Gaining Legitimacy in Post-Qaddafi Libya: Analysing Attempts of The

societies Article Gaining Legitimacy in Post-Qaddafi Libya: Analysing Attempts of the Muslim Brotherhood Inga Kristina Trauthig War Studies, King’s College, London WC2R 2LS, UK; [email protected] Received: 5 August 2019; Accepted: 27 August 2019; Published: 13 September 2019 Abstract: The Libyan Muslim Brotherhood needed to manoeuvre underground for several decades, just as most opposition groups in Libya had to—because of the repression from the Qaddafi regime. In 2012, however, the political wing of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB), the Justice and Construction Party (JCP, sometimes also called the Justice and Development Party) participated in popular elections just shortly after its inception. Seven years later, one can unanimously say that the movement was not able to take power in the country. This paper will analyse the LMB in post-revolutionary Libya by concentrating on the attempts of establishing legitimacy in the political sphere—while continuously being informed by historical influences. Methodologically, the paper examines primary sources, key academic texts but also factors in interview data from semi-structured interviews. Overall, the paper addresses the puzzle of why Libya as a predominantly Sunni, conservative country did not translate into a conservative Sunni movement like the LMB faring well; with that, derailing the impression that the whole region was “going Islamist” after the so-called Arab Spring. The LMB today is still influenced by the historical treatment it received under Qaddafi, which lead it to base itself mostly in exile, hence it struggled to entrench itself in the country. The LMB was pointed towards their opponents’ fearmongering of an alleged Islamist takeover, mostly without addressing self-inflicted wounds, such as their inability to unite or to convince major parts of the population of their political programme. Keywords: Arab Spring; Libya; legitimacy; political Islam; Muslim Brotherhood 1. Introduction Despite the indubitably unfortunate developments following the so-called Arab Spring that had many countries stumble into violent conflict and turmoil, the protests had still allowed elections to occur in several countries [1] (p. 695), inter alia, in Libya in 2012 [2] (p. 171). In order to shield themselves from Western calls for democracy, North African heads of government fearmongered about Islamists potentially gaining power in the case of uncontrolled democratic measures for decades [3] (p. 1090). However, after these political leaders were toppled, political parties (often established in a rush) competed, for example, in the recently unclenched Libyan political sphere. In accordance with the mentioned fearmongering, the rise of popular Islamic governance1 replacing the previous Middle Eastern regimes was expected by many [4] (pp. 40). Naturally, the pre-eminent Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was oftem regarded as a suitable candidate for this challenge. This paper scrutinises two ways in which the Libyan Branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (LMB) attempted to 1 Most analysts assumed that the majority of party list seats would go to Islamist parties, both because the only surviving opposition movements against the Qadhafi regime all had Islamist roots (the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, and various Salafi currents) and a North Africa-wide trend favoring Islamic politics that would reflect conservative Libyan sensibilities [2]. Societies 2019, 9, 65; doi:10.3390/soc9030065 www.mdpi.com/journal/societies Societies 2019, 9, 65 2 of 18 erect and solidify itself as a legitimate political actor after 2011—attempting that in a particularly challenging environment that was post-Qaddafi Libya: A political sphere lacking any established political entities due to the totalitarian nature of Qaddafi’s system [5] (p. 143). The paper adheres to the following structure: Firstly, a brief overview of the history of the LMB preceding 2011 is provided; secondly, an introduction to the framework of legitimacy that is applied in this paper is given. This will then thirdly lead to the analysis of the LMB and its perception in post-Qaddafi Libya, guided by the two aspects of adherence to and display of ideals from the 2011 revolution, as well as commitment to the national Libyan cause. Finally, the paper will close with tying this assessment back to the LMB’s historical experience and provide an outlook for the movement in Libya that also considers the movement more broadly. For this analysis, the LMB and the Justice and Construction Party (JCP) are considered equable, as this paper concentrates on the political performance of the LMB after 2011, and it was during the following year (in March 2012) that the JCP mutated into the political wing of the LMB; therefore, the JCP is the natural point of reference when analysing political performance. Still, the paper acknowledges that the JCP was theoretically founded independently