CAN RUSSIA REALLY CHANGE? Kasparov, Stanovaya, Korejba, Lukyanov, Golubovsky, Preobrazhensky

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INTERVIEW: ANNE APPLEBAUM The European Union’s Missed Opportunity Re ections on Dominik Jankowski & Paweï ¥wieĝak Eastern Europe Who won in Ukraine? Volodymyr Horbach

Books & Reviews: Anne Applebaum, Halik Kochanski, Emil Brix and Vesna PešiÊ

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Dear Reader, It is almost a cliché to say that change is not easy; just as you might say that change is what politics is all about. However, while these two ideas are probably true for free and democratic societies, they don’t apply in the same way to the less free or authoritarian regimes. That is why in this issue we ask the question: Is change really possible in Russia? The special block of texts in this issue feature the different perspectives of Russian public figures and experts such as Garry Kasparov, Fyodor Lukyanov, Anatoly Golubovsky and Tatiana Stanovaya. They provide us with their interpretation on how the recent civil awakening has (if at all) changed Russia during 2012. Beyond Russia, we also look at change, or a lack thereof, in Ukraine after the parliamentary elections, as well as take a glimpse at the European Union’s Neighbourhood Policy and what real impact it has had on the countries in the East. In our interview section, we publish a conversation with Pulitzer-Prize winning author, Anne Applebaum, in which she discusses the history and present situation in the countries that were once – as we commonly say – behind the Iron Curtain. We also invite you to read a review of her new book written by Guardian journalist Luke Harding. Among the other interesting pieces, French writer and screen director, Emmanuel Carrère, discusses his latest book, a biography of Eduard Limonov and Vladimir Putin’s enemy number one; while Katerina Barushka reports on recent developments in Chinese-Belarusian relations. In addition, Filip Mazurczak analyses Poland’s economic challenges in the coming year; Zuzanna Warso discusses the legal challenges to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and Jakub Nowakowski takes us to Lviv to discover its Jewish heritage. Lastly, as you may have noticed, our magazine has also undergone some change of its own – which includes a new logo and minor layout changes. We would also like to announce that Adam Reichardt, who previously worked as the managing editor, has become New Eastern Europe’s editor- in-chief. We thank Andrzej Brzeziecki and Małgorzata Nocuń of Nowa Europa Wschodnia, for all the work they have done for our magazine. Most importantly, starting in January 2013 New Eastern Europe will be available electronically for download on iPads, Android and Amazon Kindle Fire devices. Using these outlets, we hope to reach even more readers and enhance the dialogue we have already started with the traditional print version. As always, we invite you to join this dialogue online at www.neweasterneurope.eu as well as on Facebook and Twitter. The Editors 4

Contents

Opinion and Analysis

7 The Cost of Inaction incompatible with Russia’s deeply rooted Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak history, social structure, psychology and mentality. Trying to boost democracy Despite being the best positioned would mean acting against all the elements to resolve conflicts in the region, the that make up the Russian national identity. European Union is losing sight of its role in the security and stability in Eastern Europe. 65 No Competition If only it had the will and courage to do so. Fyodor Lukyanov 15 The Dark State – Part I 67 Divided We Stand John Sweeney Anatoly Golubovsky 20 Four More Years 69 In Search of Traitors and Spies Giuseppe D’Amato Ivan Preobrazhensky 22 Nobody Wanted To Win 74 a Question of Jurisdiction Volodymyr Horbach Zuzanna Warso The best phrase to explain the hidden 80 Tusk’s Unenviable Dilemma agenda of the latest parliamentary Filip Mazurczak campaign in Ukraine is that “nobody Throughout this economic crisis, wanted to win”; of course, not the Poland has been in a privileged position, candidates, but the chief strategists with a relatively strong economic performance of the main political forces. Although allowing it to stall on difficult reforms. nobody will confirm it aloud, the actions However, the comforts of Euro 2012 public of the main political players reveal investments, generous aid from Brussels, their true motivation. and a lucrative export market in the West 28 Ukraine’s Quiet Revolution are all gradually receding. Sebastien Gobert 39 CaN RUSSIa ReallY ChaNge? Interviews 41 Pushed Outside the System Interview with Garry Kasparov 87 Dishonest Promises “Despite the state propaganda and and Illegitimate Regime attempts to divide us, we all are going A conversation with Anne Applebaum to live together in the same country, “The countries of what we used to call and if we want this country to survive Eastern Europe are now as different from we are going to have to unite together one another as the countries of Western against Putin’s regime.” Europe, maybe even more so. 45 Opposition(s) in Waiting? The differences between Poland and Tatiana Stanovaya Albania, and Romania and Slovakia 57 Democracy? No thanks! are certainly as great as those between Jakub Korejba England, Italy and Greece.” The idea of freedom and democracy 93 Russia in my Blood in the western sense is currently A conversation with Emmanuel Carrère 5

Reports Books and Reviews

99 Potatoes and Fortune Cookies 145 luke harding – homo Sovieticus: Katerina Barushka Stalin’s failed european experiment The recent boom in Belarus-China On Anne Applebaum’s Iron Curtain: relations is surprising; it’s sudden, The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944-56 it’s wide scale and it’s inexplicable. 148 Wojciech Michinik What are the true reasons and possible The Irony of Polish history prospects for this cooperation? On Halik Kochanski’s The Eagle 109 Stateless in Riga Unbowed: Poland and the Poles Ruben Martinez in the Second World War 151 Dominik P. Jankowski How to Build Influence? History On Małgorzata Klatt and Tomasz Stępniewski’s Normative Influence. 116 Together against Totalitarianism The European Union, Eastern Europe Cécile Vaissié and Russia 153 Iwona Reichardt – Bitter-sweet. Or what’s People, Ideas, Inspirations in between europe’s east and West On Emil Brix’s Z powrotem w Europie Środkowej. Eseje i szkice (Back to Central 123 Contemporary lviv Europe. Collection of Essays) and its Jewish Background 156 Magdalena link-lenczowska – 13 Tales Jakub Nowakowski from the Polish Kingdom of Commi-land The city of Lviv is currently undergoing On Tadeusz Lubelski’s Historia nie była kina the process of reviving its Jewish memory. PRL (The Non-existent History of Cinema This process is not only complex, in the People’s Republic of Poland) but also painful. It requires asking many difficult questions and making 160 Monika Murzyn-Kupisz – anchored in the an effort to answer them. Past, Food for Thought in the Present On the Taube Foundation’s Field Guide to Jewish Warsaw and Kraków 131 The Solitary Voice Joanna Bernatowicz 163 Ida Orzechowska – Into the Wild On Vesna Pešić’s Divlje društvo 139 When Itzik Fell out of the Sky – kako smo stigli dovde Annabelle Chapman (Wild Society. How did we get here) 167 edward lucas – The Return of edward lucas Authors love reviews of their books – even negative ones (any publicity is better than none). A long and sympathetic review by an expert is as welcome as it is rare. So I was delighted that my old friend Eugeniusz “Gienek” Smolar has reviewed my book Deception at such length in New Eastern Europe. www.neweasterneurope.eu

EDITOR AND PUBLISHER The Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe [email protected] www.kew.org.pl

CO-EDITOR European Solidarity Centre [email protected] The publication of New Eastern Europe www.ecs.gda.pl is co-financed by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Department EDITORIAL BOARD of Public and Cultural Diplomacy. Leonidas Donskis, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Ivan Krastev, Georges Mink, Zdzisław Najder, Cornelius Ochmann, Eugeniusz Smolar, Lilia Shevtsova, Roman Szporluk, Jan Zielonka. Content with the notation (CC) is licensed under EDITORIAL TEAM the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. Adam Reichardt, Editor-in-Chief All attempts are made to give proper Hayden Berry, Editor, Web Manager and appropriate attribution Iwona Reichardt, Editor, Lead Translator to the author and source.

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European Solidarity Centre Printing: ul. Doki 1 Drukarnia Kolejowa Kraków Sp. z o.o. 80-958 Gdańsk tel.: +48 58 767 79 71 International Distribution: [email protected] www.pineapple-media.com The Cost of Inaction

Dominik P. Jankowski anD Paweł Świeżak

Despite being the best positioned to resolve conflicts in the region, the European Union is losing sight of its role in the security and stability in Eastern Europe. If only it had the will and courage to do so.

The current debate on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the European Union is acquiring Manichean features. The dualism and polarisation of judgement are striking. On the one side, we hear voices that we are finally seeing an irreversible weakening of European interest to the rest of the world due to the deep economic crisis in the continent. Moreover, there is a strong belief that apathy, reactivity, lack of leadership and renationalisation of foreign policies of the European countries are permanent features. Hence, the EU is supposed to be consistently pushed to the sidelines of the global decision- making processes. Ignoring Eastern Europe The other extreme is the “happy-go-lucky” is a reckless policy in which optimism, for which EU actions receive better marks than they deserve. In this scenario, the EU’s the EU should not indulge. reaction to the events of the Arab Spring in North Africa is interpreted in an overly optimistic way: the flexibility and efficiency of the European Neighbourhood Policy, together with the increased development aid for the region, are said to be responsible for democratic changes on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean.

Shifting attention

The average European (or American) often forgets that the whole picture is composed of individual, often non-spectacular events or actions. Only gathering them together allows us to draw long-term conclusions. There is a popular claim about the “southward turn” of the EU. We believe that it is a simplification and that such claims should be treated with caution. Naturally, to some extent it is true – indeed, since 2010 we have been observing a shift of 8 Opinion and Analysis Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Cost of Inaction

attention of the EU towards the African continent. This was particularly evident in the area of security. The EU has taken a number of steps aimed at building security in Africa, and not all of them were the result of the Arab Spring. Civilian missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD – the mission supporting the reform of the security sector in Congo since 2005, and the EUPOL RD – police mission since 2007), and military ones in the Horn of Africa (EUNAVFOR Atalanta – the naval mission since 2008, and EUTM – the training mission in Somalia since 2010) were supplemented with new missions. In 2012 three new civilian operations on the African continent were launched (EUCAP Sahel Niger – aid in combating terrorism, EUCAP Nestor – coordination of the ongoing EU efforts in the region, and in South Sudan – ensuring security at Juba airport). Despite comparable, if not greater, challenges of security in Eastern Europe, no single EU mission has been introduced in this region after 2008. Moreover, the number of people staffing the most important EU operation in the region – the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia – has been cut every year. If we add to this both the opinions of senior EU officials suggesting (informally, but directly) that Eastern Europe should be a zone of the special responsibility of Russia, and the ideas intended at a “Taiwanisation” of EU policy towards Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, it has to be said that we are dealing with a really negative trend. What is more, Eastern Europe is absent in the EU enlargement agenda (which covers only the Western Balkan states and the EFTA countries, e.g. Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Lichtenstein).

If not the EU then who?

One could ask why the security challenges in Eastern Europe should be tackled by the EU. The simplest answer is that no other candidate for this role is available. NATO is inapt for this function (its authority was damaged in 2008 when there was no convincing response of the Alliance to the aggression against a country with a membership perspective). Moreover, NATO has other priorities right now.1 The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) remains paralysed by disagreements and mistrust between member states. This was confirmed once again at the summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, in 2010, when no progress was achieved in the area of security in Eastern Europe. The OSCE may still be a valuable platform

1 Among them strengthening the fundamental capabilities arising from the article 5 of the Washington Treaty: collective defence, retaining adequate military potential in the face of financial constraints, counteracting certain threats of an unconventional nature (for example, in cyberspace) and ending the combat mission in Afghanistan in 2014. Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Cost of Inaction Opinion and Analysis 9 for the debate on security, but its image is tarnished by the Organisation’s inability to resolve any of the “frozen conflicts” on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Similar charges could also be levelled at the United Nations. Withdrawing the OSCE and UN mission from the Caucasus after the 2008 war is another factor contributing to the increased security deficit in the region. The European Union should confront this issue in its own interest. The situation in Eastern The greatest challenges Europe is shaped by at least six determinants. for stability in the region The first is economic uncertainty and the remain unresolved. ongoing effects of the economic breakdown in 2008 and 2009, as well as the fear of a new wave of the crisis. The second: a general lowering of the importance of the region on the geopolitical map of the world (resulting from the international community’s focus on the challenges in the Greater Middle East and a “reset” in US.-Russia relations). The third is Russian assertiveness in regional policy and Moscow’s new integration project in the economic-political sphere – the Common Economic Space and the projected Eurasian Economic Community. The fourth: revitalisation of Russia-sponsored regional military cooperation both in multilateral (the Collective Security Treaty Organisation) and in bilateral formats (Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan). The fifth is authoritarian consolidation of power in the post-Soviet states. A sixth factor is the specific, non-transparent foreign policy, often invoking such vague slogans as “multi-vectorality” or “non-alignment”. Intensification of these negative tendencies can be seen as the long-term threat to Europe, touching the very foundations of European security. Ignoring these challenges would be a reckless policy for the EU.

Negative positives

The EU has yet been unable to make use of its political, military and economic potential for playing a significant role in overcoming the challenges of the security of Eastern Europe. It is in the context of this region that the incoherence of the CFSP is especially blatant. The policy of individual European actors towards Russia and the states of the Eastern Partnership is far from being compatible. The matter is further being complicated by the multiplicity of instruments used by Europe in its external relations – that is, bilateral programmes, projects within the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, missions under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and their inadequate coordination. Furthermore, the EU’s involvement in security policy in Eastern Europe has a reactive character, one of responding to emerging crises ad hoc. 10 Opinion and Analysis Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Cost of Inaction

The EU’s ability to predict and set the course of events is weak. This results in mistakes being made in early stages of the policy planning process. For example, the missions under the CSDP, which generally have the nature of “putting out fires” and are short-term operations, were given mandates including the conduct of structural changes, which by definition is a long-term task. Consequently, EU involvement in the East is perceived with disappointment in the East European capitals. Regardless of the fact that in the EU itself no one accepts the charges of passivity in matters concerning security in Eastern Europe, the major challenges for stability in the region remain unresolved (including the protracted conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, as well as between Armenia and Azerbaijan).

Positive positives

Nevertheless, as emphasised above, the picture cannot be and is not unambiguously pessimistic. The European Union can boast of some successful actions and interventions in the delicate crisis situations. A good example of this was the mediation by the French Presidency, supported by Poland and the Baltic states, which led to the ceasefire of the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. Moreover, three missions launched thus far in Eastern Europe under the auspices of the CSDP deserve a positive evaluation. They are EUJUST Themis (started and concluded in 2004 in Georgia Increased involvement and focused on supporting the reforms of the Georgian justice system), EUBAM (helping to in Eastern European maintain stability on the Ukrainian-Moldovan security is not beyond border since 2005), and finally the EUMM in the EU’s potential. Georgia since 2008. Despite its limitations (there are problems with implementing the mission’s mandate owing to the lack of Russian permission to access the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia), the mission was an important success and led to a decrease of tension between the conflicting parties (especially under the Incident Preventing and Response Mechanism). On the positive side we can also include the EU’s Special Representatives dealing with crises in the Eastern neighbourhood: in 2003 for the South Caucasus and in 2008 for the Georgian war (replaced by one emissary for both in 2011), and in 2005 for the Moldovan/Transnistrian crisis. The presence of EUSR’s has allowed the EU to influence the dynamics of the events and has facilitated the coordination of European policy in troubled regions. Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Cost of Inaction Opinion and Analysis 11

The element which in the long-term may prove decisive for EU efforts aimed at assuring permanent stability in the Eastern neighbourhood is the support for structural reforms in the countries of the region. This is to be achieved by using an extended set of instruments at the disposal of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. One cannot forget that the declaration adopted at the Second Summit of the Eastern Partnership in September 2011 in Warsaw contained clauses on deepening EU cooperation with partner countries in security area, including additional resources for building trust in the regions of conflict. The declaration also included a call for strengthening dialogue aimed at a possible participation of Eastern partners in EU civilian and military missions. Until now however, only Ukraine has signed an appropriate agreement with the EU on cooperation in crisis management. The European Union also promised to devote more attention to specific programmes contributing to greater stability in the Eastern neighbourhood. Concrete measures which could be named here are including the Eastern Partnership countries in the training activities (programmes within the European Security and Defence College and in the EaP Academy of Public Administration), and plans for EU engagement in developing comprehensive programmes of security sector reforms in Eastern European countries interested in such aid.

Grassroots approach

The Arab Spring serves as convincing proof that the cost of passivity and inaction may turn out to be higher than the cost of active involvement. As Przemysław Grudziński, former Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, correctly notes in his book A Smart State. Poland in Search of an International Role, “intelligent” policy and being a significant player in international relations means, most of all, adopting a strategy of “propose, propose, propose”, without waiting for a signal from others, for then you can only react. Ensuring permanent stability in Eastern Europe lies in the EU’s vital interest. Unresolved conflicts in the region may easily get out of control, the most pronounced example of which being the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. The demoralising impact of these conflicts on the situation in the countries of Eastern European is obvious. The conflicts serve as an excuse for the local elites which neglect the policy of modernisation and necessary reforms. Protracted disputes create a negative perception of the region by the outside world, hampering its economic development by damaging the investment climate. And for the EU, the inability to shape the situation even in its closest neighbourhood is embarrassing. 12 Opinion and Analysis Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Cost of Inaction

Of course, resolving conflicts in Eastern Europe does not depend solely on the EU. It is the local elites’ attitude which is crucial in this respect. Also, the activity of other players in the region, above all Russia and Turkey, is vital. Nevertheless, an increased involvement in the Eastern European security is not beyond European Union’s potential. Smart EU policy towards Eastern Europe should be based both on an adequate diagnosis, and on understanding the EU’s own interests. It seems fair to say in this respect that in the security sphere, the EU’s The EU has the advantage policy should be based on four fundamental directives. of being able to act as an Firstly, it is necessary to go beyond mental “honest broker” not directly clichés. Both the claims about the complete involved in the conflicts. ineffectiveness of the EU action in Eastern Europe and the marginal importance of this region for Europe are false. European elites should be aware of this when planning future activities in Eastern Europe. Secondly, more coordination is welcomed; it is advisable to combine EU instruments in security policy – such as CSDP, or confidence building measures – with the instruments of diplomatic and soft power (this role is currently played, above all, by negotiations on the Associate Agreements and DCFTA’s, intended at formulating and precipitating reform agendas and stabilising the Eastern European states). An added value may also be brought in by the Eastern Partnership – not only through concrete programmes targeted at the security domain but also through creating a platform of multilateral dialogue, which is especially important considering the low level of regional cooperation in Eastern Europe. Thirdly, the EU must not forget about its space for political manoeuvre. The “policy corridor” is set, on the one hand, on the non-recognition policy, while on the other hand – on preventing the complete international isolation of separatist para-states. What can be done is the implementation of soft power instruments dedicated to defusing tensions in conflict zones. Those are: facilitating local and regional cooperation, supporting the development of civil societies and mutual contacts of communities living on the opposite sides of the “administrative boundary line”, involving local elites in multilateral projects of neutral character (for example, scientific, journalistic), or economic cooperation on a limited scale. These forms of cooperation, consulted with Tbilisi, Chisinau, Yerevan and Baku (as well as Kyiv in the case of Transnistria), could help prepare the ground for the difficult talks regarding the ultimate political status of the “quasi-states”. And fourthly, the EU has the advantage of being able to act as an “honest broker”, a neutral player not involved directly in the ongoing conflicts. It is important, Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Cost of Inaction Opinion and Analysis 13 because models of regional stability presented, for example, by Ankara and Moscow2 proved unacceptable in this respect for the countries of the region. This is why the EU model remains attractive. The assumption that applying European economic and political standards as a long-term panacea for Eastern Europe’s problems may sound idealistic but it is also based on solid ground.

Courage to act

Describing his 19th-century Eastern European experience, the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz wrote:

“The serpent slipping adown grassy lanes; From my far home if word could come to me! Yet none will come” (The Ackerman Steppe, translated by Edna Worthley Underwood)

The question for today is whether “the word” – followed by actions – from the EU will come. Nothing has been lost so far; but the determination and persistence are of fundamental importance right now for the success of the EU in Eastern Europe. We need the CFSP which is geographically balanced and which uses the full potential of EU resources. Diplomatic, political and economic grassroots work is of firstmost importance and not necessarily spectacular or media-worthy initiatives. But it does offer a chance for tangible, long-term benefits. In his article A Zone of Oblivion (New Eastern Europe No. 4(V)/2012) Paweł Świeboda writes about a Ukrainian (or more broadly speaking, Eastern European) dilemma of the EU: continue the current “persuasion” policy despite the growing disenchantment with its results, or take a break and wait until Eastern Europe returns on the path of democratic and free-market reforms? We believe that this dilemma should be put another way. “Nature abhors a vacuum”, so the “wait and see” option should not be considered (in political practice it would mean apathy, reactivity and losing the East). The true question is about the specific means of implementing the first option. In an optimum arrangement they should be based on a proactive, “pre-emptive” approach, and formulating proposals; and the existing mechanisms and instruments at the EU’s disposal are a good starting point for that.

2 In 2008-2009 Russia and Turkey presented their own “agendas” for arranging relations in the region: the Turkish idea of a “platform of stability and cooperation” regarding the South Caucasus and aimed at creating a Turkish- Russian “duopoly” in the region; the Russian “privileged interests zone” covering the whole post-Soviet area. 14 Opinion and Analysis Dominik P. Jankowski and Paweł Świeżak, The Cost of Inaction

The EU not only needs a good diagnosis of the future development of the situation in Eastern Europe, but also self-confidence, as it still has the potential to be an inspiration for changes in Eastern Europe and to influence their direction. But above all, the EU must have the courage to act.

Translated by Tomasz Bieroń

Dominik P. Jankowski is an expert analyst at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland and a PhD student at the Warsaw School of Economics. Paweł Świeżak is an expert analyst at the National Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland. The article does not reflect the official position of the National Security Bureau, but expresses the private views of its authors. The Dark State – Part I

JOhn Sweeney

The night train east from Warsaw to Minsk, clickerty-clack, clackerty-click, eases to a dead stop somewhere, nowhere.

Bursts of sodium-yellow punch holes in the dark. There is no moon. Metal creaks, a steel door slams. Borders eat time. A Polish frontier guard enters our train carriage, a tribute to Soviet heavy metal, still hot and stuffy from the heat of the day. The guard shouts, “passportszy” or some such and struts as much as anyone can strut in two square They call it Belarus, feet between four bunks, a pygmy tyrant. He’s pretty rude to the other two chaps in the carriage, one a Pole, which kind of means one a Belarusian. I look up from my nest I have built White Russia, in my corner of the carriage by the netted window: or maybe not. one empty bottle of Sauvignon Blanc, one copy of The Hound of the Baskervilles, one tombstone, Arguably, by Christopher Hitchens, one secret-camera watch on my wrist filming the bullying guard for practice and one Private Eye crossword; seven across seemed oddly fitting: “Dread getting screwed in ugly squalor, having taken precautions: nine letters.” (The answer is “guardedly” not that I got it.)I hand him my British passport.

*** The train shunt-clunters on for a mile or so and stops dead, again. Somebody should write a book about these particular train-tracks, history’s clatter of metal on metal, in the fuzzy, endlessly shifting borderlands between where Poland stops and Russia starts. Geography has cursed this place; and history too. They call it Belarus, which kind of means White Russia, or maybe not. Down these train-tracks Lenin fled Tsarist persecution to the west, then coming back further north in 1917 in a sealed train. The Tsars killed 4,000 Russians in a century; Lenin’s mob matched that in two months. The train tracks carried Stalin’s men in 1939 hereabouts thanks to 16 Opinion and Analysis John Sweeney, The Dark State – Part I

the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the midnight of the century, and Hitler’s in 1941, then Stalin’s men back again in 1944. Stalin’s heir in Belarus is still in charge. Train doors are slammed open somehow and it is the turn of the Belarus border guards to play heavy. I’m a little bit scared and whenever I feel afraid I whistle a happy tune so that no-one will suspect I’m afraid. My cover is that I’m an artist. I’ve got a beret with a silly tiddly squiggle on top in my rucksack, a dab of red paint on my jean jacket and a box of paints I bought in W.H. Minsk is a city that Smiths in Wimbledon. In Warsaw, I dabbled and dibbled and produced my first work of art since primary school: looks safe, clean, “A Pint of Lager”. It’s mostly in bile yellow, with dabs of European and red and olive green here and there, inexplicably. A spider perfectly modern. with six broken wrists could have done better. The Belarusian border crew are considerably more polite than the Polish guard. One chap in a silly hat too big for him asks for my passport. It is spanking new, so shiny and clean it looks fishy, with only one stamp, a tourist visa allowing me into Belarus. If someone with half a brain googles me, I’ve got seven million hits on YouTube, the BBC reporter who went bonkers at the Church of Scientology. He stamps it and gives it back to me. A woman Customs official, mumsy and pleasant, glances at my suitcase, stuffed with all manner of stuff I don’t want her to look at. “Only clothes?” she asks. “Only clothes,” I reply. Two weird things happen once we enter Belarus. The first weird thing is the entire train jolts and ker-clunks and then is slowly lifted off its wheels by a giant hand and plonked on wider, Russian train tracks, to the accompaniment of an awful lot of heavy metal clonk-clunking. Sleep is futile. The second thing is stranger and happens soundlessly. Without pomp or circumstance, you sense you are time-travelling backwards onto different political tracks, to the old days of the Soviet Union and the eastern European dictatorships, when strong men ruled and dissidents got smudged out or tortured or shot and zeks got banged up in forget-me prisons or psychiatric hospitals for talking sense, and in the name of humanity useful idiots from the West cheered on inhumanity.

*** A dawn of rare beauty, a great red sun rising above a green meadow swathed in pearl-grey mist. Through the carriage window oceans of forest, mainly silver birch, saunter by, then a duck pond, little wooden houses with yellow, peach and grey window frames, as fragile as if they are made from gingerbread. Half-dead with lack of sleep, I feel as though I’ve stumbled into a fairy tale. The landscape is not quite flat, but rolls with gentle undulations, like big Atlantic rollers coming into John Sweeney, The Dark State – Part I Opinion and Analysis 17

Cornwall on a nice calm day. The paranoia that troubled me through the night by the light of day seems unhinged, unreal, pathetic. This see-sawing between morbid fear of arrest and what may follow, and sniggering at my over-hyped paranoia never goes away the whole time I’m in Belarus. The train clickerty-clacks into Minsk station. Plan A is to take a taxi to the Eternal Flame, the national memorial to the dead of the Second World War where I will be met by “Dick” which, funnily enough, is not exactly his real name. I don’t like Plan A because I would be wandering around the monument with a big red suitcase, so we arrange Plan B; that I will be picked up by a taxi driver, “Tom”, who shall drive me to Dick’s place. Thing is, the moment a foreign-looking bloke with an Irishman’s nose and a big fancy red suitcase steps out into the air at Minsk station a dozen taxi drivers will hit on him, as so they did. “Taxi?”“Taxi?”“Taxi?” There is an agreed signal, something like “the paprika will be hot tonight”, but I’ve completely forgotten what it is. My phone rings. It’s Dick. Tom can’t find me. “Where are you,” asks Dick? I’m standing bang in front of the station, a big bald man in a blue jean jacket and a red suitcase and seven millions hits on YouTube. I decided not to wear the beret because it might make me look conspicuous. Ah, says, Dick, Tom’s on the other side of the station. “Harry” is on his way, too. Stay there, he says, and hangs up. I begin to get the feeling that if the other side had half an idea of how rubbish Tom, Dick, Harry and I are, they would laugh themselves silly. The other side, by the way, is the KGB. Imagine a post-Stalinist regime so cocky they can’t even be bothered to change the name of the secret police. Tom turns up, leads me back through the station, and we get in the car and go for a drive through Minsk and I meet Dick who introduces me to Harry. We eat a fancyish breakfast in a 24/7 eatery. Dick is a character, immediately likeable, and we hit it off. Harry is more Do not doubt the wary, and pulls a face when Scientology comes up. “Why was it necessary to shout that loud?” Well, then, brutality of the regime if you insist. L Ron Hubbard wrote a science fiction and the effectiveness story about a space alien satan called Lord Xenu and of political violence turned it into a religion and Tom Cruise… oh, sorry, wrong book. (A book, as it happens at the time of in suppressing dissent. writing, no major publisher dare print.) Dick and Harry go off to film some general views of the city, and leave me to snooze for a bit and then walk and explore the city. The third weird thing, the weirdest thing of all, unfolds in front of my eyes and eats into my brain. The city looks safe, clean, European, perfectly modern. You 18 Opinion and Analysis John Sweeney, The Dark State – Part I

can’t get more twenty-first century than a Porsche Cayenne zipping down the main Independence Avenue. Or a beautiful woman, all curves and angles, diving into a fancy shop, name-check bags dangling from slim wrists. The man in the al fresco fancy restaurant is tap-tapping away on his Apple Mac. Over there a woman is whispering sour nothings into an iPhone. It could be London or Berlin or, more likely, Prague or Brno or Vilnius. But there’s money here, and modernity, and western brands galore. What could be wrong? Back in the safety of Warsaw, a man who knew different drew precise directions for what could be wrong in my W.H. Smith artist’s watercolour pad: “Walk on down Independence Avenue, past McDonalds on the right and TGI Fridays on the left. There, on the other side of the street from the statue to Dzerzhinsky [Lenin’s secret police chief and mass-murderer, Felix Dzerzhinsky,] is the KGB headquarters. Look out for four columns. Behind the columns is a square block, completely shut off from public view. And that is where you’ll find the Amerikanka, [the American Place, named after a circular prison in Chicago from the 1920s]. That’s where they torture.” He knows because he’s been a guest of the KGB, he’s done the Amerikanka.

*** The KGB torture for a number of reasons, I discover, but most often it is to shut people up who dare to claim that the President of Belarus is a liar and a cheat and a murderer. I follow my friend’s directions, past McDonald’s and TGI Fridays, and there on the other side of the wide boulevard from the statue to Dzerzhinsky stands a big yellow building with four Doric columns. I walk on past the front of a building and down a side street and watch two men come out of a small door on the side street of the KGB block. They are young, sharing a joke, like any other office workers anywhere on our continent. Normal, modern, ordinary, laughing, smiling – and that is how the Alexander Grigoryevich Lukashenka mind-fuck works. They look normal, but there is evidence that they torture people for telling the truth in a building just behind the main street. He’s Lukashenko in Russian but Lukashenka in Belarusian. Both work. When the trumpets sound and he is named President, they announce him: Lukashenka. Do not doubt the brutality of the regime, and the effectiveness of political violence in suppressing dissent. A few days later in Minsk, under the gaze of a photograph of Vaclav Havel, I met Andrei Mowchan, who had dared go out in public carrying the old, pre-Soviet flag of Belarus, the white-red-white one, in support of another member of the opposition, SiarhieiKavalenka, slowly dying in prison for the same crime. The flag dates back to the Middle Ages, and reflects the country’s White Russian name. Long suppressed, it bubbled up in 1917-1918 before the Soviets established control, and then again after 1941 when the Nazis invaded. For this John Sweeney, The Dark State – Part I Opinion and Analysis 19 reason the Lukashenka regime damns it as a Nazi relic, which air-brushes out the other bits of history. The better test of what is or is not Nazi-like is how you treat people you disagree with. In Andrei’s case, his one-man political protest lasted a couple of minutes – and then seven officers beat him up. Look at his left eye. It is deep red, like the crater of the volcano Nyiragongo in the Congo. They beat him up so savagely that he is still suffering from a head-tremor. A young man in his twenties or early thirties, he has the head-shake of a 90-year-old. I ask Andrei why talk to the BBC, because it will only lead to more trouble with the regime? He told me: “I want people to know that Belarus is in the centre of Europe, and that there is a dictatorship here, a complete dictatorship. Totalitarianism. Here people don’t count as people. I want people to know about this, and that here in Belarus people are still fighting against this. But we may be no more if other people in the world don’t pay attention to us.”

This text originally appeared in the book Big Daddy, published by Silvertail Books. To read part II of Mr Sweeney’s adventure – you can go online at www. neweasterneurop.eu or download the whole book in its entirety available in e-format from Amazon Kindle.

John Sweeney is an award-winning British journalist and investigative reporter for the BBC programme Panorama. Four More Years

GiuSeppe D’AmAtO

With the re-election of Barack Obama as the president of the United States, will we now see a period of growing geopolitical stability in Europe? The evolving relationship between the US and Russia, the only possible rival power in Europe, will give us the answer.

The European Union breathed a sigh of relief following Barack Obama’s presidential victory in the United States; as did Russia and its former communist satellites. US priorities in foreign policy will remain the same for another four years: the fight against terrorism, the Middle East, and China with the Pacific region. During the presidential campaign some In 2009 President Obama analysts highlighted the fact that the two launched the “reset” policy candidates for the White House did not debate in an effort to improve the Europe and the transatlantic problems. The reason is simple and is not at all connected relationship with the Kremlin. with a sort of disinterest. The Atlantic moat did not widen, as some specialists wrote. Quite the opposite! The Euro-American axis already works fruitfully for a better world on the basis of decades of friendship, despite some unsolved bilateral questions. The time of the Cold War is over and Europeans have started actively playing their role in global affairs. Libya and Afghanistan are one example, with Syria and Iran being another. Brussels will remain a strategic American ally, which shares common views and strategies with the White House on the economic recovery from the financial crisis. Don’t forget that in August 2012, President Obama received decisive support for his re-election from Mario Draghi, the President of the European Central Bank, in his official statement defending the euro from speculation at any cost. This courageous choice by the bank’s head stabilised the world’s financial markets, the dollar saw a better rate with significant effects on the internal American labour market, and Obama was able to play his cards more easily during the presidential campaign. One question is now crucial: does Obama’s re-election mean that the entire Old Continent is facing a period of geopolitical stability? The relationship between the US and Russia, the only possible rival power in Europe, will give us the answer. In 2009 President Obama launched the “reset” policy in order to restore the relationship Giuseppe D’Amato, Four More Years Opinion and Analysis 21 with the Kremlin after the war in Georgia. In 2012 Russia is not a superpower, even if it is considered a “resurgent” power by experts. It lost its status of superpower as a result of the end of the Cold War, and currently has limited weight in global political, economic and military affairs. Moscow is not the hated enemy it was for four decades during the 20th century. It is a useful ally in places such as Afghanistan, but also a partner, which has often criticised Western positions on issues such as Syria or Iran, and an energy supplier to the US strategic reserves. In short, Russia is neither a threat for Washington nor the European Union, as the Soviet Union was. Today’s challenges in the era of globalisation are completely different from those of the past. Barack Obama promised the Russians to be more “flexible” after the elections. In 2009 he started a new period in the bilateral relationship, but did not invite Moscow to join the regional anti-missile shield, which would represent a decisive recognition of the successful end of the Russian democratic evolution that began in 1991. The Kremlin’s former European satellites, now US allies, are still hesitant to make that historic step. Protests in Moscow and the repression of dissent will further delay any other openings. Nonetheless, in these four years there have been positive changes in US-Russian relations. Moscow and Washington signed the nuclear arms control treaty in 2010, and this year the White House supported Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization. Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has recently described Barack Obama as “a genuine person” who “really wants to change much for the better”. The Kremlin wants the White House to stay away from the former Soviet space and help maintain the “status quo” in the area. In the past, the “coloured” democratic revolutions in the Community of Independent States, financed by the George W. Bush Administration, provoked a tough anti-Western sentiment in Moscow. The US airbase in Manas, Kyrgyzstan, will be a special new chapter in the bilateral relationship. Despite the Russians who lobbied against the US presence in the former Soviet republic, some reports say that Americans have installed radar to monitor Northern Chinese airspace. More likely, Manas is probably a part of the regional US anti-missile shield in Asia. With Mitt Romney in the White House, it would have been easier for Putin to justify the astronomically expensive 10-year rearmament and modernisation plan for the armed forces (770 billion dollars), especially at a time when the economic crisis is narrowing and social problems are becoming more and more serious. The dismissal of the Russian defence minister, Anatoly Serdyukov, is a sign of the fight to control all that money among the Kremlin’s opposing clans. But Obama was re-elected, and how this will all play out exactly over the next four years remains to be seen.

