NAMUN 2021

Integrated Crisis Committee 2011: Chamber of Commerce

Background Guide

Welcome

Dear delegates,

Welcome to the Cairo Chamber of Commerce at NAMUN 2021! The North American Model United Nations conference is a large, annual event hosted by the University of

Toronto. While we regrettably cannot host an in-person conference this year, we are working hard to ensure as fulfilling an experience as possible come February. The Integrated Crisis Committee this year will be on the topic of the Egyptian

Revolution of 2011. This uprising is still fresh in the minds of many as an early and impactful event during the Arab Spring. It marked the most potent and well-organized effort to shift away from the status quo of the decades-old regime of . The event is an important case study in modern revolutions and can be studied for the roles played by ideology, nationalism, pan-Arabism, liberalism, corporatism, and the military. With regards to the Cairo Chamber of Commerce specifically, it was an organization founded almost a century before the starting date of the committee with the purpose of protecting commercial interests in the country. Delegates will be given characters who represent various businesses and industries; they will have to navigate through an era of political turmoil while securing their personal objectives.

As this committee’s chair, I look forward to meeting you all both prior to and on the day of the conference. I am a third-year student at the University of Toronto working towards a Finance and Economics Specialist. I have been involved in crisis committees for over two years and MUN as a whole for over five years. I hope you find your experience with NAMUN this year to be as positive as I have.

Good luck and I hope to see you all in February!

Raza Akbari Chair of the Cairo Chamber of Commerce

1

Introduction

At the start of this committee, delegates will find themselves in early 2011, shortly after the resignation of long-time president Hosni Mubarak. The end of his reign, brought about by ever-increasing pressure from activists and political opponents, marked the end of a thirty-year-long chapter in Egyptian history during which civil liberties were curtailed in the name of national security.

However, bringing an end to a lengthy rule undoubtedly has consequences for national stability. A political vacuum now exists and it is entirely unclear who will fill it. On one hand, power could fall into the grasp of the wrong people, preventing the change that a majority of desire. On the other hand, uncertainty comes with its own price; if the direction of the country is not determined promptly and assertively, confidence will be lost in national institutions and the economy, perhaps leading to even more turmoil in the near future.

This committee’s role is to carefully manage commercial interests in a precarious situation and to try to restore confidence in the Egyptian economy. The national economy has not yet managed to fully recover from the financial crisis of 2008 and if political uncertainty continues, the impacts could be much more harmful and long-lasting than anticipated initially. Foreign investors pulled out much of their human and financial capital in January, leaving the fate of countless financial ventures unclear. Despite this, the characters in this committee will still be able to peddle considerable influence and have access to a large pool of resources because the most well-known figures in key industries are still relatively very wealthy and powerful.

2

Definitions

Cairo Chamber of Commerce (CoC): ​ A public organization that directly represents about

60% of commercial actors in the nation and protects their interests on the government level.

Hosni Mubarak: ​ from 1981 to 2011, Mubarak assumed the office after the assassination of . He immediately implemented a state of emergency that lasted until 2013 and led to alleged violations of human rights.

Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA): ​Formed in 1997, GAFTA is a large group of Arab and

North African nations in mutual cooperation for commercial purposes.

Arab League: ​An organization of many Arab and North African countries created in 1945 with the objective of diplomatic coordination.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): A​ metric that calculates the total value of all goods and services produced within the borders of a given country, GDP is a commonly-used measure of general economic performance.

Abou Abdel Monaam: ​ Baker Abou Abdel Monaam engaged in self-immolation outside the

Egyptian parliament building on January 17th 2011. This is popularly seen as the spark for the events that followed.

Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF): ​The only labour union that was allowed to exist in

Egypt during Mubarak’s reign was the ETUF. It was notorious for its consistent support of

Mubarak’s government. During the protests in January and February, armed ETUF members defended government forces from protesters.

Kingdom of Egypt: ​The predecessor of the modern-day republic, the was set up by the United Kingdom to serve as a successor state to the Khedivate of Egypt after the defeat of the Ottomans in . Distrust of British influence brought about its end in 1953.

3

Historical Background

For much of its history, the Egyptian nation has been controlled by foreign powers.

