Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Extension & Advisory Services

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

FEED THE FUTURE NIGERIA AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION AND ADVISORY SERVICES ACTIVITY Conflict Assessment July 2020

Submission Date: July 8, 2020

Contract Number: 72062020C00001 Activity Start Date and End Date: May 25, 2020 to May 24, 2025 COR Name: Charles Iyangbe

Submitted by: Jennifer Snow, Associate Director, Agriculture, Resilience, & Water Winrock International 2101 Riverfront Drive, Little Rock, AR 72202 Tel: +1 501-280-3073

Email: [email protected]

This document was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development Nigeria (USAID/Nigeria).

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

Table of Contents

Acronyms ...... 4 1. Introduction/Executive Summary ...... 5 2. Objective and Methodology ...... 5 Objective ...... 5 Methodology ...... 6 Target States ...... 6 Data Collection ...... 6 Sample Size, Population, Techniques ...... 7 Data Analysis ...... 7 Limitations due to COVID-19...... 7 Applicability for the project ...... 8 3. Summary of Conflict Factors in Nigeria...... 8 Natural Risk Factors and Agricultural and Natural Resource Disputes ...... 10 Terrorism/Extremist Groups ...... 12 Boko Haram...... 12 Ansaru (Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, or Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa) ...... 13 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) ...... 13 Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) ...... 14 Ethnic and Religious Violence/Conflict ...... 14 Economic and Social Exclusion...... 15 Gender Considerations ...... 16 Youth ...... 18 Politics and Governance ...... 18 Security Risks ...... 19 COVID-19 ...... 21 Peacebuilding Efforts ...... 23 State-Specific Issues and Priorities ...... 23 4. Recommendations ...... 24

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

ACRONYMS

AEAS Feed the Future Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Activity APC All Progressive’s Congress CSOs Civil Society Organizations FEWSNET Famine Early Warning Systems Network FTF Feed the Future GDP Gross Domestic Product GON Government of Nigeria ICT Information and Communication Technology IS Islamic State LGA Local Government Area MEL Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta NDA Niger Delta Avengers NEMA National Emergency Management Agency NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PDP People’s Democratic Party PIND Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta PLWD Persons Living with Disabilities SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons SEMA State Emergency Management Agency SME Small or Medium Enterprise UN United Nations UN OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance UPCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program USAID U.S. Agency for International Development VC Value Chain ZOI Zone of Influence

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

1. INTRODUCTION/EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Feed the Future (FTF) Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services (AEAS) Activity is leveraging the power of Nigerian entrepreneurship to facilitate learning, replication, and scale around alternative models of extension to increase access and adoption of agricultural technologies for two million smallholder producers in the FTF focus states of Benue, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Kaduna, Kebbi, and Niger and target value chains (VCs) of maize, rice, soy, cowpea, and aquaculture. Across Nigeria, conflicts or disputes are common and can be related to ethnic, religious, demographic, cultural, political, economic, or civic tensions – or more probably – a combination of these. Such conflicts occur at urban, rural, or national levels, and could involve disputes over farmlands, ponds, rivers, or ranches.1 Conflict is always multilayered and complex, especially where there is a competition for resources. The seven states within the AEAS zone of influence (ZOI) are very diverse, but there are common causes of conflict that run through all the target states. Primary drivers of conflict in Nigeria include: • Natural resource disputes and increasing competition for land and resources, made more difficult as a result of climate change • Violent extremist organizations • Ethnic and religious divisions • Economic and social exclusion and poverty – particularly for women and youth • Political antagonism born of mistrust, corruption, and lack of transparency • Increased availability of unregulated small and light weapons • More recently, COVID-19 This conflict assessment outlines the conflicts and underlying causes within in the ZOI for the AEAS Activity, particularly as they relate to work in the agriculture sector. Given time constraints and COVID- related limitations to in-country travel and in-person gatherings, this assessment was approached as a “rapid assessment,” providing a bigger picture analysis of the major causes of conflict, risk factors, and implications across the country. Limited first-hand information was able to be collected at the state level. This data was used to examine the latent, active and post-conflict phases of conflict and underlying causes in each of the target states, so as to create the enabling environment for the project’s success and a “Do No Harm” approach. This document will be a living document and can be updated as work progresses on AEAS. Specific dimensions of conflict – particularly as related to security, agriculture, natural resources, climate change, gender, youth, and economic conditions – will be analyzed at every stage of the project, from work planning through implementation and monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) activities. 2. OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY Objective This conflict assessment intends to provide detailed understanding of the local conflict dynamics, to

1 International Journal of Education Research, Vol. 6 No. 6, June 2018.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment enable AEAS to understand and address the underlying causes of conflict related to violence and identify and support opportunities for peacebuilding.

AEAS will use a conflict lens in the design of interventions, first, to “do no harm;” second, to mitigate rather than fuel conflict; and third, to create a positive peace-building environment. Methodology This rapid conflict assessment utilizes a case study approach in investigating the dynamics of past and trending localized conflicts located within agrarian communities in the AEAS target states (see Table 1).

Target States2

Table 1: Target States and Regions Region State North-West Kaduna, Kebbi Middle Belt Niger, Benue South-South Cross River and Delta South-East Ebonyi

Data Collection Both primary and secondary sources of data collection were utilized in this rapid assessment. The secondary sources feature existing literature and reports from international organizations like the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET), Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UPCDP), and United

2 Princewell, T., “To keep Nigeria one: A task we all believe in?” Vanguard, July 24, 2019.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN OCHA), the World Bank, Oxfam, Transparency International, the U.S. Institute of Peace, International Crisis Group, U.S Department of State, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Government of Nigeria (GON), and many others. The primary sources of data collection consisted of mostly interviews – key informant interviews, conducted virtually on the internet, and with phone calls. This report also drew from the West Africa Trade and Investment Hub conflict assessment (completed in 2019) and is referenced accordingly.

Sample Size, Population, Techniques The original design of this assessment included a target population covering three categories of respondents:

Category A – Farmers, marketers, and distributors of farm products Category B – Government Officials from the various State Ministries of Agriculture, as well as NGOs Category C – Security personnel, agro-rangers

Given a limited timeframe to complete the assessment and constraints to in-country travel due to COVID-19, a small group of respondents -- 10 per state (70 total), were envisaged for this assessment.

Non-random (purposive and snowballing) techniques were used, with reliance on referrals from local representatives in the various states, beginning with the respective State Ministries of Agriculture, and then experts and resource persons from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs).

Data Analysis The analysis for this assessment adopts the 2016 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Conflict Diagnostic Model.3 Specifically, it juxtaposes existing literature from the aforementioned secondary sources, with the responses from the qualitative interviews conducted with respondents from the seven states, and acquired with phone calls and web-based research. This data was used to examine the latent, active and post-conflict phases of conflict and underlying causes in each of the target states, so as to create the enabling environment for the project’s success and a “Do No Harm” approach.

