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Home , Ecuador, Peru, Spanish Council of State

Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution The Case of and Per u

Beth A. Simmons

United States Institute of Pea c e Peaceworks No. 27. First published 199 9 .

The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect views of the Institute of Peace

UNI T E D STA T E S INS T I T U T EO F PEA C E 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20036-3011

Phone: 202-457-1700 Fax: 202-429-6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.usip.org Co n t e n t s

Key Points v Map vii Foreword ix

1. Introduction 1

2. Territorial Conflicts in America 4

3. Ecuador and : The Search for a Solution 10 ◗ Background ◗ The1995 Border War and Its Diplomatic Aftermath ◗ What Were the Remaining Impasses? ◗ Contributing Factors to a Solution

4. Conclusion 20 Appendix: The Rio Protocol 25 Notes 29 About the Author 35 About the Institute 37

Key Poi n t s

◗ The Peru- E c u ador case is the Wes t ern Hemi s ph ere’s only territorial dispute in whi ch dea dly conf l i ct has brok en out repea t edly since War II. Most recent ly, in early 19 9 5 ,t he two nations fou ght an intense nineteen- d ay war along a forty- n i n e - m i l e un dem a rc a t ed section of th eir border. The 1998 agreement between the two cou n tries that settles the remaining issues in their border dispute provides a sh a rp contras t to the persi s tent rival ry between two cou n trie s with a history of wa r and seemi n gly perpetual border skirmi s h e s .

◗ More than in other areas of the world ,b disputes in the Wes tern Hemi s ph ere have been subj ect to formal legal and qua s i - l e gal proces s e s ,su ch as adju d i c a ti on and arbi tra ti on ,in whi ch the disputing cou n tries request a neutral third party to make an auth ori t a tive ruling res o l ving the territ orial que s ti on .Th ere have been twenty - two such cases of lega lly binding third- p a r ty rul i n gs on conte s ted territorial sover- eign ty in Latin Ameri c a .Com p a re these num bers to one small case in conti n en t a l ;t wo among the independent states of Afri c a ;t wo in the Mid dle East; an d th r ee in Asi a ,the Far East, and the Paci f i c .

◗ The Ecuador-P eru border dispute has also included exten s i ve third- p a rty involve- m en t ,i n cluding that provid ed under the 1942 Rio Protoco l ,a trea ty fram ework that ende d the 1941 war between the two cou n tri e s . Soon therea f ter, however ,Ec u adora n le aders cla i m ed that geographical informa ti on that had come to their attenti on after the signing of the Rio Protocol rendered the agreement inval i d .T he 1995 border war led to some cha n ges that bol s tered the pros p ects for a res o luti on :E c u ador’s mil- it a ry made a strong showin g, while Peru’s leaders rea l i zed their cou n try ’s flaggin g economy could not sustain similar future enga gem en t s .

◗ The Rio Prot ocol repres ents a special meth od of th i rd - p a rty dispute sett l em en t . The trea ty ’s provis i ons were overseen by four “Gua ra n tor ”s t a tes (Argen ti n a ,Bra z i l , Chi l e ,a nd the Uni ted States — f our of the most powerful cou n trie s in the region ) . The Gua ra n tors are legally obli ga ted to medi a te—and pos s i bly arbitra te ,wh i ch th ey eventu a lly did for two major remaining impasses—all aspects of the Ecuador- Peru border dispute.As such , the Rio Protocol exemplifies not only the vari ety of in tern a ti onal dispute- s et t l em ent mecha n i s m s ,b ut the power of in tern a ti o nal law th ro u gh the obs erva n ce of trea ty obli ga ti on s .

◗ Several factors contri buted to favorab le pros pects for a sett l em en t of this border dis- pute :com m i tm ent by the pol i tical leadership in both Ecuador and Peru,a cha n ge in popular attitu des in both cou n tri e s , and the role played by the four Gua ra n tor na ti o ns under the Rio Protoco l . v vi Keypoints

◗ The Gua ra n tor states’ in terest in res o lv ing this conf l i ct ,a m ong other rea s on s ,was to help fos ter the region’s econo mic and trade integrati on . Both Ecuador and Peru ,a s well as the Gua ra n to r states ,re cogni zed the adverse effect s of the dispute on the developm ent of regional trade.

◗ The Ecuador-P eru dispute also illus tra tes how conf l i ct can lead to increa s ed pur- chases of advan ced wea pons and the corres po nding opportun i ty cost to econom i c developm ent for the parties to the dispute. Settling eli m i n a tes a key irrit a n t to rela ti on s ,t h o u gh it is not a guaran tee of pos i tive future rela ti on s .O n ce res o luti on has been reach ed ,t he portion of mi l i t a ry expen d i tu res that previo u s ly went towa rd defending the disputed territory can be used for econo mic developm ent or soci a l pu rpo s e s .

◗ Given that res o luti on of such conf l i cts often involves highly sens i tive issues wit h st rong conn ecti ons to notions of na ti onalism and national identi ty, the involvem en t of a third party does not guaran t ee res o luti on or comp l i a n ce .The Uni ted States and the other Gua ra n t or nation s had a stake in seeing the Peru- E c u ad or dispute res o lved to promo te regional pol i tical harmony and econom ic and trade integrati on , and to decrease the likeli h ood of a regional competi ti on for advan c ed wea pon s . Area of Detail

Source: Gary S. Elbow, “Territorial Loss and National Image: The Case of Ecuador,” 1996 Yearbook, Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers. Vol. 22, pp. 93–105. Reprinted with permission. vi i

Forewo rd

fter nearly six decades of sporadic warfa re over a rela ti vely small stretch of di s- puted border, Ec u a dor and Peru signed an accord on October 26, 1 9 9 8 ,t h a t Aprovides a defi n i tive sett l em en t of the remaining issues in their ong oing border conf l i ct .T he accord may not spell the end to future territorial disputes in the region ,but it is historic in that it involv es many actors working over many decades to achi eve a set- tl em ent to a long-standing dispute.In this Pea ceworks , Beth Sim m ons expert ly sum m a- riz es not only the history of this dispute,b ut also the principal instituti onal mecha n i s m s in the interna ti onal realm that are avai l a ble to help res o lve such interst a te conf l i cts over di s p u ted territ ory. When natio ns cl a s h ,i n terna ti onal soci et y fortun a t ely provides them with a vari ety of al tern a tive ways to settle their disputes short of wa r. However, cou n tries are often less am en a b le to res o lving disputes with such pacific means when it comes to issues as frau gh t with national passions as territorial borders. Even as recent ly as four yea rs ago, Ec u ad or and Peru renew ed a war they origi n a lly fou ght in 1941 over a long - d i s p uted border. For nineteen days in Janu a ry 1995, these two La Amer ican nations waged an intense border war that involv ed five thousand troops and all bran ches of both cou n tri e s’ arm ed forces .M oreover, the rela t ively brief border conf l i ct gave both cou n tr ies new rea s o ns to repl en ish and upgrade their arsen a l s , as both Ecuador and Peru announced plans to equip their air forces with sophi s ti c a t ed jet fi gh ters . As Sim m on s explains in this Peac eworks ,t he one compon ent of in tern a ti onal legal mach i n ery that helpe d prevent the conf l i ct from escalating and provided a supporti n g mechanism for the warring cou n tries to settle all the issues in their dispute was the 1942 Rio Protoco l ,a trea ty fram e work for third- p a rty dispute sett l em ent of the issue s surr ounding the 1941 war. Sim m on s ,a profes s or of pol i tical science at the Univers i ty of Cal i forn i a ,Ber keley,is an expert on the pol i tical and interna ti o nal legal dimens i ons of border conf l i ct s .Du ring her Jenn i n gs Ran do l ph Program fellow ship here at the Ins ti tute , Profes s or Sim m ons conti nu ed her work on a comp i l a ti on and analysis of border conf l i ct s around the world .She selected for this Peac eworks the Ecuador-Pe ru border conf l i ct as one of a series of case studies in the vari ety of in tern a ti onal third- p a r ty dispute res o luti on mech a n i s m s . Over a period of decade s ,b oth Ecuador and Peru have res orted to a ran ge of th i rd - pa r ty involvem en t to settle their border conf l i ct .W hile they did not meet a May 30, 19 9 8 deadline to rea ch agreeme nt on all of the outstanding issue s , the process crea ted under the Rio Protocol at least kept the disputing nations enga ge d in the process of trying to sett l e the remaining issue s .Su cc ess came a rela tively brief five months later in the form of an ix x Foreword

arbi tra ti on deci s i on rendere d by the “Gua ra n to rs”—the regio nal powers overseei ng the protoco l ’s executi on . The Ins ti tute’s special interest focuses on the role of the Gua ra n tors — Ar gen ti n a ,Bra z i l , Chi l e ,a nd the Uni ted States .I n examining the protoco l ,Profe s s or Sim m ons illus tra tes the power of in tern a ti onal law in trea ties and the legal principles that serve as their fou n d a- tion .In deed , the trea ty fram ework is noteworthy for the cond i ti ons it places not only on the disputing cou n tri e s ,b ut also on the Gua ra n t ors thems elve s :Un der the protoco l ’s pro- vis i on s , the Gua ra n tors were trea ty - bound to medi a te and pos s i bly arbitra te — wh i ch ,i n the end , the parties did res ort to— a ll aspects of the dispute to the best of th eir abil i ty. Several factors contri buted to favorable pros pects for a sett l em en t of this border dis- pute :com m i tm ent by the pol i tical leadership in both Ecuador and Peru,a cha n ge in pop- ular attitu des in both cou n tri e s , and the role played by the four Gua ra n tor nations under the Rio Protoco l .N everth el e s s ,t h ere are also some serious res erva ti ons about calling the trea ty fram ework a total succe s s .Af t er all, the parties had been trying to settle this dispute un der the Rio Protocol for more than a half-centu ry. Ec u ador ’s earli er rejecti on of th e protoco l ’s basis—poin ting to new geographic al informa ti on that was unknown at the time of the protoco l ’s signing and also to the fact that it signed the trea ty after its defeat in the 1941 war—proba bl y served as the most formi d a ble obs t acl e . Yet circu m s t a n ces cha n ge ,as Sim m ons points out, and new rea l i ties crea t ed a new nego ti a ting environ m en t :T he Fuj i m ori governm e nt in Peru faced a poor economy and few res o u rces to devote to similar military enga gem ents in the future .E c u ador ’s stronger sh owing in the 1995 war meant that any conce s s i on s it made would no longer be seen as coerced.The se new rea l i ties provided the impetus for both cou n t ries to press for the May deadline and, eventu a ll y, an October agreemen t . The instituti on a l i z a ti on of such dispute- re s o luti on mechanisms raises some issues for U.S .for eign policy towa rd Latin Ameri c a .The growing economic integrati on between North and South Amer ica holds the promise that the conti n ent will find a recou rse to these more instituti on a l i zed means of di s p u te sett l em en t , not only over trade and finan- cial issue s ,b ut also over more difficult issues such as disputed territori al sovereign ty.To be sure ,the of the Area ,s l a ted to be establi s h ed and extend the benef i t s of fr ee trade throu gh o ut the Wes te rn Hemi s ph ere by 2005, is premi s ed on the openness of borders among all its nation s . Add i ti on a lly, as Profes s or Sim m ons asks, can the succes s of the Uni ted States in the gu a ra n tor process serve as a model for res o lving conf l i cts on other conti n ents? As she points out,the circu m s t a n c es that led to success in the Ecuador-P eru case may be difficult to repl i c a te in other disputes . This work fits into the Ins ti tute’s broader interests in the res o luti on of in ters t a te con- fl i ct s .The Ins ti tute has just approved a grant to the Inter- Am er ican Dia l o gue for a com- prehen s ive exa m i n a ti on of eight to ten of the most poten ti a lly dangerous past disputes in the Wes tern Hemi s ph ere . The Ins ti t ute is also publishing a paper on the diploma tic dy- namics of the Ecuador-Peru conf l i ct by Lui gi Ein a u d i ,U . S .s pecial envoy to the Ecuador- Peru peace proces s .T he paper will appear as a cha pt er in a book on the management of comp l ex interna ti o nal medi a ti on ,ed i ted by Che s ter A.C rocker, Fen Osler Ham p s on ,a n d Pam ela Aall ,to be publi s h ed by the Ins ti tute’s Press later this yea r. Bas ed on these effort s Foreword xi

and other work of the U.S .In s ti t ute of Peace , the Ins ti tute is develo ping conf l i ct res o luti on training programs with the Organ i z a ti on of American States and other orga n i z a ti ons that will draw on the Ecuador-P eru experi en ce . The Ins ti tute has exa m i n ed other sources of conf l i ct in Latin Ameri c a ,ra n g ing from Cynthia McCl i n tock’s exa m i n a ti on of gu erri lla insur gencies in and Peru in her Revolu ti o n a ry Moveme nts in Latin Ameri c a , recent ly publi s h ed by USIP Pres s ,to Wendy Hun ter ’s look at the cha n g ing of civi l - m i l i t a ry rela ti ons on the conti n ent in her Sta te and Sold i er in Lat in Ame rica: Redefining the Mil i t a ry ’s Role in Argen ti n a ,B ra z i l ,a n d Ch i l e (Pe aceworks No. 1 0 ,O ctober 1996). In this tim ely Pea ceworks , Beth Sim m on s helps shed light on the source of some of La tin Ameri c a’s more prot racted conf l i ct s ,a s well as on the interna ti onal legal machi n ery at these cou n tri e s’ di s posal to help res o lve these border disputes .In so doin g, she has con- tributed to the significant body of li tera tu re that will obvio u s ly become more importa n t to U.S .forei gn pol i c ym a ke rs as the growing interdependen ce of regional markets draws the two conti n ents even clo s er.

