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A.F. Ogbemudia, & C. N. Kouassi; Ind J Human Sco Sci; Vol-2, Iss-8 (Aug, 2021): 47-55

The situation in the is However, with the downturn in the economy symptomatic of what has been referred to as criminal of the country, it has become extremely difficult to social neglect and ecological degradation. The end cushion the proliferation of these weapons. However, result in the region of the country is responsible for the problems of availability of these weapons lay seventy (70) percent of the country‟s income displays a mainly on the manufacturing and its accumulation. degree of poverty which stands in sharp contradiction to It is observed that over eighty-five (85) percent of the wealth it produces. This has led to a militarized States in the world produce various arms and youth population with access to Small Arms and Light ammunitions. The major source of supply of arms are Weapons (SALW). said to have come directly from the manufacturers to private groups and government (Addo, 2006). Ethno-religious animosities have led to the phenomenon of armed ethnic militias in virtually all parts of the country. While ethnic militias did exist under military HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF rule, they were by and large kept under check. However, with the return to civil rule and the The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) is consequent expansion of political space, these groups a militant group in Nigeria's Niger Delta. The group blossomed to the extent of representing and causing publicly announced their existence in March 2016. threats and alternatives to state security structures (Edomwonyi, 2007). The NDA have attacked oil-producing facilities in the delta, causing the shutdown of oil In addition, corruption within the legal system terminals and a fall in Nigeria's oil production to its has meant the criminal often escape justice and this has lowest level in twenty years. The attacks caused Nigeria promoted a mentality “self-help” among the populace, to fall behind Angola as Africa's largest oil contributing to the acquisition of Small Arms and Light producer. The reduced oil output has hampered the Weapons (SALW) by individuals and groups who have Nigerian economy and destroyed its budget, since come to view the state as a failure (Edomwonyi, 2007). Nigeria depends on the oil industry for nearly all its Armed robbers and other criminals have also government revenues. contributed to the proliferation of these groups of weapons. The NDA's declared aims are to create a sovereign state in the Niger Delta and have threatened In some instances, they capture the weapons to disrupt Nigeria's economy if their aims are not met. belonging to security agencies and these weapons are The NDA claims its members are "young, educated, often put into criminal uses. Local fabricate commonly well-travelled...and educated in east Europe". The group referred to as blacksmiths „ports‟ have traditionally have criticized the , Muhammadu been a source of supply for (SALW) for hunters and Buhari, for having never visited the delta and his local security men. detention of the Biafran independence activist Nnamdi Kanu.

Niger Delta Avengers Dates of Operation January 2016 – present Headquarters (allegedly)

Active regions Niger Delta

Ideology Regionalism Allies Red Egbesu Water Lions Joint Niger Delta Liberation Force Niger Delta Red Square Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate[citation needed] Opponents Nigeria

Battles and wars Conflict in the Niger Delta

Organization difficult for the government to make meaningful contact The leadership of the organization is not with the group. Nigerian officials are also disorganized understood, as many local leaders have acted as the when speaking with the members, as many have found spokesperson to the government. This has made it it their duty to make contact (DiChristopher, 2016).

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A.F. Ogbemudia, & C. N. Kouassi; Ind J Human Sco Sci; Vol-2, Iss-8 (Aug, 2021): 47-55