Limitations due to COVID-19 The COVID-19 situation in Nigeria continues to be a high-risk factor, and the nationwide restriction of movement in Nigeria (through the end of June 2020) consequently created limitations to accessing substantial qualitative data from the potential respondents on a face-to-face basis. Alternatively, the assessment adjusted to conduct interviews with respondents via phone and virtually. The interview guide was uploaded on Google docs for intended respondents to fill to the best of their ability and knowledge.

The method of data collection for this assessment also came with challenges in contacting farmers in the rural communities within the target states, most of who cannot be reached by phone or email. This led to the exclusion of most of the respondents in Category A (outlined in the methodology) which would have been useful in balancing the feedback from the respondents, presenting more conflict-sensitive empirical results.

3 “Conflict Diagnostic Considerations for Food for Peace,” Tetra Tech Company for USAID, September 21, 2016.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

The qualitative data collection also experienced some delays from respondents, most of whom delayed before answering calls or filling out the interview guide. The methodology for this assessment outlined 3 categories of respondents. Not being able to access all the categories of respondents due to the limitation created by COVID and time constraints was balanced with existing literature. Applicability for the project This document serves as an initial guide for the project as it considers partnerships, geographic targeting, and activity planning during the initial project startup period and in Y1 – and will be a living document which can updated as in-country conditions change and the project evolves.

Specific dimensions of conflict – particularly as related to security, agriculture, natural resources, climate change, gender, youth, and economic conditions – will be analyzed at every stage of the project, from work planning through implementation and monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) activities. 3. SUMMARY OF CONFLICT FACTORS IN NIGERIA This rapid conflict assessment’s preliminary findings grouped the risk factors into three main categories: natural risks (e.g., environmental factors, climate change); man-made risk factors (agricultural/land disputes, extremist groups, ethnic/religious context, social exclusion, politics/governance, ); and economic risk factors (poverty, unemployment, and more recently – COVID-19) (see Figure 1). Economic factors are often an underlying driver, affecting both the man-made and natural risks (and vice versa). While most of the identified risk factors tend to have some regional undertones, one thing all the states/regions have in common is the economic risk factor, making it the most serious of the three.

Figure 1: Three Categories of Risk Factors

The Uppasala Conflict Data Program (UPCDP) cites that between 2014-2019, Nigeria experienced 32,390 deaths due to conflict.4 While the vast majority of these were in northeast Nigeria, conflict related deaths occurred throughout the country. Conflict leading to death in Nigeria is driven by many causes, but especially ethnic and religious tensions, particularly the conflict with Boko Haram, which led to 9,357 of the deaths during this period of time.5

4 Information obtained from Uppsala Conflict Data Program website, ucdp.uu.se, on July 7, 2020. 5 Ibid

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

The map below highlights regions of Nigeria based on security risk: highest risk (red), high risk (orange), and medium risk (green). AEAS will not operate in any of the highest risk areas.

In its 2019 conflict assessment, the USAID West Africa Trade and Investment Hub highlighted the following:

Beginning in 2016, violence and general insecurity rose significantly in the Niger Delta. Conflict dynamics in the Niger Delta are primarily fueled by an amalgamation of criminality (including robbery, piracy and kidnapping), cult and gang violence, election violence, ethnic and communal violence, and land disputes, all of which feed into and are exacerbated by a resurgence in militancy.

International Crisis Group identifies four violence triggers that feature throughout the Niger Delta: intense competition between the All Progressive’s Congress (APC) and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) for control in politically strategic states; local rivalries between former and incumbent governors; existing farmer-herder or ethno-religious tensions; and the presence of cult groups that commit violence on behalf of politicians and political parties.6

In the Middle Belt and North Central regions, inter-communal and ethno-religious conflict have led to cycles of conflict that have turned deadly over the years, causing widespread insecurity and destabilizing urban and rural population centers. In the Middle Belt region, pastoralist conflict between farmers and nomadic herdsmen over access to resources — water, land and pasture — has become Nigeria’s key security challenge, causing widespread violence and destruction of property and farmland. These pastoralist conflicts often take on an ethno-religious dimension, pitting Christian farming communities against Muslim pastoralists, and one ethnic group against another. Communal violence over land has been driven by unclear border demarcation and boundary disputes, as well as other issues such as chieftaincy disputes.

In recent years, these dynamics have been exacerbated by militia attacks, lacking government response, and 2018 laws banning open grazing in Benue and Taraba. Additionally, the spread of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria, from the Niger Delta to the Middle Belt to the Northeast, have also contributed

6 “Nigeria’s 2019 Elections: Six States to Watch,” International Crisis Group, December 2018.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment to the lethality of these conflicts. Farmer-herder conflict has claimed significantly more lives than the Boko Haram insurgency and has displaced thousands.7 Natural Risk Factors and Agricultural and Natural Resource Disputes The effects of climate change and environmental factors like desertification, drought, and the drying of Lake Chad in the North, combined with the activities of Boko Haram in the North Eastern region, has made cattle grazing difficult, and has driven herders to migrate southwards to exploit the rich grazing areas of the higher rainfall zones with less worries of possible attacks on herds. These environmental disasters and resulting migration have led to heightened tensions beyond the Middle Belt region (which used to be the epicenter of the farmer-herder conflict), increasing the prevalence of violent clashes in struggle over land resources. These conflicts are now appearing in the Southern regions, affecting States like Delta, Enugu, Ekiti, Ondo, and Osun.

The Southern region, featuring Cross-River, Delta, and Ebonyi States, and the Middle Belt state of Benue, are frequently affected by both natural and man-made disasters like flooding, gully erosions, intra-state community clashes, inter-state border disputes, and clashes between farmers and herders, resulting in the destruction and loss of crops, lives, and property. Adding to this environmental conflict is also another agro-related problem – land grab. Taking into consideration constant loss of lands to environmental disasters, infrastructure development projects, and urbanization, land grab has become a serious risk factor. Similarly, in some cases, oil spillage in the Niger Delta region, which affect aquatic lives and agricultural lands, generate conflicts from communities who rely on aquatic lives for their livelihoods. Cases of fatal conflicts between the affected communities and government on one hand and between the communities and oil firms on the other hand, reoccur.

The Northern region is distinct for its robust nomadic farming, in addition to subsistence and commercial agriculture. Traditionally, herders moved cattle through grazing reserves and along traditional migration routes during the productive rainy season and had a symbiotic relationship with farmers over the dry season by grazing cattle on crop residues after harvest. Extensification of farming, land grabs, and migration caused many LGAs and States to allow the encroachment of crop production into traditional grazing reserves, reducing the area available to rainy season grazing. Pasture degradation due to the smaller grazing areas available combined with the environmental factors and associated issues exacerbated the peripherally associated criminal elements, including cattle rustling, animal banditry, and farmer-herder conflicts. In the past five years, such-agro related problems have come to be a dominant feature of most states in the North-Western and Central regions of the country, namely Kaduna, Niger, Kebbi, and Zamfara.

