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J 202 EricM. Davis Domino Democracy:Challengesto US.Foreign Policy ill a Post-SaddamMiddle East 2u3 the real q\Jestion is what the United States means by democratization of the regio" i" these weapons systems a meaningful threat. To date, no weapons of mass destruction and how 'the policy of domino democracy will affect the citizenry of countries li, have been discovered despite vigorous efforts by the United States to locate these question. Por many Middle Easterners, the stated American goal of promoting dc:- weapons systems after occupying Iraq. In light of the extensive debate that developed mocracy ~n the region is viewed with deep suspicion. They point to past American, after the war in Iraq was officially declared to have ended in May 2003, and espe- support for many authoritarian regimes, including that of Saddam Hussein during th, I cially in light of the escalating American casualties, the continued problem of estab- 1980s, failure to support Palestinian reformists in their efforts to create a Palestinian fishing political and economic stability in Iraq, and the ongoing debates of whether state base~ on norms of political participation and transparency, and failure to brill' the Bush administration manipulated intelligence about Iraq's possession of weapons pressure On autocratic monarchies such as Saudi Arabia to inlplement democratic rl:~ 'of mass destruction to justify invading the country, an answer to this question has forms. Many Arab and non-Arab analysts also view domino democracy as a cover fOi gained significance. If the stated reason for the invasion was to remove the Ba'athist extendin~ u.S. economic influence in the region, particularly in oil-rich states such regime's weapons of mass destruction capacity, and this turned out not to be the real as Iraq. In addition, large contracts were awarded in Iraq, often without a biddill«: motivating factor, then many Americans can raise the question of whether the con- process, t6 firms such as Halliburton, Bechtel, Parsons E&C, and WorldCom. Thc:s:: 'tinuing human and material losses in Iraq serve the national interest. corporations were closely linked to Vice President Cheney and other members ofth, Another argument that was offered to explain the invasion was that the United Bus~ adnfinistration. The contracts reinforced the view that our foreign policy W;l:' States coveted Iraqi oil. Many Iraqis came to this conclusion after realizing that, in seeking to enhance American economic power in the region. addition to Saddam Hussein's Republican Palace, the United States only stationed The ii.nfluence of economic interests is a particularly important question bc:- troops outside Iraq's Ministry of Oil after having entered Baghdad in April 2003. cau.se dommo democracy is intinlately linked to a second component of recent US Those who have claimed that the March-April 2003 war was influenced by concerns pohcy, namely the spread of market economies. While opening new markets cali for Iraqi oil have focused on Iraq's position as one of the world's largest oil produc- have nlany positive repercussions for the Middle East, it can also, as has been evident ers, possessing the second largest proven reserves after Saudi Arabia, and on the close elsewhere, such as in Russia, Eastern Europe and China, lead to great discrepanciC'i 'ties between Vice President Cheney and other Bush adnunistration figures and the of wealth between econonuc and political elites and the populace at large. The ad- American oil and natural gas industries. verse effects caused by market reforms and structural adjustments may alienate large Despite its intuitive attraction as an explanation, the desire to control Iraq's oil se~ments of the populace, including intellectuals and the nationalistically nundc:d ,industry does not seem to have been the main impetus for the American invasion. nlld~~ classe~,.thereby .providing. an opening for supporters of authoritarian rule to: It will take at least three years and probably closer to five years for Iraqi oil produc- mobillZ . al li al d e co mons agamst po tIc an econonuc change. tion to reach pre-1991 Gulf War levels. Purther,much of the money that will be gen- erated trom future oil sales will need to be dedicated to reparation payments that Iraq srill owes Kuwait as well as to outstanding debts owed Russia and other countries &om the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. Given the sensitivity of the United States to WHY DID THE UNITED STATES INVADE IRAQ? accusations, even before the invasion, that it was trying to appropriate Iraqi oil, it does not seem likely that the American government will attempt to control Iraq's oil Before ex,anuning the inner workings of donuno democracy, it is useful to exanune industry. Despite the extensive advantages that they give to foreign investors, invest- the arguments that have been offered to explain why the United States invaded Iraq. ment laws that were promulgated by the Iraqi Governing Council, the transitional The stated reason for the invasion was that it constituted part of a larger global wa! government with limited powers