Giuseppe D’Amato is an Italian analyst and historian who specialises in Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union. Nobody Wanted To Win

VOlODymyr hOrbAch

The best phrase to explain the hidden agenda of the latest parliamentary campaign in Ukraine is that “nobody wanted to win”; of course, not the candidates, but the chief strategists of the main political forces. Although nobody will confirm it aloud, the actions of the main political players reveal their true motivation.

In Ukraine, the Party of Regions had a plan (and probably hasn’t said farewell to it yet) to gather 300 seats in parliament in order to change the constitution. Changing the constitution would allow the president to be elected again in 2015, not by public ballot but by vote in parliament. Achieving this goal was planned, if not as an The vote for Svoboda was the immediate result, then as a gradual process most popular form of a protest of enticement throughout 2013 and 2014 vote against the ruling party. of supporters who want to prolong Viktor Yanukovych’s stay in power. Andriy Klyuyev, the party’s chief of staff during the electoral campaign and secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (NSDC), was (and perhaps still remains) responsible for this scenario. If successful, he could also expect to become prime minister and thus occupy the second highest position in the power vertical after the president. The latter is also approved by a simple majority in parliament upon the president’s request.

Fundamental contradiction

However, apparently, not everyone in the government can be enticed, especially those whose services may appear unnecessary for the president if the above scenario becomes a reality. An example would be Klyuyev’s main competitor, head of the presidential administration Sergey Levochkin. Levochkin played an active role in the process of selecting candidates for the Party of Regions for the October 28th Volodymyr Horbach, Nobody Wanted To Win Opinion and Analysis 23 elections and provided administrative support for them. It has become obvious that the fundamental contradiction within Yanukovych’s team has been between the different strategies and visions of the heads of the NSDC, and the presidential administration: while Klyuyev directed staff and the campaign (people and finances), Levochkin controlled administrative resources and information policy of the major media outlets. At the same time each was tempting to shift responsibility to the other. The president also ordered Levochkin to secure the acceptance of the West that the Ukrainian elections were fair and democratic. However, it is well known that western observers and politicians have declared that the recent elections were a step backwards in terms of democratic developments compared to the previous elections. Thus, it appears that both “pillars of the ruling regime” have lost because they did not fulfil the president’s orders. One of them did not manage to provide a simple majority for the Party of Regions, as his competitor prevented him from achieving it. While the other failed to provide positive publicity of the electoral process itself, due to incidents in the single-mandate (winner-takes-all) constituencies after the polling stations closed. The joint opposition Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) also did not have any illusions about whether Yanukovych would simply hand over power based on the outcome of the elections. The main problem here is that the authorities have restored the 1996 constitution, according to which, the government should resign only in the case of a change of president. Parliament only has the right to express distrust for the government, and in such a case, the president should issue a decree on the resignation of the government. But the president still has the possibility to preserve the government if, for example, parliament refuses to approve the new candidate for the position of prime minister. Only the president has the right to propose this candidature. One can easily imagine President Yanukovych acting this way given the current political conflict between the authorities and the opposition. Furthermore, there are no volunteers among the opposition willing to take responsibility for the unpopular measures that will be inevitable during these times of growing economic and debt crisis. If the opposition had won and the president had agreed to nominate the pro-opposition candidate for the position of prime minister, he would still, in fact, control the security ministries. He would also be able to actively use his right to veto. The media sphere, controlled by the oligarchs, would then be able to shape the image of the failure of the opposition’s social and economic policies. The issue of the release of the former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, might well have been the only motivation for Batkivshchyna to win the recent parliamentary elections. However, it looks as she was deliberately sacrificed at the stage of creating 24 Opinion and Analysis Volodymyr Horbach, Nobody Wanted To Win

an election coalition of the two major opposition parties – Batkivshchyna and Front Zmin (The Front for Change). The clear explanation for this sacrifice is that the new leaders of the opposition had to secure favourable conditions for their own participation in the 2015 presidential elections.

The most important

Yulia Tymoshenko’s initial strategic goal to create an anti-presidential majority around “Batkivshchyna” quickly became unattainable. Therefore, the joint opposition leaders established a new strategic objective to control more than 150 parliamentary seats in order not to allow the president to execute a constitutional reform through parliament, essentially blocking Yanukovych’s re-election. This explains why the opposition began negotiations with the Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms (UDAR) on the mutual withdrawal of candidates in the single-mandate (winner- takes-all) constituencies that brought significant benefits, but not overall victory. The leader of UDAR, the boxer Vitali Klitschko, stated his readiness to form his own government, although hardly anyone had hoped Despite fraud, the 2012 that this opportunity would immediately come true. It was the first time his party had participated in parliamentary elections parliamentary elections and, therefore, it was also in Ukraine were still an application for participation in the selection for very competitive. the second round of presidential elections in 2015. The visible slowdown of rhetoric toward the end of the campaign could be explained as UDAR’s will not to confront the authorities too early. UDAR, however, didn’t manage to avoid attacks from both the joint opposition and Svoboda (the right-wing nationalistic party), but most importantly, still managed to enter parliament. The main phenomenon of “protest voting” during the recent elections, when the “against all” option was eliminated from voting ballots for the first time, was the fact that Svoboda also managed to enter parliament. Not only did nationalists (in the common sense of the word) vote for Svoboda, but also liberals, including Russian- speaking Ukrainians. This time it was the most popular form of protest vote: the worse for the Party of Regions, the better! This situational motivation overcame the ideological beliefs of voters, who clearly understood against whom (and what) they voted by supporting the most radical opponents of the Party of Regions. This was also evidenced by the preservation of the division of the electorate into “post-orange” and “post-white-and-blue”. Flows of support between Batkivshchyna, UDAR and Svoboda occurred depending on the current motivation of voters. The more radical Svoboda succeeded in convincing the electorate of its importance Volodymyr Horbach, Nobody Wanted To Win Opinion and Analysis 25 and managed to take away up to five per cent of UDAR’s votes within two to three weeks. The nationalist party with a liberal name (Svoboda’s literal translation into English is “freedom”) proposed a more radical alternative than a liberal party with an aggressive name (“UDAR” also means “Strike”), and thereby satisfied the demand for radicalism. Thus, another contender for the 2015 presidential elections has now appeared: Oleh Tyahnybok, the leader of Svoboda.

The elections

On October 28th 2012, voting was almost perfect, at least in those constituencies where there were real observers. However, in the post-Soviet space it is not the procedure but the whole electoral process that is usually falsified. The introduction of a mixed electoral system allowed the Party of Regions to distort significantly the representation of Ukrainian voters. In the proportional part, three opposition parties gained significantly better results (about 50 per cent) than the ruling party (30 per cent), even if one takes into account the outcome of the ruling party’s allies – the Communists (an additional 13 per cent). Thus, if the elections were held on a proportional basis, President Yanukovych would have lost control over the legislature.

Amount Amount of seats of seats won Total won in proportional Party in single-mandate number representation (winner takes all) of seats constituencies constituencies

Party of Regions 72 115 185

Batkivshchyna 62 40 101

UDAR 34 6 40

Svoboda 25 13 37 Communist Party 32 - 32 of Ukraine Single Centre - 3 3

People’s Party - 2 2

“Soyuz” Party - 1 1

Independent candidates - 44 43

Total 225 225 445 26 Opinion and Analysis Volodymyr Horbach, Nobody Wanted To Win

As the table demonstrates, the results of the vote (excluding five districts, where the decision was made to repeat elections) didn’t allow the Party of Regions to form a constitutional majority and were not even sufficient for creating a simple majority of 226 seats on its own. Even adding the Communists’ seats wouldn’t have been enough. However, they have a large reserve among independent candidates. It is worth noting the results despite the fact that voter bribing lasted for many months, administrative pressure occurred, and administrative resources and selective financing addressed to some single-mandate constituencies were widely used. A specific feature of the recent elections The emergence of a single was the fact that most of the fraud, which opposition candidate in 2015 had previously occurred at the level of local will almost certainly mean commissions, had shifted to the level of district election commissions. This time, the district the defeat of Yanukovych. commissions became an area in which the will of citizens was actively distorted and voting results had been adjusted. Although they operated in different ways, a comparison of the number of invalid ballots in some single-mandate constituencies as well as in the whole country provides evidence of the manipulation undertaken by district commissions and their influence on the final outcome of the elections. The number of such ballots in the national constituency (about two per cent) is almost twice as low as the similar number in single-mandate constituencies. In some districts the difference is just incredible! In cases when the proportion of invalid ballots at a particular polling station differs dramatically from the average level and is approaching 50 per cent, it is not hard to realise that manipulation was taking place, namely a deliberate damage of ballots containing the votes for opposition candidates. There were tangible manipulations of voter turnout and voting itself in the regions under the control of the ruling party. Thus, a recorded voter turnout in some adjacent polling stations in Donetsk differed by 30 per cent. This indicates the phenomenon of artificial overstating; in other words, voting on behalf of people who did not show up at the polling stations. There are many examples discussed online which focus on a purely mathematical analysis and modelling of the electoral process.

Hope

The main conclusion is that Ukraine still differs from its post-Soviet neighbours – Russia and Belarus, at least because the 2012 parliamentary elections were held under conditions of real competition and the opposition had access to the media, despite some significant violations being noted. The presence of a parliamentary opposition still retains the hope of the restoration of democracy as soon as a window Volodymyr Horbach, Nobody Wanted To Win Opinion and Analysis 27 of opportunity appears. And the emergence of a single opposition candidate in the 2015 presidential elections will almost certainly mean the defeat of authoritarian President Yanukovych. Despite the fact that no change in Ukraine’s government has taken place, the parliamentary opposition has changed qualitatively. The presence of UDAR and Svoboda has made it much harder for the authorities to suppress the opposition. It will be also much harder to induce the “corridor agreements” (where ministers agree on legislation in the corridors of parliament, rather than inside the parliament) on some opposition parties, as there will be a tough fight within the opposition camp for the right to run for the presidency with the status of opposition leader; and not just a satellite of the ruling party. This is something that has certainly changed on the Ukrainian political scene, despite the fact that the real power still remains in hands of the president’s “family”. President Yanukovych will bear personal responsibility for everything that is going to happen in Ukraine in the nearest future, regardless of what he thinks about it and whether he wants it or not. And, besides, nobody wanted to win!

Translated by Igor Lyubashenko

Volodymyr Horbach is a political analyst at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation in Kyiv, Ukraine. Ukraine’s Quiet Revolution

SebAStien GObert

A historical building in Kyiv’s city centre has become the heart of a new kind of civic protest in Ukraine. From the defence of architectural heritage to protests against electoral frauds, Hostynny Dvir has turned into a local epicentre of a renewed civic dynamism.

Kontraktova ploscha (Contract Square) in downtown Kyiv is a place for strollers and light car traffic. Located in the centre of the Podil district, one of the city’s best-preserved ancient neighbourhoods, it is dedicated to the nearby Mohylanka Theatre Academy, bookshops, libraries, restaurants and cafés. Its landmark, an elegant Italian-style white building in the middle of the square, is Hostynny Dvir (Hospitable Yard). Once a peaceful building classified as a historical monument, it has now become Hostynna Respublika (Hospitable Republic). The building was first designed and built in the early 19th century. It was reconstructed between 1971 to 1990 and has since been classified as a historical landmark, host to a state library, a state research institute, restaurants, an architecture workshop, a photo studio, as well as a private The activities of the occupation business, Ukrrestavracia. In August 2011, Prime Minister Mykola Azarov signed a decree include concerts, exhibitions, allowing for the declassification of Hostynny seminars, film screenings Dvir as a historical landmark, paving the way and language classes. for the building’s privatisation. The move went unnoticed for several months. However, the late announcement of the first construction works prompted civic activists to demonstrate against the initiative, which they consider to be illegal. “The withdrawal of the Dvir from the list of architectural landmarks is just one more manoeuvre for the government to make money out of Ukraine’s heritage,” political analyst and one of the initiators of the occupation Dmytro Potekhin denounces. “We started demonstrating against the move in the spring [2012]. On May 26th, during the celebrations of the Day of Kyiv, we broke the lock of the main Sebastien Gobert, Ukraine’s Quiet Revolution Opinion and Analysis 29 gate to the courtyard and moved in. They call us occupiers, yet we have actually liberated the place from the illegitimate speculators.” As of December 2012, the activists were still there.

One theft too many

The move to withdraw the Dvir as a landmark followed a series of controversial reconstruction projects in Kyiv’s city centre. Some 300 metres away from Hostynny Dvir, the case of Andriyivsky Uzviz (Andrew’s Descent) served as a trigger. Known as a street of artists and painters, Andriyivsky Uzviz had been one of Kyiv’s most picturesque sights for decades. According to a project by the city council, the street was under heavy reconstruction for about eight months. The repairs went relatively fast as the municipality intended to complete the work before the start of Euro 2012. Yet it was marred by controversy, as experts accused the authorities of bad planning, poor execution and the misuse of funds. The head of the “Save Old Kyiv” initiative, Ihor Lutsenko, has been trying to preserve the city’s heritage for years, and has proved fiercely critical of the authorities’ methods. “First of all, they did not use the right technology to renovate the facades. They did the reconstruction quickly, so as to present a good- looking result in the minimum time,” he says. “They used Ukraine is in dire the wrong cobblestones for the pavements. They didn’t need of an active isolate the facades in the proper way: water will come in, but not come out. Facades need to breathe, but with their civil society. techniques, they won’t and they will rot from the inside. I assume that they will soon have to rebuild at least half of these buildings.” During the course of the construction, three historical buildings were torn down in order to make space for a multi-storey business centre. The demolition permit delivered by the city council was seen as a gift to the System Capital Management (SCM) company, owned by Ukraine’s wealthiest oligarch and strong supporter of incumbent President Viktor Yanukovych, Rinat Akhmetov. On April 11th 2012, about 2,000 people gathered outside the SCM office to demand a halt to the project. They were supported by the world heavyweight champion and recent political candidate, Vitali Klitschko. To the public’s surprise, Akhmetov backed down the following day, promising instead to restore the destroyed buildings and turn them into a cultural centre. Despite this unexpected success of civic mobilisation, the rest of the reconstructions continued, to the pride of Prime Minister Azarov, who savoured the record pace of the projects’ implementation and announced more plans for the city: “Among 30 Opinion and Analysis Sebastien Gobert, Ukraine’s Quiet Revolution

our plans are many different objects that could turn our capital into a beautiful European city,” he declared. An ambition that art historian Katerina Goncharova regrets, as plans have not been consulted on nor decided with the relevant experts. “Apart from the technical problems, Andriyivsky Uzviz has lost the freshness that it used to have. It has become totally dull. Of course, some repair was necessary: the street was neither modern nor very practicable. But it was alive. The way I understand it, Andriyivsky Uzviz is the first step of an enterprise to turn all Kyiv’s city centre into a commercial tourist attraction, into a sterile Disneyland.” The street was reopened on May 25th 2012, a few days before the start of Euro 2012. This was one case too many for the civic activists.

The building of a new civil society

“The first thing we did was to clean up the place,” Kyiv guide and civic activist Vladyslava Osmak recalls. “From the very beginning, we wanted to create a space where people would feel they could come and gather and discuss, without complications. Kyiv needs a public space where citizens can meet and start thinking for themselves about a more hospitable, and more human-friendly urban environment. Here is a good place to start.” An activist team of about 20 members was set up to organise the life of the improvised community centre. The activists discuss and vote on many key decisions, such as the duty schedule, cleaning tasks and the cultural agenda. “We tried to create a differentiated space, out of the perverted and corrupt system that is now in force in Ukraine,” Dmytro Potekhin explains. “Some of our members were quite naive on this: among the first decisions our council passed was the prohibition of bad language and alcohol consumption within the area of the Dvir. It didn’t work of course, but the spirit of the place was not spoiled. We abolished these decisions soon after realising they were just not enforceable.” Within the first few days of the occupation, the Dvir came under a brief attack during the night, when several men attempted to forcefully evacuate the activists. Thanks to police intervention, the attack failed. “Since then, the situation has been quiet. The ones who have tried to steal Hostynny Dvir from the people are trying to reassure investors, to make them believe that everything is OK,” says Ihor Lutsenko, involved in the core activist team. “But it is obvious that everything is not OK. Kyiv residents now acknowledge the building as a symbol. Yet we know that they can kick us out any time. Our main task is to keep it at the centre of attention. If investors start to think that there might be a negative impact to their reputation by carrying on, there is a chance that they will give up.” Sebastien Gobert, Ukraine’s Quiet Revolution Opinion and Analysis 31

Activists form a human chain around HostynnyDvir in Kyiv Photo: www.HostynnyiDvir.org.ua / ANT Berezhnyi to protest the city’s plans to privatise the building.

Soon after the occupation started, Hostynny Dvir came alive with concerts, art performances, seminars, literature presentations, film screenings as well as language and yoga classes. Over the summer, Hostynna Respublika acquired an excellent reputation and attracted thousands of supporters and onlookers. As for funding, the community states it has been relying solely on its own resources and a network of donations by citizen. One of Hostynna Respublika’s supporters, Yuli Lifshits, is a former restorer of historical buildings. After what he considers the “disastrous” renovation of Andriyivsky Uzviz, he rejoices in the active involvement of Kyiv’s residents. “The main problem in Ukraine is that the issue of preservation and reconstruction of historical landmarks only depends on the local authorities. So they can do whatever they want. And in many cases, it ends up in dirty privatisation and poor repairs. Civil society is weak and doesn’t try to participate. The country also lacks architecture schools and specialists, which also doesn’t help. And the politicians only intervene in some specific occasions and out of interest. Klitschko showed up for the Andriyivsky Uzviz action. But he didn’t stay long.” 32 Opinion and Analysis Sebastien Gobert, Ukraine’s Quiet Revolution

Made in Cyprus? Yet the pressure is strong for Hostynna Respublika’s experiment to come to an end. “I like what they do inside, when it comes to culture, but they are delaying necessary repairs to a very old building, without offering much of an alternative plan,” a young architect called Anja warns. “If they don’t do anything soon, there will be no building to defend ten years from now.” A project introduced by city council official and architect Andriy Myrhorodsky foresees a crucial strengthening of the building’s foundations, meant to compensate for the dangerous vibrations which come from the nearby metro line. Civic activists claim they are not against the repairs, yet they refuse to accept the transformation of Hostynny Dvir into “another shopping mall”, which most of the existing plans propose. Plus, doubts remain about the intentions and identity of the potential investors. Among the first in line is one of Hostynny Dvir’s tenants, the company Ukrrestavracia. Its director, Dmytro Yarych, is offering to invest more than 300 million hryvnias (about 30 million euros) to turn the building into a trade and office centre. In August, he confirmed that his company initiated the declassification of Hostynny Dvir from the list of historical landmarks. In his view, the current version of the building, based on the 1971-1990 reconstruction, should Despite setbacks, not be considered a historical landmark. According to Ukrainian law, tenants of a state- ideas of accountability owned property may apply for its privatisation and fairness are slowly without going through a competitive tender, making their way in Ukraine. provided that the tenant commits to invest at least 25 per cent of the property’s value in its maintenance. Something Ukrrestavracia is ready to do. In the summer of 2012, local media reported that over 90 per cent of the company’s shares are owned by Cyprus-registered Afidreko Holdings Limited, which Dmytro Yarych has confirmed. Yet, when asked about the actual owners of the holding, he refused to name them. In parallel with the occupation, the activists also took the case to court to question the change of Hostynny Dvir’s status. As of late 2012, the judicial process was still underway. Yet lawyer Maryna Solovyov, defender of the community’s interests, has demonstrated that the declassification is the result of a mere manipulation of technical terms. As Ihor Lutsenko wrote on November 8th 2012 on the internet- based Ukrainska Pravda, “The only explanation of such a clumsy falsification is that the name of the eventual investor, in favour of which it has been done, is one of the most prominent in Ukraine.” That is to say, a Ukrainian businessman close to the ruling elite. The European Solidarity Centre in numbers 1 ﬁrst ever national sociological survey in Poland aimed at answering the question ‘what do Poles really think about Solidarność?’ 16 documentaries produced 18 special exhibitions

36 books published 190 coferences organised 600 projects dedicated to young people 745 ﬁlmed narratives of oppositions

13 500 European Solidarity Centre ECS publications in library resources ul. Doki 1 80-958 Gdańsk Poland 36 000 e-mail: [email protected] archival pictures tel.: +48 58 767 79 71 www.ecs.gda.pl 80 000 facebook.com/solidaritycentre archival documents, leaflets, posters 200 000 visitors to the ‘Roads to Freedom’ Exhibition ADVERTISEMENT THE EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY CENTRE The European Solidarity Centre (ECS) is an institution of a new form: it is not only a museum, but also an educational and scientific establishment aimed at providing a greater understanding of Solidarność and the anti-communist movements in Poland and Europe. The objective of its founders was to create a Central European agora, a meeting place for citizens, who feel responsible for the development of democracy in Europe. The European Solidarity Centre supports reflection on the state of an open society, the role of a country, the identity of democratic communities and the issue of social justice.

ECS was created in 2007 by the Minister of Culture and National Heritage, the City of Gdańsk, the self- governing body of the Pomorskie Voivodeship, NSZZ Solidarność and the Solidarity Centre Foundation. The ﬂoor space of the newly-built building of ECS covers nearly 26 thousand square meters. A permanent exhibition dedicated to the history of Solidarność will be the heart of the centre. There will also be a library and reading room, a media library, archives, a scientiﬁc-research centre, an educational training centre, creative youth workshops as well as space for special exhibitions.

ADVERTISEMENT THE MISSION of the European Solidarity Centre We aspire to ensure the ideals of Solidarność – democracy, an open solidary society and the culture of dialogue – maintain a modern perspective and appeal. We want to preserve, in the memory of Poles and Europeans, the experience of Solidarność as a peaceful revolution, so that Solidarność, throughout European democracies, is remembered as a key part of the story of the establishment of Europe. We want Solidarność to be a source of inspiration and hope for those who do not live in open and democratic societies. THE WEIGHT of responisbility Iryna Sheiko-Ivankiv, 25 years old, works at the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative in Kiev in the Ukraine. She is writing her PHD thesis on solidarity and is also a social activist. - The Solidarity Academy in Gdańsk uncovered some very important details of the Polish road to real freedom, which I was previously unaware of. Having taken part in the workshop dedicated to leadership, I have begun to feel the weight of responsibility of a social leader. Thanks to the Solidarity Academy my understanding of Solidarność has broadened not only theoretically, but also with a view to its practical application.

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ADVERTISEMENT Sebastien Gobert, Ukraine’s Quiet Revolution Opinion and Analysis 37

Although the core team of activists pursues justice in court, Dmytro Potekhin defends a drastic political view on the judicial process as a whole. “There is no justice in Ukraine because there is no rule of law. The Hostynna Respublika group doesn’t recognise Ukraine’s corrupt courts.” In his view, the “liberation” of Hostynny Dvir is the first step in creating a new civil movement, which will eventually free Ukraine from the ones he calls “usurpers”.

Disappointment and frustration

To the disappointment of many observers, Ukraine is in dire need of an active civil society. The severe disappointment and frustration which followed the failure of the 2004 Orange Revolution led to a dramatic disinterest of citizens in the political process. In early October 2012, Andreas Gross, head of the election observation mission of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) stated that, “Ukraine is in some ways worse than Russia today because you don’t have large demonstrations and a mobilised civil society here.” “What we need is to make politicians more responsible,” says Oleh Rybachuk, former vice-prime minister of Ukraine’s first “Orange” government (2005) and chief of staff to President Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2006). Rybachuk, now the leader of the civic campaign Chesno (Honestly), undertook a “scan” of candidates in Ukraine’s October 28th general parliamentary elections, comparing their behaviour against criteria of integrity, respect of election promises and the rule of law. Out of the 504 scanned candidates, 284 were labelled guilty of inappropriate behaviour before the elections. However, Rybachuk is still optimistic. “So far, political competition in Ukraine has been understood as money competing against money. With our campaign, we want to make sure the candidates deliver and make them accountable. I believe members of parliament have started to understand that being an MP is a job with responsibilities, not simply a position to get rich.” Based on his civic activism background, Ihor Lutsenko ran a campaign as an independent candidate in one of Kyiv’s constituencies. “My campaign was all about accessing people and talking with them about their actual problems. Political parties are disconnected from the reality of this country. They talk about Russian language, political persecution, gas and the Black Sea Fleet. But people want jobs, education and proper justice. In my constituency I was the only one to actually defend the inhabitants’ interests. Some of the more mainstream candidates hardly bothered to show up in the neighbourhood.” Eventually, Lutsenko withdrew his candidacy and announced his support for a candidate from one of the opposition parties. But he feels confident about the changes he induced and is to run again in Kyiv’s city council elections. 38 Opinion and Analysis Sebastien Gobert, Ukraine’s Quiet Revolution

Although the campaign and the October 28th election day were marred with fraud and multiple violations, ideas of accountability and fairness seem to have slowly made their way in Ukraine. The authorities have faced unexpected pressure for clean vote counts and punishments against fraudsters. Vadym Omelchenko is the president of the Gorshenin Group, a non-profit analytical centre, who considers the election to be “heavily ruled by the protest sentiments … Therefore we believe we have witnessed a quiet revolution. It is the first serious signal that Ukraine is slowly returning to the democratic path of its development.” Activists still occupy Hospitable Yard in Podil. But now the elections are long gone, many fear that the controversial privatisation plans will proceed. “The winter is going to slow things down, for them as much as for us. We don’t know when they are going to start the construction. But eventually I am sure we will be thrown out,” Vladyslava Osmak states placidly. “But I already know that things have changed. Hostynny Dvir is now more a concept, a brand, than a physical place. People have realised that getting together and organising can change things for the better. This is our main victory.”

Sebastien Gobert is a freelance journalist based in Kyiv. Can Russia Really Change? Photo: Ilya Schurov (CC) www.flickr.com www.flickr.com (CC) Ilya Schurov Photo:

Starting in December 2011, Russia began seeing a surge in the amount of street protests against the ruling regime in Russia. This opposition movement was sparked by the results of the December 2011 Duma elections and the announced return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency. However, since the return of Putin as president in March 2012 and the subsequent tightening of powers by the Kremlin, this movement has slowly begun to wane. Is this movement truly a new awakening in Russia aimed at changing the political landscape, or has it lost its momentum, once again succumbing to the realities of Kremlin rule?

Read on pages 40 – 73

Pushed Outside the System Interview with Garry Kasparov Opposition(s) in Waiting Tatiana Stanovaya Democracy? No Thanks! Jakub Korejba No Competition Fyodor Lukyanov Divided We Stand Anatoly Golubovsky In Search of Traitors and Spies Ivan Preobrazhensky 40 Photo courtesyPhoto of S.M.S.I., Inc.

World chess champion turned political activist, Garry Kasparov is a member of the newly formed Coordinating Council of the Opposition. Pushed Outside the System

Interview with Garry Kasparov, Russian opposition leader and renowned world chess champion. Interviewer: Adam Reichardt

NEW EASTERN EUROPE: A year has So I think there was this spontaneous passed since the Duma elections which reaction immediately after the fraudulent seemingly awakened the opposition election on December 4th 2011, and what protest movement in Russia. You have we saw over the year that followed was personally been involved in many of that the movement failed to dismantle the the rallies and have been an outspoken regime immediately, although the core critic of Vladimir Putin. Looking back of the opposition – which was previously over the last year, what would you say estimated at three to four thousand and has been the biggest accomplishments has remained unchanged for almost five of this movement? years – has now jumped to 30 to 40,000. GARRY KASPAROV: Clearly, there’s Some of the demonstrations have even been a major change in the political reached over 100,000 in strength; this landscape in Russia, and it is not just is a very good sign for us and probably an accomplishment of the opposition a very bad sign for the regime, because movement. The real change was not on if anything happens and the public gets December 5th 2011, the day after these annoyed, angry or anxious as it did in fake elections, but rather on September December 2011, this number could rise 24th 2011 after Dmitry Medvedev quickly from this new level. publicly gave all the powers he had What’s more, the opposition has never used back to Vladimir Putin. finalised the coordination of its different This was a signal for many Russians factions – the liberals, nationalists, and who hadn’t even thought about politics left-wing radicals, etc. This is something or didn’t want anything to do with the the United Civil Front, which I helped political opposition. At that moment, establish in 2005, has been advocating for these Russians realised they had a choice: years. We held free and fair elections of either they would have to leave the candidates to the opposition coordinating country, stay there under Putin, or they council in October 2012, and this signifies could fight. the first attempt of the different groups to work together. 42 Opinion and Analysis Pushed Outside the System, Interview with Garry Kasparov

In your opinion, is being “anti- of all the liberal groups that have always Putin” enough to hold this opposition tried to gradually influence the regime. together? The coalition that we have built today is The reasoning behind this coordination made up of those who are pushed outside within the opposition wasn’t only because the system – and these are the groups the protesters don’t like Putin, but also which have been attracting the hundreds because they are trying to work out the of thousands of supporters. Their demand vision of the future of Russia. We believe is to dismantle the regime. Not to try to that a new vision for Russia is the last influence it from the inside. obstacle for the opposition, and the last line of defence for the regime. It’s true You don’t think that the system can that not that many people like Putin, but be transformed from within? they still have a genetic fear of a collapse We’ve already seen this strategy and of the regime and what happens next. it doesn’t work. In 2006, I was one of the Russians have a legitimate scepticism first to say this at one of United Civil over any dramatic change judging from Front’s earliest conferences, when a lot the experience of the 1990s. And this fear of people were laughing and booing at of change is the last barrier protecting us. And my words back then were: this the regime and holding the opposition regime won’t change through the ballot together. A vision of a Russia without Putin box. However, please do keep in mind could help the people recognise that the that this is not something I personally Putin regime is no longer the guardian of like. The majority of the opposition now a safe future, but rather its destruction. share my sentiments because Putin has The truth is that the longer the Putin made it very clear, just like Muammar regime survives, the less the chances Gaddafi or Bashar Assad: he is not going for Russia to survive are. The Putin to leave power no matter what public regime is a slow acting poison. Actually opinion polls say. it’s no longer slow acting. This poison has destroyed state institutions and its Nevertheless, the protesters endemic corruption makes it impossible are being criticised for not being for the state to recover. representative of Russian society. They are said to belong to the wealthier Some of Putin’s opponents think classes, predominantly inhabiting they can defeat him by working within urban areas. And the groups making up the system, through political means. the coordinating council are criticised Do you agree? for their lack of organisation along with These are not examples of the real a wide range of political views under opposition. The People’s Freedom Party, one tent. Will this ultimately hurt the for example, is not a coalition. It’s a replica effectiveness of the movement? Pushed Outside the System, Interview with Garry Kasparov Opinion and Analysis 43

History and experience of coalition You don’t seem to believe that building against a dictatorship tells us the Russian people prefer a strong that success only happens when these leader? different groups come together. In the I believe that the Putin regime has acted late 1980s in Chile, even the communists as a vaccination to many Russians against were included in the coalition with the a strong presidency. We now understand Christian Democrats and other similar that under Russian conditions, this leads groups who forced Augusto Pinochet to to a dictatorship. a referendum and restore democracy in As someone that has been advocating for Chile. Nobody thought that the Christian organising the factions of the opposition Democrats and the communists, and from the beginning, I have met all of these the socialists who were actually a very groups and view myself as a facilitator of important element in this coalition, the process. The agreement, especially shared the same views. They had totally among the younger members, is that different views about the future of the all of the political differences can be country, but they knew that as long as solved in a parliament, not by one man. Pinochet was in power, there would be There will be elections, people will raise no future. Similar things are happening their hands, and if the majority wants in Russia, but to the surprise of many, nationalisation, which I don’t believe is even Russian experts, there are very few going to happen, we’ll move this way. differences left among the antagonised Experience tells us that these groups can political groups with respect to the work together because they recognise, political future of the country. despite the state propaganda and attempts Of course, there are still some quite to divide us, that we all are going to live substantial differences when it comes together in the same country, and if to the economic policy of these groups. we want this country to survive we are Obviously the left-wing radicals advocate going to have to unite together against for the dramatic redistribution of Putin’s regime. wealth, while the nationalists believe that the Russian state should become And what about the criticism that more exclusive and fight immigration. the protesters are middle-class, urban However, I don’t believe that these are dwellers? the issues which are important for the It’s probably true that in the beginning coalition today. That’s for an elected those taking to the streets were urban parliament to decide. My bet is that and upper-middle class. But now, if you a freely elected Russian parliament look at the demographics, it has changed. would either vote for a parliamentary You shouldn’t be surprised, however, that republic or a weak form of presidency it is only Moscow, because Putin has like Germany or Estonia. concentrated all the political and financial 44 Opinion and Analysis Pushed Outside the System, Interview with Garry Kasparov

powers in Moscow. As a result, the people is concentrated on Moscow. On the understand that nothing which happens other hand, this also helps us as we outside of Moscow matters. If you go to don’t have to bother about other cities. protests in Ryazan, Vladivostok, Irkutsk With 500,000 people on the streets of and elsewhere, or even in St. Petersburg, Moscow, this is what is going to change it’s not going to affect power. In order to the regime; and it makes our job easier. challenge Vladimir Putin, you have to see But still, 500,000 people will not show the stars that adorn the Kremlin. That’s up unless the country is in the right what people understand. Nobody cares if mood. Those who flock to Moscow you show up and demonstrate with anti- from the small Russian towns and rural Putin slogans in Rostov. Buy a ticket and areas act as mysterious energy; and this come to Moscow, and then we’ll get what we is enough to influence Muscovites to had on May 6th 2012: thousands of people build up more courage and energy to arriving from different places in Russia. come out in bigger numbers. It is these On the one hand, the complete picture numbers which will open a new chapter is not very bright because the opposition in Russian history.

Garry Kasparov is a member of the Russian opposition coordinating council, founder of the United Civil Front political movement and world chess champion.

Adam Reichardt is editor-in-chief of New Eastern Europe. Opposition(s) in Waiting?

TATIANA STANOVAYA

Vladimir Putin’s image in Russia today is not what it was four years ago. The various opposition groups are now preparing for eventual change, but are their diverse and confusing positions enough to provide Russian society with any clear alternative?

The Russian parliamentary elections which took place in December 2011 were the starting point for a new changed political situation to be developed in the state. However, almost nothing has changed in relation to the institutions in Russia: the State Duma, the lower house of the parliament, remains in the hands of the The systemic opposition pro-Kremlin United Russia majority. at first supported the protests, Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev swapped places and kept control of the but is now one of its largest critics. executive branch system and key elements of the power “vertical”. But, a set of political risks is accumulating in the state, which may greatly increase the odds for further destabilisation in a most unpredictable format. One of the most notable events of the last decade in Russia took place in September 2011, and has acted as a sort of “bifurcation point” determining the development of the state for the next few years. This event was the United Russia convention, where Vladimir Putin’s return to the highest state office was announced. However, it was not Putin’s actual decision that was crucial to the state, but rather the consequences it had for Russian public consciousness.