RIC H A R D H.S OLO M O N PRE S I D E N T UNI T E D STATE S INS T I T U T EO F PEAC E

On e

In t ro d u c t i o n

s a region ,L a tin America has enj oyed rela tive pol i tical and economic succe s s over the last decade .The pos t – Cold War period has seen the ameli ora ti on of ide- Aol og ical conf l i ct throu gh o ut the region that exac ted a high human and econom- ic toll from the 1950s to the pres ent deca de.Vi rtu a lly every cou n t ry in the region is under some form of civili an and more or less democ ra tic rul e .Ac r oss the conti n en t ,t h ere are few if any flash points of in tern a ti onal conf l i ct . The one issue - a rea that has recent ly con- tributed to militarized vio l en ce between cou n tries in the region is a small num ber of un re s o lved territ orial disputes (see table 1). His tori c a lly, di s a gree ments over sovereign cont rol of territory have cost the region dea rl y in both human and economic terms .Y et significant progress has been made in res o lv ing Latin Ame rican border disputes in recent yea rs .In 1984, Argen tina and Chi l e set t l ed the Bea g le Cha n n el dispute,a s well as a num ber of sm a ll er border disputes in the 19 9 0 s ,i n cluding the Laguna del Des i erto sett l em e nt throu gh arbitra ti on in 1994; th ey are now in the rati f i c a ti on stage of an agreement on the Ice Fields in south ern Pat a gon i a . In 1992, El Salvador and Hondu ras sett l ed a centu ry - l o ng disagreement over adjac ent territ ory (with the exception of one small segment) throu gh the Intern a ti o nal Cou rt of Jus ti ce (ICJ). At the close of the twenti eth centu ry — well after more than a centu ry of ter- rit orial disputes ,b order skirmi s h e s , and full-scale wars— qu e s ti o ns of territorial sover- eign ty are eit h er largely latent or within sight of res o luti on throu gh o ut Latin Ameri c a . Former Peruvian foreign Fran c i s co Tudela ent hu s i a s ti c a lly comm en ted on the trend :“O n ce we are throu gh with these problem s ,L a tin Amer ica will have no inherent conf l i ct .” 1 While such an assessment may be overly optim i s ti c ,it is fair to say that a very sm a ll num ber of territorial disputes conti nues to plague the region . However, these dis- putes cons ti tu te one of the few interna ti onal points of conten ti on with the poten tial to erupt into mass vio l en ce at the regional level. Des p i te their pol i tical sens i tivi ty, these issues are often well served by interna ti o nal legal mech a n i s m s .Con tra ry to the notion of in tern a ti onal law as ineffe ctive in the absence of a supra n a ti onal cou rt whose deci s i ons can be enfo rced throu gh punishments that pierce the shield of sov ereign ty, border disputes offer an excellent way of surv eying not only the vari ety of such mecha n i s m s — ra n ging from deci s i on s of the ICJ to the qua s i - ju d i c i a l met h ods exa m i n ed in this study — but also why states adh ere to the interna ti o nal legal principles that suppor t them. This essay looks speci f i c a lly at the border conf l i ct between Peru and Ecuador. It is the only such case on the conti n ent over whi ch deadly conf l i ct has brok en out repea tedly si n ce World War II and—des p i te the recent arbitra t ed sett l em ent to res o lve the outs t a n d- ing issues in the dispute—has the poten t ial to do so agai n .T he parties have recent ly con- cluded a sett l em ent that is the culmination of an instituti on a l i z ed process involving fou r 1 2 Introduction

Table 1: Unresolved Territorial Boundaries in *

Bo r d e rS e g m e n tS t a t u s El Salvador/ Small segment undecided by the 1994 ICJ ruling In d e f i n i t e Ec u a d o r / P e r u Guepi-Lagartococha rivers segment Se t t l e d Yaupi- rivers segment del segment Br a z i l / U r u g u a y Isla Brasilera Di s p u t e d Arroyo de la Invernada segment Gu y a n a / S u r i n a m e“ New River Triangle” segment Di s p u t e d Gu y a n a / V e n e z u e l aE ntire boundary Di s p u t e d / Litani River segment Di s p u t e d Br a z i l / P a r a g u a yG uaira Falls segment† Se t t l e d Ar g e n t i n a / C h i l e “Ice Fields” segment‡ In d e f i n i t e

* Land boundaries or boundary segments in Latin America that the U.S. State Department considers to be in dispute or indefinite as of March 1999. The official position of the Guatemalan government is that it has a dispute over its poorly demarcated boundary with , but the State Department does not list this as a dispute. † The official position of the Brazilian government is that it has solved all of the disputes with its neighbors, but its maps still seem to show boundaries with which its neighbors disagree. ‡ Awaiting ratification by the Argentine .

regional “Gua ra n tor ”p owers (Argen ti n a ,Bra z i l ,Ch i l e , and the Uni te d States ) .Si gn i f i c a n t progress on a sett l em ent was evident at the beginning of 1998 with the accepta n ce by bot h Ec u ad or and Peru of a negoti a ting schedule and the establi s h m ent of four bil a teral techn i- cal comm i s s i ons cha r g ed with add ressing naviga ti on ,i n tegra ti on ,con f i den ce bui l d i n g, an d ,mo st cruc i a lly, border dema rc a ti on in the disputed . 2 What factors contri buted to succes s in res o lving these issues? What cha ll en ges remain? How important has Uni ted St a tes partic i p a ti on been in contri buting to the peaceful res o luti on of this border conf l i ct ? What lesson s ,i f any, mi g ht be appl i c a ble to other region s of the world? These are the main que s ti ons this study attempts to answer. The will i n gness of Peru and Ecuador to discuss and settle the sub s t a n ce of th eir territo- rial dispute marks an important turning point in a long history of tense bil a tera l rela ti on s . As the history of such disputes in Latin America will attes t , the res o luti on of conf l i cti n g territ orial claims often involves highly sens i t ive issues with strong conn ecti ons to notion s of na ti onalism and natio nal identi ty. While there may be good rea s ons to res o lve border di s p ut e s ,t h ere are also often strong emo ti on - b a s ed pol i tical barriers to doing so. For this rea s on , border sett l em ents throu gh o ut Latin America oft en have taken decades or more to craft and implemen t .Di s c u s s i ons can move glac i a lly. Agreement can be elus ive ;ra ti f i c a- tion of in tern a ti onal agreements highly conten ti o u s .I n some cases, peac eful discussions hav e been preceded by full- f l ed ged war; els ewh e re threats of mi l i t a ry conf ron t a ti on or mi- nor border clashes have punctua t ed diploma tic talks. Nonet h el e s s , the res o luti on of border uncerta i n ty is important for a num ber of rea s on s .F i rs t ,u n re s o lved territorial disputes are an invit a ti on to cros s - bo rder vio l en ce . Introduction 3

Uncert a i n ty oft en enco u ra ges mutua lly suspicious governm ents to fortify or otherwis e mi l i t a ri ze the disputed region ,c re a ting opportun i ties for armed skirmishes and wider, more lethal conf ron t a ti on s .Un re s o lved borders provide a pretense for force concen tra- tions whi ch — i n ten ded or not—can result in vio l ent cla s h e s .Th ro u gh o ut history, terri- torial disputes have contri b uted to vio l e nt interst a te conf l i ct worldwi de and conti nue to be a prim a ry cause of the kind of regional instabil i ty that has manifes ted itself in the pos t – Cold War period . 3 Settling disputed borders on a mutua lly accepta bl e basis remove s an important irritant to rela ti on s ,t h o u gh it is of cou rse hardly a guaran t ee of ha rm on i o u s rela ti on s . Border sett l em e nt is therefore usua lly important for providing the secu ri ty govern- me nts requi re as a precond i ti on to divert a portion of th ei r military expen d i tu res from the task of defending a disputed border to economic and social developm en t ,as Peruvia n pres i dent Alberto Fuj i m ori himselfhas oft en noted. Persuad ed by their military establi s h- men t s ,g overnm e nts may spend more to protect their claims to a conte s ted border th ro u gh arms than to develop the underlying value of the land.4 Fi n a lly, cle a rly defi n ed juri s d i cti on over borders is a precond i ti on of in tern a ti o nal eco- nomic discou rs e and integrati on .Di s p uted borders act as barriers to bil a t eral and even mul ti l a te ral economic rela ti on s .Mut ua lly accepted borders are crucial in providing the conf i den ce that inves to rs need to make physical inves tm ents in fronti er region s , in provid- ing the certa i n ty that exporters need to establish cros s - border trade, and even in provid i n g the conf i den ce governm e nts need to invest in econom i c a lly product ive infras tru ctu re (as oppos ed to military installa ti ons) along and across the border region .Overa ll ,mu tua lly accepted borders are important in providing the certa i n ty neces s a ry for inves tm ent and economic growth . For all these rea s ons—the direct human costs of vio l ent conf l i ct ,t he diversi on of re- so u rce s from social developm en t to military uses, and missed opportun i ties for exp a n ded trade and inves tm en t — a rrivi ng at mutua lly accepta ble solutions to current ly disputed in- terna ti onal bou n d a ries should be an important priori ty for the interna ti onal commu n i ty. The recent dispute betwe en Ecuador and Peru is a sharp remi n d er of the costs of such fes- tering uncerta i n ty. The foll owi ng section places this case in historical contex t ,and exa m- ines major trends in territ orial disputes and their sett l em ent in Latin Ameri c a . Two

Te rritorial Conflicts in Latin Am e r i c a

ea rl y every border in Latin America has been disputed at some point in its history.5 Most of these claims date back to the col oni al era,re su l ting from the uncerta i n ty Nin the col onial adm i n i s tra tive bou n d a ries and lack of in form a ti on about the conti n en t’s geography. In the early nineteenth centu ry , it was hardly crucial where these lines fell exact ly, si n ce they usua lly passed throu gh sparsely popu l a ted jun gle or moun- tainous areas that were largely unexp l ored and practic a lly beyond col o nial adm i n i s tra t ive contro l .Si n ce most of these areas were under the domain of the Spanish Crown,t h ere was little rea s on to underta ke precise border deli n e a ti on on the conti n en t . 6 Upon independen ce , most of the emer ging states in the region accepted the prin c i p l e of uti pos sed eti s , whi ch provides that newly decol on i ze d states should inherit the col on i a l adm i n i s tra tive borders that they held at the time of in depe nden ce . 7 However, th ere was di s a greem ent over what cons ti tuted eviden ce of such “pos s e s s i on .” According to one view, only Spanish legal docu m ents could define borders (u ti pos sed etis juris ) ; but another view pos i te d that lands actua lly held at the time of in depen den ce were the basis for conti nu ed pos s e s s i on (u ti pos sed et is facto) . For exa m p l e , cla i m ed large stretches of land beyond the borders that were stip u l a ted in trea ties betwe en and Portuga l ,s i m p ly because it had claim to their “contro l .” 8 For these rea s on s ,m o s t , but by no means all,b orders in Latin Amer ica have been dis- puted at one point or another (see table 2). The few bou n d a ries that appa ren t ly never have been disputed oft en involve cou n tries that were very unevenly matched in terms of st a n d a rd measures of power at the tim e ,su ch as popu l a ti on and military person n el and expen d i tu re s .In highly conten tious border disputes ,re s o luti on has often taken decade s , in some cases more than a centu ry . Some territorial disputes were artic u l a ted only many yea rs after independen ce , and after furth er exp l ora ti on , as well as an initial period of st a te cons o l i d a ti on—a fact that should be kept in mind when making comp a ri s ons to Afri c a and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Uni on . A num ber of these disputes involve military cla s h e s ,ev en full- f l ed ged war, th o u gh this met h od of res o l ving uncertain borders was much more comm on in the nineteenth cen- tury than in the twenti et h .P eru and Col om bia fou g ht vic i o u s ly over their borders early in the nineteenth centu ry .The (1879–83) resu l ted in the tran s f er of Bo- li vian territory to Ch i l e ,i n cluding the port of Antof a ga s t a ,t h ereby depriving Bol ivi a of access to the Pacific Ocea n .Vi ct ors in the War of the Triple Alli a n ce (1865–70) tran s- ferred significant portions of Para g u ay ’s territory to Braz i l .I n this centu ry, the Chaco War (1932–35) over the vast grazing lands between Para g u ay and Bol ivia cost a qua rter of a mi ll i on lives ,w hile Ecuador and Peru fou ght a border war in 1941 that resu l ted in the ter- rit orial agreement Ecuador disputed for more than half a centu ry. 4 Territorial Conflicts in Latin America 5

Table 2: Status of Latin American Borders (by category of dispute settlement)*

1. Cases of no dispute

Ar g e n t i n a / U r u g u a y Br a z i l / G u y a n a Be l i z e / M e x i c o El Salvador/ Br a z i l / V e n e z u e l a

2. Disputes settled/handled through negotiation

Argentina/ 18 7 2 – 1 9 2 5 Gu y a n a / S u r i n a m e1 9 7 5 – 1 9 9 5 Ar g e n t i n a / U K1 8 2 0 – 1 9 9 5 Be l i z e / G u a t e m a l a1 9 3 9 – ? Bo l i v i a / B r a z i l1 8 3 7 – 1 9 2 5 Br a z i l / C o l o m b i a1 8 2 6 – 1 9 3 7 Bo l i v i a / C h i l e1 8 5 8 – 1 9 9 5 Co l o m b i a / E c u a d o r1 8 3 0 – 1 9 1 6 Bo l i v i a / P a r a g u a y1 8 2 5 – 1 9 3 8 Co l o m b i a / N i c a r a g u a1 8 9 0 – p r e s e n t Br a z i l / P a r a g u a y1 8 6 0 s – 1 9 3 2 Co l o m b i a / P e r u1 8 2 2 – 1 9 3 3 Br a z i l / P e r u1 8 2 1 – 1 9 1 3 Dominican Rep./ 18 4 4 – 1 9 3 6 Br a z i l / U r u g u a y1 8 2 5 – 1 9 9 5 Gu a t e m a l a / M e x i c o1 8 4 0 – 1 8 9 5 Co l o m b i a / P a n a m a1 9 0 3 – 1 9 2 4

3. Cases involving authoritative third-party rulings

… in which the parties complied with the ruling: dates of dispute (ruling date) by“ l o s e r ”c o m m e n t s Ar g e n t i n a / B r a z i l1 8 5 8 - 1 8 9 8( 1 8 9 5 )U . S .A r g e n t i n a Ar g e n t i n a / C h i l e1 8 7 2 - 1 9 0 3( 1 8 9 9 )U . S .n ot clear Los Ar g e n t i n a / C h i l e1 8 4 7 - 1 9 6 6( 1 9 6 6 )U KC h i l eP alena sector; 70% to Ar g e n t i n a / C h i l e1 8 4 7 - 1 9 9 4( 1 9 9 4 )r e g i o n a lC h i l e Laguna del Desierto Ar g e n t i n a / P a r a g u a y1 8 4 0 - 1 9 3 9( 1 8 7 8 )U . S .A r g e n t i n a Co l o m b i a / V e n e z u e l a1 8 3 8 - 1 9 3 2(18 91) Sp a i nV e n e z u e l a compliance delayed 25 years El Salvador/Honduras 18 6 1 - 1 9 9 2( 1 9 9 2 )I C J El Salvador 80% to Honduras Gu a t e m a l a / H o n d u r a s1 8 4 2 - 1 9 3 3( 1 9 3 3 )C R / G / U . S .n ot clear (UK)/ 18 8 0 - 1 8 9 9( 1 8 9 9 )U . S .V e n e z u e l a3 4K sq. mi. to UK; 8K to Venezuela Ho n d u r a s / N i c a r a g u a1 8 5 8 - 1 9 6 0( 1 9 6 0 )I C JN i c a r a g u a

… in which the parties did not comply with the ruling: dates of dispute (ruling date): by :r e j e c t e r :c o m m e n t s : Ar g e n t i n a / C h i l e 1847-1984 (1 9 7 7 )U KA r g e n t i n a Beagle Channel, settled 1984. Ar g e n t i n a / C h i l e184 7-1994 (1 9 0 2 )U KC h i l e awards in 4 sectors; 2 rejected Bo l i v i a / P e r u 1825-1911 (1 9 0 9 )A r g .B o l i v i ar esolved by Peru’s concessions Ch i l e / P e r u1 881-1929 (1 9 2 4 )U . S .P e r u re: holding of a plebiscite / 18 4 2 - 1 9 0 0 s( 1 8 8 8 )U . S .N i c a r a g u a Costa Rica/Nicaragua 1842-1900s (1 9 1 6 )C A C JN i c a r a g u ar e: validity of 1888 ruling Costa Rica/ 1903-1944 (1 9 0 0 )F r a n c eC osta Rica originally: Costa Rica and Costa Rica/Panama 1903-1944 (1 9 1 4 )U . S .P a n a m a Ec u a d o r / P e r u1 8 4 2 - 1 9 9 8( 1 9 1 0 )S p a i nE c u a d o rn oncompliance threat deters ruling Ec u a d o r / P e r u1 8 4 2 - 1 9 9 8( 1 9 4 5 )B r a z i lE c u a d o ri nitially accepts; rejects in 1960 Gu y a n a / V e n e z u e l a1 951-present (1899) U. S .V e n e z u e l ar ejects UK/Venezuela arbitration Ho n d u r a s / N i c a r a g u a 1858-1960 (1 9 0 6 )S p a i nN i c a r a g u aN icaragua claimed “null and void”

* Excluding maritime and Antarctic disputes. 6 Territorial Conflicts in Latin America