under the United States occupation authority, on terror~sm, especially because Iraq was said to possess weapons of mass destruction specifically exempted the oil sector trom privatization and foreign ownership. that could be used in nulitary combat. Indeed, arguments were made that Iraq coul.! ,Finally,the failure of the United States to cite the extensive human rights abuses mobilize and introduce its weapons of mass destruction into combat in a very shon of Saddam Hussein and his Ba'athist regime as factors leading to the invasion rules period ot: time. this out as well as a major motivation for the invasion. Despite the fact that human In retrospect, the concern that Saddam's reginle had a significant nlilitary capa- " rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch, the United Nations, the Iraqi Na- bility to LIseweapons of 11laSSdestruction appears to have been far-fetched. While tional Congress, and INDICT have been documenting the widespread use of torture, the Iraqi regime may have possessed plans or even the capacity to produce such ,\ execution, and imprisonment without trial for an extensive period of time, no U.S. weapons, it did not have the stockpiles or delivery systems that would have made :~1administration had made tlus issue a core component of American foreign policy in 205 204 Eric M. Davis DcJlI1itloDemocracy: Challetlges to US.Foreign Policy in a Post-Saddam Middle Else the Middle East. Clearly, the Ba'ath Party's abysmal human rights record, which son1;: genuine autonomy and widespread political participation to citizens who had been would argue verged on genocide, did not playa significant role in the United States' ireed fi-om rule by authoritarian regin1es? motivations for invading Iraq. As has often been argued since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the If none of these three reasons-weapons of mass destruction, oil, or humal! Ba'athist regime, it was clearly more difficult to win the peace than it was to win rights-were critical in leading the United States to depose the Iraqi Ba'athist regime, !he combat phase of the war. In other words, domino democracy could not be what did the United States hope to accomplish by toppling Saddam Hussein? The implemented through a military strategy alone. Indeed, the very idea of establish- main mqtivation for the United States invasion of Iraq, I would argue, was the cen- ing dem.ocratic polities grounded in strong civil societies is based on the assump- terpieceof a bold vision to remake the political map of the Middle East. In this vi- tion that the populace of the respective countries in question need to be actively sion, theidestruction of the Iraqi Ba'athist regime represented the first step in a proces~ involved in creating the transition to democracy. The problems that plagued the of creating democratic governments where authoritarian regimes formerly held sway .Jstensibly democratic constitutional monarchies that Great Britain and France and replacing inefficient and corrupt state-run public sectors with market economies. iinposed during their colonial rule in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East fol- lowing the Ottoman Empire's collapse at the end of World War I decisively demonstrated that democracy is only as strong as the participation of citizens in DOMINO DEMOCRACY: THE UNDERLYING AMERICAN POLICY its daily functioning. What, then, were the assumptions underlying the notion of domino democ- racy? How viable were these assumptions, and what hypotheses aboUt the future of I call this "domino democracy" because the United States' actions in Iraq were !raq and its neighbors logically flowed fi-om these assumptions? If the assumptions viewed .assetting in motion a ripple effect in which neighboring Iran and Syria and were flawed, what could be done to rectify these flaws so that a democratic Middle possibly Saudi Arabia would feel pressured to institute the types of political and eco- .E;lStmight still become a reality? If the United States was not truly committed to nomic reforms COllunensurate with an American vision of the new Middle East. ,he policy that it publicly espoused, or was unwilling to significantly adjust its strate- With the removal of Israel's two most threatening enemies, namely the Ba'athist gic and economic interests in the region should they run counter to the American regimes in Iraq and Syria, domino democracy would likewise have a salutary in1paCt policy of democratic change, what could be done to pressure the American govern- on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It would send a strong message to Palestin. ment to live up to its commi1l11ents? ian rejectionists, both Islamists and secularists, that their policies have no future, mar- To think through these issues, I have chosen five case studies: Iraq, Iran, Syria, ginalize Palestine National Authority President Yasir Arafat once and for all, and set Palestine, and Saudi Arabia, through which to exannne the assumptions underlying in motion the political forces that would replace hin1 with a pro-Western govern- the concept of donnno democracy.

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