Out of thin air

In practice, this was only noticed two and a half months later, when more than a hundred thousand people took to the streets in protest against the falsification of the elections to the lower house of parliament. The situation was unique due to the fact that during the most recent years of Putin’s steady rule, the opposition managed 46 Opinion and Analysis Tatiana Stanovaya, Opposition(s) in Waiting?

to gather a movement of only around 5,000 followers, with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation being the most popular, although the latter not being viewed by the Kremlin as in anyway politically dangerous. An average meeting of non-systemic liberal oppositions (those opposition groups who have no official recognition – editor’s note) would be attended by no more than 500 people. In recent years, the situation in the state was controlled to such an extent that the massive winter protest materialised out of thin Alexei Navalny has been air for the leaders of the opposition, as well as for the Kremlin and the sociologists. The Levada confirmed as the most Centre, the largest independent sociological and popular figure in the public opinion research centre in Russia, clearly Russian protest movement. established that the protests in Russia were to a large extent the people’s reaction to the Putin/ Medvedev decision to trade places in the Russian power structure and how that decision was made. This dissent was caused by the fact that the decision about Putin’s return was “imposed” upon society at a time when the demand for change and reform was growing. The polarisation began in Russia between the passive conformist majority and the active liberal-minded minority, which started rapidly and radically reviewed its attitude to Putin. Since December 2011, one of the primary characteristics of the changed political situation is the fact that Vladimir Putin ceased to exist as the “national leader”, i.e. a leader who is more or less acceptable for the overwhelming majority of Russian citizens, including moderate reformers.

What opposition?

It is customary in Russia to divide the opposition up into two types: systemic and non-systemic. The Kremlin has allowed the first type of opposition to participate in the legitimate political process and in elections. There were just seven political parties that ran in the last Duma elections in Russia, where only the Communist party – and very nominally A Just Russia – can be regarded as the real opposition. A Just Russia was constantly seen as swinging between the status of being an opposition power and the second party of power (its informal leader Sergey Mironov, the former chairman of the Federation Council, has been close to Putin since the time they worked together in St. Petersburg City Hall). The growth of the protest movement “from below” and the emergence of the new social and political demands were severe tests for the systemic opposition. Within a year the systemic opposition shifted from being a supporter of the protests to becoming its intolerable critic. In December 2011, when the situation Tatiana Stanovaya, Opposition(s) in Waiting? Opinion and Analysis 47 was to a large extent uncertain, both the Communist Party and A Just Russia tried to join the protests. The communists took part in actions organised by the opposition. It was even expected that the communist leader Gennady Zyuganov would appear at the scheduled action of the opposition in September 2012. However, inner-party contradictions rapidly rose within the party due to the fact that a part of the leadership considered it necessary to distance itself from the protest, whereas the other part voiced its support. The protests escalated the long-standing internal party problems. For years, a keen struggle has taken place between the three wings of the Communist Party: moderate (Gennady Zyuganov); “dogmatic-Marxists” (deputy chair Vladimir Kashin); and reformers (first deputy chair Ivan Melnikov). The latter wing has been for some time attempting to push the party down the path of change and modernisation, transforming it into a more European type of social-democratic party. Yet they are confronted by the dogmatists who insist upon the necessity to retain the “kernel communist electorate” of the party. This internal struggle is also supported in the Kremlin, where they treat the Communist Party as less dangerous in its current preserved form. Zyuganov is trying to act as an arbitrator, manoeuvring between the two camps. As a result, while the reformists attempted to flirt with the protest, the dogmatists demanded to rigidly cease all cooperation with the street opposition. In the end, the latter prevailed. So far, only minor figures of the Communist Party have actually participated in the “March of Millions” (in September 2012), and only acted as observers. The leadership of the party has openly declared the danger of the “non- systemic opposition” and has criticised the “orangists” – this is how the Kremlin refers to the liberals demanding an overthrow of the Putin regime (through an analogy to the term “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine). A similar process, yet far more woeful, took place in the party A Just Russia. Its three eminent activists – Gennady and Dmitry Gudkov (father and son), along with Ilya Ponomarev, joined the protest actions, closely cooperating with the “non- systemic” opposition, which also provoked a split in the party. The informal leader of the party and Vladimir Putin’s ex-friend, Sergey Mironov, was forced to seek a difficult balance between remaining loyal to the authorities and being an opposition force. What’s more, the business allies that financed A Just Russia demanded that it maintain a constructive relationship with the Kremlin. However the logic of the political process creates a temptation to flirt with the protests. Gennady Gudkov, who became one of the most popular “personalities” of the non-systemic opposition, turned out to be an inner-party competitor of Sergey Mironov: Gudkov demanded the radicalisation of A Just Russia’s position and full solidarity with the protests. Eventually the party’s financial sponsors began to 48 Opinion and Analysis Tatiana Stanovaya, Opposition(s) in Waiting?

abandon the party, and a number of deputies resigned de facto from Gudkov’s faction and united into a group loyal to the regime. Gudkov, in an extraordinary manner, was unseated by the State Duma for being engaged in business activities. The final word in the disputes concerning A Just Russia’s attitude towards the protest was given by Sergey Mironov during a press-conference at the end of October 2012. He threatened party members who cooperated with the protests that they would be expelled from the party. “In such circumstances, playing revolution and provoking the authorities to further tighten the screws is either infantilism, or even worse, a dangerous and wilful provocation aimed at attaining one’s own egoistic goals at all costs,” Mironov said.

Elite opposition

Within a year after the massive protest actions started in Russia, the systemic opposition represented by the communists and A Just Russia shifted from being a vigilant ally of the protest movement to its harshest critic. As of today, both parties are examples of the controlled opposition which is forced to maintain constructive relationships with those in power. And while the Communist Party has been able to maintain what’s left of its electorate, A The oppositional “elite” Just Russia is on the brink of extinction: the maintains access to some of the party’s rating continues to sink, whereas liberalisation of the political parties’ laws most influential people in Russia. (which could lead to dozens of new parties) may lead to a situation when A Just Russia will not be able to overcome the electoral threshold during the next Duma elections. Many more significant processes have occurred on the side of the non-systemic opposition within the last year. The non-systemic opposition is a set of political leaders and organisations, which until recently could not participate in the elections in the Russian Federation. Under Vladimir Putin’s rule, election and political parties’ laws were so strong that only political parties registered by the Ministry of Justice and complying with strict requirements (such as a minimum of 50,000 people, having branches not less than in half of all Russian regions etc.) could participate in parliamentary elections. Even formal compliance with such requirements could not provide any guarantee of registration, as the Ministry of Justice repeatedly refuses to register parties on the grounds that they are not in compliance with Russian law. As a result, a number of non-systemic opposition leaders have appeared in Russia and can be divided into three types. The first type includes professionals of the 1990s. Among these are politicians who matured and became popular under Boris Yeltsin’s rule. These are Mikhail Tatiana Stanovaya, Opposition(s) in Waiting? Opinion and Analysis 49

Kasyanov, Boris Nemtsov, Vladimir Ryzhkov, Vladimir Milov and others. Since 2003, when democratic parties Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces lost the vote to the State Duma, the non-systemic opposition founded plenty of organisations (Committee 2008, Solidarity, the Other Russia etc). However during all the years under Vladimir Putin’s rule, the politicians of the 1990s remained on the fringe of the political process. Some changes only happened during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency. During a thaw, the non-systemic liberal opposition began actively approaching the human rights activists through holding the first relatively successful campaign entitled “Strategy 31”. These were the meetings in support of article 31 of the Constitution of Russia on freedom of assembly. It was a local protest against the approval procedure for holding mass actions (formally Russian law provided that the actions should be held on a notification basis, but in practice the local authorities always have reasons to deny such events). As of today, the professionals of the 1990s are viewed by the Kremlin as the less dangerous representatives of the non-systemic opposition.

Coordinating Council of the Opposition

The second type of the non-systemic opposition includes the new leaders of the protests. Of course many of them made a name for themselves earlier, prior to December 2011. However, they became known during the mass winter protest actions against the electoral fraud. Today, almost all of them are represented in the recently elected Coordination Council of the Opposition (CCO). The CCO consists of 45 members (30 were elected from a “general” list and another 15 from three separate streams – liberal, left-wing and nationalist). The vote to the CCO is the first large- scale experiment of the opposition, which has managed to create a more or less clear mechanism of identifying the most interesting figures in the protest movement, organise debates, and draw the attention of more than 100,000 people. Pursuant to the results of the poll, the CCO was comprised of public figures such as Alexei Navalny, the writer Dmitry Bykov, the chess-player Garry Kasparov, TV presenter Ksenia Sobchak, the leader of Solidarity Ilya Yashin, the ecologist Evgenia Chirikova, journalists Oleg Kashin, Olga Romanova, Sergey Parkhomenko, the coordinator of the Left Front Sergei Udaltsov, the ex-deputy of the State Duma Gennady Gudkov, his son, the deputy of the State Duma Dmitry Gudkov, Leonid Razvozzhayev, arrested on suspicion of plotting mass disorder, Daniil Konstantinov, arrested on suspicion of murder conspiracy (he will be represented by Ivan Mironov in the CCO), the nationalists Nikolay Bondarik, Igor Artemov (wanted on suspicion of crime under Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation “Incitement to Ethnic Hatred”), Vladimir Tor and Konstantin Krylov. 50 Opinion and Analysis Tatiana Stanovaya, Opposition(s) in Waiting?

Navalny was the absolute winner of the poll and his status as the most popular figure in the protest movement in Russia has been confirmed. On the whole, however, the composition of the CCO was astonishing due to a relatively low representation by the nationalists and the left-wing. This turned out to be rather a nice surprise for the democrats, and the basis for criticism by the left-wing and the nationalists, who suspected that the organisers had created more favourable conditions for Navalny and his team. Nevertheless, the CCO today is a kind of coalition of the very diverse non-systemic forces – the left-wing, the nationalists, as well as the liberals. The specific features of this type of non-systemic opposition are that it has a democratic ideological world-view and it has found its allies among the Russian liberal intelligentsia. This is a fairly new feature to the part of the non-systemic opposition that has only begun to be set up, and which today seems to be the most perspective part of the potential protest.

Opposition “elite”

Finally, the third type of the opposition is the “elite opposition”. So far the two major players are the former vice-prime-minister and former-minister of finance Alexei Kudrin, who founded the Civic Initiatives Committee; and Civic Platform, a party created by billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov. This type of opposition is special because it belongs to a group of the most influential people in Russia, who have access to the offices of the highest governmental and Kremlin officials. The very fact that the appearance of an opposition represented by Kudrin and Prokhorov is a sign of the growing rift in the Russian establishment, a part of which is dissatisfied with “stagnation” and tendencies to nationalise the economy, toughen political laws and aggravate anti-Western attitudes. Kudrin’s and Prokhorov’s strategies are so far quite different. Kudrin has preferred to limit his actions by creating an expert group – the Civic Initiatives Committee (CIC), while keeping a good relationship with Putin, yet also publicly declaring his doubts to the official Kremlin “line”. Kudrin’s committee is currently reluctant to participate in elections or register as a political party, as this would create additional political risks and limit Kudrin’s opportunities; according to some sources he has the ambition of becoming prime minister. In other words, Kudrin’s CIC is a kind of inter-elite opposition which, for the time being, prefers to appeal to the elite and not to society. Mikhail Prokhorov, on the contrary, decided to establish his own political party. Prokhorov has had a rather controversial relationship with the authorities during the course of the last year. The Kremlin invited him to lead the Right Cause party, Tatiana Stanovaya, Opposition(s) in Waiting? Opinion and Analysis 51 which could have become a sort of constructive liberal partner to the Kremlin. However due to disagreements with respect to the potential candidates to be included on the voting lists of the party, Prokhorov soon clashed with the Kremlin administration (the party was at that time overseen by the former First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration, Vladislav Surkov). Russian society no longer believes Prokhorov took several months off the promotion of Putin’s image from his political activities after harsh criticism from the Kremlin. Upon the as a brave hero with perfect health. change of leadership in the presidential administration, Prokhorov’s relationships with the authorities were revived, and he participated in the presidential elections. According to some sources, he was expected to get an office in the federal government based on the results of the elections. The Kremlin considered his participation as very convenient and supported the semblance of an alternative and competitive character of the elections. Yet Prokhorov did not receive any office in the new cabinet of ministers, and the surge of protests after the elections to the State Duma led him to think of continuing his individual political career. Liberalisation of the laws of political parties allowed the quick registration of his own political party, which was initially supposed to be to focus on regional elections. However, it has recently transformed into a fully functional organisation, whose purpose is to implement a radical reformation of the national political system. Yet in spite of the declared “radicalism”, Prokhorov is still extremely close to the authorities, and his chances to really stand against the Kremlin seem rather vague.

Crucial changes

Thus, more than a year after the protests, a new opposition elite has rapidly started to arise in Russia, which is turning into a real political force with new leaders, ambitions and agenda. Further development of the situation will be largely determined by a number of factors, which are not completely dependent upon the efficiency of the opposition itself. First of all, it is a matter of efficiency of the authorities and their readiness to comply with social obligations. Today, the political regime has become much more vulnerable to the consequences of the possible financial and economic crisis. The latter is unavoidable in the case of a significant reduction in energy prices or a second wave of the global economic crisis. Crucial changes are happening in the public consciousness. Within the last four years Vladimir Putin’s image has been profoundly desacralised, and his approval ratings continue to be high largely due to the artificially supported lack of an alternative. However, this very lack becomes more illusory: the importance 52 Opinion and Analysis Tatiana Stanovaya, Opposition(s) in Waiting?

of the internet and social networking is increasing, and the greatly improved rate of information circulation substantially lowers the chances of controlling the information space. The old schemes of promoting Putin’s image as a brave hero with perfect health and a professional approach to resolving any problem have been exhausted and are no longer digested by the population as they were four years ago. Putin’s model of ruling the state with a lack of system mechanisms to change or update the model is gradually turning into a crisis. All of these combined lead to the accumulation of critical political risks inside the system and substantially increases the possibility of chaos in Russia’s political life, at least in the medium term. For the opposition, the top priority now is being prepared for the day when the authorities will no longer be able to perform their duties.

Translated by Olena Shynkarenko

Tatiana Stanovaya is an expert on Russian domestic and foreign policy. She is a researcher and analyst with the Russian Center for Political Technologies (CPT) and the representative of CPT in France. 53

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nee_nov.indd 1 11/19/2012 5:06:32 PM Democracy? No Thanks!

JAkub kOreJbA

The idea of freedom and democracy in the western sense is currently incompatible with Russia’s deeply rooted history, social structure, psychology and mentality. Trying to boost democracy would mean acting against all the elements that make up the Russian national identity.

A year has passed since the beginning of the last electoral cycle and Russia is still widely accused of lacking democracy. The manner in which the parliament and president were elected does not correspond with western expectations. But is reacting negatively the proper way to tackle the problem? Does it make sense to force western beliefs on Russia despite the fact that its society neither wants nor understands them? Blaming Russia for a lack of democracy is similar to complaining about not being able to buy alcohol in Saudi Arabia. Thus, instead of accusing Russia, it would be better to concentrate on Russia has no single the sources of its undemocratic political system. social force capable Although the absence of democracy is a common or interested in factor throughout the country’s history, it still raises criticism and expectations of change. Russia is regularly changing the system. expected to modify its political system, modernise and westernise it. From the western point of view, democratisation of public institutions and society is supposed to be a logical element of the country’s modernisation. Western experts regularly announce a “new” phase in Russian history that is expected to lead the country and its people towards a western-style democracy.

Russian model of democracy

Expectations were raised after the fall of communism, during Boris Yeltsin’s second election and after he stepped down, as well as when Dmitry Medvedev became president. This happened to come up once again on the occasion of 58 Opinion and Analysis Jakub Korejba, Democracy? No Thanks!

the last parliamentary and presidential elections, especially with the Russian opposition protests and its attempts to self-organise into a significant political force. The protests against electoral fraud were presented in the western media as a clear sign of Russia’s democratic awakening and the beginning of the possible dismantling of the authoritarian framework. But again, these expectations did not come true. Furthermore, seeing Russia’s opposition as a serious political force is a sign of wishful thinking and idealistic projection of our own historic experience of Russia’s reality. Expecting Russia to become a democracy is a sign of a lack of realism based on a deep conviction that the Western model is unique and universal, and will sooner or later be adopted by every country on earth. This approach however is irrelevant, not because it is unattractive, but simply because it cannot be applied to the logic of Russia’s political system. Time has come to accept that, in the foreseeable future, the opposition in Russia has no chance of becoming a sound political force and transforming the political system and culture. The attitude of the The non-democratic nature of Russian policy is not an invention of Vladimir Putin or any other average Russian towards ruler. It is deeply rooted in history, the social any kind of power is both structure, the economic model, psychology and brutal and infantile. mentality. Trying to boost democracy would mean going against all these elements of the Russian national identity. Most obviously, if Russians wanted democracy, they would already have it. There was never a better moment than during the 1990s, and if democratic change has not occurred, it means that it’s not on the top of their priorities. When Putin says that Russia has built its own model of democracy, obviously not worse and possibly better than the Western one, there is no trace of hypocrisy in his words. Being a perfect product of his own country’s history, he fully believes what he says and thus sees no link between such things as producing televisions or Mercedes and the freedom of speech, the press and liberty to elect and control the government. From the point of view of the Russian historic experience, there has never been so much freedom in Russia as there is today, and that is why it is naive to expect more democracy to be implemented into the Russian system. During its long history of statehood, Russia has never been even close to a democratic model as is defined and practised in the West. This fact was explained and described nearly 40 years ago by Richard Pipes (a Polish-American scholar and expert on Russian history – editor’s note) and his propositions of “Russia under the old Regime” and “Russia under the Bolshevik Regime” stay pertinent and fully applicable to today’s reality. Jakub Korejba, Democracy? No Thanks! Opinion and Analysis 59

In other words, the political regime demonstrates no trend toward democratisation, simply because it is an organic emanation of the social structure, which itself is highly undemocratic. The West, its politicians, analysts and commentators seem to think that Russians are oppressed by an authoritarian regime, and can no longer tolerate it and are waiting for the West to help them change it. In fact, the political system is just a logically organised strata of a fully-compact and coherent structure of Russian society. When seen from up close, inside the country, in every domain and any level of social life, Russians quietly reproduce what external commentators see at the top of political power. This concerns interpersonal relations from the very beginning to the very end of one’s life. It is relevant within families, at schools, universities and at work. Obviously for Russians (and those foreigners who have been living inside Russia with Russians and not isolated from them in embassies or foreign companies), the social lift works differently than in Western countries. There is no single social force that would be capable or interested in changing the system towards democratisation. An ambitious, talented and efficient young Russian does not search to change the system in a way to get more opportunities for more people. He or she will never try to break the existing structures, but to enter inside, which means to leap through the barrier separating the almighty tiny elite from the wretched, destitute majority. After breaking the barrier, he will turn all his efforts to strengthening the barrier and securing himself from the other contenders who are still trying to get in. The most evident and illustrative example is of the once called “opposition” blogger Alexei Navalny who realised his anti- systemic capital by accepting a highly prestigious and lucrative post on the board of directors of the state-owned Aeroflot airline. It is worth noticing that this is the main difference between Russia and the other formerly communist countries, and also explains the contrast of their evolutions during the 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. While in Poland or Hungary, communist power was widely seen as immoral and illegitimate, in Soviet Russia there was virtually no opposition to the system. People who were not satisfied with their lives eventually signed up for Komsomol and joined the Party while their Polish peers printed rebel leaflets and organised anti-governmental demonstrations.

Politically indifferent

Another key element that simulates and enhances the non-democratic regime is the structure of the Russian economy. Economic life in Russia is based on highly centralised and state-controlled monopolies. Any major economic activity must be controlled by a state agency. It is obvious that such a system has no chance of being effective. As a result, huge natural resources and human potential, smothered 60 Opinion and Analysis Jakub Korejba, Democracy? No Thanks!

Idle voting machines wait for ballots during the March 2012 elections. Photo: Petri Krohn (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

by bureaucratic procedures and stiff structures are simply wasted. The system wastes the country’s riches and the massive intellectual potential of its people while safeguarding a handsome and normally unattainable rent for business and the political elite. It is clear that this state of affairs provokes social tension and popular anger, which is why the maintenance of this system needs solid instruments of control. If there were free-elections, people would simply erase those who have been illegitimately appropriating state funds and transferring the rent abroad. Yet, it is absolutely clear that any major change of power would provoke massive violence, maybe even a social revolution. In the end, this might produce another dictatorship which would most probably be less democratic then the current corrupt, but non- lethal regime currently residing in Moscow. If the only available alternative to Putin and Medvedev is a new Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin, one can hardly imagine this change bringing more democracy. Jakub Korejba, Democracy? No Thanks! Opinion and Analysis 61

This is all relevant, but the crucial reason why Russians reject any chance to democratise their country is hidden deep in the Russian psychology. Actually, no one will stand for more freedom because the lack of democracy is the best excuse for individual and social passiveness. In fact, Russians were and remain politically indifferent: even if they criticise, they don’t tend to practically change the regime. This was perfectly shown during the street protests after the parliamentary elections in December 2011 and the presidential election in March 2012. Considering the size of the country and Moscow, those actively protesting were just tiny groups, perfectly invisible for the majority of the population and harmless for the actual elite. In no case can these protests be called “massive”, “popular” or “widespread”. It is true that the climate, territorial size and distances discourage people from active action and immobilise them. Doing any ordinary thing in Russia, especially when connected to politics, requires so much energy and introduces such a risk, that the safest option is to stay where you are. The only force capable of mobilising Russians is external aggression, and there is no prospect of this. Another factor highly disadvantageous for democratisation is the Russian mentality. The attitude of an average Russian towards any kind of power (no matter whether personal or political) is brutal and infantile at the same time. On the one hand, Russians fear those in higher positions, while on the other hand they reproduce what happens to them by tyrannising their own subordinates. According to a report by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 90 per cent of Russian women admit witnessing or experiencing domestic violence first hand. This shows that the attitude towards violence as a means to execute power doesn’t depend on social or material status, and is organically rooted in national psychology. Power in Russia is admired, and the aim of Russians is not to make it weaker, but to get a part of it for their own and execute it. The international environment is also not conducive to the promotion of democracy in Russia. In fact, the democratic West is fading and models seen as worth copying are not the liberal democracies of Europe and America, but rather authoritarian China or highly hierarchised India. For Russians fascinated with power, losing potential is the best proof of structural dysfunction.

How could change come?

Theoretically, political democratisation in Russia could be initiated in two different ways: from the top or from the base. The first option would mean a massive popular movement against the actual regime capable of generating an alternative political programme for the whole country, and a new political elite able to undertake the task of reforming state structures. This would be a Russian version of the “coloured 62 Opinion and Analysis Jakub Korejba, Democracy? No Thanks!

revolutions” which have occurred in several post-Soviet countries such as Georgia, Kyrgyzstan or Ukraine. To happen, this would mean a consolidation of politically conscious and active masses joined with viable leaders both courageous enough and experienced to move Russia towards historical reforms. This would also mean weeks or even months of massive protests possibly accompanied with bloodshed along with uncertainty and risk. Considering the complexity of such a process and all the factors mentioned above, it is clear that there is no social base for such a popular push in favour of democratic developments. It is time to admit that the existing political system is actually based on a wide social consensus grounded in the aggregated effects of activity of the elite and the passivity of the rest. The second option for a major shift is to follow the traditional way, in which changes traditionally had been implemented in Russia: a coup decided and initiated from the top by a single ruler or part of the Russian elite. This was the case under Ivan the Terrible, both tsars and reformers Peter There is hardly any and Catherine, under Alexander I as well as under Vladimir Lenin and Joseph Stalin. All of them alternative to Putin able violated national traditions, and by the force of to gain and execute power. their authority and revolutionary means imposed reforms badly needed to make the country up- to-date with the contemporary reality. Although Russia is a huge and complicated organism, it can only be pushed on the path of change by an outstanding mix of idealistic vision and rough methods. This needs massive mobilisation of political will incarnated by one man and supported by an influential group within the state elite. In today’s reality, this could potentially be the president himself, some part of business, the Army, the Orthodox Church, the intellectual elite, and the academic community. No other social structure has both the political influence and organisational skills to initiate and enforce any durable political change. But in reality, all of them constitute pillars of the actual system and have no interest in disturbing the balance. Preserving the system gives them warranty for receiving part of the state rent, while any systemic sway could result in the revision of the social hierarchy with negative consequences for actual beneficiaries. This is the stagnating reality of the Russian upper class and the reason why there is hardly any hope for the country’s elite to initiate any change towards democracy. This is also why so many expectations in the West are placed on the Russian opposition – all those who declare themselves to not only be against Putin, but the state elite as a whole. Unfortunately, here again exist organic reasons why the Russian opposition is and never will be capable of acting as a real alternative for power. It is important to note that there are two kinds of opposition in Russia: the Jakub Korejba, Democracy? No Thanks! Opinion and Analysis 63

“systemic” one, officially registered and having its representation in parliament, and the much fuzzier “non-systemic” opposition, which having no other way of expression is seen demonstrating out on the streets and sometimes calling for foreign support. The problem is that both are unable to gain and hold power firmly enough to change the country. What’s more, they don’t tend to want it, being absolutely content with the role they currently play.

The opposition

The systemic opposition, present in parliament, is as organic and indispensable an element of the ruling system as Putin himself. The existence of the other political powers is just a massive mystification, more intended to dupe the West than the Russian people. Gennady Zyuganov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Sergey Mironov, although calling themselves “opposition” and declaring themselves as the alternative to the party of power, practically stay fully loyal. They were created and maintained to canalise popular emotions widespread in several potentially dangerous social niches. It is sufficient to read the parties’ programmes or randomly listen to their leaders to understand that they don’t promote democratic values or political liberalisation. In fact, all of them are even more nationalistic, anti-Western and nostalgic of communism than Putin and the rest of his rather technocratic team. Finally, the very last hope for democratic change in Russia may come from the “non-systemic” opposition, which means a wide and not clearly defined plethora of parties, organisations, movements and individuals presenting themselves as critical not only of Putin or Medvedev, but to the system in general. What they officially contest is not this or that president or official, but the entire architecture of Russian political life. Considering their programmes, they could theoretically be able to propose a real prospect for systemic change and reveal hope among Russians tired with corruption and the insolence of the illegitimate authoritarian rulers. Yet, in fact, this anti-systemic opposition will not be in a position to gain power, simply because it is untrustworthy. People like Boris Nemtsov, Mikhail Kasyanov and Grigory Yavlinsky have already been a part of the establishment, and what they presented is anything but an example of democratic rule. This fact is often underestimated in the West, who sees this opposition as something parallel to the opposition they have in their own countries. But for an average Russian, the 1990s were the worst period of the country’s contemporary history. Economic collapse, while for Western observers was just a matter of statistics, had a very practical impact on the everyday lives of the Russian people. They could hardly find anything to eat, could easily be evicted from their apartments or simply shot in the street because they happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Criminals 64 Opinion and Analysis Jakub Korejba, Democracy? No Thanks!

ruled the Russian streets, oligarchs took control over the treasures of the national economy, transferring all the income abroad, while a sick president and his corrupt “family” declared it was all “democracy” and the “free-market”. And all this happened while Nemtsov, Ryzhkov and Kasyanov were part of an inner circle of the Russian power elite and had all the opportunities to change things for the better; but they didn’t, and are widely blamed for the fact that Russia deteriorated into a semi-failed, dysfunctional state. What they proved to the average Russian was complete incompetence, immorality and a lack of patriotism. Hence, it is hard to believe that these former co-founders of Boris Yeltsin’s regime would miraculously follow democratic principles and suddenly be trusted by the majority of Russian voters. For all of these reasons, one can hardly find any alternative political force to Vladimir Putin apt to gain and execute power. Moreover, any alternative political force is incapable of using it to promote democratic rule, which is why criticising Russia for not being a democratic country is both arrogant and counterproductive. Such a manifestation of civilisational chauvinism may only push Russians away from the West and compromise western values. Any attempt to impose democracy from the outside will be treated as a violation of national identity and rejected. The democratisation of Russia can only emerge from within Russian society; and the latter seems to be in need of more time both to understand it and make it real.

Jakub Korejba is an adviser with the Center for Post-Soviet Studies at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO). He graduated from the Institute of International Relations at Warsaw University in 2009, studied at the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (NaUKMA) also in 2009, the Institute of International Relations of St. Petersburg State University in 2008, and Institute d’Etudes Politiques de Lyon between 2006 to 2007. No Competition

FyODOr lukiAnOV

Russian protests have brought some success: the social atmosphere has changed and people have stopped being passive. However, this is in no way related to the opposition.

Russians have finally reacted to the reality they have to live in. They said “no” to what they didn’t agree with and to what they are just plain tired of. The development of events over the last year surprised the opposition, who joined this “Russian rebellion” and realised the hidden potential in the explosion of the discontent. And yet the opposition hasn’t managed to use this great potential to its advantage. In addition to the changes in people’s mentality and the change in their perception of the government, important reforms have been initiated. Unfortunately the reforms have brought the opposite results than those that had been proposed by the group of the discontent. President Vladimir Putin quickly realised that the demonstrations in Russia’s cities The situation has should not be ignored and tightened his grip. Thus, it has become more difficult to organise a street event or matured enough operate an NGO. The government has decided to make to encompass change. it as difficult as possible for the discontent, meaning the goal is to prevent any further mass protests. And in this way the government has actually been quite successful. The president has tightened his fist not because he fears the opposition, as he does not bother himself with these types of things; he did so, just in case in the future, no real alternative to his government arises. The government seems to realise that it is not possible to operate in stagnation. Something has to be done. The situation has matured enough to encompass change. But nobody knows what should actually be done. For the political elite it is clear that change would mean destabilisation. Putin does not seem to have much of a vision on how to get out of this charmed circle. What’s more, the government does not look at the street protesters as being its dialogue partners. 66 Opinion and Analysis Fyodor Lukianov, No Competition

One can quite frequently hear voices in the West that Putin is right now in the abyss and will be toppled at any moment. He’s near his end, they believe. This is all an exaggeration. Putin is doing quite well as he has only one competitor – himself. Let’s be honest and clear here: is there anyone out there who could replace him? Is there any alternative on the horizon? The protest atmosphere among Russians is still quite high (some even think that it is permanently increasing), but this potential will be wasted. There are no leaders who could consolidate Russian society. The opposition cannot do it by itself as it is much worse organised than it was a year ago, which is why the impasse will still last for quite some time.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Fyodor Lukyanov is editor-in-chief of the journal Russia in Global Affairs. Divided We Stand

ANATOLY GOLUBOVSkY

Russian intellectuals have different attitudes towards the government. Some are critical, while others are either loyal or don’t want get involved. The former are the ones most embarrassed of today’s Russia.

The Kremlin has been trying to attract intellectuals. At least since the infamous date of September 2011 when the decision made by Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev to swap positions did not get the approval of Russia’s intellectual elite. And in these attempts to attract the high brows, the Kremlin so far seems to be quite successful. In the last year, within government structures, a number of new units have been created which are platforms for intellectuals to get more involved. Among them The fact that elections are primarily expert and social councils. They are being set up at different organisational levels, were rigged means that starting with the highest, national level as in the government is ruling the case of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the without a social mandate. Ministry of Education and Science, to the lower, local level, such as in the municipal governments. These bodies are made up of many different specialists: economists, sociologists and representatives of the so-called free professions (lawyers, journalists, etc.). All have agreed to become such experts, and refusal to accept these roles is currently one of the most discussed issues. The intellectuals’ reactions varied towards Putin’s return to power in March 2012, during which not only the head of state was changed but also the government’s attitude towards intellectuals. Some, such as Dmitry Oreshkin and Lyudmila Alexeyeva who were with the Presidential Council for Human Rights, have left as they came to the conclusion that these organisations would just become a kind of decoration. Many, while resigning, would say that their voices on issues such 68 Opinion and Analysis Anatoly Golubovsky, Divided We Stand

as the assembly law or the arrest of Pussy Riot have simply been ignored by the president. On the other side, there are also those who believe that there is no alternative to the state structures, and these structures are the only place where anything can be done to improve the situation in Russia. Liberal economists, for example, say that they cannot leave the government as they have to somehow prevent Russia’s economic collapse. What’s interesting, however, is that although the role of experts and specialists has decreased, their number has increased. This has been the government’s “show off” trick. The other issue is that within the government itself, in the Duma or the Federation Council, there are not that many intellectuals to be found. In Russia there are different types of protest, starting with the workers’ protest to those organised by the intellectuals. The problem is that until now there has been no success in unifying all these groups which are against the current regime. The protests have taken on a new face after the revelations of the election fraud in December 2011. The real mobiliser for these new protests has been the slogan “honest elections”, which in fact has not lost its meaning: the fact that the elections were rigged means that the current government is ruling without a social mandate. There is still a chance that the intellectuals will join other protest groups. The intellectuals only need to start realising that not only are their rights being abused, but that the current situation in Russia is having the same effect on the blue-collar worker, the farmer and the university professor a like.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Anatoly Golubovsky is a radio and television producer, a sociologist and an art historian. He was also the editor-in-chief of the Russian radio stations Culture (2003-2007) and Cinema FM (2007-2008). In Search of Traitors and Spies

iVAn preObrAzhenSky

The Russian authorities are preparing for a new wave of repressions; or at least this is what we expect, based on the recent legal changes and the anxiety felt within the Kremlin caused by the growing atmosphere of the protests.

It may one day turn out that such events as the Pussy Riot trial or the trial of the demonstrators who protested in Moscow in May 2012 will look innocent. And while the ruling elite is aware it is not currently in direct competition with the opposition as such, it does need to come to terms with the fact that it could quickly fall victim to its own crackdown. This will happen when Russians get fed up and start massively protesting again. “The authorities are trying to intimidate us,” say members of the opposition. “They are violating our freedom of expression,” grumble the journalists. “They are hindering our work for the greater good of society,” complain workers of non- profit organisations. And yet a significant portion of Russian society seem not to hear these dissatisfied voices of the opposition, Most of Russian society most of whom may also be unhappy with the does not hear the discontented government although for different reasons: voices of the opposition. their utility rates are too high, the police doesn’t ensure their safety, pubic administration is full of corruption, there are no places in kindergartens, or the poor conditions in public hospitals, and so on.

The discontent of the masses

This discontent, however, does not have any influence on the relations between “the people” and the opposition, journalists and human rights activists. For the Russian public, and primarily these are the people who watch Russian state television (and there is a lot of them!), issues such as freedom are much less of a serious concern. Public opinion polls show that the government has managed to play a “trick” by 70 Opinion and Analysis Ivan Preobrazhensky, In Search of Traitors and Spies

turning real events into a television show. This is why the majority of Russians think that Ksenia Sobchak (a well-known TV personality who became involved in the opposition movement – editor’s note) is the main opposition leader, while the most important journalists are Vladimir Posner (a well-known journalist in the Soviet Union) and Andrey Malakhov (a TV show host and presenter). Similarly, if you asked the average Russian, he or she would say that the main human rights activist is Valeria Novodvorskaya (a Soviet dissident who is outspoken and controversial). In the eyes of the Preparations for placing certain majority of society, it is people like these celebrities who are the discontent. For this “agitators” behind bars are reason it is not surprising that Russians taking place on multiple fronts. don’t accept the opposition’s views. What’s more, these same Russians don’t think that the oppositionists are the real adversaries of the existing regime. This is all because oppositionists have no means of putting their message across to the Russian television viewers. And yet should there be a rebellion, it would still be possible to convince the average Russian not to join. Following a failed rebellion, there would then be new trials, expulsions and arrests. The most important thing for the Kremlin would be to seek out the guilty ones and publicly make an example of them. It is also possible that there would be a repeat of what was done in Krymsk in July 2012, where dozens of people died when the local civil servants did not inform them about the oncoming flood. As a result, the city mayor was arrested, even though it is clear that it was not only his fault, but also that of the authorities on the regional level and even the Moscow leadership. And this is what a repeat of Krymsk might look like: put a few civil servants and officials behind bars and blame them for the economic crisis, a weak security system and all the other problems. Alternatively, there is the “Bolshevik way”, which would mean finding, among the opposition, new enemies of the state and announcing that they are responsible for the flood in Krymsk. In this way, it would be possible to blame the opposition for plane crashes and derailed trains. And one might almost believe that all these actions, which are aimed at harming the country, are performed in the interest of overseas powers. If there was a way of connecting the civil servant (who acts as the fall guy for some major problem) and the opposition movement (acting in the interest of foreign powers) – this would be the best solution for the regime. Then, even if the people didn’t believe in these “enemies”, they wouldn’t stand up and fight for the truth either. There would just be constant debates, and all the strikes and demonstrations would eventually pass and go unnoticed. Ivan Preobrazhensky, In Search of Traitors and Spies Opinion and Analysis 71

These types of activities have already started to take place. The most prominent case so far is that of the deputy of the Communist Party, Vladimir Bessonov, who was stripped of his parliamentary immunity. And this took place even despite the protests from the opposition which fears that the Bessonov case is not the last. In the Duma there are many candidates who „qualify” to lose their immunity.

