may 2013 . Vol 6 . Issue 5

Contents The Pakistani Taliban’s

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 The Pakistani Taliban’s Karachi Karachi Network Network By Zia Ur Rehman By Zia Ur Rehman

Reports 5 A Review of the French-led Military Campaign in Northern Mali By Derek Henry Flood 9 Mali’s Challenges Post-French Intervention By Anouar Boukhars 13 The Significance of Taliban Shari`a Courts in Afghanistan By Jami Forbes 16 Mexico’s New Strategy to Combat Drug Cartels: Evaluating the National Gendarmerie By Peter Chalk 18 Morocco’s Stability in the Wake of the Arab Spring By Camille Tawil

21 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

An injured child is carried to a hospital after the TTP tried to kill a secular political candidate in Karachi on May 11. - AFP/ Getty Images n the run-up to Pakistan’s general militants have increasingly moved to elections in May 2013, Tehrik-i- this bustling commercial hub to escape Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants Pakistani military operations and U.S. displayed their might in the drone strikes. Although the TTP’s Icountry’s largest city of Karachi. On May movement to Karachi has been visible 3, the TTP assassinated Sadiq Zaman since at least 2009,3 the group began Khattak, a candidate from the secular to escalate violent activities in June Awami National Party (ANP).1 On May 2012, threatening to destabilize one of About the CTC Sentinel 11, election day, TTP militants tried to Pakistan’s preeminent cities—home to The Combating Terrorism Center is an assassinate ANP candidate Amanullah the country’s central bank and stock independent educational and research Mehsud by detonating a powerful bomb exchange.4 Today, evidence suggests institution based in the Department of Social that killed 11 people in the city’s Landhi Sciences at the United States Military Academy, neighborhood.2 West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses 3 For the past decade, Afghan and Pakistani Taliban fac- the Center’s global network of scholars and Far from their traditional home in tions have used Karachi for fundraising purposes. Af- practitioners to understand and confront Pakistan’s Federally Administered ter Pakistan’s military operations in the Swat Valley in contemporary threats posed by terrorism and Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber 2009—as well as operations in South Waziristan Agency other forms of political violence. Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP), TTP and Mohmand Agency—TTP militants expanded opera- tions in Karachi. The scale of their operations increased dramatically beginning in June 2012. The views expressed in this report are those of 1 “Taliban Claim Responsibility: ANP Candidate, Son Shot 4 Karachi generates at least 60% of national revenue. For the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, Dead in Karachi,” Dawn, May 4, 2013. details, see Declan Walsh and Zia Ur Rehman, “Taliban the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 2 “Poll-Related Violence Claims 38 Lives,” Dawn, May 12, Spread Terror in Karachi as the New Gang in Town,” New 2013. York Times, March 28, 2013; Zia Ur Rehman, “Taliban

1 may 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 5 that entire Pashtun neighborhoods in can find sanctuaries in Pashtun Hakimullah Mehsud, and the second Karachi are under the influence of TTP neighborhoods.10 A number of other one reports to TTP South Waziristan militants.5 In October 2012, a report militant groups operate in the city—such chief Waliur Rehman Mehsud.16 Both submitted to Pakistan’s Supreme Court as Jaysh-i-Muhammad, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, leaders belong to the Mehsud tribe, and claimed that 7,000 TTP militants have Jammatul Furqan, Harkat-ul-Jihad- within the TTP they each have their own infiltrated Karachi.6 Islami, and Jundullah—some of which are militias but share the same agenda.17 sectarian in nature and generally share This article identifies the various TTP the TTP’s more radical outlook.11 In the The leadership structure of the TTP factions operating in the city, explains early stages of the TTP’s movement to Mehsud faction in Karachi is relatively how the TTP uses extortion to raise Karachi, the group’s primary purpose unknown. TTP militants and Mehsud funds in Karachi, shows how the group was for fundraising, as well as rest and tribal elders, however, claim that is targeting secular political parties and recuperation.12 Beginning in June 2012, Hakimullah Mehsud appointed Qari law enforcement, and then reveals the however, the group escalated its violent Yar Muhammad as the TTP’s Karachi implications of these developments. fundraising tactics and increasingly chief and Sher Khan as the operational It finds that the TTP has increased its attacked secular politicians and law commander.18 Waliur Rehman Mehsud influence in Karachi and is escalating enforcement personnel.13 reportedly appointed Khan Zaman violent activities—a trend that could Mehsud as his Karachi commander.19 negatively impact Karachi’s economy As TTP militants moved into Karachi, Other Karachi commanders for Waliur and put the city’s security at risk. they organized into three factions: the Rehman’s faction include Naimatullah Mehsud faction, the Swat faction and Mehsud, Abid Mehsud and Ghazan The TTP’s Karachi Network the Mohmand faction. All three factions Gul.20 Naimatullah Mehsud, the chief for Since 2009, TTP militants have operate from Pashtun neighborhoods in Sohrab Goth, was killed in the Lasi Goth moved from FATA and the KP to Karachi.14 These areas include Ittehad area of Sohrab Goth during a Pakistani Karachi. Security analysts attribute Town, Mingophir, Kunwari Colony, paramilitary operation on April 5, this migration to Pakistan’s military Pashtun Abad, Pipri, Gulshen-e-Buner, 2013.21 His successor is unknown. operations in the country’s northwest Metrovele, Pathan Colony, Frontier as well as increasingly frequent Colony and settlements in the Sohrab Both TTP Mehsud factions are active and deadly U.S. drone strikes in Goth area.15 in Mehsud tribe dominated suburban FATA.7 Karachi is attractive to the neighborhoods in Karachi.22 Before June TTP because it is Pakistan’s largest The most powerful TTP faction in 2012, these militants operated under the city—with approximately 20 million Karachi is dominated by the Mehsud cover of political and religious parties to people—and is home to many different tribe of South Waziristan. The avoid the attention of law enforcement ethnic and linguistic groups, making TTP Mehsud faction in Karachi is agencies, but now they have brazenly it easier to operate clandestinely.8 organizationally divided into two formed several organizations in Pashtun More significantly, approximately five groups: one is loyal to TTP chief neighborhoods. These organizations, million Pashtuns9—the ethnic group such as the Sohrab Goth-based Insaf to which almost all Taliban belong— 10 Personal interview, Sohail Khattak, a journalist based Aman Committee (Committee for Justice live in Karachi, and tribal militants in Karachi who has covered militancy in the city exten- and Peace), are increasingly arbitrating sively, Karachi, Pakistan, April 12, 2013. small disputes among Mehsud tribesmen Bringing Their War to Streets of Karachi,” Friday Times, 11 Amir Mir, “Karachi Taken Hostage by 25 Jihadi over property, family feuds, and August 10, 2012; “Karachi Contributes 60-70pc of Rev- Groups,” The News International, November 5, 2012. business matters according to Shari`a 23 enue,” The Nation, July 25, 2010. 12 Zia Ur Rehman, “Taliban Recruiting and Fundraising (Islamic law). Due to the long delays of 5 Rehman, “Taliban Bringing Their War to Streets of in Karachi,” CTC Sentinel 5:7 (2012); personal interview, Karachi.” Chaudhry Aslam Khan, senior Karachi police official, 16 Personal interview, TTP associate in Karachi who 6 “SC Orders IG Sindh, Officials to Submit Report on Karachi, Pakistan, February 25, 2013; personal inter- identified himself as “Mohsin,” Karachi, Pakistan, April 7,000 Taliban Infiltrating Karachi,” Express Tribune, view, TTP associate in Karachi who identified himself as 8, 2013. October 3, 2012; Fahim Zaman and Naziha Syed Ali, “Mohsin,” Karachi, Pakistan, April 8, 2013. 17 Some media reports suggest that the two leaders are “Taliban in Karachi: The Real Story,” Dawn, March 31, 13 Personal interview, Shahi Syed, Sindh president of on poor terms due to prior disputes over TTP leadership 2013; “Taliban Flex Muscle in Karachi Ahead of Pakistan Awami National Party and a member of Pakistani Sen- succession. See “A New Pakistani Taliban Chief Emerg- Vote,” Agence France-Presse, May 11, 2013. ate, Karachi, Pakistan, April 7, 2013. Syed said that before ing?” Dawn, December 6, 2012. 7 Syed Aarfeen, “Karachi Main Security Idray Baihis, June 2012, there were only a few cases of the TTP threat- 18 Personal interview, TTP associate in Karachi who Mukhbar Qatal, Intelligence Khatm Hogai,” Daily Jang ening Pashtun traders and leaders at the organizational identified himself as “Mohsin,” Karachi, Pakistan, April [Karachi], February 2, 2013; Ali Arqam, “The Taliban in level. For more details, see Zia Ur Rehman, “Taliban Col- 8, 2013; personal interview, former leader of the ANP Karachi?” Pakistan Today, April 4, 2013; personal inter- lect Funds Through Extortion, Forced Zakat, Officials from the Mehsud clan, Karachi, Pakistan, April 12, 2013. view, Chaudhry Aslam Khan, senior Karachi police of- Say,” Central Asia Online, August 1, 2012; personal inter- 19 Ibid. ficial,Karachi, Pakistan, February 25, 2013. view, TTP associate in Karachi who identified himself as 20 Ibid. 8 Salman Masood, “New Exodus Fuels Concerns in Paki- “Mohsin,” Karachi, Pakistan, April 8, 2013. 21 “Taliban Commander Killed in Sohrab Goth Raid,” stan,” New York Times, May 15, 2009; personal interview, 14 Zia Ur Rehman, “Karachi Police Continue Crackdown The News International, April 6, 2013; “‘TTP Man’ Killed Chaudhry Aslam Khan, senior Karachi police official, on TTP,” Central Asia Online, December 3, 2012. in Lasi Goth,” Dawn, April 6, 2013. Karachi, Pakistan, February 25, 2013. 15 Personal interview, Sohail Khattak, a journalist based 22 Zaman and Ali. 9 Farrukh Saleem, “Why Karachi is Bleeding,” The News in Karachi who has covered militancy in the city exten- 23 “‘TTP Man’ Arrested in Sohrab Goth,” Dawn, April 11, International, October 21, 2010. sively, Karachi, Pakistan, April 12, 2013; Aarfeen. 2013; Salis bin Perwaiz, “‘Commander’ who Recruited 50

2 may 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 5 working within Pakistan’s state judicial Unlike the Mehsud faction, however, the in Afghanistan have been forced to system, some find the TTP’s arbitration Swat faction does not offer arbitration pay thousands of dollars in protection methods more attractive.24 services to settle family and business money to avoid being targeted by the disputes in Karachi.31 TTP.39 Another Taliban faction in Karachi is largely comprised of militants from The Mohmand chapter of the TTP has Some argue that the TTP escalated its the Swat Valley who are loyal to TTP also formed its own faction in Karachi, fundraising efforts due to a shortage Swat chief Maulana Fazlullah. The where it primarily extorts workers of money in the wake of anti-terrorism commander for the Swat militants in who have families in Mohmand financing measures taken by Pakistani Karachi is unknown, but anti-Taliban Agency.32 TTP Mohmand chief Abdul authorities, which have restricted the elders in Swat allege that the Karachi- Wali (popularly known as Omar TTP’s sources of income from abroad.40 based group is mainly led by Ibn-e- Khalid) and spokesman Ikramullah In response, TTP leaders in the tribal Aqeel (also known as Khog) and Sher Mohmand developed the network to regions reportedly directed their Muhammad (also known as Yaseen).25 raise money.33 Qari Shakeel, the deputy Karachi-based operatives to collect Both of these men are wanted by the to Abdul Wali, calls the Karachi workers funds through extortion, kidnap-for- authorities in Swat. TTP commander himself, threatening to kill their Ibn-e-Amin established the Karachi relatives in Mohmand if they refuse to “If the group’s attacks on chapter of the TTP’s Swat faction three pay protection money.34 The network, and a half years ago in the tribal areas.26 led by TTP commander Haleem Syed secular society and law A U.S. drone killed Ibn-e-Amin in in Karachi, has already killed several enforcement continue, it the Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency in traders who refused to pay.35 December 2010.27 could threaten stability in TTP Extortion Schemes in Karachi a city that earns 60-70% Beginning in 2011, Swat militants Since June 2012, the TTP factions in killed dozens of anti-Taliban elders and Karachi have become more brazen and of Pakistan’s national political figures from Swat who were violent. Dozens of truckers in Karachi revenue.” traveling to or living in Karachi.28 In whose families live in South Waziristan, June 2012, however, they began to kill Mohmand and Khyber tribal agencies local ANP leaders in Karachi as well.29 have paid tens of thousands of dollars Sher Shah Khan, a parliamentarian during the last year to free their family ransom, as well as bank heists.41 In the elected from Swat, alleged in 2012 that members from TTP militants.36 As part first four months of 2013, for example, “a number of other Swati political and of these extortion rackets, TTP militants 11 bank robberies netted approximately social figures have also been killed in often threaten a Karachi-based worker, $800,000, and authorities believe that the streets of Karachi by militants loyal saying that their fellow militants in most of the robberies were aimed at to TTP Swat chief Maulana Fazlullah.”30 FATA will kidnap or kill the worker’s helping the TTP as well as other groups family unless “protection” or ransom such as Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.42 Youths for TTP Arrested,” The News International, April money is paid. Demands range from 37 11, 2013. $10,000 to $50,000. Many of these The TTP leadership in FATA monitors 24 Personal interview, Ali Muhammad, Pashtun trans- incidents go unreported due to threats the fundraising campaign closely, and 38 porter in Karachi, Karachi, Pakistan, April 12, 2013; from TTP militants. In addition to has punished operatives who embezzle “‘TTP Man’ Arrested in Sohrab Goth”; “Pakistan Tali- these extortion rackets and kidnap-for- funds. In early 2013, TTP chief ban Setup Sharia Courts in Karachi,” The News Tribe, ransom schemes, Pashtun truckers who Hakimullah Mehsud reportedly ordered January 31, 2013; Ahmed Wali Mujeeb, “How the Taliban carry supplies from the port of Karachi his men to kill his former Karachi leader, Gripped Karachi,” BBC, March 21, 2013. on the Indian Ocean to NATO forces Sher Zaman Mehsud, for stealing money 25 Zia Ur Rehman, “Karachi Targeted Killings of Pash- that was collected through extortion 43 tuns Tied to Militant Groups,” Central Asia Online, April Karachi.” and bank robberies. 1, 2011. 31 Personal interview, TTP associate in Karachi who 26 Personal interview, TTP associate in Karachi who identified himself as “Mohsin,” Karachi, Pakistan, April 39 Ibid.; Saeed Shah, “Sprawling Karachi Becomes an identified himself as “Mohsin,” Karachi, Pakistan, April 8, 2013. Islamic Extremist Melting Pot,” McClatchy Newspapers, 8, 2013. 32 Ali Arqam, “The Taliban in Karachi?” Pakistan Today, June 9, 2010. 27 “Extremist Commander Killed in Khyber,” The News April 4, 2013. 40 Personal interview, Chaudhry Aslam Khan, senior International, December 20, 2010. 33 Rehman, “Taliban Bringing Their War to Streets of Karachi police official, Karachi, Pakistan, February 25, 28 Rehman, “Karachi Targeted Killings of Pashtuns Tied Karachi.” 2013; Javed Mahmood, “Pakistani Banks to Issue Alerts to Militant Groups.” 34 Ibid. About Suspicious Transactions,” Central Asia Online, 29 Personal interview, Shahi Syed, Sindh president of 35 Personal interview, timber trader in Karachi from September 9, 2012. Awami National Party and a member of Pakistani Sen- Mohmand Agency, Karachi, Pakistan, April 10, 2013. 41 Saud Khan, “Rs 76.4m Looted in 11 Bank Heists This ate, Karachi, Pakistan, April 7, 2013; Javed Mahmood, 36 Rehman, “Taliban Recruiting and Fundraising in Ka- Year,” Daily Times, May 2, 2013; “‘Taliban Bank Robber’ “TTP Warns ANP Workers to Quit Party,” Central Asia rachi.” Held,” The News International, May 8, 2013. Online, July 7, 2013; Sohail Khattak, “Settling Scores: 37 The ransom amounts are reportedly negotiable, but 42 Ibid. Taliban on a Killing Spree in Karachi,” Express Tribune, payment is not. See Walsh and Rehman. 43 “Karachi: Taliban nay Raqam ke Tanazeh par apnay August 16, 2012. 38 Personal interview, Pashtun transporter in Karachi, commander ka sar qalam kardia, Express to video Mo- 30 Rehman, “Taliban Bringing their War to Streets of Karachi, Pakistan, April 12, 2013. sool,” Daily Express [Karachi], March 11, 2013.

