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9/11 and the Post-9/11 Strategic Environment 16, 202–5, 211 17 Index 9/11 and the post-9/11 strategic Ajdabiyya 29, 113, 116, 151, 158, environment 16, 202–5, 211 161, 212, 220 17 February Brigade see Bu Katif, Algeria 17, 19, 38, 103–4, 135, Fawzi 177, 181, 185, 222 17 February Coalitions 73–4 Al-Jazeera 17 February revolution see Uprisings coverage of Islamists 74, 124, 1969 Revolution (aka The al-Fateh 192, 194, 204, 214, 224 Revolution or The Great platform for Libyan rebels 74, 79, September Revolution) 23–4, 124, 183, 207 31, 36, 176, 185 Qadhafi’s attitude towards 79 Allen, Sir Mark 203 Abdul-Jalil, Mustafa (Chairman of Allies see Coalition of anti-Qadhafi the NTC) 45, 71, 130, 162, powers and NATO 209, 213–15 Alliot-Marie, Michèle (Foreign Abdul-Nasser, Gamal (President Minister of France 2010–11) of Egypt 1956–1970) 24–5, 118 194–5 see also Nasserism Al-Qaeda 17, 40, 97, 100 Abu Salim Prison massacre 21, affiliates with bases in the new 42–5, 93, 204–7 Libya 17 families of victims 21, 42–3, 45 alleged connection with Darna see also al-Senussi, Abdullah brigades 206–11 (perpetrator) and Terbil, Fathi links with the LIFG 201–6 (advocate on behalf of the offshoots in West Africa 103–4 victims) see also Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Accountability 231 Maghreb Activism, civil 11, 23–45 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Afghanistan 10, 18, 40, 118, (AQIM) 97, 100, 103, 110 128–9, 139, 200–4, 211–13, Amazigh (Berbers) 12, 36–8, 222–3 66–8, 92, 157, 160, 175–7, Africa, sub-Saharan 104–5, 116, 186–7, 213 134, 148, 176–8 antagonization of by Qadhafi 12, African Union (AU), attempts at 36–8 mediation between Qadhafi religion of 37, 55, 81, 177 and rebels by the 124, 128, rising up of 209 133–5, 148, 227 see also Identity, Amazigh and Agriculture 85, 89 Ibadhism 234 Index Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens Arab-Israeli dispute see Stevens, Ambassador J. 1973 Arab-Israeli War 87, 128 Christopher Libyan role in 126, 128 Amirate Arabs of Darna 210–11 fighters in Afghanistan in Sanussi of Cyrenaica 56 the 1980s 102–3 Ancien regimes 1, 3–5, 73, 164, 229 Libyans as 176–7 Anglo-American cooperation Arms agreement over détente with control by local militias 19, Libya (2003–10) 118 66, 69 joint proposal about shipment to the rebels by France reconciliation over and Qatar 127, 137, 148, 216 Lockerbie 90 smuggling/proliferation out of Ansar al-Sharia 17, 76, 222 Libya 17, 103 Anticolonialism 176–7, 187 see also see also Embargo and Militias Colonialism, legacy of and Mali Aouzou Strip 38, 179 Army Arab League defections of army troops to landmark statement (of 12 rebels 45, 67, 161, 212 March 2011) 116–17, 123 as an institution 8, 60, 103, support of No-Fly Zone 140, 163, 230 (NFZ) 7, 14, 116–17, 123, Libyan National 5–6, 103, 129–30, 140, 144–6 140, 181 Arab Nationalism role in federalism issue 166–7 death/decline of 2, 116 role of in opposition to spread of to Libya from Qadhafi 30 Egypt 10, 24–5 Arus al-Bahr, editor threatened by see also Nasserism and Abdul- Islamists 68 Nasser, Gamal ‘A sab iy ya (group or tribal Arab Spring solidarity) 14, 128, 159, 161, differences inherent to Libyan 168 manifestation of 5–7, 97 