Political refugees

Preparations for placing those who are becoming more and more of a pain behind bars are actually taking place on multiple fronts. In the current situation of common distrust in the Russian judicial system, certain citizens of the Russian Federation have applied for the status of political refugee in Europe, if a criminal case has been initiated against them. Hence, the challenge for Russia’s intelligence agencies is to bring those who left the country back, but also to do it in such a way that it would seem that they had “returned voluntarily”. Consider this situation: Ivan Cherkasov, one of the former friends of Sergei Magnitsky (a Russian lawyer who died in custody after alleging serious fraud and theft by public officials – editor’s note), resides in London, to escape arrest in Russia Analysts in the Kremlin (the court made a decision to arrest him in 2011). Cherkasov, however, does not have the believe there are some 6,000 status of a political refugee and for that reason foreign agents in Russia. cannot get a new passport. His request for a new passport was rejected by the Russian Federation on the grounds of the risk that – as we read in the documentation – “the suspect may evade participating in an investigation”. And now Cherkasov cannot get a British visa for one simple reason: there is no room in his passport to put it. Furthermore, the media is also attacked in Russia. Here the dominating trend is the so-called “telephone law” – which refers to telephone calls from high-ranking officials. In the case of the media these are usually high-level “requests” to the owners of radio stations, TV stations and newspapers to get rid of disloyal journalists. Rumour has it that radio Kommersant FM will be either closed or reformed in a similar way to the local television stations which belonged to the same media group were. People are already losing their jobs. In 2012 the Duma passed a law reinstating the article on libel into the Criminal Code. This will also put aside certain legal achievements made by Dmitry Medvedev which were meant to make the life of journalists a little easier. And although there will be no mention of a prison sentence for those who commit libel in the Criminal Code, large fines will be incurred. Things are even easier in the blogosphere – 72 Opinion and Analysis Ivan Preobrazhensky, In Search of Traitors and Spies

blogs have simply been banned. In the name of protecting the youngest users of the internet, the Russian authorities have decided to create a “black list” of websites that can be shut down or have limited accessibility. Importantly, experts are of the opinion that the law will soon allow the Russian authorities to block all “uncomfortable” websites, just like in China.

Foreign secret agents

There are also serious problems with non-government organisations. President Vladimir Putin believes that most NGOs are acting in the interest of foreign countries. When speaking about this topic, Putin presents his views by applying some allusions, while the analysts, who are close to government sources, unofficially give quite “interesting” numbers: apparently in Russia there are 6,000 foreign secret agents who have hundreds of supervisors, which is why the new law on foreign agents is currently coming into force. At most, the law will be amended as proposed by the head of Council of Civil Society and Human Rights under the direction of Mikhail Fedotov. Of course while the substance of the document will not be changed, at least it will be specified what is meant by “political activity”. For the government, it is important to create the basis for activism in the future; namely, to be able to label activists as “foreign agents”. Life is not easy for the political parties, either. Bessonov’s case has already been presented, but there have also been signals sent to non-parliamentary parties, namely to Mikhail Prokhorov and his new Civic Platform party. First and foremost, there was the strange investigation into the legality of returning donations which had been received by Prokhorov’s “old” party; a signal which is being sent to all sponsors of political projects and obviously Prokhorov himself. In addition, a group of rather unknown people, allegedly connected with United Russia, had the idea to use the name of Prokhorov’s as yet unregistered party, and Prokhorov is now forced to come up with a new name. However, the political elite also needs to have some “pests” within its ranks. Without them, the campaign against the spies would look too theatrical. And when the trap closes, it will include a couple of deputies, a few diplomats, human rights activists and journalists, and one or two high-ranking officials. Together they will all be accused of being guilty of the mistakes of the current government, and of course, guilty of digging a tunnel from the Kremlin to Washington, DC. Meanwhile, as the people try to understand how these “pests” have really ruined the world economy and attempted to destroy Russia, the authorities will have the possibility of saving the current regime, by extinguishing the local fires set up by this Ivan Preobrazhensky, In Search of Traitors and Spies Opinion and Analysis 73 social discontent so that they do not turn into one big nationwide blaze. Obviously many among those who are now currently in power are aware that opening this pandora’s box could also turn them into targets accused of being spies and traitors. While the opposition may not be able to stop the government from tightening the belt, it is also quite possible that this spies’ campaign might, in fact, be stopped by the authorities, who will only do it to protect themselves.

Translated by Olga Adamczyk

Ivan Preobrazhensky is a Russian journalist and political commentator with the Rosbalt agency. A Question of Jurisdiction? Human Rights in the Nagorno-karabakh Region

zuzAnnA wArSO

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains unresolved. The European Court of Human Rights is addressing this issue from the point of view of jurisdiction over the conflict, with the hope that its decisions may provide some movement towards finding a solution to this frozen situation.

Armenia and Azerbaijan have been members of the Council of Europe for over ten years. It follows from Article One of the European Convention on Human Rights that member states must answer any infringements of the rights and freedoms protected by the Convention committed against individuals placed under their “jurisdiction”. While in most cases, the state’s Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia jurisdiction has a territorial character, there are situations in which the answer to the is ready to take the blame question of which states exercise jurisdiction for human rights violations over a given area is less than obvious. in Nagorno-Karabakh. Two important judgements are currently pending before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR): the case of Chiragov and others v. Armenia and the case of Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan. These two cases were selected from over 1,000 similar complaints, about 600 filed by Azerbaijani refugees and about 500 from Armenian refugees, to serve as a precedent. They both concern individuals who lost their property as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While the area of Nagorno-Karabakh, one of post-Soviet “frozen conflict” zones, remains to be a part of the internationally recognised territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Zuzanna Warso, A Question of Jurisdiction? Opinion and Analysis 75

Azeri government claims it is prevented from exercising its authority, because of the “Armenian occupation”. The ECtHR, the highest court of the Council of Europe, is now faced with the question of whether the matters come under the jurisdiction of the respondent government, Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively, and should engage their responsibility under the Convention. The Court will pass judgements on the two precedent cases in the upcoming months.

Conflict

Before the dissolution of the USSR, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), located within the territory of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, was an autonomous province without a common border with the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. The two areas were separated by Azerbaijani territory. The shortest way from the NKAO to the Armenian SSR led through the district of Lachin. The population of the NKAO consisted of 77 per cent ethnic Armenians and 22 per cent ethnic Azeris, while the vast majority of the population of the district of Lachin were Kurds and Azeris, and only 5-6 per cent were Armenians. The strip of land dividing the NKAO and the Armenian SSR was referred to as the “Lachin corridor” and was less than ten kilometres wide. In 1988 demonstrations were held both in the regional capital of the NKAO and the Armenian capital of Yerevan calling for the unification of the NKAO and the Armenian SSR. The district of Lachin was subject to roadblocks and attacks, and the The vast majority of those conflict continued throughout the subsequent inhabiting Nagorno-Karabakh years and resulted in numerous casualties. are ethnic Armenians. Shortly before the Soviet Union dissolved, the NKAO announced the establishment of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) and declared it was no longer under the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan. When the Soviet troops withdrew from the region, military control was taken over by the Karabakh Armenians. However, the self-proclaimed independence of the NKR has not been recognised by any state or international organisation. In 1992 the conflict between NKR and Azerbaijan escalated into war. The district of Lachin was attacked on many occasions, and for several months it became completely isolated. In May 1992 the town of Lachin was captured by forces of Armenian ethnicity. Two years later, following Russian mediation, a ceasefire agreement called the Bishkek Protocol, was signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and the NKR. According to a report published in December 1994 by the international non- governmental organisation Human Rights Watch, approximately 750,000 to 800,000 Azeris were forced out of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and the Azerbaijani districts 76 Opinion and Analysis Zuzanna Warso, A Question of Jurisdiction?

surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenian authorities claim that 335,000 Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and 78,000 internally displaced persons from regions in Armenia bordering Azerbaijan have been registered. At the moment, the vast majority of the people inhabiting Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the adjacent regions including the Lachin district, are ethnic Armenians.

Cases before the Court

All six applicants in the Chiragov and others v. Armenia case are Azerbaijani nationals of Kurdish descent. One of the applicants died in 2005 and his son is pursuing the case on his behalf. At the time of the public hearing held on September 15th 2010, the applicants were all living in Baku, but before the war broke out they inhabited the district of Lachin, where, as Establishing jurisdiction they claimed, their ancestors had lived for hundreds of years. The applicants complain over the conflict area will be that they were forced to flee from their significant in addressing other homes on May 17th 1992 as a consequence of violations in Nagorno-Karabakh. the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and the actions of the Armenian-backed Karabakh forces. According to the applicants, the Armenian government does not allow them to return to Lachin and fails to compensate them for their losses. Moreover, the applicants claim that if they had been ethnic Armenian and Christian, they would not have been displaced from their homes, and that their property rights would have been recognised and their complaints investigated. The applicant in the second case, Mr Minas Sargsyan, an Armenian national, died in 2009; his widow and their children are pursuing the application. The oral hearing in the case also took place on September 15th 2012. The applicants and his family used to live in the village of Gulistan in the Shahumyan region of the Azerbaijan SSR that shared a border with the NKAO. Although the region was not a part of the NKAO, it was later claimed by the NKR as part of its territory. Prior to the conflict, most of the population of Shahumyan had been ethnic Armenians. Before the war in 1992, however, the Armenian population was expelled from a number of villages in the Shahumyan region by Soviet Union and Azerbaijani forces, and forced to flee to either the Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenia. When the war broke out, the village where Minas Sargsyan lived came under direct attack. The entire population fled from massive bombings and Minas Sargsyan fled to Armenia. Zuzanna Warso, A Question of Jurisdiction? Opinion and Analysis 77

Who has control? The governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia have raised a number of objections to the admissibility of the cases. Among these was the question of jurisdiction and responsibility of the respondent state. In its submission to the Sargsyan case, the Azerbaijani government recalled the declaration it made upon becoming a member of the Council of Europe. In the declaration it stated that since a significant part of the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan was occupied, Azerbaijan was unable to guarantee the application of the Convention rights “until these territories are liberated from that occupation”. While the government of Azerbaijan accepted that Gulistan, the village where the applicant used to live, was on its internationally recognised territory, it argued that due to the fact that the area was located on the so-called Line of Contact between Azerbaijan and NKR forces, meaning that opposing military forces were stationed on either side of the village, Azerbaijan had no access to, and was unable to exercise any control over the village. Although violations of the cease-fire agreement had occurred and continued to occur frequently, Azerbaijan could not be held responsible for the alleged violations of the Convention. The validity of this declaration was questioned by the applicants. According to them, Azerbaijan could not have ratified the European Convention of Human Rights with such far reaching and general reservations. The fact that Gulistan was within the internationally recognised borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan, resulted in this state’s responsibility for the violations that occurred there. In the view of the applicant, the lack of complete control over the area should not automatically exclude the state’s responsibility. The view expressed by the applicants was shared by the Armenian government who went a step further, and stated that Azerbaijan had full and effective control over Gulistan. The Chiragov complaint, although the alleged violations were committed within the internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan, was lodged against Armenia, who contested the allegations and denied its military involvement in the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. It argued that it did not and could not have effective control of or exercise any public power on these territories. However, the applicants and the Azerbaijani government expressed a radically different view. The applicants claimed that Armenia’s military participation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was critical: it committed troops to the conflict, provided material aid to Nagorno- Karabakh and continued to provide political support. The applicants referred to the fact that numerous key figures in Armenian politics had ties to and were involved in the political sphere in Nagorno-Karabakh. Consequently, it was the Republic of Armenia who exercised effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding territories, including the Lachin area, and, 78 Opinion and Analysis Zuzanna Warso, A Question of Jurisdiction?

as a result, the complaints fall within the jurisdiction of Armenia. The Azerbaijani government agreed with the applicants. In support, they invoked statements by various international and non-governmental organisations, according to which at the beginning of the 1990s, Armenian forces fought beside separatist Karabakhi forces and occupied Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as the other surrounding territories. According to Azerbaijan, the NKR was not an independent state, as claimed by the Armenian government, but a “subordinate local administration surviving by virtue of the military and other support provided by the Republic of Armenia”.

Question

In order to answer the difficult question of jurisdiction over a conflict area, it is necessary to look at the existing case law of the Court. When faced with similar problems, the ECtHR has turned on several occasions to public international law. According to the well-established rules, jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial, in other words jurisdiction is presumed to be exercised throughout the state’s territory. In exceptional circumstances, however, this presumption may be limited. This is the case, for example, in situations where the state is prevented from exercising its authority in part of its territory, as a result of a military occupation by armed forces which effectively control the territory in question, acts of war or rebellion, or the acts of a foreign government who supports the installation of a separatist state. In order for the Court to be able to establish whether such an exceptional situation exists, it has to examine all objective facts that could limit the effective exercise of authority, as well as the state’s conduct. In addition, the concept of jurisdiction is not always restricted to the national territory of a given state. According to the ECtHR, the acts performed outside the territory, or which produce effects there, may amount to exercise of a state’s jurisdiction. The state will be therefore obliged to secure the rights and freedoms if it exercised effective control of an area in practice outside its national territory as a result of a military mission, no matter if it is lawful or not. Finally, it is important to highlight that the state is obliged not only to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms of those in an area of effective control, but also to take steps to ensure respect for those rights and freedoms. Those obligations remain valid even if the exercise of the state’s authority is limited. These principles are reflected in the ECtHR case law. An example here would be Loizidou v. Turkey. The case concerned the violation of property rights as a result of the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus. The Court, after recalling that the concept of jurisdiction was not restricted to the national territory of the Convention Zuzanna Warso, A Question of Jurisdiction? Opinion and Analysis 79 state parties, decided that it could hold Turkey responsible for violations of the Convention in the northern part of Cyprus because it exercised effective control over this area. In a yet another judgement concerning the conflict over northern Cyprus, the Court noted that Turkey, as a result of the effective control it had over the area, was responsible not only for the acts of its soldiers and officials but also for the local administration which could operate because of Turkish support. In a similar line of reasoning, in the case of Ilascu and others v. Moldova and Russia, the Court noted that, although the Transnistrian region was part of the internationally recognised territory of Moldova, it remained under the decisive influence of Russia. The ECtHR highlighted the “continuous and uninterrupted link of responsibility on the part of Russia for the applicants’ fate”. For this reason, Russia was held responsible for the human rights violations committed in Transnistria.

Possible outcome?

Similar factual circumstances of the two cases, without doubt, have been the reason why the European Court of Human Rights, after choosing the cases Chiragov and others v. Armenia and Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan from among hundreds of similar complaints, decided to review them simultaneously. The submissions of the governments in both cases show that neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia is ready to take the blame for human rights violations in Nagorno-Karabakh. This situation creates a “regrettable vacuum in the system of human rights protection” in the region, and indeed in the whole of Europe. Prior to becoming members of the Council of Europe, Armenia and Azerbaijan committed themselves to the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While diplomatic means fail to resolve the issue, the rights and freedoms of individuals caught up in the middle of the frozen conflict are being violated. The Court has taken on a difficult task; this was necessary, however, as the question of jurisdiction over the conflict area is of critical importance for other human rights violations in Nagorno-Karabakh to be addressed. The existing case law gives grounds to hope that the ECtHR will be able to balance the interests and find the right solution. Nevertheless, in view of the futile diplomatic endeavours, this would make the Court one of the few international bodies who is substantially contributing to addressing the harms caused by the conflict.

Zuzanna Warso is a lawyer with the Warsaw-office of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. Tusk’s Unenviable Dilemma Filip mAzurczAk

Throughout this economic crisis, Poland has been in a privileged position, with a relatively strong economic performance allowing it to stall on difficult reforms. However, the comforts of Euro 2012 public investments, generous aid from Brussels, and a lucrative export market in the West are all gradually receding.

Alcide de Gasperi, the founder of Italy’s Christian Democratic Party, famously quipped that a politician thinks about the next election, while a statesman is concerned with the next generation. As the Polish economy is increasingly threatened by the eurozone debt crisis, will Donald Tusk, the prime Prime Minister Tusk minister of Central Europe’s largest nation, have the audacity to undertake unpopular reforms that has received praise for could cost him his job, but make Poland emerge his moderation and ability from Europe’s most severe economic cataclysm to seek compromise. since the Great Depression more prosperous than ever? On October 9th 2011, Donald Tusk’s government wrote its way into history by being the first administration in the history of Poland’s democracy – both in the short-lived Second Polish Republic that lasted during the interwar period and in the Third Republic that emerged from the shackles of Moscow’s oppression in 1989 – to win re-election. While pre-election polls indicated that Tusk’s centre-right Civic Platform was merely a few points ahead of its rival, Jarosław Kaczyński’s rightist Law and Justice, the party secured a victory over Kaczyński’s party with a margin of 39.18 to 29.89 per cent. Civic Platform’s junior coalition partner, the Polish People’s Party, earned 8.36 per cent. Much to the relief of the anxious Tusk and his supporters, the two parties could govern with a wafer-thin majority of 235 votes in the 460-deputy Sejm, Poland’s lower parliamentary chamber. Filip Mazurczak, Tusk’s Unenviable Dilemma Opinion and Analysis 81

Green island There are several reasons why Tusk was re-elected as Poland’s head of government. Certainly one was Tusk’s moderation and his ability to seek compromise. Never before in the history of modern Polish democracy had a coalition government lasted. Previously, both left and right-wing governments had squabbled with their coalition partners, while Tusk defied sceptics by ruling amiably alongside the Polish People’s Party for four years. This is quite an accomplishment, given the profound ideological rift between the two parties – Civic Platform favours a neoliberal approach to the economy, while Poland’s major agrarian party prefers a strong welfare state. Yet perhaps Tusk’s greatest boon has been Poland’s booming economy. That deteriorating living standards and rising unemployment harm incumbents is obvious across Europe, where increasingly jobless and frustrated electorates have toppled heads of state from France to Latvia. However, Poland had weathered the global Great Recession better than any other European state. In September 2008, the collapse Simply avoiding difficult of Lehman Brothers quickly spread contagion to the Old Continent. In 2009, the economy of every reforms will not save single European member state – except Poland, Tusk’s popularity over whose gross domestic product grew by 1.6 per the next couple of years. cent – declined. In some countries, the fall was dramatic – in Latvia, economic output collapsed by almost 18 per cent. By 2010, however, Poland’s recovery hastened, with gross domestic product increasing by a respectable 3.8 per cent. The year 2011 brought even better news to the Poles, with an enviable GDP growth rate of 4.3 per cent. Meanwhile, unemployment has remained largely stable during Tusk’s years in power. Upon assuming power in October 2007, the head of Civic Platform inherited a jobless rate of 11.3 per cent. After four years, that figure inched up slightly to 11.8 per cent. In September 2012, it was still only modestly higher, at 12.4 per cent. Thus while many political pundits and economists scoffed at Tusk’s cheery assertion that Poland is a “green island” in a European ocean of economic misery, economically Poland has been a shining star in Europe’s black hole galaxy of debt and unemployment. Unfortunately for Poland, however, things are turning for the worse. This year, Poland’s GDP is expected to grow by 2.5 per cent, and to slow to 2.2 per cent next year, according to government forecasts. Neighbouring Germany is Poland’s main export partner, and a slowing German economy can only mean adverse effects for Central European economies. To add to the pain, the 2012 European Football Championship, which boosted Poland’s economic growth from 2007 to 2012, 82

Prime Minister Donald Tusk will be forced to make some politically unpopular decisions to address the slowing Polish economy.

Photo: Alina Zienowicz (CC) commons.wikimedia.org Filip Mazurczak, Tusk’s Unenviable Dilemma Opinion and Analysis 83 jointly hosted by Poland and Ukraine, has come to an end. The event, which is the world’s third largest sporting event only after the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup, spurred massive public investment, with about 1,400 kilometres of highways and expressway roads built. Now, a post-Euro 2012 hangover is causing public investments to fall in Poland, with increasingly unstable industrial production growth rates. Unenviable dilemma

Granted, most economists anticipate that, as the eurozone debt crisis will gradually be tamed, Poland’s economic growth will pick up in late 2013 or 2014 at the latest. And growth rates slightly above 2 per cent are decent by European standards (by means of comparison, Greece’s economy has been in recession each year since 2008, and economists at Ernst & Young predict that the debt-ridden Mediterranean state will resume anaemic growth in 2015 at the earliest). In the meantime, more and more Poles are out of work. Some economists caution that unemployment could rise to 14 per cent in 2013. And although Polish wages have been rising by a decent 2 to 4 per cent annually during each month of 2012, their real value is being eroded by high inflation rates exceeding 3.5 to 4 per cent. Thus, it is unsurprising that many recent public opinion polls show greater support for Law and Justice, and stripping that of Civic Platform. One survey surprised Polish pundits by showing Kaczyński’s party soaring to 39 per cent, compared to Civic Platform’s 33 per cent. Although many polls still show a Civic Platform lead, that margin of victory is significantly much lower than in previous years. Thus, Donald Tusk faces an unenviable dilemma. As Poland’s economy slows, his government is likely to get decimated by the opposition parties in future elections. However, his government can push difficult reforms that will spur Polish growth in the long run, yet cause public dissatisfaction with his government in the foreseeable future. In March 2012, many Polish economists and observers of the country’s political scene praised Tusk’s government for pension reform. Like all industrialised economies, Poland faces the spectre of an ageing population, and without raising the age of retirement it will face a drastic labour shortage. Thus, Tusk’s government has decided to raise the age of retirement from 65 to 67 for men and 62 to 67 for women by 2040. Over the next 28 years, Poland’s retirement age will rise by a few months annually. Polish society protested this reform vehemently. The Solidarity labour union, which played a crucial role in the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and today is a traditional union, collected over two million signatures against the measure and staged massive protests on the streets of Warsaw. Public opinion overwhelmingly opposed the reform, and thus unsurprisingly Civic Platform’s support in the polls crumbled. 84 Opinion and Analysis Filip Mazurczak, Tusk’s Unenviable Dilemma

Perhaps most worryingly, however, the Polish People’s Party threatened to leave the coalition government, thus de facto signalling snap elections in Poland. However, after making concessions to the Polish People’s Party regarding policies to boost Poland’s low birth-rate and introducing the possibility of receiving lower retirement benefits before the age of 67, Tusk was able to push through this remarkably unpopular reform. Economists were pleased, noting that raising the retirement age would push Poland’s GDP by an additional 5.1 per cent by 2060.

Fear of conflict

However, will Tusk undertake more unpopular reforms which might cost him his job security while benefiting Polish society? Professor Antoni Dudek, professor of humanities at Krakow’s Jagiellonian University and a member of the council of Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance, one of the most prolific historians of the Third Polish Republic, certainly doesn’t think so. “Personally, I am sceptical. I doubt that Tusk’s government will undertake courageous reforms,” says Dudek. He points to the example of Poland’s Minister of Justice, Jarosław Gowin, whom he praises as “the boldest reformer in the government”. Poland currently has the most regulated professions in the European Union – access to a total of 380 professions is limited in Poland, compared to an EU-wide average of 150. By comparison, Estonia has only 49 such professions. Minister Gowin has proposed the partial or complete deregulation of 250 of these professions, thus making them more Polish growth depends on accessible to unemployed Poles. However, the making its economy more project that deregulated the first 50 professions open and business-friendly. spent seven months of consultation in Tusk’s government, only being sent to the Sejm after Tusk and Gowin faced great opposition to the reform from the representatives of many labour guilds, particularly taxi drivers. “This reform was supposed to be signed into law before the summer vacation [2012] and despite the government’s promises, the reform still won’t come. It’s the same case with the reform of the court system,” Dudek laments, referring to Gowin’s reduction of the number of courts in Poland and a reform that would expedite trials in the country. Tusk has slowed the pace of the reform of Poland’s judicial system after growing pressures from judges. “Tusk’s government most clearly fears conflict with influential interest groups.” Dudek notes, however, that simply avoiding difficult reforms will not save Tusk’s popularity, as the next couple years are likely to be difficult for the Polish economy not only because of the eurozone crisis, but also because the EU’s cohesion funds Filip Mazurczak, Tusk’s Unenviable Dilemma Opinion and Analysis 85 are likely to be much less generous to Poland in the European Union budget from 2014 to 2020 than they were in the 2007-2013 budget. While one year ago Tusk campaigned on promises that he would fight for 80 billion euros of development funds for Poland from the next budget, observers of the EU note that austerity measures will likely slash development aid for Poland for 2014-2020 to around 70 billion euros. Bureaucratic burdens

However, some are optimistic that Tusk’s government can push through reforms to improve Poland’s economy. Mirosław Barszcz, the former Polish deputy finance minister and Justice Minister Gowin’s adviser on deregulation, shrugs off suggestions that the deregulation reform took so many months because of Tusk’s cabinet’s craven approach to interest groups. “From a legislative point of view, this was probably one of the quickest reforms in Poland’s history,” he said to me. “A project that is so complicated and serious cannot be undertaken at an express tempo.” Barszcz expects that at least 100,000 new jobs can be created thanks to the deregulation of the first 50 professions. In addition to deregulating Poland’s labour market and expediting the country’s judicial system, Tusk’s government should make the Polish economy more business- friendly if it wants it to grow at a quicker pace. In October 2012, the World Bank published its prestigious annual Ease of Doing Business Index, a key tool for investors when evaluating global markets. Poland jumped from 74th to 55th place, improving its ranking more than any other economy from the previous year, among the 185 countries evaluated in the study. However, despite this rosy news for Tusk’s government, much remains to be done. Of the 27 countries of the EU, only seven – Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Greece, and Malta – have a lower ranking. And in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, another key indicator for investors, Poland is ranked 64th out of 184 countries, in the “Moderately Free” category, only the third classification after “Free” and “Mostly Free.” What are the main bureaucratic burdens to businesspeople in Poland? Krzysztof Rybiński, the deputy chief of the National Bank of Poland from 2004 to 2008 and one of the country’s most respected economists, notes that Polish construction law is extremely unfriendly towards businesses. He indicates that building a simple warehouse is a tedious experience, requiring many permits and clearances. This is reflected in Poland’s position in theEase of Doing Business Index, where it is ranked 161st place among 185 countries. In addition to deregulating Poland’s labour market, as Minister Gowin has been doing, Rybiński argues that Tusk’s government should “revive the spirit of economic 86 Opinion and Analysis Filip Mazurczak, Tusk’s Unenviable Dilemma

freedom, deregulating the goods and services market, eliminating excessive permits and unnecessary tax audits that make it difficult for a new product to enter the market”. Jean Monnet who, like Alcide de Gasperi, was one of the architects of the post- Second World War European unification, noted “Europe will arise from crises and will be the sum of responses to these crises.” Undoubtedly, the continent’s current economic and political malaise – in which the monetary union, the EU’s democratic deficit, and the paradigm of prosperity that Jeremy Rifkin dubbed “the European dream” itself – are all pulled into question. From Dublin to Tallinn, governments will have to make politically unpopular decisions that might remove them from power but create stability for future generations if Europe wants to remain a potent player in world politics.

Long term battle

Donald Tusk’s government has been in a privileged position throughout the eurozone crisis, with a relatively strong economic performance allowing it to stall on difficult reforms. However, the comforts of Euro 2012 public investments, generous aid from Brussels, and a lucrative export market in the West are all gradually receding. Harsh reforms are not new to Poland. In the 1990s, Poland became both the first post-Communist state to return to its pre-1989 GDP levels and posted the highest annual economic growth of all the former East Bloc economies. Along with Prague and Budapest, Warsaw’s high-rise real estate and status as a hub of foreign direct investment made it a symbol of successful economic shock therapy. Poland became the darling of Western economists such as Nobel Prize winner Jeffrey Sachs, who wrote of “Poland’s return to Europe” with great admiration. Yet this was all thanks to the difficult reforms of Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, whose liberalising policies produced popular anger and high unemployment in the immediate outcome, yet ultimately made Poland living proof of the success of market reforms. As Law and Justice’s public support gradually creeps up to Tusk’s previously commanding status in public opinion surveys, he should consider proving to his critics that he is concerned about more than just his results in the polls. This might just result in more Poles trusting him, and perhaps even land him a third term.

Filip Mazurczak is a graduate student studying international relations and European studies at the George Washington University in the US. His academic interests include Second World War history, Polish-Jewish relations and Christianity in modern Europe. Dishonest Promises and Illegitimate Regimes

A conversation with Anne Applebaum, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Gulag: A History. Her new book Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944-1956 was published in 2012. Interviewer: Hayden Berry

NEW EASTERN EUROPE: As an American, interested in the subject of who the what attracted you to Central and Communists were, why people went along Eastern Europe? with them, and why their ideology was ANNE APPLEBAUM: I read a lot of so powerful. Of course, I could have told Russia literature when I was a teenager, the same story writing about the Soviet and got the idea that I wanted to be able Union in the 1920s and 1930s, but in a way to read it in the original. But this was the it was more interesting to focus on the 1980s, at the height of the “second” Cold Sovietisation of Eastern Europe because War, and Russia started to be interesting it was done so quickly, and by people for other reasons too: the Soviet Union who by that time had a clear idea of what seemed a menacing and fascinating place. they were doing. I wanted to understand I studied Russian, spent a summer in what the institutional building blocks of Leningrad, and then afterwards found totalitarianism were. myself at Oxford. From there I started making trips to Eastern Europe. The In Iron Curtain you seem to argue first time I was in Poland was, I think, that apart from the Second World War in 1986. I did a trip on behalf of a group itself, the defining moment for Eastern that Roger Scruton used to help run, Europe was the Yalta Conference. which smuggled money into Eastern What impact did Yalta have on the Europe for dissidents. region? Yalta was a moment of clarity, And did you always plan to write revealing, finally, that Poland, Hungary Iron Curtain after writing Gulag? and Czechoslovakia were not the priority I didn’t plan Iron Curtain, but in of the Western Allies. When Franklin the course of writing Gulag, I became Roosevelt was at Yalta, he was interested 88 Interview Dishonest Promises and Illegitimate Regimes, A conversation with Anne Applebaum

in other things, such as the United Nations of Stalinist system from 1945 or 1946 and Japan, and his conversations with the until 1956, and then which had a messier Soviet Union were about those issues. post-Stalinist communist system until Poland just wasn’t a priority. Someone the 1980s. In that sense, all the countries had told Roosevelt that Lviv was a very of this region still have something in important city to Poles and that there was common. They have a piece of their some oil around, which is actually true. history and similar experience. So he made some noises about including Of course, it’s not true anymore. it within Poland, but then got distracted The countries of what we used to call and didn’t pursue it. Winston Churchill Eastern Europe are now as different was actually more interested in Poland, from one another as the countries of but was also more doubtful about his own Western Europe, maybe even more so. ability to do anything about the Soviet The differences between Poland and Union. However, the main cause of what Albania, and Romania and Slovakia happened was the Red Army’s occupation are certainly as great as those between of the region. Once that was a fact on the England, Italy and Greece. The post- ground, it was very difficult to change. Soviet world, meaning countries such as It was probably politically impossible Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, are different for the British and Americans to go to again: they were part of the Soviet Union war again, right after the Second World for 70 years, and not satellite states for War had ended. 40 years. It’s a very different historical experience. There is a deeper civilisational In the introduction you also write difference between Russia, Ukraine and about “Eastern Europe” essentially Belarus, on the one hand, and Poland being a western historical and political and Hungary, on the other. concept rather than a geographical one. To what extent has this concept You write quite powerfully in Iron prevented the West from breaking Curtain about the wave of ethnic down these, in some sense, self- cleansing which took place after the imposed barriers and embracing the Second World War, which essentially cultures of the East? In short, how destroyed multi-ethnicity in the region much is the West to blame for the and left only nostalgia for what had stereotype? been. To what extent did this nostalgia It depends on when you’re talking nurture or drive nationalism? about. If you had looked at these countries It depends what you mean by in the 1950s, they did have remarkably nationalism, and it depends what you similar political systems, and it is correct mean by nostalgia. There are forms of to define them, politically, as a single nationalism, which I would call patriotism, group: the countries which had this kind which are quite useful and healthy. There 89 Photo courtesy Applebaum Photo of Anne

are also people who define themselves back, the effect they had on mainstream by the people they hate, or by the people German politics was minimal. So are who they are not. And, yes, for some of these important feelings? Yes. But did those people the loss of territory or the they cause either Germany or Poland to memory of some past mistreatment is a become raving fascist states? No. motivating life factor. It’s not just true of this region, you can see it all over the In a radio interview for the BBC1 world. you discussed how “authoritarianism It also varies. Although the Poles lost contains the seeds of its own a good deal of territory in 1939, I don’t destruction”. Could you elaborate think contemporary Poland is particularly on this? nationalistic. There is nostalgia for the I was talking specifically about Soviet- formerly Polish cities of Vilnius and Lviv, style totalitarianism, and two aspects in but I don’t detect mass movements to particular. Firstly, in their attempt to take them back. Nor is there mass hatred control and politicise everything, the of Ukrainians. Even in Germany, where communist parties of the region made former German expellees played a role in German postwar politics for many 1 The interview can be found at: http://www.bbc. decades, agitating to get land and houses co.uk/programmes/b01n0vmt 90 Interview Dishonest Promises and Illegitimate Regimes, A conversation with Anne Applebaum

everyone into a potential political enemy: And in terms of Russia? an artist painting in a politically incorrect It’s very similar. In Russia, Vladimir style was automatically a political Putin argues, “I keep the country together. dissident, whereas in another culture I pay your wages on time. And I’m they might not have been. Boys who bringing growth.” However, Putin has didn’t want to join the new youth groups done very few of the reforms that he’s became dissidents too. By politicising promised, and growth is shaky. Clearly, ordinary activities, civil society and the Russian government knows that it is associations of all kinds, the communists illegitimate and fears popular challenge: it created potential opponents. wouldn’t need to crack down on girls who Secondly, by constantly presenting demonstrate in churches if they weren’t the world as it was supposed to be, as on some level afraid of them. For regimes opposed to the world as it was, they which are nervous about whether they created a bizarre gap between reality deserve to be in power or not, criticism and propaganda. At some point, even the will always be a problem. communist parties stopped believing in the propaganda. In the end, the system What comparisons can you see unravelled because it made no sense; it between the Soviet style and Putin’s was based on dishonest promises. style of repression? The Stalin of the 1930s and Putin of How does this concept apply to the present are not similar in that Putin regimes which exist today? is not engaging in mass arrests or mass All regimes which do not hold power murder. He’s not shooting 20,000 people thanks to a democratic process have in the forest within the space of a few to legitimise themselves through weeks as he did at Katyń. And he’s not some other method. This includes, arresting one million people. But his for example, modern China, which system does bear a resemblance to Yuri is not totalitarian in the Stalinist or Andropov’s Russia in the 1980s, and not Maoist sense: the Chinese no longer accidentally. Putin was a great admirer make people march in parades or shout of Andropov (General Secretary of the slogans they don’t believe in, and they Communist Party of the Soviet Union also don’t try to control everything. between 1982 to 1984, and head of the Nevertheless, it has this in common KGB before that – editor’s note), and has with the USSR: the Chinese regime’s since built statues in his honour all over legitimacy is based on a promise of Moscow and St Petersburg. rapid economic growth, and if they Like Andropov, Putin believes in cease to have rapid economic growth, moderating the amount of freedom then why should people support them? Russians are allowed. At the moment, Propaganda has to match reality. you can have freedom of speech, you can Dishonest Promises and Illegitimate Regimes, A conversation with Anne Applebaum Interview 91 say what you want, you can even publish people around him, with the exception things critical of the authorities – as of Michael McFaul (currently the United long as not many people are listening or States Ambassador to Russia – editor’s reading. Nobody’s going to be arrested note), who knew much about the region. for saying things in their own houses or The result of that absence was series telling jokes, like they were in the 1930s. of unfortunate mistakes, such as the But if you create a political movement, president’s use of the term “Polish death if you attract too much attention, if you camps”, a phrase the Poles find offensive. appear on national television, then you I gather that in the second term the could lose your job, discover you are White House hopes to rectify this lack under investigation for tax fraud, even of expertise. be arrested. At the same time, please remember the Putin also shares with Andropov a downgrading of Europe and European fanatical interest in small, civic-minded, matters in the United States is not independent and not even necessarily happening because Americans don’t opposition groups. He is obsessed with like Europeans, but because the president non-governmental organisations, who now has limited time and there are other face bureaucratic and financial obstacles of crises: Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, China, all kinds. I met a friend of mine last week the economy, the hurricane. Only after who runs a small educational institute all of those things are dealt with can you in Russia. She gets some money for worry about Europe, including Eastern educational projects from abroad, and Europe. Poles never believe me when I she will now have to register as a “foreign say this, but from the point of view of agent”, which essentially means as a spy. the United States, everything is fine in There is a deliberate stigmatising of self- Poland. Is there a crisis? No. A war? No. organised, non-official groups, to keep Sometimes you don’t agree with one them from having too much influence. another, but that’s normal. That’s very Soviet. Do you see these linguistic gaffes as Many in this region were being particularly damaging? disappointed by Barack Obama’s I thought the “Polish death camp” first term as president of the United comment was unfortunate but not States, but what does his re-election disastrous. The Polish foreign ministry mean to the stability and politics of had been conducting a campaign against the region? the use of this term for a decade. That I don’t think it means very much nobody in the White House seemed at all. On the one hand, yes, there are to know that the phrase is considered some justifiable criticisms of Obama. offensive is rather odd. In the first term, there weren’t many 92 Interview Dishonest Promises and Illegitimate Regimes, A conversation with Anne Applebaum

In a review of Iron Curtain you’ve But I don’t see why that’s right-wing any been accused of having “a political, as more. It’s been a long time since being well as a scholarly purpose” and that anti-communist meant that you were a “as a right-wing cold warrior [you are] right-wing “cold warrior”. anxious to drive another nail into the coffin of the old European and American And finally, what’s next? Will you left, with their residual tendency to find write a trilogy? excuses for Soviet communism.” How I would like to write a book about the 2 would you respond? famine in the 1930s in Ukraine, about I really don’t think I had a political which there is a lot of information but agenda as such when writing this book. not an up-to-date popular book, written Do I want to drive a nail into the coffin using archives. I would also like to write of the idea that there was something about 1989, which I remember very well, good about Communism and that it was but it’s still maybe slightly too early for just a much misunderstood system? Yes. that.