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Political Killings and Attacks on Law at mosques and at polling stations, a presence.57 Police suspect that Taliban Enforcement warning Pakistanis not to vote for the militants in Karachi operate in small cells, During the past year, the TTP has ANP, PPP and MQM candidates.51 The each consisting of 10-15 militants.58 If the increased operations targeting secular group assassinated an ANP candidate group’s attacks on secular society and law political parties and law enforcement on May 3, and tried to assassinate an enforcement continue, it could threaten personnel. In June 2012, TTP operatives ANP candidate on election day.52 stability in a city that earns 60-70% of sent a message to the ANP’s local Pakistan’s national revenue.59 leaders demanding that they quit the TTP militants in Karachi are also party, take down ANP flags and posters, targeting law enforcement. Police On the political front, the Taliban’s and close their offices.44 According to believe that the TTP has a “hit list” growing strength in Karachi will weaken the ANP, the TTP has killed 70 ANP that includes police officers who have Pakistan’s more secular political leaders in Karachi since that warning.45 been involved in the arrests and deaths parties, especially the anti-Taliban Approximately 44 ANP party offices of TTP commanders and militants.53 ANP and MQM.60 The ANP leadership have been closed across the city, These police officials include Senior claims that TTP pressure and attacks and several party leaders have left Superintendent of Police (SSP) in the lead-up to election day prevented Karachi and moved to Islamabad due Chaudhry Aslam Khan, Superintendent them from openly contesting the polls in to persistent TTP threats.46 In addition of Police Mazhar Mashwani, SSP Raja Karachi, and they were forced to limit to targeting the ANP, the TTP has also Omar Khitab, SSP Khurram Waris and threatened the secular Muttahida Qaumi SSP Farooq Awan.54 Taliban militants “The ANP leadership Movement (MQM), a political party that have attacked the Sohrab Goth and largely represents the Urdu-speaking Mangophir police stations several claims that TTP pressure Muslim community.47 times, while dozens of law enforcement and attacks in the lead-up personnel have been killed in areas The TTP has not, however, targeted of Karachi under TTP influence.55 to election day prevented Karachi’s religious parties, such as According to former Sindh Police Chief them from openly Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam-Fazlur (JUI-F). Fayyaz Leghari, TTP militants and According to JUI-F candidate Mullah other banned outfits such as Lashkar- contesting the polls in Karim Abid, who spoke to reporters i-Jhangvi killed 27 personnel from the Karachi.” before the May 11 polls, their campaign Criminal Investigation Department was not affected by the Taliban.48 When (CID) of the Karachi police between asked about the TTP’s strong-arm November 1 and December 15, 2012.56 tactics in the city, he replied, “Taliban? outreach activities.61 Perhaps partly as What Taliban? There are no real Taliban Implications a result of this intimidation, the ANP, on the ground. All these things are The TTP’s escalating violence in which had won two seats out of 42 in fabricated by authorities.”49 Karachi has major security and political Karachi in the 2008 elections, lost implications for Pakistan. Media reports both of its provincial assembly seats.62 During the recent election campaign, suggest that of the 20 million people The PPP lost two national and three TTP militants attacked rallies and offices living in Karachi, roughly one million provincial assembly seats that it had of the ANP, MQM and the Pakistan live in neighborhoods where the TTP has won in previous elections as well.63 Peoples Party (PPP) in various parts of Karachi, killing and injuring dozens Therefore, if the TTP’s Karachi network 50 of people. The TTP placed pamphlets chi,” Dawn, April 26, 2013; Imran Kazmi, “Attacks on grows, it could weaken the local economy, MQM, PPP in Karachi; Five Killed,” Dawn, April 28, constrain Karachi’s secular parties, and 64 44 Maqbool Ahmed and Mansoor Khan, “Troubled 2013. threaten the city’s overall security. North-West Comes to Town,” Herald, December 16, 51 “Plan B for ANP Candidates: Live the Country,” Ex- 2012. press Tribune, May 11, 2013. 45 Ibid. 52 Mansoor Khan, “Taliban Bullets Kill ANP Candidate, 46 Personal interview, Shahi Syed, Sindh president of Son in Karachi,” The Nation, May 4, 2013; Salis Bin Per- 57 Zaman and Ali. Awami National Party and a member of Pakistani Sen- waiz, “Explosions Rock Karachi; Punjab, KP Remain 58 Ibid. ate, Karachi, Pakistan, April 7, 2013. Relatively Peaceful,” The News International, May 12, 59 “Karachi Contributes 60-70pc of Revenue.” 47 Urdu-speaking Muslims migrated to Pakistan when 2013. 60 Ali K. Chishti, “Terror Threat Looms in Karachi,” Fri- the country became independent from the British in 53 Zia Ur Rehman, “Karachi Police Determined to Elimi- day Times, April 12-18, 2013. 1947, and they largely settled in Karachi and Hyderabad nate Terror Network,” Central Asia Online, December 61 Personal interview, Younas Khan, an ANP candidate in Sindh Province. The MQM has openly denounced 12, 2012. contesting elections from Karachi, Karachi, Pakistan, the TTP in the past. See Zahir Shah Sherazi, “Pakistan 54 Personal interview, Chaudhry Aslam Khan, senior May 10, 2013. Taliban Threaten to Target MQM,” Dawn, November 2, Karachi police official, Karachi, Pakistan, February 25, 62 Ibid.; Tahir Hasan Khan, “PPP and ANP Lose their 2012; “Pakistani Taliban Claim Responsibility for MQM 2013; “Police Officers Were Receiving Threats from Ter- Share in City,” The News International, May 13, 2013. MPA’s Killing,” Dawn, January 17, 2013. rorists in Karachi: Sources,” Samaa TV, September 19, 63 Ibid. 48 “Taliban Flex Muscle in Karachi Ahead of Pakistan 2011. 64 Personal interview, Abdul Waheed, president of Vote.” 55 Aarfeen. Bright Education Society, an NGO working in Pashtun 49 Ibid. 56 Zia Ur Rehman, “Karachi Police Determined to Elimi- neighborhoods of Karachi, Karachi, Pakistan, April 16, 50 “Taliban Attack on ANP Meeting Kills Ten in Kara- nate Terror Network.” 2013.

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Conclusion A Review of the French- the ways of Salafism.4 Contrary to the Pakistani security experts, politicians, stereotype of a nihilistic jihadist run and law enforcement all agree that led Military Campaign in amok, the 79-page document clearly the TTP wants to tighten its grip on Northern Mali illustrated a desire for state formation Karachi.65 The government is still in the with some trappings of a functioning position to roll-back the TTP’s spreading By Derek Henry Flood administration with an interim Karachi network, yet Karachi’s police government and a constitution based on force continues to downplay the TTP on january 11, 2013, at the behest of Mali’s Shari`a.5 threat to the city, insisting that the enfeebled interim government led by number of tribal militants operating in President Dioncounda Traore, the This article examines the regional and Karachi is low.66 Analysts suspect that French military launched Operation international response to the Salafi- the police want to avoid the perception Serval after convoys of Salafi-jihadi jihadi conquest of northern Mali, how that they have failed to maintain law- rebels careened into the town of Konna in the militants have responded to their and-order in the city. If Pakistan fails Mali’s vulnerable central Mopti Region rapid losses, and the new challenges to confront these developments soon, during January 9-10. The alliance of al- facing international forces and Mali’s the TTP’s Karachi network will weaken Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), government going forward. It finds that the city’s overall security and stability, Ansar Eddine, and the Movement for the successes achieved by the French and this will have a national impact on Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in northern Mali are not sustainable Pakistan. had been solidifying since the various over the long-term unless the rebel movements ejected the presence of country achieves progress in internal Nevertheless, although the TTP’s the Malian state in late March 2012. The reconciliation. influence in Karachi is alarming, the fall of Konna threatened Mali’s army city will not “fall” to the Taliban. garrison in Sevare, the northernmost The Regional Response Karachi is home to powerful liberal limit of central government control. From the outset of the joint Tuareg secular elements, as well as progressive MUJAO’s Oumar Ould Hamaha boasted: separatist and Salafi-jihadi takeover of political parties such as the MQM, PPP “We took the barracks and we control northern Mali, regional state actors were and ANP.67 It does not share a border all of the town of Konna…the soldiers beset with two concerns: was it only a with either Afghanistan or the tribal fled, abandoning their heavy weapons matter of time before the conflict would areas, which will at least slow the TTP’s and armored vehicles.”1 spill over into their respective territories, ability to infiltrate the city. These and would this conflict eventually pull factors will help restrain the TTP from As the militants began to consolidate their own regular militaries into Mali? rapid advances. control over the Sahelian communities The response across the spectrum was of the Niger River plains and the Malian anything but uniform. Algeria publicly Zia Ur Rehman is a journalist and Sahara, evidence supports that they maintained its long-held stated policy of researcher who covers militancy and were in the nascent stages of forming non-intervention, but made a situation politics in Pakistan. He has written an Islamic state replete with Shari`a specific exception and quietly allowed for The Friday Times, The Jamestown courts and Islamic police meting out overflight rights to French fighter jets to Foundation, The News International, brutal public punishments to alleged attack Mali-based militants.6 Nigerien The National and has contributed to the criminals.2 The Salafist leadership in President Mahamadou Issoufou was New York Times. He is also the author of Timbuktu and Gao were in contact with especially concerned with the threat the book Karachi in Turmoil. AQIM’s amir, Abdelmalek Droukdel Mali-based militants posed to the (also known as Abu Mus`ab al-Wadud), renewed destabilization of northern who is based in northern Algeria.3 Niger. When asked if an assembled Economic Community of West African The Associated Press recovered a States (ECOWAS) force should enter manifesto from the grounds of the the fray in northern Mali, Issoufou told state television station in Timbuktu an interviewer without hesitation in that was purportedly written by June 2012: “Of course…now it is time Droukdel. In the document, Droukdel for ECOWAS to take all the necessary rebuked his colleagues for their clumsy measures to regain the territorial implementation of Shari`a, which integrity of Mali.”7 he believed risked alienating local populations who were unlearned in

4 Ibid. 65 Personal interview, Shahi Syed, Sindh president of 1 Tiemoko Diallo, “Mali Islamists Capture Strategic 5 “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook”; Jean-Louis Le Awami National Party and a member of Pakistani Sen- Town, Residents Flee,” Reuters, January 10, 2013. Touzet, “La feuille de route d’Aqmi au Mali,” Libération, ate, Karachi, Pakistan, April 7, 2013. 2 “Mali-Al-Qaida’s Sahara Playbook,” Associated Press, February 25, 2013. 66 Aarfeen. February 6, 2013. 6 “Algeria Authorises France to Use Airspace for Mali 67 Personal interview, Muhammad Nafees, a Karachi- 3 “Aqim Leader Condemns Destruction of Mali Mauso- Raids,” Agence France-Press, January 13, 2013. based independent security analyst, Karachi, Pakistan, leums in Secret Papers Found by RFI Journalist,” Radio 7 Folly Bah Thibault, “It Was Not Necessary to Kill Gad- April 16, 2013. France Internationale, February 25, 2013. dafi,” al-Jazira, June 8, 2012.

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Macky Sall, the president of the fight, backed up logistically by a rear All of these actions were completed neighboring Senegal, waffled about guard coalition of Western militaries.11 under the official rubric of providing whether to commit Senegalese troops This strategy had an inherent flaw in support to Mali’s disheveled army that in an intervention scenario. Even after that it relied on the precept that the had suffered from defections and deadly the French intervened, Sall remained Salafi-jihadi rebels would probably not infighting since the onset of the current publicly concerned about a militant advance southward and instead wait bout of rebellion in January 2012.15 From spillover into Senegal, explaining, to negotiate a settlement with Mali’s the first salvos of the reconquest of “Senegal being a neighboring country fragile interim administration and Mali’s battered north, the mission was to Mali, it of course pays very close military junta. All such plans unraveled unequivocally spearheaded by French attention to these developments.”8 literally overnight when heavily armed decision makers, with their Malian Salafi-jihadi rebels finally attempted counterparts a distant second. The security architecture of the to occupy more territory by invading ECOWAS collective was regularly put Konna in mid-January 2013. Employment of Asymmetric Tactics forth as a mechanism to recapture Mali’s As French troops, followed by their lost regions. Yet two neighboring states Concerned that Ansar Eddine, MUJAO, Malian counterparts, swept into the whose input mattered, Mauritania and and AQIM could invade Mali’s capital, cities of Gao and Timbuktu with Algeria, were glaringly not members of French forces launched a full-scale relative ease after a number of French ECOWAS. In fact, ECOWAS was close military intervention to wrest rebel- airstrikes, ground forces faced little to to operational irrelevance at the outset controlled areas of Mopti Region and no initial resistance from the Salafi- of Operation Serval because France- neutralize Islamist control of the three jihadi rebel coalition. In the early allied Chad, a non-ECOWAS member northern regions of Gao, Timbuktu days of the intervention, Salafi-jihadi state, ended up committing the largest and Kidal. French President Francois fighters seemed to melt away, leaving number of foreign troops behind the Hollande indicated that the coordinated population centers in droves via their French—becoming the key regional attack on Konna threatened not only ubiquitous Toyota “technicals”16 and military actor in the subsequent fight the Malian garrison in Sevare, but nimble motorbikes. The rebels avoided against the Salafi-jihadis. was clearly an existential threat to the direct confrontation with the newly rump government led by Dioncounda arrived conventional forces.17 The The International Community’s Response Traore in the south, announcing that deployment of French, Chadian and In March 2012, the international the rebels “have even tried to deal other military contingents in northern community verbally condemned the a fatal blow to the very existence Mali radically altered the threat posed partition of the Malian republic but of Mali.”12 Paris also had a strong to central Mali. opted against taking immediate military interest in trying to rescue seven French action against the rebels. By June 2012, nationals and a dual French-Portuguese Rather than the formal frontline that the Salafi-jihadis had dislodged their man held captive by AQIM and MUJAO threatened the Malian capital with armed peer competitors, the Tuareg in northern Mali.13 a southward militant creep as seen Movement for the Liberation of Azawad in the attack on the town of Konna in (MNLA), from northern Mali’s principal Paris quickly mobilized forward central Mopti Region, Mali and its cities and towns. What followed was a deployed forces at its airbase in allies now faced a dispersed threat. de facto strategy of containment while a N’Djamena, Chad. French Mirage and Fleeing militants sought sanctuary in host of international bodies—including Rafale fighter jets flew bombing sorties sympathetic villages or in the rough- the United Nations, ECOWAS and the over central and northern Mali while hewn northern-most redoubts in Kidal African Union (AU)—slowly deliberated the government of President Hollande Region, an area that has been exploited about how to resolve Mali’s crisis.9 negotiated with key allies to assist the by Tuareg rebels for decades. French military with its heavy airlift On December 20, 2012, the UN Security capacity to rapidly transport armored On February 8, 2013, an Arab suicide Council passed Resolution 2085, paving personnel carriers and other materiel bomber disguised as a paramilitary the way for the African-led International into Bamako, Mali’s capital.14 soldier drove a motorbike up to a Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).10 A Malian military checkpoint in Gao, number of intervention scenarios were 11 “West Africa Bloc Ecowas Agrees to Deploy Troops to devised with the central element being Mali,” BBC, November 11, 2012. hind the Mali Headlines, an Issue of Airlift,” Internation- that a coalition of regional indigenous 12 Jamey Keaten and Sylvie Corbet, “France: Ready to al Institute for Strategic Studies, January 30, 2013. military forces would take the lead in Stop Advance of Mali Rebels,” Associated Press, January 15 Andrew McGregor, “Red Berets, Green Berets: Can 11, 2013. Mali’s Divided Military Restore Order and Stability?” 8 Scott Malone, “Senegal Worried about Risk of Mili- 13 None of the hostages were recovered, and AQIM is- Terrorism Monitor 11:4 (2013). tants Entering From Mali: President,” Reuters, March sued a statement in March claiming that it beheaded one 16 The term “technicals” refers to 4x4 vehicles mounted 8, 2013. of the hostages in response to the French intervention. with recoilless rifles of varying calibers or rocket launch- 9 “African and EU Leaders to Hold Mali Summit,” al- See “French FM Says Troops in Mali Focused on Free- ers. The weaponization of Toyota Hilux pickup trucks Jazira, October 19, 2012. ing Hostages,” Agence France-Press, March 19, 2013; is thought to have originated in the Chadian-Libyan 10 “Security Council Authorizes Deployment of Afri- “Fabius: ‘No Confirmation’ Yet For the Execution of the conflict in the 1980s. The term “technical” later arose in can-led International Support Mission to Mali for Initial French Hostage Philip Verdun,” Agence Nouakchott Somalia in the 1990s. Year-Long Period,” UN Security Council, December 20, d’Information, March 25, 2013. 17 “French and Malian Troops Enter Diabaly,” al-Jazira, 2012. 14 Douglas Barrie, James Hackett and Henry Boyd, “Be- January 22, 2013.