The most renowned and violent of the man-made risk factors is the near-constant clashes between farmers and herders in the Middle Belt region, specifically in Benue and Plateau States. The farmer- herders conflict is a social and economic problem best understood when the interplay between desert encroachment and the compulsion or desperation by nomadic farmers and their herds to survive, are in focus. The effect of this environmental crisis is the clashes between the nomadic herders pushing down South through the Middle Belt and beyond (to the South-South, South-West, and South-East).

There are also negative economic implications following these man-made and natural agro-risk factors. Between 2003 and 2007 in Bauchi State (North-Eastern Nigeria), livestock valued at over two million

7 “Stopping Nigeria’s Spiraling Farmer-Herder Violence,” International Crisis Group, July 2018.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

Naira was lost.8 Mercy Corp, in a Department for International Development-sponsored study on the causes and effects of the farmer-herder crisis between 2013 and 2016, also revealed an annual loss of $14 billion in potential revenue.

Several studies have noted that as environmental degradation and climate change increase, so does the likelihood of increased conflict over scarce natural resources and the potential for additional associated negative impacts. The U.S. Institute of Peace outlines climate change related impacts in Nigeria – particularly if the government to adequately address the risks -- to include: increases in food insecurity and health issues, displaced populations, and adverse economic effects.9 Another report notes, “The consequences of climate change have untold security implications on the life of Nigerians. A series of inter-ethnic, inter-religious, and reprisal attacks in the country have been traced to the doorsteps of the two groups that are forced to live together as a result of unfavorable climatic conditions in the northern parts of the country.”10

Likewise, the West Africa Trade and Investment Hub notes in its conflict assessment: Nigeria has also been impacted by climate change, environmental pressures, and increasing competition for land and resources. Environmental pressures are also closely linked to conflict in the country. The Middle Belt region has seen perennial land-based conflicts between pastoralist and herder communities, for example, and oil spills in the Niger Delta have created tensions over impacts on the health and livelihoods of local communities.11 There are concerns that, as climate change intensifies and competition for land increases, these conflicts could become more common.

The Northwest region of Nigeria is one of the most vulnerable to climate change. States at the northern fringes such as Zamfara, Kebbi, and Sokoto have experienced the combination of increasing temperatures and declining rainfall. Naturally, this has facilitated desert encroachment, with loss of the lands that retain water.121314 Other states in the Northwest, including Kaduna, Katsina and Niger, are also vulnerable but not at the degree of the earlier mentioned three states. Studies show that the Southwest and Southeast states are less vulnerable to climate change than other parts of the country. Specifically, within Southern Nigeria, the South-south (Niger Delta region) is the most vulnerable, given

8 Okoro, J., “Herdsmen/farmers conflict and its effect on socio-economic development in Nigeria,” Journal of Peace, Security and Development, 4, 1, 143 – 158. 2018. 9 Sayne, Aaron, “Climate Change Adaptation and Conflict in Nigeria,” United States Institute of Peace, 2011. 10 Folami, Olakunle, “Climate Change and Inter-Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria,” Peace Review," 25 (1): 104-110, 2013. 11 Conroy, S., “Land Conflict, Climate Change, and Violence in Nigeria: Patterns, Mapping, and Evolution”, National Stability and Reconciliation Program, March 2017. 12 Abdulkadir, A. et al., “Climate change and its implications on human existence in Nigeria: a review,” Bayero Journal of Pure and Applied Sciences, 10(2), 152-158, 2017 13 Akande, A. et al., “Geospatial Analysis of Extreme Weather Events in Nigeria (1985– 2015) Using Self-Organizing Maps,” Advances in Meteorology, 2017. 14 Ebele, N. E. and Emodi, N. V., “Climate change and its impact in Nigerian economy,” Journal of Scientific Research & Reports, 10(6), 1-13, 2016.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment the sea level rise, increased rainfall, erosion along the coastline, and flooding. This has resulted in the displacement of many communities.151617

The adverse effects of climate change will likely manifest in different ways in diverse income groups, classes, vocation, age brackets, and gender.18 The agricultural sector is immensely vulnerable to climate change, and this affects women more, since a larger percentage of women are resource-poor farmers who rely on rain-fed agriculture19 and who take primary responsibility for collecting wood and water for the household.

The Nigerian government has not fully succeeded at easing tensions between herdsmen and farmers. States such as Benue have passed laws that ban herdsmen from grazing their cattle on open land. Wole Soyinka, a Nobel laureate and prominent Christian leader in southern Nigeria, argues that the ban is not harsh enough and believes Fulani herdsmen should be declared terrorists by the state, therefore allowing police greater authority when handling the conflict. On the other hand, many northerners believe the grazing ban further instigates the Fulani’s violence.

At its foundation, the Fulani-Bachama conflict is about scarce land and resources. With 70% of the Nigerian labor force employed in agriculture, and livestock production accounting for 35% of the regional gross domestic product (GDP), it is evident that Sahelian livelihoods are heavily reliant on a fertile environment. Diversifying livelihoods and exploring other land uses could therefore be the next step to mitigating conflict and addressing changing climates. Also deploying hi-tech agriculture including vertical farming may play a role in mitigating conflict from limited access to land. Terrorism/Extremist Groups Boko Haram Boko Haram is the country’s most active Islamist extremist group. Despite the group’s allegiance to the so-called “Islamic State” (IS) transnational Islamist militant network, Boko Haram’s sources of funding, membership base, and motivations are believed to remain largely domestic. Boko Haram is calling for a stricter implementation of Sharia (Islamic law) and the abolishment of the “Western” education system, though the latter objective is not reflected in its dominant targeting patterns, which mostly serve a domestic, anti-establishment agenda.

The group was founded in 2002 in Borno state by its former spiritual leader Mohammed Yusuf, who was killed in a security crackdown in July 2009. While the group was believed to be all but eradicated following this crackdown, it re-emerged as a more powerful force in 2011, with two high-profile, separate attacks on the police and United Nations headquarters in Abuja, and a militant, territory- capturing campaign centering in the northeast. The growth of the group has been fueled by heightened

15 Matemilola, S, “Mainstreaming climate change into the EIA process in Nigeria: Perspectives from projects in the Niger Delta Region,” Climate, 7(2), 29, 2019. 16 Federal Ministry of Environment. United Nations Climate Change Nigeria. National Communication (NC). NC 2. 2014 17 Sayne, A., “Climate change adaptation and conflict in Nigeria,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report, June 2011. 18 Amobi, D. and Onyishi, T., “Governance and climate change in Nigeria: A public policy perspective,” Journal of Policy and Development Studies, 9(2), 199-210, February 2015. 19 Onwutuebe, C. J., “Patriarchy and Women Vulnerability to Adverse Climate Change in Nigeria,” February 2019.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment perceptions of discrimination against the north and exacerbated ethno-sectarian tension there.

