Michael J. Engelhardt

REWARDING NONPROLIFERATION: THE SOUTH AND NORTH KOREAN CASES

by Michael J. Engelhardt

Michael J. Engelhardt is Professor of Political Science at Luther College in Decorah, Iowa. He is the co-author of American Government: Essentials and Perspectives (3rd edition forthcoming 1997) and author of two studies on counterinsurgency conflicts that appeared in Conflict Quarterly (1991,1992).

Personally I am haunted eration has been superpower alli- community in general have main- by the feeling that, unless ance commitments made during the tained a commitment to nonprolif- we are successful, by 1970 Cold War. In his study of 40 coun- eration. The question is whether there may be ten nuclear tries in 1984, Meyer finds that hav- nonproliferation strategies will be powers instead of four, ing a nuclear ally had “the greatest effective in the post-Cold War and by 1975, fifteen or twenty.... I see the possi- overall dissuasive effect”: most world. bility in the 1970s of a countries allied with either the On this point, the case of the two President of the United United States or the Soviet Union Koreas may tell us much, since in States having to face a showed no sign of wanting a bomb.4 Korea the United States has had to world in which fifteen or Reiss, in six case studies of address proliferation threats from a twenty or twenty-five na- proliferators and nonproliferators, friend as well as an adversary. As tions may have these assigns more weight to internal fac- an examination of proliferation in weapons. I regard that as tors, such as antinuclear public opin- the two Koreas will show, both the the greatest possible dan- 1 ion in democracies, but friend and the adversary ultimately ger and hazard. John acknowledges the importance of al- responded to American threats and Kennedy, 1962 liance ties.5 incentives. However, rewarding Reiss’s conclusion supports the nonproliferation by a friend may ortunately, we do not live in recent pessimism about proliferation have encouraged an attempt at pro- the world President Kennedy given the collapse of the Soviet al- liferation by a foe. feared. Instead of 20 nuclear F liance system and the possible weak- powers by 1970, the number had ening of the U.S. system (in the THE SOUTH TRIES FOR A reached nine by 1990, including four absence of a unifying outside BOMB, 1970-1976 undeclared nuclear powers (Israel, threat). For example, if the United India, Pakistan, and South Africa).2 States withdraws from commit- In 1970, U.S. allies in Asia and South Africa subsequently decided ments abroad, former Cold War elsewhere were nervous. The Viet- to dismantle its six bombs.3 Few allies may reconsider the nuclear nam involvement, undertaken to would have predicted such successes option as a way of dealing with lo- demonstrate American resolve and in the early 1960s. cal threats.6 So far, however, the commitment to distant friends, in- According to the literature, the United States and the international stead undermined both. Reacting to greatest single deterrent to prolif-