Govern m ents have a broad ran ge of options in settling mutual dispute s ,i n cluding bi- la te ral diploma tic negoti a ti on s ; the use of a third party’s “good off i ce s” to intercede be- tween parties for whom commu n i c a ti on is difficult; med i a ti on , in whi ch a third party contri butes to dispute sett l em ent by offering conc rete propos a l s ;com m i s s i ons of in qu i ry, whi ch attempt to help res o l ve disputes throu gh providing credi b le informa ti on regard i n g di s p u ted facts ;a nd arbitra ti on and adju d i c a ti on , in whi ch the parties agree to submit their di s p ute to a neutral third party for an auth ori t a tive rul i n g. Bil a teral negoti a ti ons are the most comm on approach to sett l em en t , and are some- times augmen ted by vari ous forms of non - bi nding third party involvem en t .O cc a s i on a lly such efforts produce succes sful sett l em en t s ,as when repres en t a tives of Pope John Paul II med i a ted a solution to Argen t ina and Chi l e’s dispute over the Bea gle Cha n n el in 1984. Of- ten ,h owever, the effort s of th i rd parties are rebuf fed or their proposals rejected .Pri or to the outbreak of the War of the Paci f i c , the Uni ted States tried unsucce s s f u lly to medi a te Bol ivia and Chi l e’s territorial dispute.A num ber of st a tes have offered at vari ous times to med i a te — wi th little suc cess—in Hondu ras and Nic a ra g u a’ s border dispute before that case was sett l ed by the ICJ.9 And in 1965, Britain and Gua temala reque s ted the Uni ted St a t es to medi a te in determining the bou n d a ries of ne wly independent Beli ze ,t h o u gh the two sides ended up rejecting the U.S .propo s a l . Arbitra ti on and adju d i c a ti on differ from medi a ti on and good off i c es in a num ber of crucial res pect s .F i rs t ,a greements that give rise to these procedures genera lly specify that a deci s i on must res pe ct the rule of in tern a ti onal law, making arbitral or judicial awa rds (in th eory) legal rat h er than exp l i c i t ly pol i tical deci s i on s . 10 Second ,a nd most importa n t ,t h e deci s i o ns that result from arbitra ti on and adju d i c a ti on are legally binding (enforce a bi l i ty is another matter altogeth er ) ,t h o u gh the deci s i on to submit to legal processes in the first pl ace is volu n t a ry .Except under unusual circu m s t a n ce s ,the awa rd of a cou rt or an arbitra l tribunal settles the dispute defi n i tively, wit h o ut the right of ap pea l . This effectively means that an agreement to sub mit a dispute to arbitra ti on or interna ti onal adju d i c a ti on rai s e s the stakes for each state by publi cly comm i t ting it to the sett l em ent of the dispute— regardless of the deci s i on . While adju d i c a ti on typi c a lly relies on an interna ti onal cou rt (prin c i p a lly the ICJ), arbi- trati on is largely an ad hoc procedure :The cou n tries invol ved in the dispute agree to sub- mit the issue to a neutral third party— ei t h er an arbitral panel (made up of repres en t a tive s fr om other cou n trie s) or a regio nal power. Because arbitra ti on does not invol ve interna- tio nal cou rts per se, but does result in auth ori t a tive ,l egally binding rul i n gs , it is someti m e s referred to as a qu a s i - judicial form of in tern a ti o nal dispute sett l em en t . That Latin American cou n tries have waged wars over adja cent territory is sadly no sur- pris e , for this has been the case the world over. What is surprising about border disputes in the Wes t ern Hemi s ph e re is the extent to whi ch they have been subj ect to legal proces s e s of arbi tra ti on and adju d i c a ti on , given the pol i tical sens i tivi ty of territorial issues and their centra l i ty to notions of st a te sovereign ty and natio nal identi ty. Table 2 indicates that there have been some twenty - t wo instances of lega lly bin d i n g th i rd - p a rty arbitra ti ons or adju d i c a ti on s with res pect to sovereign ty over territory in Latin Ameri c a . By comp a ri s on , similar rul i n gs apply to only one small case in conti n ental Eu- rope (thirty-six acr es between Belgium and the Neth erl a n d s ) ;t wo among independen t Territorial Conflicts in Latin America 7

st a t es in Af ri c a ;t wo in the Mid dle East; and three in Asi a , the Far East, and the Paci f i c . Certa i n ly, more than any other region on the globe , the Latin Wes tern Hemi s ph ere has a rela t ively strong tradi ti on of using formal legal procedures to res o lve disputes over con- tes ted territory. Arbitra ti on was an especi a lly popular form of di s p u te sett l em e nt in Latin America around and shortly after the turn of the centu ry. 11 Several recent cases indicate conti nu ing interest in this form of di s p ute sett l em en t ,i n cluding El Salvador and Hon- dura s’ s recent use of the ICJ in 1992, and and Argen ti n a’s use of arbi tra ti on to sett l e th eir conte s te d border in the Laguna del Des i erto region in 1994. Cou n tries vary grea t ly in their will i n gness to let third parties deci de issues as importa n t as territorial sovereign ty. In Latin Ameri c a ,s t a tes that are more symm etrical in their mili- ta ry capabil i ties (as measured by total popu l a ti on and, to a lesser exten t ,ra tios of mi l i t a ry person n el) have been more likely to submit a territo rial dispute to arbitra ti on than highly as ym m etric pairs of cou n tri e s ,su gge s ting that arbitra ti on is viewed as useful when it is less certain whi ch side would prevail should the dispute turn vio l en t .Fu rt h erm ore ,co u n- tries that have had a history of di f f i c u l ty getting territo rial agreements rati f i ed by their own national legis l a tu r es also have been more likely to agree to third- p a rty legal rul i n gs . 12 For exa m p l e ,Hon du ras failed to rat ify at least two bou n d a ry conventi ons or dema rc a ti on agreem en ts (1870 and 1889) with Nic a ragua and one arbitral agreeme nt (1920) before agree ing to submit the issue to the ICJ in 1960. Neit h er Bol ivia nor Para g u ay could man- age to ratify a border agreement (four negoti a ted trea ties filed for rati f i c a ti on between 1879 and 1907) before agreeing in 1938 to a comm i s s i on of six regional powers to sett l e the border defi n i tively. Col om bia and Vene z u ela negoti a ted three agreeme nts that failed to be rati f i ed before they agreed to Swiss arbitra ti on in 1916. These cases seem to sugg est that the legal device of binding qua s i - judicial procedures holds an attraction in cases where conti nu ed dome s tic obs tru cti on to border sett l em ent prevents a solution . Prior experi en ce with qua s i - judicial procedures can often lead to their repea ted use in settling border dispute s ,e s peci a lly betw een cou n tries that share long borders.Ar gen ti n a has a long track record with this form of di s p ute sett l em en t ,acco u n ting for seven of th e twen ty - t wo cases in table 2. The Argen ti n e - Chilean arbitra ti on s ,in fact,a ccount for five of these cases, giving these two cou n t ries a long history of experi en ce with formal interna- tio nal qua s i - ad ju d i c a ti on . More than once ,b oth cou n tries have been on the “lo s i n g” end of arbi tr al awa rd s , but have accepted the deci s i ons nonet h el e s s . One cou n try, Hondu ra s , has used arbitra ti on or adju d i c a ti on four times for portions of all three of its interna ti on a l borders, making it the one Latin American state with the most judicial rul i n gs per border- mile (a distin cti on it likely holds worldwi de as well) . Arbitra ti on hardly guaran tees that a border will be defi n i tive ly sett l ed once and for all. Vene z u el a’ s claim to territ ory current ly contro ll ed by Guyan a , and Peru and Ecuador’s lon g - ti me dispute ,a re examples of specific disagreements that have been arbitra ted in the pa s t ,b ut for whi ch compr ehen s ive agreeme nt has been elus iv e (at least until October 26, 1998 in the latter case). Sim i l a rly, arbi tra ti on does not guaran tee comp l i a n ce :Regi on a lly, the num ber of awa rds that have not been comp l i ed with slight ly exceeds the num ber of awa rds that have .O n ly Nic a ragua and Ecuador have failed to comp ly with more than one arbi tral awa rd (in each case, the dispute involved nonc omp l i a n ce with two awa rds wit h the same neigh bor ) . 8 Territorial Conflicts in Latin America

Peru and Ecuador are long - time rivals with a history of wa r; seem i n g ly perpetual bor- der skirmishes with intermi t t ent perio ds of la ten c y; and exten s ive third- p a rty involve- men t ,i n cluding medi a ti on ,g u a ra n tor status , and specific efforts at binding arbitra ti on , none of whi ch resu l t ed in a compreh en s ive border sett l em ent until recent ly. The case thus illu s tra tes many aspects of the dispute sett l em ent process avai l a ble to states ,the endu ri n g succes s of whi ch will be tes ted in the coming yea rs . One of the unique aspects of the Ecuador-Pe ru case is the role of four regio nal pow- ers— Ar gen ti n a ,Bra z i l ,Ch i l e , and the Uni ted States—as legal “Gua ra n t ors” of the bou n d- ary agreement reach ed between the parties in 1942. Gua ra n to rs have been used in a num ber of exp l o s ive or poten ti a lly vio l e nt interna ti o nal conf l i cts in Europe , 13 but this type of th i rd - p a rty involvem ent appea rs in Latin Amer ica only in the case of Ec u ador and Peru’s dispute.I n the Peruvia n - E c u adoran Prot ocol of Peace ,Fri en d s h i p, and Bou n d a ri e s , si gn ed in Rio de Jan ei ro in 1942 (herea f ter, the “Rio Protoco l ” — s ee append i x ) , the fou r regional powers agreed that “Any dou bt or disagreement whi ch may arise in the executi on of this prot ocol shall be sett l ed by the parties . . . with the assistance of the repres en t a tive s of the Uni t ed States ,Ar gen ti n a ,Bra z i l ,and Chi l e” (Arti cle VI I ) . The Rio Protoco l des c ri bes an agreed- u pon borderline (Article VI I I ) ,a ll owing for “reci procal conce s s i on s as [the parties] may cons i der advis a b le in order to adj ust afores a i d line to geographical rea l i ti e s” and providing that “these rectif i c a ti on s shall be made with the coll a bora ti on of repres en t a t ives of the [four Gua ra n tor states ] ”( Arti cle IX). Artic le V pro- vides that the Gua ra n tors should conti nue in this role “un til the defi n i tive dema rc a ti on of the fronti er line [between Peru and Ecuador] .” In short,t he four Gua ra n t ors are legally comm i t ted by an interna ti onal trea ty to ensu re the executi on of the 1942 Rio Protoco l ,a fu n cti on that goes well beyond medi a ti on and gives a certain interna ti on a lly recogni zed le- giti m acy to the agreement whi ch it otherwise might lack. Both Articl es VII and IX imply a pos s i b le arbit rati on role for the Gua ra n tors ,b ut they do not speci f i c a lly mandate one . While guaran t ors ostens i bly take on a legal obli ga ti on to ensu re implemen t a ti on of th e terms of the trea ty, th ere may be cond i ti on s under whi ch they may evade the executi on of a trea ty wit h o ut techn i c a l ly vio l a ting it. Intern a ti on al law texts emph a s i ze that the guaran- teed state must request guaran t ors to render assistance, and that the guaran t ors be able to do so at that tim e .Wh en the guaran te ed state itselfhas not comp l i ed with the previo u s advice of the guaran tors ,s ome legal texts suggest it is no longer the guaran t or’s duty to render assistance. 14 Thus ,w hile third parties acting as guaran t ors may be expected to in- cr ease the cha n c es of trea ty implemen t a ti on ,t his guaran t ee is subj ect to the caveats that reduce the certa i n ty of the guaran te e itself .H owever, the proviso that guaran t ors may refuse assistance if th eir advice has been ignored gives add i ti onal leverage to the third par- ties in the negoti a ti on s .In the case of the Ecuador-Pe ru border dispute,the fact that bot h si de s ,b ut especi a lly Peru,p referred to negoti a te under the auspices of the Gua ra n tors rat h er than wit h o ut them gave the four regio nal powers a measure of in f lu en ce over the di r ection and pace of the talks. The case of Peru and Ecuador illus tra t es just why many of these disputes become vio- lent and seemi n gly intracta bl e .B oth sides (but most notably, Ec u a dor) have at times nur- tured a combi n a ti on of na ti o nal myths and claims regarding the legal i ty or jus tness of th eir pos i ti on s that tap into deeply held notions of na ti onal identi ty.But as these two Territorial Conflicts in Latin America 9

cou n tries have matured as democ rac i e s , the role of pu blic perceptions has become more comp l ex . In Ecuador, an increa s i n gl y independ ent civilian governm e nt must balance an array of econom i c ,po l i ti c a l , and social issues that compete on some level with long - h el d territ orial ambiti on s . In both cou n tri e s , the military has an important stake in the terms of the sett l em en t . As has been the case with many such disputes in the region’s history, a regio nal “th i rd party”( in this case, the Gua ra n tor cou n tries) has faci l i t a ted negoti a ti on s and has assisted the parties in accepting a binding solution . The res o luti on of the long - standing conf l i ct betwe en Ecuador and Peru may go far towa rd cons o l i d a ting democ rac y, sti mu l a ting economic developm en t , and solidifying peace in the region . Thre e

Ecuador and Peru: The Search for a Borde r So l u t i o n

Ba ck g ro u n d

The border dispute betw een Ecuador and Peru had been until recent ly the most persi s ten t and seemi n gly most resistant to res o luti on of any in the Wes tern Hemi s ph ere . The conf l i ct arose virtu a lly at the birt h of these two nations from the .It surv ived World War II, out l a s t ed the Cold War, and most recent ly was the locus of mi l i t a ry conf l i ct between Peruvian and Ecuadoran forces in 1995. Yet the natural res o u rces of the shared Condor ran ge — go l d ,u ra n iu m ,a nd oil — do not appear to be signi f i c a n t ,a n d the territory, es pec i a lly from the Peruvian side,i s difficult to access and has only minimal in f ra s tru ctu re . 15 The 883-mile-long border has been in dispute intermi t ten t ly since Ecuador’s seces s i on fr om Great Col om bia in 1830.16 Sin ce 1884, Peru and Ecuador have been invol ved in at least thirty- four epi s odes of bloody military conf ron t a ti on over sovereign ty in the Ama- zon. 17 Maj or clashes broke out on the border in 1941 and conti nu ed for four mont h s . Peru’s military prevai l ed in that conf ron t a ti on , and in early 1942 the two sides signed the Rio Protoco l , the first mutua lly rati f i ed trea ty in more than a hun d r ed yea rs to attempt to es t a blish the bou n d a ry. 18 That agreement genera lly foll owed what was known as the “St a- tus Quo line of 19 3 6 ,” whi ch both Peru and Ecuador had agreed to, even though it meant a territorial loss to Ecuador of some five thousand squa re miles.19 On Janu a ry 29, 19 4 2 , the governm ents of Braz i l ,Ar gen ti n a ,Ch i l e ,and the Uni ted States also signed the Rio Pro- tocol ,i n d i c a ting their will i n gness to guaran tee its obs erva n ce and executi on . In implemen ting the 1942 Rio Protoco l ,m ore than 95 percent of the border was actu- ally dema rc a ted ,u n der difficult topographic al cond i ti on s ,e xcept for a small section .At six points along the dema rc a ti on of the border, di s a greem en ts were referred to the Gua ra n tor cou n tries and were managed by Braz i l ,a cting as the lead Gua ra n tor. One of the are a s ,i n- cluding the conte s ted Cordi ll era del Condor, was the subj ect of an arbitr al awa rd auth o- rized by the Rio Protocol and rendered by a Brazilian naval off i cer, Captain Braz Dias de Agu i a r, in 1945. Both cou n tries initia lly accepted the awa rd uncond i ti on a lly and the Bin a ti onal Dema rc a ti on Comm i s s i on immedi a tely began to dema rc a te the border on the basis of that rul i n g. Dema rc a ti on might have proceeded smoot h ly had Ecuador not conte s ted what it as- serted was new geographical informa ti on whi ch ,a ccording to off i c i a l s ,h ad come to light as a result of aerial pho togr aph y in 1946. As interpreted by Ecuador, this informa ti on dis- clo s ed a Cenep a River watersh ed far more exten s ive than that implied by the Rio Protoco l . The newly elected governm ent of Ec u a doran pres i de nt used this opportun i ty to halt dema rc a ti on in 1948. In 1960, Ec u ador off i c i a lly decla the awa rd of Braz Dias de Aguiar and the Rio Protocol null and void ,c laiming the latter to be inexecut a ble due 10 to the “new ”geo graphic informa ti on .E c u ador also deni ed the trea ty ’s val i d i ty, ci ti ng its Ecuador and Peru: The Search for a Border Solution 11

