The Historical Significance of Japanese Grassroots Cooperation for the Support of Korean Atomic Bomb Survivors

CONFRONTING COLONIAL LEGACIES:

THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF JAPANESE GRASSROOTS COOPERATION FOR THE SUPPORT OF KOREAN ATOMIC BOMB SURVIVORS

ÁGOTA DURÓ

DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Peace Studies in International Studies in the Graduate School of Hiroshima City University, 2017

Hiroshima City, Japan

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Robert A. Jacobs, Chair Associate Professor Itsuki Kurashina Associate Professor Michael Gorman

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... vii

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ...... 26

SECTION ONE: SON JIN-DOO’S LEGAL SUPPORT IN JAPAN ...... 36

CHAPTER 1: SIGNIFICANCE OF SON JIN-DOO’S LEGAL CASE AND THE EMERGENCE OF HIS SUPPORT MOVEMENT ...... 40 Raising awareness in Japan ...... 40 Son’s story prior to 1970 ...... 44 Son’s undocumented entry in 1970 ...... 47 News coverage of Son’s case ...... 49 Formation of the initial support movements...... 54 Key advocates: Takashi Hiraoka in Hiroshima ...... 58 Key advocates: Rui Itō in Fukuoka ...... 64 Key advocates: Tatsumi Nakajima in Tokyo ...... 66

CHAPTER 2: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS OF SON JIN-DOO’S LAWSUIT TO 1974 ...... 71 Son’s first trial and verdict ...... 71 Extension of the support movement ...... 78 Son’s deportation order ...... 84 New challenges for the Association of Citizens ...... 87 Appeal trials ...... 100 Son’s first legal victory and its reverberation ...... 104 Directive No. 402 ...... 106

CHAPTER 3: THE CONTINUING LEGAL BATTLE: 1974 TO 1978 ..... 109 Son’s appeal to his deportation order ...... 109 The A-bomb certificate trials: 1974 to 1977 ...... 114 Major support activities of the Association of Citizens after 1974 ...... 117 1978: a breakthrough year ...... 122 Repercussions of the 1978 Supreme Court ruling ...... 124 Events from the Ministry of Welfare and Fukuoka Prefecture’s perspective ...... 128 Consequences of the 1978 Supreme Court decision ...... 132

SECTION TWO: INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT OF KOREAN ATOMIC BOMB SURVIVORS ...... 139

CHAPTER 4: REVEREND MASAHARU OKA’S RESEARCH ON KOREAN HIBAKUSHA IN NAGASAKI ...... 143 Prewar, wartime, and postwar years ...... 145 Omura Prison ...... 151 The Nagasaki Association to Protect the Human Rights of Koreans in Japan and its support activities ...... 153 Investigations on the conditions of Korean hibakusha in Nagasaki City ...... 161 Sekai no Hito e (To the People of the World) ...... 167 Reverend Oka’s influence on city politics ...... 169 Reverend Oka’s legacy and foundation of the Oka Masaharu Memorial Nagasaki Peace Museum ...... 171 Reverend Oka’s ideals ...... 173

CHAPTER 5: DR. TORATARŌ KAWAMURA’S MEDICAL SUPPORT OF KOREAN HIBAKUSHA ...... 181 His early life and influences ...... 183 Medical visits to South Korea ...... 185 Inviting A-bomb survivors from South Korea to Hiroshima for medical treatment .. 193 Efforts to build up a support network ...... 197 The Hiroshima Committee to Invite Korean A-bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment ...... 203

CHAPTER 6: CASE OF THE KOREAN A-BOMB VICTIMS’ UNRETURNED ASHES: MUNETOSHI FUKAGAWA’S INVESTIGATION ...... 213 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Hiroshima ...... 215 Fukagawa and Mitsubishi ...... 219 Fukagawa’s Investigations into the Disappearance of 246 Koreans ...... 221 Later developments in the Missing Koreans ...... 239 Lawsuit against Mitsubishi ...... 241

SECTION THREE: ASSOCIATION OF CITIZENS FOR THE SUPPORT OF KOREAN ATOMIC BOMB VICTIMS AND OTHER SUPPORT GROUPS ...... 247

CHAPTER 7: ASSOCIATION OF CITIZENS FOR THE SUPPORT OF KOREAN ATOMIC BOMB VICTIMS ...... 249 Different branches and their objectives ...... 250 Major figures ...... 254 Assisting A-bomb victims in South Korea and cooperating with the Korea Atomic Bomb Victims Association ...... 266 Conducting surveys on the A-bomb survivors in South Korea ...... 275 Advocating for the rights of Korean hibakusha in Japan ...... 283 Raising awareness in Japan ...... 290 Criticism of the AOC and its pitfalls ...... 297