This was most recently the case when the Sultanate of Egypt was formed as a of the UK after the dissolved in the wake of World War I.1​ ​ In 1922, the UK established the Kingdom of Egypt under the and granted nominal

Egyptian independence.​2 ​ It also established as a joint condominium of Britain and

Egypt but the practical reality was that the UK exerted far more influence.3​ ​ Furthermore,

Britain still had explicit control over Egypt’s foreign relations, military, and communications.​4

Alarmed by the second Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1936, King Farouk signed the

Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which resulted in the removal of much of the British military presence nationwide (except for in the ).5​ ​Despite this, the UK still maintained its influence through diplomats and political advisors.6​

Defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, continued British influence, and rampant corruption led to the Revolution of 1952 led by the Free Officers Movement.​7​ This was a group of nationalist military leaders strongly opposed to the rule of King Farouk.8​ ​ As the revolution gained more momentum, the movement also began pursuing a comprehensive nationalist, anti-imperialist, republican agenda. The Free Officers Movement forced King

Farouk to abdicate in favour of his son (Fuad II).​9 ​ Shortly afterwards, the Revolutionary

Command Council was formed as a successor organization to the Free Officers Movement.1​ 0

The RCC immediately began engaging in power-securing measures. A new constitution was adopted by February of 1953 in which Egypt was declared to be a secular republic.1​ 1

1 Roberts, The Cambridge History of Africa, 745-746 ​ ​ 2 Roberts, The Cambridge History of Africa, 747 ​ ​ 3 Roberts, The Cambridge History of Africa, 747 ​ ​ 4 Roberts, The Cambridge History of Africa, 747 ​ ​ ​ 5 Roberts, The Cambridge History of Africa, 750 ​ ​ 6 Roberts, The Cambridge History of Africa, 750-752 ​ ​ ​ 7 Noshokaty, The 1952 revolution ​ 8 Noshokaty, The 1952 revolution ​ 9 Noshokaty, The 1952 revolution ​ 10 Al-Ahram Weekly ​ 11 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 50-51 ​ ​

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The first two presidents of the Republic of Egypt were very much in line with the principles of the revolution. They limited religious and external influence in politics and adopted a hard-line stance against Israel.​12 ​ Economically, they established the ideology of

“Nasserism” which involved aspects of Arab socialism.1​ 3​ This ideology was opposed to both

Western capitalism and communism but still supported a generally left-wing set of policies such as nationalization of key industries and considerable limitations on private sector investment.​14

The next president, Anwar Sadat, took a different approach; he notably sued for peace with Israel through the Camp David Accords in exchange for the return of the Sinai

Peninsula. He also departed from Nasserism and instead instituted “Infitah”, which was the name given to his more open-door economic policies that encouraged investment and a freer private sector to combat the perceived inefficiencies caused by the bureaucracies of government.1​ 5​ For many Egyptians, however, this was seen as the abandonment of the lower and middle classes to the benefit of a newly emergent aristocracy.​16 ​ Thus, Sadat was a very divisive figure who was criticized by both Islamists and leftists for his foreign, domestic, and economic policies. This led to his assassination during a military parade in 1981.​17

At this point, Hosni Mubarak - Sadat’s Vice President - assumed the office of the presidency. One of his first acts was to declare a national state of emergency in response to the assassination of Sadat.​18 ​ This essentially abandoned all constitutional rights and led to a significant extension of police powers, the trial of civilians by military courts, and cases of indefinite sentencing.1​ 9​ Political rights were also eroded as anti-government demonstrations were met with violent backlash and all but one of the elections Mubarak ran in were mere referendums asking for approval of his presidency.​20 ​ The stated justification

12 Rougier and Lacroix, Egypt’s Revolutions 185-186 ​ ​ 13 Nasserism ​ 14 Nasserism ​ 15 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 5 ​ ​ 16 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 5 ​ ​ 17 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 49 ​ ​ 18 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 119 19 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 50-51,192 ​ ​ 20 Wackenhut, Understanding Protest Diffusion, 24 ​ ​

5 for these measures was to control and crack down on Islamist groups such as the Muslim

Brotherhood.​21 ​ The state of emergency lasted until Mubarak’s resignation in 2011.​22