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 31 Michael J. Engelhardt

domestic displeasure with open- draw all American forces if it con- Ministry of Science and Technol- ended military commitments over- tinued. As a result the project was ogy announced plans to build its seas, President Nixon came out in shut down.10 In April 1975, South own reprocessing plant, without July 1970 with the Nixon Doctrine, Korea ratified the nuclear Non-Pro- foreign assistance.15 These plans which required allies to take more liferation Treaty (NPT). were scrapped when Carter can- responsibility for defending them- However, a second nuclear dis- celled the withdrawal plans in 1978, selves, except in cases of direct So- pute between Seoul and Washing- under heavy pressure from domes- viet threat.7 The same year, the ton erupted in the autumn of 1975, tic critics. United States began reducing its when France announced its inten- Why did South Korea give in to forces stationed in South Korea tion to sell the South a reprocess- American pressures not to build a from 70,000 to 44,000. ing plant for separating plutonium bomb? The South’s economic de- The Nixon Doctrine came as a from spent fuel rods used in South pendence upon the United States and severe shock to South Korean lead- Korea’s civilian reactors.11 Al- its allies was clearly a factor. If it ers, whose country would not exist though such plants are legal under had continued the project, Seoul if it had not been saved by Ameri- the NPT, the United States raised would have faced “almost certain can military intervention in 1950. strong objections, fearing that the severe sanctions.”16 While such Twenty years later, the military plant could not be safeguarded sanctions are often ineffective, this threat from the North was still very against secret bomb-making efforts. case probably would have proven real. North Korean commandos had The Ford administration warned an exception. The United States was attempted to assassinate President that building the plant would result South Korea’s largest trading part- Park Chung Hee in 1968 and would in a loss of American Export-Im- ner, buying 26 percent of the try again in 1974. Also during this port Bank loans for South Korea’s country’s exports. If the United time, North Korea seized the U.S. civilian nuclear program and “jeop- States had persuaded Japan, South spy ship Pueblo in January 1968 and ardize” the Korean-American secu- Korea’s second largest trading part- shot down an unarmed American re- rity relationship. The United States ner and a major investor in Korean connaissance plane 90 miles outside also got Canada to hold up the pro- industry, to join in the sanctions, its airspace in April 1969. In line posed sale of a heavy water reactor the results would have been devas- with the Nixon Doctrine, the United to South Korea.12 In early 1976, the tating. States authorized $1.5 billion over South Korean government backed The threat to halt financing for five years to modernize the South’s off again, cancelling the French or- the civilian nuclear program was armed forces and thus reduce the der. also a powerful one, coming at a need for American troops. How- While in 1974-1975 the United time when oil prices were soaring ever, with the North’s ground forces States demonstrated its ability to and substitutes for oil were urgently considered superior to those of the coerce South Korea, in 1977-1978 needed. In addition, South Korea South, this hardly seemed an ad- the shoe was on the other foot. Dur- owed $20 billion in foreign debt in equate security guarantee.8 ing his 1976 presidential campaign, the late 1970s, mostly to American South Korea began work on its Jimmy Carter promised to withdraw and Japanese banks.17 Any political first nuclear reactor in September all American ground troops and tension that could frighten creditors 1970.9 Though this reactor was un- nuclear weapons from South Korea. and prevent refinancing of the debt connected to any military purpose, In March of 1977, just after his elec- could have severely damaged the a parallel, secret weapons research tion, Carter announced plans to economy, even without formal gov- project was apparently begun at carry out his promise and have all ernment sanctions. about the same time on the orders ground troops out by 1982, leaving Most important in the South’s of President Park Chung Hee. In only air forces.13 South Korean of- decision, however, was probably the 1974-1975, the United States dis- ficials responded both publicly and fact that continuing the program covered the project, and Secretary privately with “strong hints—virtual “risked placing the country in a po- of State Henry Kissinger commu- threats,” to build nuclear weapons sition where it had neither nuclear nicated directly to President Park if Carter’s plan were carried out.14 arms nor the American commit- that the United States would with- In August 1977, the South Korean ment.”18 Building a bomb would

