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PIPS) a PIPS Research Journal Conflict and Peace Studies Conflict and Peace Studies VOLUME 10 Jan - June 2018 NUMBER 1 PAKISTAN SECURITY REPORT 2017 PAK INSTITUTE FOR PEACE STUDIES (PIPS) A PIPS Research Journal Conflict and Peace Studies Copyright © PIPS 2018 All Rights Reserved No part of this journal may be reproduced in any form by photocopying or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage or retrieval systems, without prior permission in writing from the publisher of this journal. Editorial Advisory Board Khaled Ahmed Dr. Catarina Kinnvall Consulting Editor, Department of Political Science, The Friday Times, Lahore, Pakistan. Lund University, Sweden. Prof. Dr. Saeed Shafqat Dr. Adam Dolnik Director, Centre for Public Policy and Governance, Professor of Counterterrorism, George C. Forman Christian College, Lahore, Pakistan. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Germany. Marco Mezzera Tahir Abbas Senior Adviser, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Professor of Sociology, Fatih University, Centre / Norsk Ressurssenter for Fredsbygging, Istanbul, Turkey. Norway. Prof. Dr. Syed Farooq Hasnat Rasul Bakhsh Rais Pakistan Study Centre, University of the Punjab, Professor, Political Science, Lahore, Pakistan. Lahore University of Management Sciences Lahore, Pakistan. Anatol Lieven Dr. Tariq Rahman Professor, Department of War Studies, Dean, School of Education, Beaconhouse King's College, London, United Kingdom. National University, Lahore, Pakistan. Peter Bergen Senior Fellow, New American Foundation, Washington D.C., USA. Pak Institute for Peace Studies ISSN 2072-0408 (PIPS) Price: Rs 1000.00 Post Box No. 2110, US$ 45.00 Islamabad, Pakistan +92-51-8359475 The views expressed are the authors' own www.pakpips.com, and do not necessarily reflect any positions [email protected] held by the institute. TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword 11 1 Overview of security in 2017: critical challenges and recommendations 15 Muhammad Amir Rana and Safdar Sial 2 Security landscape of Pakistan in 2017 35 Safdar Sial 3 Militant landscape of Pakistan in 2017 81 Muhammad Amir Rana 4 State responses: anti-militant operations and 95 National Action Plan Safdar Sial 5 Security of CPEC in 2017 113 Anam Fatima 6 Securing Pakistan: 119 Interview with Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Nasser Khan Janjua, National Security Advisor Muhammad Amir Rana and Muhammad Ismail Khan 7 Making NACTA effective: 131 Interview with Ihsan Ghani, National Coordinator, NACTA Muhammad Amir Rana and Muhammad Ismail Khan 8 Security landscape of Punjab in 2017 137 Shahzada Irfan Ahmed 9 Balochistan security in 2017 145 Maaz Khan 10 The tale and context in making of Ansar-ul- 153 Sharia Pakistan Syed Arfeen 11 Jamaat ul Ansar ul-Sharia – a new endeavor 163 by Al-Qaeda to regain ground Dr. Farhan Zahid 12 Educated, urban and destructive: the new 171 breed of jihadis in Pakistan Dr. Farhan Zahid 13 Fate of FATA still hangs in balance 179 Tahir Khan 14 Sindh in 2017 – same old pattern 187 Zia Ur Rehman 15 Disbursing Faizabad sit-in: action and way 191 forward Imran Mukhtar and Azam Khan 16 Faith-based violence & rule of law 199 Najam U Din 17 Dark days for freedom of expression 205 Najam U Din 18 An appraisal of India-Pakistan relations in 211 2017 Ershad Mahmud and Jalaluddin Mughal 19 Annexures 233 20 Timelines 257 LIST OF ACRONYMS AJK: Azad Jammu and Kashmir HG: Hand Grenade AJIP: Awami Jamhoori Ittehad Pakistan HRCP: Human Rights Commission of ANP: Awami National Party Pakistan Arm: Army IDP: Internally Displaced Persons AQIS: Al-Qaeda in the IED: Improvised Explosive Device IndianSubcontinent ISAF: International Security Assistance ASP: Ansar ul Sharia Force ASWJ: Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat ISI: Inter Services Intelligence ATC: Anti Terrorism Courts ISIS: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ATF: Anti-Terrorism Force ISO: Imamia Student Organization BC: Balochistan Constabulary BH: Beheading ISPR: Inter-Services Public Relations BLA: Balochistan Liberation Army JI: Jamaat-e-Islami BLF: Balochistan Liberation Front JID: Joint Intelligence Directorate BNP: Balochistan National Party JQM: Jamote Qaumi Movement BNP-M: Balochistan National Party- JM: Jaish-e-Muhammad Mengal Group JuA: Jamaatul Ahrar BRA: Baloch Republican Army JuD: Jamaatud Dawa BSF: [Indian] Border Security Force JUI-F: Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl BT: Bomb Blast Kid: Kidnapping CIA: Central Intelligence Agency KP: Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa CID: Criminal Investigation LeJ: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Department LeJ-A: Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami CTDs: Counter Terrorism Departments LI: Lashkar-e-Islam [of police] LM: Landmine Blast Civ: Civilians LoC: Line of Control CPEC: China-Pakistan Economic Lvs: Levies Force Corridor Mil: Militant CVE: Counter-Violent Extremism MQM: Muttahida Qaumi Movement DGMOs: Director Generals of Military