Rebuilding Afghanistan : Counterinsurgency and Reconstruction in Operation Enduring Freedom
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Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2003-12 Rebuilding Afghanistan : counterinsurgency and reconstruction in Operation Enduring Freedom Armstrong, Bradley J. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/6234 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS REBUILDING AFGANISTAN: COUNTERINSURGENCY AND RECONSTRUCTION IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM by Bradley J. Armstrong December 2003 Thesis Advisor: Hy S. Rothstein Second Reader: Kalev I. Sepp Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 2003 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Rebuilding Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency and Reconstruction in Operation Enduring Freedom 6. AUTHOR(S) Captain Bradley J. Armstrong 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) International efforts at the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan are confronted by a paradox in their strategy for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM that has crippled their ability to locate and defeat the enemy and establish stability. In their narrowly focused pursuit of the strategy of attrition, coalition military forces have neglected the fundamental principle that guides small wars: that the protection of the population and the elimination of the influence of the insurgent forces are paramount to gathering the necessary intelligence to locate the threat. The disregard for the control of the population has eliminated the coalition’s primary source of intelligence directly impinging on its ability to locate or separate the insurgent from the population and trapping it in an operational quagmire. Additionally, international aid efforts have focused on short- term relief rather than long-term reconstruction, establishing the foundation for continued dependence and instability rather than self-sufficiency. The purpose of this thesis is not to limit or narrowly define the threat in Afghanistan as an insurgency, but to illustrate how the situation when framed in terms of an insurgency can be effectively managed and the threats eliminated to produce a stable and self-sustaining country on the world stage. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Counterinsurgency, Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom, Malay, 15. NUMBER OF Philippines, Vietnam PAGES 191 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN: COUNTERINSURGENCY AND RECONSTRUCTION IN OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM Bradley J. Armstrong Captain, United States Air Force B.A., University of Iowa, 1996 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2003 Author: Bradley J. Armstrong Approved by: Hy S. Rothstein Thesis Advisor Kalev I. Sepp Second Reader/Co-Advisor Gordon H. McCormick Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT International efforts at the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan are confronted by a paradox in their strategy for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM that has crippled their ability to locate and defeat the enemy and establish stability. In their narrowly focused pursuit of the strategy of attrition, coalition military forces have neglected the fundamental principle that guides small wars: that the protection of the population and the elimination of the influence of the insurgent forces are paramount to gathering the necessary intelligence to locate the threat. The disregard for the control of the population has eliminated the coalition’s primary source of intelligence directly impinging on its ability to locate or separate the insurgent from the population and trapping it in an operational quagmire. Additionally, international aid efforts have focused on short-term relief rather than long-term reconstruction, establishing the foundation for continued dependence and instability rather than self-sufficiency. The purpose of this thesis is not to limit or narrowly define the threat in Afghanistan as an insurgency, but to illustrate how the situation when framed in terms of an insurgency can be effectively managed and the threats eliminated to produce a stable and self-sustaining country on the world stage. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I .............................................................................................................................1 A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1 1. Tora Bora..............................................................................................4 2. 2002: Transformation..........................................................................5 a. Operation ANACONDA............................................................6 3. 2003: Insurgency ................................................................................11 B. ANALYSIS .....................................................................................................13 CHAPTER II..........................................................................................................................21 A. MALAYA........................................................................................................21 1. Analysis ...............................................................................................26 a. Input Denial ............................................................................26 b. Conversion Mechanism Destruction......................................30 c. Counterforce............................................................................31 d. Strengthening the State...........................................................32 e. Failures....................................................................................34 f. Findings...................................................................................34 B. VIETNAM ......................................................................................................35 1. Analysis ...............................................................................................48 a. Input Denial ............................................................................50 b. Conversion Mechanism Destruction......................................53 c. Counterforce............................................................................54 d. Strengthening the State...........................................................55 e. Failures....................................................................................56 f. Findings...................................................................................59 C. THE PHILIPPINES.......................................................................................60 1. Analysis ...............................................................................................74 a. Input Denial ............................................................................75 b. Conversion Mechanism Destruction......................................76 c. Counterforce............................................................................78 d. Strengthening the State...........................................................79 e. Failures....................................................................................81 f. Findings...................................................................................82 D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................83 CHAPTER III...................................................................................................................85 A. ETHNIC DIVIDES ........................................................................................86 B. WARLORDS..................................................................................................88