im po s i ti on on Ecuador after an armed conf l i ct . 20 Foll owing its rejecti on of the arbitra l awa rd and the proto co l ,E c u ador made a conscious effort over time to link its pos i ti on to analogous cases of arbi tral rejecti on in the region :the Argen tine pos i ti on on the 1977 Bea gle Cha n n el arbitra ti ons and the Vene z u elan pos i ti on on the 1899 Essequi bo deci s i on regarding Guyan a ,for exa m p l e . 21 Peru,w ith the conc u rren ce of the four Gua ra n tors (as spell ed out in a diploma tic note of 9, 19 6 0 ) ,took the pos i ti on that the trea ty could not be unilaterally abrogated .F rom the Peruvian perspective , the 1942 Rio Protoco l “end ed a centu ry - l ong bil a t eral bou n d a ry dispute by defining the border foll ow ing the 1936 deci s i on to decla re the territo rial status quo.” 22 Until negoti a ti ons reopened in 1995, Peru had deni ed that a territorial dispute between the two cou n tries exi s ted . The border has been the site of varying degrees of tens i on for the past four decade s . Des p i te a num ber of cooperative agreements on the use of bin a ti onal river basins and the passage of in d ivi duals and vehi cl es in the 1960s and 1970s, fi gh ting broke out in 1981 (in the “Pa q uisha Inc i den t ”) when Ecuadoran forces attempted to take over three Peru- vian military posts in the Cond or area .B order vio l en ce has been sporadic ever since ,u su- ally peaking around Janu a ry, whi ch coin c i de s with the month that the Rio Protocol was si gn ed . By one cou n t ,con f ron t a ti o ns between the armed forces of the two cou n trie s have occu rred in thirteen of the past eigh t een yea rs since the Paquisha Inc i den t . 23 Des p i te Peru’s proposals to comp l ete dema rc a ti on of the border, no agreeme nt had been pos s i bl e as long as Ecuador rejected the Rio Protocol and Peru insisted on it as the fram ework for a sett l em en t . By the early , pros p ects for settling the border dispute seemed to improve.In Peru,the newly elec ted Fuj i m ori governm ent faced serious economic problem s ,i n clu d i n g cu mu l a ti ve of two milli on percent over the five- y ear cou rse of the previous Gar- cia adm i n i s tra ti on (1985–90), wide s pre ad impoveris h m en t , and conti nuing problems ser- vicing the external debt,a s well as internal unrest fomen ted by the Maoist guerrilla grou p Shining Pat h . 24 Bes et by a num ber of ur gent dome s ti c problem s ,the Fuj i m ori governm ent jud g ed that Peru was in no pos i ti on to fight a border war with its neigh bor. Cons equ en t ly, his adm i n- is tra ti on tried to improve rela ti ons with all of Peru’s neigh bors ,i n cluding Ecuador. In 19 9 1 ,Pre s i dent Fuj i m ori made a state visit to Ecuador, the first ever by a Peruvian chi ef . Sensing an opening to res o lv e the long-standing dispute that yea r, Bol ivi a , Col om bi a , and Vene z u ela offered to medi a te within the fram ework of the Andean Pact. 25 For its part ,E c u ador also propos ed in that year to subm it the whole problem to medi a- tion by Pope John Paul II, who had succe s s f u ll y assisted the Argen tines and Chileans in res o lvi ng their dispute over the Bea gle Cha n n el in the 1980s. However, the re- fu s ed to renego ti a te the Rio Proto col and insisted that, pending dema rc a ti on ,bor der mat- ters be subm i t ted to an expert as provided for in the agreemen t . 26 In 1992, Pres i dent Fuj i m ori wrote a letter to his Ecuadoran cou n terp a rt , Rodri go Borja , proposing to comp l ete the dema rc a ti on of two small sections of the comm on border in excha n ge for an agreemen t to grant naviga ti on rights to and throu gh the Ama zon River, so that Ecuador would have an outl et to the Atl a n t ic Ocea n , in accorda n ce with Article VI of the Rio Protoco l . 27 Peruvian proposals offering the use of port faci l i ties on the Ama zon and its tribut a ries in return for final border dema rc a ti on were reitera ted in various forms 12 Ecuador and Peru: The Search for a Border Solution

during 1992–93, but the Ecuadoran governm ent conti nu ed in its insistence that the Rio Protocol was invalid and dema n ded its revis i on to ensu re Ecuador’s sovereign territori a l access to the Ama zon .Mi n or military clashes broke out near the Sab a n i ll a River in Aug u s t 19 9 3 ,but the dispute rema i n ed stalema ted until vio l ent conf l i ct erupted in early 1995.28

The 1995 Border War and Its Diplomatic Af t e r m at h Mass vio l en ce between Ecuador and Peru, on a scale larger than at any other time this centu ry, fl a red up on Janu a ry 26, 19 9 5 , in the Cenepa Vall ey near the forty- n i n e - m i l e un m a rked stretch of border on the Condor mountain ran ge ,2 20 miles south of Qu i to and 590 miles north of Li m a .F i gh ting was intense around the Tiwintza military base, whi ch both sides cla i m ed to be within their own territory. Alt h o u gh rela tively brief — t h e ma j or outbreak of fi gh ting lasted only nineteen days—the conf l i ct is estim a ted to have re- sul ted in somewh ere between 200 and 1,500 casua l ti e s , the loss of nine aircr aft on the Pe- ruvian side and two on Ecuador’s , and an estim a ted cost to both sides of up to one bill i on doll a rs . 29 Des p i te the war’s brief dura ti on ,its risk of es c a l a ti on was thought to be signi f i- ca n t :I n a matter of days , 5,000 troops had been introduc ed into a fifty- f ive - s qu a re - m i l e are a ;s ix Peruvian divis i ons were depl o yed along the coastal plain, and the equiva l ent of four Ecuadoran brigades were brou ght to the immedi a te front .W ith naval fleets on alert, hi gh - p erforma n ce fighter- bom bers forwa rd - dep l oyed , and armies from both sides en- gaged in combat in the Cenepa region ,e s c a l a ti on seemed a distin ct pos s i bi l i ty in Februa ry 19 9 5 . 30 Ye t both sides were eager to prevent such an outcome .Pre s i dent Fuj i m ori was qui ck to ca ll for a demi l i t a ri zed zone to be moni tored by the Gua ra n t or grou p, as speci f i ed in the Rio Protoco l . 31 Within a mont h , the conf l i ct had been cont a i n ed and agreeme nts were in pl ace for a cea s e - f i re and sepa ra ti on of forces . On Februa ry 17, 1995 the two sides signed the Ita m a ra ty Agreemen t ,wh i ch was drawn up in Brazil by repres en t a tives of the fou r Gua ra n tors .T he agreement did not add r ess territorial issue s ,but only military and cea s e - fi re cond i ti on s .Ob s er vers from the Gua ra n tor nations establi s h ed posts near the conf l i ct zone to verify implemen t a ti on of the cea s e - f i re . While neit h er cou n try had made any territorial gains duri ng the nineteen- d ay conf l i ct , the war and its sub s equ ent fatal skirmishes in March ,M ay, and 1995 had a fu n d a m e ntal impact on the res o luti on of the border dispute. One important cons equ en ce was that it provided an opportun i ty for Ecuador to take a more flexi ble pos i ti on on its th i rty - f ive - y ear oppos i ti on to the Rio Protoco l .By most accou n t s ,t he Ecuadoran military had dealt a tactical blow to Peruvian forces , in sharp contrast to their enga gem en ts in 1941 and 1981. It is widely recogni zed ,h owever, that the long - te rm balance of forces is and will remain in Peru’s favor. This may have provided a win dow of opportun i ty for Ecuador’s le ad ers to make prin c i p l ed rat h er than coerced conce s s i on s .S h ort ly after the ces s a ti on of ho s ti l i ti e s ,E c u adoran officials announced their will i n gn ess to work within the Rio Proto- col ’s fram ework to res o lve the dispute.Ar g u a bly, this step was pol i ti c a lly easier for Pres i- dent Six to Dur á n - Ba llén to take after a rela t ively strong military showin g. 32 If it is true that Ecuadoran leaders in the 1990s have sought ways to extri c a te thems elves from the defiant pos i ti on taken on the Rio Protoco l , the res pect a ble military showing in 1995 gave th em an opportun i ty to make these conce s s i on with their digni ty intact.The accepta n ce Ecuador and Peru: The Search for a Border Solution 13

of the Rio fram ework was a significant conce s s i on that, in turn ,open ed the way for dis- cu s s i on s of the underlying territ orial issue . The conf l i ct led to a second and rela ted cons equ en ce :a far more active involvem e nt in the res o luti on of the dispute on the part of the four Gua ra n tor nation s .Mi l i t a ry repres en- ta tives of the Gua ra n tors were essenti al to implemen ting the cea s e - f i re and sepa ra ti on of forces ,wh i ch would have been extrem ely difficult to achi eve , given the dense terra i n ,t h e hi gh ly comm i n gl ed depl oym en t , and the absence of neutral obs erva ti on ,coo rdi n a ti on , and commu n i c a ti on . 33 Furt h erm ore ,the guaran t or process has been central to re- e s t a b- lishing commu n i c a ti ons between Ecuador and Peru,a t both the military and the diplo- ma tic level. The military chi efs of the four Gua ra n tor cou n tries moni to red a meeting near a border garri s on between high- r anking military officials from Peru and Ecuador in Februa ry 1996—the first time such officials had met face- to - f ace since the conf l i ct broke out in Janu a ry 1995. Also faci l i t a ted by the Gua ra n to rs was a meeting betwe en Ecuador’s foreign mi n i s te r Galo Leoro and his Peruvian cou n terp a rt ,Fra n c i s co Tudel a , in on Janu a ry 17 – 1 8 ,1 9 9 6 ,t he first cont act of this kind in fifty- fo ur yea rs .M eeting again in late Febru- ary, the foreign ministers signed two agreemen t s : The first requi red their governm e nts to list what they regard ed as underlying “sub s t a n t ive impasses” in the peac e process and to deliv er them to the Gua ra n tor nation s . It also laid out a plan for reducti on of forces at the Peruvian PV-2 obs erva ti ons pos t ,wh ere the conf l i ct occu rred ,to be verif i ed by MOMEP (the Peru- E c u ador military obs erva ti on mission) . The second agreement speci f i ed the cre a ti on of a joint military working grou p, whi ch was cha r ged with craf ting a conf i den ce - building “bil a teral mecha n i s m” between the two cou n tries that wou l d ,a m ong other th i n gs ,m a ke future wea pons purchases more tran s p a ren t . 34 Also in the pres en ce of the Gua ra n tors ,the two governm ents signed the San ti a go Agreemen t ,o n October 29, 19 9 6 ,com m i t ting them to add r ess the remaining “i m p a s s e s” surr ounding the dispute. The meeti n gs ,h eld in Brasilia during 1997 and, once aga i n ,a t- tended by repres en t a tives of the Gua ra n tors ,were aimed at a defi n i tive conclu s i on of th e un derlying territ orial dispute,as requi red by the Februa ry 1995 cea s e - f i re agreemen t .Bo t h si de s made major conce s s i ons as precond i ti on s for these talks: They would be condu cted in accorda n ce with the Rio Proto col—a prime Peruvian demand—and with the ackn o wl- edgm en t that a territ orial dispute did in fact exist betw een the two cou n tries—a centra l conce s s i on to the Ecuadoran pos i ti on . 35 This shift signi f i c a n t ly increa s ed commu n i c a ti on s between the two cou n tries on the cent ral territorial issue ,and signa l ed a strong des i re to reach a defi n i tive res o luti on .Su ch a rapproch em ent was achi e ved almost exclus ively in accorda n ce with the Rio Proto col and with sub s t a n tial Gua ra n tor involvem en t . 36 A third cons equ en ce of the recent fighti n g, howe ver, sti ll has ominous implicatio ns for the region :its poten tial for contri buting to a local and even regional arms race,at a tim e when most cou n t ries are attempt ing to cons o l i d a te instituti onal tran s i ti ons to civilian rul e and cha n n el exces s ive military spending towa rd developm ent needs .In the aftermath of the fighti n g, each side cla i m ed a need to rebuild its forces to maintain previous military ca p a bi l i ti e s .I n December 1995, Ec u a dor announced its deci s i on to buy four Kfir fighter- bombers ( ’s versi on of the French Mira ge ) ,de s p i te protests from Peru. 37 Peru,too , began an arms repl acem ent program . On 26, 19 9 6 ,Pre s i dent Fuj i m ori 14 Ecuador and Peru: The Search for a Border Solution

conf i rm ed the purchase of an unspeci f i ed num be r of MiG-29 jet fighters from Bela ru s — the first Soviet - built fighters in any South American cou n try. According to Pres i den t Fuj i m ori ,t he purchase was a “pu rely defens ive measure ,m eant to rees t a blish strategi c equi l i briu m .” 38 Sh ort ly after Pres i dent Fuj i m ori announced the aircraft purcha s e ,s o u rce s in s i de the reported the acqui s i ti on of fou rteen Suk h oi Su-25 grou n d - support aircra ft (and a significant qua n ti ty of soph i s ti c a ted air-to - su rf a ce missiles), whi ch an a lysts agree could condu ct ground assaults while the MiG-29s fly high cover.39 Peru’s prime minister Alberto Pan dolfi deni ed reports of the Su-25 acqui s i ti on and emph a s i zed that the MiG purchase was to repl ace obs o l ete aircraft and those des t royed during the 1995 border war with Ecuador.40 In November 1997, Ec u a doran military officials re- spon ded to Peru’s purchases by saying they were cons i dering the acqui s i ti on of up to 50 U.S . - m ad e F-16 or F-18 planes, also reportedly for purely defens ive purpos e s . 41 The acqui s i ti on of hi gh - tech n o l o gy aircraft like the MiG-29 has highl i gh t ed the prob- lem of a regional arms race igni ted by dispute s ,l i ke the one between Peru and Ecuador, at a time when Cold War conti nue to downs i ze by disposing of th e ir excess aircra f t as profi t a bly as pos s i bl e .M oreover, the border conf l i ct has streng t h en ed the military’s claim for res o u r ces in both Ecuador and Peru,a t a time when new civilian governm ents in both cou n tries have tried to reduce the military’s pol i tical promi n en ce and bud get sh a re .F or exa m p l e , in 1995 the Ecuadoran armed forces were slated to lose their 12–15 percent surtax on foreign oil comp a n i e s’ profi t s .Du r ing the 1995 border war, Ec u ador ’s congr ess res tored the oil surt a x ,wh i ch goes directly into the defense bud get ,for another fi f teen yea rs . 42 To s um m a ri ze ,t he 1995 border war between Ecuador and Peru has had three major cons equ en ces that influen ced the sett l em en t of the border dispute and, more broadly, re- gion al stabil i ty. Fi rs t ,the conf l i ct provided a win d ow of opportun i ty for moderati on on the part of Ec u a dor, whose leaders seemed to recogni ze that the correla ti on of mi l i t a ry and diploma tic forces ,a t least in this case, was not in their long - t erm favor. Secon d ,t h e conf l i ct reactiva ted a concerted interna ti onal effort to res o lve it throu gh the proces s spell ed out in the Rio Protoco l ,a nd with the assistance of the Gua ra n tor cou n tri e s .Th i rd , the conf l i ct has rai s ed the specter of rea rm a m ent and the remi l i t a ri z a ti on of pol i tics in the region ,wit h trou bling cons equ en c es for both secu ri ty and conti nu ed economic and pol i t- ical developm en t .