 May 20 - The Escravos-Lagos Pipeline System Additionally, many Niger Delta militant was once again blown up by NDA militants groups have sprung up in the wake of the NDA‟s 2016 following the commencement of repairs being actions. These copycat organization have contested done on the pipeline following the May 5 claims to various act against numerous oil companies attack. originally attributed to the NDA (Ovie Okpare,  May 25 - NDA militants blew up Chevron's 2016). The most prominent of these splinter groups has main electricity feed pipeline, located at the been the Reformed Niger Delta Avengers (RNDA), Escravos Tank Farm at Ciera Creek. whose similarity of name has caused confusion both  May 27 - At approximately 2:15 am NDA inside and outside the country but is not affiliated with militants blew and Shell's pipelines 1, 2, the NDA. (Findlay, 2016) and 3 located at Nembe, .  May 27 - At approximately 11:45 pm NDA Timeline of Activities militants blew up several gas and oil pipelines 2016 belong to the Nigerian National Petroleum  January 14 - Several gas pipelines and oil Corporation located near . installations located in West were  May 30 - NDA militants were forced to retreat blown up following orders issued by a from the villages of Gulobokri and Nigerian High Court in Lagos to arrest the ex- Eweleso, Brass following a series of clashes militant leader Government Ekpemupolo. with Nigerian soldiers, resulting in the deaths  February 10 - At approximately 1:30 am NDA of approximately 20 civilians, 2 police officers, militants blew up the Bonny-Soku Gas Export and an unknown number of militants/Nigerian Line. soldiers.  February 14 - NDA militants destroyed Shell's  May 31 - At approximately 3:44 am Chevron's underwater Forcados 48-inch Export Pipeline Oil Wells RMP23 and RMP24 located near the at the Forcados Export Terminal. village of Dibi, Warri South-West, Chevron's  February 19 - At approximately 3:30 am NDA highest producing wells in the Niger Delta, militants blew up Eni's Clough Creek- were blown up by NDA militants. Tebidaba Pipeline in Bayelsa State.  June 1 - Five boats loaded with heavily armed  May 4 - NDA militants attacked and heavily militants attacked a houseboat near the village damaged the Chevron Valve Platform located of Ijere, Warri South, where Nigerian soldiers at Abiteye, Warri South. This platform is were reportedly stationed. 2 Nigerian soldiers reportedly Chevron's most significant platform and 4 civilians were killed during the attack. as it serves as a connecting point where all of The NDA claims they were not behind the Chevron's other Niger Delta platforms link-up. attack and stated they will "bring the culprits to  May 4 - Shell's underwater Forcados 48-inch book". Export Pipeline was once again blown up by  June 2 - At approximately 2:00 am NDA militants shortly after repairs commenced militants blew up the Ogboinbiri-Tebidaba and following the February 14 attack. Cough Creek-Tebidaba pipelines, belonging to  May 5 - The Escravos-Lagos Pipeline System, Eni, in Bayelsa State. linking Warri to Lagos was blown up by NDA  June 3 - At approximately 3:00 am NDA militants. militants blew up Shell's Forcados 48-inch  May 5 - The NDA's Strike Team 4 launched a Export Pipeline for a third time following a coordinated attack on several Chevron oil series of repairs done by . installations located in Abiteye, resulting in the  June 3 - At approximately 3:30 am NDA destruction of Chevron Well D25 and several militants blew up Eni's Brass-Tebidaba oil other major pipelines in the area. pipeline in Bayelsa State.  May 6 - The crude oil pipeline linking Warri  June 8 - At approximately 1:00 am NDA to Kaduna was blown up by the NDA's Strike miliatans blew up Chevron's Well RMP20, Team 7 as well as a gas line that supplies both located 20 meters from the Dibi Flow Station Lagos and with electricity. in LGA.  May 6 - Oil pipelines located near the villages  June 9 - At approximately 8:00 pm NDA of Alero, Dibi, Otunana, and Makaraba were militants blew up the Chanomi Creek oil blown up the NDA's Strike Team 7. facility, belonging to Royal Dutch Shell, near  May 9 - 3 Nigerian soldiers were killed during the village of Ogidigben, . a shootout with NDA militants in the village of  June 10 - At approximately 3:00 am NDA Foropa, Southern Ijaw LGA, Bayelsa. miliatans blew up the Obi Obi Brass trunk line,  May 13 - The Chevron pipeline at Makaraba belonging to Eni. It is one of Eni's most was blown up for a second time in 7 days significant crude oil pipelines in Bayelsa State. following repairs done by Chevron.