32 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Michael J. Engelhardt have taken South Korea about four technology in order to make pos- South Korean experience with the to six years in the late 1970s.19 If sible a successful non-nuclear de- United States set a precendent fol- Washington had withdrawn its fense against the North.22 By the lowed later by the North. forces in 1975-1976, North Korea early 1990s some authorities con- would have had a “window of op- tended that the South’s qualitative THE PYONGYANG PUZZLE portunity” in which to launch a con- advantage balanced the North’s nu- 1989-1995 ventional attack. Since the perceived merical superiority, though others conventional superiority of the disputed this.23 As noted earlier, North Korean interest in nuclear North was the reason for consider- such an upgrading of conventional matters began soon after the Korean ing nuclear weapons in the first capabilities was foreseen in the War, during which the United States place, the attempt at proliferation Nixon Doctrine, but prior to the several times threatened the use of 28 could have been self-defeating, ex- nuclear dispute the South Korean nuclear weapons. In the early posing the country to invasion and government was dissatisfied with 1960s, a small research reactor was conquest. A South Korean bomb the pace of force improvement.24 built at Yongbyon. However, little could also have provoked North The threat to proliferate must have concern was shown by either the Korea and possibly even Japan to increased Washington’s incentive to United States or South Korea until develop their own bombs.20 provide the South with what it a larger, five megawatt reactor was On the other hand, the South re- needed. As Yager noted in 1980, completed in 1987. No power lines alized benefits from threatening to nonproliferation turned out to be ran to or from the site, indicating join the nuclear club. Other factors “the best of both worlds” for South that something other than energy 29 played a role in President Carter’s Korea.25 was to be produced by the plant. decision to retreat from his troop Though the present South Korean In 1989, the reactor was shutdown withdrawal pledge, including criti- government disavows any desire for for 100 days, time enough for the cism from American “hawks” and nuclear weapons, its technical ca- North Koreans to extract enough new U.S. Central Intelligence pacity to build them is actually much plutonium from the spent fuel for 30 Agency estimates placing the num- higher now than it was in the 1970s. one or two bombs. ber of North Korean troops much This is due to the growth of South Despite concerns over an emerg- higher than previously estimated. Korea’s civilian nuclear power in- ing North Korean nuclear capabil- Still, given the American goal of dustry, which now provides half of ity, the Bush administration chose discouraging proliferation, the de- the country’s power and has pro- not to enter into direct talks with cision seems almost inevitable. The duced a large amount of spent reac- the North. According to Michael United States could hardly threaten tor fuel that could be reprocessed Moodie, who handled the issue for to withdraw military support from to obtain plutonium for bombs. Pe- the Arms Control and Disarmament the South in retaliation for the bomb ter Hayes estimates that “under ex- Agency, this was because, unlike project if support was to be with- treme circumstances” the South the case with South Korea, the Bush drawn anyway. In effect, deterring could produce a single “crude” administration felt it had very little 31 the South from making a bomb nuclear device in nine months and leverage over North Korea. De- forced the Americans to stay on the a deliverable stockpile of warheads scribed as an “Orwellian” state by 32 peninsula as “a type of peacekeep- in less than five years.26 However, one analyst and a “cult-based mon- ing force” restraining proliferation21 since all the disadvantages of pro- archy rather than a communist 33 at a time when many American lead- liferation noted above still apply, state” by another, North Korea ers wished to leave. including the threat of a North Ko- was one of the world’s most closed The nuclear threat may also have rean preemptive strike, it is unlikely societies. With emigration and for- enhanced South Korea’s conven- that the South will exercise its eign travel generally forbidden, ac- tional defenses. Under the “Force nuclear option. Only U.S. with- curate intelligence on the country Improvement Plan” begun in the drawal from the peninsula or Japa- was exceedingly difficult to obtain. mid-1970s, the South Korean mili- nese proliferation might be likely With so little available informa- tary was given access to advanced to alter this conclusion.27 One ques- tion, U.S. officials had a hard time American weapons and military tion worth examining is whether the divining what North Korea’s goals

