WHAT IT TAKES TO WIN SUCCEEDING IN 21ST CENTURY BATTLE NETWORK COMPETITIONS JOHN STILLION BRYAN CLARK Sponsored by: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Strategic Technology Office (STO) Program: STO Studies Procurement Request No. HR001135963, Program Code: GM13G Issued by DARPA/CMO under Contract No. HR0011-14-C-0028 Distribution Statement “A” (Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited) The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressly or implied, of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency or the U.S. Government. WHAT IT TAKES TO WIN: SUCCEEDING IN 21ST CENTURY BATTLE NETWORK COMPETITIONS JOHN STILLION AND BRYAN CLARK 2015 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS (CSBA) The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, nonpartisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s analysis focuses on key questions related to existing and emerging threats to U.S. national security, and its goal is to enable policymakers to make informed decisions on matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. ©2015 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. All rights reserved. ABOUT THE AUTHORS John Stillion is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Dr. Stillion is a former U.S. Air Force officer, instructor navigator, and tactical aviator. He is a Distinguished Graduate of Air Force ROTC, USAF Navigator Training, and RF-4C Tactical Aircrew Training. He previously worked at the RAND Corporation where he led multi-disciplinary study teams and analyzed a wide range of issues related to airpower and future warfare, including air operations in urban environments and against elusive targets, airbase vulnerability, combat aircrew skill acquisition and retention, tanker and airlift operations, aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and fire support to Special Operations Forces. During his time at RAND he received a number of awards for the quality of his research. Prior to joining CSBA Dr. Stillion was a Senior Analyst in the aerospace industry where he analyzed the cost-effectiveness of existing and possible future products as well as the emerging demand for advanced capabilities and production techniques. Before that he led a multi-disciplinary team of analysts and engineers at exploring advanced applications of stealthy unmanned aircraft in future conflicts. Bryan Clark is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Prior to joining CSBA in 2013, Mr. Clark was special assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations and director of his Commander’s Action Group, where he led development of Navy strategy and implemented new initiatives in electromagnetic spectrum operations, undersea warfare, expeditionary operations, and personnel and readiness management. Mr. Clark served in the Navy headquarters staff from 2004 to 2011, leading studies in the Assessment Division and participating in the 2006 and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Reviews. His areas of emphasis were modeling and simulation, strategic planning, and institutional reform and governance. Prior to retiring from the Navy in 2007, Mr. Clark was an enlisted and officer submariner, serving in afloat and ashore submarine operational and training assignments, including tours as chief engineer and operations officer at the Navy’s nuclear power training unit. Mr. Clark holds an M.S. in national security studies from the National War College and a B.S. in chemistry and philosophy from the University of Idaho. He is the recipient of the Department of the Navy Superior Service Medal and the Legion of Merit. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The research and analysis presented in this report was sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency–Strategic Technology Office (DARPA-STO). We received superb guidance and encouragement from several DARPA-STO personnel, including Dr. Aaron Lazarus, Dr. John Shaw, and Dr. Craig Lawrence. We offer our sincere thanks to all of them for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this work. Our CSBA colleagues Kamilla Gunzinger, Jacob Cohn, and Ryan Boone were instrumental in moving the report through the publication process and improving its content and aesthetics. The authors would also like to thank the Navy History and Heritage Command (NHHC) for their assistance in locating references for the Cold War history of the submarine-anti-submarine warfare competition. Contents Introduction . 1 Defining Battle Networks ....................................................1 Why Battle Network Competition Matters ........................................2 What Matters in Battle Network Competitions ....................................3 Submarines Versus Anti-Submarine Warfare . 5 Enduring Aspects of the Competition ...........................................5 The Battle of the Atlantic ...................................................7 The Cold War ...........................................................34 What Comes Next? .......................................................43 Imperatives for Future Submarine and ASW Battle Networks .........................45 Air Attack Versus Integrated Air Defense Systems . .. 47 Enduring Aspects of the Competition ..........................................47 Night Bombing in World War II: Active Electromagnetic Competition ....................49 The Cold War: The Active Electromagnetic Competition Culminates ....................74 What Comes Next? .......................................................89 Significant Insights .......................................................90 Conclusions . 93 A Framework for Analysis of Battle Networks. 95 FIGURES Figure 1. Battle of the Atlantic Convoy Routes and U-Boat Patrol Areas ................... 8 Figure 2. The German View of the Battle of the Atlantic ............................. 11 Figure 3. The Allied View of the Battle of the Atlantic ............................... 14 Figure 4. Shipping Losses off the U.S. East Coast ................................ 15 Figure 5. Useful Lifetime of Advancements in the Battle of the Atlantic EM Competitive Regime ............................................... 20 Figure 6. The ASW Battle Network for Making Submarines Ineffective. 22 Figure 7. Allied Shipping Losses to Submarines During World War I .................... 24 Figure 8. Japanese Shipping Losses to Submarines During World War II. 24 Figure 9. Convoy Losses Versus Ship Speed ..................................... 26 Figure 10. Effect of Changing Submarine and Merchant Ship Speed on Possible Submarine Angles of Approach ....................................... 27 Figure 11. Shipping Losses During the Battle of the Atlantic .......................... 28 Figure 12. Depth Charges, Mouse Trap, and Squid ................................. 30 Figure 13. Bay of Biscay Operations ............................................ 31 Figure 14. Results of Bay of Biscay Operations .................................... 32 Figure 15. Diesel Submarine Detections During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War ................ 35 Figure 16. Nuclear Submarine Detections During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War ............... 37 Figure 17. Atlantic SOSUS Array Coverage, 1958–1978 ............................. 38 Figure 18. Qualitative Representation of U.S. ASW Capabilities Versus German and Soviet Submarines ............................................. 39 Figure 19. Pacific SOSUS Array Coverage, 1958–1978 .............................. 41 Figure 20. Daylight Bombing Accuracy During World War II ............................ 50 Figure 21. Bombers Lost per Ton of Bombs Within 1,000 Feet of Aim Point ............... 51 Figure 22. Effect of 4 Percent Attrition Rate on a Force of 100 Aircraft ................... 52 Figure 23. German Knickebein Radio Beam Navigation System ........................ 53 Figure 24. X-Gerat Radio Beam Navigation System ................................. 55 Figure 25. Relative Accuracy of Knickebein and X-Gerat .............................. 56 Figure 26. Quantitative Depiction of Luftwaffe Bombing of Britain ....................... 57 Figure 27. Bomber Command Versus German Night Defenses, 1939–1945 ............... 59 Figure 28. Typical RAF Bomber Command Accuracy, Pre-1942 ......................... 61 FIGURES Figure 29. Kammhuber Line/Himmelbett System Versus Bomber Command, Early 1942 ...... 62 Figure 30. Himmelbett Box Interception Concept .................................. 62 Figure 31. Elements of the Night Bombing BNC, Early 1942 .......................... 63 Figure 32. Effect of GEE on Bomber Command Navigation and Bombing Accuracy ........... 64 Figure 33. Elements of the Night Bombing BNC, March 1942–January 1943 .............. 65 Figure 34. H2S S-Band Navigation and Targeting Radar Mounted on a Handley Page Halifax Bomber ................................................... 67 Figure 35. Radar Navigation with H2S .......................................... 68 Figure 36. Elements of the Night Bombing BNC, July 1943–January 1944 ................ 70 Figure 37. German Tactical Adapataion to Bomber Command Window Use ................ 71 Figure 38. Elements of the Night Bombing BNC, 1944 .............................. 73 Figure 39. Night Bombing BNC Discovery to First Countermeasure ...................... 74 Figure 40. Quantitative Depiction