CHAPTER 8: ADDITIONAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS ...... 303 The Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons (Kakkin Kaigi) ...... 303 The Hiroshima Paper Crane Group ...... 310 The Nagasaki Testimonial Society ...... 315 The Good Neighbor Society (Zenrinkai/Zenrinkyō) ...... 318 The Citizens’ Council Addressing the Problems of Korean A-bomb Victims (Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai Shimin Kaigi) ...... 321 The Mugunghwa Study Group ...... 322

CONCLUSION ...... 329

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APPENDIX A: LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS ...... 367

APPENDIX B: LIST OF COURT DECISIONS AND GOVERNMENTAL MEASURES ...... 369

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 371

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Map of South Korea ...... 337 Figure 2: Son Jin-doo and his sister, Son Gwi-dal ...... 338 Figure 3: Son Jin-doo arrives in Hiroshima for medical treatment in 1976 ...... 339 Figure 4: Son Jin-doo receives medical treatment ...... 340 Figure 5: Son Jin-doo learns the news of his legal victory at the Supreme Court...... 340 Figure 6: Son Jin-doo receives his A-bomb certificate ...... 341 Figure 7: Son Jin-doo is given Special Permission of Residence...... 341 Figure 8: Reverend Masaharu Oka ...... 342 Figure 9: Reverend Masaharu Oka gives a talk ...... 343 Figure 10: Dr. Toratarō Kawamura...... 344 Figure 11: Dr. Toratarō Kawamura receives Presidential Award ...... 345 Figure 12: Dr. Toratarō Kawamura (third from the right) and Munetoshi Fukagawa on the right talk with other Korean hibakusha supporters ...... 346 Figure 13: Dr. Yuzuru Kawamura receives a certificate from the South Korean Consulate General in Hiroshima on March 17, 2015 ...... 346 Figure 14: Munetoshi Fukagawa in 1974...... 347 Figure 15: Munetoshi Fukagawa in September 2004 ...... 347 Figure 16: No Seong-ok ...... 348 Figure 17: Location of the ports the Korean returnees had departed from in 1945 and some of which Fukagawa visited in 1973 ...... 349 Figure 18: Location of Iki Island and Tsushima...... 350 Figure 19: Enlarged map of Iki Island ...... 351 Figure 20: Excavations on Iki Island in 1976, led by Fukagawa ...... 352 Figure 21: Enlarged map of Tsushima ...... 353 Figure 22: Location of Konjōin Temple ...... 354 Figure 23: Yoshiko Matsui giving a speech in 1991 ...... 355 Figure 24: Keisaburō Toyonaga giving a speech in 2003 ...... 355 Figure 25: Nobuto Hirano giving a speech in 2011 ...... 356 Figure 26: Junko Ichiba giving a speech in 1997...... 356 Figure 27: Members of the Hiroshima Papercrane Group send a flag to Pidulgi ...... 357

Figure 28: Members of the Hiroshima Papercrane Group see off the four visiting members of Pidulgi at Hiroshima Station in 1972 ...... 357 Figure 29: Members of the Mugunghwa Study Group in 1997 ...... 358 Figure 30: Members of the Mugunghwa Study Group are listening to the testimony of an A-bomb survivor in Hapcheon in 1998 ...... 358 Figure 31: Hapcheon Welfare Center for Atomic Bomb Victims ...... 359 Figure 32: Lee Soo-yeong, an A-bomb survivor living in the Hapcheon Welfare Center in 2016 ...... 360 Figure 33: Monument in Memory of the Korean Victims of the Atomic Bomb, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park ...... 361 Figure 34: Monument for Korean Atomic Bomb Victims, Nagasaki Peace Park ...... 362 Figure 35: Keisaburō Toyonaga with the author in front of the Monument in Memory of the Korean Victims of the Atomic Bomb at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park ...... 363 Figure 36: Takashi Hiraoka giving a lecture in Hiroshima on August 6, 2017 ...... 364 Figure 37: Keisaburō Toyonaga giving an A-bomb testimony in Hiroshima ...... 365 Figure 38: Junko Ichiba giving a speech at the Symposium to Consider the Number of Korean A-bomb Survivors in Hiroshima on March 3, 2018 ...... 366