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 June 16 - At approximately 4:00 am NDA belonging to Shell located near the Batan Flow militants blew up a crude oil pipeline Station in Warri South West LGA. belonging to the Nigerian National Petroleum  July 24 - At approximately 11:30 pm NDA Corporation in Oruk Anam LGA, Akwa Ibom. militants blew up a natural gas pipeline  July 1 - At approximately 9:15 pm NDA belonging to the Nigerian National Petroleum militants blew up a crude oil trunk line Corporation located in Nsit-Ibom LGA, Akwa belonging to the Nigerian National Petroleum Ibom. Corporation linked to the Warri refinery.  July 31 - At approximately 1:00 am militants  July 2 - At approximately 11:26 pm an NDA blew up the Trans Ramos crude oil pipeline, "Strike Team" blew up two major crude oil owned by Royal Dutch Shell, located near the trunk lines belonging to the Nigerian village of Odimodi, LGA, Delta State. Petroleum Development Company, located  August 30 - The announced the near the Batan flow station in Delta State. commencement of military operations against  July 3 - At approximately 1:15 am NDA militants in the Niger Delta, militants blew up Chevron Wells 7 and 8, nicknamed Operation Crocodile Smiles. located near the Abiteye flow station in Warri  August 30 – September 3 - 20 Nigerian South West LGA. soldiers were killed in action by heavily armed  July 5 - At approximately 10:00 pm NDA NDA militants during the first 4 days of militants blew up Chevron Well 10, located "Operation Crocodile Smiles", 16 were killed near the Otunana flow station. along the River Ethiope while the other 4 were  July 5 - At approximately 11:15 pm NDA killed in the creeks of Bayelsa State. militants blew up a manifold belonging to the  September 10 - The Niger Delta Avengers Nigerian Petroleum Development Company, released a photograph showing 4 freshly located near Banta, as well as two crude oil captured Nigerian Army soldiers being rowed trunk lines belonging to the Nigerian National in a boat manned by a single militant to an Petroleum Company. undetermined location somewhere in the Niger  July 6 - Between the hours of 10:50 pm and Delta creeks. 11:10 pm an NDA "strike team" blew up  September 23 - At approximately 8:40 pm Chevron manifolds RMP 22, 23 and 24 in NDA militants blew up the Bonny 48-inch Delta State. These manifolds are major crude oil pipeline, owned by Royal Dutch convergence points for numerous crude oil Shell, located at the Bonny Export Terminal. pipelines operated by Chevron Corp.  October 25 - At approximately 3:45 am the  July 8 - Between the hours of 3:00 am and NDA Strike Team 06 blew up the Escravos 5:00 am NDA militants blew up Nembe Export Pipeline, owned by Chevron pipelines 1, 2, and 3, belonging to Shell and Corporation, located offshore from the Eni, in Bayelsa State while simultaneously mainland. Prior to its destruction, the pipeline blowing up the Brass-Tebidaba trunk line in transported hundreds-of-thousands of barrels Rivers State. of crude oil each day from offshore oil fields to  July 11 - At approximately 7:30 pm NDA the Escravos GTL petroleum refineries, located militants blew up ExxonMobil's "Qua Iboe 48" on the mainland, to be refined crude oil pipeline. into gasoline, kerosene, and diesel fuel. The  July 12 - Late on the night of July 12, NDA NDA spokesman, Mudoch Agbinibo, warns militants blew up a natural gas pipeline that any attempt to make repairs to the pipeline belonging to the Nigerian National Petroleum will immediately halt their peace negotiations Corporation located in Ogijo, Ogun State. with the Nigerian government.  July 13 - Heavily armed NDA militants hosted  November 7 - On the night of November 7 a function in Delta State in which they came heavily armed NDA militants attacked a group face-to-face with soldiers of the Nigerian of Nigerian surveillance personnel in charge of Army. One militant announced "I want to hand securing the Forcados Export Pipeline near the over our request to our Ogba Pata today. You'll village of Batan, Delta State. Reports state that go and give it to the governor." before telling a militants in speedboats opened fire on the Nigerian officer the group's demands. After the surveillance personnel with assault rifles and short speech, the crowd was wild with machine guns, forcing them to flee for their jubilation as the militants began shooting their lives. The militants then sped off into the assault rifles in the air while singing and creeks without detonating any explosives. dancing to the song "Fada Fada"  November 8 - At approximately 10:45 pm the by Phyno ft. Olamide. NDA Strike Team 06 blew up the Forcados  July 18 - At approximately 12:05 am NDA Export Pipeline less than 24 hours after their militants blew up a crude oil trunk line attack on Nigerian surveillance personnel in Batan. Locals reported feeling the shock-wave *Corresponding Author: Abu Frank Ogbemudia 50