What Were the Remaining Impasses? The major diploma tic accomp l i s h m e nt in the peac e process was the enum era ti on of a list of “i m p a s s e s” that were ,u n til October 1998, un re s o lv ed demands that had to be add re s s ed for a compreh en s ive border agreement to succee d.A comm i tm ent to crea te a list of im- passes was secu red in Februa ry 1996 and an agreemen t to discuss them was the heart of the October 1996 San ti a go Agreem en t .( See table 3.) Dis c u s s i ons on the list of sub s t a n tive impasses took place in a series of meeti n gs in April ,M ay, and June 1997, with talks to conti n ue until all differenc es were res o lved .In April ,d i s c u s s i ons were held on the first two areas that were suppo s ed to be the easiest: th e Rio Napo and Lagortococha / Gu epi geophysical lines, ar eas close to Col om b ia and distant fr om the site of the undecla r ed war in 1995 (whi ch was add re s s ed in the April and May Ecuador and Peru: The Search for a Border Solution 15

Table 3: Substantive Differences in the Ecuador-Peru Border Dispute*

Ec u a d o r Pe r u 1.P artial inexecutability of the Rio de Janiero Pro- 1. In the Lagartococha sector: tocol due to the absence of a watershed between a.t he source of the Lagartococha-Güepí rivers the Zamora and Santiago Rivers. Free access 2.I n the Cordillera del Cóndor: and Ecuadorean sovereignty to the Marañon- a. between the boundary marker “Cunhuime Am a z o n . Sur,” noted in the Dias de Aguiar Brief (on 2. Boundary demarcation problems: the Cordillera del Cóndor from the point a.t he Cuzumaza-Bambuiza sector along the Zamora-Santiago height of land b.t he Lagartococha-Güepí sector where the spur juts out) and the boundary marker “November 20.” 3.P roblems produced by the intersecting of the b.b etween the boundary marker Cusumasa- rivers by the survey lines [Pastaza, Tigre, and Bumbuisa and the confluence of the Yaupi Curaray rivers]. Problem on the in and Santiago Rivers. the Yasuní-Aguarico sector. 4.T he Zarumilla Canal.

* Republica del Ecuador, Ministerio do Relaciones Exteriores, “Communicado Oficial” signed by Galo Leoro F., Minis- tero Relaciones Exteriores, at 23 Febrero de 1996; signed by , Ministero de Relaciones Exteriores del Peru, at Quito, 6 Marzo 1996. Faxed to the author from the Ecuadoran Embassy in Washington D.C., March 6, 1997. Translation is that of David Scott Palmer, “Missed Opportunities and Misplaced : Continuing Chal- lenges to Multilateral Efforts in the Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict,” Boston University, March 15, 1997, pp. 22–23.

di s c u s s i on s ) .E ach side pres en ted proposals and cou n terpro pos a l s ,w ith the Gua ra n tors making conc i l i a t ory propos a l s . 43 Both Peru and Ecuador brou ght to these negoti a ti on s two fundamental impasses, orig- in a lly pres en ted as virtu a lly non- n ego ti a bl e .F i rs t , Peru insisted on comp l ete dema rc a ti on of the border, as establi s h ed by the Rio Protoco l , while Ecuador conti nu ed to refer to the Protocol as partia lly inexecut a bl e .S econ d ,E c u ador insisted on “fr ee and sovereign”acce s s to the Mara ñ ó n - Am a zon ,whi le Peru offered access throu gh some arran gem ent cons i s ten t with Articl e VI of the Protoco l ,b ut absolutely not on the basis of Ec u ador ’s “territori a l so vereign ty.” 44 In Novemb er 1997, Ec u ador and Peru negoti a te d an agreeme nt crea ting a tim et a ble for add ressing these and rela ted issue s .Si gn ed on Janu a ry 19, 19 9 8 ,the agreement establi s h ed four bin a ti o nal comm i s s i on s — e ach compo s ed of th ree members from Ecuador and three from Peru— to tackle the main areas of conten ti on :com m erce and naviga ti on (on the basis of Article VI of the Rio Protoco l ) ,borde r integrati on ,con f i den ce - building measure s , and on- s i te border dema rc a ti on .The agreement add re s s ed elem en ts that would poten- tia lly form the basis of an eventual res o luti on invol ving border dema rc a ti on (likely along the lines envis a ged by the earli er Brazilian arbitra ti on deci s i on) in return for Ecuadoran access (on some basis short of soverei gn contr ol) to the Ama zon River. The agreemen t ca ll ed for the dema rc a ti on comm i s s i on to be compo s ed of geograph ers and legal expert s cha r ge d with examining and attempti ng to res o lve the outstanding territo rial cla i m s . Ec u ador ’s lead negoti a tor, Ed gar Teran (former ambassador to the Uni ted States ) ,cl a i m ed that the agreement would lead to a “final solution ,” 45 and Foreign Min i s t er Jose Ayal a 16 Ecuador and Peru: The Search for a Border Solution

Lasso termed the agreement “a digni f i ed and rea l i s tic solution that satisfies the legiti m a te na ti onal interes t s” of both cou n tri e s . 46 By Februa ry 1998, it appea red that Ecuador had fi n a lly accepted the border establi s h ed by the 1942 Rio Protoco l , making the cond i ti on s for naviga ti onal access to the Ama zon the only, and most sens i tive , remaining issue . 47 Des p i te a flurry of di p l om a tic activity as the agreemen t’s May 30, 1998 deadl i n e approach ed , the two cou n tries could not agree on the opi n i ons of the comm i s s i ons re- spon s i ble for comm erce and naviga ti on and on- s i te border dema rc a ti on .Non et h el e s s , Pres i dents Ala r con and Fuj i m ori expre s s ed their determi n a ti on to res o lve the rema i n i n g is sues qui ck ly. 48

Contributing Fac t o rs to a Solution Even though the two cou n tries were plagued with conti nuing disagreemen ts over the fun- da m ental aspects of eventu a lly settling the underlying territori al issue ,the pros pe cts for reaching a defi n i tive agreement on their border were proba b ly bette r now than at any time this centu ry. Fi rs t ,t h ere had never been a higher degree of comm i tm e nt demon s tra ted by the pol i ti- cal leadership in each cou n t ry to res o l ve the issue ,evi den ced by the unprecedent ed level of pol i tical cont act and commu n i c a ti on by heads of st a te and their foreign ministrie s .Fu j i- mori ’s 1991 visit to Ecuador, as well as the nonofficial visits to Peru by Ecuadoran pres i- dents Borja and Six to Dur á n - Ba ll é n ,gre a t ly faci l i t a ted rap prochem en t . In Janu a ry 1997, Pres i dent Abdala Buc a r am traveled to Peru for the first official state visit in 170 yea rs . Buc a ra m’s ill- f a ted pres i denc y was especi a lly notable for its conc i l i a to ry approach to Peru.Fr om his inaugurati on speech to his historic vis i t ,Bu c a ram cle a rly subord i n a ted na ti onalist claims to broader concern s .Th ro u gh o ut his brief adm i n i s tra ti on ,Bu c a ra m frequ en t ly sum m on ed populist themes in the cause of settling the border dispute;f or ex- am p l e :“ Bu ll ets cost the same as book s ,a rifle costs the same as a schoo l ; and a war tank costs the same as a universi ty. One prepa r es for vio l en ce ,the other for pea ce and love.” Aston i s h i n gly, he even advoca ted before the Peruvian congress that the two governm en t s seek “forg iveness for the teach i n gs we gave our chi l d ren .” 49 Before members of the Peru- vian medi a ,Bu c a ram distanced himselff r om the “war of the maps”50 and once agai n downp l a yed nationalist theme s :“ [ N ] a ti ons are increa s i n gly less repres en ted by their sym- bol s ;th at is, the flag, coats of arm s ,n a ti onal anthems , and the military marches of ou r arm ed forces .The concept of a nation is increa s i n gly defi n ed by the citizen’s power of determi n a ti on and attitu de s .” 51 Indeed ,“ poverty has no nation a l i ty ” was a slogan used to in tert wi ne the populist with the anti- n a ti onalist theme . 52 was even enl i s ted to cou n t er intran s i gen ce :“ E n dorsing the cause of in tra n s i gen ce at the expe nse of ot h er peo- pl e’s lives is an offen s ive and [unworthy] attitu de from those who do so.”53 Far from the na ti onalism of the past, Buc a ram used the most conc i l i a to ry in recent Ecuado- ran history to des c ri be the need to res o lve the border dispute.His succe s s or abandoned the flowery rhetori c ,b ut conti nu ed to call for “peac e with digni ty ” and an immedi a te res o luti on of the dispute. The comm i tm ent on the part of the pol i tical leadership in both cou n tri es was furth er eviden ced by conti nuous efforts to establish and maintain momen tum on the negoti a ti on s des p i te a num ber of opportun i ties to derail them.For exa m p l e ,whi le tens i ons were Ecuador and Peru: The Search for a Border Solution 17

rek i n dl ed in December 1995, when Ecuador announced its deci s i on to buy Israe li Kfir fi gh ter- bom bers ,Peru did not res po nd with claims of cea s e - f i re agreement vio l a ti on s . Min or border incidents such as those in May 1997, invo lving accu s a ti ons of mi n e - l ayi n g and Peruvian detenti on of Ec u adoran soldiers,were exp l i c i t ly played down by both sides as subord i n a te to res o lvi ng the sub s t a n tive territorial disagreemen t . 54 Contra ry to expect a ti on s of those who beli eve that natio nal leaders have used the bor- der issue to divert attenti on from dome s tic pol i tical and economic probl em s ,i n terna l crises in both cou n tries failed to undermine discussions to res o lve the border.55 Peru’s De- cember 1996–Mar ch 1997 hostage crisis in the Japanese emb a s s y, in whi ch Foreign Min i s- ter Tudela himself was held captive for the dura ti on ,on ly brief ly delayed discussion of th e sub s t a n tive issue s .E ven more surpri s i n gly, pol i ticians in Ecuador refu s ed to seize on the economic cha o s ,po l i tical unres t , and instituti onal crisis that brou ght down Pres i dent Bu- ca ram in Februa ry 1997 to scuttle the border-s et t l em ent effort s .In this case, a popu l a rly elect ed pres i dent whose economic policies sparked a vio l ent national strike was removed fr om off i ce by congre s s i o nal vote for “mental incomp etence” af t er serving only six mon t h s ,wi t h o ut eit h er a setbac k for the border talks or disturb a n ces at the border.56 This pol i tical crisis certa i n ly would have been an opportun i ty for eit h er the soon- to - be - depos ed pres i den t , the congre s s ,o r even the military to use the territo rial issue to unite the cou n try, but none did.57 Rat h er, Fabi an Ala rcon Rivera,who had been pres i dent of the Ecuadoran congr ess and was selected by that body in Februa ry to become the interim pres i dent until 1998, es po u s ed an attitu de towa rd the territ orial dispute that was similar in content to that of the ousted pres i den t : He called for an immedi a te solution to the border situa ti on ,ref er- ring repea t edly to the neces s i ty of a “di gn i f i ed peace with Peru.” 58 Accordi n gly, Pres i den t Ala rcon conti nu ed negoti a ti ng along the lines of previous governm en t s . 59 Sh ort ly after the first round of the Brasilia talks, Ala rcon decla re d that the territ orial problem must end and not be left to future genera ti on s . 60 Overall ,de s p i te num erous opportun i ties to back- track, pol i tical leaders on both sides maintained a comm i tm ent to settle the dispute. A second factor favoring sett l em ent can be found at the level of pu b lic opi n i on .Th ere was a detecta ble cha n ge in popular attitu des towa rd the border dispute ,e s peci a lly in Ec u ador, where the dispute has tradi ti on a lly been felt much more deeply than in Peru. Certa i n ly, these attitu des were influen c ed by governm ent policies and public campaigns : St a r ting in grade schoo l ,E c u adorans have been taught that Peru dismembered their cou n try and that Ecuador is “an Ama z on cou n try ” and alwa ys will be. 61 In the decade foll ow ing the 1941 war, pu blic opi n i on in Ecuador was staunchly anti- Peruvian and highly supportive of a conf ron t a ti onal approach to territorial issue s .Vel a s co Iberra had just been elect ed pres i dent with more votes than the combi n ed total of all his opponents when ,in 1960, he decla re d the Rio Protocol “null and void .” Mas s ive publi c demon s tra ti ons erupted in favor of this pos i ti on to regain sovereign access to the Ama- zon.Th ere is some eviden ce that these attitu des persi s te d into the 1980s. Afte r the 1981 Paq uisha Inc i den t ,E c u ador’s Foreign Min i s try condu cted a national opi n i on survey that reportedly conf i rm ed the popu l a ri ty of null i f i c a ti on and sovereign access to the Ama z on. In 1983, the Ecuadoran congress rea f f i rm ed its pos i ti on on the null i ty of the Rio Protoco l . 62 18 Ecuador and Peru: The Search for a Border Solution

However, so me eviden ce indicated a cha n ge in Ecuador’s public mood regarding terri- torial dema n d s .Af ter minor incidents on the border in 1991, Ec u ador ’s public opi n i on on the territorial issue seemed to moderate cons i dera bly, comp a re d to that in the past. Some obs er vers detected “a certain fatigue with the issue of Ama z on cla i m s” and a crack in the na ti onal unity that had previo u s ly stood solidly behind maximalist irredenti s m . 63 In 1991, the governm ent began to speak openly about seeking a new national cons en sus throu gh some form of pl ebi s c i te on the issue ,pre su m a bly allo wing for alterna tives that would in- clude depa rtu res from Ecuador’s tradi ti o nal policy pos i ti on . The foreign minister sug- ges te d that it might be pos s i ble to draw up bil a te ral agreemen ts that would allow Ecuador freer access to the Ama zon region and enj oym e nt of preferent ial bene fits in the zone occu p i ed by Peru,to whi ch Ecuador laid cla i m . 64 Opi n i on polls in the 1990s sugge s ted poten ti al popular suppor t for res o lv ing the dis- pute .I n 1992, 79 percent of Ec u ador ans poll ed thought that a solution to the border problem could contri bute to the econo mic developm ent of both cou n tri e s , and 55 per- cent thought that it would be conveni ent to open comm e rce betw een both cou n tri e s comp l etely. Sti ll , 49 percent of the res pon dents also viewed Peru as an enemy cou n try, sugge s ti ng a good deal of remaining sus p i c i on and hostil i ty. By 1995, surv eys showed that 58 percent of the Peruvian popu l a ti on and 71 percent of the Ecuadoran public would accept the settling of th e ir territorial dispute with mutual ter- rit orial conce s s i on s . 65 It was about this time that Ecuadoran pres i d ent Dur á n - Ba ll é n deci ded that demanding the absolute null i f i c a ti on of the Rio Protocol was no long er ad- vis a bl e ,a pos i ti on that would have been “ve ry difficult to accept twenty yea rs ago.”66 The policy shift was a major conce s s i on on the part of Ec u ador, and was appa ren t ly cons on a n t with trends in public attitu de s . Ye t no major social forces or partisan orga n i z a ti ons in Ecuadoran soci e ty have advo- ca ted accepting less than sovereign access to the Ama zon . 67 Pol i ticians are still likely to be- li eve that conceding the sovereign access issue will cost them an electi on . 68 Buc a ra m ,for exa m p l e ,l a m en ted from that his conc i l i a tory approach in Lima, es pec i a lly his call for “forgiven e s s ,” offen ded his supporters and contri b uted to his ouster.69 While the publi c may have wanted the issue res o lved ,t he terms of set t l em ent rema i n ed highly sens i tive pol i ti c a lly. The third set of cond i ti ons that have contri buted pos i tively to the res o luti on of the dis- pu te have been ext ernal regio nal factors, prime among them the role played by the Gua r- an tors .Repre s en t a ti ves from Argen ti n a ,Bra z i l ,Ch i l e , and the Uni ted States have taken th eir res pon s i bi l i ties serio u s ly and were appa ren t ly interes ted in getting the dispute re- so lved for good.Hi gh - l evel profes s i o nals who are rea s on a bl y well res pected by the partie s st a f fed the Gua ra n tor dele gati on s .Y et this is not to suggest that the guaran to r process has been wit h o ut difficulti e s ,p a rtic u l a rly differences in the pace at whi ch the Gua ra n tors ide- ally wanted to see the talks proceed:T he Brazilians were the most willi ng to allow the dis- cu s s i on s to proceed at their own pace, and the Uni ted States was the most insistent on constant progress and rapid res o luti on . Furt h erm ore ,t h ere were particular issues on whi ch each Gua ra n to r was influen ced by its own foreign pol i c y, but this tendency was proba b ly more prono u n ced in the past. The tradi ti onal enm i ty betwe en Chile and Peru (whi ch sub s i ded only recent ly) rai s ed issues of Ecuador and Peru: The Search for a Border Solution 19