6 may 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 5 killing himself and wounding a Malian fighters launched a fierce raid in Gao’s In Kidal city, French troops and their soldier.18 The martyrdom operation city center, catching Malian troops off Chadian allies have struck an accord was quickly claimed by Abou Walid guard. A French-led counterassault of sorts with the MNLA and an Ansar Sahraoui, MUJAO’s spokesman, stating: ensued, resulting in a MUJAO defeat.22 Eddine splinter group calling itself the “We claim today’s attack against the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA) led Malian soldiers who chose the side of MUJAO remained undeterred, and by Alghabass ag Intallah who publicly the miscreants, the enemies of Islam.” its incipient martyrdom campaign parted ways with Iyad ag Ghaly.27 In the This marked the first suicide attack in northern Mali did not cease. Four wake of the French air campaign, MNLA in Mali since the French intervention, months into the foreign military fighters opportunistically reentered and it would begin a wave of similar intervention, suicide bombers launched Kidal city just ahead of the advancing insurgent actions.19 twin attacks in the Gao region, striking French and Chadian contingents. The Nigerien troops in Menaka and Malian MNLA’s leadership has made it clear As if to demonstrate a coordinated troops in Gossi on May 10, 2013.23 that Malian troops—such as those now campaign were underway, a second back in Gao and Timbuktu—would in no suicide bomber struck the same Mountain Redoubt way be welcomed back into Kidal. The Malian checkpoint at Gao’s entrance In the last major forward logistical phase French and Chadians decided that they the following night.20 The outcome of of Operation Serval, French troops would work with militant groups on that follow-up operation was nearly deployed into Kidal city, the capital of the ground who were not diametrically identical; only the bomber was killed and Kidal Region, on January 30. French opposed to their presence. In effect, and Chadian forces then established to carry out its counterterrorism their presence in the lightly populated operations, the French military struck “To carry out its Saharan garrison towns of Aguelhok a tacit alliance with the same group that counterterrorism and Tessalit on February 7 and 8, instigated the January 2012 rebellion in respectively.24 In doing so, Franco- the north, in a new alliance against the operations, the French Chadian forces partially encircled the AQIM-linked militias. This strategic military has struck a tacit Ifoghas and Tigharghar mountains. pragmatism, however, means that a large swath of northern Mali is still alliance with the same This sparse, rocky region has served not under the control of Mali’s own group that instigated the as a refuge and supply depot during military. past bouts of Tuareg rebellion.25 Its January 2012 rebellion in inaccessible terrain—pockmarked with Although the official media arm of the the north, in a new alliance caves, coupled with pools of fresh French Ministry of Defense described a water—makes it ideal guerrilla February reconnaissance mission in the against the AQIM-linked country. Its isolation and the fact Ifoghas mountains as being comprised militias.” that it is currently surrounded on of “combined French and Malian the Malian side by Franco-Chadian troops,”28 the only Malian forces at military camps, however, will likely work with foreign forces in the offensive make it difficult for the Islamists to in the Ifoghas mountains are ethnic one Malian soldier was reported injured resupply once their prepositioned Tuareg militiamen under the command with Malian forces disseminating the provisions are expended. Bilal ag of the pro-Bamako Colonel El Hadj ag absolute minimum of information about Cherif, the secretary-general of the Gamou.29 The implicit understanding the incident, stating only that they MNLA, emphasized the importance of believed the young man was Arab and the Tigharghar mountains to AQIM: February 28, 2013. 21 a member of MUJAO. Although these “there are a number of places where you 27 “Mali: des membres d’Ansar Dine font sécession et initial incidents were abject failures will find AQIM such as west of Timbuktu créent leur propre movement,” Radio France Interna- in terms of producing mass casualties, but [the] Tigharghar [mountains are] tionale, January 24, 2013. they were successful in announcing their anchor point. This is where you 28 “Établissement de communication et de production that MUJAO and its allies intended will find the bulk of their forces, [as audiovisuelle de la Défense, Mission de reconnaissance to wage asymmetric warfare against well as] materiél. The current battle is dans le massif de Adrar,” French Ministry of Defense, 26 conventional military forces. Following of utmost importance.” February 19, 2013. the two suicide bombings, Islamist 29 After pledging a “phony” allegiance to the MNLA to 22 “Mali: un commando islamiste attaque la ville de Gao,” avoid confronting Ghaly’s Ansar Eddine fighters, Gamou, 18 Krista Larson and Baba Ahmed, “Locals: Mali Suicide Agence France-Presse, February 10, 2013. who fled across the border to safety in Niger with some- Bomber Tied to Terror Leader,” Associated Press, Feb- 23 “Five Bombers Die in Attacks on Troops in Mali,” where between 400-600 loyalist men under his com- ruary 8, 2013. Agence France-Presse, May 10, 2013. mand in late March 2012, returned to Gao Region with 19 Marc Bastian, “Mali Hit by First Suicide Bombing,” 24 Thierry Oberlé, “Les otages français en danger après Chadian and Nigerien soldiers. While he sent the bulk Agence France-Presse, February 8, 2013. la mort d’Abou Zeid,” Le Figaro, March 1, 2013. of his troops to accompany French units in the towns 20 Sia Kambou, “Suicide Blast in North Mali’s Gao, No 25 Andrew McGregor, “Rebel Leader Turned Counter- of Bourem and Menaka, he dispatched 19 of his men to Other Wounded,” Agence France-Presse, February 10, Terrorist: Tuareg’s Ag Bahanga,” Militant Leadership serve as local guides in the rugged Ifoghas mountains as 2013. Monitor 1:3 (2010). Franco-Chadian forces scoured for AQIM encampments. 21 Krista Larson, “Mali Town of Gao Hit by 2nd Suicide 26 Jean-Philippe Rémy, “Dans les roches de l’Adrar de See Paul Mbenm, “Colonel Alhaji Ag Gamou: Les raisons Bomber Attack,” Associated Press, February 10, 2013. Tigharghâr, une bataille cruciale est engage,” Le Monde, d’une desertion,” L’Independent, April 2, 2013; “La guerre

7 may 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 5 during the early war phase of Operation Along with the usual caches of Soviet- ensconced in the security affairs of the Serval was that Malian regular troops era weaponry, French forces discovered Kidal Region with a degree of French and would not move north of the Niger that AQIM had planned well in advance Chadian complicity, a situation that will River valley, as Paris wanted to avoid a for the eventuality of guerrilla war with likely be unsustainable following the secondary conflict from concomitantly components for improvised explosive planned French military withdrawal. occurring between the reemerging devices and pre-assembled suicide The Nigerian-led AFISMA forces have MNLA and Malian regular forces. As bomb belts.34 French forces found that yet to do any real front line engagement; northern militants shuffle allegiances AQIM was growing its own food in the the Chadians and to a much lesser extent and rebrand their movements, the fight Ametetai Valley to sustain itself far the Nigeriens have done the only real is not over from Bamako’s perspective. from settled populations while having fighting in the far north. access to the most important resource As French and Chadian units fanned of all to conduct a mobile war in the The MNLA entrenchment in Kidal out deeper into the parched valleys Sahara: fresh water.35 Although the goal Region has caused distinct fissures and massive boulders of Kidal Region, of French officers was to form a tight between the objectives of the Malian they finally confronted AQIM directly. cordon around the area, it is likely that army versus those of AFISMA and AQIM was entrenched in the Ametetai many of the jihadists escaped.36 French commanders who thus far Valley situated approximately midway have not equated the Tuareg MNLA between Tessalit and Aguelhok due Overall, the reconquest of northern separatists—who publicly welcomed east in the Tigharghar region west of the Mali has been an ad hoc, complex the idea of foreign intervention—as Ifoghas mountains. French commanders— affair involving a host of stakeholders a security challenge on par with the who claimed to have killed some 100 with divergent interests. The French Salafi-jihadi militants.38 militants—estimated that the jihadists had Ministry of Defense wanted to planned to use the remote area as a base of withdraw French ground forces, who Although French forces have begun to operations for the foreseeable future.30 To numbered approximately 4,000 at the modestly withdraw from northern Mali prevent jihadists from slipping over the height of their deployment, in March along with their Chadian partners, Paris border to Algeria, a risky three-pronged 2013, but pragmatically scaled back its cannot extricate itself from its military assault was prepared in late February expectations due to the ferocity of the mission as fast as some in the Elysée 2013. A column of French troops moved fighting on the Algerian border. They might hope.39 Although the Salafi-jihadi northward from Aguelhok while a separate stated that a reduced number of French triumvirate led by AQIM appears to have French column parachuted in from north troops would remain until July.37 Paris either dissolved or largely disappeared of the valley and an independent Chadian may begin a partial drawdown earlier, in the conflict’s current stage, the war one moved south from Tessalit to ensnare but an immediate total withdrawal of for the so-called Azawad region is by no AQIM in the Ametetai Valley.31 Of the combat troops appears unlikely. means over. three formations, the Chadian column had the most grave encounter with the fleeing Conclusion Many questions plague the hoped for Salafi-jihadis, evidenced by a reported 25 The initial stages of the French reunification of the Malian state. The Chadian soldiers, and 65 mililtants, killed counterterrorism offensive in northern perennial Tuareg question remains in three separate ambush encounters.32 and central Mali were highly effective as yet unanswered. The reintegration in terms of displacing Ansar Eddine, of northern Mali into Bamako’s orbit Troops then swept arduously over the MUJAO and AQIM from their fixed is further hampered by transnational terrain on foot encountering AQIM’s positions both in the regional capitals and narcotics trafficking, a refugee crisis, abandoned earthen infrastructure while in the Ifoghas badlands. French airstrikes food insecurity and now the threat of looking for evidence of French captives.33 followed by large-scale northward ground Salafi-jihadi insurgency. Putting Mali incursions undid the nearly 10 months of back together will be a long and dusty au Mali ne fait que commencer, croyez-moi,” L’Humanité, north-south partition. road. March 1, 2013; “Mali: El Hadj Gamou échappe à une ‘ten- tative d’assassinat’ à Niamey,” Agence France-Presse, Yet Mali is nowhere near the road to Derek Henry Flood is an independent December 2, 2012; “Le colonel El Hadj Gamou depuis son internal reconciliation. The Malian army analyst working on MENA, Central and cantonnement de Saguia au Niger,” L’Indépendant, June has not reached Kidal city. The MNLA is South Asia. Mr. Flood has written for Asia 31, 2012. Times Online, CNN, Christian Science 30 “Opération Serval au Mali: une centaine de jihadistes port from Jihadist Stronghold in Mali,” France 24, March Monitor and Jane’s Islamic Affairs tués dans la vallée d’Ametettai,” La Voix du Nord, March 7, 2013. Analyst among others. Previously, 7, 2013. 34 Tiemoko Diallo, “Al Qaeda Rebels Wanted Mali as he served as editor of The Jamestown 31 Philippe Chapleau, “Au combat dans la vallée Base for Global Attacks: France,” Reuters, March 8, Foundation’s Militant Leadership d’Amettetaï: retour sur le triple mouvement offensive,” 2013. Monitor. Ouest France, March 15, 2013. 35 Jean-Philippe Rémy, “Voilà, on a cassé le donjon 32 “Mali: nouveau bilan de 25 soldats tchadiens tués d’AQMI,” Le Monde, March 8, 2013. après de violents combats dans le nord,” Agence France- 36 Thomas Fessy, “French Fight in Mali’s Hostile Des- Presse, February 28, 2013. ert,” BBC, March 25, 2013. 38 Zine Cherfaoui, “Le MNLA dans le collimateur de la 33 AQIM regularly kidnaps Westerners throughout the 37 Sylvie Corbet and Angela Charlton, “Officials Say Cédéao,” El Watan, May 14, 2013. Sahel. The group currently holds captive a number of French Forces to Remain in Mali Until at Least July,” As- 39 Djamila Ould Khettab, “Les premiers soldats français French nationals. See Matthieu Mabin, “Exclusive Re- sociated Press, March 1, 2013. quittent le Mali,” Algerie-Focus, April 11, 2013.

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presidential contest might exacerbate The French troop drawdown plan, Mali’s Challenges Post- tensions and create more unrest. There however, is complicated by a decrepit French Intervention is a risk that a large number of displaced and undisciplined Malian army, the people and refugees will not be able unreadiness of the African force to do By Anouar Boukhars to participate in the vote, and such the heavy lifting of keeping the peace,5 disenfranchisement could endanger the uncertain prospects of intercommunal on january 11, 2013, French forces began prospect for peace and stability. reconciliation, and the MNLA’s control a military offensive in northern Mali of Kidal. The Malian army has not set to unseat a coalition of Salafi-jihadi This article assesses the security and foot in Kidal since its liberation from militant groups who had taken control political challenges that complicate the the grip of Ansar Eddine on January 28, of the major population centers in process of stabilizing Mali. It examines 2013.6 Tuareg rebels from the MNLA early 2012. While the offensive has the complex local and regional dynamics oppose any Malian military presence been successful, the militants have not that can make or break international in this historic bastion of the Tuareg in been defeated. The Malian army is still efforts to win the peace. It finds that the northeastern Mali.7 weak and disorganized, and the African military gains achieved by the French forces deployed to secure the north and Chadians in northern Mali cannot be In the capital Bamako, the tone is face a number of challenges. Islamist consolidated without fostering a political equally virulent and defiant. The militants retain a significant ability process that promotes reconciliation population seeks a reconquest of to be a major nuisance for stability and extensive consultation with all Kidal.8 As a recent International operations, reconstruction and peace- stakeholders. Putting Mali “back together” Crisis Group report warned, the risk building. Inter-communal tensions and also requires that the international of a military confrontation in Kidal mistrust still prevail in the north, which community and the main regional actors between a vengeful Malian army and are compounded by the excesses and harmonize their views, align their efforts 1 abuses of the Malian army. Tensions in fighting transnational terrorist groups, 5 Rémi Carayol, “Guerre au Mali: la Misma, faible force,” in the Tuareg stronghold of Kidal are and stem the trafficking of arms, drugs, Jeune Afrique, April 16, 2013. especially high, as the secular National and other illicit products. 6 The armed revolt against Malian forces began on Janu- Movement for the Liberation of Azawad ary 17, 2012, exactly six months after the Tuareg returned (MNLA) refuses to disarm or submit to Uncertainty Amid Troop Drawdown home from Libya. It was led by the National Movement Bamako’s authority. The January 2013 French intervention for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), an organization stopped Mali’s quick descent into established in October 2011 and comprised of a mosaic of The situation in the capital of Bamako is chaos. After a dramatic year of armed armed groups bound by loose loyalties and conditional slightly better. The French intervention insurrection, civil strife and militants’ alliances. The MNLA, which declared the independence has empowered the interim civilian conquest of huge swathes of territory, al- of Azawad on April 6, 2012, was forced to cede ground to authorities, but the coup leaders still Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), armed Islamist forces—led by the radical Islamist group 2 maintain influence. Public opinion in Ansar Eddine and the Movement Ansar Eddine—who were cash rich and better armed. the south is also increasingly hardening for Unity and Jihad in West Africa The French intervention in northern Mali in early 2013 against compromise with the Tuareg (MUJAO) are in retreat. The French allowed the MNLA to reclaim control of Kidal. See Rémi 3 MNLA rebels, and the temptation of army, backed by Chadian troops, rolled Carayol, “Mali: à Kidal, tout reste à faire,” Jeune Afrique, opportunistic political actors to stoke back the jihadist offensive and chased April 16, 2013. nationalism and stir the flames of them out of the main cities in the north. 7 Tuareg civilians and light skinned Arabs are also ethnic animosity is strong. The electoral The campaign to dislodge AQIM from scared of a vengeful army exacting revenge on those calendar set by the interim authorities its sanctuary in the Ifoghas mountains suspected of participating in the rebellion that chased is ambitious, but unless the many by the Algerian border is underway, Malian troops out of the north. Islamists accused of be- logistical hurdles are overcome, the July as is the more difficult task of securing longing to armed movements are especially enticing tar- Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal, and towns on gets for soldiers who are poorly trained and supervised. 1 Several human rights organizations (Human Rights the Niger River. The French are anxious When they were in control of the north, radical Islamists Watch, Amnesty International, and the International to bring major combat operations to an terrorized the population with the imposition of draco- Federation for Human Rights) and news agencies have end so that they can pass the baton to nian punishments (public executions, amputations and already documented cases of abuse, torture and execu- a UN peacekeeping mission of 11,200 whippings). The MNLA also committed its share of 4 tions committed by Malian soldiers. See “Mali: Prosecute troops and 1,440 police. The UN killings, pillage and rape against black women. In the Soldiers for Abuses,” Human Rights Watch, February mission is expected to be given a robust attack in Aguelhoc on January 24, 2012, the MNLA and 21, 2013; “Mali: First Assessment of the Human Rights mandate under chapter VII to contain Islamist rebels are accused of executing dozens of Malian Situation after Three Week Conflict,” Amnesty Interna- armed groups, secure the major urban soldiers. The temptation for soldiers who are bitter, often tional, February 1, 2013; “Abuses Committed by Malian centers, protect civilians and oversee the violent, to strike back is real. On the incident in Aguel- Military: Urgent Need for an Independent Investiga- political process. It will be supported hoc, see “Nord-Mali: Raincourt parle d’une ‘centaine’ tion Commission,” International Federation for Human by a parallel permanent force of 1,000 d’éxécutions sommaire à Aguelhok,” Jeune Afrique, Feb- Rights, January 23, 2013. French troops that will focus primarily ruary 13, 2012; “Mali Says Soldiers, Civilians Executed 2 In March 2012, the Malian military overthrew the on counterterrorism. During Tuareg Clashes,” Agence France-Press, Febru- democratically-elected government of Amadou Toumani ary 13, 2012. Touré. 4 Flavia Krause-Jackson, “UN Security Council Ap- 8 Personal interviews, Malian civil society actors and 3 “Mali: sécuriser, dialoguer et réformer en profondeur,” proves 11,200 Troops to Stabilize Mali,” Bloomberg, several security officials working on Mali, Dakar,- Sen International Crisis Group, April 11, 2013. April 25, 2013. egal, May 6-10, 2013.