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 33 Michael J. Engelhardt

for its nuclear program really were. a far more urgent problem in Ko- The North Korean decision led The most alarmist observers saw a rea. In January 1993, on their sixth some leading newspaper columnists possible North Korean attack to inspection visit to the North, Inter- and Republican politicians to urge unify the country under Kim Il- national Atomic Energy Agency the administration to take strong sung’s control, with nuclear weap- (IAEA) inspectors found “clues” action, even to “prepare for war” ons used to deter the United States that plutonium had indeed been di- rather than accept a North Korean from responding.34 There was also verted from the Yongbyon reactor.39 bomb.42 To those on the scene, how- fear that, with a collapsing In response, the North Korean gov- ever, military action did not look economy, North Korea might be ernment on March 12 threatened to so attractive. General Gary Luck, tempted to sell its new nuclear withdraw from the NPT, citing the commander of U.S. forces in Ko- weapons to Middle Eastern rogue annual joint U.S. and South Korean rea, estimated that the costs of a states like Libya and Iran.35 On the Korean “Team Spirit” military ex- second Korean war “would far ex- other hand, some questioned ercises as a pretext. ceed those of the 1950s.” Other whether North Korea even had a real Reversing the Bush approach, the military sources predicted “a mil- nuclear program or was merely pre- Clinton administration decided to lion coffins and $100 billion drained tending to have one in order to in- adopt a dual strategy of opening di- from U.S. coffers.”43 timidate South Korea and the United rect negotiations with the North, Accordingly, Clinton decided to States.36 while at the same time warning of stick with the sanctions approach, Even if the United States had dire consequences if Pyongyang proposing first an arms embargo, known more about North Korean pressed ahead. At the second meet- followed by a second phase includ- intentions, U.S. leverage appeared ing between Assistant Secretary of ing an oil embargo and a ban on far more limited than in the South State for Political-Military Affairs remittances from Japan.44 Unfortu- Korean case. North Korea’s declin- Robert Gallucci and North Korean nately, both Japan and China, who ing economy relied mostly on trade officials in Geneva in June 1993, held the key to effective sanctions, with other Communist states, espe- the North appeared to give ground were reluctant to go along, fearing cially China, which, after the So- once again, suspending its with- that economic pressure could drive viet switch to world market prices, drawal from the treaty. the North over the edge into terror- supplied most of the country’s oil. A month later, however, ist attacks or war. Even South Ko- Military threats seemed equally un- Pyongyang demanded, as a condi- rea was reluctant to support attractive, given the enormous dam- tion of remaining in the NPT, aid sanctions, in part because they age a war could do to South Korea, in building new light water reactors might actually succeed and cause a especially to the capital Seoul, to replace the outdated (and danger- collapse of the Northern regime, which is located less than 30 miles ous) Soviet gas-graphite design used leaving the South to pick up the es- from the border. Without credible at Yongbyon.40 This was the first timated $1 trillion cost of reunifi- threats, negotiation appeared an un- sign that, like South Korea, North cation.45 Nevertheless, the United promising option. In addition, the Korea might be willing to bargain States was determined to bring a South Korean government greatly away its nuclear program in return sanctions proposal before the U.N. feared negotiations between the for the right concessions. However, Security Council. United States and the North, which inspections did not resume. The sanctions effort was derailed, might lead to a deal done over their The situation heated up still fur- and the war scare dissipated by heads.37 ther in May of 1994. On May 14, former president Jimmy Carter’s Accordingly, the Bush adminis- North Korea’s news agency an- sudden acceptance of a long-stand- tration continued to express concern nounced that the fuel rods in the ing offer by Kim Il-sung to visit and even held one face-to-face meet- Yongbyon reactor were being re- Pyongyang. Unexpectedly, during ing with the North Koreans in Janu- moved and replaced. Without in- Carter’s four-day mission (June 15- ary 1992.38 Otherwise, it mostly left spectors present, this would allow 18, 1994), Kim agreed not only to the problem to the South Koreans. the North to divert enough pluto- allow IAEA inspectors back in, but The incoming Clinton administra- nium for five to six bombs, once indicated a willingness to scrap the tion, however, was to be faced with the fuel rods cooled.41 Yongbyon reactors if light water re-

