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Syria Proving More Fertile Than Iraq to Al-Qa`Ida's Operations

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Syria Proving More Fertile Than Iraq to Al-Qa`Ida's Operations NOVEMBER 2013 . VOL 6 . ISSUE 11-12 Contents Syria Proving More Fertile Than FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Syria Proving More Fertile Than Iraq Iraq to Al-Qa`ida’s Operations to Al-Qa`ida’s Operations By Brian Fishman By Brian Fishman REPORTS 5 Tracking Australian Foreign Fighters in Syria By Andrew Zammit 9 The Capture of Abu Anas al-Libi: Reactions and Militancy in Libya By Alison Pargeter 12 Increase in Taliban Efforts to Recruit from Afghan Government and Security Forces By Jami Forbes and Brian Dudley 15 The Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters: The Newest Obstacles to Peace in the Southern Philippines? By Peter Chalk 17 The Evolution of Jihadism in Italy: Rise in Homegrown Radicals By Lorenzo Vidino 21 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Members of Jabhat al-Nusra take part in a parade in Aleppo calling for an Islamic state in Syria. - Photo by Karam al-Masri/AFP/Getty l-qa`ida’s operation in Syria became nearly dominant in 2006 and is both its most dangerous 2007, and then suffered a dramatic and dysfunctional. Al-Qa`ida series of setbacks at the hands of the chief Ayman al-Zawahiri’s U.S. military and the famed Sunni Arebuke of the Islamic State of Iraq and Awakening. Those setbacks were a the Levant (ISIL), in which he ordered result of endogenous conditions and it to focus solely on Iraq and defer exogenous factors.2 They were enough authority in Syria to Jabhat al-Nusra to deeply damage al-Qa`ida in Iraq About the CTC Sentinel (JN), is evidence that terrorist groups (AQI),3 but not enough to destroy it. The Combating Terrorism Center is an can still pose a significant threat even As a result, when the uprising against independent educational and research when plagued by internal divisions.1 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad institution based in the Department of Social Moreover, despite al-Qa`ida’s internal turned violent in Syria, AQI was ready Sciences at the United States Military Academy, strife in Syria, the context in which it West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses operates is deeply advantageous compared the Center’s global network of scholars and to other environments, including Iraq. 2 This framing borrows heavily from Assaf Moghadam practitioners to understand and confront and Brian Fishman eds., Fault Lines in Global Jihad: Or- contemporary threats posed by terrorism and The dramatic growth of al-Qa`ida ganizational, Strategic, and Ideological Fissures (London: other forms of political violence. affiliates in Syria is a direct result of Routledge, 2011). its preexisting networks in Iraq. These 3 For the purpose of clarity, this article refers to the 2006- networks were built in 2004 and 2005, 2007 al-Qa`ida affiliate in Iraq as al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) The views expressed in this report are those of rather than the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which was its the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, formal appellation from October 2006 until changing its the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 1 “Al-Qaeda’s Zawahiri Disbands Main Faction Operating name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in in Syria,” al-Arabiya, November 9, 2013. 2012. 1 NOVEMBER 2013 . VOL 6. ISSUE 11-12 to take advantage in a country where For obvious reasons, federating what it operational success, and its personnel the context was quite different than meant to define ideological purity made vetting and training programs were Iraq. it difficult for AQI to build coalitions inadequate despite collecting a wide with other militant groups—even those range of information on its volunteers.10 This article compares the AQI of 2006- with similar ideologies, such as Ansar When fighters with Western passports 2007 to JN and the ISIL4 today with al-Islam and Ansar al-Sunna—or entered Iraq, they were funneled directly the objective of estimating the relative tribal factions. This isolation deeply into the suicide bomber pipeline, just danger of the latter two groups. It first undermined AQI’s ability to govern looks at the endogenous and exogenous territory that it seized.7 constraints on AQI during its zenith, “Compared to AQI’s before examining whether those same Expansive and Shifting Strategic Goals earlier incarnation, JN and factors will weaken JN and the ISIL AQI had expansive strategic goals. in Syria. The article finds that the After October 2006, AQI aimed to the ISIL are more likely growth of JN and the ISIL in Syria govern areas it controlled in Iraq, and to sustainably control poses a significantly larger global celebrated that shift by changing its threat than their precursor, AQI, name to the Islamic State of Iraq (an territory, project power during the height of its strength in obvious precursor to the ISIL).8 The around the region, possibly 