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of the blast followed by the sight of huge the war. The case was worst in Zaire as some military fireball that could be seen for miles around. commanders ran what was similar to personal fiefdoms. The NDA spokesman, Mudoch Agbinibo, says “The soldiers were not paid regular salaries, but were that it is yet another warning to oil encouraged to loot and pillage local villages, demand corporations not to repair blown pipelines. contributions at arbitrary road blocks and commit  November 15 - At approximately 11:45 pm the sexual violence against local women” (Rupesinghe NDA Strike Team 03 blew up the Nembe 01, 1998). Such privatization of state army in Congo (Zaire) 02, and 03 crude oil pipelines, operated arose because of Mobutu‟s repressive and kleptomaniac by Eni, Oando, and Royal Dutch Shell. The 3 regime. Mobutu reduced the state army to an major pipelines supplied the Bonny Export insignificant number, consolidating his power on fear Terminal, located in Bayelsa State, with and oppression through a network of security personnel 300,000 barrels of crude oil everyday prior to that are best described as secret police and army. their destruction. NDA spokesman Mudoch Agbinibo stated that these attacks are in The command lines of his secret personnel are response to the Nigerian military's so-called frequently changed to enable him control the security "Operation Sharkbite", launched on November system, (Emizet, 2000). Rupesinghe (1998) argues that 4. Mobutu‟s strategy was to suppress the national army, 2017 reduce its number to only 20,000 and provide little  November 4 – NDA spokesman Murdoch equipment or training. As noted above, Mobutu Agbinibo stated that the NDA will withdraw concentrated on creating a series of convert special from the Pan Niger-Delta Forum (PANDEF) strike forces, formed and dissolved in quick succession. and end the cease fire agreement with the Oppressive regimes encourage the formation of militia federal government. The NDA also took the groups which will no doubt lead to small arm opportunity to disavow any connection with proliferation. Another factor that aids small arm the RNDA and questioned their legitimacy. proliferation is the use of children as soldiers. “Young 2018 recruits and children as young as eight has been evident  January 17 – last official update on the official in a number of long term conflicts, especially where Niger Delta Avengers website. there is shortage of personnel. The child soldiers have 2019 fought in battle frontline and this is not removed from  NDA endorses presidential candidate Alhaji the fact that there is the availability of cheap,light and Atiku Aububakar over the incumbent, easy to use automatic weapons (Rupesinghe, 1998). President . Aububakar Hence children are recruited and more arms required, as vowed to increase the amount of oil revenue to small arms require little or no training and coupled with the delta region as well as increase its standard the fact that children are obedient and disciplined, they of living. While President Buhari won the re- are used. The end result therefore is arm proliferation election, the NDA has not responded or and increase in the possibility of violence. retaliated. The presence of mercenaries is another factor Factors Aiding Proliferation of Small Arms and aiding small arm proliferation. When the army of a state Light Weapons is disintegrated during conflict, it gives room for the Several factors contribute to the proliferation resurgence of mercenaries and bounty hunters. The of small arms. One of such factors is the privatisation of worst is that such groups have no interest or concern in security. In countries such as Angola, Guatemala and the countries or regions which they fight. The groups Nicaragua, where official peace has come, poverty, have no motivation or incentive to end the conflict. insecurity and fear still plague different levels of society Rupesinghe (1998) observes “From Sierra Leone to (Rupesinghe, 1998). In a situation where a state cannot Angola, Sri Lanka, the Middle East and Papua New provide for her citizens, ownership of weapon becomes Guinea, the presence of mercenaries, heavily armed, essential for survival, as noted inter alia both as highly trained, protecting and preserving ramshackle protection and as an economic asset. It is believed that regimes or factions.” Such activities not only the possession of lethal weapon at personal level proliferates arms, it prolongs and intensifies conflicts. alleviates the insecurity but it in turn encourages the The avarice of such groups is always the interest. They spread of violence. The privatization of state armies is may have their eye on oil, gold, diamond and other another factor aiding proliferation. precious minerals within the region of those who contract them. The primary objective of such Rupesinghe (1998) notes that in “the absence organization is to make money and they require arms to of external patronage, conscript armies, or what is left accomplish their task, so illicit trade continues to grow of them are known to sell their arms, equipment or and arms- small arms- keep proliferating. services to the highest bidder.” Rupesinghe argues that even in places like Ethiopia officers were found to be Greed and grievances have also been explored selling arms and ammunition during the closing years of by several scholars as a motivation for groups to rebel.