34 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Michael J. Engelhardt

actors were provided in return and to finance the new reactors, no ap- ment to Korea easier to justify and if the U.S. would pledge itself to propriations from Congress were maintain. Southern economic de- the non-use of nuclear weapons needed.) Senator Robert Dole re- pendence on the United States and against North Korea.46 The Kim- marked that “it’s always possible the contrasting isolation and autarky Carter talks created a moment of to get an agreement when you give of the North have already been confusion within the Clinton admin- enough away.” On the other hand, noted. The dispute with the North istration, with Secretary of State Arnold Kanter, Gallucci’s predeces- was also far more public than the Warren Christopher pushing to con- sor under Bush as point man on one with the South, probably mak- tinue the sanctions effort and Vice- North Korea, called the agreement ing resolution harder. President Gore favoring pursuing “a good decision, essentially to buy Yet, in both cases, the United the opening.47 The dispute was re- out the North Korean nuclear pro- States ended up dispensing rewards solved in Gore’s favor, with the gram.”51 for nonproliferation as well as U.S. agreeing to resume official Scholars disagreed as vehemently threatening sanctions for prolifera- talks in July. as politicians. Peter Zimmerman, a tion. Indeed, positive incentives The talks were delayed briefly by nuclear physicist, said that “North were more important in the case of the death of Kim Il-sung on July 9, Korea agreed to virtually every the North than in the South. While 1994, but by October 21 the United American demand” while Byong- the Nixon administration could States and North Korea had reached Joon Ahn, a South Korean political wield the threat of military with- an agreement calling for the shut- scientist, claimed that “Washington drawal and trade sanctions against down and eventual dismantling of gave Pyongyang all that it wanted” the South, the Clinton administra- the Yongbyon reactors, a ban on in return for unreliable promises.52 tion had few sticks with which to fuel reprocessing, and placing the Even in 1996, the deal is still a beat the North. Nonetheless, in both spent fuel rods from Yongbyon in matter of dispute. One expert inter- cases the would-be proliferator storage under IAEA inspection. viewed by the author denounced it reaped rewards: for South Korea, a Also, the North agreed to open two as a “farce” which would prolong modernized army and a virtually secret military sites to inspection. the life of the North Korean regime ironclad U.S. security commitment; In return, North Korea would re- and allow it to develop deliverable for North Korea, food and new re- ceive two light water reactors to be nuclear weapons using the pluto- actors. completed in 2003 and 2005, and nium already diverted.53 Others de- The two cases are also similar in 500,000 tons of oil annually for fended it as the best that could have that the United States needed coop- heating and electricity.48 During the been achieved without war.54 eration from other countries in or- spring, a brief snag brought on by der to coerce the Koreans. In the North Korean objections to the use CONCLUSIONS first case, France and Canada of a South Korean design for the proved willing to cooperate. In the reactors was resolved. By the end Obviously there are major differ- second, cooperation proved more of 1995, oil was actually being de- ences between the two U.S. efforts difficult to obtain. Interviews by the livered to North Korea under the to keep nuclear weapons out of Ko- author with Clinton administration agreement. At the same time, Ja- rean hands. Nixon, Ford, and officials involved in the negotiations pan, South Korea, and the United Carter faced a far less complicated revealed different opinions as to States began donating rice to the problem with the South than Bush whether China and Japan would ul- North to relieve near-famine con- and Clinton did with the North. The timately have gone along with sanc- ditions.49 United States never had to fear war tions had the agreement not been Reactions to the deal varied with South Korea, and American reached. They also disagreed over sharply. Congressional Republicans policy-makers knew far more about whether sanctions could have been condemned the administration for that country and its motivations than effective.55 “extending aid to a Stalinist regime” they did about the North. The Cold The Korean cases have both posi- and for using an executive agree- War atmosphere in the earlier case tive and negative implications for ment to bypass Congress.50 (Be- probably also contributed to suc- future nonproliferation policy. On cause South Korea and Japan agreed cess, since it made a U.S. commit- one hand, the negotiations with the

The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 35 Michael J. Engelhardt

