DOCSLIB.ORG

Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/23/2021 10:50:40PM Via Free Access 502 China, the European Union and the Developing World

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/23/2021 10:50:40PM Via Free Access 502 China, the European Union and the Developing World Index abbott, r. 484 functional cooperation 408–10 abe, S. 139 interventionist policies, differences abrahamian, E. 257 between 409–10 abu Lughod, J. 20, 21 military options 410 acharya, a. 147, 151–2, 164 multilateral cooperation 405, 409 adda, J. 29, 30 and national economic interests 410 africa oECD China-DaC Study Group Democratic republic of Congo 405, 406, 407 (DrC) see Democratic republic Sudan and Zimbabwe sanctions, of Congo (DrC) and China, disagreement over 404–5 and conflict of interests Tibet unrest, effects of 406–7 Forum on China-africa trilateral cooperation 405–7, 408–9 Cooperation (FoCaC) UK Department for International Declaration 414 Development (DfID) historical links with China and EU involvement 408 see historical links between aglietta, M. 49 China, EU and developing agricultural goods import substitution, world, EU, africa and the EU-aSEan and China-aSEan Middle East economic relations 108 Maghreb countries see Maghreb agriculture problem and European countries, economic relations protectionism, Latin america with China 28–9 MENA region see MENA region ahn, C. 69 Sub-Saharan africa see Sub-Saharan aid see development aid africa al-rasheed, M. 243 see also individual countries alden, Chris 374, 375, 381, 386, 394, african development challenges 402–13 402–13 algeria african ownership concerns 405 Chinese FDI 300, 301–2, 303, 305, bilateral cooperation 405 312 China as economic partner, EU Chinese labour 317–18 concerns over 403–4 Chinese trade relations 306, 307, China-Ethiopian-World bank 308–9, 310, 312 Health Initiative 409 and colonialism 39, 40, 240–41 China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Euro-Mediterranean association Partnership agreement 404–5 agreement 248 China-US Joint assessment of European funding 249 Health Cooperation in africa and European neighborhood Policy 408–9 253 EU–China cooperation 403–7 trade with China 276 Eurozone crisis, effects of, and aliboni, r. 358 501 Jan Wouters, Jean-Christophe Defraigne and Matthieu Burnay - 9781783477340 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/23/2021 10:50:40PM via free access 502 China, the European Union and the developing world alterman, J. 359 astuto, M. 97 alvstam, C. 96 atanassova-Cornelis, Elena 63–88 amelot, L. 279 attali, J. 421 ames, b. 422 anderlini, J. 52 ba, a. 135, 140 anderson, L. 347 bach, D. 387 anderson, P. 22 bai, G. 49 arab Spring effects 287–8, 319, 345–7, bairoch, P. 20, 21–2 354–5, 361 bandung Conference 113, 205, 271 arahuetes, a. 451 bangladesh relations with India, argentina improvement in 202 Chinese FDI 442, 443, 459, 467, 469 banlaoi, r. 158 Chinese trade agreement 432, 436, barber, Laura 402–13 468 barcelona Process 44, 247 –8, 251–3, EU FDI 450, 452, 453 255 –6, 287, 319, 351–2 EU as trading partner 446, 449–50, barton, benjamin 371–401 479 basave, J. 456 in G20 458 BASIC group (brazil, South africa, import barriers 479 India and China), and climate import-substitution industrialization change 197 26 bassiri Tabrizi, a. 334 portfolio investment 31 bava, Ummu Salma 177–85 privatization reversal pressure 455 baviera, a. 135 aris, S. 125 bean, r. 21 armony, a. 477 beaud, M. 33 arroba, a. 438 bechle, K. 151, 152, 163 aSEan beeson, M. 37, 128 and burma see burma/Myanmar belkaïd, a. 240 and human security, aSEan belligoli, S. 41, 42, 51, 383 and aSEan regional Forum ben Porat, G. 261, 262 (arF) benabdallah, Y. 312 and China 125, 126, 129 bergenäs, J. 333, 335 economic relations with EU and berger, b. 405 China see EU-aSEan