Initially, most Boko Haram attacks consisted of attacks targeting the security forces, local politicians, Christian and Muslim clerics, or communities perceived to be an obstacle to their objectives. However, the group later began to target civilians, engaging mostly in indiscriminate, high-casualty attacks, frequently through suicide bombings.

Most violence by the group has taken place in the northeast; the authorities in May 2013 imposed a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe and launched military operations against the movement. However, the group has also been able to successfully carry out attacks elsewhere, including occasionally in larger cities, such as Abuja, Jos, and Kano. Security operations and awareness of the threat in the capital have succeeded in mitigating the threat, and largely confining it to the city’s outskirts.

The group’s cross-border activity in northern Cameroon and southern Niger prompted regional governments to initiate a multinational military operation in early 2015, led by Chadian forces. These forces, and Nigerian military operations, have made significant headway and succeeded in reversing some territorial gains made by the group, though the risks from Islamist militancy in the northeast remain extreme. The group is capable of staging high-casualty attacks in Borno, including on the outskirts of Maiduguri, notably at transport hubs, government and security force infrastructure, places of entertainment, and Christian and Shia Muslim-related targets. The potential for sporadic attacks outside this core area of operations also persists.

Ansaru (Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan, or Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa) This breakaway faction of Boko Haram emerged in mid-2012, declaring its intention to target “any group or religion that attack Islam and Muslims.” Its main support base was in Kano state, where Islamist militants have been increasingly active. Ansaru cites Boko Haram’s targeting of Muslim leaders who have resisted or opposed its militant campaign as its main ideological divergence with the sect, but shares its intent to fight the establishment, notably the security forces. Ansaru claimed responsibility for an audacious attack in November 2012 on a detention facility and police post in Abuja during which several detainees, including suspected Islamist militants, were freed.

Ansaru has carried out several high-profile kidnappings of Western hostages. The United Kingdom Government in November 2012 added the group to its list of terrorists organizations, accusing it of ties to Al-Qaeda and blaming it for the death of one of its nationals who was abducted in May 2011 in Kebbi state and killed during a failed rescue operation in Sokoto state in March 2012. The faction was also suspected of involvement in the kidnapping of a German engineer in Kano in January 2012 and that of seven foreign construction workers in February 2013 in Jama’are (Bauchi state); this practice clearly set it apart from Boko Haram. However, no attacks have been attributed to the sect since the arrest in April 2016 of Ansaru’s leader, Khalid al-Barnawi, during a military operation.

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) MEND—effectively an umbrella name for a variety of armed gangs—emerged in 2006 and was formerly the most active and best organized militant group operating against oil companies in the Niger delta region. Attacks by MEND and its affiliates have typically taken the form of bombings against oil infrastructure, kidnapping of local or expatriate employees, or piracy. Like many other armed groups, it has a major involvement in crime, including oil bunkering.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

The level of threat it posed to foreign personnel and assets in the region decreased significantly in October 2009 after its regional commanders, as well as most of its fighters, declared a ceasefire and engaged in a government-backed amnesty program. A radical faction of MEND called off the ceasefire and has engaged in sporadic, disruptive attacks on infrastructure in the region. Former MEND militants have also engaged in sporadic protests as a result of frustration with the amnesty process, such as late payments of monthly benefits to former militants.

However, the federal government’s decision in 2016 to reduce the monthly amnesty benefits allocated to former militants and its perceived failure to address grievances of communities in the Niger delta led to an increase in attacks targeting oil and gas infrastructure. Other armed gangs have emerged in the region after the amnesty plan was implemented with a blend of criminal, militant, and activist motives.

Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) Since February 2016, this group has claimed responsibility for several attacks on oil infrastructure and pipelines, primarily in Delta, Bayelsa, and Rivers states. It is driven by environmental grievances and claims a greater proportion of state oil revenues for the Niger delta region. The group shares similar motives with MEND, though the latter has condemned and dissociated itself from the NDA’s activities.

Oil industry installations are the group’s prime targets; while attacks on the Nigerian military have also been recorded, a link with the NDA has not been confirmed. Local creeks provide convenient hideouts, from which militants and criminals can coordinate raids.

Counter-militancy operations have been launched by security forces in the Niger delta region. The government has also committed to talks with various Niger delta groups, though these are unlikely to substantially solve their deep-seeded grievances in the near-term. Ethnic and Religious Violence/Conflict Nigeria’s population is roughly 50% Muslim and 40% Christian. Serious communal violence caused by a mixture of ethno-religious divisions and tension over resources can break out with little or no warning, especially in the so-called “Middle Belt,” or central region, which marks the intersection of the mainly Muslim north, where 12 states enforce Islamic law (Sharia), and the predominantly Christian south.

Attacks by Fulani herdsmen, primarily aimed at robbing village residents and stealing their cattle, can quickly degenerate into tit-for-tat violence, vigilante activism, and potentially sectarian disturbances. Fulani herdsmen traditionally operate in central states, particularly in Benue, Kaduna, Niger, Plateau, Taraba, and Nasarawa. This type of violence mainly affects rural areas and appears to have intensified in those states in recent years, partly due to the growing scarcity of grazing land (as mentioned in the previous section), and has begun to affect areas further north, such as Katsina and Zamfara states, as well as further south, such as Enugu state.

In Benue state, higher risk Local Government Areas (LGAs) for herder-settler conflict include Ado, Agatu, Buruku, Guma, Gwer, and Logo LGAs. Cross River State has seen recent high levels of inter-ethnic communal violence in the Egbor, Urubam, Ipene, and Abanwan LGAs. This has included several fatalities and displacement of people because of territorial disputes.

In the Niger Delta, ethnic violence/conflict is also a significant risk factor. The state is majority Christian with several religious minorities. Ethnically the Edoid Urhobo-Isoko people are predominant, but there are also several ethnic sub-groups, including the Isoko, Ezon, and Igbo. Oil and the presence of

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment international oil factories is an escalating factor for ethnic related conflict.

Likely triggers for ethnic disturbances include actual or perceived slights against members of a given community by members of another, or heavy-handedness by security forces. Authorities tend to deploy elements of the Joint Task Force in key locations when outbreaks of unrest occur, as well as sometimes restricting movement by imposing curfews. However, the security forces—the bulk of which are based in main cities— are often slow to intervene in rural areas.

