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Turkey's Escalation in Libya
Turkey’s Escalation in Libya: Implications and U.S. Policy Options JINSA Gemunder Center’s Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project - May 2020 Co-Chairs: Ambassador Eric Edelman and General Charles Wald, USAF (ret.) ACKNOWLEDGMENT This report is made possible by the generous support of the Gettler Family Foundation. A portion of the research for this report was conducted on JINSA’s 2019 Benjamin Gettler International Policy Trip to Greece. DISCLAIMER The findings and recommendations contained in this publication are solely those of the authors. Cover photo credit: Reuters Policy Project Members and Staff Co-Chairs Amb. Eric Edelman Gen Charles “Chuck” Wald, USAF (ret.) Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Former Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command Members Gen Philip M. Breedlove, USAF (ret.) John Hannah Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Senior Counselor, FDD; JINSA Gemunder and former Commander of U.S. European Center Senior Advisor Command Reuben Jeffery Gen Kevin P. Chilton, USAF (ret.) Former Under Secretary of State for Former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs Svante E. Cornell Alan Makovsky Policy Advisor, JINSA Gemunder Center for Former Senior Professional Staff Member at Defense & Strategy U.S. House Foreign Relations Committee ADM Kirkland H. Donald, USN (ret.) GEN David Rodriguez, USA (ret.) Former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Former Commander, U.S. Africa Command Program Lt Gen Thomas "Tom" Trask, USAF (ret.) VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.) Former Vice Commander, U.S. -
IN IRAN Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green Fulfillment
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF BROADCASTING IN IRAN Bigan Kimiachi A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY June 1978 © 1978 BI GAN KIMIACHI ALL RIGHTS RESERVED n iii ABSTRACT Geophysical and geopolitical pecularities of Iran have made it a land of international importance throughout recorded history, especially since its emergence in the twentieth century as a dominant power among the newly affluent oil-producing nations of the Middle East. Nearly one-fifth the size of the United States, with similar extremes of geography and climate, and a population approaching 35 million, Iran has been ruled since 1941 by His Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr. While he has sought to restore and preserve the cultural heritage of ancient and Islamic Persia, he has also promoted the rapid westernization and modernization of Iran, including the establishment of a radio and television broadcasting system second only to that of Japan among the nations of Asia, a fact which is little known to Europeans or Americans. The purpose of this study was to amass and present a comprehensive body of knowledge concerning the development of broadcasting in Iran, as well as a review of current operations and plans for future development. A short survey of the political and spiritual history of pre-Islamic and Islamic Persia and a general survey of mass communication in Persia and Iran, especially from the Il iv advent of the telegraph is presented, so that the development of broadcasting might be seen in proper perspective and be more fully appreciated. -
Libya's Other Battle | the Washington Institute
MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 2295 Libya's Other Battle by Andrew Engel, Ayman Grada Jul 28, 2014 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Andrew Engel Andrew Engel, a former research assistant at The Washington Institute, recently received his master's degree in security studies at Georgetown University and currently works as an Africa analyst. Ayman Grada Ayman Grada is an independent political analyst and cofounder of Libyan Youth Voices. Brief Analysis The escalation in and around Tripoli holds troubling parallels with the tribal divisions that precipitated Libya's bloody 1936 civil war. ibya is a fractured country whose long-simmering violence is threatening to boil over. Internecine fighting L once mostly limited to Benghazi -- where Maj. Gen. Khalifa Haftar launched "Operation Dignity" against U.S.- designated terrorist group Ansar al-Sharia and other armed Islamists -- has now spread to Tripoli. The U.S. embassy was hurriedly evacuated on July 26, and foreign governments have urged their nationals to flee the country. The Tripoli fighting erupted on July 12, pitting largely Islamist militias from the Muslim Brotherhood stronghold of Misratah and their northwestern allies against well-equipped and trained nationalist brigades from Zintan. The latter factions -- the Qaaqaa, Sawaiq, and Madani Brigades -- are tribal and back the more secular-leaning political alliance, the National Forces Alliance (NFA), but ostensibly belong to the Libyan army. The Misratan and Islamist militias have since bombarded Tripoli International Airport, which has been held by Zintani forces since the revolution ended. This battle -- in which 90 percent of aircraft on the ground were destroyed, costing over $1.5 billion -- marks a dark turn for Libya, increasing the likelihood of the country repeating its brutal 1936 intertribal civil war. -