Anne Applebaum is Philippe Roman Professor at the London School of Economics for 2012-2013 and a columnist for the Washington Post. Her book Gulag: A History won the Pulitzer Prize in 2003, and her new book Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944-56 was published in 2012. She is married to Radosław Sikorski, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Hayden Berry is an editor with New Eastern Europe.

2 The interview can be found online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2012/oct/26/iron-curtain-anne- applebaum-review Russia in my Blood

A conversation with Emmanuel Carrère, French author, screenwriter and film director. Interviewer: Łukasz Wojtusik

ŁUKASZ WOJTUSIK: Your most recent had a good portion of the text finished. book is a biography of Eduard Limonov, In fact, I did give it up. And the reason I the avant-garde Russian poet and gave up was mainly because I suddenly writer, but also, as some say, Vladimir couldn’t help but start seeing this person Putin’s worst nightmare. Why did you very differently. He became beyond decide to write a book about a person unlikeable, even grotesque. It took me who French journalist Jean Hatzfeld a whole year to return to this text and once derogatively called a “Mickey to be able again to see Limonov in a Mouse”? different light. EMANUEL CARRERE: Jean Hatzfeld didn’t say this directly, but while reporting Limonov liked to shock the public on the war in the Balkans, he described this and would often change his image. category of people in his correspondence. Which of his life stages was the most The name “Mickey Mouse” is given to difficult for you to verify? a person who excites himself with war To be honest, I was only verifying my and weapons. These people can get very facts to a very small extent. My book is infantile and in times of war feel as if not an American-style biography. My they were in an amusement park. In a main sources were Limonov’s own books controversial film, which was broadcast about himself and I assume that in them worldwide, Limonov was caught shooting he tells us the truth about himself. He a machine gun into the besieged Sarajevo doesn’t come across as a liar. He’s also not in the company of the then Bosnian the most imaginative person out there Serb leader Radovan Karadžić. And in but he is no prude and talks about many this case, indeed, he behaved like what humiliating facts without reserve. The Hatzfeld would call a “Mickey Mouse”. majority of the events in his life would be After watching this broadcast I even difficult to actually verify – for example, gave up the idea of writing a book about his life in Kharkiv. I admit I restrained Limonov, although at that time I already from doing field research for this book. 94 Interview Russia in my Blood, A conversation with Emmanuel Carrère

I didn’t look for Limonov’s friends from less and less interested in competing with that period of time. I could only confront others. This isn’t of course the case with his stories with reports from those who Limonov. He lives by competing. From a had witnessed the Bosnian war. I knew literary point of view, I thought it would some journalists who were reporting be very interesting to look at his life from from this war, but I didn’t talk to them. a time distance and not just describe All in all, I don’t consider my book to be parallel lives. I think Limonov is a very Limonov’s most faithful biography. It’s talented writer and, let’s say, a strange more of a novel about his life. politician, but the most important thing about him is that he is and always was And what was Limonov’s reaction an outsider. He was never on the right to the book? side of conflict. Paradoxically, however, His first reaction was an email in in this lies his greatness and nobility. which he thanked me for writing the If Limonov could make it somewhere book. And he wrote that maybe one else, and this is all assuming that the day he would react to it and say what political sphere is out of his reach, he he thinks about it. But this most likely would make quite a guru. One of his will never happen. What could he do, greatest talents is that of being a guru. anyway? Verify facts from his own life? Even though he’s nearing 70, Limonov is This wouldn’t be interesting. He could surrounded by people who are in their also question some political assessments, 20s. This excites him greatly. And it is but that wouldn’t change much either. still possible that he becomes something In my view, Limonov took a very sound else, something more than a guru: a position. He accepted the fact that the really wise man. Who knows? There is book exists and that people are talking also this virtuality in him. about him again, but he doesn’t get involved in the details of the debate. At the end of your book, however, Limonov isn’t really particularly In your book you make many successful. Do you pity him? comparisons with characters such as If we dare to assess somebody else’s Joseph Brodsky, Venedikt Erofeyev life, let’s do it based on the criteria he and even Vladimir Putin. Why didn’t or she has suggested. Limonov dreamt Limonov become such a great writer of being a hero. His desire was to lead a like Brodsky or a politician of Putin’s heroic life. But a hero can also fail. That calibre? is why Limonov never settled and never One of the central issues of the book adjusted to others. When, for example, is rivalry and the constant competition he was released from prison, he could with others. Personally, I believe that have become one of the “official” writers, wisdom and maturity mean that a man is get a dacha, as well as other benefits. 95 Photo: BartłomiejPhoto: Kwasek

French author, screenwriter and director, Emmanuel Carrère is also the son of renowned historian Hélène Carrère d’Encausse. 96 Interview Russia in my Blood, A conversation with Emmanuel Carrère

But he rejected such an opportunity. little risky and difficult project, but for He remained faithful to himself and this reason also an interesting one. It’s didn’t want to sacrifice his principles quite clear that I didn’t take the role for such a life. of being Limonov’s defender. I’m not his lawyer. I’m not making excuses for We can also see from your book him. During one of our conversations that Limonov didn’t have much luck he even told me: “I know we are not on with women… the same side.” Limonov’s curse and glory is his On the other hand, I very often faithfulness to a young boy’s ideals. stress my bourgeois, social-democratic His ideal of heroism is a vision of a child. background and leftish views in the book And maybe that’s why in the area of love for purely literary reasons. What probably Limonov is like a chivalrous knight. But makes the book more interesting is the let’s make it clear: Don Juan he is not. fact that the story of Limonov hasn’t He takes care of women and embraces been told by one of his supporters, but them. But they ditch him. All in all, in rather a person who’s on the other side this area a hero is also someone who of the barricade. fails. He is a loser, but maybe it’s better, from a romantic point of view, to end a But isn’t there some contradiction loser than a billionaire or a successful here? We read the story of a non- politician. submissive hero, an outsider whom we want to support. But in the end, The footage showing Limonov this hero fails. Is he one of those with Radovan Karadžić clearly had characters that we get interested a very negative impact on his career. in, but don’t want to succeed? Captured by award-winning director Subconsciously, we refuse them the Pawel Pawlikowski in his Serbian right to triumph… Epics documentary and shown at If you are saying that you have some Karadžić’s trial at The Hague, it cost satisfaction in the fact that Limonov him some publishing contracts in both hasn’t got into power, then I can only Europe and the United States, and applaud. I have satisfaction from this turned him into persona non grata in too. But if Limonov is experiencing a many Western literary circles. What renaissance as a writer, and if I had my did your friends think about this? share in it ... well, in that case I can only I only discussed the plan to write this be happy. Why? Because he is, indeed, an book with a very small group of people. extraordinary person. Even his political In fact, the only people I talked to were failures are written into the history of the publisher and my closest friends. his life. I do have some sort of respect Everybody said that this would be a towards him. Russia in my Blood, A conversation with Emmanuel Carrère Interview 97

In your autobiography and story 19th century Russian novels: Mikhail about the Carrère family, A Russian Lermontov, Alexander Pushkin and Novel, you dedicate it to your mother, Fyodor Dostoyevsky. There is nothing Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, and unusual about this. This is part of the included information about her father’s French education. French teenagers tend collaboration with Nazi Germany, which to love Russian literature. As a young is said to have cost your mother her man I made the assumption that Russia political career. Indeed, your mother is my mother’s territory. And because stopped talking to you after you wrote the world is so big, we don’t need to A Russian Novel, and didn’t comment cross paths. But, well, later in my life, I publicly about Limonov. started regularly crossing the Eastern A Russian Novel is an autobiography, border. I travelled to Russia; I filmed a and includes the story of my grandfather documentary film in a small Russian who collaborated with the Nazis and died town and wrote two books that deal in tragic circumstances which were never with Russian issues. fully explained. My mother was entirely However, I do have ambiguous feelings against the idea of me tackling this issue. towards this country and I’m probably I acted against her will. I crossed the line not the exception. Russia is a dangerous and broke the family rule of speaking place, a country full of violence, but about this story. The tension was huge. it’s also a fascinating one. For sure, my We did have a period of, let me put it mother and I write about it in a completely this way, difficult relations.Limonov , different way. She’s a historian and an on the other hand, is a book which fits academic. I’m more subjective, I present into my mother’s area of interest as she my impressions, which are far from being is a worldwide renowned historian. By objective, which is why I always write in writing it, I wanted to pay tribute to her. the first person singular. I am writing about Russia. I am using her analytical techniques. I am adopting Your mother is known for the her way of reasoning. Limonov brought prediction she made in the late 1970s her great pleasure. This is a book of about the collapse of communism. conciliation. This year Vladimir Putin won Russia’s presidential election and returned Would you say that your literary to the Kremlin. Can you make your interest in Russia is your mother’s own prediction? Is there a chance for legacy? change? Or is there another Limonov I have Russia in my blood. It is part who could come after Putin? of the DNA I got from my mother. As a I’m not an expert here. All I can say child I spoke Russian but quickly forgot is that Limonov wants a revolution and the language. As a French teenager, I read he is probably the only one in Russia 98 Interview Russia in my Blood, A conversation with Emmanuel Carrère

with such a vision. As we all know, human dignity. They were protesting the Russians have already had their against bureaucracy, corruption and revolution. The people who in 2011 and the authoritarian regime. Hence, we can 2012 were demonstrating in the streets of only hope that in 10 or 20 years’ time, Moscow or St. Petersburg wanted more they will, as 40 or 50 year-olds, take over democracy. That’s a big difference. The power. protesters were demanding respect for

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Emmanuel Carrère is a French author, screenwriter and film director. Łukasz Wojtusik is a Polish journalist and radio reporter. He is the head of the Kraków office of the radio station TOK FM. Potatoes and Fortune Cookies

phOtOS AnD text: kAterinA bAruShkA

The recent boom in Belarus-China relations is surprising; it’s sudden, it’s wide scale and it’s inexplicable. What are the true reasons and possible prospects for this cooperation?

International relations in Belarus are a difficult area to write about, but an easy subject to study for one and the same reason. The scope of these relations is rather limited: a few sparks of Belarusian dialogue with the European Union, contrasted by long periods of frozen relations; then stable dependency on Russia within the framework of a rich and pretentious patron and his smart vassal; and the sporadic contacts with other countries – and that is all there is. But this quiet domain has been shaken up by a sudden entry of a new player: China. The state media is making its best efforts to brand this cooperation as natural and long-awaited. Society is puzzled, there had been no indications of this impulsive, new friendship even a year ago; and nothing united these two countries in the past. President Alyaksandr Lukashenka proudly explained to his people that this abrupt twist of Belarus’s foreign policy is his own fortunate initiative.

The glorious Belarusian-Chinese partnership

In order to illustrate the peculiarities of this complicated process, let’s look for a metaphor within the food preferences of these two nations. Belarusians are said to the world’s leading consumers of potatoes. A potato is unsophisticated and obvious; it hits hard and flies straight. It doesn’t require special treatment, it just wants to grow. The politics of the Belarusian regime is similar. It doesn’t require complicated codes. It just wants to remain in power for as long as possible. Just as a potato needs sun and rain, Lukashenka needs credits and investments, preferably fast, easy and on an unconditional basis. In the best case scenario, there is no need to give them back. A Chinese fortune cookie is a different story. It features imagination, long-term thinking and necessary ingredients. A fortune cookie is never what it looks like. 100 Reports Katerina Barushka, Potatoes and Fortune Cookies

It hides secrets carefully; to figure it out you need to get fully engaged. And once you have cracked it, there is no hiding from the fortune inside. You won’t confuse a Chinese fortune cookie with a product from Vietnam, Korea or Japan. It is distinct and remains true to its homeland, just like the Chinese officials when doing business in Belarus or elsewhere in the world. The combination of these two approaches provides some interesting results. A joint Chinese-Belarusian venture called Midea-Horyzont was created in 2007 and produced its first microwaves in 2009. The Belarusian state media Since then they have been primarily sold in the post-Soviet countries under the loudly praises the Chinese-Belarus brand names Midea, Horyzont, “and some partnership as being long other brands”, as the Horyzont website awaited and well deserved. states. Just one year after the start of production, the enterprise became the first company to receive a certificate from the Customs Union, which allowed them to be directly distributed throughout Russia and Kazakhstan. Interestingly, three months before, the Chinese Midea Group acquired a controlling stake in the Midea-Horyzont Company. Horyzont Deputy Director General Sergei Gunko succinctly explained that the decision was taken “to interest the Chinese holding company in further development of business in Belarus”. In other words, after all the lobbying by the Belarusian side was complete, and the possibility to sell the Chinese goods under the mysterious “other brands” without the burdensome taxes on the territory of the Customs Union was secured, the Chinese holding company took control over the enterprise for its own benefit. Another exciting joint project is the reconstruction of a paper factory in Dobrush, a city in the north-east of Belarus, 25 kilometres from the Russian border. On October 1st 2012 Lukashenka signed a decree, stipulating the plan of this modernisation. The construction of a new factory is to be completed by 2015 with the main contractor being Xuan Yuan Industrial Development Co., Ltd. The reconstruction will cost some 500 million dollars, which is to come from the Chinese Bank for the Development of China. The Belarusian media have loudly praised the upcoming project as long awaited and well deserved investments. But the truth is, this transaction is no investment, but credit, and judging from the international experience, this credit will not arrive in hard cash, but in Chinese machinery of moderate quality, to be operated by a Chinese contractor. The Chinese Bank for the Development of China knows how to do its job well. While the Belarusian president, desperate for money, agrees to unfavourable terms in credit to be used on one of the most ecologically dangerous productions. Katerina Barushka, Potatoes and Fortune Cookies Reports 101

But the most prominent and by far the most thrilling idea is the Belarusian- Chinese Industrial Park. This free economic zone is to occupy an area of some 80 square kilometres. The industrial part is planned practically right next to the airport, just 30 kilometres from Minsk. The economic exemptions for the future residents of the park are unprecedented. The main production areas of the park are electronics, chemistry, biotechnologies, machinery construction and new materials. Ten square kilometres of the future park is currently occupied by villages, children’s resorts and an ecological reserve called Valmianski. Construction is set to begin in early 2013.

Friendly shoulder

“Listen, the Chinese have money to burn! There are plenty of projects they can invest it into to make profit for their economy. But I want them to come to us! Today they are an empire; tomorrow they’ll be a global leader. What’s so bad in relying on the shoulder of a friendly China?” replies Lukashenka to questions regarding the reasoning of the choice for his new best friends. These questions are infrequent and humble. They mainly come from the residents of those unlucky villages, situated on the territory of the future industrial park. After the initial plan for the park was leaked to the public, there were even some public protests – people gathered for meetings, signed petitions and demanded the local The most prominent joint administration conduct a referendum. On June 5th 2012, before the administration had project is a future industrial park time to react, the president signed decree to be located near the town number 253 “On the Chinese-Belarusian of Smaliavichy. Industrial Park”, significantly easing the task of the administration. The matter of the possible referendum, they said, is of national importance, so it is the national administration who should decide. But the president has already signed the relevant decree, and nobody questions presidential decrees in Belarus. The decree itself is a piece of art. It stipulates truly beautiful benefits and romantic concessions: 10 years free from income, property and land taxes, 50 years of income tax for employees reduced from 12 to 9 per cent and tax exemption on imported equipment, as well as on products to be used for construction within the park. The Ministry of Economy rejoices that such idyllic conditions will attract some five billion dollars in investments over the next ten years. How exactly will the wonder park in the problematic republic attract that much money is only known to Anatol Tozik, the deputy prime minister. With great 102 Reports Katerina Barushka, Potatoes and Fortune Cookies

excitement, which is hardly explainable by altruistic reasons, Tozik lobbies for the Industrial Park in the media and the government. His recent meeting with the China CAMC Engineering Company and its parent company China National Machinery Industry Corporation (SINOMACH) was presented to the citizens of Belarus as the final step in solving all the administrative questions of the project. Additionally, the two sides covered the questions of financing (which is apparently practically solved) of the park and other perspective future projects. The Chinese way of presenting the meetings was quite different. The last time Tozik and Belarus were actually mentioned on the websites of the two companies was a year ago, in November 2011 in connection with Tozik’s visit to China. The matters that the Chinese partners found interesting enough to mention in the Belarus hopes that China’s press release, however, concern the engagement with Belarus spectacular impression SINOMACH will be a threat to Russian interests. made on the Belarusian delegation and the conditions for transferring Belarusian state assets to Chinese investors. The English language media mainly mention Belarus in connection with public acclaims by Tozik of the great Chinese economy and the future prospects of mutual cooperation between the two countries. There are more discrepancies to follow. The cooperation agreement with the Chinese partners has already been signed, stipulating the obligations of both sides, but there is no general plan of the project attached to the document. Combined with the fact that 60 per cent of shares of the company to manage the park belong to China CAMC Engineering Company, this agreement is in fact a carte blanche for the Chinese partner to do whatever it pleases on the territory of the park. But the government claims that there is nothing to worry about. The highest governing body of the structure is an intergovernmental coordination council, in which the Belarusian side has “a blocking vote”, although the details on the role and principles of this mysterious “blocking” vote are not provided. The park is to be situated right next to the airport. This choice is justified by the convenience for international investors and the availability of a qualified workforce from Minsk. However, the airport area is considered to be a zone of higher risk. Thus, the comfort of the international investors and qualified specialists will be disturbed quite significantly if there are any accidents in the chemical factories which will be constructed in the park. In the case of such accidents, the ecological problems will not only concern the residents of the park, but all those living in the vicinity of the industrial park. Unfortunately, the protests of the residents of these villages have died down, as it Katerina Barushka, Potatoes and Fortune Cookies Reports 103 often happens in Belarus. Yauhen Puhach, a journalist from the largest local town of Smaliavichy, explains this decrease in people’s activity by the fact that the park is ten kilometres away. And those who live in the area itself are apparently satisfied by the promise contained in the presidential decree on not moving the people who live there away. It is easy for the president to provide such guarantees; but once the park is constructed, there will be no need to move anyone. People, tired of their loud, noisy and polluted neighbour, will move away through their own free will. High hopes

The most ridiculous part of the project is the declared financial perspectives. Just guess how much capital the Belarusian government plans to attract in the form of investments by the time the park is constructed? Unbelievably enough, this modest country, which has difficulties in attracting any foreign investment whatsoever, hopes the industrial park will bring 30 billion dollars into the country! Those who wonder why Belarus needs this park are offered a short answer. “The first reason is investment, the second reason is new jobs,” states the Ministry of the Economy. Who the first investor will be remains unknown. The state media mentions ten large international companies, but omit abundant details as to what these companies are and where they come from. So we can assume that these companies don’t exist. The perspective of new jobs is also questionable since as international experience shows, Chinese businessmen prefer to hire Chinese workers. All in all, the Belarusian-Chinese Industrial Park is all about few benefits, plenty of risks and many blank spaces. It is hard to believe that the Belarusian state, which only cares for quick money, will really engage in this venture. It is one thing to let the Chinese partners take control over a part of a factory, or agree to unfavourable credit in the situation when it is the only credit Belarus can get; but letting a foreign company construct whatever it wishes 30 kilometres from Minsk, despite popular protests and ecological requirements, with little chances of making money is just unjustifiable. But why make a fuss? Why spend the energy and resources on a project, which is doomed to close down? The reasons for this sudden friendship with China lie elsewhere. Apparently, the Belarusian state hopes that Chinese companies, once engaged and seemingly powerful on the territory of Belarus, will look like a threat to the Russians. There are indeed two areas where that could happen – the privatisation of Belarusian state enterprises and the regulations of the Customs Union. Regarding Belarusian state-owned enterprises, China is particularly interested in Belaruskali, one of the world’s leading producers of potash fertilizers. China is one of the main consumers of these fertilizers and they naturally wish to control 104 Reports Katerina Barushka, Potatoes and Fortune Cookies

the supply. Along with China, India and Russia are also competing for influence. Once there are more Chinese companies in Belarus, China could potentially be more inclined to offer a higher bid. Another conflicting area will be the foreign companies registered at the free economic area of the Belarusian-Chinese Industrial park. According to agreements signed by Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan, foreign companies are to leave free economic areas by the year 2017. Lukashenka has promised the Chinese partners that the tax benefits will be available to them within the industrial park until 2062. A way for the Belarusian authorities to have its cake and eat it too is to register the Chinese companies as Belarusian and sell their goods, the production of which is basically exempt from taxes, all over the Customs Union. In other words, glue a sticker “Made in Belarus” on Chinese products and happily sell them to the Russians. Russia is bound to object at some point. And this is when the trading genius of Lukashenka will glow with all its power. The Russians will be told that since they are Belarus’s greatest allies, Belarus would be happy to please them. But obviously, Belarus has agreements with the Chinese that it needs to keep. However, if Russia were to give Lukashenka some money for the 2015 presidential campaign, he could theoretically come up with something. If the amount of money offered by Russia, keen on the Customs Union idea, is satisfactory, an ecological committee might emerge, which would block the construction of the industrial park. And the Belarusians would then be told that the Chinese tried to trick our naive citizens, but that the wise president was able to stop them. Hence, this industrial park is yet another ghost project, invented for one purpose only: to negotiate a better position with Russia. And although this particular idea is much too unfavourable for Belarus economically and far too dangerous ecologically, it is also extremely annoying that the Belarusian state would rather engage in some fantastic industrial park instead of concentrating on real foreign development investments and modernising the Belarusian economy.

Katerina Barushka is a Belarusian journalist who works for the independent television station Belsat TV covering political and social issues in Belarus and international affairs. The international airport in Minsk105 welcomes all foreign investors. 106The premises of the administration of the future industrial park.

ADVERTISEMENT 107

A local billboard in the village near the future industrial park. In a year, it will supposedly be filled with attractive job offers. Despite the rotten houses behind the coloured facades, Belarusians try to remain positive. Stateless in Riga ruben mArtinez

In Latvia, former citizens of the USSR, who are neither citizens of Latvia or of any other country, can’t vote in elections or actively participate in Latvia’s political life. They can’t work as civil servants or in certain private business, and their pension rights are restricted.

Walking quietly around the cobbled streets of Riga’s old town, Zanna explains to a group of tourists about the particularities of the Art Nouveau style that adorn many of the facades of the buildings in Latvia’s capital city. For many years now, this 71-year-old woman has worked as a tour guide for Russian visitors in the country where she was born after her father, who was born in Russia, was sent to the Baltic shore to fight the Germans in the Second World War. Zanna, born in 1941, never knew her father. He set off for the war one day and never made it back. Facing reality was tough for her family after such a loss, but they opted to stick together and stay in Latvia. They had no one waiting for them back in Russia. Life was all about surviving in the western part of the yet to be vast Soviet empire. Many years have passed since then, but in her voice there are still shades of many bittersweet moments of her life. Zanna reflects on her mother’s efforts to build a reasonable a comfortable life in Latvia, and how all that changed from one day to the next.

Second class citizens

Recalling the day the country regained its independence, Zanna says, “I literally went from being an average citizen to being on some kind of a blacklist; I became a second-class citizen of the country where I was born.” Many people took part in the 1991 referendum on re-establishing the country’s independence, even those ethnic Russians who were either sent to Latvia to work or, like Zanna, born in the country when it was a part of the Soviet Union. They represented as many as 715,000 people in a country of little more than two million inhabitants. The restoration of the 1922 constitution was among the first measures the newly elected government of Latvia implemented, and individuals who were 110 Reports Ruben Martinez, Stateless in Riga

citizens of the country as of June 17th 1940 were once again recognised as Latvian citizens along with their descendants. All those who didn’t fit this description were given a “non-citizen of Latvia” status, limiting their rights at the social and political level in the newly re-established independent republic. This action left contradictory feelings in those left behind, turning their lives upside down, and the 71-year-old Zanna recalls one example: “My family was given 30 per cent less privatisation certificates About 14 per cent of the than Latvian-born people, limiting our right to population of Latvia is privatise our apartment. For me it has always categorised as non-citizens. been clear about what happened –they improved the lives of the others at our expense.” During the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the path to citizenship was blocked for this large community, leaving them in a sort of limbo. Only in 1995 did the Latvian government pass the law on the status of the citizens of the former USSR, making naturalisation an option for them. However, annual quotas and so-called windows were imposed for the next three years, which limited both the number and sort of people who could apply for Latvian citizenship. Latvia’s “non-citizens” represent a unique status never seen before at the international level. They are former citizens of the USSR, individuals who are neither citizens of Latvia nor of any other country. They cannot vote in any type of elections, nor actively participate in Latvia’s political life. They can’t work in the public sector nor work in certain private businesses, and their pension rights are restricted.

Failed referendum

Today, around 315,000 of these non-citizens live in Latvia (14 per cent of the entire population), down from approximately 715,000 in 1991. The data is still relevant for such a small country of just 2 million inhabitants, and after two decades of ups and downs, the non-citizens’ community seems to have finally taken the initiative to try to achieve a change in their situation. Last September, the social movement For Equal Rights submitted over 12,000 signatures to the Central Election Commission (CEC) in order to initiate a referendum to grant full citizenship to all Latvia’s non- citizens. The bill submitted by the petitioners stipulates that all non-citizens of Latvia who do not apply to keep their status of non-citizens by November 30th 2013 would be automatically granted Latvian citizenship on January 1st 2014. The CEC, however, decided that the second round of signature collection for staging a referendum, which would have needed petitioners to gather at least 10 per cent of voters’ signatures (approximately 150,000 signatures), couldn’t proceed for technical reasons. Ruben Martinez, Stateless in Riga Reports 111

The Latvian authorities welcomed the decision, and Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis said that the CEC’s decision was based on the incompatibility of the bill with the country’s constitution and believes that it should contribute to defusing inter-ethnic tensions in Latvian society. Officials also stated that the automatic granting of citizenship to non-citizens would contradict the European Union’s security standards, being also discriminatory to those who had already been naturalised. Nevertheless, the initiative has already shaken the political arena in the country, with Latvia’s president, Andris Bērziņš, saying during an interview previous to the CEC’s decision, that “automatic citizenship for non-citizens is not the right solution, although I believe that the problem requires an urgent solution”.

Evolution

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and Amnesty International describe non- citizens of Latvia as stateless persons, belonging to a state that does not exist anymore. However, under Latvian law, they are long-term residents of the country who are neither citizens of Latvia nor any other country. Tatjana Ždanoka, Parliamentarian and co-chairperson of For Human Rights in United Latvia, maintains that what happened in Latvia was “a clear division by origins”, adding that parliament, “elected by all the people, deprived a large number of the country’s citizens of some rights. Basically, it was the creation of apartheid.” Such comparison could be dangerous, but clearly illustrates the bitter feelings, especially for Ždanoka, who has made non-citizens’ rights one of her main political pillars. Over the years, the situation of these people has been evolving, in part, thanks to international pressure Naturalisation when the country joined the EU and NATO back in 2004. rates are very low Nils Muižnieks, a Latvian human rights activist and since April 2012 Council of Europe Commissioner for Human in Latvia today. Rights, believes that the citizenship law has not really worked: “It has not promoted integration and participation, and the majority of politicians are not very concerned about the situation. In fact, some are quite satisfied with how things are.” The Latvian authorities believe that time has given them the reason. Latvian culture and language are stronger than they were 20 years ago, and the small Baltic country has been able to get on to its feet after the collapse of the Soviet Union. “I truly believe that there have been no big mistakes at the political level over the last two decades,” Roberts Zīle says. The Latvian economist and member of parliament, who served as Minister of Finance from 1997 to 1998 and Minister Yuri Petropavlovsky is waiting for a decision by the European Court for Human Rights after his citizenship was revoked in 2004.

Photo: Igor Trepeshchenok of Communications from 2002 to 2004, considers non-citizenship to be a non- issue. “We would not have become an EU member state if we had not fulfilled the legal framework on citizenship. Being a non-citizen poses no obstacles to work and contributing to the development of the country, and I think the issue has been over exaggerated many times,” Zīle adds. However, the numbers speak for themselves; around 14 per cent of Latvia’s population has the words “alien” and “non-citizen” printed in their passports. Such a large figure proves that it is a large and diverse community which includes an important number of elderly people, youngsters, and children. Alex Krasnitsky, a journalist born in Riga, says he feels “cheated by all Latvian politicians who do not represent us,” and notes that everyone was promised citizenship during the “awakening period” of the late 1980s and early 1990s. “At the social level there is no such problem between citizens and non-citizens, but I believe we have been used politically many times. I love my country, but sometimes I have felt alone and isolated from a political point of view. To be honest, I think we have been forgotten over the years,” Krasnitsky adds. Ruben Martinez, Stateless in Riga Reports 113

Naturalisation Non-citizens have been offered the opportunity to naturalise since 1995. More than 135,000 people have taken advantage of this opportunity proving that they had lived in Latvia for at least five years and knew the country’s constitution, language, history and national anthem. Death rates and migration movements have also contributed to bringing down the numbers of non-citizens in Latvia. Today, however, naturalisation rates are very low, while the number of non-citizens applying for other citizenships, mostly Russian, has increased slightly. There are reasons to explain this phenomenon: poor knowledge of the Latvian language, especially among older people, and a lack of motivation. “Naturalisation is a cynical procedure introduced at the beginning of the 1990s,” 24-year-old student Aleksandrs Filejs says. “I was born in Riga, so why should I pass an exam to acquire citizenship of my own country? I believe it should be given to me automatically.” Filejs, a highly active polyglot – speaking Latvian, Russian, French, German and Spanish The international – mentions “a moral discomfort” when talking about the right to vote in Latvian elections. pressure and political The case of Yuri Petropavlovsky is unique. His will to solve this issue naturalisation application coincided with the education has disappeared. reform protests that took place in Latvia in 2004, when hundreds of ethnic Russians took to the streets claiming their right to be taught at school in their native language. Born and raised in Latvia, he passed the naturalisation exams, but the government revoked his citizenship after considering him disloyal to the country. In 2006 he took his case before the European Court for Human Rights after being told that in Latvia “political decisions of the government are not under the influence of the Latvian Court system”. He expects to have a positive resolution in the near future, although he says that it would only be “the end of a small battle”.

Language

However, the naturalisation process also has its positive sides. Nadzezhda lives with her husband, a non-citizen, and their daughter who has citizenship as she was born in independent Latvia. Tired of feeling like an outsider in the country where she lives and having to deal with endless procedures when travelling, Nadzezhda naturalised because she wanted to be a “full-right citizen of Latvia, take part in the social and political life of the country and freely travel around Europe”. She had to take the naturalisation exam twice as she failed to prove her fluency in the Latvian language the first time around. “When I passed the exam, I felt very confident in 114 Reports Ruben Martinez, Stateless in Riga

myself for achieving something I had very much longed for,” Nadzezhda says. Like her, most young non-citizens were either born in the country or had their education in Latvian. Elderly people, however, struggle to speak the Latvian, mainly because they can get around only speaking Russian and refuse to learn the language after living for many years in the country. Language poses a key element for the integration of such a large community whose mother tongue is mostly Russian. Svetlana Djačkova, a social and human rights researcher at the Latvian Centre for Human Rights, says that the state should take more steps to further promote naturalisation, and believes that there is a “lack of political will to promote social integration” in Latvia. “International observers have advised easing some of the naturalisation procedures for social groups such as the elderly in terms of language. However, there is a lack of dialogue between the state, experts and minorities,” Djačkova adds.

Voting

After non-citizens were granted visa free travel throughout the Schengen Area and Russia, the debate on how to further promote the integration process of these people has focused on one of the most important democratic rights: the right to vote and participate in politics; something that is sometimes taken for granted in Western Europe. Nils Muižnieks points out that “people learn democracy through participation and Latvia doesn’t see the drawbacks of having such a large community of non- citizens … to promote participation and have their rights represented, you have to promote naturalisation and voting rights at the local level”. The Latvian political elite doesn’t share such an approach. “Can you tell me of a country where non-citizens can vote in national elections? I don’t know of any,” argues Roberts Zīle, who also adds: “If you want to be politically active, you have to be a citizen, and the doors are open for everybody. There are no quotas or so- called windows as there used to be.” Latvia took important steps to address the situation of its non-citizens prior its accession to the European Union, but once the country became a member state, the problem was moved to the very bottom of the list of political priorities. International pressure and therefore political will have disappeared, and the EU, which says that citizenship issues belong to the internal affairs of individual countries, limits its position. Meanwhile, Russia has not contributed positively to finding a solution to the problem. Taking into account that these non-citizens are mostly ethnic Russians who were either born or sent to the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic during the Ruben Martinez, Stateless in Riga Reports 115 time of the Soviet Union, the messages sent from the Kremlin have been everything but helpful, calling for external interference and for non-citizens to believe that their situation in Latvia, and that of the Russian language, would change. So while Latvia has achieved important goals during these 20 years, non-citizens have not. They may have got used to their status, but as long as they cannot vote and lack representation at the political level, the social integration process will not go forward in the country. Democracy sometimes doesn’t mean fairness, and while some people promise to keep fighting for this cause, the battle for the hearts and minds is yet to be won by Latvia.