how foreign policy cons i dera ti on s affected Chi l e’s pos i ti on s and influen ce as a Gua ra n tor. More acutely, wea po ns sales to the parties rai s ed que s ti o ns of Gua ra n to r impartia l i ty. For exa m p l e ,wh en the wea pons emb a r go against the two antagonists was lifted in September 19 9 5 ,the Uni ted States governm ent approved Israel ’s request to sell the Kfirs (equi pped with engines manuf actu red in the Uni ted State s ,t hus requi ring governm ent approval) to Ec u ador, causing an irate res ponse from Peru.Most poten ti a lly damaging for the integrity of the guaran tor process was the illegal sale of wea po ns to Ecuador by the Argen tine De- fense Min i s try during the conf l i ct .T he sales crea ted an interna ti onal scandal and certa i n ly af fected the image of Argen tina as an impartial Gua ra n tor. 70 It was Bra z i l ,h owever, that played the role of “le ad Gua ra n tor ” in settling the Ecuador- Peru dispute.A cting as coordi n a tor of the grou p, Brazil had a long tradi ti on of med i a ti n g betwe en the two antagoni s t s .T he origi nal Rio Protocol was negoti a ted in the Braz i l i a n ca p i t a l ,the arbitral function in the was carried out by a Brazilian arbiter, and the 1995 Ita m a ra ty Accord was signed at the Brazilian Foreign Min i s try. Perhaps more than any of the other guaran tors ,B razil has provided long - term leadership that has been cru- cial to res o lv ing the conf l i ct .Wa rn i n gs were heard from some qua rt ers in both Ecuador and Peru that their natio nal policies were being unduly pres su red towa rd compr omise by the Gua ra n tors ;Un i ted States diplomats especi a lly had to be sens i tive to perceptions of U.S .dom i n a n ce of the proces s .But overall , the Gua ra n to rs played a pos i t ive rol e ,pri m a r- ily in their abil i ty to faci l i t a te commu n i c a ti on that would have been difficult, if not impos- si bl e , in their absence . 71 Des p i te these pos i t ive factors, the res o luti on of the border conf l i ct was far from certa i n . One issue was the role that the military in Peru and Ecuador would play in faci l i t a ting or ha m pering an agreemen t .I t is true that civilians are not automa ti c a lly more peac eful than the military with res pect to the border issue ;a f ter all,a 1977–78 border conf r ont a ti on was defu s ed by military governm ents in both cou n tri e s , while both the 1981 mini-war and the 1995 war occu rr ed under democ ra tic regimes in both cou n tri e s . 72 But in the 1990s, mi l i- ta ry establi s h m e nts in both cou n tries have appea re d to be more skeptical of a sett l em en t than their civilian governm en t s . These same militaries have, on occa s i on ,pre s s ed for arms pu rc hases that have been difficult for the civilian governm e nts to resist but that have also rai s ed serious que s ti ons regar ding each governm en t’s intenti on to settle the dispute peace- fu lly. 73 In add i ti on , the conti nu ed dispute over the border gives the military establi s h m en t in each cou n tr y an opportun i ty to make a case for conti nu ed privil eges and priori ty fund- in g, as is the case with the oil sur tax in Ecuador. Overall ,i t is a gross exa ggera ti on to sug- gest that the military dicta t es policy in eit h er cou n try, but it is fair to say that the pres ti ge and influen ce of this instituti on gives it a virtual veto over the terms of any sett l em ent it stron gly oppos e s . Fou r

Co n c l u s i o n

n August 1998, Ec u ador ele cted a new pres i den t , Jamil Mahu ad , who pledged to con- tin ue negoti a ti on s with his Peruvian cou n terp a rt on the findings of the bin a ti on a l Icomm i s s i on s . While the two pres i den t s’ personal rela ti onship enco u ra ged progress in res o lv ing the more nett l e s ome issues of the border dispute ,t h ey soon rea l i zed that they were at an impasse. Their frus tra ti on at not being able to agree on mutua lly accepta bl e so luti ons was accomp a n i ed by apprehen s i on over another outbreak of fi gh ti n g — ju s t before Ecuador’s pres i den tial electi on ,bot h cou n t ries had mobil i zed troops on their res p ective sides of the border. The mounting tens i on seemed to call for a brea k t h ro u gh in the approach towa rd a set t l em en t .On , 19 9 8 ,Pre s i dents Mahu ad and Fuj i m ori sent a lett er to Braz i l i a n pres i dent Ferna n do Henri que Cardo s o, cha i r man of the Gua ra n tors ,req ue s ting the Gua r- an t ors’ lega ll y binding arbitra ti on of all issues in the dispute.Af te r more than a half-cen- tury in exi s ten ce , the Rio Protocol would finally be reli ed upon to exercise perhaps its most auth ori t a tive—and most ambig u o u s — powers . On October 26, 19 9 8 ,E c u adoran pres i dent Jamil Mahu ad and Peruvian pres i de nt Al- berto Fuj i m ori—in the pres en ce of the four Gua ra n t or powers’ repres en t a tive s — s i gn ed the Brasilia Pres i den tial Act,def i n i tively res o lv ing the remaining impasses to their cou n- trie s’ border dispute. That both Ecuador and Peru eventu a lly res o rted to the Gua ra n tors’ binding arbitra ti on for a packa ge sett l em e nt of all the issues add re s s ed by the four bin a- tional comm i s s i on s — but partic u l a rly the two intracta ble issues of comm erce and naviga- tion and border dema rc a ti on — te s tifies to the crucial role of the Gua ra n tors and the formi d a bi l i ty of the 1942 Rio Protoco l . The Gua ra n tors’ deci s i on has been des c ri be d by one informed obs erver as “one of th e most crea tive if not unus ual tran s m i s s i ons of aut h ori ty by sovereign legis l a tu res to foreign st a te s .” 74 Under the Gua ra n t ors’ pl a n ,t he disputed stretch of border will be dema rc a ted according to the Rio Protoco l ’s line of divi s i o n—a major conce s s i on from the Ecuadoran si de . In retu rn ,E c u ador will be given a squa re kilometer of private — but not sovereign — property acro ss the Peruvian side of the border, extending to Tiwin t z a .Both cou n trie s will es t a blish an ecol ogical park on eit h er side of the border, whe re unimpeded transit will be gu a ra n te ed and no military forces will be allowed .Reg ar ding the second major impasse in the dispute,t he plan gives Ecuador naviga ti on righ t s — but ,a ga i n , no sovereign acces s — to the Ama z on and its tribut a r ies in Peru and allow s Ecuador to establish two trading centers al ong the river. The most obvious incenti ves to settle the territorial issue arose from a des i re to avoid the kinds of costs incurred in the 1995 war. But aside from the obvious toll in human lives and natio nal res o u rces used to pursue territorial cla i m s ,an increa s ed awa r eness of the in- 20 di rect opportun i ty costs of territorial conf l i ct finally persua ded the parties of the need to Conclusion 21

settle the conf l i ct .F or exa m p l e , while regio nal trade is growin g, the dispute stun ted bil a t- eral economic rela ti ons signi f i c a n t ly: Peru exports more to Bol ivia than to Ecuador ($166 mi ll i on comp a red with $147 milli on betwe en 1992 and 1994), des p i te the fact that Ec u ador ’s gross dome s tic product is almost three times the size of Bol ivi a’s .More over, Ec u ador bou gh t $684 milli on worth of exports from Col om bia between 1992 and 1994, and only $147 milli on from Peru, even though Peru’s economy is only slight ly smaller than Col om bi a’s . 75 The territorial dispute between these two states likely contri but ed to this distorted trade rela ti on s h i p. As a modern and interna ti on a lly orien ted comm erc i a l sector develops in both cou n tri e s ,d emands for res o lving the econom i c a l ly disruptive conf l i ct conti nu ed to ris e . In add i ti on to the four major regio nal powers’ comm i tm ent to seeing the conf l i ct re- so lved ,t h ere were other regional incent ives to settle as well. One incent ive doveta i l ed wit h the economic aspect menti on ed previo u s ly: As economic and trade integrati on in the re- gion proceeded ,E c u ador and Peru were increa s i n gly awa re of the opportun i ty costs that th eir border dispute exacted in denying them the benefits of regio nal integrati on .C ooper- ative trade arran gem ents with (a - trade area and customs union establi s h ed by Argen ti n a ,Bra z i l ,Pa ra g u ay, and Urug u ay ) , for exa m p l e , were unlikely unless the dis- pute were on its way towa rd sett l em en t . 76 Furt h erm ore ,wit h Argen ti na and Chile close to peacef u lly settling their last remaining dispute in south e rn Pat a gon i a ,l e aders in Ecuador and Peru were increa s i n g ly awa re that theirs would be one of the last active disputes on the conti n en t .Pre s su re from the interna ti onal commu n i ty lent weight to the argument s for sett l em en t . Nonet h el e s s ,the true obs t acles to sett l em ent arose from dome s t ic pol i tics and institu- tion s .Pu blic support for sett l em ent in both cou n tries was fragile and highly sens i tive to the terms of any propos ed sett l em en t .Mu ch depended on the governm en t s’ will i n gn e s s and abil i ty to prepa re the public to accept a sett l em e nt invol ving significant conce s s i on s . Even more uncertain was the role that the military would play in each cou n try. Agai n , while they do not dicta te pol i c y, it is unrea l i s tic to expect military leaders in each cou n try to accept sett l em ents that they vehem en t ly oppos e .In Peru,the Nati onal Secu ri ty Cou n c i l (wh i ch includes the comm a n d ers of the three armed forces as well as the powerful cha i r- man of the Joint Chi efs of St a f f) unanimously endors ed the Janu a ry 1998 agreemen t , th o u gh important military figures in both cou n tries have been reluctant to embrace the accord fully.77 In Ecuador, in f lu en tial off i cers in the armed forces ,su ch as Gene ral Mon- cayo, conti nue to be reluct ant to accept any agreeme nt based on the 1942 Rio Protoco l . 78 Nonet h el e s s ,m i l i t a ry leaders in both Ecuador and Peru appear to have accepted the Brasilia Pres i den tial Act. While the risk that eit h er cou n try will choose to use military force to achi eve territori a l objectives appea rs to be signi f i c a n t ly reduced ,i t is far from eli m i n a ted .I fboth cou n tri e s deci de to re- occ u py their res pect ive parts of the demi l i t a ri zed area ,m i l i t a ry clashes cou l d resu m e .I t is not obvious how the two militaries might res po nd to perceived border provoca ti ons in the future ,b ut the Gua ra n tors have cons i dered the pos s i bi l i ty that hostil i- ties could spread beyond the immedi a te border area .In deed ,i n formed obs erve rs conti nu e to predi ct that should military clashes resume at the border, Peru would be unlikely to 22 Conclusion

confine its military operati o ns to the disputed area alone . 79 Thus it is important to rea l i ze th ere is still the poten tial for vio l ent conf ron t a ti on . While every case has its unique cha racteri s ti c s ,t he dispute between Ecuador and Peru should be understo od in the broader Latin Amer ican contex t . Progress appea r ed slow to contem pora ry anxious obs ervers ,b ut most disputes in the region have taken deca des to res o lv e—a fact that Brazil seemed to understand well, less so the Uni te d States . This case, li ke a num ber of ot h er conf l i cts throu gh o ut history, benef i ted grea t ly from the involve- ment of “neutr al ”reg io nal powers. But while the role played by regional actors in other di s p utes has been that of med i a tor or arbitra tor, that of “gu a ra n tor ” is unique . In the case of Ec u a dor and Peru,the four Gua ra n t or nation s took on a legal obli ga ti o n to faci l i t a te the executi on of an interna ti o nal agreement—th e Rio Protocol of 19 4 2 . This obli ga ti on en- ta i l ed both qua s i - m i l i t a ry and diploma tic function s , the coordi n a ti on of whi ch was cru- cial to the operati on’s succe s s .L i ke diploma tic medi a tors , the Gua ra n tors made sugge s ti ons and conc i l i a tory recomm en d a ti on s ,but it was up to the parties to accept,re- ject , or amend the Gua ra n tors’ propos a l s .H owever, the Gua ra n tors had no expli ci t power un der the protocol to render a legall y binding deci s i on on how the dispute was to be re- so lved .Nev erth el e s s ,b oth Ecuador and Peru eventu a lly reli ed on the trea ty fram ework’s aut h ori ty to settle “[ a ] ny dou bt or disagreement whi ch may arise in the executi on of th i s prot ocol . . . with the assistance of the repres en t a t ives of the [Gua ra n to rs ] ”( Article VI I ) . As noted throu gh o ut this study, Ec u a doran access to the Ama zon and the final territ or- ial divis i on of Ec u ador and Peru’s border were the issues on whi ch both cou n trie s had been the most intran s i gen t .R elying on the Gua ra n t ors to function in the capaci ty of arbi- trat ors and actua lly make a deci s i on — with in carefu lly outl i n ed cond i ti ons whi ch the par- ties speci f y — rega rd ing the access and territorial issues seemed to be the only way to brea k the impasses. La tin Ameri c a’s experi en ce with arbitra ti on and adju d i c a ti on is exten s ive , th o u gh it was rea s on a ble to wonder whet h er the experi en ce of these two cou n tries in par- ticular could bring them to accept a binding deci s i on in this case; the dispos i ti on of th e abort ive 1910 arbitra ti on by the King of Spain and the ultim a te rejecti on of the Braz i l i a n arbi tra ti on in 1945 gave cause for skeptic i s m . However, two of the most crucial aspects of any such arbitra ti on would be its perceived legiti m ac y as well as its power to streng t h en the partie s’ abi l i ty to make a deci s i on they would like to make in any case, but find it pol i t- ic a lly difficult to reach agreement on a diploma tic basis alone . In both of these res pect s ,i t is important to keep in mind how different 1998 is from 1945. In the earli er case, arbi tra- tion took place when one party, Ec u ador, accepted an agreement after a military defea t .In the recent agreemen t ,n ei t h er party was militarily coerced into sett l em en t . The Gua ra n- tors’ arbi t ral deci s i on about the border should now carry much grea t er legiti m acy than previous rul i n gs . The Gua ra n tors’ binding arbitra ti on is also supported by a much more condu c ive cli- ma te of pu blic opi n i on today . In the 1950s, pu blic opi n i on (most likely informed by gov- ernm ent prono u n cem en ts and somewh at tenden ti ous histories of the region pres en ted in the cou n tri e s’ sch oo ls) was ram p a n t ly oppos ed to conc i l i a ti on on the border issue .Ava i l- able eviden ce suggests a softe ning on the issue in the 1990s. In the case of an ongoi n g st a l em a te , one of the advan t a ges of arbi tra ti on is to streng t h en each governm en t’s abil i ty to accept a deci s i on that may be in the public interes t , but whi ch is very difficult to Conclusion 23