and berkofsky, a. 81, 82, 83 China-aSEan economic beurdeley, L. 250, 253, 254 relations beuret, M. 51, 403 regional Forum 136, 139, 198, 205 bhagwati, J. 484 US-aSEan annual summits, China, bianco, L. 44 rise and impact 132 bin, S. 468 asia bisley, n. 131, 132 Central asia see Central asia blockmans, S. 330 engagement, China compared blustein, P. 52 to EU borger, J. 408 and historical links between China, bossuyt, Fabienne 210–35 EU and developing world see bouhou, K. 240 historical links between China, bowker, r. 394 EU and developing world, asia bozdémir, M. 265 see also individual countries bozorgmehr, n. 330 asian financial crisis effects see under bradford, C. 31 financial crises braeckman, C. 41 Jan Wouters, Jean-Christophe Defraigne and Matthieu Burnay - 9781783477340 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/23/2021 10:50:40PM via free access Index 503 brainard, L. 32 burma/Myanmar and human security branigan, T. 408 146–73 brant, P. 408, 409 Chinese respect for political braudel, F. 19, 20 independence 153, 160 brautigam, D. 377, 378, 382, 383, 384, drug-trafficking 155, 161–2 385 foreign aid and diplomatic ties, brazil improvements in 167 and brICS membership 181 fuel price protests 154–5 Chinese FDI 442, 443, 444, 459–60, future directions 167 467, 469 human rights record 154, 162 Chinese foreign policy, key role in main political developments since 476–9 independence 153–5 Chinese trade agreement 429, 432, national Human rights 436, 438, 468, 471, 472, 475, 488 Commission 167 climate change 197 non-intervention and anti-colonial EU FDI 32, 450, 452, 453 norms 152 EU as trading partner 446, 447, pro-democracy protests, effects of 449–50, 485, 487 154 FDI in Europe 455, 456 refugee flows 155 in G20 458 sovereignty, divergent views on IbSa Dialogue Forum 200, 206 151–3 import-substitution industrialization burma/Myanmar and human security, 26 aSEan and aSEan regional and Iran nuclear programme 329, Forum (arF) 147–50 339 burma/Myanmar’s entry into bregolat obiols, E. 271 aSEan, effects of 157–8 breman, J. 410 Chinese relations 158–9 breslin, S. 128 confidence-building mechanisms brewster, D. 198 (CbMs) and trust 148, 149 brICS (brazil, russia, India, China conflict resolution measures 150 and South africa) membership counter-terrorism measures and 181, 184, 206 need for cooperation 150 see also individual countries Disaster relief Desk-top Exercises bridges, b. 89, 100, 112, 114 149–50 bristow, M. 478 EU-aSEan Free Trade agreement brunel, S. 40, 41 failure 157 brzezinski, Z. 247 history of 147–8 brzoska, M. 336 peace promotion methods 148, 149, buente, M. 167, 168 150 bull, b. 327, 335 under-institutionalization 148–9 bunyanunda, M. 153, 154, 157, 159, burma/Myanmar and human security, 162, 165, 166 aSEan countries’ policies 161–6 burma/Myanmar aSEan chairmanship 163–4 as Chinese client state 135 aSEan Inter-Parliamentary Caucus Chinese FDI 110 and human rights demands 163 gas pipeline 110 aSEan Intergovernmental loss as substantive Chinese client Commission on Human rights 130–31 (aICHr) 164–5 Myitsone Dam project cancellation ‘asian values’ debate by aSEan 134 states 157 Jan Wouters, Jean-Christophe Defraigne and Matthieu Burnay - 9781783477340 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/23/2021 10:50:40PM via free access 504 China, the European Union and the developing world challenges to 165–6 Cabestan, J.