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Tuareg rebels cannot be discounted.9 complicates the search for a peaceful for combat.17 They lack funding,18 the This is exacerbated by the divisions, resolution to the crisis as different transportation capability to project competitions and mistrust between and and rival groups jostle to carve out a power19 and reconnaissance and combat among the different communities in the prominent role in any power-sharing aircraft to survey targets in a huge region. Even within the Tuareg tribes, agreement with Bamako. area of operations.20 AFISMA also divisions and antagonisms run deep.10 suffers from lack of interoperability The aristocratic Ifoghas and their The decision of Chad’s president, of its contingents. Problems in allies are, for example, pitted against Idriss Déby, to start withdrawing his communication, cooperation, and the Imrad vassals and their Arab and 2,000 soldiers from northern Mali, integration will be major impediments Tuareg associates. especially Kidal, complicates matters to a successful military operation, further. Chadian troops fought especially when there is not yet a clear Before his strategy backfired, Amadou alongside French forces in the far and legitimate command structure. Toumani Touré, the president of Mali north mountains in Mali as well as from 2002 to 2012, exploited these helped stabilize the northeastern The Malian army is also incapable of divisions, opportunistically dispensing Saharan outposts of the region of securing the territories and military favors and playing groups and tribes Kidal. The changing nature of the war, gains won by French and Chadian against one another.11 His strategy of the mounting death toll of Chadian forces. It is demoralized, disorganized, preventing the thinly populated and soldiers—at least 30 so far—and the and plagued by factionalism.21 It also expansive peripheral northern zones rising financial costs of military possesses mostly antiquated military of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu (which operations have all contributed to equipment and vehicles. The military comprise two-thirds of the country the rush to exit Mali.14 “The Chadian junta that toppled the government in but only 10% of the population) from army does not have the skills to fight March 2012 in an effort to ostensibly slipping into armed insurgency was a shadowy, guerrilla-style war that save the integrity of the state threw based on outsourcing state functions is taking place in northern Mali,” the army into further disarray. To use to Tuareg clans of lower status, President Déby stated.15 Chadian the words of French General Francois opportunist local elites, and troops might still contribute to the Lecointre, the force is “unstructured” manageable Arab armed factions future UN peacekeeping force, but their and “incapable of planning for the and militias.12 As a result, “Tuareg withdrawal might leave the Kidal region future.”22 The challenge of reversing tribes of aristocratic descent saw their in a precarious situation. institutional deterioration, fostering hitherto dominant position in Kidal civilian oversight and creating a region increasingly eroded,” wrote The African-led International Support cohesive, disciplined and well-equipped Wolfram Lacher, a senior researcher at Mission in Mali (AFISMA) is still force is daunting. the German Institute for International a weak force to take over the fight and Security Affairs.13 This unsettling against violent extremist groups The European Union Training Mission of the status quo and creation of new and handle security in the liberated in Mali (EUTM) is planning to rectify vested interests, buttressed by criminal areas.16 Although the deployment these problems by training four associations and tactical alliances, is of AFISMA to Mali was swift and battalions of 650 soldiers during a what contributed in the first place to widely applauded by the international period of 15 months. The focus will the conflict in Mali and currently still community, the African battalions— be on basic firearms skills such as with the exception of the Chadian target practice. The trainers will also

9 “Mali: sécuriser, dialoguer et réformer en profondeur”; soldiers—arrived in the theater of “provide theoretical classes that will Carayol, “A Kidal: Tour Reste A faire.” conflict ill-equipped and ill-prepared include modules on complying with 10 See Pierre Boilley, “Géopolitique africaine et rébel- lions touarègues. Approches locales, approches globales 17 The first contingents from Niger, Burkina Faso, Sen- (1960-2011),” L’Année du Maghreb VII (2011): pp. 151- egal, Togo, Benin and Ghana arrived immediately after 162; Baz Lecocq, Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Compet- the French intervened to stop the jihadist offensive. On ing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern Mali 14 According to Roland Marchal, a senior fellow at the the weakness, see Carayol, “Guerre au Mali: la Misma, (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2010). National Center for Scientific Research, President Déby faible force.” 11 This strategy of governance was ultimately unsustain- “could also be using the threat of withdrawal as a bar- 18 Out of the $450 million requested by ECOWAS, only able. It exacerbated ethnic and tribal tensions and left gaining tool to get more money from France and other $16 million was disbursed. See Alexandra Geneste and the structural problems of underdevelopment and pov- Western countries.” See Xan Rice, “‘Guerrilla’ Conflict Nathalie Guibert, “Mali: la France peut-elle partir?” Le erty that produced the rebellions of 1963, the 1990s, and Makes Chad Quit Mali,” Financial Times, April 15, 2013. Monde, March 29, 2013. 2006-2009 unattended. Worse, it was built upon shaky 15 Ibid. 19 For example, it took 500 Senegalese troops several and unreliable alliances. 16 At a U.S. congressional hearing in April 2013, the weeks to redeploy to Mali. 12 See Anouar Boukhars, “The Paranoid Neighbor: Al- assistant secretary of defense for special operations, Mi- 20 So far, AFISMA has only two aerial surveillance air- geria and the Conflict in Mali,” in Fred Wehrey and An- chael Sheehan, described African forces in Mali as “com- craft, four alpha light jets based in Niamey, Niger, and ouar Boukhars eds., Perilous Desert: Insecurity in the Sahel pletely incapable” and not “up to the task” of fighting half a dozen attack helicopters. See Carayol, “Guerre au (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Interna- radical Islamist militants. He said, “Right now, the Mali: la Misma, faible force.” tional Peace, 2013), pp. 87-117. ECOWAS force isn’t capable at all. What you saw there, 21 “Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in 13 Wolfram Lacher and Denis M. Tull, “Mali: Beyond it is a completely incapable force. That has to change.” Mali,” United Nations Security Council, March 26, 2013. Counterterrorism,” German Institute for International See “ECOWAS Force in Mali is ‘Incapable’: US Official,” 22 Aline Glaudot, “Training of Mali’s Armed Forces Be- and Security Affairs, February 2013. Agence France-Presse, April 9, 2013. gins,” Europolitics, April 5, 2013.

10 may 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 5 humanitarian law.”23 The first battalion There are multiple desert routes to Therefore, the French push to establish is slated to be ready by September 2013. move drugs and illicit goods in the Sahel. military control across the north Most experts, however, agree that for The most known routes depart from and mop-up the remnants of jihadist the mission to succeed, its duration coastal towns in Guinea and Mauritania, groups and armed gangsters from must be prolonged and the flaws that passing through northern Mali and into their sanctuaries in the Ifoghas and dogged previous training missions must Algeria and Libya, then Egypt and the Tigharghar mountains will not eliminate be rectified. The United States spent Middle East, before reaching their final the threats to Mali. Even if AQIM and millions of dollars training Malian destinations in Europe.29 In each of these its allies are defeated in Mali, the main soldiers only to see hundreds of them, countries, there are networks of drivers security threats will persist as long as including top commanders, flee or and handlers that enjoy the protection governments lack the will to thwart defect to the rebels’ side.24 of civilian and military authorities.30 terrorist and criminal activity.

Transnational Threats International stakeholders continued Opportunities for regional terrorist Even if EU and U.S. efforts succeed in to dispense economic and military aid recruitment and arms supplies are bolstering the capacity of the Malian to these countries despite the states’ manifold. The refugee camps in army, it will not alone be able to tackle unwillingness or inability to crack down neighboring countries are especially problems that are by their very nature on drug activity. In Mali, the dispensing of concern. The UN secretary general transnational, some of which are propped of foreign aid coincided with a dramatic recently warned about the vulnerability up and supported by powerful political, increase in organized criminal of the Sahrawis in the Polisario- military and economic networks. It is activity.31 It is crucial, therefore, for the controlled refugee camps in northwest common knowledge that top officials in international community to assess state Mali’s government and military actively willingness and capacity. “In Mali, imported radical colluded with organized crime.25 The drug trafficking business still flourishes The control of criminal activity religious ideas justifying in Mauritania and Niger. In both requires more than just capable the recourse to armed countries, the groups that control drug national institutions. The willingness trafficking are influential and are known of state actors to thwart the criminal struggle have penetrated locally—which demonstrates their marketplace and the financial flows society, contributing to the impunity.26 Mali is also a transit area of trafficking proceeds is critically for the illicit trafficking of cannabis and important. Without such resolve, radicalization of religious other drugs. Well-established networks externally led efforts to empower discourse and fueling a of Moroccans, Sahrawis, Mauritanians, the executive branch and prop up Algerians, Libyans, Nigeriens and its coercive apparatus—namely, the contemporary wave of Malians are involved.27 military, police, and judiciary—can be extremism.” counterproductive. A state that lacks Mali has traditionally played a central capable institutional capacities but has part in the trans-Saharan illicit leaders determined to fight terrorism trade, including trafficking of goods, and organized crime is the most suitable Algeria to radicalization and terrorist cigarettes and arms. The arrival in candidate for capacity building.32 infiltration.33 It is the first time that a mid-2005 of Latin American cocaine senior UN official acknowledged what in the Sahel dramatically changed Eddine. many experts have been describing for the face of criminality in the region 29 “Mali: sécuriser, dialoguer et réformer en profond- years as a “ticking time bomb.” The and transformed social, political and eur”; Lacher, Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel- same fears apply to the refugee camps in 28 economic power balances in Mali. Sahara Region. Mauritania and Niger where displaced 34 30 Ibid. Malians live in “appalling” conditions. 23 Ibid. 31 Lacher, Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Saha- Organized criminals and extremist 24 Lydia Polgreen, “Mali Army, Riding U.S. Hopes, Is ra Region. groups will continue to exploit the Proving No Match for Militants,” New York Times, Janu- 32 In the West, Mauritania is generally considered the fragility of states, frozen conflicts such ary 24, 2013. least problematic state in the Sahel. Its president, Mo- as the Western Sahara, and the lack of 25 Wolfram Lacher, Organized Crime and Conflict in the hamed Ould Abdel Aziz, has portrayed himself as tough regional security cooperation. Sahel-Sahara Region (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie En- on national security. Nigerien President Mahamadou dowment for International Peace, 2012); Judith Scheele, Issoufou is also appreciated for his firm stand against The international community can “Circulations marchandes au Sahara: Entre Licite et Il- terrorism. His country is seriously threatened by several help mitigate external pressures licite,” Hérodote 142 (2011): 143-162. transnational terrorist actors originating in Libya and by promoting regional cooperation 26 “Mali: sécuriser, dialoguer et réformer en profond- Nigeria. In this context, it makes sense that international in sharing intelligence, monitoring eur.” donors have supported Issoufou’s programs for security financial flows from drug trafficking, 27 Ibid. and development. It could be argued, however, that this 28 Drug money disrupted the traditional sociopoliti- support should be conditional on democratic account- 33 Afua Hirsch, “Mali Conflict Could Spill Over into cal patterns and balance of power between and among ability and the implementation of verifiable and concrete Western Sahara, Warns Ban Ki-moon,” Guardian, April communities. Such social upheaval contributed to the anticorruption measures. See Luis Simon, Alexander 9, 2013. eruption of the 2012 rebellion, which saw the Imrad lin- Mattelaer, and Amelia Hadfield, “A Coherent EU Strat- 34 “Mali Refugees Endure ‘Appalling’ Mauritania ing up behind the MNLA and the Ifoghas joining Ansar egy for the Sahel,” European Parliament, May 2011. Camp,” BBC, April 12, 2013.

