TRANSITION 2017 POLICY NOTES FOR THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

General Principles to Guide U.S. Middle East Policy

 AMBASSADORS JAMES F. JEFFREY AND DENNIS ROSS

all accounts, the Middle East will be a priority for the Trump administration, given its concerns By about terrorism, current U.S. military operations, and the long history of American successes and failures in the region. Unsurprisingly, much of the foreign affairs debate in the presidential campaign revolved around the region, especially in regard to responses to Islamic terrorism and Iran. Because the basic thrust of President Trump’s global foreign policy is not yet clear, proposing specific policies for the new administration in one single region would be premature. However, considering the enduring U.S. interests and assets in the Middle East, and the challenges they face, laying out broad principles to advance these interests can contribute to the public debate.

AMBASSADOR JAMES F. JEFFREY, the Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute, is a for- mer deputy national security advisor and U.S. ambassador to and .

AMBASSADOR DENNIS ROSS, the William Davidson Distinguished Fellow and counselor at The Washington Institute, formerly served as special assistant to President Obama, as National Security Council senior direc- tor for the Central Region, and as special advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. He was U.S. point man on the peace process in both the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations.

THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ NO. 31 ■ JANUARY 2017 POLICY NOTES FOR THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

HIS PAPER describes the following principles for against opponents. This policy has come under T U.S. foreign policy: pressure since 9/11, particularly in the Middle East. The Bush administration attempted a of 1. Containing Iran: Most important regional issue anti-American and extremist forces through military 2. Defeating the Islamic State (IS): Critical to regional operations intended to bring about regime change. stability The Obama administration also deviated from the traditional policy playbook by reaching out directly 3. Combating other Sunni extremist forces: Still a priority to Muslim populations, attempting rapprochement 4. Maintaining alliances: Needs work with Iran, condemning Israeli settlement and other actions, distancing itself from previous American 5. Helping resolve regional disputes: Useful, but not positions, and pivoting away from the region. critical at present Neither George W. Bush nor Barack Obama suc- 6. Exercising military power: Essential, but requires caution ceeded, and their failures, combined with the 2008 financial crisis and the disastrous outcome of the 7. Exercising economic and soft power to complement Arab Spring, produced significant shifts in U.S. public hard power: Useful, but can be oversold attitudes toward international engagement, as mea- 8. Avoiding transformational approaches: “Fixing” has sured by Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Pew proven counterproductive Research Center polls beginning in 2012. The 2016 presidential campaign reflected this change, with two Introduction of the three leading contenders, including , questioning longstanding U.S. global policy. NE OF the most urgent tasks for the Trump admin- Indeed, while Trump’s foreign policy could differ in Oistration will be to chart America’s way forward both rhetoric and substance from traditional foreign in the Middle East. Over the past two administra- policy, it nevertheless likely will not deviate too far tions, no region has consumed more U.S. resources from prior American experience, assuming it is nei- and generated more controversy than the broader ther rigorously isolationist nor aggressively transfor- Middle East—from to the Bosporus, from mational. And in the Middle East, general principles Mali to the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Compounding can be developed to guide U.S. policy. this , the new administration will inherit three active U.S. combat operations with no immediate relief in Interests sight—in , against the Islamic State, and against al-Qaeda—as well as one “" N A 2013 speech to the UN General Assembly, Presi- with Iran. According to the U.S. National Intelli- I dent Obama aptly summed up U.S. interests in the gence Council 2016 Global Trends Report: “Politi- region: supporting allies and partners, ensuring the cal upheaval will characterize the next five years in free flow of hydrocarbons, countering the spread of the Middle East and North Africa.” weapons of mass destruction, and countering ter- The difficulties of thinking through a regional rorism. In that same speech, he specifically ruled policy for a new administration are compounded in out promoting democracy as a core U.S. interest to 2017. For most of the past century, U.S. regional be advanced by the use of force. Each of these inter- policies have largely flowed from global U.S. pol- ests, as discussed below, is as valid now as then. icy based on what Americans understand as uni- And the new president has already signaled that he versal values: U.S. leadership of a global collec- will not elevate democracy promotion as a core U.S. tive security system to promote liberal legal, trade, interest. If anything, the incoming Trump administra- and monetary principles, integration of individual tion has clearly indicated a tilt toward U.S. interests, states into that system, and defense of that system not toward values, in its foreign policy.