-P. 47, 272 drug smuggling concerns 161–2 Calmettes, J. 41 ‘enhanced interaction’ strategy 163 Camarena, a. 492 ‘flexible engagement’ 162–3, 166 Cambodia human rights violations 162 aSEan entry 129 isolationism concerns and as Chinese client state 135 ‘constructive engagement’ Chinese investment 109–10, 117 161–2, 166 EU food security programs 112 and political heterogeneity 161, protected areas and national parks, 165 sold to China 134 burma/Myanmar and human security, Camroux, David 124–45 Chinese relations 158–61 Cannizzaro, E. 183 and aSEan regional Forum Capie, D. 136, 151, 152 (arF) 158–9 Carbone, M. 28 and cross-border crime 160 Carlson, a. 128 regional multilateralism, benefits of Carnegy, H. 288 159 Carranza, M. 473 security and commercial interests Casarini, n. 37 159–60 Castel, v. 305, 318 ‘soft intervention’ policy 160–61 Central america, EU FTa 447–8 and territorial disputes in South see also Latin america China Sea 159 Central asia engagement, China and Un Security Council national compared to EU 210–35 reconciliation call 160 Central asia engagement, China burma/Myanmar and human security, compared to EU, China EU relations 155–8, 166 2000s and emergence of all-round asia-Europe Meeting (aSEM) and player 230–31 Plan of action 156 aid flows 218, 222–5 asian financial crisis, effects of aid flows, perceived benefits of 225 157–8 bilateral agreements 231 ‘asian values’ debate by aSEan confidence-building measures 229 states 157 economic cooperation, increased burma/Myanmar’s entry into 215, 230–31 aSEan, effects of 157–8 energy market 215–16 economic development and capacity- enterprise groups 215 building measures 156 foreign direct investment 217–18 EU and human rights-related norms free economic zones (FEZs), 151–3 establishment of 215 EU Troika visit 157–8 as key security actor 229–30 and EU-aSEan Free Trade preferential loan system 218 agreement failure 157 security considerations 214 food security programs 112 separatist movements in Xinjiang, human rights and democracy clauses containment of 230 and policy of conditionality Shanghai Cooperation organization 156–7 (SCo) 230, 231 and human rights standards 157 Shanghai Five forum 229–30 burnay, Matthieu 1–16, 160 soft loans 223–4 butler-Thomas, v. 24, 26, 27, 28 trade with 213–16 butt-Philip, a. 469 transport infrastructure and buzan, b. 126 extraction industries 218, 225 Jan Wouters, Jean-Christophe Defraigne and Matthieu Burnay - 9781783477340 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 09/23/2021 10:50:40PM via free access Index 505 Central asia engagement, China Cha, v. 36 compared to EU, EU Chagnollaud, J.-P. 264 aid flows 219–22, 223 Chan, S. 109, 124 aid flows, additional funding 222 Chanda, n. 100 aid flows, impact assessment 219–20 Chandler, a. 25 aid flows, USaID comparison 220 Chandy, L.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Turkey's Escalation in Libya
    Turkey’s Escalation in Libya: Implications and U.S. Policy Options JINSA Gemunder Center’s Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project - May 2020 Co-Chairs: Ambassador Eric Edelman and General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.) ACKNOWLEDGMENT This report is made possible by the generous support of the Gettler Family Foundation. A portion of the research for this report was conducted on JINSA’s 2019 Benjamin Gettler International Policy Trip to Greece. DISCLAIMER The findings and recommendations contained in this publication are solely those of the authors. Cover photo credit: Reuters Policy Project Members and Staff Co-Chairs Amb. Eric Edelman Gen Charles “Chuck” Wald, USAF (ret.) Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Former Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command Members Gen Philip M. Breedlove, USAF (ret.) John Hannah Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Senior Counselor, FDD; JINSA Gemunder and former Commander of U.S. European Center Senior Advisor Command Reuben Jeffery Gen Kevin P. Chilton, USAF (ret.) Former Under Secretary of State for Former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs Svante E. Cornell Alan Makovsky Policy Advisor, JINSA Gemunder Center for Former Senior Professional Staff Member at Defense & Strategy