To Engage Or Not Engage? Libyan Salafis and State Institutions Virginie Collombier and Fiona Barsoum
To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions Virginie Collombier and Fiona Barsoum HYRES Research Note Publisher: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Copyright: © Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2019 Any views expressed in this publication are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. The text may not be printed in part or in full without the permission of the author. Visiting address: C.J. Hambros plass 2d Address: PB 7024 St. Olavs Plass 0130 OSLO, NORWAY Internet: www.nupi.no E-mail: [email protected] Fax: [+ 47] 22 99 40 50 Tel: [+ 47] 22 99 40 00 2 To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions To engage or not engage? Libyan Salafis and state institutions Virginie Collombier and Fiona Barsoum Published by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs Virginie Collombier and Fiona Barsoum 3 Contents HYRES – Hybrid Pathways to Resistance in the Islamic World .............. 4 Introduction .......................................................................................... 5 2011 – old constraints, new opportunities ............................................ 5 2011-2013 political participation versus moral order ........................... 7 2013-2015 – different modalities of violence, fitna versus order .......... 9 2016-2019 - not so “apolitical” Salafis................................................ 12 What future for Libya’s quietist Salafis? ............................................. -
Ghosts of the Past: the Muslim Brotherhood and Its Struggle for Legitimacy in Post‑Qaddafi Libya
Ghosts of the Past: The Muslim Brotherhood and its Struggle for Legitimacy in post‑Qaddafi Libya Inga Kristina Trauthig ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author of this paper is Inga Kristina Trauthig. She wishes to thank Emaddedin Badi for his review and invaluable comments and feedback. The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own. CONTACT DETAILS For questions, queries and additional copies of this report, please contact: ICSR King’s College London Strand London WC2R 2LS United Kingdom T. +44 20 7848 2098 E. [email protected] Twitter: @icsr_centre Like all other ICSR publications, this report can be downloaded free of charge from the ICSR website at www.icsr.info. © ICSR 2018 Rxxntxxgrxxtxxng ISIS Sxxppxxrtxxrs xxn Syrxx: Effxxrts, Prxxrxxtxxs xxnd Chxxllxxngxxs Table of Contents Key Terms and Acronyms 2 Executive Summary 3 1 Introduction 5 2 The Muslim Brotherhood in Libya pre-2011 – Persecuted, Demonised and Dominated by Exile Structures 9 3 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Role During the 2011 Revolution and the Birth of its Political Party – Gaining a Foothold in the Country, Shrewd Political Manoeuvring and Punching above its Weight 15 4 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Quest for Legitimacy in the Libyan Political Sphere as the “True Bearer of Islam” 23 5 Conclusion 31 Notes and Bibliography 35 1 Key Terms and Acronyms Al-tajammu’-u al-watanī – Arabic for National Gathering or National Assembly GNA – Government of National Accord GNC – General National Council Hizb al-Adala wa’l-Tamiyya – JCP in Arabic HSC – High State Council Ikhwān – Arabic for -
4 the Samanid State
ISBN 978-92-3-103467-1 THE SAMANID STATE 4 THE SAMANID STATE* N. N. Negmatov Contents The creation of the Samanid state ............................ 84 The system of government ............................... 86 The nature of political authority under the Samanids .................. 87 Agriculture ....................................... 88 Mining .......................................... 89 Crafts .......................................... 90 Domestic and external trade ............................... 90 Material culture ..................................... 92 Intellectual life ..................................... 93 Central Asia and the Ismacili movement ........................ 100 The ethnic composition of the Samanid state and the creation of an Eastern Persian- Tajik ethnic identity ................................ 101 By the tenth century, the majority of the various Iranian peoples of Khurasan, Transoxania and Khwarazm – Persians, Bactrians, Sogdians, Khwarazmians and others – were using the New Persian (Farsi-Dari) language as their spoken and written form of communication, although such Middle Iranian languages as Khwarazmian and Sogdian were still in use in certain regions – in the case of the former, for some four centuries subsequently. The terms Taz¯ ¯ık/g (Middle Persian) and Taz¯ ¯ı (New Persian), originally coined in western Persia to denote the conquering Arabs, now came in Khurasan and Transoxania to be applied to all the Muslims there (at this time, the majority were Persians), in distinction to the largely pagan -
WAR on the MEDIA Journalists Under Attack in Libya WATCH