This 30-year period of unchecked power, inequality, corruption, police brutality, and authoritarian policies caused a build-up of dissent that was, in some ways, reminiscent of

1952.​23 ​ Poverty was still very much rampant; as of late 2010, about 40% of the country was living on the equivalent of $2 per day or less.​24 ​ There was also a great shortage of jobs for young adults.2​ 5​ This depressing economic reality on the back of high overall national economic growth increased the frustration of many Egyptians.2​ 6​ Workers essentially had no legitimate representation as the only legal labour union in the country - the Egyptian Trade

Union Federation (ETUF) - was closely affiliated with the Mubarak administration.2​ 7 ​ In fact,

ETUF even intervened in the revolution on the side of the government.2​ 8​ All this was more than enough to fuel a desire for major changes. The spark that finally set things in motion was the beating of a young man named Khaled Said by police forces. Within the week, various political groups coordinated demonstrations to take place on National Police Day

(January 25th).​29

The demonstrations escalated very quickly and demanded Mubarak’s resignation.

He continuously attempted to arrive at compromises by offering constitutional reform but this did not stop demonstrators from engaging in violent riots outside the Presidential

Palace. Finally, on February 11th, 2011, Vice President Omar Suleiman announced President

Mubarak’s resignation and the transfer of power to the military.​30 ​ Thus, Egypt had entered a new era.

This committee will follow the assembly of the Cairo Chamber of Commerce immediately after Mubarak’s resignation. The organization traces its roots to 1919 when a

21 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 50-51 ​ ​ 22 Wackenhut, Understanding Protest Diffusion, 44 ​ ​ 23 Rougier and Lacroix, Egypt’s Revolutions 75 ​ ​ 24 The Muslim Brotherhood ​ 25 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 74 ​ ​ 26 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 74 ​ ​ 27 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 30 ​ ​ 28 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 30 ​ ​ 29 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 37 ​ ​ 30 Abou El-Fadl, Revolutionary Egypt, 2 ​ ​

6 group of traders created a commercial chamber in Egypt’s capital upon the decision of the

Minister of Trade. The objective of this public group is to represent the interests of its constituents - the business community - on the government level. The Chamber of

Commerce is subdivided into 26 separate chambers so that there is one for each governorate of the nation. Approximately 60% of the country’s trade actors are members of the

Chamber.​31

31 About Chamber ​

7

Economic Situation

The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of the evolution of the Egyptian economy as the Chamber of Commerce will likely be the most economically focused branch of the overall Egypt crisis.

The nation of Egypt has spent most of its modern history under heavy foreign influence and much of that has been under direct foreign rule. The impacts of colonialism on Egypt’s economy have been complex but one assessment that can be made is that colonizers usually develop the economies of their subjects to extract natural resources. In the early half of the twentieth century, Egypt saw constant year-over-year growth in exports. The Suez Canal likely contributed immensely to this growth.​32

Between 1517 and 1915, Egypt was administered as a territory of the Ottoman Empire

(although from 1867 onward, Egypt was de facto independent). Perhaps the most important event in this phase of history was the construction of the Suez Canal which concluded in

1869.​33 ​ It allowed for a major naval shortcut from the Meditteranean Sea to the Indian

Ocean, greatly improving travel efficiency for commercial and military ships alike. Within six years, the () of Egypt had to declare bankruptcy and sell all of Egypt’s shares in the canal to the British.​34 ​ Soon after, this led to a full takeover of the Suez Canal by the UK and France. The European powers maintained control over the canal until 1956. At this point, the canal was nationalized by President , causing the Suez

Canal Crisis of 1956. Today, the canal continues to play a major role in international trade, breaking its own records every year. A 2018 study showed that over 9% of all goods involved in international trade that year travelled through the Suez at some point.3​ 5​ In the same year,

18,000 ships made use of the waterway, which was a 3.6% year-over-year increase.​36​ The average size of ships using the canal is also experiencing rapid growth, in part due to a 2014 expansion of the Suez Canal.3​ 7

32 Roberts, The Cambridge History of Africa, 77-78 ​ ​ 33 Tignor and Tignor, Egypt: A Short History, 153 ​ ​ 34 Tignor and Tignor, Egypt: A Short History, 268 ​ ​ 35 SRM, Le Prospettive Marittime ​ 36 SRM, Le Prospettive Marittime ​ 37 SRM, Le Prospettive Marittime ​