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Allies and partners bring assets to any global Assets system, and are valuable “ends in themselves” in anything resembling the current global order. The ESPITE the Russian intervention in , the United genius of the American world role since 1941 has DStates has extraordinary military, diplomatic, and, been to share leadership and responsibility, rather to a lesser degree, economic capabilities and rela- than—as with Rome and Imperial Britain—running tionships in the region, and consequently much free- the system solo. Such collective security leverages dom of maneuver. In relative terms, the American power, usually allowing the United States and its local partners are more dominant in the to play the dominant role in multiple regions, but Middle East than in East Asia or Europe. Through- with help from others and thus without exhausting out the region, U.S. forces maintain more than its resources. There is a cost: such a system requires 70,000 troops backed by significant naval power. America to support its partners. Failing to respond The U.S. Navy has basing or other military coop- to their concerns, even if they do not endanger the eration agreements with thirteen countries, from United States immediately, undercuts the system. Pakistan to Egypt, and is carrying out operations in Syria, Libya, and African countries to the south. With (In his confirmation testimony, Gen. James Mattis, these thirteen states, the United States has active Trump’s nominee for defense secretary, emphasized military sales programs in the hundreds of billions of the importance of the U.S. alliance structure as an dollars. Together, the U.S. partners Turkey, Pakistan, essential part of America’s strength.) Egypt, , the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi According to the International Energy Agency, Arabia offer military capabilities far beyond those the proportion of total global energy generated of any potential regional rival or coalition. Two of by hydrocarbons will remain at about 50 percent. these states have or are thought to have nuclear In its 2016 World Energy Outlook report, the IEA weapons. Together, they control fully or partially all forecasts that the global oil supply will be increas- the major regional sea chokepoints—the Darda- ingly concentrated in the Middle East and that oil nelles, Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, and Bab al- prices likely will rise gradually by 2020, restoring Mandab Strait—and U.S. air access in these areas purchasing power to the Middle East. While the allows coverage for much of the region. region’s natural gas holdings are not as great as Together, the six GCC states and Iraq produce its oil reserves, it will become an important interna- roughly 25 percent of the world’s crude and a much tional gas exporter. larger percentage of internationally traded oil. The The threat from various Islamic terrorist organi- entire global economy, including ultimately that of zations to both the United States and the interna- an energy-independent United States, relies on that tional community has hardly decreased over the flow. Separately, Israel is developing extraordinary last decade, will persist even if IS loses its territorial natural gas resources, and Turkey is increasingly a base, and thus will likely remain the preeminent for- Eurasian oil and gas transit zone. Beyond weapons eign policy preoccupation of the American public. sales, the overall U.S. trade relationship with the Finally, while the WMD threat from Iran has been region is limited, but U.S. energy companies play temporarily checked, after 2026 the Islamic Repub- an important role there, and regional leaders widely lic can—as articulated by the Joint Comprehensive seek U.S. technology and education resources. Plan of Action (JCPOA)—increase the size and enhance the capability of its enrichment infrastruc- U.S. diplomatic power rests on a number of important ture. Moreover, given the likelihood of U.S. confron- assets: tation with North and its record of supplying „„ the military relationships outlined above unsavory Middle East actors with nuclear capabili- ties, constraining WMD proliferation will remain an „„ success since the 1970s in containing threats to the obvious American interest. region—the Soviet intervention in the Yom Kippur

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War (1973) and in Afghanistan, Iran’s counterof- stances include ideologies of violent extremism…and fensive into Iraq and the “Tanker ” (1987–88), fragile states…” (While the report focuses on Arab Iraqi president ’s aggression states, Afghanistan and Pakistan have similar prob- against (1990), and the campaigns against lems. Iran, Turkey, and Israel are far more stable.) al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State. Since the late 1970s, the Middle East has endured a seemingly unending succession of civil and „„ promoting peace between Israel and Arab states international confrontations, with dramatic conse- and the Palestinians, and quences for . Although other „„ acting against Iraqi, Libyan, Syrian, and–at least regions, from Southeast Asia to Central America, temporarily–Iranian WMD threats. the Balkans, and sub-Saharan Africa, have expe- rienced violence and outside intervention since the A final asset is the absence of a regional near-peer 1960s, most have gradually recovered. By con- competitor. While the region has dangerous dys- trast, the only brief respite from Middle East crises functional elements and challenges, the potential occurred in the mid-1990s. The Arab Spring, ini- strengths of U.S. partners, let alone when aug- tially seen as a way out of the region’s problems, mented by the United States itself, far outweigh has created even further disarray, notably in Egypt, those forces challenging regional order. Syria, Libya, and Yemen. is again active in the Middle East with its military Faced with chronically unstable governments operations, UN veto, and oil diplomacy, but its and societies, regional and international actors military capabilities, diplomatic ties, and economic have been hampered in their attempts to respond weight are greatly overshadowed by those of the to threats to regional order. Over the past fifteen United States. years, these threats have come primarily from Islamic transnational movements, including, within Challenges Sunni Islam, al-Qaeda and various local offshoots, the Taliban, and, since 2013, the Islamic State. The HE MIDDLE EAST faces two primary challenges to threat from Shia Islam differs, given its focus on stability and thus U.S. interests: T Iran, which is both an expansionist “anti-status-quo” „„ dysfunctional governmental and economic systems state and a champion of regional Shiite popula- and Islamic extremism, manifest in Sunni violent tions based on shared religion. In fact, Iran’s use of movements, and Shiite militias to gain leverage in the region and to threaten Arab governments is one of the burgeon- „„ Iran and its use of Shiite militias. ing threats to state security in the Middle East. The two challenges complement each other. Islamic The Sunni and Shiite movements alike are impla- extremism with its ideological and transnational cably anti-Western and seek not just to combat but nature undercuts “Westphalian” state systems, while to undermine regional nation-states. With Sunni dysfunctional governance provides opportunities extremist movements, the goal is a regional caliph- for extremist entities to recruit adherents and estab- ate replacing individual states, a goal partly, if likely lish roots. temporarily, achieved by the Islamic State in parts of These dysfunctionalities have been repeatedly Syria and Iraq. Iran, meanwhile, subverts states by documented, particularly in the series of Arab Human establishing alternate local Shiite military and politi- Development Reports published by the UN Develop- cal structures more loyal to Tehran than to their own ment Programme (UNDP). The 2016 edition reiter- governments. Both movements sponsor terrorism, ates findings from previous reports, including “weak seek WMD, and risk propelling the region into a economic competitiveness and the failure to estab- Sunni-Shiite conflict that would endanger all U.S. lish good governance” and notes that “risky circum- interests in the region.