Assets, Libyan heightened expectations caused crony privatization of 121 by 127, 207 freezing of 6, 106 Muslim Brotherhood response investment of by LIA 104 to 216–17 issues surrounding the unfreezing organizations created by 70–1 of 138–9, 148 origin and validity of the nationalization of by RCC 87 term 19–20 smuggling of Qadhafian assets spread of to Libya 114–16 back into Libya 94 unique features of 1–5 Awjila oasis 37, 161 Western diplomacy towards 118 Awlad Mahmud (tribe) 154 see also Uprisings and Egypt and Awlad Suleiman (tribe) 158–9, 181–3 Tunisia Azawad (Independent Tuareg State Arab uprisings, concept of 2–3, in Northern Mali) 103, 177 19–20 see also Mali Index 235 Bab al-Aziziyya (Qadhafi’s Ben Gdara, Farhat 133 see also compound) Central Bank of Libya (CBL) bombing by NATO 136 Benghazi storming of by rebels 214 17 February Coalition in 73–5 Bamako 103 see also Mali as administrative center during Bani Walid the Monarchy 10 as counterrevolutionary force 3, American bombing of (in 1986) 14–15, 162–5 29–30 feud with Misrata 14–15 attack on Christopher Stevens as ignored by NTC 142 see Stevens, Ambassador J. last siege of by rebels (Sept/Oct Christopher 2011) 54, 156, 159, 160, 181 as both center and periphery 10 as outside the control of the post- Bulgarian nurses scandal in 42, Qadhafi government 18 142 overt conflict with NTC post- cartoon riots in 43, 93 Qadhafi 162–5 demographics of 32 see also as part of Qadhafi support Population base 58, 152, 154–5 election of local council in 73 see also Warfalla and Coup, by and federalism 59, 102 Warfalla Officers (in 1993) formation of rebel organizations Barclays, as Central Bank of Libya in 68–71, 77, 118, 128–33, during the BMA 86 136, 156–7 Barqa Conference (on 6 influx of Westerners to during the March 2012 advocating for uprisings 63, 118–20, 122, 138 Cyrencaican federalism) 59, Islamists in 76, 201, 209–19 83, 166–7 localism in 66–7 Barqa see Cyrenaica militias in 124 Barrels per day, Libyan production participation in BPCs 27 of (million b/d) 87–8, 91, 97, political liberalization in 42, 49 117 see also Oil Qadhafi’s threat to destroy and Bashir, Muhammad (leader of NFZ to protect 113–16, revolutionary Warfalla 28 May 126–7, 130, 144 Brigade) 155, 163–4 Qatari links with 123–4 Basic People’s Congress start of the uprisings in 5–7, (BPC) 25–7, 47–8, 73 21, 43–6, 92–3, 113, 206–9, Bay’a (allegiance) 29, 48 219–20 Bayda 10, 66–7, 92, 157, 210 as traditional locus of anti- as administrative center during Qadhafi opposition 21, the Monarchy 10 40–2, 154 Ben Ali, Zine Al-Abidine university in 32, 34, 199, 218 collapse of his regime 45, 114, see also Qar Yunis 118, 128, 143–4 see also killing of Younis half-hearted reforms by 4 (al-Obeidi), Abdul Fattah role of institutions in his Berbers see Amazigh (Berbers) regime 5–6, 97 Berlusconi, Silvio (Prime Minister see also Tunisia of Italy) 121–3 236 Index Bernard-Henri Lévy (BHL) Bu Katif, Fawzi (Leader of the 17 see Lévy, Bernard-Henri February Brigade) 124, Bevin-Sforza Plan see British 218, 219 Military Administration and Bulgarian Nurses Scandal see Independence, Libyan (1951) Benghazi, Bulgarian nurses Bilhajj, Abdul-Hakim scandal in competition with Salafists 221 Bureaucracy 3–6, 8–9, 18, 20, 25, connection with