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Between President Nasser’s time in office and the end of the twentieth century,

Egypt followed a policy of import substitution. The aim of such a policy is to reduce reliance on foreign actors by “substituting” commonly imported goods with domestic production.​38

However, inefficiencies are caused when the economy is not allocating resources as effectively as possible because this policy results in the production of goods in a country which does not have a comparative advantage in their production.​39 ​ Similarly, Egypt’s exports were suppressed until the 21st century by the greater need for inefficient Egyptian producers to satisfy domestic market demand.4​ 0

In the 1990s, Egypt applied for and received a number of International Monetary

Fund loans.4​ 1​ ​The nation also experienced a high level of external debt relief thanks to its role in the Gulf War.​42 ​ Shortly afterwards, in the early 2000s, President Hosni Mubarak introduced far-reaching structural economic reforms which reduced taxation, loosened fiscal and monetary policy, increased privatization, and improved the ease of doing business.​43 ​ All of these factors allowed the country to begin experiencing rapid growth in foreign trade.4​ 4

Although the country’s exports have diversified over the past two decades, Egypt’s largest export sector for many years has been and continues to be the services sector (mainly tourism and transport). In 2010, services made up about 45% of the $51.6 billion of Egyptian exports.​45 ​ The second largest industry is that of minerals such as petroleum and gas (20% of the total).​46​ For a long time, Egyptian petroleum products were not exported in mass and instead kept for domestic use.​47​ For example, the value of petroleum-related exports for

Egypt in 1998 was barely more than $2 billion.​48 ​ This industry is the one that has perhaps

38 Madani and Olarreaga, Politically Optimal Tariffs, 2 ​ ​ 39 Madani and Olarreaga, Politically Optimal Tariffs, 14 ​ ​ 40 Madani and Olarreaga, Politically Optimal Tariffs, 14-16 ​ ​ 41 Madani and Olarreaga, Politically Optimal Tariffs, 5 ​ ​ 42 The Egypt IMF Loan ​ 43 Efrat, Hosni Mubarak’s Economic and Social Policies ​ 44 Tignor and Tignor, Egypt: A Short History, 211-214 ​ ​ 45 Atlas, What did Egypt export? ​ 46 Atlas, What did Egypt export? ​ 47 Atlas, What did Egypt export? ​ 48 Atlas, What did Egypt export? ​

9 benefitted the most from Mubarak’s reforms. There has also been a significant and steady acceleration in the agriculture industry (third-largest Egyptian export) which, as of 2010, makes up almost $5 billion in exports.​49

Imports to Egypt have been very diverse for a long time; no one industry constitutes more than 20% of the total.5​ 0​ Nevertheless, the biggest sectors represented in imports are services, agriculture, and machinery.​51 ​ Most of these imports are not for consumption by the

Egyptian people but are intermediate goods which have additional value added by Egyptian firms before being exported to a different country. With a total import value of $75.9 billion as of 2010, Egypt currently faces a trade deficit of approximately $24.3 billion.5​ 2

49 Atlas, What did Egypt export? ​ 50 Atlas, What did Egypt import? ​ 51 Atlas, What did Egypt import? ​ 52 Atlas, What did Egypt import? ​

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Issues

Post-revolutionary aftermath

At first, Mubarak was opposed to the calls for his resignation and the dissolution of the government, arguing that it would cause instability.5​ 3 ​ While he did ultimately resign on

February 11th, the potential concern of instability has not yet been alleviated. In this situation, it is possible for a power vacuum to be left behind and create inviting conditions for another unpopular government to gain control. Furthermore, the demands of the protesters extend beyond Mubarak’s resignation. There is much work yet to be done to craft a lasting form of that facilitates sustainable economic growth. For example, there are concerns over the control of the media from the Ministry of

Information.​54 ​ Most opposition factions are also pushing for the establishment and the transfer of power to a civilian council in the federal government. The many allegations of violence and human rights violations levied against public security officials must also be investigated and tried appropriately.​55 ​ Furthermore, civilians favour ending the decades-long implementation of the emergency law and reversing heightened security measures and powers granted to police and the State Security Intelligence Service.