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Most groups attempt to have access to resources. Most and justice minister, reported that eleven convictions of times, the motivation are the benefits “that may accrue members were obtained in 2013. through activities such as pillage and looting during conflicts” (Collier & Hoeffler 2002). The frustration- On 4 December 2013, the defence aggression mechanism as a response by regimes ignites headquarters recommended the immediate trial of over violence. When regimes are oppressive, then violence is 500 suspects arrested in the north-eastern states of the last result. Again, in such state most times, the Yobe, Borno and Adamawa. They were among almost struggles for democratic governance often lead to 1,400 detainees in Maiduguri, Yola and Damaturu violence perpetuated with the use of arms- small arms. screened by a joint investigation team. Among those Several other factors aid small arms proliferation. Some recommended for trial were paramilitary personnel and of the weapons are locally made, while some are stolen a medical doctor who allegedly offered the militants from government armory. There are transfers between direct logistical support; others who trained them in sub national groups, others captured from government weapons handling; and those who confessed that they agents, some are taken from demobilized soldiers and were trained in Mali and other countries (The Guardian, so on. There are several ways of proliferating small 2013). arms. The production and export of small arms are increasing by day. Boosting the Capacities of the Military and Other Security Agencies Dhanapala (1998) adds that small arms and The military had not anticipated the insurgency light weapons are being currently manufactured in over and was not prepared for its bombing campaign, as the 70 countries which are almost twice as many as the late National Security Adviser Owoeye Azazi admitted manufacturers of other categories of weapons. In in August 2011. Over the last two years, the Dhanapala‟s words, “there are at least 20 known types government has sought to improve the capacities of the of pistols available in close to 200 models, which mean military and security services to respond to the that 400 varieties are being manufactured. Over 40 challenge, particularly by improving training, models of rifles are being manufactured to at least one equipment and coordination. More emphasis has been dozen specifications, the better known AK-47 being just placed on retraining personnel in urban warfare, one of the 500 known varieties. counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency (Vanguard, 2012). Personnel management and training is also Score Card of the Nigerian Military in Fighting prioritised, as well as equipment for close quarter Insurgencies combat, intelligence and amphibious operations, The escalation of the insurgency in early 2010 demolition and explosive breaching, tactical caught the government flat-footed. It initially believed communication and civil-military relations. the violence would peter out. Sustained attacks, however, ushered in more sober responses. Since 2012, In September 2015, the Counter-Terrorism and it has tried to address the challenge on multiple tracks Counter-Insurgency Centre in Jaji, Kaduna graduated but especially by increasing the defence budget from 316 personnel, its ninth class. According to its 100 billion naira ($625 million) in 2010 to 927 billion commandant, Brigadier-General Tijani Golai, the army naira ($6 billion) in 2011 and 1 trillion ($6.25 billion) has trained over 7,000 from the army, police and naira in 2012, 2013 and 2014. Much of these increases Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC). was to combat Boko Haram. Other measures include Seeking to strengthen counter-insurgency capacity, the strengthening anti-terrorism legislation, boosting the army recently built the country‟s first indigenous capacities of the military and other security agencies, armored personnel carriers (APCs) and now produces exploring dialogue with the insurgents and military other protective gear, such as bullet-proof vests. On 17 operations and civilian vigilantes. Results have been December 2013, President Jonathan unveiled the first limited. drone designed and constructed by the air force. Senior security officials are first to admit, however, that their Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Legislation agencies are ill prepared for today‟s challenges, President Jonathan signed the Terrorism especially terrorism. Factors blamed include under (Prevention) Act in 2011. It was amended in 2012 to funding, lack of training and equipment, poor designate the Office of the National Security Adviser intelligence, corruption, complicity, inter-agency (NSA) as the national coordinator for anti-terrorism, in rivalries and lack of effective political leadership order to prevent in-fighting among security agencies (Vanguard, 2012). (The Guardian, 2013). The government proscribed Boko Haram and9 , describing their activities as The Galtimari Committee, established to terrorism, and warned that any persons associated with analyse the security challenges in the North East, noted the two groups was liable to prosecution. It is in September 2011 that “on the part of the security prosecuting hundreds of suspected Boko Haram and forces, there are palpable operational lapses, service Ansaru members and collaborators (The Guardian, rivalry, under-funding, under-equipment and lack of 2013). Mohammed Bello Adoke, the attorney-general collaboration”. This perhaps explains why the

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A.F. Ogbemudia, & C. N. Kouassi; Ind J Human Sco Sci; Vol-2, Iss-8 (Aug, 2021): 47-55 inspector-general of police said in December 2011 that On 11-12 May 2013, the government sent 2,000 all suspected Boko Haram militants arrested were mere additional troops, accompanied by heavy military “foot soldiers; that the security agencies lacked equipment including fighter jets, to Maiduguri. On 14 evidence to apprehend the leaders of the sect”. The May Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the police force is ill-equipped to address the Boko Haram North East (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe). In a national threat and enjoys little public confidence. It has been broadcast, he ordered the troops to “take all necessary grossly underfunded – less than 5 per cent of the budget action … [to] end to the impunity of insurgents and – since military rule ended in 1999 and needs reform. terrorists”.

