Michael J. Engelhardt REWARDING NONPROLIFERATION: THE SOUTH AND NORTH KOREAN CASES by Michael J. Engelhardt Michael J. Engelhardt is Professor of Political Science at Luther College in Decorah, Iowa. He is the co-author of American Government: Essentials and Perspectives (3rd edition forthcoming 1997) and author of two studies on counterinsurgency conflicts that appeared in Conflict Quarterly (1991,1992). Personally I am haunted eration has been superpower alli- community in general have main- by the feeling that, unless ance commitments made during the tained a commitment to nonprolif- we are successful, by 1970 Cold War. In his study of 40 coun- eration. The question is whether there may be ten nuclear tries in 1984, Meyer finds that hav- nonproliferation strategies will be powers instead of four, ing a nuclear ally had “the greatest effective in the post-Cold War and by 1975, fifteen or twenty.... I see the possi- overall dissuasive effect”: most world. bility in the 1970s of a countries allied with either the On this point, the case of the two President of the United United States or the Soviet Union Koreas may tell us much, since in States having to face a showed no sign of wanting a bomb.4 Korea the United States has had to world in which fifteen or Reiss, in six case studies of address proliferation threats from a twenty or twenty-five na- proliferators and nonproliferators, friend as well as an adversary. As tions may have these assigns more weight to internal fac- an examination of proliferation in weapons. I regard that as tors, such as antinuclear public opin- the two Koreas will show, both the the greatest possible dan- 1 ion in democracies, but friend and the adversary ultimately ger and hazard. John acknowledges the importance of al- responded to American threats and Kennedy, 1962 liance ties.5 incentives. However, rewarding Reiss’s conclusion supports the nonproliferation by a friend may ortunately, we do not live in recent pessimism about proliferation have encouraged an attempt at pro- the world President Kennedy given the collapse of the Soviet al- liferation by a foe. feared. Instead of 20 nuclear F liance system and the possible weak- powers by 1970, the number had ening of the U.S. system (in the THE SOUTH TRIES FOR A reached nine by 1990, including four absence of a unifying outside BOMB, 1970-1976 undeclared nuclear powers (Israel, threat). For example, if the United India, Pakistan, and South Africa).2 States withdraws from commit- In 1970, U.S. allies in Asia and South Africa subsequently decided ments abroad, former Cold War elsewhere were nervous. The Viet- to dismantle its six bombs.3 Few allies may reconsider the nuclear nam involvement, undertaken to would have predicted such successes option as a way of dealing with lo- demonstrate American resolve and in the early 1960s. cal threats.6 So far, however, the commitment to distant friends, in- According to the literature, the United States and the international stead undermined both. Reacting to greatest single deterrent to prolif- The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 31 Michael J. Engelhardt domestic displeasure with open- draw all American forces if it con- Ministry of Science and Technol- ended military commitments over- tinued. As a result the project was ogy announced plans to build its seas, President Nixon came out in shut down.10 In April 1975, South own reprocessing plant, without July 1970 with the Nixon Doctrine, Korea ratified the nuclear Non-Pro- foreign assistance.15 These plans which required allies to take more liferation Treaty (NPT). were scrapped when Carter can- responsibility for defending them- However, a second nuclear dis- celled the withdrawal plans in 1978, selves, except in cases of direct So- pute between Seoul and Washing- under heavy pressure from domes- viet threat.7 The same year, the ton erupted in the autumn of 1975, tic critics. United States began reducing its when France announced its inten- Why did South Korea give in to forces stationed in South Korea tion to sell the South a reprocess- American pressures not to build a from 70,000 to 44,000. ing plant for separating plutonium bomb? The South’s economic de- The Nixon Doctrine came as a from spent fuel rods used in South pendence upon the United States and severe shock to South Korean lead- Korea’s civilian reactors.11 Al- its allies was clearly a factor. If it ers, whose country would not exist though such plants are legal under had continued the project, Seoul if it had not been saved by Ameri- the NPT, the United States raised would have faced “almost certain can military intervention in 1950. strong objections, fearing that the severe sanctions.”16 While such Twenty years later, the military plant could not be safeguarded sanctions are often ineffective, this threat from the North was still very against secret bomb-making efforts. case