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These challenges are exacerbated by two further issues: „„ prospects for a long-term American presence in Iraq; and „„ the longstanding alienation of Islamic populations from the West, particularly the United States, based „„ U.S. responses to the Saudi-led effort against the on specific policies, including military interventions Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. and support for Israel, and a general belief that On the nuclear front, options both within and outside the West wishes ill to the world’s Muslim communi- the JCPOA are available to press Iran. A pullout ties; and from that agreement would raise two questions: „„ the inability of regional states to organize collectively. what would replace it, and would that decision com- plicate the broader mission of checking, along with The result is that support for U.S. policies is often muted, an international coalition, Iranian expansionism. A and the “whole” of the region's strength is less than sure outcome of withdrawing from the deal would the sum of its parts. The latter puts a premium on be to turn the spotlight on U.S. actions, rather than U.S. leadership; the former limits it. harmful or destabilizing Iranian behaviors. Smart strategy would continue to make the issue Iran’s Principles threatening policies, not our walking away from the JCPOA. HE FOLLOWING general principles for American Additionally, an immediate challenge for the Tforeign policy in the region reflect U.S. interests, administration is fashioning a credible and effective assets, and challenges, and provide a framework response to Iranian provocations, from terrorist acts for decisionmaking. Specific U.S. policies, as well and seizure of American citizens to confrontations as priorities among those laid out here, will vary with U.S. ships and aircraft. in accordance with the general foreign policy adopted by the administration. 2. DEFEATING THE ISLAMIC STATE ★ Critical to regional stability 1. CONTAINING IRAN Given the high costs borne especially by Iraq in ★ Most important regional issue the fight against the Islamic State, and the threat Iran, as noted earlier, is attempting to expand its of further IS-related attacks within the region and power by targeting various Arab states (Bahrain, around the globe, defeating the jihadist group is an Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen) along with Afghani- urgent imperative. Evidence of the organization’s stan. The Syrian conflict demonstrated the impact resiliency includes stalemates with IS in Mosul until of Iranian policy in the region and beyond, as its very recently and against Turkish forces in al-Bab; encouragement of President Bashar al-Assad’s no- IS’s recapture of ancient Palmyra (Tadmur, Syria) compromise position contributed to the rise of the from a Russian-supported Syrian-Iranian force; Islamic State, near-record slaughter of civilians, a and attacks in Berlin and Istanbul. Thus, U.S. com- humanitarian crisis affecting Europe, and the rein- manders speak of up to two more years to defeat troduction of Russian forces into the region. More- the group. over, until Iran is successfully contained, the region Given the risks of such a long-lasting threat— risks descent into deeper sectarianism and a cata- including the need to divert resources from the Ira- strophic Sunni-Shiite conflict in general. nian challenge—the administration should review its military options, including the possibility of using Key issues to consider here include U.S. ground combat units, as well as changes to „„ potential U.S. responses to the Russia-Turkey-Iran rules of engagement and tactics. The administra- in Syria and to the Turkish enclave in tion must also draw Sunni governments into sup- northern Syria; porting the reconstruction of areas liberated from

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IS—as well as promoting Sunni inclusion—to pre- would restore the greatness lost to the region. Saudi vent the emergence of the conditions that helped success has far-reaching implications not just for give rise to IS in the first place. Saudi Arabia but for the region as well.

