Selling Justice Short
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Selling Justice Short Why Accountability Matters for Peace Copyright © 2009 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 1-56432-508-3 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor New York, NY 10118-3299 USA Tel: +1 212 290 4700, Fax: +1 212 736 1300 [email protected] Poststraße 4-5 10178 Berlin, Germany Tel: +49 30 2593 06-10, Fax: +49 30 2593 0629 [email protected] Avenue des Gaulois, 7 1040 Brussels, Belgium Tel: + 32 (2) 732 2009, Fax: + 32 (2) 732 0471 [email protected] 64-66 Rue de Lausanne 1202 Geneva, Switzerland Tel: +41 22 738 0481, Fax: +41 22 738 1791 [email protected] 2-12 Pentonville Road, 2nd Floor London N1 9HF, UK Tel: +44 20 7713 1995, Fax: +44 20 7713 1800 [email protected] 27 Rue de Lisbonne 75008 Paris, France Tel: +33 (1)43 59 55 35, Fax: +33 (1) 43 59 55 22 [email protected] 1630 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 500 Washington, DC 20009 USA Tel: +1 202 612 4321, Fax: +1 202 612 4333 [email protected] Web Site Address: http://www.hrw.org July 2009 1-56432-508-3 Selling Justice Short Why Accountability Matters for Peace I. Overview ......................................................................................................................... 1 II. State of the Law ............................................................................................................10 A. The obligation in international law to prosecute serious international crimes ............ 10 B. No amnesty for the most serious crimes .................................................................... 14 Part One: In the Heat of the Moment: Justice Issues during Peace Talks III. Marginalization ........................................................................................................... 18 A. Charles Taylor ........................................................................................................... 20 B. Radovan Karadzic ...................................................................................................... 25 C. Lord’s Resistance Army ............................................................................................. 28 IV. The Price of Inclusion .................................................................................................. 35 A. Afghanistan ............................................................................................................... 35 B. Democratic Republic of Congo .................................................................................. 43 1. Incorporating abusers in the transitional government .......................................... 45 2. New armed groups want official appointments ................................................... 46 3. Repeat offenders, contrasting fortunes – Laurent Nkunda and Bosco Ntaganda . 50 C. Bosnia and Herzegovina ............................................................................................ 54 V. Explicit and Implicit Amnesties in Peace Agreements .................................................... 57 A. Sierra Leone .............................................................................................................. 57 B. Angola ....................................................................................................................... 61 1. The Bicesse Accords ........................................................................................... 62 2. The next war and the Lusaka Protocol ................................................................. 64 3. The final phase of conflict ................................................................................... 66 C. Sudan ....................................................................................................................... 68 1. North-south conflict ............................................................................................ 68 2. Darfur ................................................................................................................. 70 3. Naivasha peace talks ........................................................................................... 72 4. Ongoing impunity ................................................................................................ 73 Part Two: Long-Term Impact VI. Renewed Cycles of Violence ......................................................................................... 75 A. Kenya ........................................................................................................................ 77 B. Rwanda .................................................................................................................... 82 C. Burundi .................................................................................................................... 86 VII. Strengthening the Rule of Law: Enhanced Domestic Criminal Enforcement .................. 93 A. Ad hoc tribunals ....................................................................................................... 93 1. Bosnia and Herzegovina ..................................................................................... 94 2. Serbia ................................................................................................................. 96 3. Croatia ................................................................................................................ 98 4. Rwanda .............................................................................................................. 99 B. International Criminal Court ..................................................................................... 100 1. Uganda .............................................................................................................. 101 2. Democratic Republic of Congo ........................................................................... 101 3. Sudan ................................................................................................................ 102 4. Central African Republic .................................................................................... 104 5. Situations under analysis: Kenya and Colombia ................................................. 105 C. Universal Jurisdiction ............................................................................................... 108 1. Chile .................................................................................................................. 109 2. Argentina ........................................................................................................... 112 VIII. Protection against Revisionism ................................................................................ 117 A. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ......................................... 117 1. Milosevic trial .................................................................................................... 118 2. Srebrenica ......................................................................................................... 120 IX. Deterrence ................................................................................................................. 123 A. Afghanistan ............................................................................................................. 123 B. Côte d’Ivoire ............................................................................................................ 124 C. Democratic Republic of Congo ................................................................................. 125 D. Central African Republic .......................................................................................... 126 Acknowledgments .......................................................................................................... 128 I. Overview The long-running debate about whether seeking justice for grave international crimes interferes with prospects for peace has intensified as the possibility of national leaders being brought to trial for human rights violations becomes more likely. The International Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague, which is mandated to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, has already issued its first arrest warrant for a sitting head of state—Sudan’s president Omar al-Bashir. That the ICC operates while armed conflicts are ongoing fuels the justice and peace debate. The temptation to suspend justice in exchange for promises to end a conflict has already arisen with respect to the ICC’s work in Darfur and Uganda, and threatens to recur in coming years as parties and mediators struggle to negotiate peace deals. With the functioning of international criminal courts, national tribunals, and, increasingly, trials abroad, the context of amnesty discussions is already very different from several years ago. It is now generally recognized that international law obligates countries to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. International tribunals and national courts applying universal jurisdiction are likely to reject de jure amnesties for the most serious human rights abuses. The trials of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic and Liberia’s Charles Taylor demonstrate that insulation from prosecution is no longer a certainty for former heads of state. The expectations of victims for justice have changed in this evolving context.1 At the same time, some diplomats tasked with negotiating peace agreements have argued that the prospect of prosecution by the ICC