In its 2019 conflict assessment, the West Africa Trade and Investment Hub noted: Nigeria has a history of sectarian violence, and conflict continues to occur along ethnic, religious and geographic lines. In many cases it is difficult to separate ethnic, religious and regional conflicts or grievances, as many of these identities overlap. In the Middle Belt states such as Kaduna and Plateau, violent inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflict has occurred between Muslims and Christians. In the Niger Delta, the resurgence of pro-Biafra sentiment has relied on a discourse of secession based on the region’s ethnic and religious makeup. In Cross River State, fieldwork participants highlighted the prevalence of an “indigene vs. non- indigene” divide among ethnic groups. Throughout the country, the rhetoric of a North-South divide continues to be salient, particularly in areas where ethnic or religious identities correspond with geographic disparities in resources or services. Economic and Social Exclusion Cultural diversity remains a huge issue, including in the agricultural sector where it continues to have a huge impact on the regional value chains. Reports from resource persons in Benue and Kaduna States reveal that there are numerous cases of exclusion and marginalization on the grounds of religion, ethnicity, gender, and physical disability for Persons Living with Disability (PLWD). Government policies relating to agriculture at the State level continue to exclude certain groups, failing to bring them into the mainstream. Among the affected groups are PLWDs, women, youth, and even children. In the words of Bernard Bassason, a resource person with an international NGO and an expert on the farmer-herder conflict, “cultural diversity is yet to be mainstreamed into the agricultural sector, as we have it in other sectors; hence in conducting our diagnostics, it is imperative that we mainstream it into agriculture so that certain groups are not deliberately cut-off from agricultural interventions.”

Economic inequality – and the country’s high poverty rates overall – are other significant drivers of conflict. A study commissioned by Oxfam in May 2017 states, “Economic inequality matched with low, unequal and inefficient provision of public services results in very high levels of multidimensional poverty, meaning that multiple deprivations occur in the same households with respect to education, health and living standards. In fact, estimations suggest that Nigeria may be the country with the highest number of multidimensional poor in the world.” 20

Nigeria’s unemployment and under-employment rates in 2018 were 23% and 20%, respectively21 -- and in mid-2019, the Nigerian Ministry of Labor projected that this could increase to more than 33% in 2020.22 (This does not take into consideration effects of COVID on the economy and jobs.) The resulting income inequality, along with limited economic development, particularly in the north, contributes directly to social and political discontent. Women and youth are disproportionally affected.

20 “Inequalities in Nigeria exploring the drivers,” Oxfam, May 2017. 21 The World Bank Country Overview, October 13, 2019. 22 Premium Times, May 2, 2019.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

The country also faces economic and social impacts (and resulting conflicts) due to migration and displacement. According to International Crisis Group, “Since the [extremist] violence escalated in January 2018, an estimated 300,000 people have fled their homes. Large-scale displacement and insecurity in parts of Adamawa, Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba states hinder farming as well as herding and drive up food prices. The violence exacts a heavy burden on the military, police and other security services, distracting them from other important missions, such as countering the Boko Haram insurgency.”23 Internally displaced persons (IDPs) escaping the violence in the NE are moving into the nearby States, including Benue and Ebonyi, and seeking farmland and other resources with which to sustain themselves. In addition to IDPs, there are regional refuges. Cross River shares boundaries with three states and one international border with Cameroon. Recently, as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reports, “A little-known exodus has been taking place for more than a year in western Africa as tens of thousands of people flee the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon to seek refuge in southern Nigeria’s Cross River State. Teams from MSF have launched an emergency response to provide aid to the refugees and the communities hosting them." A refugee camp has been set up in Ebonyi, but this influx of IDPs and refugees is an additional source of conflict for a region that already is resource constrained and experiences land disputes arising from other types of social exclusion.

Gender Considerations In the agriculture sector, in spite of women’s significant contributions to Nigeria’s agriculture and food security – providing an estimated two-thirds or more of all agricultural labor – they lack equal access to land and other assets, inputs, extension services, credit, fair pay, and opportunities for group membership and leadership, among other things.24 Constraints vary across states, with higher levels of female illiteracy in the north than in the south, but with higher levels of HIV/AIDS and gender-based violence in the south.25 Conflict has led to displacement and shifts in gendered social roles among men and women, young and old.26

Over the years, women have established more defined roles in agriculture as productive actors and economic partners in Nigeria by their involvement in agricultural production, processing, and utilization. A woman’s role in the agricultural sector is significantly affected by socio-economic factors such as income, time, education, inequality, discrimination and access to infrastructure. Women are majorly providers of direct labor on the farmlands and are basically “assets” to the man as the number of wives increases his speed of work through his farmlands. Within this context, women generally do not have access to ownership of land, and are affected by discrimination with respect to inheritance and land ownership.27 For example, in the Northeast, only four percent of women own land compared to 52 percent of men.28 Likewise, women have less access than men to farm inputs, fertilizer, extension services and other services.

Several interactions with women have shown that, although government have made efforts to see that women make some traction in the agricultural farm business, the gender norms and barriers imbedded in the Nigerian culture has jeopardized these efforts and women are seen to make some significant

23 International Crisis Group, July 26, 2018 24 “National Gender Profile of Agriculture and Rural Livelihoods: Nigeria,” Food and Agriculture Organization, 1, xiv–xv, 2018 25 “Nigeria Country Development Cooperation Strategy 2015–2020”, USAID, 2015. 26 Ibid, 20. 27 “Social Institutions & Gender Index: Nigeria”, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2014 28 Ibid.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment progress only when development partners who are focused and intentional on women in agriculture, create platforms with the objective of giving women agency and space, to participate in farm business.

Women and men play different roles and responsibilities in agricultural production, processing, and marketing. These roles and responsibilities vary across the various participating states. These roles are often based on prevailing socio-environment factors such as economic, climatic and environmental changes, institutional and socio-cultural factors. Religious, cultural, and social norms constrain women's rights to participation in economic activities, while reproduction and household responsibilities impinge on their time and mobility. The range of agricultural activities and crops cultivated by women is dictated by norms rather than their capabilities. Hence, variations exist among different social groups in women's role in agriculture.

Since gender relationships are socially determined, there is great diversity from one area of Nigeria to another. In Kaduna, Niger and Kebbi which is in the northern part of Nigeria, religion plays a large role in the division of labor. Among Muslims, gender norms around seclusion dictate that women are less involved in outside-the-compound farming tasks. However, non-Muslim women are involved in every stage of agricultural production. Generally, rural women are actively involved in post-harvest processing as well as in raising poultry and small animals (sheep and goat), even when in purdah. Thereby contributing directly to disempowerment of women.

