailia, injuring six military personnel. northern Mali. Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic October 16, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A The Salafi-jihadi group Ansar Bayt Maghreb claimed responsibility. – New suicide bomber killed a provincial al-Maqdis claimed responsibility. York Times, October 24; AFP, October 24 government minister and seven other – Washington Post, October 19; AFP, October 21 people near Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber October 26, 2013 (LIBYA): A car bomb Pakhtunkhwa Province. – al-Jazira, October 19, 2013 (SYRIA): A suicide exploded outside a school used as a October 16 bomber in a vehicle killed approximately training center for local municipal 16 soldiers at a checkpoint in a pro- elections in Benghazi, but there were no October 17, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide government suburb of Damascus. injuries. – CNN, October 26 bomber driving an explosives-laden Activists said that Jabhat al-Nusra was truck killed at least 15 Shabak in responsible. – CBC, October 19 October 27, 2013 (IRAQ): At least six car Ninawa Province. The Shabak are bombs exploded across primarily Shi`a ethnic Turkmen and Shi`a Muslims. October 19, 2013 (SOMALIA): A suicide districts of Baghdad, killing at least 21 – Reuters, October 17 bomber killed at least 15 people in a people. – Reuters, October 27 crowded restaurant in Beledweyne. October 17, 2013 (IRAQ): Ten bombs Al-Shabab claimed responsibility. October 28, 2013 (CHINA): A car exploded in primarily Shi`a areas of The restaurant is popular with foreign slammed into a crowd of tourists in Baghdad, killing at least 44 people. troops, and at least four Ethiopian Beijing, and then burst into flames. – Reuters, October 17 soldiers were among the dead. – Voice of Two civilians and all three people America, October 19; New York Times, October 19 in the vehicle were killed. Chinese October 18, 2013 (UNITED STATES): police described the incident as a U.S. authorities arrested Marcos October 20, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide “carefully planned terrorist attack,” Alonso Zea (also known as Ali Zea), a bomber in a minibus detonated and they blamed Muslim separatists Long Island man, for allegedly trying to explosives outside a café in a mainly from Xinjiang Province. According to join al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula Shi`a Muslim district of Baghdad, Voice of America, “It remains unclear to carry out jihadist attacks overseas. killing at least 38 people. – Reuters, if Monday’s incident was an accident According to U.S. Attorney Loretta October 20 or an intentional act carried out at the Lynch, “Despite being born and raised in politically symbolic heart of Beijing.” the United States, Zea allegedly betrayed October 20, 2013 (SYRIA): A suicide – Australian Broadcasting Corporation, October his country and attempted to travel bomber detonated a truck filled with 31; Radio Australia, October 31; Voice of America, to Yemen in order to join a terrorist propane tanks at a military checkpoint October 28 organization and commit murder.” The in Hama, killing more than 30 people. case involved a co-conspirator, who Activists said that Jabhat al-Nusra, October 28, 2013 (SOMALIA): A was identified as Justin Kaliebe—also which is linked to al-Qa`ida, was suspected U.S. drone strike killed a top a U.S. citizen. Kaliebe is scheduled to responsible. – New York Times, October 20 bomb expert for al-Shabab in southern be sentenced in December 2013. – CBS, Somalia. Somali authorities identified October 18; Voice of America, October 18 October 20, 2013 (NIGERIA): Boko the man as Ibrahim Ali Abdi, also Haram gunmen on motorcycles and known as Anta-Anta. – Sydney Morning wearing military uniforms shot and Herald, October 29 hacked to death 19 people on Nigeria’s border with Cameroon. – AFP, October 20

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October 28, 2013 (EGYPT): Masked CTC Sentinel Staff men killed three Egyptian policemen at a checkpoint in the Nile Delta city of Editor-in-Chief Mansura. – Reuters, October 28 Erich Marquardt Senior Editor, CTC October 29, 2013 (NORTH AFRICA): The French government announced Editorial Board that four French hostages kidnapped by COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb three Department Head years ago in Niger have been released. Department of Social Sciences (West Point) France denied that a ransom had been paid. – Guardian, October 29 COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. Deputy Department Head October 29, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide Department of Social Sciences (West Point) bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle attacked a police checkpoint in Mosul, MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. killing at least eight people, including Director, CTC three policemen. – Voice of America, October 30

October 29, 2013 (IRAQ): Two suicide bombers detonated their explosives outside the Baghdad home of a leader of an anti-al-Qa`ida Sunni militia, killing at least 11 people. – Voice of America, October Contact 30; AP, October 30 Combating Terrorism Center U.S. Military Academy October 30, 2013 (EGYPT): A car bomb 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall exploded in the Sinai Peninsula, but West Point, NY 10996 there were no injuries. The bomb was Phone: (845) 667-6383 intended to kill Egyptian troops. – AFP, Email: [email protected] October 30 Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ October 30, 2013 (TUNISIA): A suicide * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 bomber detonated explosives on a beach near the resort of Sousse, an important tourist destination close to Tunis. There were no casualties. Thirty minutes later, in the neighboring town of Monastir, Tunisian security forces avoided another support suicide attack by a different man. The Combating Terrorism Center would Officials described the two bombers as like to express its gratitude to its financial “Salafi-jihadis.” According to Agence supporters, for without their support and France-Presse, the bombing was the shared vision of the Center products like the “first in Tunisia since 2002, when an CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you attack claimed by al-Qa`ida killed 21 are interested in learning more about how people at the ancient Ghriba synagogue to support the Combating Terrorism Center, on the resort island of Djerba.” – Reuters, please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call October 30; AFP, October 30 Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1561.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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