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TRANSITION 2017 POLICY NOTES FOR THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION General Principles to Guide U.S. Middle East Policy AMBASSADORS JAMES F. JEFFREY AND DENNIS ROSS all accounts, the Middle East will be a priority for the Trump administration, given its concerns about terrorism, current U.S. military operations, and the long history of American successes By and failures in the region. Unsurprisingly, much of the foreign affairs debate in the presidential campaign revolved around the region, especially in regard to responses to Islamic terrorism and Iran. Because the basic thrust of President Trump’s global foreign policy is not yet clear, proposing specific policies for the new administration in one single region would be premature. However, considering the enduring U.S. interests and assets in the Middle East, and the challenges they face, laying out broad principles to advance these interests can contribute to the public debate. AMBASSADOR JAMES F. JEFFREY, the Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute, is a for- mer deputy national security advisor and U.S. ambassador to Turkey and Iraq. AMBASSADOR DENNIS ROSS, the William Davidson Distinguished Fellow and counselor at The Washington Institute, formerly served as special assistant to President Obama, as National Security Council senior direc- tor for the Central Region, and as special advisor to Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. He was U.S. point man on the peace process in both the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations. THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY ■ NO. 31 ■ JANUARY 2017 POLICY NOTES FOR THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION HIS PAPER describes the following principles for against opponents. This policy has come under T U.S. foreign policy: pressure since 9/11, particularly in the Middle East. The Bush administration attempted a rollback of 1. Containing Iran: Most important regional issue anti-American and extremist forces through military 2. Defeating the Islamic State (IS): Critical to regional operations intended to bring about regime change. stability The Obama administration also deviated from the traditional policy playbook by reaching out directly 3. Combating other Sunni extremist forces: Still a priority to Muslim populations, attempting rapprochement 4. Maintaining alliances: Needs work with Iran, condemning Israeli settlement and other actions, distancing itself from previous American 5. Helping resolve regional disputes: Useful, but not positions, and pivoting away from the region. critical at present Neither George W. Bush nor Barack Obama suc- 6. Exercising military power: Essential, but requires caution ceeded, and their failures, combined with the 2008 financial crisis and the disastrous outcome of the 7. Exercising economic and soft power to complement Arab Spring, produced significant shifts in U.S. public hard power: Useful, but can be oversold attitudes toward international engagement, as mea- 8. Avoiding transformational approaches: “Fixing” has sured by Chicago Council on Global Affairs and Pew proven counterproductive Research Center polls beginning in 2012. The 2016 presidential campaign reflected this change, with two Introduction of the three leading contenders, including Donald Trump, questioning longstanding U.S. global policy. NE OF the most urgent tasks for the Trump admin- Indeed, while Trump’s foreign policy could differ in Oistration will be to chart America’s way forward both rhetoric and substance from traditional foreign in the Middle East. Over the past two administra- policy, it nevertheless likely will not deviate too far tions, no region has consumed more U.S. resources from prior American experience, assuming it is nei- and generated more controversy than the broader ther rigorously isolationist nor aggressively transfor- Middle East—from Pakistan to the Bosporus, from mational. And in the Middle East, general principles Mali to the Bab al-Mandab Strait. Compounding can be developed to guide U.S. policy. this , the new administration will inherit three active U.S. combat operations with no immediate relief in Interests sight—in Afghanistan, against the Islamic State, and against al-Qaeda—as well as one “frozen conflict" N A 2013 speech to the UN General Assembly, Presi- with Iran. According to the U.S. National Intelli- I dent Obama aptly summed up U.S. interests in the gence Council 2016 Global Trends Report: “Politi- region: supporting allies and partners, ensuring the cal upheaval will characterize the next five years in free flow of hydrocarbons, countering the spread of the Middle East and North Africa.” weapons of mass destruction, and countering ter- The difficulties of thinking through a regional rorism. In that same speech, he specifically ruled policy for a new administration are compounded in out promoting democracy as a core U.S. interest to 2017. For most of the past century, U.S. regional be advanced by the use of force. Each of these inter- policies have largely flowed from global U.S. pol- ests, as discussed below, is as valid now as then. icy based on what Americans understand as uni- And the new president has already signaled that he versal values: U.S. leadership of a global collec- will not elevate democracy promotion as a core U.S. tive security system to promote liberal legal, trade, interest. If anything, the incoming Trump administra- and monetary principles, integration of individual tion has clearly indicated a tilt toward U.S. interests, states into that system, and defense of that system not toward values, in its foreign policy. 2 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY JEFFREY AND ROSS . GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY Allies and partners bring assets to any global Assets system, and are valuable “ends in themselves” in anything resembling the current global order. The ESPITE the Russian intervention in Syria, the United genius of the American world role since 1941 has DStates has extraordinary military, diplomatic, and, been to share leadership and responsibility, rather to a lesser degree, economic capabilities and rela- than—as with Rome and Imperial Britain—running tionships in the region, and consequently much free- the system solo. Such collective security leverages dom of maneuver. In relative terms, the United States American power, usually allowing the United States and its local partners are more dominant in the to play the dominant role in multiple regions, but Middle East than in East Asia or Europe. Through- with help from others and thus without exhausting out the region, U.S. forces maintain more than its resources. There is a cost: such a system requires 70,000 troops backed by significant naval power. America to support its partners. Failing to respond The U.S. Navy has basing or other military coop- to their concerns, even if they do not endanger the eration agreements with thirteen countries, from United States immediately, undercuts the system. Pakistan to Egypt, and is carrying out operations in Syria, Libya, and African countries to the south. With (In his confirmation testimony, Gen. James Mattis, these thirteen states, the United States has active Trump’s nominee for defense secretary, emphasized military sales programs in the hundreds of billions of the importance of the U.S. alliance structure as an dollars. Together, the U.S. partners Turkey, Pakistan, essential part of America’s strength.) Egypt, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi According to the International Energy Agency, Arabia offer military capabilities far beyond those the proportion of total global energy generated of any potential regional rival or coalition. Two of by hydrocarbons will remain at about 50 percent. these states have or are thought to have nuclear In its 2016 World Energy Outlook report, the IEA weapons. Together, they control fully or partially all forecasts that the global oil supply will be increas- the major regional sea chokepoints—the Darda- ingly concentrated in the Middle East and that oil nelles, Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, and Bab al- prices likely will rise gradually by 2020, restoring Mandab Strait—and U.S. air access in these areas purchasing power to the Middle East. While the allows coverage for much of the region. region’s natural gas holdings are not as great as Together, the six GCC states and Iraq produce its oil reserves, it will become an important interna- roughly 25 percent of the world’s crude and a much tional gas exporter. larger percentage of internationally traded oil. The The threat from various Islamic terrorist organi- entire global economy, including ultimately that of zations to both the United States and the interna- an energy-independent United States, relies on that tional community has hardly decreased over the flow. Separately, Israel is developing extraordinary last decade, will persist even if IS loses its territorial natural gas resources, and Turkey is increasingly a base, and thus will likely remain the preeminent for- Eurasian oil and gas transit zone. Beyond weapons eign policy preoccupation of the American public. sales, the overall U.S. trade relationship with the Finally, while the WMD threat from Iran has been region is limited, but U.S. energy companies play temporarily checked, after 2026 the Islamic Repub- an important role there, and regional leaders widely lic can—as articulated by the Joint Comprehensive seek U.S. technology and education resources. Plan of Action (JCPOA)—increase the size and enhance the capability of its enrichment infrastruc- U.S. diplomatic power