The 2012 budget allotted 1.6 million naira The next day, fighter jets began bombarding ($10,000) per soldier but only 870,000 naira ($5,400) Boko Haram camps in northern Borno, and a day later per police officer (Punch, 2013). At current levels, troops sealed parts of the borders with Chad, Niger and police colleges “can only turn out demoralised, Cameroon. Phone networks were taken down on 16-17 frustrated and dehumanised policemen”. Many residents May in Yobe and Borno and remain down. On 19 accused police of selling informants‟ identities to Boko August, a new army division, the 7th, codenamed Haram. Given the urgency of the situation, the police BOYONA and headed by a major general, took over are in no fit state to answer the Boko Haram challenge, counterterrorism operations in Borno, Yobe and but to truly achieve stability in the long term, Nigeria Adamawa. Since the operations in Maiduguri have been will need to address the shambolic state of law supported by civilian vigilantes, youths from city enforcement and carry out systematic police reform neighbourhoods who initially organised themselves into (Punch, 2013). groups to patrol streets in search of Boko Haram. They stormed homes of known, and suspected, members, Exploring dialogue with the insurgents hacking them to death or manhandling and then handing From the insurgency‟s onset, the government them over to the military. Armed with machetes, axes, has said it is open to dialogue with Boko Haram, but it bows and arrows, clubs, swords and daggers, this has often wavered in seeing this through. At times, “Civilian JTF” (CJTF) became instrumental in the anti- officials speak of ongoing indirect negotiations; on insurgent campaign. other occasions they deny this. On 2 August 2011, the government set up an eight-member committee led by Usman Galtimari, its former envoy to Chad, to study the CONCLUSION Boko Haram security challenge and advise on ending From the discussion so far, it could be inferred the violence. Its report, submitted on 26 September that the inability of the law enforcement agencies to 2011, recommended talks and amnesty for sect check the supply factors of Small Arms and Light members who renounce violence. On 16 September Weapons (SALW) worsened security situation in 2011, former President Olusegun Obasanjo held talks in Nigeria. That the inability of law enforcement agencies Maiduguri with Boko Haram members, who laid out to check the supply factors of SALW worsened security conditions for a temporary ceasefire. These were and situation in Nigeria. remain an end to arrests and killings of sect members; compensation for families of members killed by That the inability of the Nigeria borders to deal security personnel; and prosecution of police with the demand factors heightened the proliferation of responsible for Yusuf‟s extrajudicial execution. In a SALW. Small arms and light weapon had never been televised interview on 18 November 2012, President considered strategic to global security as have weapons Jonathan contradicted repeated claims by officials of of mass destruction, and they have never been subject to behind-the-scene negotiations. On 17 April 2013 and any systematic and traceable transfer regime. This was under mounting pressure from northern elites, including the case until the end of the cold war, then asymmetric the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammad Sa‟ad Abubakar, warfare in the world‟s walker states, terrorism, drug Jonathan set up a 26-member amnesty committee trafficking, and banditry threatened to tear states apart. headed by Special Duties Minister Kabiru Tanimu Turaki. There is no doubt that the accumulation of small arms and their diffusion into society are both Military operations and civilian vigilantes causal and symptomatic of the governance. The Starting in early 2011, the government opportunity cost of arms accumulation is the promotion deployed some 3,600 personnel to Maiduguri and other of sustainable security, based on the provision of basic major north-east towns as part of the Joint Task Force needs and rights. Finding a common solution to the (JTF), a special formation of military, police and SSS SALW pandemic, however, is not easy, given the units. They were supplemented by small contingents specific status of this category of weapons. SALW may from Chad and Niger, members of a Joint Multi- facilitate and exacerbate conflicts and promote banditry, National Task Force (JMNTF) initially created to but they do not cause them. Quite unlike the successful combat smuggling (see above). The troops, however, campaign to anti-personnel landmines, which are also were stretched too thin to control the large region. 203 most unanimously acknowledge as inhumane, it is