There are also other significant issues at hand that are less concrete. One of these is the need for a revival of Egyptian political culture. Due to the absence of opposition parties for decades, Egyptian citizens have been disenfranchised from political participation.​56

While the current fervour spurred by the ongoing revolution is a positive sign, leaders must find ways to keep the populous motivated to participate in the long-term. This may be difficult to do for a population that has not experienced sustained democracy for more than two decades but is necessary to help prevent the rise of a future dictatorship. Egypt’s serious economic problems constitute a further barrier to the development of a rigorous democracy as will be discussed in the next section.

53 Adams, Mubarak refuses to resign ​ 54 Egypt’s reinstatement of Information Ministry ​ 55 Roth, World Report 2011: Egypt ​ 56 Wackenhut, Understanding Protest Diffusion, 24 ​ ​

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Economic challenges

The Egyptian economy was experiencing exponential growth between 2002 and 2008 but since the Great Recession, the GDP growth rate has slowed down.5​ 7​ Despite this, slow but steady economic growth has continued and the unemployment rate has only increased by less than a percentage point compared to its pre-recession level.​58​ However, the ongoing revolution is likely to change all this. The outbreak of violence has led to a decline in confidence in the economy, causing businesses to shut down and investors to leave.​59​ As of late January 2011, foreign governments and multinational corporations had begun to engage in mass evacuations for their citizens and expatriate employees.6​ 0​ This situation poses a long-term threat to the sustainability of the Egyptian economy. Whether many of these individuals and organizations will return to the country is unclear at the moment and depends on the success of the rebuilding process and efforts to restore stability.​61

These concerns further extend to one of the fastest-growing sectors of the Egyptian economy: tourism. Since the dawn of the century, the number of tourists in Egypt has increased by an average of about 20% annually.6​ 2​ As of 2010, that figure stood at over 14 million which represents 17% of the total population of the country.6​ 3​ This popularity is due to Egypt’s supremely unique cultural and historical significance. While the Mubarak administration tried to promote tourism, this sector faces significant risk going forward as those currently on vacation and prospecting tourists alike will fear the dramatic rise in violence.​64 ​ Therefore, the tourism sector is almost certainly going to seriously suffer in the short-term. How long the situation remains depressed, however, depends once again on the ability of the country to rebuild, stabilize, and regain the confidence of foreign individuals.​65

57 Khan and Miller, The Economic Decline of Egypt, 2 ​ ​ 58 Khan and Miller, The Economic Decline of Egypt, 2-3 ​ ​ 59 CNN Wire Staff, Foreign Governments, Businesses Begin Evacuations from Egypt ​ 60 CNN Wire Staff, Foreign Governments, Businesses Begin Evacuations from Egypt ​ 61 CNN Wire Staff, Foreign Governments, Businesses Begin Evacuations from Egypt ​ 62 Puri-Mirza, Topic: Tourism Industry of Egypt - Statistics & Facts ​ 63 Puri-Mirza, Topic: Tourism Industry of Egypt - Statistics & Facts ​ 64 Khan and Miller, The Economic Decline of Egypt, 2,5 ​ ​ 65 Puri-Mirza, Topic: Tourism Industry of Egypt - Statistics & Facts ​

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A key detail that must be highlighted is the extensive involvement of the armed forces in the Egyptian economy. The military operates large-scale construction and infrastructure projects as well as food businesses.6​ 6 ​ Because these military businesses are exempt from taxation, it is challenging for independent private organizations to compete in certain industries.​67 ​ These operations constitute a large portion of the revenue for the armed forces.​68​ While this situation likely causes corruption and grants the military excessive power, one could argue that such intervention is necessary to prevent economic instability and to save on public defence spending.