Ruben Martinez is a freelance journalist based in Riga, Latvia, and has collaborated with different international media in both Spanish and English. Together against Totalitarianism

cécile VAiSSié

The shared history of two Paris-based émigré magazines, Polish Kultura and Russian Kontinent, shows that dialogue is possible even at times when everything seems to be paralysed and frozen. And the legacy they left behind is important even today.

Founded in 1974, Kontinent was the leading magazine of the Russian émigré in Paris. It proclaimed the following principles: “unconditional religious idealism”, “unconditional democratism” and “unconditional anti-totalitarianism”. It also aimed at becoming a periodical where different opposition groups for Central and Eastern Europe could freely communicate and collaborate with each other. The Polish magazine Kultura, also based in Paris, greatly influenced this mission which led to a fruitful dialogue between the Russian and the Polish emigrant intelligentsia in the 1970s and 1980s.

The other Russia

In March 1974, a Russian writer named Vladimir Maksimov (1930-1995), was forced to emigrate to the West as he had continually supported Soviet dissidents and signed petitions demanding the release of prisoners of conscience. Even prior to leaving the Soviet Union, he had had an idea to establish a magazine that would bring together the consolidate the powers of oppositionists to the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. In May 1974, Maksimov discussed this idea with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who was exiled from the Soviet Union on February 14th 1974, after The Gulag Archipelagowas published in the West. The Nobel Prize laureate fully supported Maksimov’s project, and suggested the title Kontinent. He also advised Maksimov to contact the Polish emigrants, who had already been publishing Kultura in Paris since 1947. In a matter of days, Maksimov, together with his wife, met the lead editors of Kultura: Jerzy Giedroyc and Józef Czapski. The meeting took place in Maisons-Laffitte, a suburb of Paris. Giedroyc and Czapski agreed to become the Cécile Vaissié, Together against Totalitarianism History 117 members of the Kontinent editorial board. They joined Gustaw Herling-Grudziński (another Polish writer and dissident) and famous Soviet dissidents and members of intelligentsia Andrei Sakharov, Andrei Sinyavsky, Alexander Galich and Nahum Korzhavin. Kultura editors had a role in the publishing of Kontinent and advised Kontinent’s editorial team on articles and essays, thus influencing the content of the magazine. They helped with “private personal contacts” and their relationships with the editor-in-chief remained friendly. Solzhenitsyn played a key role in forming these relationships. It was his books, The Gulag Archipelago, in particular, which made many Poles change their attitude towards Russia. As Jan Nowak- Jeziorański, the former head of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe, Both Kontinent and Kultura would write, Solzhenitsyn had shown addressed common tragedies: “to the Poles, Ukrainians, Czechs, Soviet crimes and historical conflicts. Slovaks and other oppressed peoples in Eastern Europe that there is an other Russia, which is also suffering as they do; Russia, which is the victim of dreadful crimes and injustice, as they are. And that there are other Russians … not enemies but allies, who are sharing our misfortune with us.” Joint activities became possible together with those other Russians.

Shared oppressions and positions

Solzhenitsyn supported the positioning of Kontinent from the very first issue, saying that the magazine, published by the Russian dissident intelligentsia, “perhaps could become the true voice of Eastern Europe”, which was possible because the peoples who had been in conflict in the past were now sharing a common experience: Soviet totalitarianism. In this first issue, another article signed only “A Voice from Warsaw” and the “Editorial Board of Kultura Magazine”, protected Solzhenitsyn, who was then heavily criticised by some people in the West for his 1974 book Letter to the Soviet Leaders. It is now known that Wiktor Woroszylski was this “voice” and that Giedroyc had asked Maksimov to add Kultura’s signature. Kontinent published authors from the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, both those who were residing in the region and those who had emigrated from it. In the magazine they together addressed common tragedies (Soviet crimes) and historical conflicts. This was also done under the influence of the three Poles from Kultura who threatened to leave the editorial board before the fourth issue because, as we read in Giedroyc’s letter to Maksimov, Kontinent had not yet made a clear statement on the Ukrainian issue, Poland, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, “the deportation of one and a half million Polish citizens to Siberia in 1940”, and had 118 Reports Cécile Vaissié, Together against Totalitarianism

failed to address the Katyń massacre and the attitude of the Soviet Army during the Warsaw Uprising. These “gestures” would not have to wait for too long.Kontinent published an article titled “Russia’s ‘Polish Complex’ and the Territory of ULB (Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus)” in its fourth issue. Its author, Juliusz Mieroszewski, was one of the members of Kultura, and his text began with the following words: “We are afraid of the Russians. We are afraid of the Russians not on the battlefield …We are afraid of Russian imperialism; Kontinent brought Russian political plans. Why are the Russians willing to have the satellite to light some historical events states such as Poland, Czechoslovakia that were concealed in the USSR. and Hungary instead of sympathetic and neutral neighbours?” Mieroszewski, however, also noted that the mentality of some Poles needed to be changed: “In other words, we can demand that the Russians abandon their imperialism, provided that we ourselves, once and for all, abandon all forms and aspects of our traditional and historical imperialism.” Mieroszewski protected the right of the Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belarus peoples to self-determination. Immediately after his article, Kontinent clarified the need not to confuse Soviet and Russian nationalism, and reminded that “it was mostly Russian people who were detained in the Archipelago camps”. Kontinent also stated, however, that in relation to Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus, “recognising the sacred right to self- determination of each mentioned peoples, without any external interference, is one of the underlying principles of the magazine”.

The courage to apologise

At the same time, Kontinent also brought to light some historical events that were firmly concealed in the Soviet Union. Also in the fourth issue, Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, a former member of the Central Committee of Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who was arrested in 1937 and emigrated, wrote a detailed article about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and noted that “the additional secret protocol foreclosing partition of Poland, annexation of the Baltic states, Bessarabia and part of Finland by the Soviet Union” was attached to the agreement. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union refused to acknowledge that this secret protocol ever existed until 1989. The statement, “Measure of Responsibility”, published in the fifth issue of Kontinent reflected the real change in relations of a part of the Russian intelligentsia to the history of Poland in the 20th century. The statement was signed by the composer Andrei Volkonsky and six Russian émigré writers: Vladimir Maksimov, Cécile Vaissié, Together against Totalitarianism History 119

Aleksandr Galich, Viktor Nekrasov, Andrei Sinyavsky, whose trial drew a lot of attention in 1966, and poets Naum Korzhavin and Joseph Brodsky, who was tried in Leningrad in 1964 for “social parasitism” and would in 1987 receive the Nobel Prize in Literature. Together they stated that September 17th 1939 “was the starting point for the national guilt before the Polish people” of the peoples of the USSR “and Russia in particular”. “This day, two totalitarian regimes – of the East and of the West – under the cynical connivance of the free world committed one of the gravest crimes in the 20th century – the third (sic) predatory and unjust Partition of the Polish state.” The signatories asserted that “they had to assume blame for all the grievous sins committed in the name of Russia in relation to Poland upon themselves … Murders of the innocent in Katyń, perfidious treason of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, an attempt to suppress tumults in 1956.” They also – and correctly – added that “during the entire, nearly two-hundred-year long Polish struggle for its freedom, the Kontinent frequently published best people in Russia – from Hercen to Tolstoy – had always been on its side,” statements written by the Polish and that “this noble tradition continues Solidarity movement. on”. This was the project of Kontinent: to openly discuss the common past and to apologise in order to start a new kind of relationship and together shed the Soviet oppression. The contacts between the Russian and Polish intelligentsia progressed further, due to Natalya Gorbanevskaya amongst others, who upon leaving the USSR in December 1975 cooperated with Kontinent starting from its seventh issue. Being a poet, she also loved Poland and spoke Polish (later, she even became a Polish citizen). In Russia she was at the centre of the arising dissident movement and established the major samizdat magazine Chronicle of Current Events. On August 25th 1968 Gorbanevskaya participated in demonstrations in Red Square in protest of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia. The studies of the “forbidden” history developed with her assistance. In the eighth issue of Kontinent, Zbigniew Stypułkowski, a participant of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, described how he along with other leaders of the Polish resistance movement were “invited” for negotiations with the Soviet authorities, then arrested and convicted in Moscow. In 1977, the article “Katyń 1940” by Lord Nicholas Bethell was published, in which the English publicist described how the NKVD had murdered 14,500 Polish officers, how the Soviet authorities had deliberately lied about their responsibility, and how the West had known the truth since 1943 and kept silent about it. In the 12th issue, the review of the book In the Shadow of Katyń by Stanisław Swianiewicz was published. The author had been 120 Reports Cécile Vaissié, Together against Totalitarianism

imprisoned in a Soviet camp, the prisoners of which were killed in Katyń Forest. In the meantime, the other authors of Kontinent were speculating about Russia’s identity, its past and its possible future.

The difficulties of dialogue

Many of Kontinent’s contributors, both Russian and Polish, emphasised that dialogue between the two states and societies was needed. Among others, the eminent Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski welcomed awarding Andrei Sakharov, the human rights activist, with the Nobel Prize and approved Sakharov’s statement that “the system of the Soviet Union is not ‘an internal affair’ of this state”. Indeed, as Kołakowski noted, “We cannot imagine a situation in which Poland could on its own gain the right to national self-determination and democratic institutions.” Therefore, “the agreement and friendship with unofficial Russia and Ukraine is the main prerequisite enabling victory in the struggle to overthrow the social and national oppression”. Some time later, Czapski in his article on Kultura celebrating its 30th anniversary suggested “not only to normalise relationships with Russia but also to create friendly relationships in the future”. For this purpose, it was necessary to develop relationships with “the liberal Russia”, and “to overcome old wounds”. In the same issue, however, another prominent Pole and member of the democratic opposition, Adam Michnik did not hide the difficulties of this Russian- Polish dialogue, which many Poles did not approve of. Kontinent continued to open its pages to Poles exposed to repressions and struggling for liberation of their state. In the seventh issue, Emil Morgiewicz, who had been arrested on June 25th 1970 and had served five years in jail, described contemporary Polish prisons. In the 10th issue, the firstInformation Bulletin, created on the model of the Chronicle of Current Events, was entirely republished. In the 21st issue, Kontinent presented a range of the independent non-censored press in Poland. Further, Jan Walc in issue 27 wrote about the underground publishing of the Information Bulletin. Besides that, the Russian intelligentsia positively supported Polish dissidents and their actions. For example, in 1977, when Adam Michnik was arrested, Bukovsky, Gorbanevskaya and Maksimov wrote in Kontinent, of their friendship and respect towards him, and added: “We support the appeal of the (Polish) Workers’ Defence Committee to cease police persecutions in Poland … We demand that the repressions be ceased and that the workers, intelligentsia and students be released. We are in solidarity with the free Polish unions … We hope that the air of freedom will become a regular atmosphere in Poland, in the whole Eastern Europe, and in our unhappy country.” Cécile Vaissié, Together against Totalitarianism History 121

At the same time, the Polish intelligentsia living in Poland or in emigration supported the Russian dissidents. Joint activities continued to grow, which not only these emigrants were engaged in and which not only concerned Russia and Poland. For example, in the 21st issue of Kontinent a letter was published which was signed on July 31st 1979 by the members of the Moscow Helsinki Group from the Soviet Union and the members of the Polish Workers’ Defence Committee: they together called for “speaking up for the Czech and Slovak human rights activists who signed Charter 77 and were illegally arrested by the Czechoslovak authorities”.

Long live Solidarity!

Kontinent’s support for Polish opponents strengthened when the repressions against them increased. In December 1981, seven Russian dissidents close to the magazine (Nekrasov, Maksimov, Bukovsky, Gorbanevskaya, Ginzburg, Delaunay and Kuznetsov) signed a petition titled “Poland Again”, in which they didn’t disguise their resentment: “We, the Russians happening to be in the West, including those who ‘liberated’ Poland in 1944, are with our whole heart and soul on the side of the Polish people, of its working class that was fearlessly and despite everything able to show the world how one should struggle for his rights. We are on Solidarity’s side! We are proud to repeat today the motto which was born one hundred fifty years ago during the November Uprising of 1830: ‘For our freedom and yours!’ Long live a free, independent Poland! Long live Solidarity!” Kontinent continued to frequently publish statements written by Solidarity or about it, literal and political texts by Polish writers, articles on the situation in Poland, about Pope John Paul II or the complexity of the Polish-Russian relationship. For this reason, Jerzy Giedroyc wrote in 1984 that Kontinent “has become not only the leading magazine of the Russian emigration, but to a large scale, the magazine of Eastern Europe”. Cooperation between Soviet and Polish authors in relation to Kontinent was reached in three ways. Firstly, it was due to the expressed confirmation of the necessity of peoples’ self-determination; secondly, the acknowledgement of the Soviet Union’s – and respectively, Russia’s – responsibility for several crimes against Poland; and thirdly, the understanding of the fact that Russia, as well as Poland, Ukraine and many other states, had been the victim of Soviet repressions. At the beginning of 1990s, when Maksimov announced to Giedroyc that he would take Kontinent’s editorial board to Moscow, Giedroyc quietly replied: “Mister Maksimov, if there is any least possibility you would rather abstain, as Russia is still in need of hearing a free word from the outside. I will not give my Kultura…” 122 Reports Cécile Vaissié, Together against Totalitarianism

Looking at its history, which in fact didn’t happen that long ago, one can say that had Kontinent remained in Paris, it could have also played an important role today. The current situation and relations between both nations show that matters raised in it, its principles, its approaches to resolve difficult and often painful issues, are still very much relevant. More than anything, however, it is Russia who should decide if it is ever going to fully endorse the legacy of Kontinent.

Translated by Olena Shynkarenko

Cécile Vaissié is a French political scientist and professor of Russian and Soviet studies at Université Rennes 2. Contemporary Lviv and its Jewish Background

JAkub nOwAkOwSki

The city of Lviv is currently undergoing the process of reviving its Jewish memory. This process is not only complex, but also painful. It requires asking many difficult questions and making an effort to answer them.

Nothing is simple in Lviv. Winding roads and crack-filled streets reflect the stormy history of this city and its inhabitants: of those who lived in Lviv in the past and those who live there now. For some, Polish Lwów is an object of many memories, a sense of longing for the times gone by, heroic fights and young heroes Interwar Lviv was one of the – the Eaglets (Lwów Eaglets was a term describing Polish youth who defended most important and largest cities Lwów during the Polish-Ukrainian war of Poland’s Second Republic. in 1918 and 1919 – editor’s note). For Poles, Lwów is not a city that you “just” visit – but a destination of pilgrimages. It is a city which is remotely located; but it is also very close and nearby. It is full of beauty and nostalgia. For others, the Yiddish Lemberg is a symbol of a lost, murdered world; one that will never return. A city whose streets still echo the old pain and suffering, but also a city of an incurable longing. Lemberg is a city which dreams and a city which hangs in between time, somewhere between then … and today. And finally for others, as Lviv, it is a symbol of gained independence, a return to pride and a source of questions about a difficult, often painful and embarrassing past; one which many did not want to think about for years. Instead, efforts were put into building a future, first a communist, Soviet, then – a new one – of independent Ukraine. When in 1991 Ukraine gained independence, Lviv, after many years of marginalisation and oblivion, was to become one of the main centres of the newly created state, a symbolic city of the historical right of the Ukrainian people to 124 People, Ideas, Inspirations Jakub Nowakowski, Contemporary Lviv and its Jewish Background

have their own country. Constructing such a historical narration had yet to mean moving, to the background, the influences that the city’s previous inhabitants had on Lviv’s life.

Interwar Lviv

Still, the Lviv of the interwar period was one of the most important and largest cities of Poland’s Second Republic. In terms of the population it was preceded only by Warsaw and Łódź. Among its 320,000 inhabitants, 150,000 were Poles, 80,000 Ukrainians and nearly 110,000 were Jews. Despite growing anti-Semitism, increasingly noticeable in the second half of the 1930s, the city (just before the outbreak of the Second World War) had over Reviving memory in Lviv 45 active synagogues, hundreds of smaller will be a long-term, complex houses of prayer, numerous Jewish schools and and painful process. educational institutions, theatres, and many other Jewish political, youth, cultural and charity organisations. In additions to religious members of the Jewish community, both the Orthodox and the reformed – many Jews were assimilated, considering themselves to be, first of all, Polish citizens. The situation in Lviv changed dramatically with the outbreak of the Second World War and the takeover of the city by Soviet troops. As a result of the inflow of Jewish refugees from areas taken over by the Germans, the number of Jews in the city increased to over 150,000 until the outbreak of the war between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. In late June 1941, the city was once again conquered. This time by the Germans. Almost immediately, the pogroms began along with the persecution of Jewish people, frequently performed by the local communities instigated by the Germans. It took just a few months for a ghetto to be opened in the city and later, on Janowska Street, a labour camp (which was also used as a place for mass murder, known as Piaski). The Red Army entered Lviv again on July 27th 1944. Out of around 150,000 Jews who were in Lviv at the beginning of the war, only a few hundred managed to survive. The precise number of Lviv’s Jews who survived in other areas of the occupied Europe remains unknown. With the end of the war, the survivors slowly came out of hiding and began searching for their loved ones and friends. The city and its surroundings were, however, far from safe, and fights and murders were not uncommon. In the devastated Lviv, hunger and poverty were commonplace. Similar to other European cities, a Jewish Committee was created in Lviv. Its mission was to help those in need. In just a few months, around 3,500 Jews registered Jakub Nowakowski, Contemporary Lviv and its Jewish Background People, Ideas, Inspirations 125 there, mostly those who survived in the city’s surroundings and the territories taken over by the Soviets. The Second World War ended on May 8th 1945. In its aftermath, Poland lost its territories in the East to the benefit of the USSR, while regaining new areas in the West. For the next 46 years, Lwów, already known as Lviv, became part of the Soviet Union. Poles living in the city were relocated to the west of Poland. The vast majority of the Jews also left. They would move to Poland and from there to the United States, Western Europe, Scandinavia and Israel.

Fading history

Those Jews who stayed in Lviv could not freely practise their religion, which was combated with all means possible by the communist system. Jewish institutions and organisations initially allowed to operate, were gradually dissolved or shut down. The last working synagogue closed its doors in 1962 and resulted in moving the practising of services to the underground, mainly in private flats. Former Jewish houses were then taken over by new residents. Deserted lots which once had been hosts to synagogues and cemeteries were slowly forgotten. Piaski and other mass murder remembrance sites were now covered with grass. The Jewish history of the city faded away. In 1989, the process of the Soviet Union’s collapse began. After over 40 years since the end of the Second World War, the countries of Eastern Europe started to slowly regain their full independence. In 1991, as a result of this process, Ukraine claimed its independence. Today’s Lviv, inhabited by over 750,000 people, is one of Ukraine’s main cities. According to data from 2002, it is inhabited by around 30,000 Poles and over 2,000 Jews. And yet not much has remained from the inter-war splendour and glory of the city’s Jewish community. The synagogues, schools, baths, kosher shambles, cemeteries, in other words, the whole pre-war infrastructure was almost entirely destroyed during the Shoah. The 16th-century Złota Róża (Golden Rose) synagogue was demolished in 1942, and today only its remains are left. The largest Jewish cemetery, the Old Cemetery, was devastated by the Nazis. After the war, the new communist government finished its destruction and built an open-air market on top of it. The mikvehs and the yashivas (religious schools), now in deplorable condition, are both endangered by the passage of time as well as by investors, for whom each ruined lot in the city’s centre is a fantastic place for a new hotel or luxurious apartment complex. The Shoah of Lviv’s Jewishness is only seen in its monuments: at the entrance to the former ghetto or at the site of mass murder, Piaski, which is right next to the prison on Janowska Street. 126 People, Ideas, Inspirations Jakub Nowakowski, Contemporary Lviv and its Jewish Background

Preservation The preservation of the memory of Lviv’s Jews has become a mission of a few institutions, both Jewish and non-Jewish. Jewish organisations take the responsibility of providing care to the elderly members of the Jewish congregation (gmina) but also cultivating Jewish culture and tradition so that it is passed to new generations. In 1998, a Jewish congregation centre, Hesed Arieh, opened its doors. The centre is supported by the American Joint Distribution Committee. In addition to its social and cultural activities, the centre also runs a Jewish kindergarten. In the first year of its operation, it attracted 500 members from Lviv and western Ukraine. Currently, it has over 6,000 members. By organising meetings, lectures and festivals, Hesed Arieh is trying to also open dialogue with the non-Jewish community in order to break existing stereotypes, promote tolerance Contemporary Lviv, despite all and mutual understanding. The Jewish congregation led by Rabbi its problems and difficulties, Mordechai Shlomo Bald meets for services today has a real opportunity. in the only active synagogue in Lviv – Beis Avron Veyisroel, renovated ten years ago. In addition to the Orthodox congregation, there is a small reformed community. In Lviv there is also a kosher canteen run by a local branch of the American Association of Jews from the former USSR, which is actively engaged in the processes of protecting Jewish heritage in Ukraine. The branch association is led by Meylakh Sheykhet, who is also a director of the Museum and a non-governmental organisation: The Faina Petryakova Scientific Center for Judaica and Jewish Art. The group’s mission is, first and foremost, the protection of Jewish cultural heritage, but also building contacts and relations with cultural institutions in Ukraine and abroad. Unquestionably, however, one of Meylakh Sheykhet’s goals is the protection of Jewish cemeteries and synagogues. This is a colossal task as there are over 2,000 Jewish cemeteries in Ukraine, let alone a few thousand sites of mass murder which were performed by the Germans and their collaborators. In Lviv there are also non-Jewish organisations which are focusing their efforts on preserving the memory of the multinational and multicultural world, which existed in the city over 70 years ago. One such institution is the Centre for Urban History of East Central Europe. Established in 2004 it has played a key role in the process of introducing a positive change to the city. The Centre is, above all, interested in academic and research work, but also supports social activities and the building of an open and tolerant society, aware of its past and the past of its city. One of the more recent initiatives of the Centre was an architectural International Design Competition for Sites of Jewish History Jakub Nowakowski, Contemporary Lviv and its Jewish Background People, Ideas, Inspirations 127 in Lviv. The sites that were selected for the competition in Lviv included: Synagogue Square, located in the heart of the former Jewish district, where before the war, the Great City Synagogue, the Turei Zahav (Złota Róża/Golden Rose) Synagogue, and the Beit haMidrash House of Study, were all located; the area of a destroyed Jewish Cemetery, located near the former Jewish hospital where an open air-market now stands; and the places of mass execution at Piaski, located near the former concentration camp on Janowska Street. The main goal of this competition, run jointly by the Centre with Lviv’s City Council and the German Society for International Cooperation, was to shed some light on the multiethnic past of the city and its heritage, as well as the commemoration of the sites of Shoah. What is also important is that along with the competition, public consultations were held. The meetings were attended by historians, representatives of cultural institutions and members of the Jewish community. All in all, over 70 projects from all over the world were submitted to the contest. In December 2010 the international jury selected the winners among whom were architects from the United States (for commemoration of the area of the former concentration camp on Janowska Street and the sites of mass murder), architects from Germany (the Synagogue Square) and an Israeli architect for the project on the area of the old cemetery. The successful projects were presented to the wider public at the Centre of Urban History as a part of an exhibition called “Historical Legacy and the City Space”. The first steps in the implementation are complete, and currently under way are preparatory architectural works for Synagogue Square. The remaining projects will take place during the subsequent stages.

Photo courtesy of Galicia Jewish Museum, Kraków 128 People, Ideas, Inspirations Jakub Nowakowski, Contemporary Lviv and its Jewish Background

The competition is an ideal example of the positive changes taking place in Lviv, namely the cooperation between non-public institutions, the city authorities, and the Jewish community, as well as a new, more open attitude of the city’s residents, who were also invited to participate in public consultations.

kept in silence

The Centre for Urban History is also running other projects related to the Jewish past of the city. Among them are seminars and training courses for teachers and educators, all related to Jewish history and culture. Equally important are also plans and discussions on the possibility of establishing a Jewish Museum in Lviv, which could become the main cultural and educational centre on the history of Lviv Jews. An increase in interest in Lviv’s Jewish heritage is also being noticed outside Ukraine. In 2010 and 2011, the Kraków-based Galicia Jewish Museum also held an exhibition entitled A City Not Forgotten. Memories of Jewish Lviv and the Holocaust. The exhibition traced the fate of a group of former Jewish residents of the city, their lives in pre-war Lviv and later their war stories and experiences with the Soviet and German occupations. They survived hunger and disease in the overcrowded ghetto, dramatic escapes, deportations and concentration camps. They witnessed Shoah, which took away their families, friends and their entire world. Their stories are examples of the power of the spirit, the courage, the fight and hope. At the same time as the Galicia exhibit, the filmIn Darkness directed by Agnieszka Holland (New Eastern Europe reviewed this film in issue number 2/2011 – editor’s note) was also being produced. The film is a story of a group of Jews who, for more than ten months, lived in hiding in the Lviv sewage system completely dependent on Leopold Socha, a local crook who proved to be their saviour. The film was based on the memories of those who survived and was welcomed with great interest both in Poland and abroad, probably also due to its nomination for the American Academy Awards in the category of the best foreign film. This exceptionally brutal, but also realistic film, whose director is not afraid to tackle even the most difficult of questions, is for many the very first encounter with the history of the Shoah of the Lviv Jews; a history, which for so long has been kept in silence. The film was screened in many cities around the world and its premier in Lviv took place in August 2012.

Reviving memory

All of this shows that positive change regarding the memory of the Jewish past of Lviv is possible and is gradually taking place. The process of reviving memory Jakub Nowakowski, Contemporary Lviv and its Jewish Background People, Ideas, Inspirations 129 is, however, very long and requires the engagement of the city’s authorities as well as representatives of the state and non-governmental institutions, members of the Jewish congregation, and Jewish organisations from both Ukraine and abroad. Above all, however, it requires the engagement and participation of the residents themselves. Only when the present residents of Lviv become aware of its Jewish past and the influence this ethnic and religious group has had on the city’s history over the centuries (along with other ethnic groups such as the Poles), will the history of Lviv’s Jews stop being the history of strangers and will become the history of their own, Lviv and Ukrainian past. The process of reviving memory is not only long-term and complex but also painful. It requires asking many difficult questions as well as making an effort to answer them. It requires going deep into the dark and embarrassing past. The threat to this process is also the uncontrollable development of the city, and the investors who are focused on chasing profits rather than preserving the traces of the past. Despite the fact that the historical old town in Lviv is on the UNESCO World Heritage List, and as such is under state and international protection, right next to the Golden Rose Synagogue in the centre of the former Jewish district, construction of a luxurious hotel has been begun. As a result of the poorly performed construction work, some damage has been done to the historical buildings next to it. The point is not to create an open-air museum on the whole area of the historical centre, but rather a detailed control of new investments to ensure they don’t have a negative effect on the city’s fibre, and that they fit. Needless to say, such factors as Ukraine’s economic and political situation also have a negative impact. Hence, it seems that contemporary Lviv, and also the whole of Ukraine, despite all its problems and difficulties, is today facing a real opportunity. The ongoing modernisation, increase in interest and flow of foreign tourists, along with stronger and more numerous non-governmental organisations can all contribute to the Jewish (and not only!) heritage of Lviv. And hopefully, both the city and the country will become more stable and dynamic in the process. Unfortunately it will also require a reckoning with its extremely difficult past, and a confrontation with many stereotypes and myths about its glorious history. The example of neighbouring Poland shows that this could be a traumatic and complicated process whose effects might only be seen many years later.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Jakub Nowakowski is the director of the Kraków-based Galicia Jewish Museum. ADVERTISEMENT

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Svetlana Alexievich speaks of her writing and journalistic mission as being interested in the solitary human voice and writing the forgotten story of feelings.

When exploring the acclaimed Belarusian author Svetlana Alexievich, a good starting point is Voices from Chernobyl. This book is neither a history of the disaster, nor, given its documentary nature, a story about “ordinary people” and how they survived April 26th 1986 and the months which followed: evacuating their towns and villages, the clean-up after the disaster, and the illnesses and deaths of close relatives. Of course, all these threads are present in the book, but what Voices from Chernobyl presents is a picture of the world after the Chernobyl disaster. The image which emerges is from the stories told by the “people in whom everything is poisoned by Chernobyl”. For these people, and for Svetlana Alexievich herself, the disaster and what came after became the beginning of a new chapter in the history of the world. For the first time the world saw nuclear energy gone awry on such a mass scale. Man was exposed to inconceivable danger: an invisible enemy soaking into the environment and the body, interfering with organs, blood, and genes, as well as – and this is what Alexievich’s book is mainly about – sweeping over the consciousness. If it is possible to sketch a portrait of the main character of the book, it would be humanity forced to face the unknown and crippling death on a cosmic scale.

The Star Wormwood

When a cursor is moved on south-east from Belarus towards the Chernobyl exclusion zone, it points to a clear green mark: the Polesie State Radio-Ecological Reserve. According to Sergey Kuchmel, who leads the ecological research department in the area of more than 2,162 square kilometres, the presence of several species of amphibians, reptiles and over two hundred species of birds was reported. The overview of mammals inhabiting the reserve is impressive: European bison, Przewalski’s horses, lynxes, badgers, wolves and bears. So the reserve lives in the shadow of the 132 People, Ideas, Inspirations Joanna Bernatowicz, The Solitary Voice

disaster as part of the Chernobyl “laboratory of the future” (Alexievich’s subtitle, not by accident, is the Chronicle of the future). From interviews conducted by the author with people affected by the disaster, a common belief emerges: that they became guinea pigs, living flight recorders storing a record of the disaster for future generations. Two out of ten million Belarusians still live on contaminated land: “The natural laboratory ... and they come here from everywhere, from all over the world ... because they are scared of the future,” in the words of one of Alexievich’s characters. The apocalyptic vision of Chernobyl, whose echoes are felt in monologues delivered by the characters of Voices, is unique for Belarusian literature. The perception of the disaster in Belarus was greatly affected by writer and literary scholar Ales Adamovich, whom Alexievich regards as Two million Belarusians still her teacher and mentor. Towards the end of the 1980s and 90s, Adamovich became live on contaminated land involved in helping the victims of the disaster. of the Chernobyl disaster. He was active as a journalist, undertaking social activities and writing letters to Mikhail Gorbachev, as well as appealing to the international community in his attempt to seek help for Belarus. In 2006 Adamovich published a bulky volume entitled This Star’s Name is Chernobyl – a collection of journalism, letters, notes, lectures and literary works about Chernobyl. His recurrent opinions expressed on the pages of this volume are unambiguous. “We will never get out of Chernobyl. This is a new state for the planet, for humanity.” In a lecture delivered in the United States in 1990, he said: “Belarus has again been covered by the shadow of the Apocalypse … Chernobyl is still ahead of us. We are going to live and die with it for decades and even centuries.” The title of this collection is an important archetype in Belarusian literature on Chernobyl: The Star of Chernobyl, often appearing in Belarusian texts (especially in poetry) as the Star of Wormwood which refers to the biblical apocalypse in Revelation 8:10. The etymology of the name “Chernobyl”, which in Ukrainian and Belarusian, comes from a sort of wormwood (artemisia), and in the following verses from Revelation we read: “… and there fell from heaven a great star, burning as a torch, and it fell upon the third part of the rivers, and upon the fountains of the waters; and the name of the star is called Wormwood: and the third part of the waters became wormwood; and many men died of the waters, because they were made bitter.” The metaphor of the “Star Wormwood” took root in Belarusian culture and has been used in various anniversary memorials, exhibitions and topical lessons in schools. Alexievich treats the Chernobyl disaster itself as a warning to mankind whose boundless pride and blind faith leads towards self-destruction. After the disaster 133

Svetlana Alexievich is a Belarusian author who became notable for her documentary style of emotional writing and storytelling.

Photo courtesy of Galina Dursthoff 134 People, Ideas, Inspirations Joanna Bernatowicz, The Solitary Voice

at the Fukushima power plant in an interview for the French newspaper Liberation, Alexievich said that during her visit to Japan she met with the workers of the Tomari Nuclear Power Plant, who asked her to tell them about Chernobyl. They listened to her with polite smiles expressing sympathy. For them there was no doubt that totalitarianism and “Russia’s negligence and the Soviet mentality” were to blame for the tragedy of Chernobyl.

With the shovel against the atom

The problem of explaining the causes of the Chernobyl disaster and the lie surrounding it takes up a lot of space in the narratives of Alexievich’s book. I don’t mean the immediate causes of the accident, for Chernobyl achieved the status of a symbol of the Soviet system and its operating mechanisms. The conclusions of one of the interlocutors in the book, historian Alexander Revalsky, that “Chernobyl is the catastrophe of the Russian mind-set,” resulting from the Russian man’s intense contempt, thrown into the rapid and chaotic cogs of industrialisation, are very interesting. Striking are the words of an evacuee who remembers with fondness: “We had no idea about the atom ... And we lived next to the nuclear plant, 30 kilometres as the crow flies ...You could buy a ticket and go there – they had everything, like in Moscow. Cheap salami, and always meat in the stores. Whatever you want. Those were good times!” The monologues in which Alexievich’s characters, especially intellectuals (engineers or teachers), try to grasp the hidden meaning of the events and strive to come to terms with the past, lead to surprisingly similar conclusions. The president of the board of the Children of Chernobyl Relief Fund, Gennady Grushevoy, says that Soviet socialism was a cross between a kindergarten and a prison, it offered its citizens a childish and simplified view of the world: “You gave it your soul, your conscience, Alexievich has been harshly your heart and you got a food ration card criticised for her views that in return.” It is only in this context that you Belarusian is a dying language. can understand the problem of war and heroism, which is actually the main topic of Alexievich’s writing. From the first days after the disclosure of the disaster, the recovery process in Chernobyl was accompanied by war rhetoric. Here begins the “heroic fight with the reactor,” and the landscape turns into a battlefield. One of the recovery workers, whose account was recorded by Alexievich, wonders: “We were told that we had to win. Against whom? The atom? Physics? Space?” Troops with automatic weapons and heavy military equipment were sent to Chernobyl. There were rumours about spies, saboteurs or an American conspiracy. Joanna Bernatowicz, The Solitary Voice People, Ideas, Inspirations 135

Disinformation reached its peak. Journalists, and only a few of them were let in, were closely monitored, and the Soviet obsession with military secrets, or covering up and withholding information, eventually turned into one unimaginable lie. As one of them admits, “Everyone here talks about spies and saboteurs, and nobody says a word about iodine protection. Any unofficial piece of information is regarded as foreign ideology.” In the interview for Liberation mentioned above, Alexievich formulates a controversial theory that in the case of Chernobyl, totalitarianism “saved the world”. The writer claims that, “If it weren’t for the totalitarian state, the disaster would have covered the world. There wouldn’t have been considerable human resources and an army of recovery workers. Ukraine, independent of Belarus and Russia, wouldn’t have been able to handle the situation. And people ready to work with their bare hands were already gone.” Totalitarianism, as a beneficial factor, means unlimited possibilities of making use of “resources” – that is, when a human life is worth nothing, when you can dispatch soldiers from Afghanistan to Chernobyl, and miners from Tula, when people volunteer because they dream of heroic deeds, when people can be changed into “bionic robots”. In this heroic frenzy there are two features that paradoxically stand out: courage and reason; when an engineer, despite the bugged phone, calls his friends about instructions on the necessary preventive measures, and a doctor tells people the truth.