Security challenges resulting to migration are among the key factors driving women’s growing role in agriculture. Also, conflict is a key factor that is directly and rapidly altering women’s roles in agriculture through the loss of able-bodied male labor and means of livelihood. Climate change exacerbates migration of herders which ardently leads to fragility, civil unrest, and conflict with farmers. These societal unrest and increased insecurity have resulted to large displacements of community members and have left a large share of women as primary providers for all agricultural supplies and household needs.

In addition, it is widely recognized that women are more vulnerable to gender-based violence in Nigeria, due to their lack or limited access to resources (such as land, education, information, and income). These vulnerabilities include rape, forced marriage, forced impregnation, indentured labor, sexual servitude. In addition, these have kept women in poverty as well as deprives them of their rights and undermines their capacity for change.

In its 2019 conflict assessment, the West Africa Trade and Investment Hub notes: Women and girls are deeply impacted by conflict and insecurity in Nigeria, both through direct violence and through indirect consequences such as loss of livelihood and displacement. Women throughout the country face high rates of gender-based violence, and few states currently have legislation prohibiting sexual violence.29 This was identified as the main vulnerability for women and girls in the three focus regions (Middle Belt, Niger Delta, Northeast). Women continue to be significantly underrepresented in politics and decision- making processes. Legislation around promoting gender equality has also been shut down within the government. The 2010 Gender and Equal Opportunities Bill was rejected in 2016 on the grounds of violating ‘certain biblical and sharia principles.

29 “Nigeria 2016 Human Rights Report”, U.S. Department of State, 2017.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

Youth With over 200 million people, Nigeria holds one of the largest youth populations in the world.30 In its December 2018 report, the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics cited that 55.4% of youth (aged 15-34) are either unemployed or under-employed, a slight rise from the previous year. The growing youth population suffers from many of the same inequities as women, in addition to rising unemployment, particularly in rural areas.31 Young people in Nigeria are burdened with the strain of a number of factors, including unemployment, population growth and inadequate socio-economic structures, inappropriate school curricula, and the rapid expansion of the educational system so that in cases where they are able to acquire certificates, these are hardly enough to secure them jobs or even provide job security. Many youth are forced to make rural-urban migrations in the hope of finding better employment.32

The West Africa Trade and Investment Hub similarly explains: Youth unemployment also remains a pressing concern in Nigeria. Fieldwork participants throughout the country connected the high rate of youth unemployment to criminality and drug abuse, and noted that poverty increases youth vulnerability to recruitment by extremist or criminal groups or manipulation by politicians. The high rate of unemployment and lack of economic and livelihood opportunities for the youth population were key vulnerabilities highlighted by participants in the fieldwork. Interviewees throughout the country asserted that youth unemployment drives criminality, extremism, and drug use in Nigeria. Politics and Governance Political Violence During electoral cycles, politically motivated violence is frequent and can take the form of voter intimidation, attacks on supporters or officials from rival political parties, and unruly protests or riots. The authorities tend to deploy substantial security force contingents during electoral cycles and may implement curfews preemptively, particularly for gubernatorial and presidential polls.

The line between politically motivated and ethnic or sectarian violence can be blurred. This was demonstrated during riots in several northern and central states, notably Kaduna and Kano, which followed the announcement of President Goodluck Jonathan’s victory in the April 2011 election; around 800 people were reported to have been killed in several days of violence. Incidents of politically motivated violence, albeit on a smaller scale, were also reported in the run-up to the March 2015 presidential election and the gubernatorial elections that followed in April 2015. Subsequently, the 2019 presidential elections also brought violence, primarily in the south.3334

Potential triggers for such disturbances include the postponement of elections, the announcement of results, or allegations of electoral fraud. Outbreaks of violence can occur during political meetings or demonstrations, at the passage of campaign convoys, at political party offices, and around polling stations.

South eastern states, including Ebonyi state, sees regular conflict and violence associated to the long- standing demands of the Indigenous People of Biafra and Movement for the Actualization of the

30 The World Bank Country overview: Nigeria, October 13, 2019 31 “Nigeria Country Development Cooperation Strategy, 2015–2020,” USAID, 2015 32 http://rais.education/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/001.pdf 33 New York Times February 25, 2019 34 Information obtained from SBM Intel, website https://www.sbmintel.com/wp- content/uploads/2019/03/201903_Election-violence.pdf, July 3, 2020.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

Sovereign State of Biafra. The objective of these groups is the formation of an independent country for the Igbo people.

Transparency & Corruption Transparency International ranked Nigeria at 146/180 in its 2019 corruption perceptions index; this is a decrease from the prior year. This correlates to 26 points out of 100 on the index in 2019; meanwhile, the global average is 43 and the average for sub-Saharan Africa average is 32.35

The U.S. State department notes, “Nigeria has yet to develop effective systems to address corruption, poverty, and ineffective social service delivery.”36 Likewise, the West Africa Trade and Investment Hub states: Mistrust in the national government and a lack of legitimacy of state governments due to widespread perceptions of corruption and nepotism are key political vulnerabilities in Nigeria. Interviewees during the fieldwork identified a lack of confidence and mistrust in the judiciary as a widespread concern across the country, citing perceptions of corruption, bias, impunity, and ineffectiveness. Corruption is widespread in Nigeria, which affects the functioning of both the security forces and the legal system and undermines accountability. Security Risks Crime Nigeria has very high levels of crime. The risks vary between different parts of the country, but violent and opportunist crime are prevalent and related risks are exacerbated by the availability of firearms. Armed robberies tend to increase between October and December in the run-up to Christmas in southern Nigeria, when more frequent audacious attacks are traditionally observed. Additionally, credit card/email scams and ATM fraud are an increasing concern.

Violent crime—including mugging, armed robbery, home invasions, and carjacking—poses credible risks to staff in the most populous southern areas, as well as the northern border region with Niger and Chad and border areas with Benin in the west. The capital Abuja has lower levels of violent crime than other big cities. The primary danger is usually from opportunist crime carried out by criminals who often take advantage of severe traffic congestion to rob vehicle occupants. Criminals sometimes pose as police officers, members of the security forces, or bogus greeters at airports; conversely, members should be aware that elements of the security forces can be involved in criminal activities. Police officers may also seek to solicit bribes through obstructiveness or by the arbitrary application of arcane laws.

Armed bandits operate along major expressways in the south as well as in the north—across the Dajin Rugu forest, which stretches across the Zamfara, Katsina, Kaduna, and Niger states. The risk of armed banditry is particularly high in the state of Kaduna. Armed bandits in Kaduna have been who have been responsible in recent years for many murders, kidnappings and attacks on communities, particularly in the Chikun, Kajuru, Birnin Gwari Local Government Areas (LGA).

Piracy is a major concern, particularly around the Niger Delta and Lagos, with most attacks targeting vessels supporting the oil industry. Passenger boats and fishing trawlers are also targeted for theft or kidnap-for-ransom purposes. Offshore areas of the Rivers and Bayelsa states are hot spots for such incidents, while pirates are also active around the Calabar channel and Bonny River.