U.S. House Foreign Relations Committee ADM Kirkland H. Donald, USN (ret.) GEN David Rodriguez, USA (ret.) Former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Former Commander, U.S. Africa Command Program Lt Gen Thomas "Tom" Trask, USAF (ret.) VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.) Former Vice Commander, U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya's Other Battle | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2295 Libya's Other Battle by Andrew Engel, Ayman Grada Jul 28, 2014 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Andrew Engel Andrew Engel, a former research assistant at The Washington Institute, recently received his master's degree in security studies at Georgetown University and currently works as an Africa analyst. Ayman Grada Ayman Grada is an independent political analyst and cofounder of Libyan Youth Voices. Brief Analysis The escalation in and around Tripoli holds troubling parallels with the tribal divisions that precipitated Libya's bloody 1936 civil war. ibya is a fractured country whose long-simmering violence is threatening to boil over. Internecine fighting L once mostly limited to Benghazi -- where Maj. Gen. Khalifa Haftar launched "Operation Dignity" against U.S.- designated terrorist group Ansar al-Sharia and other armed Islamists -- has now spread to Tripoli. The U.S. embassy was hurriedly evacuated on July 26, and foreign governments have urged their nationals to flee the country. The Tripoli fighting erupted on July 12, pitting largely Islamist militias from the Muslim Brotherhood stronghold of Misratah and their northwestern allies against well-equipped and trained nationalist brigades from Zintan. The latter factions -- the Qaaqaa, Sawaiq, and Madani Brigades -- are tribal and back the more secular-leaning political alliance, the National Forces Alliance (NFA), but ostensibly belong to the Libyan army. The Misratan and Islamist militias have since bombarded Tripoli International Airport, which has been held by Zintani forces since the revolution ended. This battle -- in which 90 percent of aircraft on the ground were destroyed, costing over $1.5 billion -- marks a dark turn for Libya, increasing the likelihood of the country repeating its brutal 1936 intertribal civil war.
    [Show full text]
  • To Engage Or Not Engage? Libyan Salafis and State Institutions Virginie Collombier and Fiona Barsoum
    To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions Virginie Collombier and Fiona Barsoum HYRES Research Note Publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Copyright: © Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2019 Any views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The text may not be printed in part or in full without the permission of the author. Visiting address: C.J. Hambros plass 2d Address: PB 7024 St. Olavs Plass 0130 OSLO, NORWAY Internet: www.nupi.no E-mail: [email protected] Fax: [+ 47] 22 99 40 50 Tel: [+ 47] 22 99 40 00 2 To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions Virginie Collombier and Fiona Barsoum Published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Virginie Collombier and Fiona Barsoum 3 Contents HYRES – Hybrid Pathways to Resistance in the Islamic World .............. 4 Introduction .......................................................................................... 5 2011 – old constraints, new opportunities ............................................ 5 2011-2013 political participation versus moral order ........................... 7 2013-2015 – different modalities of violence, fitna versus order .......... 9 2016-2019 - not so “apolitical” Salafis................................................ 12 What future for Libya’s quietist Salafis? .............................................