propose or accede to in a diploma tic cont ext because of powerful pol i tical oppos i ti on .As long as the terms of the agreeme nt to accept arbitra ti on are carefu lly establi s h ed so that each governm ent could envis i on defending a worst-case outcome to its publ i c ,t h ere are rea s o ns to beli eve that arbitra ti on might be a via ble alterna tive in case of st a l em a te .Th e Brasilia Pres i den t ial Act is no exception ,su pp orted by num er ous regional precedents in the 1990s—for exa m p l e ,C hile and Argen ti n a , El Salvador and Hondu ras—that persuaded dome s t ic criti cs of comm i t ted natio nal governm ents of the advan t a ges of abiding by a lega lly binding deci s i on . Regar ding U.S . pol i c y, what conclu s i ons can be drawn about the guaran tor role the Uni ted States played in this conf l i ct? Can these lessons be appl i ed to territorial conf l i cts in ot h er regio ns of the world? Speci f i c a lly, can the Uni ted States repl i c a te its guaran tor role to move the negoti a ti ng process along in other territo rial conf l i cts? For a num ber of rea s on s ,pru den ce cautions against advoca ting such a role more gen- erally. For one thing, the Uni te d States has too little experi en ce with the guaran t or func- tion to draw conclu s i ons about its general appl i c a bi l i ty. This fact alone should caution against its taking on a legal obli ga ti o n—as oppos ed to a pol i tical rol e — to assure the im- pl em en t a ti on of a particular interst a te territori al agreemen t .Con s i d er the special circu m- st a n c es that gave rise to the U.S .com m i tm ent in this case in the first place: During the hei ght of World War II, the Uni ted States and the other Gua ra n to rs placed a high pre- mium on hemi s ph eric peace and thus were will ing to underwrite this agreement with an obli ga ti on to see it implemen ted .Tod ay, few border agreements jus ti f i a bly comm a n d such a comm i tm ent from the Uni t ed States .Fu rt h erm ore , the cond i ti ons that serve to maintain the U.S .obl i ga ti on in the Ecuador-Pe ru case may be difficult to repl i c a te in other contex t s .T he Uni te d States has a long tradi ti on of working towa rd the res o luti on of terri- torial and other conf l i cts in Latin Ameri c a .De s p i te (or because of) the Spanish col on i a l role and exten s ive Eur opean involvem en t , the Uni te d States has contri buted more to the nego ti a ti on ,m ed i a ti on , and arbitra ti on of border disputes in this region than any other si n gle power. Such a level of invo lvem ent is much less true for other region s in the world , and it gives the Uni ted States a degree of legi ti m acy and credi bi l i ty that may not read i ly app ly to disputes in other region s . In such a ro l e ,c redi bi l i ty is cruc i a l . The Uni ted States must be viewed by the disputin g pa r ties as willing to commit the res o u rces (econom i c ,d i p l om a ti c ,and pos s i bly even mili- ta ry) to ensu re the agreemen t’s implemen t a ti on .Wh e re the costs of ensu ri ng the agree- ment are obvio u s ly out of proportion to U.S .forei gn policy goal s ,a s would be the case in ma ny regions of the world ,t aking on the role of gu a ra n tor would most likely res ult in in- effectual res ponses to vio l a ti ons of the agreement and ultim a tely damage the reput a ti on of the Uni ted States as a glo bal power. Nor should it be forgo t te n that one of the cond i- tions contri buting to the cons tru ctiv e role of the Uni ted States in the Ecuador-Pe ru case is the mul ti l a t eral cha racter of the third- p a rty arran gem en t .W ould such a role be pos s i bl e or even des i ra ble in the African or Asian cont ext? It has proven difficult eno u gh to secu re regional cooperati on among European allies where conf l i cting territorial demands in the Balkans were at stake. Fi n a lly, it should be emph a s i zed that the function of a guaran tor is to help ensu re that an agreement is implemen ted .T he role thus assumes the conte nding parties can agree on 24 Conclusion

the basic conto u rs of th eir border are a ,t h o u gh not perhaps on every deta i l .Gu a ra n t ors cannot crea te agreemen t ;wh e re the disputing states are far apart,a more appropria te rol e to assume is that of med i a tor or provider of good off i ce s .T his raises que s ti ons about how us eful a guaran to r role would be in situa ti ons of wide s pre ad vio l ent conf l i ct . Des p i te these cavea t s , the role of the Uni te d States in the res o luti on of the Ecuador- Peru border conf l i ct has been productive in genera l . The Uni ted States has had an im- portant stake in the res o luti on of this incend i a ry regio nal issue and will undou btedly conti nue to play a significant supporting ro l e ,a l ong with the other Gua ra n tor powers, as the agreement is implemen ted .All owed to fes ter and escalate to the level of orga n i zed vio l en ce ,terri torial conf l i ct in Latin Amer ica poses a threat to broader U.S .g oals in the re- gion ,wh i ch are predi c a t ed on an econom i c a lly vibrant region of open borders that is free fro m interst a te vio l en ce .Po l i tical cons o l i d a ti on of civ ilian rule remains preca rious as long as peace is not secu re along national borders and the region’s militaries are able to parlay such a situa ti on into special privil eges and prodi giou s bud get alloc a ti on s . While settling a border dispute is hardly a panacea for democ ra tic peace and develop- men t , it is certa i n ly a step in the right direction .Invo lvem ent in the guaran tor proces s gives the Uni t ed States an opportun i ty to partic i p a te in the res o luti on of these conf l i cts at rela tively low cost (Ecuador and Peru have picked up most of the bill for the military obs ervers ) .A ctive involvem e nt also gives the Uni ted States the opportun i ty to cooperate with regional efforts to solve the problem wit h o ut the risk of being perceived as domi n a t- ing the process or dicta ting the outcome .Cl e a rl y, the U.S . policy of prodding the parties to settle while hinting at wit h d rawal in the absence of progress made good sens e . The Uni ted St a t es needs to conti nue to be sens i ti ve ,h owever,to the pace at whi ch it can expect other such endu ring conf l i cts to be sett l ed . Ap p e n d i x

THE RIO PROTOCOL PEACE, FRIENDSHIP, AND BOUNDARIES BETWEEN PERU AND ECUADOR PROTOCOL BETWEEN PERU AND ECUADOR (SIGNED ALSO BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE) Signed at Rio de Janeiro, January 29, 1942. Approved by the Congress of Ecuador, February 26, 1942. Approved by the Congress of Peru, February 26, 1942. (T r a n s l a t i o n ) PROTOCOL OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP, AND BOUNDARIES BETWEEN PERU AND ECUADOR

The Governments of Peru and Ecuador, desiring to settle the boundary dispute which, over a long period of time, has separated them, and taking into consideration the offer which was made to them by the Governments of the United States of America, of the Argentine , of the United States of Brazil, and of Chile, of their friendly services to seek a prompt and honorable solu- tion to the program, and moved by the American spirit which prevails in the Third Consultative Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American , have resolved to conclude a protocol of peace, friendship, and boundaries in the presence of the representatives of those four friendly Governments. To this end, the following plenipotentiaries take part: For the Republic of Peru, Doctor , Minister of Foreign Affairs; and For the Republic of Ecuador, Doctor Julio Tobar Donoso, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Who, after having exhibited the respective full powers of the parties, and having found them in good and due form, agree to the signing of the following protocol:

ARTICLE I The Governments of Peru and Ecuador solemnly affirm their resolute intention of main- taining between the two peoples relations of peace and friendship, of understanding and good faith and of abstaining, the one with respect to the other, from any action capable of disturbing such re l a t i o n s . ARTICLE II The shall, within a period of 15 days from this date, withdraw its military forces to the line described in article VIII of this protocol.

ARTICLE III The United States of America, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile shall cooperate, by means of military observers, in order to adjust to circumstances this evacuation and retirement of troops, according to the terms of the preceding article. 25 26 Appendix

ARTICLE IV The military forces of the two shall remain in their new positions until the defini- tive demarcation of the frontier line. Until then, Ecuador shall have only civil jurisdiction in the zones evacuated by Peru, which remain in the same status as the demilitarized zone of the Ac t . ARTICLE V The activity of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile shall continue until the defini- tive demarcation of frontiers between Peru and Ecuador has been completed, this protocol and the execution thereof being under the guaranty of the four countries mentioned at the beginning of this article. ARTICLE VI Ecuador shall enjoy, for purposes of navigation on the Amazon and its northern tributaries, the same concessions which Brazil and Colombia enjoy, in addition to those which may be agreed upon in a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation designed to facilitate free and untaxed navigation on the aforesaid rivers. ARTICLE VII Any doubt or disagreement which may arise in the execution of this protocol shall be settled by the parties concerned, with the assistance of the representatives of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, in the shortest possible time.

ARTICLE VIII The boundary line shall follow the points named below: A)–In the west: 1)–The mouth of the Capones in the ocean; 2)–The Zarumilla River and the Balsamal or Lajas Quebrada; 3)–The Puyango or Tumbes River to the Quebrada de Cazaderos; 4) – C a z a d e r o s ; 5)–The Quebrada de Pilares y del Alamor to the ; 6)–The Chira River, upstream; 7)–The Macará, Calvas, and Espíndola Rivers, upstream, to the sources of the last mentioned in the Nudo de Sabanillas; 8)–From the Nudo de Sabanillas to the Canchis River; 9)–Along the whole course of the Canchis River, downstream; 10)–The Chinchipe River, downstream, to the point at which it receives the San Francisco River. B)–In the east: 1)–From the Quebrada de San Francisco, the watershed between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers, to the confluence of the Santiago River with the Yaupi; 2)–A line to the outlet of the Bobonaza into the Pastaza. The confluence of the Conambo River with the Pintoyacu in the ; 3)–Outlet of the Cononaco into the Curaray, downstream, to Bellavista; Appendix 27

4)–A line to the outlet of the Yasuní into the Napo River. Along the Napo, downstream, to the mouth of the Aguarico; 5)–Along the latter, upstream, to the confluence of the Lagartococha or Zancudo River with the Aguarico; 6)–The Lagartococha or Zancudo River, upstream, to its sources and from there a straight line meeting the Güepí River and along this river to its outlet into the Putumayo, and along the Putumayo upstream to the boundary of Ecuador and Co l o m b i a . ARTICLE IX It is understood that the line above described shall be accepted by Peru and Ecuador for the demarcation of the boundary between the two countries, by technical experts, on the ground. The parties may, however, when the line is being laid out on the ground, grant such reciprocal conces- sions as they may consider advisable in order to adjust the aforesaid line to geographical realities. These rectifications shall be made with the collaboration of the representatives of the United States of America, the Argentine Republic, Brazil, and Chile. The Governments of Peru and Ecuador shall submit this protocol to their respective Con- gresses and the corresponding approval is to be obtained within a period of not more than 30 days. In witness thereof, the plenipotentiaries mentioned above sign and the present protocol, in two copies, in Spanish, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, at one o’clock, the twenty-ninth day of Jan- uary, of the year nineteen hundred and forty-two, under the auspices of His the Presi- dent of Brazil and in the presence of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, Brazil, and Chile and of the Under Secretary of State of the United States of America.

(L.S.) Alfredo Solf y Muro (L.S.) J. Tobar Donoso Signed) Sumner Welles Signed) E. Ruiz Guiñazú Signed) Juan B. Rossetti Signed) Oswaldo Aranha

No t e s

1. “Peru-Ecuador: Accord Said to Set First Springboard for Talks,” Inter-Press Service, , 1995. 2. Santiago Accord, November 1997; Brasilia Declaration, January 1998. 3. Studies include Gary Geortz and Paul F. Diehl, Territorial Changes and International Co n f l i c t . (New York: Routledge, 1992); Paul Huth, Standing Your Ground. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996); S. Kocs, “Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945–1987,” Jo u r n a l of Politics (1995); John Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Edward Kolodziej and I. William Zartman, “Coping with Conflict: A Global Approach” in Edward Kolodziej and Roger Kanet, eds., Coping with Conflict after the Cold War (B a l t i m o r e : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3–32. 4. In the 1970s, for example, when the Pastaza-Marañón basin near the border with Ecuador seemed to promise future oil revenues, the Peruvian government obligated its anticipated oil rev- enues for several years in advance through the purchase of military equipment to secure the terri- tory. William L. Krieg, Ecuadoran-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, 2d ed. (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1986), 251. 5. The classic sources on the history of territorial conflicts in the region are Gordon Ireland’s Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938) and Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in Central and North America and the Ca r i b b e a n (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941). 6. Preston James, Latin America, 3d ed. (New York: Odyssey Press, 1959). 7. Steven R. Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possedetis and the Borders of New States,” American Journal of 90, no. 4 (1996): 590–624. 8. Ibid., 595. 9. The United States and during border clashes in 1907; Salvador in 1933; and Costa Rica, Venezuela, and the United States in 1937. 10 . Equity and fairness may also be criteria for the decision. In the case of arbitration, the parties can establish other parameters for the decision in the co m p r o m i s , an agreement between the par- ties that defines the issue to be arbitrated and the details for selecting arbitrators and establishing the arbitral tribunal. 11 . At the First International Conference of American States, held in Washington D.C. in 1889–90, a comprehensive Plan of Arbitration was elaborated but not ratified. Wide-scale accep- tance of arbitration came at the Hague Peace Conference of 1899. 12 . Beth A. Simmons, “See You in ‘Court’? The Appeal to Quasi-Judicial Legal Processes in the Settlement of Territorial Disputes,” in Paul F. Diehl, ed., A Roadmap to War (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, forthcoming). 13 . For example, the Treaty of Berlin guaranteed the territorial integrity of in 1878; a number of treaties have included guarantee clauses regarding the neutrality of Belgium (1831, 29 30 Notes

1839, and 1867). Guarantees are also written into parts of the Locarno Pact (the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee of October 16, 1925) in which Britain, , Belgium, and guaranteed the maintenance of status-quo boundaries between and Belgium and Germany and France. 14 . L. Oppenheim, International Law, 2d ed., vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1912), 59 9 – 6 0 1 . 15 . EFE News Agency, , February 6, 1995. This is according to British and U.S. studies. Reports of the Peruvian National Mining and Oil Society have confirmed that there is a produc- tive open-pit mine at , near the region in conflict. In Ecuadoran territory, the Pachicutza gold mine was discovered within the past few years and is being exploited by the Canadian company Tux Gold. Peruvian sources assert there are uranium resources, although their number and importance are still unknown. The presence of oil in the area has never been confirmed; no company has ever conducted serious oil prospecting work in the Condor range. 16 . A number of proposals for definitive lines have been made over time, including those contained in the Pedemont- Protocol (1830), the Garcia-Herrera Treaty (1890), the Mendez-Pidal Line (1908) and the Spanish Council of State Line (1909), the “Status Quo” Line (1936) and the Rio Protocol Line (1942). See Krieg, Ecuadoran-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Am a z o n , insert following p. 36. 17 . Figures cited by David R. Mares, “Deterrence Bargaining in the Ecuador-Peru Enduring Rivalry: Designing Strategies around Military Weakness,” Security Studies 6, no. 2 (Winter 1996/97): 99. 18 . The treaty was ratified in Peru as Legislative Resolution No. 9574 of the Peruvian Congress Approving the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, February 26, 1942. The Ecuadoran Congress approved the Rio Protocol 26 votes in favor, 3 against, and 5 abstentions in the Senate, and by 43 in favor, 3 against, and 3 abstentions in the House of Representatives. The only other bilateral treaty in force prior to 1942 was the Treaty of and Friendship of 1932 (the Pando-Novoa Treaty), which defined Peruvian rights with respect to Tumbes, Jaen, and Maynas, leaving a comprehensive boundary agreement for a later date. 19 . Marcella, War and Peace in the Amazon: Strategic Implications for the United States and Latin America of the 1995 Ecuador-Peru War (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, November 24, 1995). 20 . Embassy of Ecuador, “The Ecuadoran-Peruvian Territorial Problem” (Washington D.C.: Embassy of Ecuador, 1995). Despite Peru’s decisive victory in 1941, the 1942 treaty seems to have envisaged the transfer of very little territory (perhaps some 5,392 square miles net) from Ecuador to Peru, compared to the 1936 line. See also Marcella, War and Peace in the Amazon. 21 . Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America (New York: Praeger, 1985), 97. 22 . Eduardo Rivoldi, Commercial Attaché, Embassy of Peru, “Letter to the Editor,” Journal of Co m m e r c e , April 26, 1995; see also EFE News Agency, Madrid, March 3, 1995. In March 1995, President Sixto Durán-Ballén continued to demand that the 1942 Rio Protocol must be changed, while Peru’s president continued to insist that “the clauses of the Rio Protocol are clear, and . . . bilateral treaties cannot be revised on a unilateral basis.” 23 . Mares, “Deterrence Bargaining,” 99. Notes 31