Children of a great illusion

Soviet totalitarianism glorified war. Alexievich repeatedly emphasises, in public statements on her own writings and in the words of her characters, that the Soviet man lived in constant readiness, always prepared for war; he sensed it and he was eager to fight. This state of readiness, eagerness and zeal can often be traced in the words uttered by the women in Alexievich’s book War’s Unwomanly Face. Of course, this can be treated as evidence of the power and effectiveness of the regime propaganda. But behind it there is another diagnosis that Alexievich puts forward in an interview: “They taught us how to die.” Until the mid-1980s, the war’s patriotic ritual stuck firmly in ceremonies was part of the Soviet canon. Alexievich writes that the Gorbachev era reveals the painful cracks, when the Russian mythology crumbled and broke apart. In the introduction to her book Enchanted with Death, about the people who committed suicide after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the writer desperately seeks to answer the question: “Who are the survivors: children of the great illusion or victims of a widespread mental illness?” One thing is certain – they are people unlike any other, with their own language, world of ideas and values. 136 People, Ideas, Inspirations Joanna Bernatowicz, The Solitary Voice

The toughest blow to the shell of Soviet heroism came with the book Zinky Boys on the Soviet Afghanistan War. It is a collection of monologues delivered by soldiers fighting in this war, their mothers and wives who received the infamous “Cargo 200” (dead bodies transported in metal containers) in zinc coffins. In 1993 the characters of the book themselves filed a lawsuit against Alexievich in Minsk. They were shocked and outraged that their testimonies had not been processed to match the current vision of heroism. People who are used to the fact that writers process the truth in order to serve the current ideology expected a pompous picture of the war in Afghanistan. The unadorned material of the brutally honest accounts given without self-censorship surprised even the characters themselves. In her war reports and discussions, Alexievich uncovered the uncomfortable truth that the war often had a devastating impact on the lives of the people who rushed onto the battlefield. At that time in the Soviet Union, no one had ever heard of post-traumatic stress disorder, and people returning from the war continued to suffer nightmares, struggling with illness, mental disorders and other severe effects of war trauma for the rest of their lives. As it turns out, the best antidote and means of overcoming the dead language of pathos was recording the accounts of an individual. As Alexievich puts it in her book War’s Unwomanly Face, when confronted with the story of an individual: “The chemical reaction occurred instantly: the pathos dissolved in the living tissue of a human’s fate and it proved to be the most soluble substance.” Soviet heroism, when stripped of its pretension exposes a different face – it becomes the story of victims, sacrifice and martyrdom. And no wonder that in the voices of the characters talking about wars, suicides and Chernobyl, you can often spot a tone of biblical lament. Dear Mr President

Soon after Alexievich’s books were first published, English and French translations appeared. According to the Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Alexievich became one of the most published foreign authors in Germany and Japan. The French edition of Voices amounted to nearly 200,000 copies. In 2005 the American edition of this book was awarded the National Book Critics Circle Award. In an interview for Rossiyskaya Gazeta in 2006, Alexievich says that as many as five hundred people came to meet her when she visited the US. Surprisingly, Alexievich has become widely known in Poland only recently, and gained increasing popularity with the Polish edition of the book War’s Unwomanly Face, for which she received the Angelus Central European Literature Award in 2011. The labels “Central European” or “dissident” don’t work in the case of Alexievich. Firstly, she firmly places herself in the context of Russian culture and civilisation. Joanna Bernatowicz, The Solitary Voice People, Ideas, Inspirations 137

Her opinions about Belarus are markedly different from those expressed by the majority of the opposition-oriented intelligentsia. In conversations with journalists, Alexievich often repeats that “without Russian culture we will always be backward.” In an interview for Voice of America she points out that Belarusians prefer to look towards the East, as the West is too distant and incomprehensible, and that “democracy or human rights are like the Chinese alphabet”. She also cherishes no illusions about the Belarusian language, for which she sees no future in the fierce competition between Belarusian and the use of Russian in Belarus. Alexievich was indeed harshly criticised for such views. In the socio-political Belarusian magazine ARCHE, in an interesting article about the “myth”, Aliaksandra Andryjeuskaja accuses Alexievich of “recklessly discrediting the Belarusian national idea in her interviews”. Andryjeuskaja tears Alexievich to shreds, stating that her work is deeply influenced by Russian messianism, which is an “emotional imbalance, an unhealthy interest in pain and suffering, apathy, a hostile attitude towards the other, a belief in the Can we consider absolute truth and flaunting simplicity and modesty”. Alexievich a spectre The conclusion of the article is that Alexievich is a of the perestroika epoch? “phantom of the glasnost and perestroika era”. In an open letter to President Alyaksandr Lukashenka written a few days after the 2010 elections, Alexievich writes: “I’ve never been your follower, but I do not believe in revolution either.” From her standpoint, the greatest tragedy of the country are the deep internal divisions, and the lack of free and open public debate. After the bloody suppression of the demonstrations on December 19th 2010, Alexievich saw two crying mothers in a hospital who were, “tormented by the life of a rural woman”. One woman’s son was a policeman, the other’s, a dissident. It seems that Alexievich’s literary sensitivity consists of her ability to see and feel sorry for both women. Alexievich is not afraid to admit that the model of Belarus socialism proposed by Lukashenka works well, and makes people, including its opponents, reflect on this phenomenon. She speaks of the president’s success in a level-headed way: “If someone created Belarus, it is, unfortunately, not us, not the national intelligentsia. Unfortunately, it is Lukashenka.” Similarly to another Belarusian intellectual, Valiantsin Akudovich, Alexievich talks about the alienation of the intelligentsia, the inability to speak the same language, the wall of misunderstanding which separates it from the people.

Soviet Union with a plus

Can Alexievich be called a spectre of the perestroika epoch? Back then, in the last few years of the decaying empire, the conditions for writing the true story of 138 People, Ideas, Inspirations Joanna Bernatowicz, The Solitary Voice

“the soul of the Russian-Soviet man” were particularly favourable. The documentary genre that Alexievich decided on can be compared to a seismograph carefully recording all the vibrations in the era of the great breakthrough. The inspiration is owed to Ales Adamovich. It was on his own initiative in the early 1970s that the documentary genre labelled “testimony in prose” came into being. Within four years, along with two other Belarusian writers, Adamovich went around Belarus looking for people who had been miraculously rescued from the ruins of villages razed to the ground, and wrote down their stories. It resulted in the book Out of the Fire, which the authors themselves call “a documentary tragedy, evoking the memory and living voices of the people”. Alexievich has improved the method of her mentor. The main character of her books is “the solitary human voice”. It rings out as if it had emerged from darkness, like a voice in the confessional, flowing out of the depths of the human conscience, a silent prayer or a cry of despair which turns into a whisper. Alexievich still uncompromisingly puts the plus sign next to the Soviet man, who is naive like a child trapped in a system which is a cross between a kindergarten, a prison and a giant laboratory. After all, he has become an involuntary participant in the “field research of the communist ideas” experiment, as Alexievich puts it. Letting her characters speak, Alexievich records only the common, human and the banality of evil.

Translated by Tomasz Gąssowski

Joanna Bernatowicz is a translator and a doctoral student at the Institute of Russian and East European Studies at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland. When Itzik Fell out of the Sky

AnnAbelle chApmAn

The key to Yiddish poet Itzik Manger’s works is his own colourful life. His hometown, Czernowitz, was once in the Habsburg Empire; today, it is the city of Chernivstsi, Ukraine.

An old Jewish legend says that, before we are born, each of us lives in Paradise. Straight after birth, we forget everything. Then, one boy manages to remember. Welcome to the Book of Paradise by Itzik Manger, a Yiddish poet born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This slim, dreamlike novel was published as Dos Bukh fun Gan-Eydn in Itzik Manger’s first 1939, on the threshold of an era. poem was published I found a copy in a second-hand bookshop near Warsaw University. A Polish edition from 1988, in Yiddish in 1921. just as another era was coming to an end. (There is also an English translation out there, somewhere). Prompted by Manger’s book, this article is a journey from the mythical Eastern European shtetl to present-day Ukraine. The road passes through mountains and theatres, arrivals and departures, to look again at the heritage – Jewish, but not only – of the region.

To Galicia and Bukovina

“I was born in a train between two stations,” Manger once told an interviewer. In fact, his birthplace was Czernowitz in 1901, then under Habsburg rule. His childhood was infused with Yiddish folklore and poetry. There was also literatoyre, a term coined by his father Hillel, a high-minded tailor, from the words “literature” and “Torah”. Manger attended school in German, until he was expelled for bad behaviour. Instead, he hung around the theatre. In return for running errands, the actors allowed him to watch performances, standing behind the curtain. He also listened to the local Yiddish troubadours, “drunk from the stars, night, wine and wind”. When the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapsed in 1918, Czernowitz became 140 People, Ideas, Inspirations Annabelle Chapman, When Itzik Fell out of the Sky

part of Romania and Manger became a Romanian citizen. He moved to Bucharest and, in 1921, published his first poem in Yiddish. A hundred years later, Czernowitz is called Chernivtsi. It is now in south-western Ukraine, near the border with Romania. But then, the changing of place names and borders is not unusual here. It is autumn when I set off for Chernivtsi with my friend, taking a train from Lviv through the Carpathian Mountains. We are travelling plastkart class, in a carriage lined with 54 open bunks. It is getting dark already. Faces peer out of the gloom, as passengers sip tea in darkening corners, wrapped in blankets. We have a copy of Nach Chernivtsi’s largest synagogue Galizien (To Galicia) by Austrian reporter was burned down during Martin Pollack with us. For over a century, between 1775 and 1918, Galicia existed as a the Second World War province of the Habsburg Empire, covering and rebuilt as a cinema. southern Poland and western Ukraine. But Pollack’s book, written in 1984, was cautiously entitled “an imaginary journey”. He was unable to visit the region himself, drawing instead on travellers’ accounts from the Habsburg days. At the time, Ukraine was cut off from Austria by the Iron Curtain – forever, it seemed then. “Chernivtsi is nothing but a smaller Lviv,” someone had warned us. But it isn’t. It lies in the historical region of Bukovina, with its distinctive blend of national cultures. At some time or other, the city was home to Ukrainians and Poles, Germans and Austrians, Romanians and Moldovans, Armenians, and Jews. The 1930 census put the latter at about 27 per cent of the population. We arrive after nightfall. The centre is perched on a hill, rising up steeply from the railway station, in an array of pleasant squares: Central Square, Theatre Square, and Turkish Square (on the territory of the 1941 ghetto). The university is a UNESCO World Heritage site. A massive building houses the main cinema, screening the latest American action films. We hurry on, towards the flat we have rented for the night. It is in a khrushchovka outside the city centre; the low blocks that sprang up across the Soviet Union under leader Nikita Khrushchev (hence the name). And yet, Chernivtsi is definitely more Habsburg than Khrushchev.

From Yitskhok to Itzik

The next morning, the city’s buildings are soft pinks, greens, and blues. Here and there, vines cling to the pastel facades. We find ourselves by the cinema that we passed the night before, only to learn that it was once the city’s largest synagogue, the Temple. It was burned down during the Second World War, when the city was occupied by the Nazis’ Romanian allies. In desperation, the Soviet authorities rebuilt Annabelle Chapman, When Itzik Fell out of the Sky People, Ideas, Inspirations 141 the wreck as a cinema in 1959. We reach the museum of the Jews of Bucovina just before closing time. In its single room, one wall is dedicated to local Jewish writers. In addition to Manger, the Romanian poet Paul Celan was born nearby. In the post- war years, he moved to Paris, where he continued to write. In 1970, he committed suicide, drowning in the Seine. There were also Karl Emil Franzos, Alfred Gong, and Rose Ausländer (whose surname means “foreigner” in German). They survived the Second World War, only to see Chernivtsi incorporated into the Soviet Union along with western Ukraine, and Romania transformed into a Communist satellite state. They left Bukovina, bound for Vienna, Paris, or eventually New York. We are looking for Sholem Aleichem Street, named after another famous Yiddish writer. (He too was born in what is now Ukraine). My friend asks an elderly couple for directions in Ukrainian. They don’t understand him. They are Americans who have come to Ukraine to look for their roots. A few days earlier, the woman found her family village in the foothills of the Carpathian. “There are still people living there who have the same surname as me,” she says proudly. Now they are on their way south to the seaport Odessa, where the husband’s ancestors, ethnic Germans, once farmed the lands around the Black Sea. From Romania, Manger moved to Warsaw, Poland. The year was 1929. He was 27 and about to enter “my most beautiful decade”, as he called it later. With a haggard look and a shock of dark hair, he was often drinking and always smoking. Around that time, he changed his name to Itzik (from Yitskhok), which sounded more folksy. It hardly mattered that he knew very little Polish. Warsaw was the centre of Jewish culture. Soon Manger was accepted into the prestigious Yiddish PEN club, which brought together some of the greatest Jewish writers of the time. Among them was Isaac Bashevis Singer, renowned for his short stories set in pre- war Warsaw – and then in New York, where he emigrated to in 1935. Today, Warsaw has taken Manger’s work to the stage. A play based on his Book of Paradise, directed and adapted by Piotr Cieplak, has been running at the city’s Jewish Theatre since 2010. Formed in 1950, it is named after mother and daughter Esther Rachel and Ida Kamińska, two of Poland’s leading actresses of Jewish origin. In 1968, the anti-Semitic stance of the Communist regime led many Polish Jews to emigrate – among them Ida Kamińska, who had directed the Theatre in 1955-1968, and many of the actors. Still, the Theatre survived. It puts on a variety of plays covering classical Yiddish repertoire, as well more contemporary Jewish playwrights. In Europe, it is one of two permanent theatres with performances in Yiddish (with translation into Polish). Many locals will have seen its production of the musical Fiddler on the Roof. At the end of the summer, it forms the focal point for the Singer Festival, an annual celebration of Jewish culture that takes over Warsaw’s theatres, streets and cafés. 142 People, Ideas, Inspirations Annabelle Chapman, When Itzik Fell out of the Sky

The world according to Manger The Book of Paradise tells the story of Shmuel-Aba, a young angel who lives in heaven but has the “misfortune” of being taken to live on earth. Usually, those about to be born receive a punch on the nose just before leaving Paradise, which causes them to lose their memory. But Shmuel Aba-dodges the punch and can recall every detail of his previous life. He is born into a Jewish family in a Jewish village, with an adoring mother and pious father. They are part of that timeless world that once spread across Eastern Europe, until it was wiped off the map by the Holocaust. Quickly, his stories from Paradise attract the attention of the village elders. Told with a childlike naivety, these flashbacks form the core of the novel. The production in Warsaw is true to the spirit of Manger’s novel, combining tangible elements of Jewish culture with surreal theatrical style. Life in Paradise has an everyday banality to it. A fat policeman in a Prussian helmet maintains order. Young angels fall in and out of love. Little boys sit at rigid desks, studying the Torah. At nightfall, the air is filled with a gentle rustling and the sky on stage – the heavenly sky – is a deep, star-studded blue. To distinguish between the action in Paradise and on earth, the scenes down below are played by marionettes. A team of talented puppeteers, dressed in black, brings the hero’s parents, the local rabbi, lawyer and banker to life. The actors providing their voices stand slightly to one side, in full view of the audience, which adds to the production’s eccentricity. But Manger’s heaven holds no illusions. He was a secular writer who took his Bible stories with a pinch of salt – though religious folklore permeates his poems, plays and prose. For instance, in Itzik’s Midrash (1935) he took biblical characters After Czernowitz, Manger lived and set them in the prosaic, and sometimes in many cities including Warsaw, profane, Eastern Europe of his day. In many London, New York and Tel Aviv. ways, the heaven in The Book of Paradise is no different from earth. There are still rich men and poor men. King David plays the harp and seduces women, while his domain is tended by hosts of barefooted angels. Meanwhile, night after night, Adam and Eve – dressed in Victorian outfits and conversing in German – sneak back into Paradise. Under the Tree of Knowledge, they stand blaming each other for their expulsion from Eden. They try to return to their state of naked innocence, but find that their clothes have grown onto their bodies. “There is no justice in heaven,” one character later observes. The Book of Paradise also makes a statement against religious prejudice and division. Apart from the Jewish paradise, the novel also mentions a Turkish (Muslim) paradise and a Christian paradise. The borders are strictly guarded. Then an emergency forces the Jewish paradise to open diplomatic relations with Annabelle Chapman, When Itzik Fell out of the Sky People, Ideas, Inspirations 143 the Christian one, and even send a delegation. There, it encounters anti-Semitism and the sweet taste of forbidden love. Manger describes it all with biting irony. At last, somebody asks: why are there three separate paradises? In the multi-ethnic Czernowitz of Manger’s day, the different national groups lived alongside one another but did not fully interact. Reading these pages, one wonders whether he was writing for his home town, or for the 21st century. In 1938, with the storm brewing over Europe, Itzik Manger left Warsaw for Paris, and then on to London. The happy days were over. Among the poetry Manger wrote as a young man was the collection Stars on the Roof (Shtern afn dakh, in Yiddish). In contrast, the one he published in England in 1942 was entitled Clouds over the Roof. After a miserable decade in London, he (by now a British citizen) moved to New York, and finally to Tel Aviv, Israel, where he died in 1969. Standing here in Warsaw’s central railway station, there is no point in following Manger any further. We visited him in Chernivtsi and Warsaw, and that is probably where he felt best.

Further Reading: For the best translation of Itzik Manger’s poetry into English (and good biographical introduction), see The World According to Itzik: Selected Poetry and Prose (2002). Translated and edited by Leonard Wolf, Yale University Press, Nev Haven, CT.

Annabelle Chapman is a journalist writing from Ukraine and Poland. She spent September 2012 in Lviv, Ukraine, on a grant from the Center for Urban History of East Central Europe. ADVERTISEMENT

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Homo Sovieticus: Stalin’s entrenched on the ground, Stalin rolled out Failed European Experiment the same Soviet template in his new client states, imposing communism and erasing deep-rooted pre-war traditions such as social Iron Curtain: The democracy. By the early 1950s these countries Crushing of Eastern were so politically uniform they had acquired Europe 1944-56. a name – “the Soviet bloc”. By: Anne Applebaum. Each newly-installed pro-Soviet regime Publisher: Allen Lane, boasted its own mini-Stalin – Walter Ulbricht London, 2012. in East Germany, Bolesław Bierut in Poland, Mátyás Rákosi in Hungary. All were ideologically There are many illuminating vignettes in reliable. All were communists flown back to Iron Curtain, Anne Applebaum’s magisterial their home countries from Moscow. The new account of the post-war Soviet hijacking of ruling parties mimicked the Soviet communist Eastern Europe. One sticks out. During the parent, with a strict vertical structure and a Second World War, the leader of Poland’s Politburo. Each fledgling state had its own government-in-exile, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, secret police modelled on the ruthless NKVD; held a meeting with Joseph Stalin. The pair its Soviet-trained recruits, as Applebaum points discussed the likely political settlement in Poland out, were young, uneducated, inexperienced once the fighting was over. Mikołajczyk pointed and malleable. out that in a democracy – as he hoped Poland To various degrees, these Stalin clones would soon become – it would be impossible initially played along with democratic and to dictate who could be in politics. In response, other political forces in the chaos and collective “Stalin looked at me as if I were a lunatic... and trauma immediately after the war. But by ended the conference,” Mikołajczyk wrote. And 1948, stunned by their lack of success in so it proved. As Applebaum notes, in the year popular votes, they abandoned any pretence at after the Yalta Conference – with its hollow electoral legitimacy. By this stage, Applebaum promise for Eastern Europe of “free elections” suggests, the Stalinisation or “Sovietisation” of – it was Stalin’s rather than Mikołajczyk’s view Eastern Europe was well-advanced, the Yalta of government that prevailed. agreements meaningless and Europe gripped Applebaum’s judicious study of the by the Cold War. crushing of Eastern Europe between 1944- Already, these new People’s Democracies 1955 concentrates on three countries: Poland, were using Moscow methods of repression Hungary and East Germany. As she points out, – arrests, show trials, executions, and ethnic all were very different. But with the Red Army cleansing. The victims were real, imagined and 146 Books and Reviews Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, Anne Applebaum

potential “enemies”: members of the Polish Mindszenty was outspoken, uncompromising Home Army who fought the Nazis; clergy; or and defiant. He denounced Rákosi’s ongoing pre-war politicians. The state disbanded youth anti-clerical campaign, was arrested, beaten and groups, imprisoned dissenters, persecuted eventually forced to “confess” in a humiliating genuine opposition parties, and sent thousands show-trial. Wyszyński chose a different path. to gulags, newly created ones at home or to He eschewed public criticism of the regime, the original in the Soviet motherland. protesting in private. He sought out common For the peoples of Eastern Europe this ground with the authorities, on issues such darkening period spawned a series of impossible as land reform, and signed an agreement of personal choices and betrayals. Applebaum’s “mutual understanding” with the state. study is at its most fascinating when she examines Many viewed Wyszyński as a collaborator, how individuals responded to totalitarian rule. Mindszenty a hero. And yet, Applebaum Some enthusiastically collaborated with the concludes, the “Polish church emerged from the new ascendancy, for cynical reasons or from Stalinist period relatively intact”; its demoralised a belief that these regimes could, given time, Hungarian counterpart more thoroughly become genuinely progressive, and create a penetrated later on by the secret police. On a new society after the horrors of fascism. smaller scale Eastern Europeans were forced Many, exhausted by war, acquiesced. A into a series of tiny compromises – singing brave few resisted. Others voted with their feet along to propaganda songs, for example, – pouring from East to West Germany. Some or joining official youth organisations, with 3.5 million people out of a population of 18 communist bosses regarding youth as key to million are thought to have left East Germany their delusional utopian projects. between 1945 and 1961. There were also true At home, and among friends, it was a believers. One Hungarian, Bela Szasz, arrested different matter. In another wonderful anecdote, and tortured, recalled how the policeman who Applebaum recounts how two Hungarian beat him up laughed. But the man’s cynicism sisters who shared a flat both grew separately was “interwoven with a sort of bigoted and disillusioned with Stalinism. Despite living sentimental blind faith,” Applebaum relates. together each remained convinced that the In this shrinking political landscape there other was still a true believer; they continued were few good decisions to be made: most were to repeat party slogans to each other when bad. Applebaum strikingly contrasts how two alone, just as they did when outside. But of Eastern Europe’s most important Catholic the majority of Eastern Europeans – “passive leaders – Poland’s Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński opponents” – grew adept at leading a double and Hungary’s primate József Mindszenty – life. On the surface, they were respectful to the responded at the end of the 1940s when they party’s demands, whatever private doubts they came under furious official attack. Both had might have. Even schoolchildren became skilful thought deeply about how the church might at managing this public-private duality. survive under communism. Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, Anne Applebaum Books and Reviews 147

Though Applebaum doesn’t explore this, between London and Moscow raged over the many of the tactics deployed in Sovietised murder of Alexander Litvinenko, Russia closed Eastern Europe live on in contemporary Russia. the British Council office in St Petersburg. It The Putin system is an incompetent version remains shut. of its communist predecessors. The motifs are The death of Stalin in March 1953 shocked familiar: selective persecution of opponents, Eastern Europe, and ushered in a period of relentless state propaganda, and political rapid change. Dissent spread. There were fakery on a giant scale. As in the past, today’s riots in Berlin and in other parts of Germany Kremlin gives a vanguard role to the secret in 1953; a Warsaw Youth Festival in 1955 saw police, an organisation still obsessed with Poles fraternising, and even having romances, western “spies” more than two decades after with brightly-dressed foreigners; and the 1956 the end of communism and the collapse of Hungarian uprising, glancingly described Soviet rule. here. These developments alarmed Moscow. The current Russian government resembles And they set off an internal Eastern European its pompous Soviet and Eastern European debate between Stalinist hardliners and “liberals”, forebears in other respects too: it isn’t good at who wanted a more locally responsive form humour. As Applebaum records, jokes survived of communism. behind closed doors, with even regime figures The “bloc” survived for another four decades. sometimes telling them. (One goes like this: But as Applebaum notes the Stalinist experiment “Who built the White Sea Canal” / “Those to use Eastern Europe as a laboratory to create who told political jokes.” / “And who built the the Soviet man, Homo Sovieticus, had failed. Volga-Don canal?”/ “Those who listened.”) In Her moral is that authoritarian regimes are 1947 Stefan Jędrychowski, a member of the never impregnable: “the spell can suddenly, Polish Politburo, wrote a memo complaining of unexpectedly, dramatically be broken.” “Anglo-Saxon propaganda”. He recommended that strict limits be placed on the British Council Luke Harding in Poland, and that western embassies should be more closely monitored; in 2007, as the row 148 Books and Reviews The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski

The Irony of Polish History In 1945, Poland won the war but lost the peace – this cliché has frequently been cited as The Eagle Unbowed: a self-explanatory truth that both summarised Poland and the Poles Polish wartime experiences and its descent in the Second World War. into communist rule under the influence of By: Halik Kochanski. the Soviet Union. But the picture was much Publisher: Allen Lane more subtle than this and Halik Kochanski 2012. eloquently provides additional pieces to this puzzle. She acknowledges the complexity of the Polish situation in the years between the The history of Poland and Poles during the two great wars, pointing out that both internal Second World War can be interpreted from and external political factors did not set newly many perspectives and narratives. Even those independent Poland on the path to success. who do not share the need to perpetuate a For instance, competing visions of Poland martyr-like narrative of Polish history would developed by Józef Piłsudski and Roman rather acknowledge that both the wartime Dmowski – visions that clashed with each other experience and its direct aftermath were at the beginning of Polish independence, only tragic. Poland, after only more than 20 years to be intertwined in the 1930s. Or Poland’s of independence, was viciously attacked not rough relations with most of her neighbours by one, but by two totalitarian empires, its shortly after 1918, which stemmed not only territory divided and occupied, its people killed, from Poland’s geopolitical position, but also displaced and subdued. Moreover, after years from a very peculiar international setting at of brutal occupation, the Jewish uprising in the time of devising the Polish borders at the the Warsaw Ghetto and the Warsaw Uprising, end of the First World War. Poland did not regain its full independence Instinctively, we can say that this book is after the end of war. The human costs of the addressed to the non-Polish reader or at least to war were also compelling. one that was not educated in Poland. However, Halik Kochanski reminds the reader what there is no doubt in this reviewer’s mind that has often been forgotten in the West: that the Polish audience – both academic and the results of the Second World War included general – would benefit greatly from reading nearly six million Poles dead (20 per cent of The Eagle Unbowed. Not only does it fill the gap Poland’s prewar population), half of them in the historiography of Polish experiences were Polish Jews. What is really telling in the in the Second World War – combining the data quoted in the book is the fact that only history of Poland as a political entity with one-tenth of these dead were killed by direct that of Poles abroad – but it also delivers a military action. It gives us a gloomy reminder uniquely interdisciplinary study of a nation, that the Polish experiences during the Second country and its people during the war. It is World War were quite complicated and escape for this disciplinary approach that Kochanski’s any generalisations. The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski Books and Reviews 149 extraordinary work deserves the most credit she put it, a “nationalistic study”. She does not from the Polish reader’s point of view. shy away from inconvenient topics such as the By bringing together political, diplomatic, strained relations between Poles and Jews in social and military history, the author displays the period of the Second Republic and their so many different yet necessary angles in one implications during the war. volume – all of them extremely important to If there was one particular passage from the grasping the ironies and paradoxes of recent book that should be quoted here in order to Polish history. For example, the chapters on prove the value of the book it would be one the 1939 September Campaign, Poland’s on Polish-Jewish relations: “The reality is that contribution to the Allied War Effort (1940- there were Polish anti-Semites who betrayed 1943), and Fighting under British Command Jews to the Germans, and indeed, a few who (1943-1945), demonstrate Kochanski’s deep participated in the killings, but there were many knowledge of military affairs. The chapters Poles who did all they could to save the Jews. on Polish Foreign Policy (1920-1939), Sikorski’s Only in Poland was concealment of or rendering Diplomacy (1941-1943), and Poland: The assistance to a Jew punishable by death, Inconvenient Ally, are all excellent studies in and yet only in Poland was an organisation Polish diplomatic history. On the other hand, established specifically to care for the Jews in the chapters that describe the German and hiding, Żegota.” These two sides of the story Soviet occupation of Poland, show various have quite rarely been equally represented experiences and behaviours of ordinary Poles in contemporary debates about the difficult under foreign rule. relations between Poles and Jews, and in this For a non-Polish reader, the book is also an regard Kochanski’s book presents a rather excellent companion on various aspects of balanced and unbiased view. Poland’s wartime experience. But it is also more It would be almost impossible to write such a than that. Anyone from outside of Poland who sweeping history without minor shortcomings. would like to understand Polish contemporary One of these might be the lack of German politics, past and present debates, narratives and Russian language historical sources in of Polish history, be it the so-called fourth the bibliography (it might have been helpful partition narrative, the “Yalta betrayal” myth, especially in the chapters that deal with the Polish “historical” disenchantment with Western occupation of Poland and advancement of Europe, or the current Polish preoccupation the Red Army on Polish territory). But given with Russia, should read this book. the already impressive number of materials The Eagle Unbowed, as the title suggests, falls in Polish and English used in the book, this rather into a patriotic tradition of writing about is rather a quibble than a serious critique. For Polish history than a revisionist one. It should some readers it might be also be questionable not come as a surprise given the author’s family why, in the work on the Second World War, one background and strong Polish sentiment. But would devote 60 pages (2 out of 18 chapters) to it needs to be emphasised that Kochanski’s a prewar period – the chapters on the Rebirth book is by no means one-sided and not, as of Poland and its interwar foreign policy. In this 150 Books and Reviews The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski

case I would beg to differ: these introductory important contribution not only in the field of chapters are essential to the understanding history, but also in contemporary international of the later Polish wartime experience. In relations. Anyone who aspires to grasp Poland’s particular, the book’s opening chapter should wartime past and its present debates should be recommended to any reader who is not a read Kochanski’s monumental study. historian by training. All in all, The Eagle Unbowed is an extremely Wojciech Michnik – Tischner European interesting and timely read. Although it deals University, Kraków, Poland with Poland’s painful historical experience which might seem a distant past, it is a valid and

ONLINE EXTRA: Read an interview with the author of The Eagle Unbowed, Halik Kochanski, online at www.neweasterneurope.eu Normative Influence. The European Union, Eastern Europe and Russia, Klatt & Stępniewski Books and Reviews 151

How to Build Influence? the external borders of the EU eastwards, Russia’s perceived sphere of influence had been compromised and, accordingly, a “glass curtain” has been erected between the EU and Normative Influence. the countries of Eastern Europe and the South The European Union, Caucasus. In this sense, the EU’s attempts at Eastern Europe fostering democratic transformation in the and Russia. region and at establishing closer ties with its By: Małgorzata Klatt, countries are influenced, to a large extent, Tomasz Stępniewski. by Russia’s policy towards the same region. Publisher: The Catholic University of Lublin The variety of developments that these two Publishing House, Lublin-Melbourne 2012. seemingly competing approaches trigger are framed in this volume to be the normative If one is supposed to name a crucial challenge power concept, and are further explored by that Polish scholars are currently facing it would political, economic and military analysis. be their almost complete absence in the global The first two chapters of the book are scholarly debate. Indeed, this state of affairs is dedicated to the description and analysis of directly linked to the fact that they rarely publish the normative power concept. In the case of their articles, chapters or books in English – the the EU it means the promotion of normative current lingua franca. Unfortunately, such an principles, such as democracy, human rights, approach has direct negative consequences the rule of law as well as peace and freedom. for Poland: our way of perceiving the world All of them are generally acknowledged within and interpreting the undergoing significant the United Nations system. In foreign policy changes as well as our comprehensive solutions the normative nature of the EU is set out in remain largely unknown to the general public. its intent on shaping, instilling, diffusing – These developments pose a risk of lowering and thus “normalising” – rules and values in the rank and depreciation of Poland as one international affairs through non-coercive of the most important and active European means. The normative power approach is actors in international relations. Normative visible in the EU’s official texts and discourses Influence. The European Union, Eastern Europe and that make similar claims about the EU’s role in Russia written by Małgorzata Klatt and Tomasz world politics. It can especially be seen in its Stępniewski, both young and prospective foreign policy documents, such as the Eastern scholars, sets a good example on how to Partnership and Cooperation Agreements reverse that negative trend. and the Association Agreements with third The book addresses the ramifications of countries. However, one should note that the Eastern enlargement of the European the notion of normative power has attracted Union for the EU’s new “near abroad”, i.e. both conceptual and empirical criticism. The Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. The concept was criticised for its reliance on the authors demonstrate that as a result of shifting perception of the EU as “a force for good”, yet 152 Books and Reviews Normative Influence. The European Union, Eastern Europe and Russia, Klatt & Stępniewski

the EU acts not for virtuous or altruistic reasons, awareness, increasing the political activity of but on the basis of self-interest. the societies, improving economic prospects vA true virtue of this book is the third chapter and supporting the democratisation potential which includes the study of the role of Poland of Eastern European and the countries of the in the strengthening of the EU’s policy towards South Caucasus. Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus. The Moreover, the chapter on the EU-Russia authors argue that Poland plays a significant normative and non-normative cooperation role in building the codes of appropriate is a strength of this volume. According to the behaviour in Eastern Europe by acting as a authors: “The overall relations between the “norm entrepreneur”, redefining its role in EU and Russia are wavering from a strategic Europe, willing to become an “active European”, partnership on energy security to an unstable by contributing to the building of a unified oil supply, from cooperation in the fight against and integrated approach to the East in the terrorism to human rights breaches in Chechnya, EU. As Przemysław Grudziński, the former from building democracy in Europe to the Under-Secretary of State at the Polish Ministry mysterious killings of Russian journalists.” of Foreign Affairs, once stated: “Poland has Furthermore, it cannot be denied that the the potential to play the role of an ‘intelligent internal frictions between the EU member agent’ which associates its own objectives states on how to cooperate with Russia have with the objectives of the other players and been a significant weakness in the EU’s relations formulates and shares concepts and ideas, with its neighbour, and have undermined inspires other to act, and joins interesting the development of a coherent policy, to the projects, particularly in the areas beyond its detriment of both sides. immediate interest.” This book brings together important analysis As a country with adequate experience, of both normative power and Europeanisation Poland has the potential to play an active role literature with important and up-to-date in implementing the concept of normative analysis of the European Union’s relationship power, which may result in overcoming divisions with its Eastern neighbours, including Russia. within Europe and eliminating the emergence This insightful volume will be of interest to of a “glass curtain”. However, the expectations both foreign academics and policymakers, of this to happen may only be successful if especially at a time when the current structure concrete assistance instruments are provided. of international relations in Eastern Europe and One cannot expect that the declaration of the the South Caucasus is becoming increasingly political will of the EU alone will translate itself complicated (politically, economically, socially into fundamental reforms in Eastern Europe. and militarily). Therefore, Poland needs to focus on long-term Dominik P. Jankowski transformation effects such as raising civic Z powrotem w Europie Środkowej. Eseje i szkice, Emil Brix Books and Reviews 153