    [Show full text]
  • Ghosts of the Past: the Muslim Brotherhood and Its Struggle for Legitimacy in Post‑Qaddafi Libya
    Ghosts of the Past: The Muslim Brotherhood and its Struggle for Legitimacy in post‑Qaddafi Libya Inga Kristina Trauthig ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author of this paper is Inga Kristina Trauthig. She wishes to thank Emaddedin Badi for his review and invaluable comments and feedback. The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own. CONTACT DETAILS For questions, queries and additional copies of this report, please contact: ICSR King’s College London Strand London WC2R 2LS United Kingdom T. +44 20 7848 2098 E. [email protected] Twitter: @icsr_centre Like all other ICSR publications, this report can be downloaded free of charge from the ICSR website at www.icsr.info. © ICSR 2018 Rxxntxxgrxxtxxng ISIS Sxxppxxrtxxrs xxn Syrxx: Effxxrts, Prxxrxxtxxs xxnd Chxxllxxngxxs Table of Contents Key Terms and Acronyms 2 Executive Summary 3 1 Introduction 5 2 The Muslim Brotherhood in Libya pre-2011 – Persecuted, Demonised and Dominated by Exile Structures 9 3 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Role During the 2011 Revolution and the Birth of its Political Party – Gaining a Foothold in the Country, Shrewd Political Manoeuvring and Punching above its Weight 15 4 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Quest for Legitimacy in the Libyan Political Sphere as the “True Bearer of Islam” 23 5 Conclusion 31 Notes and Bibliography 35 1 Key Terms and Acronyms Al-tajammu’-u al-watanī – Arabic for National Gathering or National Assembly GNA – Government of National Accord GNC – General National Council Hizb al-Adala wa’l-Tamiyya – JCP in Arabic HSC – High State Council Ikhwān – Arabic for
    [Show full text]
  • WAR on the MEDIA Journalists Under Attack in Libya WATCH
    HUMAN RIGHTS WAR ON THE MEDIA Journalists under Attack in Libya WATCH War on the Media Journalists under Attack in Libya Copyright © 2015 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-32309 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org FEBRUARY 2015 ISBN: 978-1-6231-32309 War on the Media Journalists under Attack in Libya Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 4 I. Background: Libya’s Media Landscape ............................................................................ 5 II. Attack on the Media since 2011 .....................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Download the Discussion Paper
    DISCUSSION PAPER Libya’s Civil War: Is the End in Sight? Ferhat Polat DISCUSSION PAPER Libya’s Civil War: Is the End in Sight? Ferhat Polat Libya’s Civil War: Is the End in Sight? © TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WRITTEN BY Ferhat Polat PUBLISHER TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE March 2019 TRT WORLD İSTANBUL AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347 ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ İSTANBUL / TURKEY TRT WORLD LONDON PORTLAND HOUSE 4 GREAT PORTLAND STREET NO:4 LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C. 1819 L STREET NW SUITE 700 20036 WASHINGTON DC www.trtworld.com researchcentre.trtworld.com The opinions expressed in this report represents the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reect the views of the TRT World Research Centre. 4 Libya’s Civil War: Is the End in Sight? Introduction nspired in part by the civil uprising failed state, lacking a unified, representative and in Tunisia, minor protests began legitimate government, and unable to exercise to emerge in Libya in mid-January nationwide authority or hold a monopoly over 2011. The demonstrations were the the use of force (Eljarh, 2018). result of corruption and nepotism, driven by a desire for greater Since 2014, efforts by the international political freedom and reform. In community to broker peace have been Iearly February, significant demonstrations took unsuccessful. More recently, from November place in Tripoli and Benghazi against Muammar 12 to 13, 2018, Italy hosted The International Gaddafi. Protests subsequently spread Conference on Libya to establish a path toward throughout Libya, resulting in repression and stability.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya: Military Actors and Militias
    Libya: military actors and militias By Francesco Finucci With special thanks to Lucia Polvanesi, for her editing work Photo: BRQ Network/Flickr The aftermath After Qaddafi's fall, about 200000 militiamen took to the streets. It was the end of a 40 years lasting regime. But it was also the first step towards the chaos: a country dominated by militias, fulfilled with weapons and characterized by harsh territories, where paratroops could hide themselves for months. Moreover, evidences suggest the use of this chaos in order to cover conflicts between rival tribes. Actions already blamed as war crimes. Hope is a fundamental element to be considered in new Libya, but fear is as well. What emerged from this study is a complicated scenario, much more than expected. On the other hand, requests are numerous and often genuine. The will to build a better place to live in came to light as well as the simple effort to gain power. Exploring this lively and intense underworld is not simple, even without being on the spot. Violence is part of this scenario as well as sense of the State. Sometimes they merge, sometimes they clash, but they never disappear. Probably, they won't do it for years, until Libya will be mature for military and political stability. After entering inside the last two years of Libyan history, we can't help hoping for this. Francesco Finucci Loyalty Name Flag/Symbol State-affiliated Libyan Army Force: 35000 soldiers1. القوات المسلحة الليبية Bodies The new army risen after Qaddafi's fall seems to be partially composed by former military staff, Allies: Libya Shield; and the detained equipment level is about the National Mobile Force; same as militias weaponry standard.