Kidnapping

35 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2019,” Transparency International, 2020. 36 U.S. Department of State website: https://www.state.gov/countries-areas/nigeria/ accessed July 2020.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

Kidnapping poses a risk to both locals and foreigners primarily in the central and southern parts of the country. Kidnap-for-ransom is most common and is on the rise; most victims are released unharmed after being held for relatively short periods.

The risk of kidnapping has expanded in recent years to the west (Lagos state) and north (Middle Belt) from conventional trouble spots in the Niger delta (Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, and Akwa Ibom states). The risk of abductions, accompanied by a significant rise in criminality, has increased in several southeastern states, especially Abia, Anambra, Edo, Enugu, and Imo. Incidents have also been reported in Cross River, Benue, and Nasarawa, as well as in Kaduna and Kogi. Kidnappings of locals and foreign nationals have also occurred in major urban centers outside these states, including the capital Abuja and the commercial capital Lagos. Important road axes, such as the Abuja-Kaduna expressway, are also subject to kidnaps. While jihadist group Ansaru has previously kidnapped foreigners in northern states, such as Kebbi and Kano, this threat has receded since 2016 as the group faced military-led setbacks.

Social Unrest Strikes and protests are a common occurrence and can be accompanied by unrest. Labor disputes can significantly disrupt movement and business activity; this is particularly true for strikes by oil-sector workers, which can cause fuel shortages and subsequently disrupt air and road travel in main cities, particularly in Lagos.

Increases in fuel prices are sensitive and can trigger violent protests and crippling strikes, which may also impact fuel supplies. Opportunistic crime, such as extortion at roadblocks, can accompany prolonged strikes, which warrants careful journey management procedures.

Seemingly minor disputes can spiral quickly into wider, impromptu unrest. It is not uncommon for hostile crowds to form in the aftermath of road traffic accidents and intimidate or attack the motorists involved, and their passengers.

Spontaneous gatherings and protests also sporadically take place around prolonged shortages of essential services, such as power outages, or increases in services prices.

Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons The availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Nigeria has exacerbated conflicts and hinders peacebuilding efforts. This scenario affects virtually all of the states but is currently escalating in the Northern and Middle belt, in the form of banditry, kidnapping, cattle rustling, armed robbing, sea pirating, political thuggery, and arms trafficking. In the 2000 Millennium Report to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, the then Secretary General, Kofi Anan, brought the phenomenon of SALW proliferation to the forefront of the UN’s agenda. Since then, this genre of weapons has continued to attract concerns not only from the international community, but also from nation-states because of the multifaceted effect it has in conflict and non-conflict situations. As asserted by the Institute for Peace and Security Studies at Addis Ababa University, “The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in [Nigeria] has made it easier for violent conflict to escalate. The unauthorized access to and handling of firearms and ammunitions have, in turn, fueled communal conflicts, insurgency, criminality, and threatened lives as well as political stability.37 These arms are easily brought into the country through its borders.38 Furthermore, according to a briefing paper by Small Arms Survey in June 2018, one-fifth of

37 “Nigeria Conflict Insight”, Institute for Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa University, February 2018 38 Abiodun, F., et al, “Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Its Threats to Nigeria's Internal Security”, International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research, Vol. 6, Issue 3, 34-45, September 2018.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment civilian, rural weapons holders and one-tenth of weapons holders in urban areas possess hand-made craft weapons.39

The Nigerian parliament has taken steps to attempt to address this, including sponsoring a Bill seeking to establish a National Commission for the Prohibition of illegal importation of small arms, ammunitions and light weapons. This was still under debate as of February 2020.40 In addition, the 2018 Firearms Act Bill was passed for amendment to increase fines and stringent jail terms against offenders, along with destruction of illegal imported firearms.41 COVID-19 The COVID-19 situation in Nigeria continues to be a high-risk factor and will likely cause a rise in crime levels and social/political conflict in Nigeria in the coming year as the country experiences the economic impact of the pandemic.42 As of early July 2020, COVID 19 cases have continued to rise in the last month in Nigeria with the most recent report showing more than 4,000 new cases in a week. The map below shows the COVID-19 hotspots in Nigeria as of June 29, 2020, and Table 2 includes a breakdown by state.

0 Cases 1-50 Cases 50-100 Cases 100+ Cases

Table 2. COVID Cases in Nigeria AEAS States as of July 5, 202043

39 “Annual Report 2018,” Small Arms Survey, May 2019. 40 “Insecurity: Senate Moves to Establish Commission Against Illegal Use of Guns,” GCFR NG, February 19, 2020. 41 “Senate Passes the Firearms Act (Amendment) Bill, 2018,” Policy and Legal Advocacy Center, November 28, 2018. 42 Map and information obtained from COVID-19 Update from USAID’s Nigeria PLSO Office, June 29, 2020. 43 Information obtained from https://covid19.ncdc.gov.ng/ July 6, 2020

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

No. of Cases (Lab No. of Cases (on States Affected Confirmed) No. Discharged Deaths admission)

Benue 97 59 33 5 Cross River No data No data No data No data Delta 1,227 795 407 25 Ebonyi 503 131 369 3 Kaduna 865 283 570 12 Kebbi 84 19 58 7 Niger 122 40 75 7 Note: Actual numbers may be higher due to delays in reporting

In reference to agriculture in Nigeria, the entire supply chain has been negatively impacted by COVID-19 due to restrictions and impacts on transportation, lack of labor leading to non-harvesting, increased labor costs, disruption of the supply chain, lack of access to markets, unstable markets, and intensive focus on farmers and extensionists trying to remain virus-free. Farmers and extensionists have shared that a major impact on their production is not having access to people who they depend on who typically travel to Nigeria from other countries. While extension has continued in other countries through technology, Nigeria extension has low technology access at this time with many extension workers based in rural areas and/or on farm settlements. Currently, most small to medium scale farm operations are not technology compliant. While the GON listed agriculture and extension as essential services, due to labor issues there were extensive post-harvest losses44 According to the Leadership Newspaper, the vice-chancellor, Kano University of Science and Technology, Wudil, Prof Shehu Alhaji Musa, noted that “the COVID-19 pandemic has undoubtedly slowed down food production.”45

Prior to COVID-19, insecurity was high, with more than 40% of Nigerians living below the poverty line, and years of conflict challenges including Boko Haram, banditry, and extensive internal displacement. These challenges have worsened during the past few months as the country has been experiencing effects of COVID-19 and associated lockdowns and repercussions. Additionally, there have been cases of Nigerian security forces using extrajudicial killings to enforce lockdown measures in parts of the country. As cases continue to rise lockdown measures across the country at both national and state levels are easing, which will likely lead to a continued increase in COVID-19 cases in Nigeria. There are already demands for food for internally displaced people that are being left unmet. As attacks rise in the country this situation worsens46.