2006-2007. Moreover, there are signs determination to build an Islamic state, that JN and ISIL are likely to remain however, put AQI out-of-step with sponsor global terrorist powerful militant actors for a sustained many Iraqi Sunnis who felt a sense of attacks, and catalyze a period, unlike the earlier iteration of nationalism even as they were isolated AQI, which was significantly weakened from governing institutions. AQI’s new generation of jihadist by the Sunni Awakening just as its attempts to impose draconian social insurrection.” power was peaking. Compared to AQI’s policies on a population unaccustomed earlier incarnation, JN and the ISIL to them alienated AQI from their are more likely to sustainably control would-be constituency, and that led the territory, project power around the group to spend as much time fighting like others with less useful credentials.11 region, possibly sponsor global terrorist its potential allies as it did trying to Moreover, AQI’s lack of safe haven in attacks, and catalyze a new generation overthrow the Shi`a-led government of Iraq meant that foreign fighters posed of jihadist insurrection. Iraq. AQI’s strategy aimed to provoke serious security risks because their a Shi`a backlash against Sunnis that accents and lack of local knowledge AQI’s Endogenous Weaknesses AQI would rebuke, thereby winning the stood out.12 AQI suffered from three primary hearts and minds of that constituency. endogenous weaknesses that constrained Yet attempting to establish a jihadist AQI’s Exogenous Weaknesses its operations: ideological extremism, state in a majority Shi`a country by The U.S. strategy to apply exogenous expansive and shifting strategic goals challenging the existing tribal social pressure on AQI exploited these and limited operational capacity. framework was a course fraught with endogenous weaknesses. The United risk from the start.9 States succeeded in four key areas to Ideological Extremism limit AQI’s success: seizing operational From its founding in 2004, AQI Limited Operational Capacity initiative and battlespace control, embraced an expansive notion of takfir— AQI’s strategy was ultimately limiting foreign support, giving AQI excommunication, or the act of declaring undermined by its operational weakness. allies alternatives, and reining in the that a Muslim is not truly a Muslim— Although AQI was strong enough to sectarian fight. both in terms of the types of people who provoke a Shi`a backlash, it was too were eligible for this designation and weak to adequately defend Iraqi Sunnis. Seizing Operational Initiative and Battlespace by virtually eliminating any standard Additionally, AQI had few mechanisms Control for who was qualified to make that to improve its human capital. AQI The U.S. Special Operations Forces weighty declaration.5 By doing so, depended on foreign fighters for the campaign against AQI meant that no AQI established a predilection for suicide bombers that were central to its AQI base or safe house was secure. extreme violence conducted by largely From 2006 to 2008, AQI did not have independent operating commanders.6 ton, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007). an operational safe haven in Iraq, 7 Nelly Lahoud, The Jihadis’ Path to Self Destruction (New let alone a strategic one. By killing 4 This article uses the name the Islamic State of Iraq and York: Columbia University Press, 2010). the Levant to refer to the Iraq-based al-Qa`ida organiza- 8 Brian Fishman, “Fourth Generation Governance: 10 Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qaeda’s Foreign tion that operates in both Iraq and Syria and was recently Sheikh Tamimi Defends the Islamic State,” Combating Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West chastised by al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri. Terrorism Center, March 23, 2007. Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2007). 5 For more, see Mohammed Hafez, “Tactics, Takfir, and 9 See Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi’s letter to al-Qa`ida’s 11 Ibid. Anti-Muslim Violence,” in Assaf Moghadam and Brian leadership, which was released to the media in February 12 For example, see the Combating Terrorism Center’s Fishman eds., Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions 2004. The relationship between Ansar al-Sunna and AQI Harmony document collection, including: NMEC-2007- Within al-Qa`ida and Its Periphery (West Point, NY: Com- was occasionally hostile. For example, see Brian Fishman, 657700, NMEC-2007-657739, NMEC-2007-612449. bating Terrorism Center, 2010). “Ansar al-Sunnah Threatens al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” Combat- These documents are available at www.ctc.usma.edu/ 6 Mohammed Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq (Washing- ing Terrorism Center, February 26, 2007. programs-resources/harmony-program. 2 NOVEMBER 2013 . VOL 6. ISSUE 11-12 key AQI leaders and disrupting themselves against Shi`a oppressors Syrian Army (FSA), that has hampered communications, the United States who would kill their families.
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