Populism and social cohesion in Latin America: two sides of the same coin? Anuschka Álvarez von Gustedt Susanne Gratius Opex Working Paper Nº 99/2019 1 Anuschka Álvarez von Gustedt Professor of International Relations and Geopolitics at the Panamerican University, Guadalajara campus. Masters degree at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, currently a PhD candidate at the Autonomous University of Madrid. Has worked at the United States embassy in Madrid and as operations analyst at the South Asia Regional Office of the World Bank in Washington D.C. Her research interests include politics of identity, terrorism, global power dynamics, international development, multicultural awareness and communication. Susanne Gratius Full-time lecturer (since 2013) at the Autonomous University of Madrid and associate senior researcher at CIDOB, Barcelona. Before, she was Associate Lecturer at the Department of International Relations at the Complutense University in Madrid and Researcher at the FRIDE Foundation in Madrid. Her professional career includes a broad experience as a researcher in several European think-tanks (GIGA-Hamburg, SWP-Berlin, IRELA-Madrid), teaching commitments in German, English and Spanish at undergraduate and graduate level for public and private Universities, consultancies for the EU, public or international agencies in Germany (GIZ, BMZ, AA, EU-LAC Foundation) and Spain (MAEC, SEGIB), national and international competitive research projects (among others “Atlantic Future” (2013-2015), managed by CIDOB and financed by the EC’s tender FP7/Horizon 2020 (2013-2015). No part of this document may be reproduced, transcribed or transmitted in any way and by any means, whether electronic, mechanical, reprographic, magnetic or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the Fundación Alternativas. © Fundación Alternativas © Anuschka Álvarez von Gustedt, Susanne Gratius OPEX Director: Diego López Garrido Panel Coordinator: Érika Rodríguez Editor: Mateo Peyrouzet Layout: Paula Carretero ISBN: 978-84-120248-6-9 2 Summary 1. INTRODUCTION 4 2. POPULISM AND SOCIAL COHESION: A DIFFICULT MARRIAGE 6 2.1. Controversial Concepts, Minimal Definitions 7 2.2. Lack of Social Cohesion Breeds Inclusive Populism 8 2.3. Material and Ideational Indicators of Social Cohesion 9 3. SOCIAL COHESION UNDER POPULIST CONDITIONS: FIVE 11 LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 3.1. Inclusive and Exclusive Populism: The Three Waves 11 3.2. The Social Promise of “Reformist Populism” in Argentina and Mexico 12 Social decline and populist renewal in Argentina and Mexico 13 Argentina: The Kirchners´ Mixed Bag of Accomplishments 14 Mexico: High Expectations for Social Transformation under AMLO 16 3.3. The Social Performance of Revolutionary Populism in Bolivia, 18 Ecuador and Venezuela The Explosive Mix of Populism and Social Decline in Venezuela 19 Ecuador’s “Citizens Revolution”: Inclusion with Exclusion 21 Bolivia’s Indigenous Revolution: Positive Social Record and 22 Authoritarian Temptation 4. CONCLUSION: THE MIXED SOCIAL BALANCE OF POPULISM IN 25 LATIN AMERICA 5. BIBLIOGRAPHY 27 6. ANNEX 1 29 3 1. Introduction Are populism and social cohesion two sides of the same coin, or antagonistic concepts? In deeply divided Latin American societies, populism and discourses from the left have repeatedly promised inclusion and welfare programs under a strong leader who gives voice to the poor and marginalized. At first glance, however, results are ambiguous. The recent wave of left-wing populism in Latin America --from Hugo Chávez in 1999 to Andrés Manuel López Obrador in 2019 – show a mixed record of social inclusion or –in a term we will use here--social cohesion. Bolivia under Evo Morales (2006-2019), for example, improved all social indicators compared to former governments, while the severe political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela illustrates how populism and its welfare policies may lead to potentially disastrous consequences. The three waves of populism – nativism in the 1950s and 1960s, neo-populism under Menem and Fujimori, and left-wing populism in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela – have not substantially altered the concentration of income and wealth in Latin America, which still counts as the most unequal region in the world, ahead even of Sub-Saharan Africa. Compared to Europe, where the concept of social cohesion was first introduced into public policies, Latin America is far from overcoming deep gaps in terms of income distribution, opportunities, gender issues or the rights of ethnic groups. In 2017, the EU’s Gini coefficient showed an average of 30.3, while Brazil, the eighth largest global economy, reached 53.3, Colombia 49.7, and Uruguay --the region’s best performer-- 39.5, similar only to the EU’s worst case, Bulgaria (40.2). Latin America’s Gini coefficient thus remains three times higher than the average in Europe and Asia (ECLAC, 2019: 17). In Latin America, social cohesion as a challenge, and populism as a response, are closely intertwined. From Juan Domingo Perón to Hugo Chávez or Evo Morales, populist presidents promised to refound their nations and redefine the concept of “the people” through the political empowerment and social inclusion of the poor they claim to represent (de la Torre, 2018). Defenders of left-wing populism argue that populism by “revolution” (Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela) or reform (Argentina, Mexico) is the only path to achieving profound structural changes, strengthening direct democracy, and incorporating “the real people” into society, as opposed to an elite-centered political model of exclusion by liberal democracies that they reject (Gratius & Rivero, 2018). With this background in mind, this Working Paper sheds light on a highly ideological debate on the interaction between left-wing populism and social inclusion. It will address: 4 a) The social causes of populism, by asking whether, and to what extent, social decline leads to the rise of populism; and if populist governments often follow social decline or protest; b) The social consequences of populism, by analyzing data to verify if populists do what they promise: addressing inclusion and welfare, and improving social development. To do so, the Working Paper will look at the interaction between the so-called third wave of left-wing populism in Latin America, as well as its social inclusion discourse and policies, which have served as their electoral promises and sources of popular legitimacy once in government. The paper is organized as follows: In the first section, we provide a short overview of current political and academic debates on populism and social cohesion, as well as their relationship. The objective here is to identify a minimal definition of both concepts. In the second part, we develop a series of indicators to compare the social record of five Latin American case-studies where leftist leaders with state-centric discourses promised justice and welfare for the poor. From this comparative perspective, the third part of the document explores the causes that led to the rise of leftist populism between 1999 and 2018 in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela, as well as the social discourse and track record of populist governments. This analysis is based on indicators developed from the broad literature on social cohesion. Finally, the conclusions refer us back to the initial question on whether social decline leads to populism, and if populist governments really are successful at fostering social inclusion. 5 2. Populism and Social Cohesion: A Difficult Marriage In Latin American democracies, the lack of social cohesion brought left-wing populism to power. This happened particularly in countries with traumatic experiences, such as Argentina after the financial crash in 2001; Bolivia and Ecuador due to deep ethnic cleavages; Mexico, where poverty and crime rates have soared since 2000; or Venezuela, which was governed by a small elite at the expense of social exclusion until the end of the 1990s. In all of these countries, liberal democracies failed to deliver wealth and social cohesion comparable with European welfare standards, where a functioning state provides basic services such as security, social protection, education or health. Populist presidents like Evo Morales, Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, Néstor and Cristina Kirchner or, more recently, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (generally known for his initials, AMLO) were all elected under the promise of a social revolution and the immediate inclusion of poor and marginalized groups of society. They vowed to do so through direct leadership and without requiring complex and long-standing state reform processes. However, while these populist governments adopted inclusive policies by increasing social expenditures and social programs, they did not promote “cohesion” or “cohesive societies” but rather have tended to create new political and social cleavages between their followers and their declared enemies, “the others” (de la Torre, 2018).1 Therefore, and given that they are both polysemic concepts, left- wing populism and social cohesion embody a difficult marriage. Both populism and social inclusion are vague, controversial concepts with a strong ideological bias that has generated complex and long-standing academic and political debates in, an outside, Latin America. While populism has dominated political debates in Latin America –a region with long experience with this type of discourse, movement and governments—social inclusion or cohesion is mainly