FEWSNET lists Nigeria, more specifically central and northwest Nigeria, as one of the three areas of highest concern for famine due to conflict leading to the internal displacement of more than 2.5 million people. FEWSNET states that attacks within Nigeria, internal displacement and the effects of COVID-19 have exasperated the situation. For AEAS, Kaduna and Niger, as well as parts of Kebbi, are considered stressed, with the situation in Niger expected to become more widespread by the end of September

44 Information obtained from webinar “Extension and Community Outreach and Advisory Services Amid COVID-19 Pandemic,” Michigan State University, June 25, 2020. 45 Leadership Newspaper July 5, 2020. 46 “COVID-19 and Conflict: Nigeria,” United States Institute of Peace, May 28, 2020.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

2020.47 Peacebuilding Efforts As highlighted in the West Africa Trade and Facilitation Hub conflict assessment report:

Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are found across each of the seven states. Though they may not have the force of law, they do have the influence and sway of social norms. These mechanisms when deployed by traditional leaders can diffuse escalating levels of violence and challenge power structures which would otherwise go untouched. This reinforces community cohesion and continues to assert the role of traditional leaders within their respective cultures. Though weakened by political structures, modern economies, urbanization, and a number of other factors, when possible, these leaders, with the support of their people, will typically pursue solutions which are in the long-term interests of everyone.

NGOs and civil society groups are sources of resilience because of their involvement in peacebuilding initiatives throughout the country. Peacebuilding and dialogue initiatives led by civil society and local communities have been effective on a small scale in mitigating conflicts between herders and farmers. In the Niger Delta, anti-cult groups have also been a source of resilience, specifically for their involvement in preventing youth from joining cult groups. Civil society organizations carry out educational activities to deter recruitment to cult groups.

Several international and local organizations are working on peacebuilding efforts in country, though many of them are primarily focused on the conflict in the Northeastern part of the country. These include UN OCHA, the U.S. Institute for Peace (which has a Nigeria Working Group on Peacebuilding and Governance), the Conflict Prevention and Peace Building Initiative, The Bridge Peace Project, Mercy Corps, and Search for Common Ground. Within the AEAS target states, these groups include International Crisis Group and United Nations Development Programme in Benue; Partnership Initiatives in the Niger Delta (PIND) in Delta and Cross River; and the Interfaith Mediation Centre in Kaduna. State-Specific Issues and Priorities Table 3 notes the most significant conflict factors for each of the target states.

Table 3. Summary of Most Significant Conflict Factors by Target State Natural Risk Terrorism and Ethnic and Economic Factors and Extremist Religious and Social Politics and Resource Disputes Groups Conflict Inclusion Governance Security Benue X X X Cross River X X Delta X X X X X X Ebonyi X X X X X Kaduna X X Kebbi X Niger Kebbi and Niger experience the lease severe conflict, with Kebbi more susceptible to climate change- related conflict, albeit to a limited degree to date. Niger has limited security concerns along the main

47 Information pulled from fews.net July 7, 2020.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment transit routes coming from Abuja. Kaduna has increased security concerns from criminality in specific areas, and a history of religious and ethnic conflict in particular LGAs. The conflict and security complexity increases in the east and south east of Nigeria. Benue has historical ethnic and religious conflict and increasing resource disputes – largely stemming from migration. This includes traditional nomadic herders moving further south due to pressure on traditional grazing areas from crop encroachment, climate, and conflict. In addition, internally displaced persons are seeking land and resources and are perceived as competing with existing local populations. Cross River also has increasing pressure from refugees displaced due to conflict and security issues in neighboring Cameroon, and is susceptible to climate change-related increased flooding and other natural disasters. Delta State has the most complex conflict context, with political and governance conflict, as well as terrorism and extremist groups adding to the social, economic, natural resource, and ethnic concerns. 4. RECOMMENDATIONS In addition to our own recommendations, AEAS adapted and integrated some recommendations from the West Africa Trade and Investment Hub into our list below.

To mitigate conflict during project inception/entry phase: • Given the underlying economic drivers of conflict, highlight within the target states and target LGAs how the project will bring economic benefits to the agricultural sector and specific communities in which the project will be working. • Carefully consider conflict factors/risks and ensure a participatory process and gender and social inclusion in project interventions, particularly during the M2M, Lean analyses, selection of cohorts, development of MIPs, targeting of information and communication technology (ICT) and access to finance activities, and coordination of the Community of Practice. o Engage local leadership and different groups in stakeholder identification and validation processes. o Consider the perspective of women and youth, and well as climate/environmental factors. o Ensure that messaging reaches women, youth, and other vulnerable populations. • Integrate gender-based violence considerations into the project’s gender analyses and implementation strategies. • Interview key stakeholders in communities during the due diligence process including youth leaders, CSOs, religious leaders, and state/local government authorities to ensure that proposed interventions will not exacerbate tensions or displace individuals. • During the due diligence process, take into account the current power dynamics among local stakeholders.

To mitigate conflict during project implementation: • Remain politically neutral and work with both parties. Since many issues are treated as zero-sum by the parties, it will be important to collaborate openly and transparently with various stakeholders to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes. • Be mindful of cultural, gender, and age considerations in all communications and interactions with local people. • Be open and transparent in engagement with various stakeholders to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.

Nigeria Agricultural Extension and Advisory Services Conflict Assessment

o Analyze whether different ethnic, religious, social, gender, age groups are represented and benefitting from project interventions in the same VC. o Consider biases and conflict risks during analysis of market transactions and customer relationships. o Work with small or medium enterprises (SMEs) to understand customer segmentation – including for underrepresented groups, and promote services to meet their needs (e.g., via Last Mile initiatives). • Avoid conflict prone issues (e.g., SMEs/cohorts supporting businesses/farming sitting in land under dispute). • Integrate activities targeting youth – particularly via entrepreneurship opportunities, to address lack of job opportunities as an underlying cause of conflict. • Engage with relevant women and youth groups/platforms in the Community of Practice. • Hold regular meetings with state officers and key stakeholders (including community leadership and youth and women platforms) in the target states. • To get the latest information and understand the on-going nature of conflict and conflict mitigation, regularly liaise with development partners including community-based organizations, international and local NGOs, and other development agencies who are working on peacebuilding and conflict mitigation in the target states; coordinate particularly with PIND and its peacebuilding efforts in the Niger Delta.

To mitigate conflict during project management: • Consider ethnic biases during hiring and procurement practices; promote fairness and transparency; strive to maintain a balance. This includes ensuing that AEAS State Coordinators are recruited from the respective states. • Embrace transparency to engender the perception that there is a level playing field and promote norms that confront elite capture/corruption.