HUMAN RIGHTS WAR ON THE MEDIA Journalists under Attack in Libya WATCH War on the Media Journalists under Attack in Libya Copyright © 2015 Human Rights Watch All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America ISBN: 978-1-6231-32309 Cover design by Rafael Jimenez Human Rights Watch defends the rights of people worldwide. We scrupulously investigate abuses, expose the facts widely, and pressure those with power to respect rights and secure justice. Human Rights Watch is an independent, international organization that works as part of a vibrant movement to uphold human dignity and advance the cause of human rights for all. Human Rights Watch is an international organization with staff in more than 40 countries, and offices in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg, London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis, Washington DC, and Zurich. For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org FEBRUARY 2015 ISBN: 978-1-6231-32309 War on the Media Journalists under Attack in Libya Summary ........................................................................................................................... 1 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 4 I. Background: Libya’s Media Landscape ............................................................................ 5 II. Attack on the Media since 2011 ..................................................................................... -
Download the Discussion Paper
DISCUSSION PAPER Libya’s Civil War: Is the End in Sight? Ferhat Polat DISCUSSION PAPER Libya’s Civil War: Is the End in Sight? Ferhat Polat Libya’s Civil War: Is the End in Sight? © TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE ALL RIGHTS RESERVED WRITTEN BY Ferhat Polat PUBLISHER TRT WORLD RESEARCH CENTRE March 2019 TRT WORLD İSTANBUL AHMET ADNAN SAYGUN STREET NO:83 34347 ULUS, BEŞİKTAŞ İSTANBUL / TURKEY TRT WORLD LONDON PORTLAND HOUSE 4 GREAT PORTLAND STREET NO:4 LONDON / UNITED KINGDOM TRT WORLD WASHINGTON D.C. 1819 L STREET NW SUITE 700 20036 WASHINGTON DC www.trtworld.com researchcentre.trtworld.com The opinions expressed in this report represents the views of the author(s) and do not necessarily reect the views of the TRT World Research Centre. 4 Libya’s Civil War: Is the End in Sight? Introduction nspired in part by the civil uprising failed state, lacking a unified, representative and in Tunisia, minor protests began legitimate government, and unable to exercise to emerge in Libya in mid-January nationwide authority or hold a monopoly over 2011. The demonstrations were the the use of force (Eljarh, 2018). result of corruption and nepotism, driven by a desire for greater Since 2014, efforts by the international political freedom and reform. In community to broker peace have been Iearly February, significant demonstrations took unsuccessful. More recently, from November place in Tripoli and Benghazi against Muammar 12 to 13, 2018, Italy hosted The International Gaddafi. Protests subsequently spread Conference on Libya to establish a path toward throughout Libya, resulting in repression and stability. -
City of Viunge Charm Morrow Evening at the Second T T Mmtnn Qtttoh Trib^ Congregational Church
TUTODAT, MARCH S6,1948 ■ ---------- , ru WfzUMr AviragQ Ddftly Cimiktioa Firsnat of iU tk W c a t^ Buraan ■ iiptrijifBtrr lEorttfyg HferaUi For the Mouth of Fshmary, 1946 Fair with aOghtty lower tens- 9,042 peraturAa tonight f t ^ luat alghf; Rev. Wilfred Maclean. minUUr lising Funds CAR PAINTING Thuroday fair and cwittnaed uu- War Contracts ■saaouably mild. j of the Broadview Community Gel Onr tfslluuite Heaber *t the Audit About Town church. Hartford, will be the guest Buiuuu ot Otarealatloau speaker at the Lenten ser\’Ice to Manchester Children Well HWlled To^uild Camp SOLIMENE A FLAGG' : Manchester— ‘A City of ViUnge Charm morrow evening at the Second t t mmtnn QtttOh trib^ Congregational church. Miss June Future Citizens of Town as They Appear Today <24 Center St* TeL <101 PRICE THREE VKf i^atTu, 1. O. R. who wish to MANCHESTER, CONN., WEDNESDAY, MARCH 27,1946 (EIGHTEEN PAGES) Yeomansv ipeal concert soprano Pylhian " Knighls ami ------ ------------------------------ (CtoMUed Adyerttring oa Page 1<) ‘ to Brt«l£*po*t April • to wlt- will be the soloist. Old-fashioned C.oI. Rolfiier Tells Tall i L g S o ftood* W wid degTM Congregational singing will also Cedars of His Ex’pie'ri^ Sislers Hopfe^lo Main- tgeei conolderod one at the best In be featured, with Organist Erhest i.'^ii. i^jt. confer degMeo on a claw lain Separale\Hou8e Cosman at the piano. A cordial enees During C'^nfliel Woman Driver Killed in Crossing Crash ‘ palefacea, are aeked to get In welcome is extended to all people FULLER BRU! with WUllam J. -
Libya: Military Actors and Militias