    [Show full text]
  • Libya's Uncertain Post-Electoral Direction | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 1965 Libya's Uncertain Post-Electoral Direction by Barak Barfi Jul 23, 2012 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Barak Barfi Barak Barfi is a research fellow at New America, where he specializes in Arab and Islamic affairs. Brief Analysis The impressive electoral performance of nominally liberal parties in Libya is being widely portrayed as a setback to Islamist political momentum in North Africa, but the reality is more complicated. ollowing Libya's first free parliamentary elections since 1965, 60 percent of the members who won seats F allocated to individuals rather than parties have yet to declare their party affiliation in the legislature. In a country historically riven by geographical divisions, Libyans voted for regional parties and candidates they knew rather than backing unfamiliar national factions with hastily conceived platforms. In response, Washington has characterized the elections as an "important step" in Libya's "democratic transition," but such optimism may be premature. BACKGROUND L ibya's new General National Congress consists of 200 seats, 80 elected by party-list balloting and 120 allocated to individual candidates. During the July 7 contest -- in which 62 percent of registered voters participated -- 374 parties vied for the 80 dedicated seats, while 2,639 candidates competed for the individual slots. The National Forces Alliance (NFA), a coalition of about 60 parties, emerged with 39 seats, while the Muslim Brotherhood's Justice and Building Party finished a distant second with 17. The National Front, a group led by Libya's leading exiled opposition party, took 3 seats, and the Union for Homeland Party (UH) -- a regional faction based in Libya's third-largest city, Misratah -- captured 2.
    [Show full text]
  • Gaining Legitimacy in Post-Qaddafi Libya: Analysing Attempts of The
    societies Article Gaining Legitimacy in Post-Qaddafi Libya: Analysing Attempts of the Muslim Brotherhood Inga Kristina Trauthig War Studies, King’s College, London WC2R 2LS, UK; [email protected] Received: 5 August 2019; Accepted: 27 August 2019; Published: 13 September 2019 Abstract: The Libyan Muslim Brotherhood needed to manoeuvre underground for several decades, just as most opposition groups in Libya had to—because of the repression from the Qaddafi regime. In 2012, however, the political wing of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB), the Justice and Construction Party (JCP, sometimes also called the Justice and Development Party) participated in popular elections just shortly after its inception. Seven years later, one can unanimously say that the movement was not able to take power in the country. This paper will analyse the LMB in post-revolutionary Libya by concentrating on the attempts of establishing legitimacy in the political sphere—while continuously being informed by historical influences. Methodologically, the paper examines primary sources, key academic texts but also factors in interview data from semi-structured interviews. Overall, the paper addresses the puzzle of why Libya as a predominantly Sunni, conservative country did not translate into a conservative Sunni movement like the LMB faring well; with that, derailing the impression that the whole region was “going Islamist” after the so-called Arab Spring. The LMB today is still influenced by the historical treatment it received under Qaddafi, which lead it to base itself mostly in exile, hence it struggled to entrench itself in the country. The LMB was pointed towards their opponents’ fearmongering of an alleged Islamist takeover, mostly without addressing self-inflicted wounds, such as their inability to unite or to convince major parts of the population of their political programme.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Transition Security and Militias
    JANUARY 2014 COUNTRY SUMMARY Libya Libya’s interim government faced multiple challenges in 2013. Myriad armed groups controlled security in many parts of the country, thousands of detainees remained in government and militia-controlled detention facilities without access to justice, and rampant ill-treatment and deaths in custody persisted. Forced displacement of tens of thousands of people from the town of Tawergha by militias from nearby Misrata had yet to be resolved. Authorities failed to conclude any investigations into politically motivated assassinations, attacks on protesters in Benghazi and Tripoli, and attacks on journalists and foreign diplomatic missions, citing lack of resources and the precarious security situation. Political Transition The General National Congress (GNC), Libya’s first elected parliament, has yet to fulfill its core mandate to organize elections for the Constituent Assembly (CA). On July 16, the GNC approved a law for electing the 60-member CA, which will draft Libya’s constitution but at time of writing the law had not been issued, and the elections date had not been fixed. The GNC suffered from political discord between its main political parties, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Construction Party (JCP) and the more liberal leaning National Forces Alliance (NFA); resignations by some Congress members; and removal of some congress members due to a sweeping lustration law that banned from office persons who had held any office in the Gaddafi era. Security and Militias The interim government failed to control deteriorating security in the country, especially in the capital, Tripoli, and in Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city.