11 may 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 5 and conducting joint military operations. the motivational factors that lead to feelings of unfairness).40 Others joined Thus far, international efforts have radicalization as well as the reasons for ideological reasons.41 The same been hindered by several factors. First, that allowed extremist groups to applies to those who actively sought out Western governments and international successfully embed themselves in the Tuareg radical group Ansar Eddine. donors have focused on propping up northern Mali and recruit quite Some of the Tuareg who joined the the capacity of individual fragile states. movement “are of the conviction that Insecurity, however, is a product not just only their Salafist ideology can unify of internal factors, but of external ones as “The problem of the various Tuareg clans, the different well.35 Second, international policy has homegrown radicalization ethnic groups in the region, and even the typically overlooked the relationships whole of Mali.”42 Ansar Eddine leader and connections between conflicts in the is compounded by its Iyad ag Ghaly proposed “an alternative region. Third, competition and differing interconnectedness with to both the Malian nation-state, riddled perceptions of threats among neighbors with corruption and nepotism, and the hinder regional cooperation.36 transnational factors political ideal of Tuareg independence, like illicit trafficking which so far has been unable to For example, the regional security overcome the divisive clan structures institutional mechanisms that Algeria and regional terrorist within Tuareg society.”43 The first step, created to shape the regional fight networks.” therefore, is to understand who seeks to against terrorism did not succeed join these violent extremist movements in bolstering military and security and why. cooperation. The Algeria-based General Staff Joint Operations Committee and easily.38 The leadership of the main The crisis in Mali and the damage that Fusion and Liaison Unit need to become terrorist groups remains Algerian armed Islamist groups have inflicted true forums for sharing intelligence, and Mauritanian, but their appeal to on the population are opportunities for monitoring financial flows from drug Malians and West Africans needs a Malian political and community leaders trafficking, and conducting joint careful examination. to marginalize violent extremists military operations. Unfortunately, and discredit their narratives and fragile security in countries such as What prompted an important number ideologies.44 The use of repressive Libya and Tunisia, the opacity of the of young Malian Peuls and Songhai in measures to combat extremists would Algerian regime, and the persistent Gao to join MUJAO?39 Some evidently be unsuccessful long-term unless suspicion and mistrust between Morocco did it for financial or local reasons the sources of disillusionment and and Algeria over the Western Sahara (fragmentation of social structures, lack frustration are addressed. The greater dispute will make current efforts to of access to education, and widespread the chasm between youth expectations bring peace and stability to the region and the capability or willingness of the extremely difficult. state to meet them, the greater the risk 38 AQIM, for example, managed to use its financial that angry youths might look to non- Internal Radicalization prowess to tap into the deep cultural divide in northern state actors for essential goods. Another complicating factor in Mali Mali. Occasionally, AQIM has used its Arab roots to in- is how radical elements interact with gratiate itself into Arab communities. Timbuktu, for ex- underlying local sources of instability. ample, was a stronghold of AQIM and is where the group In Mali, imported radical religious first built its network of social and political alliances, in- 40 In its 2008 report on countering extremism and ideas justifying the recourse to armed cluding alliances with the Arab militias that the deposed development in Mali, USAID identified the drivers of struggle have penetrated society, Malian president Touré “tolerated and even maintained.” violent extremism as “multilayered and Local in Logic.” contributing to the radicalization At other times, AQIM used the distrust and competition Specifically, it noted “the North’s political isolation and of religious discourse and fueling a between Songhai and Peuls on the one hand and Arabs economic marginality, and the divisions both within and 37 contemporary wave of extremism. The and Tuareg on the other to its advantage. The most criti- across the ethnic fabric of the region” as key drivers of problem of homegrown radicalization is cal factor in AQIM’s success, however, has been “more violence. See “Counter Extremism and Development in compounded by its interconnectedness economic than cultural.” See “Counter Extremism and Mali.” with transnational factors like illicit Development in Mali,” U.S. Agency for International De- 41 According to the European Union’s counterterror- trafficking and regional terrorist velopment, October 2009. ism coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, two-thirds of those networks. Yet it is critical to recognize 39 Little is known about MUJAO. It arrived on the scene who join terrorist and criminal organizations in the Sahel after the abduction of three European tourists from the do it for financial gain or as an outlet to dramatically ex- 35 Events from outside can be destabilizing. For example, heavily fortified Polisario-controlled camps in Algeria in press their frustration. The other one-third are hardcore events in Algeria destabilized Mali. These “exogenous October 2011. Besides a preference for Algerian targets ideologues who are ready to die for their cause. EU in- dynamics” necessitate a regional response to the crisis and a sociological makeup unique from that of AQIM telligence estimates put the number of violent extremists in Mali. (its core membership is from the Lamhar tribe, supple- between 500 and 1,000 in the Sahel. See Gilles de Ker- 36 Wehrey and Boukhars. mented by Sahrawis, Songhai and Peuls), MUJAO has chove, “Au Sahel, la tâche est immense,” Le Télégramme, 37 Baz Lecocq, Gregory Mann, Bruce Whitehouse et al., acted like its extremist counterparts, fusing criminal and January 26, 2013. “One Hippopotamus and Eight Blind Analysts: A Multi- radical religious activity. MUJAO, and Ansar Eddine as 42 Lecocq, Mann, Whitehouse et al. vocal Analysis of the 2012 Political Crisis in the Divided well, prospered greatly from the lucrative trans-Saharan 43 Ibid. Republic of Mali,” Review of African Political Economy 137 trafficking trade, kidnappings of Westerners for ransom, 44 “Mali: sécuriser, dialoguer et réformer en profond- (2013). and the bonanza of the Libyan arms bazaar. eur.”

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The Road Ahead Current military progress in the The Significance of The roots of instability and conflict north cannot be consolidated if it in Mali are complex and run deep. simply restores an intolerable status Taliban Shari`a Courts in Internal sources of insecurity include quo ante. The immediate priority should Afghanistan institutional weakness and corruption, be to foster political reconciliation endemic poverty, and sociopolitical and send unmistakable signals that By Jami Forbes tensions. Unaddressed identity-based peaceful cohabitation between all the grievances splintered the society, communities of the north is once again with the drawdown of foreign troops while legacies of past abuses and possible. This process of reassurance and the post-International Security religious radicalization stirred up and reconciliation is key to the return Assistance Force (ISAF) period tensions further. Yet it is unfair to of the hundreds of thousands of quickly approaching in Afghanistan, blame Bamako for pursuing a deliberate displaced northern Malians and setting attention has focused on the outlook discriminatory policy against northern the conditions that are conducive to for continued armed conflict between Mali, especially against the Tuareg.45 holding credible elections. In this the government of Afghanistan and Several economic projects (mainly in respect, the creation by the transitional the Taliban. While insurgents will terms of infrastructure) were directed government of Mali of a Dialogue and undoubtedly continue to plan attacks to the north. While their impacts on the Reconciliation Commission in March on government officials and security population were limited due in part to 2013 is important. forces, their efforts will also focus on gross mismanagement of funds and poor softer initiatives, such as expanding accountability, the problem of corrosive More efforts could also focus on parallel or competitive governance corruption was not only limited to the mobilizing state media and civil through Shari`a courts. center. Powerful local elites, including society to promote reconciliation and Tuareg who were not appointed by moderation.49 Bamako should engage The establishment of an Islamic state Bamako, were accomplices and at representatives from all communities based on Shari`a law in Afghanistan times primary agents of mishandling in the south and north, including has been the cornerstone of Taliban or embezzling funds allocated to the Islamists who renounce violence and political goals since the movement regions.46 MNLA separatists. Preconditions that began in the 1990s. The growth of the MNLA disarm before dialogue are Shari`a courts, therefore, will be Decentralization and community dangerous and not encouraging. It integral to the Taliban’s post-ISAF participation were designed as a is true that the MNLA is a minority calculus. The Taliban likely recognize means of conflict management and group that does not have the support that their ability to provide law and good governance, but they ended up of the main Tuareg tribes, and hence order through Shari`a capitalizes on breeding high levels of corruption and cannot claim to be their legitimate the shortcomings of the current formal rent-seeking. It is not an exaggeration representative. Yet the inclusion of the judicial system in Afghanistan,1 and to state that a number of elected Tuareg MNLA is crucial for the stabilization of they will quickly attempt to expand elites and army men contributed to the Kidal. courts to contest Afghan government criminalization, delegitimization and control and habituate their authority fall of the state.47 The challenge today In short, the road ahead will be long over the local populace. Measuring is how to reduce political corruption and fraught with peril. Elections are the development of such courts may and rectify the imperfections in important, but they will not offer any provide an insightful barometer of infrastructure delivery and the quick fixes to Mali’s problems. Unifying Taliban influence and local control provision of public goods.48 the country will require widespread post-2014. dialogue and international assistance. This article first provides background Dr. Anouar Boukhars is a nonresident on Shari`a law and its traditional 45 Ibid. scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East role in Afghanistan. It then identifies 46 Lacher, Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sa- program. He is an assistant professor some vulnerabilities to the Taliban’s hara Region; “Mali: sécuriser, dialoguer et réformer en of international relations at McDaniel objectives of implementing Shari`a, and profondeur.” College in Westminster, MD, and the offers indicators that might portend 47 Ibid. coeditor of Perilous Desert: Insecurity the expansion of the Taliban Shari`a 48 To address high-level group grievances in the north, in the Sahara (Carnegie Endowment for court system. It finds that the military Bamako could design strategies to promote social inclu- International Peace, 2013). narrative often overshadows the sion, political integration, and economic empowerment. significance of Shari`a to the Taliban, As the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report and suggests that evaluating the stated, “Signaling change to groups with grievances is growth of the Taliban’s courts can be a often a key early priority.” This can help mobilize sup- beneficial tool in judging the nature of port for transitional justice and reconciliation. Interna- the insurgency in Afghanistan. tional donors can support this process by investing in community development programs that promote basic 1 The shortcomings of the judicial system include limited social services (roads, clinics, courts, etc.) and help im- access (particularly outside of urban areas), corruption, a prove the performance of livestock production and boost lack of transparency, inadequate security, and a shortage cattle exports. 49 Ibid. of human capital.

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Understanding Shari`a He also said, “This is the law that was Why Shari`a Courts Matter to the Population Implementing Shari`a across revealed by God to Muhammad. Those Political scientists have posited that the Afghanistan is a strategic objective of who consider the imposition of this law public will do “almost anything” and the Taliban. Understanding what it to be against human rights are insulting support “almost anyone” to establish means, and the methods in which it is all Muslims and their beliefs.”7 security and reduce uncertainty.11 employed in Afghanistan, is important. Given this concept, Afghanistan’s long- The word Shari`a in Arabic literally Currently, the Taliban operate Shari`a term stability will be impacted by the translates to “the path to follow” and courts (and even some prisons) in government’s ability (or inability) to in jurisprudential context means “ideal several regions of Afghanistan.8 The provide security and certainty through Islamic law.”2 Shari`a is both a system Taliban were able to reopen and operate rule of law. This includes dynamics of criminal justice and a religious or Shari`a courts in the southern provinces that are more closely tied to the local moral code for Muslims. Although this of Kandahar and Helmand since at least populace, and are often overshadowed system is based on principles outlined 2008, and courts have been identified in by the predominant narrative of the in both the Qur’an and the hadith, the the western province of Herat, as well as Taliban versus the Afghan government. implementation of Shari`a is largely in the eastern province of Paktika.9 These For instance, the UN High Commissioner left up to the interpretation of Islamic courts dispense judgment on criminal for Refugees has stated that land- scholars (which many Taliban senior as well as civil cases. This means that related disputes are among the most leaders and commanders claim to be).3 the Taliban can conduct trials of spies serious issues threatening the stability This has resulted in a diverse practice (creating a deterrent for behavior that of Afghanistan.12 As counterinsurgency of Islam, including different schools may harm their movement) as well as theorists have argued, insurgencies of thought.4 The exception is a specific provide services to the local populace, are “20 percent military action and set of punishments for offenses called such as enacting punishment for thieves 80 percent political,” and successful hudud, or “limits,” which are considered or resolving civil matters such as land insurgencies will challenge the state by to be the most serious crimes. These disputes. As a result, the Taliban are usurping the rule of law to mobilize and offenses are punishable by specific able to establish local-level legitimacy control the local population.13 penalties—including stoning, lashing, and transform Shari`a courts and rule of or amputation of a limb—and are law into authority (particularly in rural The Taliban’s provision of law considered by some Islamic scholars to areas where the Afghan government capitalizes on the shortfalls of the be immutable.5 has had difficulty establishing its own Afghan government’s justice sector, legitimacy). which according to U.S. Department of During the Taliban’s regime, Shari`a Defense reporting continues to show was used as a means to establish (or Shari`a, however, is much more than slow progress in becoming transparent, at least project) law and order within just a mechanism to gain local control. consistent, reliable, and fair.14 There Afghanistan. Taliban officials claimed It is also the foundation of Taliban have been increases in the number that their ability to rule through Shari`a governance and used to underpin of Afghan government judges being was misunderstood and overlooked by the cohesion and legitimacy of the appointed and districts holding trials; the outside world. For example, Sher movement. According to Abdul Salam however, the formal judicial system in Muhammad Stanekzai, a senior Taliban Zaeef, the former Taliban ambassador to Afghanistan has demonstrated little leader, stated in 1994, “By enforcement Pakistan, the Taliban believe that only progress in becoming self-sustaining of Shari`a, we have made safe the lives a society based on Shari`a law is living and little will in combating fraudulent and property of millions of people.”6 honorably or within “God’s orders.”10 activity. According to a February 2013 Given the significance of Shari`a as report from Afghanistan’s Tolo TV, more

2 John Esposito, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Oxford: both a means, and an end, for the than 50% of the populace in Afghanistan Oxford University Press, 2003); Joseph Schnat, An Intro- Taliban, the expansion of courts and the has used Taliban court systems rather duction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, implementation of Shari`a are critical than those provided by the Afghan 15 1964). for the viability of the movement. government due to corruption. 3 Hadith are the statements and actions of the Prophet Muhammad. 11 Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War 4 There are several legal traditions, or schools of Shari`a (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Thom- thought. These include Sunni schools—Hanafi, Maliki, Press, 1994). as Hobbes, The Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- Shafi`i and Hanbali—as well as the school of Twelver 7 Ibid. versity Press, 1996). Shi`a, Ja`fari. Most of Afghanistan and Central Asia fall 8 Noah Coburn and John Dempsey, Informal Dispute Res- 12 “Land Issues Within the Repatriation Process of Af- under the Hanafi school, from which the Taliban take a olution in Afghanistan (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of ghan Refugees,” United Nations High Commissioner for strict interpretation. For more details, see Viktor Knut, Peace, August 2010). Refugees, September 1, 2003. Between God and the Sultan, A History of Islamic Law (Ox- 9 Tom Blackwell, “Taliban Rule Returning to Kandahar,” 13 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and ford: Oxford University Press, 2005). National Post, October 2008; Tahir Khan, “Shari`a Court Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964); David Kilkullen, 5 The hudud crimes are syrub (drinking alcohol), sariqa Ruling: Taliban Amputate Thieves Limbs in Herat,” Counterinsurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, (theft), hiraba (armed or highway robbery), zina (illegal Express Tribune, April 21, 2013; David Isby, Afghanistan: 2010). sexual intercourse or adultery), qadhaf (false accusation Graveyard of Empires: A New History of the Borderland 14 “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability of rape), and irtidad or rid`a (apostasy or blasphemy). (New York: Pegasus Books, 2011). in Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 6 Peter Marsden, The Taliban War, Religion, and the New 10 Abdul Salam Zaeef, My Life with the Taliban (New 2012. World Order in Afghanistan (Oxford: Oxford University York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 15 “Corruption in Judicial System Leads People to Tradi-

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Afghan citizens have also cited the include replicating the mechanisms that Indications of an Expansion of Taliban Courts expediency, limited cost, and access to are working in areas outside of their During their regime, the Taliban Taliban courts as notable advantages control, such as mediation by elders, operated 13 high or appellate courts over the formal Afghan government tribal leaders, shuras, and other trusted in several provinces of Afghanistan.22 system. For instance, a local resident of officials. Even during the Taliban’s Although the Ministry of Justice and Paktika Province stated, “The Taliban regime, they was forced to acquiesce or the Supreme Court were located in courts don’t disturb people and tell negotiate with local elites and accept Kabul, the most powerful institution them to wait for a long time before varying degrees of local autonomy, was the Kandahar Islamic Supreme hearing a case, or demand bribes.”16 A especially within more ethnically diverse Court, which appointed qazis (judges) resident of Kandahar Province claimed, areas such as eastern Afghanistan. and provided bi-annual training and “I don’t like our current government at discussions on the application of all, and I don’t really like the Taliban, Furthermore, the insurgents are Shari`a law. Given that Taliban Shari`a either. But I can either spend months in attempting to shift from the arbitrary the government court and pay bribes, measures that the Taliban used when “The establishment of or I can go to the Taliban and have the they were in power. During the 1990s, matter settled in one day.”17 In addition, the Taliban imposed their legal system Shari`a courts represents Taliban courts provide roving support through the Department for the the foundation of what any to remote rural locations in Afghanistan, Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of and may not be fixed to urban areas like Vice, which operated a religious police insurgency is looking to many Afghan government facilities.18 force. The police were empowered to accomplish: to challenge beat and jail offenders, often without Vulnerabilities of Taliban Shari`a Courts any proof or any trial process. To the authority of the Despite its advantages, the Taliban prevent this from occurring again, government by making system is not without faults. Due to the Taliban have taken measures to his personal security practices and the make their enforcement of Shari`a inroads with the local nature of conflict in the region, Taliban more standardized. For instance, the populace.” Supreme Leader Mullah Muhammad 2010 layeha (code of conduct) stated Omar is no longer accessible as that no one is allowed to pronounce the authoritative head of Taliban punishment decisions except Mullah jurisprudence. Given his longstanding Omar, his deputy, or a judge. This, courts are already operational in the absence, the role of legal authority has however, will likely be difficult to rural regions of Kandahar Province likely been delegated to Afghan-based implement throughout all areas of (where insurgent parallel governance commanders, regional tribal leaders, or Afghanistan. Religious police have is possibly among the most robust), power brokers.19 This could allow for reportedly returned to remote Nuristan and due to the proximity to Taliban personality-based rule of law, which Province, for example, and are said to senior leaders in Quetta, Pakistan, it may cause rifts, enable retribution for be enforcing arbitrary punishments for is likely that initiatives to replicate previous personal conflicts, or even behavior without the ruling of judicial the previous bodies will be launched foster tribal favoritism. Although the officials.20 How the Taliban will regulate from this region. The development and Taliban have likely developed internal Shari`a in regions such as Nuristan expansion of courts in Kandahar may be disciplinary mechanisms to manage remains unclear. In addition, even with an insightful gauge of the capabilities such issues, the expansion of Taliban standardization, some of the practices of Taliban Shari`a systems. Indicators courts may complicate their ability to the Taliban employ will continue to may include the establishment of prohibit these practices, particularly be unpalatable to the outside world. appellate courts, the issuing of official outside of Pashtun-dominated For example, Taliban spokesman Qari or standardized summons, and possibly Kandahar Province. Yousef Ahmadi rejected claims that the the operation of trials in open arenas or Taliban were involved in the August public forums (free from fear of ISAF or In addition, the Taliban will have to co- 2010 death of a woman who received Afghan government retribution). opt, marginalize, or co-exist with the 200 lashes and was shot for adultery informal dispute resolution systems based on the grounds that the proper In addition, an expansion would see that currently exist in Afghanistan—to sentence in accordance with hudud Taliban courts spread outside of the should have been death by stoning.21 south, particularly in the more rural tional Courts: Afghan Integrity Watch,” Tolo TV, Febru- areas of Afghanistan, where the ary 19, 2013. populace is often skeptical of the formal 16 Tom A. Peter, “Leery of Courts, Afghans Seek Taliban Afghan government court systems. In Justice,” USA Today, March 7, 2012; Dan Murphy, “Dent the cases where locals have accepted in Afghan War Strategy: Why Kandahar Locals Turn to informal rule of law, the Taliban will Taliban,” Christian Science Monitor, July 6, 2010. look to increase their influence over 17 Ibid. 20 Emma Graham-Harrison, “Taliban Enforcer Squads these structures. Indicators of this 18 “Why the Taliban are So Strong in Afghanistan,” Accused of Ruthless Control in Nuristan,” Guardian, BBC, February 2, 2012. May 1, 2012. 22 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Funda- 19 Sam Siebert, “Has Mullah Omar Lost His Mind?” 21 “Brutality Against Women Stirs Fear in Afghanistan,” mentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale Univer- Daily Beast, October 15, 2012. National Public Radio, August 20, 2010. sity Press, 2000).