24 . David Scott Palmer, “Peru’s Persistent Problems,” Current History 90 (January 1990). 25 . EFE News Agency, Madrid, October 8, 1991. 26 . Radio Programas del Peru, , 1991; translated in Summary of World Broadcasts AL/1192, September 3, 1991; Latin America Weekly Report, January 9, 1992; EFE News Agency, Madrid, October 16, 1991. 27 . Radio Programas del Peru, January 10, 1992. 28 . The Ecuadoran foreign minister described the incident as “a minor scuffle,” and not an “unmanageable situation.” Voz de los Andes (Quito), August 13, 1993. 29 . Official figures are toward the low end, while “reliable sources” place estimates toward the high end; see Mares, “Deterrence Bargaining.” See also Marcella, War and Peace in the Amazon, 21 . 30 . Glenn Weidner, “Operation Safe Border: The Ecuadoran-Peru Crisis,” Joint Force Quarterly 53 (Spring 1996): 52–58. 31 . Radio Programas del Peru, February 2, 1995. 32 . This agreement was not without criticism in Ecuador. Former Ecuadoran president Rodrigo Borja (1988–1992) called the agreement “a step backward, which for me is unacceptable”; “Ecuador, Peru Agree to End Three-Week Border War; Former President Criticizes Pact,” Chicago Tribune, February 18, 1995, 16. The proposal, which Peru had supported earlier, was not previously acceptable to Ecuador. The agreement has been criticized by opposition forces in both nations as diplomatically weak. 33 . Weidner, “Operation Safe Border.” 34 . Voz de los Andes (Quito), February 24, 1996. 35 . Roger Atwood, “Peru, Ecuador to Begin Full-Scale Border Talks,” , October 29, 1996. “Ecuadoran Defense Minister on Peace Process: Relations with Peru,” Ex p r e s o (G u a y a q u i l ) , November 4, 1996. According to Ecuadoran defense minister Gen. Victor Manual Bayas (ret.), Ecuador got two things from the Santiago Agreement: a tacit admission that a dispute did in fact exist, and a way to reach the Amazon (though agreement on how such access is to be obtained remained an “impasse”). 36 . Other third parties have played a persuasive role in accepting and complying with the cease- fire but have urged cooperation with the Guarantors. For example, Pope John Paul II sent envoy Cardinal Carlo Furno to persuade leaders to respect the cease-fire and peace agreement. The envoy also expressed support for the work of the four Guarantor countries that were monitoring the cease-fire. The envoy’s visit did not amount to a full-fledged mediation mission, because only Ecuador had officially asked for the Vatican’s intervention; “Pope Sends Peace Envoy to Ecuador and Peru,” Reuters, February 27, 1995. In June 1995, OAS Secretary-General Cesar Gaviria said that he was willing “to contribute to a definitive solution” to the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru, but made it clear that this offer was subject to efforts by the Guarantors; “OAS Willing to Mediate between Ecuador, Peru,” Xinhua News Agency, June 6, 1995. 37 . Voz de Los Andes (Quito), December 15, 1995 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter “FBIS”) Daily Report/Latin America, December 18, 1995, 242. 38 . Sally Bowen, “Peru Deal on MiG Jets Confirmed,” Financial Times (London), November 26, 1996, 8. The order amounted to probably eighteen fighters. 32 Notes

39 . “Arms Race to Threaten Talks.” Jane’s Intelligence Review 4, no. 2 (February 1, 1997): 16. 40 . Ib i d . 41 . According to the BBC, General Paco Moncayo confirmed in November 1997 that Ecuador was considering the purchase of more jet fighters; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, No v e m b e r 8, 1997 (original source: American Television, Lima, November 6, 1997) and November 12, 1997 (original source: Voz de los Andes [Quito], November 10, 1997). See also Latin America Regional Reports, , December 9, 1997, 6. In addition, Peru’s traditional rival in the region, Chile, announced its intention to purchase advanced fighters, particularly the U.S. F-16, the Swedish JAS-39 Grippen, or the French Mirage 2000-5; see “Some in Latin America Fear End of U.S. Ban Will Stir Arms Race,” New York Times, August 3, 1997, 11. 42 . See Marcella, War and Peace in the Amazon, 13 . 43 . Voz de Los Andes (Quito) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, April 18, 1997. 44 . For Article 6, see Mares, “Deterrence Bargaining,” 99. EFE News Agency, Madrid, May 2, 5, and 15, 1995. On May 2, for example, Fujimori categorically rejected the possibility of giving Ecuador a sovereign outlet to the through Peruvian territory. 45 . International Herald Tribune, , 1998, 3. 46 . Agence France-Presse, January 20, 1998. 47 . Inter-Press Service, , 1998. 48 . See “President Alarcon Confirms Decision to Continue Peace Talks,” Voz de Los Andes (Quito) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, June 10, 1998. 49 . Lima Panamerica Television Network broadcast in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, January 13, 1997. 50 . As recently as 1992, an official map of Ecuador showed more than one hundred thousand square miles of Peru’s territory in the as belonging to Ecuador. For a discussion of the iconography of territorial loss, see Gary S. Elbow. “Territorial Loss and National Image: The Case of Ecuador,” Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers Yearbook, 19 9 6 (Austin, Texas: Conference of Latin Americanist Geographers, 1996). 51 . Summary of Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network broadcast in FBIS Daily Report/Latin Am e r i c a , January 14, 1997. 52 . Ib i d . 53 . Ib i d . 54 . On May 13, Peruvian forces captured seven Ecuadoran soldiers who were allegedly laying mines in what was claimed as Peruvian territory. Both heads of state and their foreign ministers reiterated their commitment to continue the talks and settle the dispute, and that talks should continue in the most normal and cordial way possible. For comments by Fujimori, see summary of Lima America Television Network broadcast in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, May 16, 1997. See also the statement of Peru’s acting foreign minister Jorge Gonzalez Izquierdo on Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network, May 15, 1997; see also statements by Ecuadoran foreign minister Jose Ayala Lasso, EFE News Agency, Madrid, May 15, 1997. Similar statements were Notes 33

made by the Ecuadoran military representative to MOMEP, Voz de Los Andes (Quito), May 15, 19 9 7 . 55 . See especially William P. Avery, “Origins and Consequences of the Border Dispute Between Ecuador and Peru,” InterAmerican Economic Affairs 38, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 65–77. See also Ronald Bruce St. John, “Conflict in the Cordillera del Condor: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute,” IB R U Boundary and Security Bulletin 4, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 78–85. 56 . A nationwide strike was announced for February 5, and violent street demonstrations took place to protest large increases in telephone and electric bills, a 344-percent rise in the cost of cooking gas, increases in public transportation fares, and in state assistance for national medical services. EFE News Agency, Madrid, in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, January 29, 1997. Representatives of different economic sectors also called for Bucaram’s constitutional removal and the resignation of several ministers. EFE News Agency, Madrid, in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, February 5, 1997. See also Voz de Los Andes (Quito) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, February 9, 1997. 57 . The popular Peruvian press was evidently quite surprised at this. Lima Gestion (I n t e r n e t version) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, February 13, 1997. 58 . Inaugural , FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, , 1997; Quito Radio Network, press interview, February 16, 1997. Santa Fe de Bogota El Tiempo, February 19, 1997, Notimex. President Alarcon, national address, February 18, 1997, Lima Expreso. 59 . FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, February 17 and 18, 1997; Voz de Los Andes (Quito) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, April 28, 1997. TVB Television Network, April 28, 1997. 60 . Voz de Los Andes (Quito) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, March 1, 1997. 61 . Ecuador has continued to insist that “One half of Ecuador was taken by Peru through 120 years. . . .” Embassy of Ecuador, “The Ecuadoran-Peruvian Territorial Problem.” 62 . E. Ferrero Costa, “Peruvian Foreign Policy: Current Trends, Constraints, and Opportunities,” Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs 29, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 64–65. 63 . Fernando Bustamante, “Ecuador: Putting an End to the Ghosts of the Past?” Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs 34, no. 4 (Winter 1992–93): 204. 64 . Ibid., 208–9. 65 . “Ecuador-Peru: Citizens of Both Nations Open to Compromise,” Inter-Press Service, February 20, 1996. 66 . Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, January 14, 19 9 7 . 67 . Mares, “Deterrence Bargaining,” 103, 109. 68 . Ibid., 120. 69 . Agence France-Press, February 23, 1997, and TVN, in FBIS Daily Report/Latin Am e r i c a , February 9, 1997. The territorial issue probably had little to do with Bucaram’s downfall, though it may have dampened the military’s enthusiasm for supporting him in an ambiguous constitutional situation. 34 Notes

70 . These examples are noted in Enrique Obando, “Peace Operations in the Ecuadoran- Peruvian Border: The Coordination Efforts between the Guarantors of the Rio Treaty,” United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1996. U.S. pressure helped persuade Ecuador to renounce huge territorial claims in the Amazon Basin in 1942, at a time when the United States was eager to settle the dispute and focus on the World War. 71 . In Peru, for example, some voices warned about the Guarantors’ pressuring Peru into mak- ing territorial concessions it should not make in the name of reaching agreement. Si (Lima) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, April 27, 1997. 72 . Mares, “Deterrence Bargaining,” 115. In fact, all three previous wars between Peru and Ecuador over the past two centuries occurred in periods of partial democratization. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995): 89, 95. 73 . With reference to Peru, see “Arms Race to Threaten Talks.” Jane’s Intelligence Review 4, no. 2 (February 1, 1997): 16. While Bucaram was telling the Peruvians during his January 1997 state visit that there would be no arms race, Ecuadoran defense minister Victor Bayas was issuing state- ments that Ecuador would purchase defensive weapons as needed. Voz de los Andes (Quito) in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, January 14, 1997. The Ecuadoran military justified these pur- chases as merely compensating for the “enormous amount of arms” that have gone far beyond renovation of capabilities devastated by the 1995 conflict, and that they amount to reinforcement of Peru’s military position; Lima Radio Programas del Peru in FBIS Daily Report/Latin America, January 14, 1997. While defense ministers do this all the time, in Ecuador the defense minister is traditionally identified with the military, so that when he speaks he tends to do so in the name of the armed forces as well. 74 . For an excellent summary of the events leading up to the signing of the Brasilia Presidential Act, particularly Ecuador and Peru’s request to the Guarantors for binding arbitration of the issues in the border dispute, see Richard Downes’s epilogue to Security Cooperation in the : Resolving the Ecuador-Peru Conflict, ed. Gabriel Marcella and Richard Downes (Bolder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, in press). 75 . All figures are from the Inter-American Development Bank. 76 . Mercosur’s November 11, 1997 decision to raise external tariffs from 20 to 23 percent may provide yet another reminder of the disadvantages of exclusion from integrating market agree- ments on the continent. Reuters World Service, Facts on File News Digest, December 18, 1997. 77 . Statements by members of Peru’s military were reportedly what prompted patriotic marches in October 1997 that were hostile to an accord with Ecuador. The Guardian (L o n d o n ) , November 5, 1997, 17. 78 . Latin America Weekly Report, February 10, 1998, 64. 79 . Latin America Regional Reports, Andean Group, November 4, 1997, 3. About the Aut h o r

Beth A. Simmons is a professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, specializing in international relations and international law and institutions. Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution: The Case of Ecuador and Peru is a case study Professor Simmons selected from a much larger project on border disputes around the world that she was researching as a se- nior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace during 1996–97. Formerly on the faculty of Duke University, she was also a visiting international affairs fellow at the International Monetary Fund under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations. She was a Fulbright scholar at the London School of Economics and Political Science during 1983–84. In recognition of her 1994 book Wh o Adjusts? Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years, 1923–1938, Si m- mons was awarded the American Political Science Association’s Woodrow Wilson Award in 1995 for the best book published in the United States on government, politics, or international affairs, and the APSA’s Section on Political Economy Award for the best book or article published in the past three years. She received her Ph.D. from Harvard University.

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About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institu- tion created by Congress to promote research, education, and training on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including research grants, fellowships, professional training pro- grams, conferences and workshops, library services, publications, and other educational activities. The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by the President of the United States and con- firmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. Crocker Vice Chairman: Max M. Kampelman President: Richard H. Solomon Executive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), Research Professor of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University Max M. Kampelman, Esq. (Vice Chairman), Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Jacobson, Washington, D.C. Dennis L. Bark, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University Theodore M. Hesburgh, President Emeritus, University of Notre Dame Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University W. Scott Thompson, Professor of International Politics, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University Allen Weinstein, President, Center for , Washington, D.C. Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex officio Phyllis Oakley, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Daniel H. Simpson, Vice President, National Defense University Walter B. Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

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OTHER TITLES IN THE PEACEWORKS SERIES

The Quest for Democratic Security: The Role of the Council of Europe and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Heinrich Klebes (No. 26, January 1999) Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution, by Patricia Carley (No. 25, December 1998) Removing Barricades in Somalia: Options for Peace and Rehabilitation, by Hussein Adam and Richard Ford, with Ali Jimale Ahmed, Abdinasir Osman Isse, Nur Weheliye, and David Smock (No. 24, October 1998) Muddling toward Democracy: Political Change in Grassroots , by Anne F. Thurston (No. 23, August 1998) Preventing Genocide in Burundi: Lessons from International Diplomacy, by Stephen R. Weissman (No. 22, July 1998) The China Challenge in the Twenty-First Century: Implications for U.S. Foreign Policy, by Chen Jian (No. 21, June 1998) Private Peacemaking: USIP-Assisted Peacemaking Projects of Nonprofit Organizations, edited by David R. Smock (No. 20, June 1998) Sovereignty after Empire: Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union, by Galina Starovoitova (No. 19, October 1997) Keynote from the “Virtual Diplomacy” Conference, by Richard H. Solomon, Walter B. Wriston, and George P. Shultz (No. 18, September 1997) Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Cyprus, the Aegean, and Regional Stability, by Tozun Bahcheli, Theodore A. Couloumbis, and Patricia Carley (No. 17, August 1997) U.S. Responses to Self-Determination Movements: Strategies for Nonviolent Outcomes and Alternatives to , by Patricia Carley (No. 16, July 1997) Creative Approaches to Managing Conflict in : Findings from USIP-Funded Projects, edited by David R. Smock (No. 15, April 1997) Police Functions in Peace Operations, by Roxane D. V. Sismanidis (No. 14, March 1997) Can Foreign Aid Moderate Ethnic Conflict? by Milton J. Esman (No. 13, March 1997) Training for Peace Operations: The U.S. Army Adapts to the Post–Cold War World, by Colonel J. Michael Hardesty and Jason D. Ellis (No. 12, February 1997) Zaire: Predicament and Prospects, by J. C. Willame et al. (No. 11, January 1997) State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, by Wendy Hunter (No. 10, October 1996) Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism, by Denis McLean (No. 9, June 1996) Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav Crisis, by Vesna Pesic (No. 8, April 1996) Self-Determination: Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and the Right to Secession, by Patricia Carley (No. 7, March 1996) OF RELATED INTEREST

Many other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address issues of direct relevance to regional stability in Latin America and the mediation of territorial disputes.

RECENT INSTITUTE REPORTS INCLUDE:

Southern Mexico: Counterinsurgency and Electoral Politics, by Michael W. Foley (Special Report, January 1999) State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, by Wendy Hunter (Peaceworks No. 10, October 1996)

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