Libya: military actors and militias By Francesco Finucci With special thanks to Lucia Polvanesi, for her editing work Photo: BRQ Network/Flickr The aftermath After Qaddafi's fall, about 200000 militiamen took to the streets. It was the end of a 40 years lasting regime. But it was also the first step towards the chaos: a country dominated by militias, fulfilled with weapons and characterized by harsh territories, where paratroops could hide themselves for months. Moreover, evidences suggest the use of this chaos in order to cover conflicts between rival tribes. Actions already blamed as war crimes. Hope is a fundamental element to be considered in new Libya, but fear is as well. What emerged from this study is a complicated scenario, much more than expected. On the other hand, requests are numerous and often genuine. The will to build a better place to live in came to light as well as the simple effort to gain power. Exploring this lively and intense underworld is not simple, even without being on the spot. Violence is part of this scenario as well as sense of the State. Sometimes they merge, sometimes they clash, but they never disappear. Probably, they won't do it for years, until Libya will be mature for military and political stability. After entering inside the last two years of Libyan history, we can't help hoping for this. Francesco Finucci Loyalty Name Flag/Symbol State-affiliated Libyan Army Force: 35000 soldiers1. القوات المسلحة الليبية Bodies The new army risen after Qaddafi's fall seems to be partially composed by former military staff, Allies: Libya Shield; and the detained equipment level is about the National Mobile Force; same as militias weaponry standard. -
Libya's Uncertain Post-Electoral Direction | the Washington Institute
MENU Policy Analysis / PolicyWatch 1965 Libya's Uncertain Post-Electoral Direction by Barak Barfi Jul 23, 2012 ABOUT THE AUTHORS Barak Barfi Barak Barfi is a research fellow at New America, where he specializes in Arab and Islamic affairs. Brief Analysis The impressive electoral performance of nominally liberal parties in Libya is being widely portrayed as a setback to Islamist political momentum in North Africa, but the reality is more complicated. ollowing Libya's first free parliamentary elections since 1965, 60 percent of the members who won seats F allocated to individuals rather than parties have yet to declare their party affiliation in the legislature. In a country historically riven by geographical divisions, Libyans voted for regional parties and candidates they knew rather than backing unfamiliar national factions with hastily conceived platforms. In response, Washington has characterized the elections as an "important step" in Libya's "democratic transition," but such optimism may be premature. BACKGROUND L ibya's new General National Congress consists of 200 seats, 80 elected by party-list balloting and 120 allocated to individual candidates. During the July 7 contest -- in which 62 percent of registered voters participated -- 374 parties vied for the 80 dedicated seats, while 2,639 candidates competed for the individual slots. The National Forces Alliance (NFA), a coalition of about 60 parties, emerged with 39 seats, while the Muslim Brotherhood's Justice and Building Party finished a distant second with 17. The National Front, a group led by Libya's leading exiled opposition party, took 3 seats, and the Union for Homeland Party (UH) -- a regional faction based in Libya's third-largest city, Misratah -- captured 2. -
Gaining Legitimacy in Post-Qaddafi Libya: Analysing Attempts of The
societies Article Gaining Legitimacy in Post-Qaddafi Libya: Analysing Attempts of the Muslim Brotherhood Inga Kristina Trauthig War Studies, King’s College, London WC2R 2LS, UK; [email protected] Received: 5 August 2019; Accepted: 27 August 2019; Published: 13 September 2019 Abstract: The Libyan Muslim Brotherhood needed to manoeuvre underground for several decades, just as most opposition groups in Libya had to—because of the repression from the Qaddafi regime. In 2012, however, the political wing of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood (LMB), the Justice and Construction Party (JCP, sometimes also called the Justice and Development Party) participated in popular elections just shortly after its inception. Seven years later, one can unanimously say that the movement was not able to take power in the country. This paper will analyse the LMB in post-revolutionary Libya by concentrating on the attempts of establishing legitimacy in the political sphere—while continuously being informed by historical influences. Methodologically, the paper examines primary sources, key academic texts but also factors in interview data from semi-structured interviews. Overall, the paper addresses the puzzle of why Libya as a predominantly Sunni, conservative country did not translate into a conservative Sunni movement like the LMB faring well; with that, derailing the impression that the whole region was “going Islamist” after the so-called Arab Spring. The LMB today is still influenced by the historical treatment it received under Qaddafi, which lead it to base itself mostly in exile, hence it struggled to entrench itself in the country. The LMB was pointed towards their opponents’ fearmongering of an alleged Islamist takeover, mostly without addressing self-inflicted wounds, such as their inability to unite or to convince major parts of the population of their political programme.