15 may 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 5 may include co-opting or coercing local Mexico’s New Strategy continued under the Barack Obama leaders, or even establishing power to Combat Drug Cartels: administration, although at a somewhat sharing agreements. Furthermore, lower level ($660 million between 2011 although some Taliban courts may start Evaluating the National and 2012).3 off as roving, there is likely the intent Gendarmerie to develop more permanent rule of law Although Calderon’s policy was throughout the country. Indicators By Peter Chalk instrumental in eliminating several key of this would be the naming of specific drug lords as well as making record judges for a geographic area, and the in 2012, mexicans elected Enrique Pena cocaine seizures, it had the unintended creation of a court or possibly prison Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary effect of unleashing a highly brutal system in a dedicated building or facility. Party (PRI) as president. On assuming war in the northern provinces. Over power, Nieto pledged to reverse the the course of six years, at least 40,000 Conclusion militarized counternarcotics policies of and possibly as many as 60,000 Insurgents look to overthrow a his predecessor, Felipe Calderon, which people are thought to have died in government through a variety of he maintained were responsible for drug-related fighting as increasingly methods, including armed conflict, as unleashing a bloody drug war that over fragmented cartels moved to engage well as undermining its authority and the course of six years left thousands each other and the authorities in a legitimacy. While much is known about dead. Central to Nieto’s approach is vicious battle over territory and sales the military methods and tactics used the creation of a National Gendarmerie “turf.”4 Those targeted have included by the Taliban against their opposition that will henceforth assume primary members of competing cartels, law in Afghanistan, less is known about responsibility for fighting drug cartels enforcement personnel, businessmen, how they use subversion to gain local in the country. local government officials and ordinary control. The establishment of Shari`a civilians. Victims have been beheaded, courts represents the foundation of This article evaluates Calderon’s dismembered and even skinned or what any insurgency is looking to campaign against drug cartels in Mexico boiled alive.5 accomplish: to challenge the authority and outlines current plans to create the of the government by making inroads National Gendarmerie. It finds that with the local populace (in this case, while the Nieto government has touted George W. Bush and Felipe Calderon met in March 2007 through the provision of security and the force as the first step in gradually to ink U.S. support for the initiative. American money dispute resolution). returning the counternarcotics mission was used to underwrite equipment, training and intel- from the army to the police, it is unclear ligence sharing for counternarcotics, counterterrorism, The Taliban likely recognize that their that the unit represents anything new border security, law enforcement and general institu- implementation of Shari`a in the post- or is relevant to the internal threat tional building. For further details, see Peter Chalk, The ISAF period will not only help shape dynamics of Mexico. In fact, it may Latin American Drug Trade: Scope, Dimensions, Impact and public opinion within Afghanistan, exacerbate what is already an extremely Response (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), but also the international community. complex national law enforcement pp. 60-62. Given the desire to be recognized structure, in addition to significantly 3 “Peña Nieto’s Challenge: Criminal Cartels and Rule as a legitimate political movement, overstretching the functional capability of Law in Mexico,” International Crisis Group, March they may seek to formalize and adapt of the military. 19, 2013, pp. 18-19. Also see Steve Fainaru and William their practices so that they are more Booth, “As Mexico Battles Cartels, the Army Becomes methodical and predictable. Calderon’s Onslaught and its Impact on Drug the Law,” Washington Post, April 2, 2009. Cartels in Mexico 4 “Peña Nieto’s Challenge: Criminal Cartels and Rule of Although the Taliban will promote In 2006, Felipe Calderon instituted Law in Mexico,” p. 1; Randal Archibold, “Mexico Drug their law and order agenda at first, a a major counternarcotics campaign War Bloodies Areas Thought Safe,” New York Times, radical Islamist and draconian rule against Mexican cartels in a concerted January 19, 2012; Ed Vulliamy and Jo Tuckman, “Failure could emerge once enough influence effort to disrupt and destroy the critical of Drug War Brings Call for Change,” Guardian, June 29, or control is obtained, as it did in the nodes of drug trafficking in the country. 2012; Damien Cave, “Mexico Updates Death Toll in Drug 1990s. How, or if, the Taliban plan on At its height, the strategy involved the War to 47,515, But Critics Dispute the Data,” New York preventing such a progression remains deployment of 96,000 combat troops, Times, January 12, 2012; David Agren, “Mexico: Death unclear. Examining the practices nearly 40% of all active personnel, to Toll from Drug-Related Violence is Thousands Higher used by the Taliban will undoubtedly directly confront syndicates and their than was Reported Earlier,” New York Times, August 3, 1 provide insightful indicators regarding leaders. The United States actively 2010. the viabilities and capabilities of the supported the crackdown, pledging $1.4 5 Most drug-related murders in Mexico are the work of insurgency, and will help to understand billion of counternarcotics assistance syndicate-controlled paramilitary cells that operate on counterinsurgency writ large. for fiscal years 2008 and 2010 in a contractual, “fee-for-service” basis. Notable groups what subsequently became known as include Los Negros, Los Gueritos, Los Pelones, Los 2 Jami Forbes is an analyst with the U.S. the Merida Initiative. U.S. support Números, Los Chachos, Los Lobos, Los Sinaloa and Los Department of the Army who specializes in Nuevos Zetas. See Chalk, The Latin American Drug Trade, studies regarding southern Afghanistan. 1 “Calderon devolvio a 50% de la a los cuarteles,” Milenio, p. 42; Ken Ellingwood, “Extreme Violence Grips Mexico She has traveled to Afghanistan on several December 16, 2012; “Sexto Informe de Labores,” Mexican Border City,” Los Angeles Times, December 19, 2008; occasions, and most recently spent several National Defense Secretariat, 2012. James McKinley, “Two Sides of a Border: One Violent, months in Kandahar Province. 2 The name is derived from the town in which Presidents One Peaceful,” New York Times, January 22, 2009.

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Aside from spawning extreme violence, initially be 10,000-strong, with 8,000 the Merida Initiative also failed to personnel drawn from the army (which, significantly disrupt syndicate activity. unlike the police, has largely not been Currently, 10 major cartels operate in afflicted by corruption) supplemented the country (see Figure 1), competing by 2,000 marines from the navy.12 with one another on numerous fronts The plan is to expand this cadre to and within the context of a constantly 40,000 during the next two years with evolving pattern of strategic and all personnel assigned on long-term tactical alliances. Of these, two cartels deployments.13 Although a civilian will are especially powerful and far- have the responsibility for leading these reaching: the Sinaloa Federation, which personnel, the troops themselves will is primarily based in northwest Mexico remain under military/naval command. and down the Baja Peninsula; and Los Zetas, which dominates the northeast The National Gendarmerie will be and areas around the Gulf of Mexico. divided into 14 regional commands that Both have established links with correspond to major drug trafficking Andean cocaine producers and each has zones in the country. Three bases will an extensive presence in the criminal be established along the U.S.-Mexico world of Central America, particularly border and are expected to be fully in Guatemala.6 operational by the beginning of June 2013.14 Members will be thoroughly Finally, Calderon’s approach had vetted, equipped with modern weaponry little impact on corruption. Cartels and body armor and will have access continue to enjoy an exceptionally Figure 1. Major cartels and areas of operation. to an air lift capacity of at least 24 strong influence over municipal law helicopters.15 According to the PRI, enforcement, which according to former of his proposed solution is to take the force will be financed from fiscal and Public Security Secretary Genaro Garcia the counternarcotics function out of energy reforms, with initial expenditures currently “supplement” operational and the hands of the military—which he estimated in the range of 1.5 billion pesos organizational budgets with up to 1.2 argues has not only been ineffective ($117.4 million); exact dollar figures have billion pesos ($94 million) of criminal but counterproductive—and return it yet to be made public.16 money.7 Syndicates have also retained to a law enforcement structure that is inroads to both the Federal Police “clean,” transparent and trusted.10 To Apart from fighting the drug cartels, and the judicial system, reflected by this end, the government has pledged the National Gendarmerie will have the remarkable state of impunity that to create an entirely new paramilitary information collection authority. To this presently exists in Mexico. Nationally, unit that is equipped and authorized to end, it will work closely with the National 80% of homicides remain unsolved, reestablish security across the country. Security and Investigation Center while overall criminal conviction rates (CISEN)—Mexico’s main intelligence currently stand at just two percent.8 The National Gendarmerie, which is agency—and other units mandated to modeled after counterparts in France investigate organized crime groups. The Enrique Pena Nieto Solution: The National and Spain, is due to become operational Considerable emphasis will be placed Gendarmerie later this year. According to the Office on monitoring rural jurisdictions Responding to the apparent failure of of the Presidency, the “corps will be where the state has a limited the Merida Initiative to fundamentally responsible for strengthening territorial presence.17 weaken the drug threat gripping the control in rural municipalities with country, Enrique Pena Nieto announced the greatest institutional weakness, a “Pact for Mexico” on coming to power as well as strategic installations such 9 11 in December 2012. A central platform as ports, airports and borders.” The 12 Personal interview, political risk consultant, Mexico force will fall under the authority City, April 2013; personal interview, U.S. Embassy offi- 6 Personal interview, political risk consultant, Mexico of the secretary of the interior and cial, Mexico City, April 2013. City, April 2013. Also see Chalk, The Latin American Drug 13 Anahi Rama and Dave Graham, “Mexico’s Pena Nieto Trade, pp. 25-30; “Peña Nieto’s Challenge: Criminal Car- targeting youths; legal modernization; overhauling the Plans New Police Force to Fight Drugs,” Reuters, April tels and Rule of Law in Mexico,” pp. 7-13. prison system; and police reform. See “Peña Nieto’s Chal- 9, 2012. 7 Cited in “Peña Nieto’s Challenge: Criminal Cartels and lenge: Criminal Cartels and Rule of Law in Mexico,” p. 14 Thompson. Rule of Law in Law in Mexico,” p. 21. 38. 15 Personal interview, political risk consultant, Mexico 8 Personal interview, political risk consultant, Mexico 10 Robert Gray, “U.S. Border Residents Mixed Over City, April 2013; personal interview, U.S. Embassy offi- City, April 2013. For a historical overview of the extent of Mexico Pena Nieto’s Win,” Reuters, July 3, 2012; Randal cial, Mexico City, April 2013. It has yet to be determined narcotics-related corruption in Mexico, see Laurie Free- Archibold and Damien Cave, “Mexico Election Signals if all 24 helicopters will be procured from the United man, “State of Siege: Drug-Related Violence and Corrup- New Tack in the Drug War,” New York Times, June 11, States or if some will be redistributed from the Federal tion in Mexico,” Washington Office on Latin America, 2012; Vulliamy and Tuckman. Police’s inventory. 2006. 11 Barnard Thompson, “The ‘National Gendarmerie’ and 16 “Peña Nieto’s Challenge: Criminal Cartels and Rule of 9 The Pact for Mexico highlights several components Mexico’s Crime Fighting Plans,” Mexidata.info, Decem- Law in Mexico,” pp. 38-39; Thompson. for reducing crime in the country: community programs ber 24, 2012. 17 Thompson.

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Assessment A further problem has to do with the Despite the optimism surrounding the rural focus of the National Gendarmerie. Morocco’s Stability in the National Gendarmerie, it is not apparent The force is primarily being readied Wake of the Arab Spring that the force represents a fundamental to boost security and surveillance in departure from Calderon’s militarized remote areas where the state has a By Camille Tawil counternarcotics approach. Although limited presence. This is at odds with falling under the Ministry of the the urbanized nature of Mexico where in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Interior, the National Gendarmerie up to 80% of homicides and 95% of all many hoped that the authoritarian will mostly consist of soldiers who crime occurs in the cities—not in the regimes in the North African states will remain under military/naval countryside.22 of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria and command. These troops will be Morocco would be swept from power heavily armed, uniquely trained in Finally, the projected number of troops and new democratic governments rapid assault tactics (rather than more who are slated to fill the ranks of the would replace them. Yet the transition standard evidentiary procedures) and National Gendarmerie is 40,000. While from the old authoritarian rule to a new specifically authorized to operate this represents only a fifth of Mexico’s democratic order has not been smooth. above force levels that typically total armed forces (including doctors, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have all seen apply to the police. The unit will nurses, administrative employees, a sharp rise in political instability, also be large; while not as extensive custodial staff and engineers), it amounts security problems, social unrest, and as the 96,000 personnel that were to around a third of its operational above all a growing presence of Islamist ultimately deployed by Calderon, it personnel. This is a sizeable cut and could militants. These developments occurred will be on par with force levels that erode the military’s ability to perform even though these governments held were mobilized when Calderon first traditional functions of territorial successful elections in the past two came to power (45,000 in 2007).18 As defense as well as assistance missions in years that brought Islamist parties one commentator remarked, despite responding to major natural disasters.23 to power for the first time, mainly in the rhetoric of a new approach, the coalition with other national or secular gendarmerie may simply end up doing There is certainly reason to believe that parties. the same thing in the same places the militarized counternarcotics tack of and with basically the same tactics, Felipe Calderon did not work and that In Algeria and Morocco, the results leadership and equipment as previous an alternative strategy is now required. have not followed this paradigm. In army units.19 The dividend resulting from President Algeria, political reforms are not yet Nieto’s proposed approach, however, complete,1 and the country’s Islamist The National Gendarmerie will also could be marginal at best. Rather than party was crushed during parliamentary add another layer of complexity to creating a new national force, another elections in May 2012. In Morocco, what is already a highly convoluted law option could have been to reform the King Mohammed VI announced major enforcement community in Mexico. A command structure and oversight political reforms, including a new plethora of forces exist in the country, all controls of the existing Federal Police constitution that eliminated many of which answer to separate mandates, and ensure that serving officers at of the entitlements and privileges command structures and bureaucratic the state and local levels are fully he previously enjoyed. During the management systems. The gendarmerie vetted, properly trained and above all subsequent elections in November may inject a new element of confusion adequately paid.24 2011, the Islamists came to power, yet to this Byzantine picture, especially unlike developments in Egypt, Tunisia given that it is meant to operate across Dr. Peter Chalk is a Senior Policy Analyst and Libya, the rise of the Islamists in all levels of governance—local, state with the RAND Corporation, Santa Morocco did not bring turmoil. and national. Particular problems are Monica, CA. He has worked on a range of likely to arise with the Federal Police, projects examining soft power “diplomacy,” Although it may still be premature to not least in terms of how they will civil-military relations, security sector judge the outcome of Morocco’s Arab share resources (including helicopters), reform, international peace operations Spring, there are a few clear lessons delineate jurisdictions and coordinate and unconventional sub-state threats in from the way that the country has intelligence.20 These problems have the Asia-Pacific, Latin America and sub- conducted its transition into what is been encountered in the two countries Saharan Africa. He is author of numerous promised to be a more representative on which the National Gendarmerie is books, book chapters and journal articles government that follows democratic modeled—France and Spain—both of on these subjects and has testified on principles. This article argues that the which are now looking to merge their several occasions before the U.S. Congress. Moroccan “spring” provides a recipe for national forces.21 Dr. Chalk is Associate Editor of Studies other countries in transition to follow, in Conflict and Terrorism, one of the especially in terms of achieving a 18 Personal interview, U.S. Embassy official, Mexico foremost journals in the international gradual change or reform without much City, April 2013 security field. bloodshed or instability. Morocco’s 19 Alejandro Hope, “Is It Worth Creating a Gendarmerie smooth transition can be best explained in Mexico?” Insight Crime, December 10, 2012. 22 Ibid. by the monarchy’s willingness to allow 20 Personal interview, U.S. Embassy official, Mexico 23 Ibid. moderate Islamists to function as a City, April 2013 24 Personal interview, political risk consultant, Mexico 21 Hope. City, April 2013. 1 The amended constitution is still being written.