probably would have proven real. North Korean commandos had The Ford administration warned an exception. The United States was attempted to assassinate President that building the plant would result South Korea’s largest trading part- Park Chung Hee in 1968 and would in a loss of American Export-Im- ner, buying 26 percent of the try again in 1974. Also during this port Bank loans for South Korea’s country’s exports. If the United time, North Korea seized the U.S. civilian nuclear program and “jeop- States had persuaded Japan, South spy ship Pueblo in January 1968 and ardize” the Korean-American secu- Korea’s second largest trading part- shot down an unarmed American re- rity relationship. The United States ner and a major investor in Korean connaissance plane 90 miles outside also got Canada to hold up the pro- industry, to join in the sanctions, its airspace in April 1969. In line posed sale of a heavy water reactor the results would have been devas- with the Nixon Doctrine, the United to South Korea.12 In early 1976, the tating. States authorized $1.5 billion over South Korean government backed The threat to halt financing for five years to modernize the South’s off again, cancelling the French or- the civilian nuclear program was armed forces and thus reduce the der. also a powerful one, coming at a need for American troops. How- While in 1974-1975 the United time when oil prices were soaring ever, with the North’s ground forces States demonstrated its ability to and substitutes for oil were urgently considered superior to those of the coerce South Korea, in 1977-1978 needed. In addition, South Korea South, this hardly seemed an ad- the shoe was on the other foot. Dur- owed $20 billion in foreign debt in equate security guarantee.8 ing his 1976 presidential campaign, the late 1970s, mostly to American South Korea began work on its Jimmy Carter promised to withdraw and Japanese banks.17 Any political first nuclear reactor in September all American ground troops and tension that could frighten creditors 1970.9 Though this reactor was un- nuclear weapons from South Korea. and prevent refinancing of the debt connected to any military purpose, In March of 1977, just after his elec- could have severely damaged the a parallel, secret weapons research tion, Carter announced plans to economy, even without formal gov- project was apparently begun at carry out his promise and have all ernment sanctions. about the same time on the orders ground troops out by 1982, leaving Most important in the South’s of President Park Chung Hee. In only air forces.13 South Korean of- decision, however, was probably the 1974-1975, the United States dis- ficials responded both publicly and fact that continuing the program covered the project, and Secretary privately with “strong hints—virtual “risked placing the country in a po- of State Henry Kissinger commu- threats,” to build nuclear weapons sition where it had neither nuclear nicated directly to President Park if Carter’s plan were carried out.14 arms nor the American commit- that the United States would with- In August 1977, the South Korean ment.”18 Building a bomb would 32 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring-Summer 1996 Michael J. Engelhardt have taken South Korea about four technology in order to make pos- South Korean experience with the to six years in the late 1970s.19 If sible a successful non-nuclear de- United States set a precendent fol- Washington had withdrawn its fense against the North.22 By the lowed later by the North. forces in 1975-1976, North Korea early 1990s some authorities con- would have had a “window of op- tended that the South’s qualitative THE PYONGYANG PUZZLE portunity” in which to launch a con- advantage balanced the North’s nu- 1989-1995 ventional attack. Since the perceived merical superiority, though others conventional superiority of the disputed this.23 As noted earlier, North Korean interest in nuclear North was the reason for consider- such an upgrading of conventional matters began soon after the Korean ing nuclear weapons in the first capabilities was foreseen in the War, during which the United States place, the attempt at proliferation Nixon Doctrine, but prior to the several times threatened the use of 28 could have been self-defeating, ex- nuclear dispute the South Korean nuclear weapons. In the early posing the country to invasion and government was dissatisfied with 1960s, a small research reactor was conquest. A South Korean bomb the pace of force improvement.24 built at Yongbyon. However, little could also have provoked North The threat to proliferate must have concern was shown by either the Korea and possibly even Japan to increased Washington’s incentive to United States or South Korea until develop their own bombs.20 provide the South with what it a larger, five megawatt reactor was On the other hand, the South re- needed.