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A.F. Ogbemudia, & C. N. Kouassi; Ind J Human Sco Sci; Vol-2, Iss-8 (Aug, 2021): 47-55 practically impossible to ban the production and transfer  National Arms Control Strategy (NACS) and of SALW. implementation of National policy on SALW should be adopted. They perform legitimate functions in the  Conduct Regular Verification Exercise and governance process and widely used by the rual Record-keeping of weapons in Nigerian community in hunting to supplement the unusually Armory. starch based diet in the sub-region. Besides, discourse  Improve Intelligence capacity on the part of about SALW invariably touches on state security and Nigerian security agencies. national sovereignty. Consequently, in the end, only  Improve National Orientation and governments can make and implement agreement on Employment opportunities. arms transfers. With this in mind, it is imperative that  Promote Peace Building Initiatives. the growing anti-proliferation campaign adopts  Robust funding and procurement of modern strategies that he capable of producing results without equipment, Arms and Ammunitions should be alienating government a delicate balancing act. Indeed. enhanced.  Government should engage the Niger Delta Whatever tactics are adopted, however, the citizens in an objective and win-win dialogue objectives should be two fold. Firstly the operators of the SALW pipelines into the sub-regions – cash – strapped rogue exporting states mainly from extern and REFERENCES central Europe, clandestine western supper brokers, and 1. Addo, P. (2006). Cross-border criminal private military entrepreneurs –as well as the recyclers activities in West Africa: Options for effective and trans-shippers within the sub region itself must be responses. Published by Transnational exposed and sanctioned. Secondly, there is a need to Organized Crime. Kaiptc paper. combine weapons elimination from society with 2. Alex, V. (2011). Combating Light Weapons effective measures to diffuse societal tensions. Proliferation in West Africa. Journal of International Affairs, 81(2). Because of this issues effect on development, 3. Arewa People‟s Congress (APC) (2010). sustainable security and programming need to confront Trans-National and Non State Armed Groups. the challenge of small arms proliferation head on. Archived from the Original on 2011-01-14, Limiting illicit arms proliferation and removing excess Retrieved 2010-04-02. and potentially destabilizing arms from circulation 4. Bayraytay A. (2006). Arms Control Policy should be both a security and development priority for under Threat; Dealing with the Plaque of the present administration. Small arms initiatives should Corruption. Geneva, UNIDIR also be built into security assistance and development 5. Binta, M. (2006. Women against Weapons: A programs. Programs that focus on security sector and Leading Role for Women in Disarmament. judicial sector reform must address small arms Geneva: UNIDIR. proliferation and misuse. The United Nations should 6. Campbell (2016). Published online. also support programs that address the demand for 7. Clifford N. (2017). Deputy Political Editor. weapons. Vanguard. Newspaper. 8. Collier, P., & Hoefiler, A. (2002). Greed and Such reforms would built public confidence in grievance in civil wars. Policy Research. security, reducing the incentive for people to obtain and 9. Derek, M. et al., (2006). From Research to keep weapons, and would also help governments and road map. Learning from the Arms for international agencies to incorporate weapons collection Development initiative in Sierra-Leone, programs into peace-building strategies – both as post – Geneva, UNIDIR. conflict disarmament programs as well as long – term 10. Dhanapala J. (1998). The Challenge of projects aiming to remove as many surplus and illegal Controlling International Small Arms weapons and ammunition form circulation as possible. Transfers Inc. 11. DiChristopher, T. (2016-10-26). "The Niger Recommendations Delta Avengers are back — and they've got big Based on the foregoing, the following recommendations oil in their crosshairs". www.cnbc.com. appear very necessary: Retrieved 2018-12-11.  Intensive policing and efficient monitoring 12. Edomwonyi, (2007). Small and Light Weapons mechanisms of the Nigerian Borders should be Proliferation in Niger Delta: Implication for enhanced. Security (Unpolished B.A Project).  Government should identify the saboteurs in Department of International Studies and the military and other security agencies. Diplomacy, Benson Idahosa University, Benin  Improvement in employment and working City). conditions of law enforcement agencies. 13. Elena Holodny (16 May 2016). "Africa's largest oil producer has been

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