18 may 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 5 legitimate political party. Morocco’s thought that the Arab Spring would instability or invite a harsh response Islamists, for their part, have also shown bring it to power in Algeria. Instead, from the regime. In Tunisia and Egypt, maturity by accepting a measured, Hams and a coalition of other Islamists in contrast, protestors demanded a step-by-step reform process, instead of were soundly defeated, according to the total regime change.7 In Libya, the calling for a total change of the regime, official election results.4 Hams’ election demands were the same, and eventually as was the case in Tunisia, Egypt and loss may have to do with the fact that the protests evolved into a full-fledged Libya. it previously collaborated with the war. Yet in Morocco, the PJD showed a Algerian government. The opposition, Morocco’s Version of the Arab Spring therefore, may not have considered “Yet in Morocco, the PJD Morocco avoided much of the Arab Hams capable of bringing real “change” Spring violence because the Islamist to society since the party worked with showed a willingness to Justice and Development Party (PJD) the government for so many years. Even meet the king half-way by had been a recognized opposition party though Hams eventually joined the in the years before its rise to power in opposition, voters may have perceived accepting his concessions the November 2011 elections.2 This is that as an opportunist decision— despite some protestors’ in stark contrast to the Islamist parties only joining the opposition once they that came to power during the Arab thought that the Arab Spring in general demands for total regime Spring protests in Egypt, Tunisia and favored the Islamist party in elections.5 change.” Libya. In Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt, the The opposite was true in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, where the Islamists were persecuted by the old regimes; when the “With the Islamist party’s Arab Spring swept these governments willingness to meet the king half-way success in Morocco, there from power, the Islamist parties were by accepting his concessions despite the main beneficiaries.6 some protestors’ demands for total is hope that Salafi-jihadis regime change. It is not clear how much will lose appeal.” In Morocco, however, the old power the king was initially willing to government has remained in power, concede, but the king and his advisers and the Islamists have succeeded as may have realized that their reforms well. The PJD in Morocco, while always had to be deep if they wanted to avoid Muslim Brotherhood was a banned recognized as an opposition party, did developments in neighboring Egypt and organization. In Zine El Abidine Ben not play a role in previous Moroccan Tunisia, where both governments were Ali’s Tunisia, the Ennahda movement governments, which may be why it completely toppled.8 was proscribed and its leaders driven was so successful in elections. Voters into exile. In Mu`ammar Qadhafi’s did not view the party as “corrupt” or In addition to having a moderate Libya, the Muslim Brotherhood fared as “collaborators” with the regime. Islamist party in the officially no better.3 Another factor that may have played recognized opposition, the king’s other to the advantage of the PJD relates to advantage was that the country’s more Only in Algeria did a legal Islamist party the way it responded to protestors’ extreme Islamist group—the banned exist, the Movement of Society for Peace demands in 2011. The PJD pursued a Justice and Charity movement— (Hams). Hams was even represented measured approach with how it pushed refused to use violence against the in the government as a junior partner the king for reforms; it did not cause regime despite its strict position on until it decided to join the opposition the “illegality” of the monarch as the ahead of the legislative elections in May 4 The name of the coalition was the Green Alliance. The “leader of the faithful,” as well as its 2012. Hams, watching developments Green Alliance included the Movement of Society for in neighboring countries, may have Peace, Ennahda and the Movement for National Reform 7 The revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt only lasted a (Islah). few weeks, and their pace seemed to take the Islamist 2 The PJD was established in its current form in 1998, al- 5 There may have also been an unspoken reason why parties, Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood, by sur- though its roots date back further. Its founder, Abdelka- voters rejected the Islamists in the elections: the Algerian prise. The protestors, who included Islamists, demanded rim al-Khatib, was a prominent nationalist figure and a people paid a heavy price during the Islamist insurgency a total “change” of the regime (the removal of Ben Ali physician of King Mohammed V, grandfather of the cur- in the 1990s and some were fearful that voting the Isla- and Mubarak), although it is not clear if this demand rent king. More information on this party can be found mists into power might lead the country into bloodshed was made because of instructions from parties such as on its official website at www.pjd.ma. once more. Therefore, they may have voted for the ruling Ennahda and the Brotherhood. Whatever the case, the 3 The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt entered parlia- party, the National Liberation Front, to ensure stability. Islamist parties did not try to push for a compromise that ment during Mubarak’s rule, but this happened when its 6 The Islamist successes in Tunisia’s and Egypt’s elec- included accepting a gradual reform from the old regimes members won seats as independents, not as candidates tions may have also been helped by the fact that the of Ben Ali and Mubarak. of a political party. In Tunisia, Ennahda was prevented old ruling parties, the Constitutional Democratic Rally 8 Additionally, both governments were toppled despite from operating in the country as a political party and its (RCD) and the National Democratic Party, respectively, Mubarak leading a strong military regime and Ben Ali members were driven into exile (or into prison) in the were banned after the revolutions, and thus the Islamists leading a regime that was successful in both security early 1990s. In Libya, the Muslim Brotherhood was al- did not face an established opposition. In Libya, no loyal- and economic affairs. See personal interview, member most totally dismantled by Qadhafi’s security services ists of the old regime contested the elections, and in any of the commission that was asked by the palace to write in the late 1990s after the group was discovered to have case Qadhafi had not allowed any parties to operate in Morocco’s new constitution in the spring of 2011, Rabat, clandestine cells within the country. Libya during his 42-year rule. Morocco, February 2013.

19 may 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 5 opposition to the monarchy as a system Despite Morocco’s smooth transition, between Morocco and its traditional of government. The movement engaged there still remains significant debate ally, the United States.15 in demonstrations as part of the 20th about the extent of the reforms in the February youth movement, but it country.12 Some criticize the reforms on It is still too early to judge whether the refused to adopt violence—contrary to the grounds that the king has retained PJD’s handling of Morocco’s challenges what occurred in Tunisia and Egypt, too much power, especially in the has affected the party’s popularity. and then later Libya.9 military and religious sectors. Others The only tangible indication has been argue that the reforms have been the results of the partial elections that The Justice and Charity movement was sufficient, especially considering how occurred in five districts to elect new unhappy with the scope of reforms much power the king previously enjoyed. members of parliament in March 2013. included in the new constitution, but its Regardless of whether the reforms went The PJD and its partners in the coalition call for a boycott of the referendum to far enough to transform Morocco into government won every contested approve the amendments was not heeded a “true democracy,” the PJD remains seat.16 If that is an indication, then the by Moroccans; instead, they voted content with the political changes, and popularity of the PJD-led government overwhelmingly to approve it.10 That it favors a gradual, step-by-step reform seems to be intact among Moroccan process.13 Indeed, the PJD’s moderate voters. approach was rewarded in the elections “This outlet could prevent of November 2011: it became the lead Will Islamists in Power Weaken the Appeal of al-Qa`ida and other party in the new parliament, with 107 Salafi-Jihadism? seats, up from the 46 seats it had in the With the Islamist party’s success in Salafi-jihadi groups from last parliament. This result allowed Morocco, there is hope that Salafi-jihadis recruiting a section of the PJD to form a new government in will lose appeal. Although Morocco has coalition with other parties, including not suffered an Islamist insurgency in Moroccan society who may the nationalist Istiqlal Party, which was the past—in contrast to Egypt, Libya and have become jihadists if second with 60 seats.14 Algeria in the 1990s—there have been a few terrorist attacks in the country. In not for their participation Nevertheless, the PJD still faces 1994, there was an attack against the in the political process.” significant obstacles. Morocco suffers Atlas Asni Hotel in Marrakesh.17 In from a rapidly growing population, 2003, a series of suicide attacks rocked limited natural resources, high Casablanca, resulting in 45 deaths, unemployment especially among including 12 suicide bombers.18 In 2011, setback was the start of the break-up of young university graduates, as well an attack in Marrakesh killed 17 people, the 20th February movement; the Justice as geopolitical challenges, such as the most of whom were tourists.19 and Charity faction withdrew from the Western Sahara dispute that almost coalition, depriving the movement from caused a crisis of relations recently All of these attacks were blamed on the thousands of Islamists who made the cells of Islamist militants, some of bulk of the protestors calling for regime 12 “The King’s Reforms Not Enough, Opponents,” BBC, whom were influenced by al-Qa`ida. change. Today, the Justice and Charity June 18, 2011. In the case of the Casablanca bombings movement seems to be contemplating 13 The PJD, along with other groups, organized a large in 2003, Moroccan authorities charged applying to become a legally recognized rally in Casablanca on May 1, 2011, in support of the re- political party. This would allow it to forms announced by the king in his speech of March 9. 15 The United States circulated a proposed Security push for its objectives through the ballot When the constitution was rewritten and the king an- Council resolution that backed widening the remit of the box instead of through street protests, nounced a referendum to vote on it, the PJD called for UN peace mission in the Sahara, MINURSO, to oversee 11 as has been the case for decades. a “Yes” vote. Mustapha Ramid, a top leader of the PJD, the state of human rights in the region. This pleased the explained: “I say with all confidence that the planned Polisario Front. The Polisario Front calls for a referen- constitution has clearly and to a great extent met a large dum on the independence of their territory, which has part of our demands regarding reforms...therefore we de- been administered by Morocco since the 1970s. Morocco, cided to vote ‘yes’ for the constitution, although there are which considers the Sahara part of its historical territo- still many remarks about the chapters.” This statement ries, offered the Sahrawis self-governance under its sov- 9 The Moroccan security forces also calmed the situa- is available at the PJD’s website: www.pjd.ma/news-pjd/ ereignty. The United States had to drop its proposal after tion by not using extreme violence against the protesters. actualite-742. strong protests from Morocco and some of its allies last Had they resorted to such tactics, developments may 14 The Istiqlal is a nationalist-conservative political party month. have escalated, as happened in Tunisia and Egypt. that led the struggle for Morocco’s independence. While 16 For the results of this partial vote, see Jamal Saidi, 10 The new constitution was approved by a majority of a coalition between the PJD and the Istiqlal Party can “Morocco: Coalition Government Wins Partial Elec- 98% of votes, and the participation rate was 70%, ac- be understood from an ideological point of view, what tions,” Morocco World News, March 2, 2013. cording to the official results. is strange about the current coalition government is the 17 Roger Cohen, “Islam Radicals Are Sentenced in 11 Fathallah Arsalane, the Justice and Charity move- fact that it includes the Party of Progress and Socialism France,” New York Times, January 11, 1997. ment’s deputy leader, recently said in an interview that (the former communists). The Moroccan government, 18 “Terror Blasts Rock Casablanca,” BBC, May 17, his group was ready to enter the political fray if the however, is currently facing a major crisis, with the new 2003. authorities allowed it. See “Banned Morocco Islamist leadership of the Istiqlal Party threatening to walk out 19 Angelique Chrisafis, “Moroccan Tourist Cafe Terror- Group ‘Ready to Form Party,’” Agence France-Presse, of the coalition over some political differences with the ist Attack Leaves at Least 15 Dead,” Guardian, April 28, January 7, 2013. prime minister, Abdelilah Benkirane. 2011.

20 may 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 5 a group of Salafi-jihadi clerics with recruit people to train in northern Mali influencing the suicide bombers.20 with al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb Recent Highlights in Authorities arrested a number of these (AQIM).25 These arrests reveal that Terrorist Activity clerics and sentenced them to lengthy jihadists are still operating in Morocco prison terms. All of them maintained and continuing to train despite the fact April 1, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber their innocence throughout. After the that the Islamist PJD is now in power. It in an explosive-laden truck attacked PJD came to power in 2011, the clerics is not clear whether these militants have a police station in Tikrit, Salah al-Din were freed from prison.21 Although plans to execute attacks against targets Province, killing at least seven people. this approach has risks, the PJD hopes in Morocco. There is concern, however, – RFE/RL, April 1 that these clerics will now participate that the French-led intervention in in the political process and therefore northern Mali has made that location April 1, 2013 (IRAQ): Militants provide an outlet for would-be jihadists inaccessible to Moroccan jihadists, attacked the Korea Gas Company at to engage in the political system. Some which might cause them to look for new the Akkas gas field in Anbar Province, of the released Salafi-jihadi clerics, targets or training locations. killing at least three local workers for example, have said that they may and kidnapping two others. They then be willing to work within the political These developments could lead to a set the company’s camp on fire. The system and may even contest elections.22 similar situation as seen in Tunisia facility is located near the border with Former jihadists in countries such as today, where despite the fact that the Syria. According to Reuters, “No group Egypt and Libya have taken a similar country is ruled by an Islamist-led claimed responsibility for the late- approach, although with disappointing government, Salafi-jihadis are openly night assault, but security officials say election results.23 This outlet could recruiting young militants and sending the local wing of al Qaeda, the Islamic prevent al-Qa`ida and other Salafi- them to training camps in the mountains, State of Iraq, is regaining ground in the jihadi groups from recruiting a section of especially along Algeria’s borders.26 remote hills, caves and villages along Moroccan society who may have become If the jihadists in Morocco choose to the Syrian border.” – Reuters, April 1 jihadists if not for their participation in confront the government, however, the political process. it will be difficult for them to achieve April 2, 2013 (PAKISTAN): Dozens much popular support, especially in of militants attacked a major power Nevertheless, the threat from jihadist light of the fact that the party in power station in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa violence in Morocco remains. In the past is Islamist and was elected by the people Province, shutting down electricity to few months, authorities have discovered in free and fair elections. In fact, such a half of Peshawar. The militants, who and dismantled a number of jihadist cells plan could backfire. traveled to the facility from Darra Adam in the country, reviving the memories Khel, destroyed the entire grid station. of 2003.24 The cells were trying to Camille Tawil is the author of Brothers According to a police official, “They In Arms: The Story of al-Qaeda and the entered the grid station and started 20 Four of the best-known Salafi-jihadi clerics in Mo- Arab Jihadists. setting ablaze each and every thing. rocco were arrested and tried in connection with the They kidnapped nine people and killed Casablanca bombings. Mohammed al-Fizizi, Abdul- five of them later and threw their bodies Wahab Rafiki (Abu Hafs) and Omar al-Haddouchi were in the fields.” The militants killed a total sentenced to 30 years in prison, while Hasan al-Kettani of seven people. – Reuters, April 2 was given a 20-year sentence. They all denied any role in the bombings. April 3, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): Nine 21 Al-Kettani, Abu Hafs and al-Haddouchi were all freed Afghan Taliban militants forced their by a royal pardon. way into an Afghan court in an attempt 22 After his release from prison, Mohammed al-Fizazi, to free insurgents standing trial in for example, said that he was working on the final prepa- Farah Province. The assault began rations before announcing a religious education asso- with a car bomb at the entrance to the ciation that will transform into “a political party with a court. For the next seven hours, the religious bent.” He is even quoted as saying that he chose militants battled security forces. All the name for his party as “Learning and Work” (Ilm and nine militants as well as 34 civilians, six Amal). army troops and four policemen were 23 In Egypt, the Islamic Group (al-Gama`a al-Islamiyya) out “jihad attacks” in Morocco. See “Moroccan Authori- killed in the battle. – AFP, April 3 contested the 2011-2012 elections through a political par- ties Dismantled Cells Plotted To Carry Out Jihadist At- ty, the Building and Development Party, which gained tacks In Morocco,” Maghreb Arab Press, May 9, 2013. April 3, 2013 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i- 13 seats in the lower house of parliament. In Libya, the 25 “Busted Islamist Cells ‘Planned Attacks’ in Morocco,” Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants killed former jihadists of the Libyan Islamic Fighting group al-Arabiya, May 9, 2013. four Pakistani security personnel in (LIFG) also contested the elections of the General Nation- 26 In December 2012, the Tunisian Interior Ministry Karachi, Sindh Province. The TTP, al Congress in July 2012, but their political parties, such announced that it had arrested 16 men suspected of be- which claimed responsibility for as al-Watan and al-Umma al-Wasat, failed miserably in longing to a group with ties to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic the attack, fired on a van carrying winning almost any of the seats they contested. Maghreb, in the western regions of Kasserine and Jen- paramilitary troops in Karachi’s Korangi 24 The Interior Ministry announced on May 9, 2013, that douba near the Algerian border. See “16 Qaeda Suspects neighborhood. Karachi, Pakistan’s two extremist cells that were dismantled in November Arrested in Tunisia: Minister,” Agence France-Presse, largest city, is not within the TTP’s 2012 were planning to set up training camps and to carry December 21, 2012. normal area of militant operations,