from the LMB [6]. The gathered interview data, however, evinces that the JCP is without exception considered identical with the LMB2 [7]. After spending years below the surface, the 2011 uprisings quickly catapulted the LMB into the open and let it arrive in the political sphere through its elected party officials. Because of the repression from Qaddafi, hence the LMB’s forced existence in the shadows, the group had nugatory experience in interacting with the majority of the Libyan people, contrary to its counterpart in Egypt [8] (pp. 3, 10). As a consequence, a marginal network structure existed that could have been activated to further popular support. Nonetheless, the LMB still expected to do well in the country’s first democratic elections in decades in 2012. To the LMB’s disappointment, however, the election results were lower than aspired; the prerequisites of Libya being a Sunni majority country with a conservative outlook did not align as seamlessly, with the LMB being a conservative Sunni movement, as the LMB had originally hoped for [9] (p. 202). Libya occupies an interesting place, as it never shows up in, for example, rankings of the “Top Ten Biggest Muslim Countries,” which means it often falls under the radar due to its allegedly nugatory contribution to the Muslim landscape. However, the comparatively small population creates a false appearance; proportionally speaking, Libya displays one of the “most Sunni Muslim societies” worldwide, since its homogenising element is its Arab-Sunni Muslim character [10]. This paper will, therefore, offer new insights on the reception of a Sunni movement like the LMB, addressing this extraordinary case of a small population (of about six and a half million) that identifies overwhelmingly as Sunni Muslim, of which most self-identify as Malikis, Libya’s Sunni form of Islam, while, at the same time, tending not to dwell in strictly and sharply divided religious orbits, as the majority does not adhere to one religious leader or school of thought in a strict manner [11] (p. 30)3. Candidly speaking, the election result of 2012 offered another enigma resulting from the Arab Spring: Libya, a country that captured many characteristics that would be considered to foreshadow an Islamist victory, actually produced election wins, compared to which the so-called liberal parties in Egypt and Tunisia were lagging behind [12]. Looking at the situation in 2019, one can comfortably conclude that the LMB seemed to have failed to achieve its objective of taking power in the country. At the same time, the paper acknowledges that the objective of taking power in Libya was unlikely to have been the imminent goal of the LMB in the country—given its limited social reach before 2011 and nascent post-revolutionary political organisation. Unsurprisingly, the LMB itself, but with it 2 Well, they always argue that it’s separate and then they say no it’s identical. The Islamic Brotherhood themselves they cannot say if this party is Islamic Brotherhood or not so how could I? But reasonably if the same person is from the same people who found the party and they coincidentally have the same ideology you have to tell that they are the same [7]. 3 No fewer than 162 religious leaders were mentioned as having influence at the local or national level, but most of these were mentioned by fewer than ten interviewees. Similarly, in 2016, a number of Madkhali and Salafi shaykhs were mentioned, but no one featured prominently. Societies 2019, 9, 65 3 of 18 many observers, were puzzled by the election results in 2012 and then in 2014, which unravelled the low levels of support the LMB had in the country [13]. This paper seeks to analyse the LMB’s endeavour to manifest itself as a legitimate political actor and assess the extent to which it was successful (or not). To sustain this analysis, the paper assesses two central sources for legitimacy in Libya; namely, portraying the LMB as a “truly revolutionary force,” as well as a “truly Libyan/national force.” Those two designations capture the central claims to legitimacy this paper will assess. This paper unravels if and why the LMB did not win as a political actor inside Libya. In order to assess this question, the research considers primary sources issued by the LMB and JCP, and factors in social media data; for example, from the leader of the JCP Mohamed Sowane. In addition, semi-structured interviews with Libyans, as well as experts in the field, were conducted to enrich the analysis, which was continuously informed by the relevant academic literature4 [14]. Basically, the LMB belongs to a scarce, forceful group that can claim germane national reach across Libya, and are not innately and solely tied to one town, region or tribe [4] (p. 186). Institutionally speaking, JCP members entrenched themselves into the existing power apparatus of the Libyan political system [9] (p. 203), even though the election results proved underwhelming [14], allegedly supporting the arguments of post-Islamism [15]5.

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