North may indicate that a hostile as blackmail. As The Economist Flashpoint: Security and the Korean Peninsula (Canberra: Allen and Unwin, 1993), p. 52. See well as a friendly proliferator can warned before the deal was made, also Spector and Smith, p. 122. be brought into line using economic rewarding the North for halting its 11 Reiss (1988), p. 92. carrots and sticks. For the South, program could trigger “a rush of 12 Yoon-Sun Ha, “Nuclearization of Small States and World Order” Asian Survey 28 (November. the threat of sanctions was impor- other might-be nuclear powers de- 1978), p. 1137; Reiss (1988), pp. 92-93. tant. In North Korea’s case, whether manding their own rewards for not 13 Reiss (1988), p. 84. 14 formal sanctions efforts would have being bad boys.”60 Yet the prece- Robert Harkavy, “Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation” in George Quester, The Politics succeeded or not, in a sense sanc- dent had already been set with South of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore: Johns tions were already in place due to Korea 20 years earlier. North Ko- Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 148-149. See also Hayes, “Republic of Korea,” p. 52-53. the North’s economic isolation af- rea asked for and got nothing more 15 Reiss (1988), p. 95. ter the fall of the Soviet bloc. Be- than its rival had received. Indeed, 16 Harkavy, p. 162. tween 1989 and 1994, North the cost to the United States was 17 Reiss (1988), p. 96. 18 Reiss (1988), p. 99. Korea’s gross national product far less this time, since Japan and 19 Ha, p. 1143. shrank 20 percent, and by 1994 food South Korea picked up most of the 20 Joseph Yager, Nonproliferation and U.S. For- and energy shortages were acute.56 tab. Ultimately, the North may or eign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings In- stitution, 1980), p. 60-64. The North, as one State Department may not keep the promises it has 21 Tong Whan Park, “Issues of Arms Control official noted, had an opportunity made, but the South could also re- Between the Two Koreas” Asian Survey 32 (April 1992), pp. 350-365. to “pry open access” to the world nege, and probably produce a 22 Yager, pp. 54-56. economy in return for proliferation nuclear stockpile before the North 23 Tai Ming Cheung, “In Search of Enemies” restraint.57 Such access may be a could. But it would also have to pay Far Eastern Economic Review, January 3, 1991, pp. 16-17; Park, p. 363. valuable tool in reaching other pa- the economic and security penalties 24 Reiss (1988), p. 81. riah states like Iran and Libya, if of proliferation. 25 Yager, p. 63. 26 and when their economies face simi- In sum, if the North Korean deal Hayes, “Republic of Korea” pp. 53-68. 27 Ibid., pp. 76-79. lar crises. encourages future nuclear black- 28 Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and The Notably, even before the Carter mailers, the deal with the South 20 Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), pp. 19-21. mission, President Clinton consis- years ago may have done the same. 29 Park, p. 357. tently stressed the economic benefits 30 Robert S. Greenberger and Steven Glain, “How for the North of a deal. Repeatedly, U.S., North Korea Went From Promise to Peril in Two Years,” The Wall Street Journal, June he stressed that the alternative for 8, 1994, p. A1. Pyongyang was “becoming more 1 Quoted in Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: 31 Michael Moodie, former head of Korea Task and more isolated, making them- The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (New York: Force, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1991-1992, interview with author, April 25, 58 Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 16. selves poorer.” In television in- 2 Leonard Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, 1995. terviews the president held out to Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread Of Nuclear 32 R.J. Rummel, Death By Government (New the North the opportunity to “be- Weapons 1989-1990 (Boulder, CO.: Westview Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994), pp. Press, 1990). 365-378. come part of the world community” 3 J.W. DeVilliers, Roger Jardine and Mitchell 33 Pak Sun Kim, “Will North Korea Blink?” Asian and “use the ability and industry of Reiss, “Why South Africa Gave Up The Bomb” Survey 34 (March 1994), p. 259. 34 The Economist, May 28, 1994, pp. 19-22; its people to strengthen trade and Foreign Affairs 72 (November/December 1993), pp. 99-109. Stephen J. Solarz, “Pyongyang’s Nuclear Game” 59 commerce.” These statements in- 4 Stephen Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Pro- Far Eastern Economic Review, September 23, dicate that the administration envi- liferation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 23. 1984), pp. 44-74 and 103-104. 35 Stephen J. Solarz, “How To Stop The North sioned a “buyout” of the North 5 Reiss (1988), pp. 247-269. Korean Bomb,” New Republic August 5, 1994, Korean nuclear program from the 6 George Quester and Victor A. Utgoff, “U.S. pp. 23-27. 36 beginning (though not the specific Arms Reductions and Nuclear Nonproliferation: David Sanger, “Tokyo Reluctant to Levy Sanc- The Counterproductive Possibilities” Washing- tions on North Koreans,” The New York Times deal involving the new reactors, ton Quarterly 16 (Winter 1993), pp. 129-140. June 9, 1994, p. A1; Colonel Guy Roberts, which was North Korea’s idea) and See also Motoya Kitamura, “Japan’s Plutonium Speech to National Security Law Institute, Program: A Proliferation Threat,” The Nonpro- Charlottesville, Virginia, June 15, 1995. that the negotiating strategy was not 37 liferation Review 3 (Winter 1996), pp. 9-14. Moodie interview, April 25, 1995. fundamentally altered by Carter’s 7 Reiss (1988), p. 81. 38 Mazarr, p. 71. 39 unexpected intervention. 8 Ibid. Young-Whan Kihl, “Confrontation or Com- 9 Ibid., p. 89. promise On the Korean Peninsula: The North Yet, both Korea deals raise the 10 Peter Hayes, “The Republic of Korea and the Korean Nuclear Issue,” Korean Journal of De- troubling question of proliferation Nuclear Issue” in Andrew Mack, ed., Asian fense Analysis 6 (Winter 1994) p. 107.