    [Show full text]
  • Post-Arab Spring Political Changes in the Middle East and Japan’S Response ― Searching for a New Axis of the Peace-Keeping System ―
    Post-Arab Spring Political Changes in the Middle East and Japan’s Response ― Searching for a New Axis of the Peace-keeping System ― Hitoshi Suzuki Introduction Since the end of 2010, “the Arab Spring” and subsequent political changes in the Middle East and Arab region have become a center of international attention. Although these political changes have exclusively been considered and discussed as the expression of the “political diversity in the Arab region,”1 to date, this paper rather attempts to reconsider this historical conversion in the context of the regional and political uniformity of the Middle East. The Middle East world is a region stretching more than 6,000 km east and west2 that has certain uniformity. The elements of this “certain uniformity” include language (Arabic, Persian, Turkish, etc.), script (Arabic script in many cases), and religion (revealed religions such as Islam). 1 Typical examples in Japan include Keiko Sakai (ed.), Reading the Arab Upheaval: The Future of the People’s Revolution (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Press, 2011). 2 The distance from the west end, Rabat in Morocco, to the east end, Kabul in Afghanistan, is approximately 6,000 km in a straight line. From the historical viewpoint, “the Middle East” is a concept originating in Europe, and its geographical region almost coincided with the territory of the Ottoman Empire except for the Balkan Peninsula. However, since the 1970s, this term has been used in Japan to refer generally to the region consisting of 17 Arab states (from Morocco to Iraq and Gulf countries), plus Iran, Turkey, and Israel, putting emphasis on the continuity of Arabic culture in the Maghreb and Mashreq.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Situation
    Libya Last update: 20 maart 2020 Population: 6,678,567 million (World Bank 2018 est.) Prime minister: Fayez al-Sarraj Governemental type: - Ruling coalition: - Last election: 25 June 2014 (Council of Deputies) Next election: - Sister parties: None Subsequently to the Tunisian uprising, first protests in Libya started halfway January 2011. One month later, the protests had turned into the most violent conflict between government and citizens among the different Arab uprisings at that time. After almost 42 years under the regime of Gaddafi the people of Libya found a momentum to take over control of their country. But what started as a popular uprising and outcry for political reform quickly turned into factional violence. The newly elected General National Congress (GNC) in 2012 tried to hold the country together. The rise of Islamic State in Libya and the contested 2014 elections resulted in the creation of a rival government in the eastern city of Tobruk. A second Civil War ensued. The reconciliation process initiated by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has so far failed to unite the country. The current internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), based in the original capital Tripoli, has limited power, while the HoR supported by Libyan National Army of general Khalifa Haftar rules more than half of the country. Political Situation Libya gained independence in December 1951 after being under UN supervision as Italy lost the territory during World War II. Following a military coup in 1969, Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi designed his own political system, the Third Universal Theory, later dubbing the country the ‘Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’.
    [Show full text]