3. COMBATING OTHER SUNNI 5. HELPING RESOLVE REGIONAL DISPUTES EXTREMIST FORCES ★ Useful, but not critical at present ★ Still a priority The United States has a long tradition of diplomatic With the exception of the Taliban in Afghanistan, engagement to resolve regional disputes and man- direct U.S. involvement against other Sunni extrem- age frozen conflicts (Israeli-Palestinian, Pakistani- ists is limited. Beyond drone and air strikes and some Indian, Turkish-Kurdish, Turkish-Greek, Western Special Operations raids, the major effort involves Sahara, ) as an element of regional security. training, equipping, and advising local forces from Such efforts earn the United States respect from North Africa to Pakistan against al-Qaeda and its the governments in question and in the West, and local franchises. This endeavor has been well sup- remain a significant element of regional U.S. policy. ported by the Obama administration, but a surprise But in the face of the four challenges just outlined, breakout by al-Qaeda in some locale is possible. these efforts should be seen as secondary.

4. MAINTAINING ALLIANCES 6. EXERCISING MILITARY POWER ★ Needs work ★ Essential, but requires caution Current relations between Washington and many of U.S. diplomacy must be backed by military force, its regional partners are weak, a situation stemming which is usually aimed at achieving deterrence largely from the perception that the United States has through presence and partner support but at times not responded adequately to threats ranging from requires more-direct engagement. The use of mili- Iran and Syria to the Islamic State. More effective tary force for limited “restore the status quo” mis- action against these threats will rectify much of this sions in the region has been consistently success- problem. But establishing better policies takes time. ful (, Afghanistan in the 1980s, the Iran-Iraq Tanker War, Kuwait liberation, defense of In the short term, these friends want high-level reas- Kurdistan, defeat of the Taliban/al-Qaeda), and is surances and responses to specific irritants, including usually employed with local partners and surrogates, with U.S. air and naval support. But the success of, „„ governmental and human rights issues with Egypt, and domestic support for, American ground-force „„ settlements and negotiations with Israel, and engagement in civil wars and regime change has been limited, as in Beirut, Somalia, Afghanistan, „„ the Fethullah Gulen extradition issue with Turkey. and Iraq. Once such bilateral ties are improved, Washing- ton could more easily nudge partners toward the 7. EXERCISING ECONOMIC AND SOFT reforms needed to address the problems docu- POWER TO COMPLEMENT HARD POWER mented in the UNDP report. ★ Useful, but can be oversold A more clearly articulated policy emphasizing Assistance, trade, and other forms of soft power U.S. stakes in the success of the Saudi National can augment classic diplomatic and security poli- Transformation Program (aka Vision 2030) is also cies, but their strategic value in the region is limited. warranted. Until now, no Arab country has pro- Most important are emergency relief and assistance duced a successful model of development, leading efforts, such as U.S. support for Syrian refugees. to a constant stream of pretenders espousing either These actions constitute a humanitarian “good secular or and claiming they in themselves,” strengthen stability in the affected

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countries and Western Europe, and win esteem. or as an alternative to “hard” diplomatic and mili- U.S. engagement in the energy sector by American tary power. firms in the Gulf and Iraq, and U.S. government support for the Iraqi hydrocarbons sector, Turkey 8. AVOIDING TRANSFORMATIONAL as an energy transit hub, or eastern Mediterranean APPROACHES gas fields also directly strengthen partners and the ★ “Fixing” has proven counterproductive global economy. Other programs, from commercial As discussed thus far, the region suffers from promotion through governmental capacity building long-term social, economic, and governmen- to public diplomacy, have a limited impact on either tal problems exacerbated by, and in turn exac- development of states and societies or attitudes erbating, security threats and extremist move- toward the United States. As noted earlier in the ments. The temptation, thus, is strong to “fix” the piece, U.S. trade with the region is limited, consist- underlying sources of seemingly constant crises ing from the United States mainly of weapons, air- and threats, and the previous two U.S. admin- craft, and high-tech and agricultural products, and istrations have tried to address these underlying from the Middle East mainly of oil—although to a sources in dramatically different ways. Neither lessening degree. Meanwhile, U.S. messaging has worked, and both may have made the region done little to shift public attitudes toward America, less stable. Moreover, emphasizing transforma- and the effects of U.S. counterextremism messag- tional “end solutions” can divert resources from, ing are disputed. Given this ambiguous record, the and thus undercut, difficult but feasible regional United States and its regional partners should not engagement focused on the myriad immediate perceive these areas as central to bilateral relations, security challenges.

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