Regional stability

The successful revolution in Tunisia and now the resignation of Hosni Mubarak have begun to inspire a wave of other insurgent movements throughout the Middle East. These insurgents vary greatly in their motivations just like the situation Egypt finds itself in at this moment. The repressive authoritarian leaders of Arab countries are being challenged and with every success, their opponents gain more inspiration. However, regardless of the outcome of these insurgencies, this poses a threat to the stability of the region as a whole. A wave of revolutions across the would likely have lasting consequences for all nations in the region. Instability in a country that is historically aligned with Egypt may cause serious domestic problems for Egypt, too. For example, if a country in the Greater Arab Free Trade

Area (GAFTA) like Saudi Arabia were to undergo a devastating insurgency, foreign trade between the two nations would be significantly impaired. As one of its largest trading partners, Saudi Arabia exports approximately $2 billion of goods and imports $1 billion of goods to Egypt annually.​69 ​ A loss in this trading relationship would have significant downstream effects on other areas of the economy and would reduce overall GDP growth.​70

66 Head, Egyptian military ​ 67 Sayigh, Egypt’s Military Now Controls ​ 68 Sayigh, Egypt’s Military Now Controls ​ 69 Atlas, What did Egypt export?, What did Egypt import? ​ ​ ​ 70 Bilaterals, Arab Free Trade Agreement (1997) ​ ​

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Furthermore, if vital trade infrastructure locations such as the Suez Canal are damaged in further conflict, there could be devastating implications not only for Egypt but many other countries worldwide.

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State of Affairs

At the start of this committee, the date is very shortly after February 11th, when

President Hosni Mubarak finally resigned. With his resignation has come the end of a decades-long reign during which the country experienced frequent violation of basic human rights. This represents a major victory for the protesters and the date will likely be remembered as such for years to come. However, there is yet a lot of work to be done.

The Chamber of Commerce in this integrated crisis scenario will be a gathering of some of the most influential Egyptian businessmen representing industries ranging from steel to oil. Historically, many of these figures have had a profound influence in government. Now, it is crucial for the individuals in this Chamber to convene and act for the sake of not only their own futures but the future of the whole national economy.

The current situation is, in a word, dire. Many multinational corporations have evacuated the country, foreign investors have pulled out of promising business ventures and political uncertainty does not bode well for certain industries. Real gross domestic product and foreign direct investment are expected to decline significantly, while inflation and the national deficit are projected to balloon. The inevitable drop in tourism has the potential to cause foreign currency reserves to dwindle at an alarming rate. Meanwhile, unemployment and poverty remain at elevated levels as they have been for years.​71

If these circumstances are unchecked for too long, there could be serious long-term repercussions. For example, if the country experiences a period of stagflation, both monetary and fiscal policy in reaction will likely be ineffective. Because of the seemingly paradoxical situation of simultaneously high inflation and unemployment levels (and negative GDP growth), contractionary monetary policy would be harmful to GDP, while expansionary fiscal policy would cause even more inflation. In the worst-case scenario, this could lead to an era of a self-perpetuating economic depression against which the central bank and the government are helpless. The problems in the fields of foreign investment and currency reserves pose great domestic currency risk. If foreign economic ties are strained

71 CNN Wire Staff, Foreign Governments, Businesses Begin Evacuations from Egypt ​

15 for too long and currency reserves continue to diminish, the will begin experiencing devaluation. Excessive devaluation would be devastating for an economy reliant on imports. These issues are just some examples of the potential economic impact of the current political instability.​72

Economic and political experts agree that the current priority for Egypt must be the restoration of stability. The removal of President Mubarak represents the end of an oppressive reign which most Egyptians are happy about but the reality of a dangerous power vacuum cannot be ignored. There is no obvious successor to the Mubarak administration, especially because individuals from a wide range of political factions were involved in the protests. The military, as always, has considerable influence and an interim government ruled by martial law to “maintain order” is very well within the realm of possibility.

However, other opposition factions such as the communists and the Muslim Brotherhood cannot be discounted. These groups were silenced for decades and only in recent years returned to the public scene but they have already managed to garner considerable support.

There is always the option of holding new elections but this would require careful planning to ensure fairness and confidence in the results.

While the members of the Chamber of Commerce do likely prioritize their self-interests and have the influence required to protect those interests, they will still have a great deal of vested interest in seeing the restoration of stability. After all, the collapse of the

Egyptian economy would only harm business interests. How the characters decide to pursue their objectives remains up to the delegates.

72 Abdou, The Egyptian Revolution and Post Socio-Economic Impact, 8-17 ​ ​

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