36 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Michael J. Engelhardt

40 Greenberger and Glain, p. A1. 41 Kihl, p. 105. 42 William Safire, “Korean Conflict II,” The New York Times, June 9, 1994, p. A25; Karen Elliot House, “Korea: Raise Another Desert Shield,” The Wall Street Journal, June 18, 1994, p. A18. 43 Kihl, p. 114; David C. Morrison, “North Ko- rean Agreement Fuels Debate,” National Jour- nal, April 27, 1995, 1285-1286. 44 Robert S. Greenberger, “North Korea Has New Threat In Nuclear Issue,” The Wall Street Jour- nal, June 14, 1994, p. A11; Gerald Seib, “In North Korea, Trouble Starts in Credibility Gap,” The Wall Street Journal, June 15, 1994, p. A20. 45 James Sterngold, “South Waits Calmly As North Korean Transition Proceeds,” The New York Times, July 11, 1994, p. A3. 46 Kihl, pp. 114-116. 47 R. Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy, “How North Korea Became Carter’s Call,” The Washington Post (National Weekly Edition), July 4-10, 1994, pp. 17-18. 48 R. Jeffrey Smith, “What Price For Nuclear Peace of Mind?” The Washington Post (National Weekly Edition), October 24-29, 1994, pp. 16- 17. 49 Shin Jae Hoon and Nigel Holloway, “Pyongyang Two-Step,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 29, 1995, pp. 22-23. 50 Morrison, pp. 1285-1286. 51 Smith, “What Price,” pp. 16-17. 52 Peter Zimmerman, “Win-Win With North Ko- rea,” The Christian Science Monitor, Novem- ber 21, 1994; Byung-Joon Ahn, “The Man Who Would Be Kim,” Foreign Affairs 73 (Novem- ber/December 1994), pp. 94-108. 53 Author’s interview with Colonel William Tay- lor, Center for Strategic and International Stud- ies, Washington, D.C., March 18, 1996. 54 Author’s interviews with U.S. State Depart- ment and National Security Council officials, March 22 and 26, 1996. 55 Ibid. 56 Ahn, p. 97-98. 57 Author’s interview with U.S. State Department official, March 22, 1996. 58 William J. Clinton, Public Papers of the Presi- dents: William J. Clinton, 1994 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 350, 559, and 584. 59 Ibid. pp. 1031, 1074, and 1185-1186. 60 “The Yongbyon Test,” The Economist, June 4, 1994, pp. 14-15.

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