MWM: Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen Operations MDM: Muttahida Deeni Mahaz DSP: Deputy Superintendent Police NACTA: National Counter-Terrorism ETIM: East Turkistan Islamic Party Authority FATA: Federally Administered Tribal NAP: National Action Plan Areas NATO: North Atlantic Treaty FC: Frontier Corps Organization FCR: Frontier Crimes Regulation NI: Nationalist Insurgents’ Attack FIA: Federal Investigative Agency NIC: National Implementation Fr: Firing Committee [on FATA reforms] FR: Frontier Region NP: National Party NPP: National People’s Party SDLF/A: Sindhu Desh Liberation NSA: National Security Advisor Front/Army PkMAP: Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party SDRA: Sindhu Desh Revolution Army P-ml: Paramilitary Forces SM: Sipah-e-Muhammad PML-N: Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz SP: Superintendent of Police Pol: Police SSP: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan PPP: Pakistan People’s Party ST: Sunni Tehreek PTI: Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf TA: Terrorist Attack QWP: Qaumi Watan Party TNSM: Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e- RA: Rocket Attack Muhammadi RCB: Remote-controlled Bomb TTP: Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Rng: Rangers UBA: United Baloch Army SA: Suicide Attack UN: United Nations Sab: Sabotage WB: Working Boundary Sect: Sectarian METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLES The PIPS conflict/security database and archives are the basic sources relied upon for this report. The archives and the database are the outcome of a meticulous monitoring process on every relevant incident in the country on a daily basis. A regular follow up is conducted in liaison with PIPS correspondents in the regions in order to keep track of daily developments on such incidents. PIPS compiles data from sources including newspapers, magazines, journals, field sources and screening of official record. More than 30 English and Urdu dailies, magazines, and journals, and various television news channels are monitored to update the database and archives. Regional daily newspapers and weeklies from Peshawar, Quetta, Gilgit and Karachi are also monitored for details of incidents reported in the local media. Correspondents in provincial capitals are the primary source for PIPS to verify the media reports. In case of a major incident, PIPS teams consult the local administration and journalists for further details. In cases where PIPS finds it difficult to verify facts of a particular incident, it gives preference to the official statements in that regard. PIPS security reports utilize eight major variables with their respective set of sub- variables for analysis of the security situation in Pakistan. The security landscape is mapped through a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches. Quantitative methods are used, based on PIPS Conflict and Security Database, to measure the scale and level of violence. Meanwhile, the qualitative approach dilates upon changes and developments on the militants’ front, state responses to these developments and projections of future scenarios. The following eight major variables with their sub-sets of variable are used in the PIPS Security Reports: 1. Attacks: This major variable has a sub-set of five sub-variables i.e. (i) terrorist attacks including militant attacks, nationalist insurgent attacks and sectarian-related attacks; (ii) incidents of ethno-political violence; (iii) cross-border attacks; (iv) drone attacks; and (v) operational attacks by security forces against militants. Since Pakistan’s security landscape is very complicated with a diverse array of insecurity indicators in different parts of the country, the type of violence in one geographical unit is often different in its nature and dynamics from security landscape in other parts of the country. For this purpose the mentioned sub-set of variables is carefully monitored and analyzed in the security report with a view to suggest specific counter-strategy for each type of attack in these areas. 2. Clash: Another variable used is of clashes which include four sub-variables, i.e., (i) inter-tribal; (ii) sectarian; (iii) clashes between security forces and militants; and (iv) militants’ infightings. The number of such clashes and their geographic location is taken as an indicator of parallel trends unfolding simultaneously with major trends and patterns of security in different areas of the country. 3. State Reponses: It has two sub-variables: (i) security measures, and (ii) political and administrative responses. The first takes into account the security forces’ operational attacks and clashes with militants, search and hunt operations and terrorists’ arrests, etc. The second variable entails the government’s political and administrative measures to maintain law and order and reduce insecurity and violence. 4. Casualties: Casualties include both the number of people killed and injured. Casualties among civilians, militants and security
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