Qataris 76, 59–60, 113, 140, 230 125, 137 Bush, George W. 121, 129 failure of his Homeland Business Party 80, 125, 137, 215 American in Libya 86–8, 120–1 legal proceedings against British conducted by Saif al-Islam 33–4 government 203 debates over the role of and the LIMC/LIFG 65, Western 20–1 205–6, 212–14 French in Libya 117–18 release from prison and German in Libya 120 reconciliation with Qadhafi Italian in Libya 122 regime 41, 204, 208 lack of private sector 90–1 shift of focus to Syria 216 Libyan in Dubai 125–6 and the Tripoli Military probusiness orientation of Council 66, 124, 192, 214 NTC 71 Bin Khayal, Ashur (NTC Interim with the Qadhafi regime Libyan Foreign Minister) 104 20–1, 63 Birth rate 86 see also Population, Qatari in Libya 98, 125 demographics Tunisian in Libya 98, 104 al-Bishti, Shaykh Muhammad (and see also Foreign direct his disappearance in 1980) investment and Projects and 39–40, 194 Infrastructure Blair, Tony 119–20 Businessmen BMA see British Military reputation of Libyan 98–9 Administration supporting Saif al-Islam 203 Bottom-up organization of Western visiting Libya 6, 118, uprisings 1 143–4 Bouazizi, Mohamed, immolation of see Arab Spring Cameron, David 119–20 Brak 155, 181, 201 see also Wadi Capacity building (assistance al-Shati offered to Libya) 80, 105, 115, Brega, Marsa 113, 132, 136, 215 142–3, 138, 217 Brigade, revolutionary see Militias Capitalism, unique Libyan Britain, see United Kingdom version of (aka “People’s British Military Administration Capitalism”) 26, 92 (BMA) of Libya (1943–51) Censorship, under Qadhafi 199 9–10, 56, 86, 229 Center and periphery, Pack’s British Petroleum (BP) 98, 120 concept of 5–6, 9–12, 15, Brutality 1, 5, 35, 78, 205, 229 17, 21–2, 64–7, 69–70, 80, Index 237 106, 124–5, 140–3, 152, 168, Civilians 186–7, 215, 232 protection of as pretext for ascendency of the periphery over intervention 93, 115–17, the center 5, 9, 15, 125, 152, 135–6, 144 see also 186–7, 215 Responsibility to Protect (R2P) new center in Benghazi 6, 9 Qadhafian attacks on xvi, 1, 93, potential for harmony 115–17 between 17, 66, 232 Clinton, Hillary 116 recreation of historical Coalition relationships of 9–12, 64 of anti-Qadhafi powers (NATO- see also Periphery (in Pack’s led) 98, 115–25, 128–30, concept of center and 132–19, 142–3 see also NATO periphery) of Islamist actors 215–16, 219 Central Bank of Libya (CBL) 86, of tribes led by Warfalla (anti- 106, 133, 148 NTC) 152, 165 Chad “Coalition of the willing” 129 border security and smuggling Collective Punishment 35, 201 issues with 103, 178–83 Colonialism, legacy of 37 see also immigration from 179–80 Anticolonialism Libyan confrontation with (over Communication, ease of 1, 136, the Aouzou strip) 38 205–6 relationship with the Tubu Communities see Localism of 178–83 Conservative forces (inside Qadhafi Charismatic leadership 1, 23, 199, regime) see Hard-liners 232 Constitution China 1951 precedent 75, 99–101 LIFG members fleeing to 202 direct election of Constitutional stance on Libya NFZ 13, Assembly 10, 12, 20–2, 75 116–17, 141 discussion of by Saif al-Islam 34, Civil Society 197 activists 5, 6, 76–8, 99, 192, 208–9 draft version of (i.e., the organization of 5–6, 12, 24–5, TCD) 69–70,
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