Bitter-sweet. Or What’s their bourgeois flats with portraits of Franz in between Europe’s East and West Joseph I), the relations between the nations in the region, which today we like to call Central Europe, have taken on an entirely new form. The tangible, meaning the shared monarch, was replaced with the intangible, namely, a Z powrotem w Europie belief in a common heritage and a sense of Środkowej. Eseje i szkice connection. Importantly, as often is the case (Back to Central Europe. with ideas and beliefs, their role is dependent A Collection of Essays). on historical circumstances, political context By: Emil Brix. Publisher: and the people’s will, which of course is the Międzynarodowe result of knowledge and education. Centrum Kultury (International Cultural The idea of Mitteleuropa, which is the main Centre), Kraków, 2012. theme of this collection, is based on the belief that despite the existing borders, the nations “Austria and Poland may not share a of Central Europe share a connection based on common border but yet the two countries values of diversity, tolerance and sensitivity to feel a neighbourly connection,” writes Professor history. Not surprisingly, the concept gained Jacek Purchla, the head of the International great popularity in the second half of the 20th Cultural Centre in Kraków, in an introduction century – that is at a time when the European to a recently published collection of essays continent was artificially divided into two Z powrotem w Europie Środkowej (Back to ideologically incompatible parts. The idea of Central Europe) by the Austrian historian and Central Europe then became regarded as the diplomat, Emil Brix. A simple sentence and panacea to the ongoing uniformisation and an obvious thought, one might think. And Sovietisation of the Eastern Bloc and found yet, as usually happens with everything that steadfast advocates among such prominent we quickly write off as simple and obvious, a thinkers as György Konrád, Milan Kundera and longer reflection shows as that this message Czesław Miłosz. Importantly, it also inspired is much deeper and the context is far from two Austrian public intellectuals: a then young obvious. Purchla continues: “Emil Brix’s book historian, Emil Brix, and Erhart Busek, the then makes Polish readers realise how little they deputy mayor of the City of Vienna. In 1986, they know about their neighbours residing along jointly authored a publication, which became the Danube River and the dilemmas caused widely discussed, titled Projekt Mitteleuropa. by the collapse of the Iron Curtain.” Three years later, the vision Brix and Busek Indeed, with the dying out of the last presented in Projekt Mitteleuropa was given generation of Poles, Ukrainians, Slovaks, the chance to face a reality test as the peaceful Czechs and others who lived under the Austro- revolutions, which had been initiated in Poland Hungarian Empire and still remembered Austria and continued in other countries of the Eastern (and cherished its existence by decorating Bloc, began to change the political landscape 154 Books and Reviews Z powrotem w Europie Środkowej. Eseje i szkice, Emil Brix

of the artificially divided continent. Time and “Central Europe’s Ambassador”, does not leave again in the region, the old was replaced with the readers with any illusions that this new something new. This time, however, it was not collection of essays is like reading a fairy tale. a concept for a monarch or an empire, but Nor is it a pastoral about a backward, yet rather a concept for a concept. Or to put it beautiful, land (think Galicia) where noble simply, the modification of a concept. savages live and life is slow, although he admits And that is precisely why a reading of Back that the latter is characteristic of this region, to Central Europe is a valuable experience. In which is neither Europe’s East nor its West. addition to being a well-written collection Seemingly for Brix, the most important barrier of deep analyses on the history and current to making the region become a truly coherent situation of the region, it provides the reader community is the mentality and perceptions with the unique opportunity to observe the that predominate among its nations today. evolving concept of Mitteleuropa in the last While in one essay he points to the stereotypes 20 years, i.e. a trajectory of the thinking about that block Austrians from seeing the richness neighbourly relations and the region as a and beauty of cities such as Kraków, in another whole. Brix believes, as we can infer from his essay he points to barriers that continue to exist writing, that this process has had, in fact, a on the other side of the Danube: “I fear that positive influence on Europe as a whole. This in the Central European countries people are is why in one of the essays he states that: “In still convinced that they don’t needs to take the new reality, Central Europe can be found personal responsibility for anything and that everywhere where one can say that Europe is they always rely on somebody else. That’s why, not an unreachable fortress or a competition much of the intense work will still need to be steered by a group of superpowers, but as the done to overcome the mental habits that were community primarily based on solidarity.” once created in Eastern Europe.” A statement like this and many similar ones These and many other comments included that can be found in the book, including the in the collection also show that the Austrian title of the collection, all suggest that Brix historian has a rather rare skill. Namely, he is indeed has a very emotional attitude not only able to present inside problems from an outside to his home country, Austria, but also to the perspective; and do so without showing the region as a whole. On a biographical note, it outsider’s arrogance or forgetting about the is worth pointing out that in 1990 Brix was ideals that have led him to write each of the appointed Austria’s Consul General in Kraków, essays in the first place. Hence, in addition to a position which he held for five years and the thorough analysis of such concepts as which allowed him to actively engage in many the functional neighbourhood or the history cultural projects during the crucial years in the of Austria’s cultural policy, the collection relations between the countries that were once also includes many inspirational statements. divided by the Iron Curtain. Consider the excerpt from Brix’s 2003 speech in And yet mistakes should not be made. which he states: “Contemporary Europe needs Brix whom, without hesitation, we can call to continue its tradition of diversity, which is Z powrotem w Europie Środkowej. Eseje i szkice, Emil Brix Books and Reviews 155 its power and the hope for a better life for all a changing concept of mutual heritage. Its Europeans, regardless of whether they live in existing barriers and inspiring values, which Drohobych or Vienna.” Brix so rightly indicates, are together like that Altogether, Brix’s essays and the message little bitter sweet taste of the old-fashioned that is put forward in each and every one chocolate which you can enjoy in many of the of them, shows that the region that we like bohemian cafés whose walls show us they still to call Central Europe does not qualify for a remember the fin de siècle. simple classification. Once united by a single monarch, it is today building its identity on Iwona Reichardt

156 Books and Reviews Historia niebyła kina PRL, Tadeusz Lubelski

Thirteen Tales from the Polish is a great read, both to experts as well as those kingdom of Commi-Land less familiar with the subject. The author had to work with very unrewarding material – quite nebulous and difficult to verify, Historia niebyła kina which only adds to the success of the book. PRL (The Non-existent Some films were never shot, while some were History of Cinema produced years later by someone else, thus in the People’s Republic losing their initial identity. In his research, the of Poland). By: Tadeusz author thoroughly examines the beginnings Lubelski. Publisher: of the films that were abandoned at various Znak, Krakow, 2012. stages of their development. One of the films, on Silesians colonising Texas in the 19th century did not even have a screenplay written; shooting The recently published The Non-existent the adaptation of Early Spring – a historical History of Cinema in the People’s Republic of novel by Stefan Żeromski which became a Poland, written by the greatest specialist on fixation of the film-maker – the production Polish cinematography, Professor Tadeusz was continually obstructed and modified for Lubelski, seems to supplement the author’s decades. earlier text called The History of Polish Cinema. And it was not just anybody; even Andrzej The book relates the story of the films that were Wajda was affected by this kind of futility, planned in socialist Poland but were never although his position in the industry was well actually produced. It is worth noticing that at established by then. His example clearly shows the start, despite its fantastically misleading title, how difficult it was to avoid a fiasco – despite the book is mostly about facts – meticulously knowing all the political tricks and being able dug out from private archives, memoirs, to navigate them. And it is this everyday sense letters, and conversations with directors. The of helplessness that becomes the overarching collection consists of 13 chapters – each of them theme of the book. Failure comes unexpectedly reconstructing the lot of a single film project, – all at once or after a period of years; failure also and 13 reviews of the would-be productions; resounds in a few initial chords of unsuccessful skimpy material, it seems, to adequately portray attempts at producing these films. the period, especially given that an average film Lubelski acts as a guide through this junk writer had drawers full of projects waiting to yard of the film industry, relating – often heart be produced. However, by making the right breaking stories of “the men of iron” who selection of material and anchoring it in the were able to withstand hard times. The most socio-political contexts, the author-researcher drastic case is that of Wojciech Wiszniewski, a succeeds in depicting the skirmishes fought documentary film-maker. Nine out of twelve between Polish cinematographers over a of his films did not make it past the censors, period of 50 years of Polish history. What’s the author, in turn, died of a heart attack before more, the story, rich in intriguing anecdotes, ever making his first fiction film which had been Historia niebyła kina PRL, Tadeusz Lubelski Books and Reviews 157 prevented from being shot for years. These moral codes shattered by the war. The next events perfectly illustrate the idea behind the film called Right after the War was designed book, which is to show that the initial reason why to serve propaganda purposes in legitimising these film projects were not pursued was always the new, communist authority, as well as political. The author tries not to the demonise debunking the troublesome myth of the Polish the censorship mechanisms. On the contrary, Home Army. However, thanks to the fact that he seems to derive satisfaction from exposing it was never shot, Andrzej Wajda adapted the its weaknesses, absurdities, lack of consistency, same story several years later to direct Ashes and the shifting responsibility among countless and Diamonds – one of the most important mutations of various decisional bodies. As a works of Polish cinematography. result, the reader is presented with an array Other would-be productions described in of quite revealing “side effects” to the control the book were to have the following functions: system. It shows us that many film projects were examining the Stalinist past which was possible abandoned, not because they were banned, after the thaw of October 1956; breaking away but for simple reasons such as the director from the dictate of socio-realism; preparing the becoming discouraged by endless corrections, soil for the Solidarity movement; and discussing losing his faith in the project, or was simply the period of Martial Law and the myth of being too narcissistic to continue. internment. It cannot escape our attention that It is not only in this sense that the Non-Existent the reconstruction of both screenplays and the History tells us the story of art entangled in events determining their fate outline, as if by politics. In the preface, the author informs us chance, the history of the People’s Republic of that while searching through the multitude of Poland. The mode of narration also serves as a abandoned screenplays he looked for the ones tool to depict the epoch in which the discussed which could have been influential on the post- projects took shape. Lubelski chooses to present war cinematography in Poland, and at the same facts in the process of happening; as a result time those which seemed most interesting to the text reads well both as a thematic study him. As one reads subsequent chapters, the and a fascinating, internally vibrant story of the nature of his interest becomes easily observable. times depicted. The reader gets to participate Lubelski selected those films which had the in the processes of the film industry which strongest potential to become an important practically re-created itself from scratch after commentary on contemporary events or even the Second World War, and observes how the a prophesy for future changes. new structures of management, production, The film opening his anthology then is the control, and film criticism were formed. story of Janusz Korczak, which was to be the Each project is summed up by a review of first film produced in 1945. At the same time the non-existent film, a plaything itemising the film was meant to serve a double-purpose: its hypothetical strong and weak points, a it was to satiate a social thirst for information substitute for the lacking film substance. about the “true undistorted realities” of the The adopted strategy allows the author to Second World War and to reconstruct the momentarily lose the distance characteristic 158 Books and Reviews Historia niebyła kina PRL, Tadeusz Lubelski

of the researcher’s work – to relax scientific characters in the book, represented only precision and fantasise about possible follow- by Wanda Jakubowska, who is already the ups to the reconstructed events. This format omnipotent empress of Polish cinema of leaves room for witty remarks or for mocking those times.. The absence of female directors the style adopted by some journalists writing is somewhat justified as the film industry was in socialist Poland – their names encrypted in still very male-dominated, which would also anagrams. Lubelski uses the opportunity to account for the adopted scientifically-factual express the respect he holds for the masters format of the book. of contemporary criticism and to show that The Non-Existent History could have been ideological writing, in its rigid ostracism, became a great venue to show “what would have yet another form of censorship. happened if” in a slightly bolder manner. No If there’s anything to object to, it might be need to apply a quota system to metres of film the certain overabundance of Andrzej Wajda in tape – simply grant the female poet-director, the book. As the main character, in as many as who had unbelievable aptitude for narration, three chapters and bit parts in several others, the basic confidence she needed to manage a he dominates the story. One could ask if it is film crew would have done. Osiecka lacked this justified to set the director of over 30 socialist kind of assurance, and quit her newly learned films and the symbol of Polish culture as the profession of a film director after graduating central figure of the book when his “unfinished from film school. That and similar cases of female projects” have already been given so much directors who did not succeed in overcoming attention. the status quo build a real non-existent history. The ground breaking character of Wajda’s In this particular area, Lubelski’s book has not project Are We Alone in the World is also to used the opportunity it was given. be doubted. Would this quite naive story of The same cannot be said about the graphic teenagers pushed to the fringes of society design of the book by Kuba Sowiński – a real have met a bigger response than a film by treat for book and cinema lovers alike. Film Agnieszka Osiecka for that matter? Let’s take posters designed by Sowiński for the would- one of her screenplays – co-written by the be productions are works of art in their own leading Polish ironist, Stanisław Dygat – on regard. They are interactive in offering an the post-war generation of the young and important commentary to the text, and at beautiful, set against the thaw of 1956. Yes, it is the same time are an intelligent play on the pure fantasy. However, had the circumstances conventions employed by the Polish school of been somewhat different, this one could have poster art over several decades. The design of become true – changing the tone of the young the publication, however, adds to its authenticity post-war culture that they were defining; at not only through the illustrations. As one reads, the same time being the manifesto of the the book acquires more and more features of generation that those times lacked. a period piece – as if the pastiche was being Selecting this kind of project would also transmuted into the original by the sheer act make up for the significant absence of female of reading; the soft light cover gets dirty easily, Historia niebyła kina PRL, Tadeusz Lubelski Books and Reviews 159 page corners fold over, the spine gradually to the suspicion-raising status of a misfit, he wears out; all that makes the book visually is constantly forced to prove his existence undistinguishable from the books that were which makes him even more real. Similarly, actually printed in the epoch described. There dozens of film projects found themselves is some coarse sensuality involved in holding under constant negotiation, only to get denied the volume – such that it is difficult to believe production in the end. The Non-Existent History that the Gutenberg era is currently coming to is a collection of fairy-tales that saves some of an end, wherein the physical form of the book those projects. gives way to digital publication. Lubelski’s book makes one think of The Non- Magdalena Link-Lenczowska Existent Knight, a postmodernist novel by Italo Translated by Agnieszka Rubka Calvino. The title hero, devoid of a body, is only visible when enclosed in his armour. Doomed 160 Books and Reviews Field Guide to Jewish Warsaw and Kraków

Anchored in the Past, present. The guide is written by an interesting, Food for Thought in the Present trustworthy team of expert contributors, many of them well known participants in the revival of Jewish life and scholarly discussions on the past and contemporary presence of Jews in Poland. The rather emotional introduction to the publication reveals that it was written by individuals who have a strong sense of mission. Aiming to present Jewish heritage in Poland in a multidimensional way, they Field Guide to Jewish Warsaw and Kraków. seem to be convinced of the urgent need to Edited by: E. Gawron, break away from the dominant narration of K. Gebert, H. Lieberman, M. Matuszewska, Poland as the land of the Holocaust and anti- B. Matis, S. Penn, K. Underhill, and W. Zeisel. Semitism, especially a single purpose-oriented Publisher: Taube Center for the Renewal instrumentalisation of youth visits to Poland, of Jewish Life in Poland, Warsaw 2012. well presented in J. Feldman’s, Above the Death Pits, Beneath the Flag (2008). Contemporary understanding of cultural Jewish travellers, including educational heritage emphasises that it is not so much and memorial tours, are without a doubt an the stock of tangible and intangible elements important group of visitors to Jewish heritage created in the past that have survived until today sites in Poland, and if they are to obtain a more but rather these aspects of the past which are complex understanding of Poland, a profound found useful in the present day context. As change is needed in the character of Jewish such, the making of heritage or heritagisation is visits in this part of Europe. As discussed with seen as a process of discovery, revaluation and respect to youth tours by one of the guide’s reinterpretation of certain aspects of the past authors, Shana Penn, also in her text in New which are understood as inspiring and relevant Eastern Europe (issue number 1(II)/2012), there in the present, for a variety of economic, social, is a need to move away from death camp tours cultural, and identity-related reasons. The usual focused on the Holocaust to Jewish heritage questions which follow such understanding tours comprising not only of extermination of heritage are in what ways and to whom it sites but most of all of places where Jewish life is relevant. still exists or thrived for centuries. As follows, The authors of the Field Guide to Jewish the publication wants to encourage Jewish Warsaw and Kraków seem to depart from this visitors to discover „the Polish cityscape as a very point of view, presenting Jewish heritage layered text, a palimpsest with hidden layers of the two cities in the context of its ability of history and a complex, multicultural past today, not only to provide Jewish visitors from visible on the surface”. If a regular guide book abroad with anchors to the troubled past but presents mainly sightseeing information, this also provoke and inspire questions about the one, in addition, tries to offer concise yet Field Guide to Jewish Warsaw and Kraków Books and Reviews 161 comprehensive contextual information relevant Showing a broader context, in some parts for Jewish readers and provoke thinking over of the publication interesting comparisons and discussion on different topics of potential are made, which may make the data more interest to Jewish visitors to Poland. meaningful to readers such as the remark on pre- First of all, the volume includes an war Warsaw being more Jewish than New York introduction to the richness and diversity of or the question of contemporary usage of sites pre-Holocaust Jewish presence in the two of atrocity not only linked with Jewish but also cities and more broadly speaking Polish lands. Native American or African American suffering. It provides information on the basic facts of The constant moving between the past and Polish history, showing the broader context the present is likewise emphasised by the use of Jewish presence in the country such as of historic and contemporary photographs as its experiences during the partitions in the well as making references to key political and 19th century, the Second World War, and the cultural figures whose legacy is still relevant communist regime. Secondly, travelling back today, such as famous Jewish writers. and forth in time on the proposed walking The idea to provide Jewish tourists with a tours, the guide stresses the existence and structured set of questions to be asked and revival of the present day Jewish communities discussed while visiting Poland is excellent. This in “the Land of Ashes”, including comments invites them to reflect on the main issues which on the complex, new models of Jewishness often surface on such occasions but may remain in Poland, an issue which many visitors may unspoken. These include the relevance of pre- not be aware of. war Jewish life in Poland to the development of Linked with that is the question of agency contemporary Jewish identity, pros and cons of and stakeholders of Jewish heritage in Poland. pre-war assimilation, issues of memorialisation, These stakeholders are very diverse, ranging agency and participation of non-Jewish Poles in from the international Jewish community, looking after and celebrating Jewish heritage, national and local authorities, and present day property ownership and the issue of Jewish Jewish communities, to NGOs and individual revival in Poland. non-Jewish Poles. It also mentions a myriad Notwithstanding the guide’s unquestionable of initiatives related to Jewish heritage in the value as a companion assisting preparations two cities and beyond them such as museum for and the actual travel of Jewish groups and institutions, art in public spaces and festivals. individual tourists to Poland, especially youth In doing so it tries to show that both the past tours, following the invitation voiced in the and the present are not black and white, book to provide feedback to the authors, a few including the coexistence of anti-Semitic and minor concerns may be raised. First of all, I am philo-Semitic approaches, and that Poland ambivalent about its promise to travellers to may be fascinating and inspiring not in spite Poland of “a journey of transformation” where of but often precisely because of the frequent “all visitors discover things they did not expect, paradoxes which one encounters. and find their understanding of Jewish culture permanently transformed”. While this is most 162 Books and Reviews Field Guide to Jewish Warsaw and Kraków

often true, and it is surely advisable for the as a multicultural city in the 19th and the early visitors to stay open minded and attempt at 20th century, Szpitalna and Floriańska Streets leaving behind them or deal with the prejudices could be added to the tour of the city centre, and stereotypes they may have coming to indicating numerous, once very prestigious Poland, their experiences may actually seem and well known locations of shops owned less unique and meaningful if they come with by Jewish residents of Krakow as well as the a preconceived notion and expectations of former synagogue building adapted for the such special experience. purpose of a Russian Orthodox church after Since the guide clearly aims to motivate its the war. The tour of Kazimierz could in turn readers to ask questions and ponder on complex include a “detour” to the tenement house of topics, if indeed their interest and curiosity is Mordechaj Gebirtig and a broader mention of aroused, they should be offered some further Jewish institutions present in the quarter prior to guidance in their search for the meanings the Second World War. Numerous sites outside of Poland. Although different interesting the scope of the proposed walk, concentrated publications are referred to throughout the especially in the south and south-western book, there is no list of suggested further reading parts of Kazimierz testify to vibrant Jewish life at the end of the volume, similar to the list of in pre-war Kraków, such as the Jewish theatre organisations and institutions provided there. on Bocheńska street, the headquarters of the It could also be of practical use while visiting Jewish community on Krakowska street, the Warsaw and Kraków, where several well stocked Jewish hospital on Skawińska Street or Jewish specialist bookshops may be found. In some sport institutions and their venues. cases it might have been useful to provide the On a broader plane, Jewish heritage and readers with more precise data, especially where experiencing it on tours may be an opportunity a topic is rather controversial (e.g. financing the to reconsider many issues important not only restoration of Jewish heritage sites in Poland). in the development of Polish-Jewish dialogue The few factual mistakes found in the book may or redefining Jewish identity, but also for the be easily corrected in its next edition such as identity formation of Poles and the development the information that the frescos in St. Mary’s of a pluralist, tolerant society in Poland. As such, Church in Kraków were designed by Stanisław as a valuable contribution to the specialist guide Wyspiański, or the error in the English version book literature, the modified, Polish version of of the title of R. E. Gruber’s book. the field guide, including similar, well thought In my opinion, being a native of Kraków, out discussion topics and questions could also naturally much more familiar with this city than be very useful to non-Jewish, Polish tourists, with Warsaw, there are some further interesting particularly educational youth groups, which sites which should be included in the proposed increasingly often take tours of Jewish Kraków walks focused on the Jewish heritage in the or Warsaw. city, of which the authors were surely aware of but perhaps due to volume limitations could Monika Murzyn-Kupisz not include them. To better introduce Krakow Divlje društvo – kako smo stigli dovde, Vesna Pešić Books and Reviews 163

Into the Wild The “bad past” and the “bad present” overlap and mix in a vicious circle of eternal questions on how to build democracy, dynamic politics Divlje društvo – kako and open the horizon of possibilities. smo stigli dovde (Wild The author opens her considerations with society. How did we get October 5th, although this turning point is of a here). By: Vesna Pešić. rather symbolic character, and clearly states that Publisher: Peščanik, whatever it was – a revolution, a coup d’état, a Belgrade, 2012. result of domestic or international negotiations – it failed to fulfill the political and societal role it was supposed to play. Pešić closes the first “A major problem with the dismemberment phase of her analysis with the assassination of Yugoslavia, as executed by extreme nationalist of the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in and political elites was the apparent absence March 2003. She guides the reader’s attention of alternative solutions that would have through the conceptual differences over the prevented (or stopped altogether) the war shape of the state which appeared between and re-established peace and security in the Đinđić and the then-President Vojislav Koštunica. region,” wrote Vesna Pešić, a Serbian sociologist, Subsequently, she suggests that the inability politician and one of the leaders of the anti- to introduce the initial democratic reforms was Milošević opposition, in 1996. Sixteen years a consequence of a substantial incoherence later she formulates the same assessment between the political vision of the future and of the political and societal developments understanding of the past represented by the in Serbia after October 5th 2000, frequently “new elites”. referred to as the 5 October Overthrow or as In the second part of the book Pešić the Bulldozer Revolution. introduces Đinđić as philosopher, politician A profound criticism of the Serbian national and friend and makes an attempt to place the (and not necessary nationalistic) ideology 2000-2003 development in the framework of became the focal point of Pešić’s diagnosis. A his political thinking. She analytically proves society cannot develop as long as its values that his idea of breaking away from the moral- and beliefs remain in deep conflict with national ideology did not represent his immoral presumptions of its progress. It is impossible nature, but a profound awareness of the fact to build a modern society based on tribal that it cannot serve as a basis for the creation principles and standards. In the case of Serbia, of a modern, pluralist society which can only claims Pešić, the crucial obstacle is not even be built upon general values confirmed represented by the moral system, but by national with legal and constitutional guarantees of identity itself. As a consequence, the permanent human rights and freedoms. Serbian social lack of normality takes the shape of pathology nationalism should be replaced, according to and cannot only be simply defined as a crisis. Đinđić, with patriotism defined as “the ethics 164 Books and Reviews Divlje društvo – kako smo stigli dovde, Vesna Pešić

of responsibility”, and its key symptom should represented by President Tadić’s attempts to have been the immediate solution of the simultaneously develop European integration Kosovo question, as the only option to allow and maintain the status quo in Kosovo, showed Serbia to enter the real European way. the continuing inconsistency of Serbian political “When I had heard that Zoran had been thinking. It proved to work only in the short term killed, for the first time in my life I cried over and failed both in its domestic and international Serbia. I thought: we will not manage it… dimensions. The clear European vision of Đinđić He was our Europe for which we have been has been sold both by the nationalists on the a burden for the past two centuries.” With one hand, and reformers, on the other, who these words Pešić closes the second part of finally followed their particular interests. her book and opens her study on Serbia’s All this leads Pešić to the conclusion that lost hopes and return to the past. She poses political power based on nationalist nostalgia the question on why Serbian nationalism is constitutes the crucial dimension of social incompatible with liberal and democratic values structure in Serbia, and defines the position of a modern society, and concludes that this of an individual in Serbian society, as well as is mainly due to significant inconsistencies of the position of Serbia in Europe by obstruction Serbian nationalism itself. This nationalism does of the normative framework of democracy. not allow creating a basis for any coherent, The over-politicised society rooted deeply in structured system and particularly not a state nationalistic rhetoric refuses to compromise system. Koštunica’s nationalistic ideas, further or to seek a clear political vision. This however, destruction of the state caused by corruption was proved in the elections in May 2012 when and expanding particracy, obstructed the Tomislav Nikolić – a right-wing politician strongly processes of democratic transition. Moreover, related to Milošević, Koštunica and the Serbian the unresolved question of Serbia’s sovereignty Radical Party – became president, which resulted over Kosovo and the great return of the in the continuity of regression and the constant, aggressive rhetoric modelled on Milošević’s unreflective looking backwards. rhetoric, polarised society and negatively Pešić leaves a lot of questions open, mainly influenced the perception of Serbia in the those regarding the future of Kosovo, the international arena. required constitutional changes in Belgrade, The continuity of the political elites, the and the accounting with the past, although clash between the declarative will to join the she highlights in an extremely brave way the European Union and the authoritarian values, as blemishes and defaults of Serbian society and well as the problems of the government sinking its political elites, and draws a very pessimistic in corruption became objects for analysis in view for its future. With all her rationalism, the fourth part of the book, dominated by the however, Pešić seems to underestimate the criticism of policies aimed at the legitimate importance of the consequences of the presence in the international community. quasi-democratic Serbia for South-Eastern The idea of having your cake and eating it, Europe as a whole. Located in the heart of the Divlje društvo – kako smo stigli dovde, Vesna Pešić Books and Reviews 165

Balkans and deeply conflicted with Kosovo, Balkans,” said Zoran Đinđić. Milošević is gone, which represents an essence of the crucial democracy in Serbia is still questionable, and cleavages and conflict lines in the region, so remains the stability in the Balkans. Serbia obstructs the regional consolidation and development of the neighbouring countries. Ida Orzechowska “Without democratic Serbia and with Milošević in power there could be no stability in the ADVERTISEMENT

The Return of Edward Lucas

EDWARD LUCAS

Authors love reviews of their books – even negative ones (any publicity is better than none). A long and sympathetic review by an expert is as welcome as it is rare. So I was delighted that my old friend Eugeniusz “Gienek” Smolar has reviewed my book Deception at such length in New Eastern Europe.

I was also delighted that he liked the book. He ably summarises the main message, and the way in which it builds on the argument that I made in my first book in 2008 (The New Cold War). For newcomers, my main points are these. The regime in Russia has dumped the constraints of communism and is using capitalist means I plead guilty to writing my to further their goals. These include using energy sales to influence politics and disrupting book on Russia with a degree Western alliances and institutions. of personal engagement. My new book is about espionage, and the way in which the security and intelligence establishment in Russia represses dissent at home and tries to subvert and penetrate Western countries. I point out that this is not new (the Soviet Union was good at spying too) and that Western attempts to do the same in return have been mostly marked by failure.

*** One question that Smolar raises is why we need to worry about Russia’s clandestine work. Are not public statements guide enough to what the Kremlin is up to? I would agree that a thorough study of the Russian media and of the words of Russian politicians paint a fairly comprehensive and depressing picture of their chauvinist, paranoid world view, in which critics at home are just the puppets of enemies abroad. That story is well told in other books including Masha Gessen’s blistering portrait of Vladimir Putin (Man without a Face) and David Satter’s 168 Books and Reviews Edward Lucas, The Return of Edward Lucas

masterly portrayal of the long shadow of Soviet history (It was a long time ago and never happened anyway). But I do feel that espionage offers an extra dimension to the story and one that is well worth depicting in detail. One reason (as Smolar himself accepts) is that people like spy stories. As I point out in the book, spies are actually government bureaucrats. But the frissons of illegality, of mind-games, of mystery and of mayhem do draw the reader’s attention. I suspect that a similar book on Russia’s energy strategy in Europe would not have sold so well, though the story I could tell in it would be dramatic and depressing. Another reason for highlighting espionage is that it is so central to the Russian regime’s world view. Mr Putin, a proud ex-KGB spy himself, devours intelligence reports (perhaps explaining his rather odd Espionage and secret view of the world). He and his colleagues are also convinced that Britain’s SIS (better mischief-making remain known as MI6 – editor’s note), America’s CIA something that Russia can, and other Western spy services devote huge and does, do. efforts to undermining the Kremlin’s grip on power. Sadly, that is not the case. Smolar’s next criticism is that I do not deal in detail with Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. The reason is simple. The story has been well told elsewhere. I did not feel I could add to the excellent account by the late Ron Asmus (A Little War that Shook the World). Unlike on the internet, books have a given length and a set deadline. I was due to write 80,000 words by September 2011 (a date I had already extended twice). If I had devoted space to the Georgian war, I would have had to cut out something else. However I did not neglect Georgia in other respects. The book gives quite detailed attention to the GRU-sponsored bombing campaign of 2009-2011. This was an astonishing series of state-backed terrorist attacks on a sovereign country, which attracted remarkably little international attention. Smolar highlights this as a story that needs covering: I agree, which is why I devoted several pages to it.

*** Smolar also criticises me for skimpy treatment of Aldrich Ames and Robert Hanssen, two top Kremlin spies in America. Again, I did not feel I had anything much to add. And both were from a previous era (Ames offered his services in the 1980s). Excellent American espionage writers have written on both cases. But Smolar is right that they were not prime examples of the recruiting skills of the Yasenevo “Sanatorium” (as the KGB and now Russian foreign-intelligence headquarters is nicknamed). Both Ames and Hansen made the first move themselves. Edward Lucas, The Return of Edward Lucas Books and Reviews 169

Smolar also takes me to task for too much material about Estonia. In my defence I would say that I am not just dealing with Estonia, but with all three Baltic states, and that they deserve attention, being the main espionage battle-ground between the West and the Kremlin over the past 100 years. They are also a largely neglected story. Polish espionage history (which Smolar would have liked more of) is a huge and interesting subject. I am particularly impressed with Timothy Snyder’s Sketches from a Secret War, which detail Polish anti-Soviet efforts in the interbellum period. But my digression into history (starting with the Lockhart Plot and ending with the mysterious triumphs and bungles of Operation Jungle and Anglo-American operations in the post-war Baltics) were there simply to disabuse the reader of a commonly-held notion: that because we won the Cold War, we had also won the espionage war. On the whole, we did not. The Soviet Union for the most part ran rings round us in any operations we tried within its frontiers. I plead guilty to writing with a degree of personal engagement. As I point out in the first pages of the book, I have spent most of my adult life dealing with the region we used to call “Eastern Europe”. In many ways I identify more with the countries of the region than I do with my own, particularly now when my government seems set on sidelining Britain out of the European Union. I did not aim to write a dry academic book; instead I put my personal background, views and passions squarely in front of the reader and invite them to join me as I explain what bothers me about spies, Russia and the West. But these are just quibbles. Smolar’s main conceptual problem with my book is a “healthy scepticism” about whether espionage really matters. He writes:

“Public threats, natural gas blackmails, the rejection of cooperating at the Security Council, and finally the war with Georgia which impeded NATO enlargement, have all proved more effective for Russia’s strategic goals than the work of spies or misinformation steered by the Kremlin’s friends.”

The short answer to this point is that we do not know. What damage, for example, did the close friendship between Germany’s Gerhard Schröder and Mr Putin do to Western unity? Was that an intelligence operation (just the sort of thing that Mr Putin had been trained to do in the 1980s, some would say). Mr Schröder insists not, and as he is a wealthy and litigious man it would be a brave author or journalist who levelled accusations of improper behaviour at him. I certainly do no such thing. But the hypothesis that Russia may have senior Western politicians on its payroll is an alarming one, particularly because the extent of the damage is unknown. 170 Books and Reviews Edward Lucas, The Return of Edward Lucas

*** I would argue that Russia’s public weapons, as cited by Smolar, have proved less effective than many feared five years ago. The days when NATO fawned and crawled to appease Russia are over (next year’s Steadfast Jazz exercise is the first time that NATO has carried out manoeuvres to show that it can defend Poland and the Baltic states against a Russian attack). The gas weapon is blunted too: Russia now has a reputation as an unreliable and expensive supplier of gas to Europe, and other sources of gas now abound. But espionage and secret mischief-making remain something that Russia can do. And it does. Smolar’s final criticism is of my conclusion. I think he misunderstands an argument I am making for rhetorical effect. I write:

“From the Russian point of view, the outcome of 1989-91 proved far less damaging and humiliating than it seemed at the time. An expensive, brittle, and unruly empire has gone. Today, these countries are the West’s problem. It is not Russia that pays for their modernisation, but the EU and international lenders … But more importantly, the continuing penetration of their societies, state structures and business by Russian intelligence gives the Kremlin an influence in Europe far more useful than it enjoyed in Soviet days.”

I am not arguing here that the Soviet collapse was a clever trick to promote the Kremlin’s interests. All I am doing is noting that the outcome has been far less bad than it seemed at the time. In place of a collapsing empire, the Kremlin now presides over an emerging capitalist economy with considerable (and often disguised) political influence. The West, which was (for the most part) well aware of the Soviet threat, is inclined to disregard the threat from Russia. To illustrate this, try a thought experiment: had the Soviet empire not collapsed when it did, it would have fallen apart a bit later, but perhaps at much greater cost (including more bloodshed). The Russian Federation arrived on the world stage in 1991 enjoying a large dose of goodwill as a country that had helped destroy communism and voluntarily given up an empire. This is far from being the main thesis of the book and I am sorry that it proved so distracting in Smolar’s reading of the conclusion. My aim in making this point was simply to underline that Russia is still a threat and has new means of getting its way. I think on this Smolar and I agree.

Edward Lucas is the international editor at the Economist. The original book review can be found in New Eastern Europe Issue 4(V)/2012 pages 36-43. New Eastern Europe is a collaborative project between three Polish institutions

The City of Gdańsk the Marshall of the Pomeranian Voivodship, the www.gdansk.pl President of the City of Gdańsk and the Chairman A city with over a thousand years of history, of the NSZZ Solidarność Trade Union. Gdańsk has been a melting pot of cultures and The main purpose of the European Solidarity ethnic groups. The air of tolerance and wealth Centre is to preserve the heritage and memory built on trade has enabled culture, science, and of Solidarność in order to hand it down to future the Arts to flourish in the city for centuries. generations, while stressing its relevance and Today, Gdańsk remains a key meeting place universal value. and major tourist attraction in Poland. While the city boasts historic sites of The Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College enchanting beauty, it also has a major historic of Eastern Europe and social importance. In addition to its 1000-year history, the city is the place where the Second www.kew.org.pl World War broke out as well as the birthplace The College of Eastern Europe is a non-profit, of Solidarność, the Solidarity movement, which non-governmental foundation founded on led to the fall of Communism in Central and February 9th 2001 by Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, Eastern Europe. a former head of the Polish section of Radio Free Europe and a democratic activist. The European Solidarity Centre The foundation deals with cooperation between the nations of Central and Eastern www.ecs.gda.pl Europe. The aims if its charters are to carry out The European Solidarity Centre is a educational, cultural and publishing activities, multifunctional institution combining scientific, and to develop programmes which enhance the cultural and educational activities with a modern transformation in the countries of Eastern Europe. museum and archive, which document freedom The organisation has its headquarters in movements in the modern history of Poland Wrocław, Poland, a city in western Poland, and Europe. perfectly situated in the centre of Europe and The Centre was established in Gdańsk on with a deep understanding of both Western November 8th 2007, by the Minister of Culture, and Eastern Europe. 172

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