21 may 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 5 although it has increasingly engaged in April 9, 2013 (SYRIA/IRAQ): The a U.S. drone attack in November 2012. brazen operations in the city in the past Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), an al-Qa`ida Al-Shihri’s latest statement, if verified, year. – Dawn, April 3 front group, announced that it was contradicts those prior claims. – Angola merging with Syria’s Jabhat al-Nusra, Press, April 11; AP, January 23 April 5, 2013 (PAKISTAN): Pakistani the Syrian Salafi-jihadi rebel group security forces killed an alleged Tehrik- that is at the forefront of the insurgency April 11, 2013 (TURKEY): Turkish police i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) commander, against the Bashar al-Assad regime. ISI announced that al-Qa`ida planned to Naimatullah Mehsud, in the Sohrab chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi purportedly bomb the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, as Goth area of Karachi, Sindh Province. said that the ISI and Jabhat al-Nusra well as a synagogue and other targets. – Dawn, April 6 would now be known together as the Turkish authorities, however, foiled Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. the plot after they dismantled two al- April 5, 2013 (THAILAND): A bomb “It’s now time to declare in front of the Qa`ida cells in February 2013. Turkish killed two top provincial officials in people of the Levant and (the) world that authorities arrested 12 people—two southern Thailand’s Yala Province. the al-Nusra Front [Jabhat al-Nusra] is Chechens, two Azeris and eight Turks— Deputy Governor of Yala Province but an extension of the Islamic State of as part of the operation. – UPI, April 12 Issara Thongthawat and Yala’s Iraq and part of it,” al-Baghdadi said. permanent secretary responsible for On April 10, however, Jabhat al-Nusra April 11, 2013 (NIGERIA): Boko Haram security, Chavalit Krairisk, were both declared allegiance to al-Qa`ida leader leader Abubakar Shekau rejected the killed. – Straits Times, April 5 Ayman al-Zawahiri, but denied that possibility of accepting any potential they were merging with the ISI. – Reuters, amnesty offered by the Nigerian April 6, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): A April 9; Reuters, April 10 government. According to Shekau, Boko suicide bomber in a vehicle attacked Haram has not done anything wrong a U.S. convoy near Qalat in Zabul April 10, 2013 (SYRIA): Syria’s Jabhat that would require an amnesty; instead, Province, killing three U.S. soldiers, al-Nusra, a Salafi-jihadi rebel group, Shekau said, Boko Haram should be the two U.S. civilians and three Afghans. pledged allegiance to al-Qa`ida chief one to offer the Nigerian government a The U.S. civilians worked for the Ayman al-Zawahiri. The group denied, pardon. – Voice of America, April 11 State Department and the Defense however, that they had merged with the Department. The Afghan Taliban Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Muhammad April 12, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): claimed responsibility. Later reports, al-Jawlani, Jabhat al-Nusra’s leader, Some 200 Taliban militants overran a however, suggested that the five U.S. said that his group was not consulted remote Afghan Army outpost in eastern personnel were instead killed while on before the April 9 announcement Afghanistan’s Kunar Province, killing foot just outside the gate of the U.S. base from ISI chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi all 13 soldiers assigned to the facility. in Qalat and not traveling in a vehicle that the two groups had merged. Al- The soldiers at the outpost were from convoy as originally reported. – New Jawlani said that while his group has the Afghan Army’s Third Battalion York Times, April 6; Guardian, April 11 received assistance from the ISI, they of the Second Brigade, one of only a will continue to operate under their handful of Afghan Army battalions April 6, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber own name with loyalty to al-Zawahiri. designated by the U.S. military as able killed 22 people in an election campaign Al-Jawlani said, “The banner of the to operate independently and without tent for Sunni candidate Muthanna al- [al-Nusra] Front will remain the same, foreign advisers. – New York Times, April 12 Jorani in Ba`quba, Diyala Province. Al- nothing will change about it even Jorani, however, escaped unharmed. though we are proud of the banner of April 12, 2013 (MALI): A suicide bomber – Reuters, April 6 the (Islamic) State and of those who killed three Chadian soldiers at a market carry it.” – Reuters, April 10 in Kidal. – Reuters, April 12 April 7, 2013 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri released a April 10, 2013 (YEMEN): Said al-Shihri, April 14, 2013 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik- new audio statement, urging Muslims the second-in-command of al-Qa`ida i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in Arab Spring countries to unite and in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), assassinated Mukarram Shah, a local establish an Islamic state. He told purportedly released a new audio leader of the anti-Taliban Awami Syrian rebels to establish a “jihadist statement, criticizing Saudi Arabia’s National Party (ANP), in Swat. The TTP Islamic state,” saying that such a state policy of allowing the U.S. military claimed responsibility, saying, “We would help to reestablish the caliphate. to launch drone aircraft from Saudi have already announced we will attack Al-Zawahiri also said that France territory. “They [Saudi Arabia] made ANP and other secular parties.” – Express would face “the same fate America met it permissible with their bases and Tribune, April 14 in Iraq and Afghanistan” in its military forces that planes launch to kill people intervention in Mali. – RT, April 7; AFP, of faith in Yemen,” al-Shihri said. April 14, 2013 (SOMALIA): Nine al- April 7 “Instead of spending money to fight Shabab suicide bombers attacked poverty and unemployment, and help Mogadishu’s Supreme Court complex, April 8, 2013 (SYRIA): A suicide bomber Muslims defend themselves against in an attack that left at least five people detonated a massive car bomb in a busy enemies, it is spent to fight Muslims in dead. Six of the militants detonated residential and financial district in every place.” On January 24, 2013, the suicide vests, while the other three Damascus, killing at least 15 people. Yemeni government announced that al- were shot to death. The attack has – Dawn, April 8; AFP, April 8 Shihri died of wounds sustained during been described as the most serious in

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Mogadishu since al-Shabab was forced April 15, 2013 (PHILIPPINES): occurred just days ahead of provincial out of the city in August 2011. – AP, April Philippine troops reportedly slightly elections. – Belfast Telegraph, April 18; AP, 14; Guardian, April 14; New York Times, April 14 wounded Isnilon Hapilon, a senior April 18 leader in the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), April 14, 2013 (MALI): Chad’s president in the southern Philippines. Hapilon’s April 18, 2013 (UNITED ARAB announced that he will withdraw followers dragged him to safety after EMIRATES): Authorities announced Chadian troops from Mali because the soldiers attacked their jungle base in that they recently arrested seven “Chadian army does not have the skills Basilan, killing eight militants. The members of an alleged al-Qa`ida cell to fight a shadowy, guerrilla-style war United States has a $5 million bounty in the country. The suspected militants that is taking place in northern Mali… on Hapilon’s head. – New York Times, April were reportedly planning to attack Our soldiers will return to Chad. They 16; GMA News, April 16 targets in the United Arab Emirates. have accomplished their mission.” His The men were also supplying al-Qa`ida decision came just two days after a April 16, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A suicide “with money and providing logistical suicide bomber killed three Chadian bomber attacked a political rally held support and seeking to expand its troops in Kidal. – Reuters, April 14 for the secular Awami National Party activities to some [other] countries in (ANP) in Peshawar, killing 16 people. the region.” – BBC, April 18 April 15, 2013 (UNITED STATES): Two Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan claimed explosions tore through the Boston responsibility. – Dawn, April 16; RFE/RL, April 19, 2013 (UNITED STATES): Marathon, killing three people and April 17 Authorities arrested Abdella Ahmad injuring more than 200. One of the Tounisi, a suburban Chicago teenager two suspects, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, was April 17, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): from Aurora, on terrorism-related killed in a firefight with police in the Afghan authorities discovered the charges as he attempted to board a Boston suburb of Watertown on April bodies of four Afghan soldiers with their flight at Chicago’s O’Hare International 19, while authorities arrested the second throats slit in Jawzjan Province. The four Airport to Turkey. The Federal Bureau suspect, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, that night soldiers had been kidnapped by the of Investigation alleges that Tounisi, in the same suburb. The two suspects Taliban the day prior. – AFP, April 17 a U.S. citizen, was trying to join the were brothers. Before his capture, al-Qa`ida-linked Jabhat al-Nusra, a Dzhokhar Tsarnaev reportedly wrote a April 17, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A U.S. Salafi-jihadi rebel group in Syria. – Fox note in which he claimed responsibility drone destroyed a Tehrik-i-Taliban News, April 21 for the terrorist attack, saying it was Pakistan training camp in South retribution for U.S. military campaigns Waziristan Agency of the Federally April 19, 2013 (NIGERIA): Boko in Afghanistan and Iraq. “When Administered Tribal Areas, killing at Haram group militants released the you attack one Muslim, you attack least five militants. – AFP, April 17 French family that it had kidnapped in all Muslims,” Dzhokhar Tsarnaev northern Cameroon two months earlier. reportedly wrote. Tamerlan Tsarnaev April 17, 2013 (YEMEN): A U.S. drone The family had been held in Nigeria. was 26-years-old, while Dzhokhar killed four suspected militants from al- A Nigerian government report later Tsarnaev is 19-years-old. – Washington Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula in a suggested that Boko Haram received Post, April 23; Fox News, May 16 desert area 90 miles south of Sana`a. more than $3 million in ransom to – AP, April 18 release the hostages. The report did not April 15, 2013 (UNITED STATES): A specify who paid the ransom. – Guardian, U.S. federal court sentenced two New April 17, 2013 (YEMEN): A U.S. drone April 19; BBC, April 26 Jersey men to prison for conspiring blew up the house of Hamed Radman, to join al-Shabab to wage a holy war an influential member of al-Qa`ida in April 20, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A female against non-Muslims. Mohamed Alessa the Arabian Peninsula. Radman was suicide bomber detonated explosives was sentenced to 22 years in prison, killed in the blast. – AP, April 18 outside a hospital in Bajaur Agency while Carlos Almonte received a 20-year of the Federally Administered Tribal prison sentence. Authorities arrested April 18, 2013 (UNITED KINGDOM): Areas, killing at least four people. the two men at New York’s John F. Authorities jailed four Britons for – AFP, April 20 Kennedy airport in June 2010 as they plotting al-Qa`ida-inspired bombings tried to board flights to Egypt. – Reuters, across the United Kingdom. The men— April 21, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): A April 15 Zahid Iqbal, Mohammed Sharfaraz civilian transport helicopter made an Ahmed, Umar Arshad and Syed Farhan emergency landing due to strong winds April 15, 2013 (IRAQ): A wave of Hussain—are all from Luton, north of and heavy rain in a Taliban-controlled attacks tore through Iraq only days London. As part of the plot, the men area of Logar Province. Taliban before provincial elections. Car bombs wanted to pack a remote-controlled toy fighters captured everyone aboard the that exploded at a Baghdad airport car with explosives, and drive it under helicopter—possibly 11 people—and checkpoint killed two people, while four the gates of a British military base. moved them to a more secure location. bombs targeting police patrols killed – Reuters, April 18 Those kidnapped include eight Turkish five people in Tuz Khurmato, Salah al- construction workers, two Russian Din Province. In total, at least 20 people April 18, 2013 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber pilots and an Afghan. – AP, April 22; BBC, were killed in the wave of attacks. – detonated explosives at a Baghdad café, April 23 NBC, April 15 killing at least 22 people. The bombing

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April 21, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A roadside April 26, 2013 (UNITED KINGDOM): CTC Sentinel Staff bomb targeted a Pakistani security A British court gave a life sentence to convoy in Bannu District of Khyber Irfan Naseer for his role as a ringleader Editor-in-Chief Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing four of a Birmingham jihadist cell that Erich Marquardt security officials. – Express Tribune, April plotted to explode up to eight rucksack Senior Editor, CTC 21 bombs in suicide bombings in the United Kingdom. Naseer will have to Editorial Board April 21, 2013 (YEMEN): A suspected serve a minimum of 18 years before COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. U.S. drone killed two suspected he is considered for release. Ten other Department Head militants from al-Qa`ida in the Arabian members of the cell also received prison Department of Social Sciences (West Point) Peninsula (AQAP) in Marib Province. sentences. Some of the men received Hours later, AQAP fighters attacked training at militant camps in Pakistan, COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. a military checkpoint in the same area where they learned how to make bombs Deputy Department Head as the drone strike, killing two Yemeni and mix poisons. The plot reportedly Department of Social Sciences (West Point) soldiers. – AP, April 21 had the blessing of al-Qa`ida. – Sky News, April 26; Reuters, April 26; AFP, April 26 MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. April 22, 2013 (CANADA): Canadian Director, CTC authorities arrested two foreign men in April 26, 2013 (AFGHANISTAN): Montreal and Toronto, charging them The Afghan Taliban declared the start with plotting a terrorist attack on a of their annual “spring offensive” passenger train with support from al- against the Afghan government and Qa`ida elements based in Iran. The international troops. – AFP, April 26 men, Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser, allegedly plotted to derail a passenger April 28, 2013 (PAKISTAN): Two train in the greater Toronto area. A separate bombs exploded at the Contact Canadian official said that the attack campaign offices for secular candidates Combating Terrorism Center was “definitely in the planning stage in Pakistan’s upcoming May 11 elections. U.S. Military Academy but not imminent.” – BBC, April 23 The first bomb, in Kohat city, killed six 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall people. The second bomb, in the suburbs West Point, NY 10996 April 23, 2013 (UNITED STATES): A of Peshawar, killed three people. Both Phone: (845) 667-6383 U.S. court resentenced Wadih el-Hage candidates were not in their offices at Email: [email protected] to life in prison for conspiring with the time of the attacks. Tehrik-i-Taliban Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ Usama bin Ladin to kill Americans. El- Pakistan claimed responsibility. – AP, Hage, Bin Ladin’s former secretary, is April 28 * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 a naturalized U.S. citizen. – Bloomberg, April 23 April 29, 2013 (SYRIA): A car bomb targeted the convoy of Syrian Prime April 23, 2013 (SPAIN): Spanish police Minister Wael al-Halqi in Damascus, arrested two suspected terrorists but the prime minister survived the with links to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic assassination attempt. – BBC, April 29 support Maghreb (AQIM). The suspects were The Combating Terrorism Center would originally from Algeria and Morocco, April 29, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A suicide like to express its gratitude to its financial and they apparently radicalized by bomber on a motorcycle targeted a supporters, for without their support and going to online forums and chat rooms. police patrol car on the busy University shared vision of the Center products like the Authorities said that one of the suspects Road in Peshawar, killing nine people. CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you was identified and recruited by Mali- – New York Times, April 29 are interested in learning more about how based AQIM members and given specific to support the Combating Terrorism Center, instructions for a trip to a jihadist camp April 30, 2013 (SYRIA): A bomb please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call in northern Mali. – CNN, April 24 exploded in the government-held area Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of Damascus, killing 13 people. – Reuters, of Graduates at 845-446-1561. April 23, 2013 (PAKISTAN): A suicide April 30 bomber in a vehicle killed at least four people near a Frontier Corps checkpost in Quetta. Authorities suspect that the bomber was trying to reach a Shi`a- dominated neighborhood. The sectarian militant group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi The views expressed in this report are those of claimed responsibility. – AFP, April 23; the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, AP, April 24 the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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