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Robert A. Jacobs, for his expert advice, extraordinary support, patient guidance and encouragement in the doctoral dissertation process. I feel extremely lucky and honored to have had such a supportive supervisor who has given constructive comments on my work on a weekly basis, responded to my questions immediately with a lot of consideration and expertise, provided me with a lot of advice on academia and publishing in general, and connected me to leading scholars and university professors in this research area. His editing during the revision process has been very helpful and his insightful thinking has left a huge impact on me and the way I have articulated my final thesis. Additionally, I am very grateful to the committee members, Professor Michael Gorman and Professor Itsuki Kurashina, for their valuable advice and assistance, which contributed to the improvement of this work. I would also like to thank Professor Kazumi Mizumoto and Professor Masae Yuasa for their additional suggestions during my mid-term presentation in May 2016. I have incorporated the scholarly works they have recommended into the dissertation. Furthermore, insightful conversations with Professor David Palmer further deepened my understanding of the conditions of the former Korean forced laborers, and his academic works served as a starting point in my research on Munetoshi Fukagawa’s groundbreaking investigation that I discuss in Chapter 6. The dissertation would not have been complete without the assistance of Takashi Hiraoka, Keisaburō Toyonaga, Yasunori Takazane, Nobuto Hirano, Dr. Yuzuru Kawamura, Sumiko Kawamura, Mineo Masaki, Itsuko Yoshioka, and Motoji Matsuda. They have been involved in the support of Korean hibakusha for decades and are regarded as central members of the citizen-based movements I discuss in my work. During interviews I conducted with them, they provided me with a lot of information and personal stories not discussed in detail in scholarly works or other publications. Thanks to them, my work has become more substantial and genuine. Talking to the major Korean hibakusha advocates in person enabled me to comprehend the complexity of their activities and the support

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network more profoundly and more critically analyze the historical events. Also, many of these activists provided me with copies of publications that are normally not available in bookstores and libraries. These have been invaluable sources for learning about the activities of various organizations and individuals. Furthermore, words cannot express how thankful I am to my parents, who have unwaveringly supported my studies and research in Japan, and who have made a lot of sacrifices to be able to back my education and career so far. They have always listened to the progress of my research with great interest and provided me with moral support and limitless affection. Also, I would like to give thanks to all my friends in Hungary and Japan who constantly encouraged me, believed in the successful outcome of my work, and gave me a lot of emotional support along the way. I owe special thanks to Sachiko Kowata and Hirofumi Kumagai, who wholeheartedly supported me during my research program at Hirosaki University from April 2013 to September 2014. They have become my family in Japan, giving me a lot of strength, which is necessary for someone who lives in a foreign country. Even though I have been living in Hiroshima since October 2014, they have been following the progress of my studies and providing me with moral support ever since. Last but not least, I am extremely indebted to the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology for their financial support throughout the research program at Hirosaki University and the doctoral course at Hiroshima City University. Also, my appreciation extends to Hiroshima City University and the Hiroshima Peace Institute for providing me with additional funding for research expenses as well as books each semester.

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INTRODUCTION

It had been raining heavily since the morning at Kushiura Port on December 2, 1970.1 On that evening from the pier, a Japanese fisherman who was in charge of inspecting vessels entering Japan noticed an unfamiliar boat in the distance. After notifying the authorities, he kept watching that boat with binoculars all night. Early in the morning, ten policemen arrived at the scene to arrest the fifteen people on board for entering Japan without visas.

All of them were Koreans. One of them claimed, “I have become an atomic bomb victim in

Hiroshima and I stowed away into Japan to receive medical treatment here.”2 None of those present could imagine that the mooring of that boat and the subsequent arrest of the undocumented entrants would set the stage for significant social changes in Japan and would generate grassroots cooperation for the support of A-bomb victims residing in South

Korea.

The man claiming to be an A-bomb survivor was Son Jin-doo, a South Korean resident from Busan. After his case was reported in the local newspapers, many Japanese were surprised to learn that there were hibakusha in South Korea, too. By then, Japanese A- bomb victims were entitled to receive free medical treatment as well as monthly healthcare allowances, which helped improve their health condition and living standard, yet these relief measures were limited to A-bomb survivors residing in Japan. Nevertheless, given the

1 In Saga Prefecture, Kyushu. 2 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai Henshū Iinkai, [Editorial Committee of the Nationwide Association of Citizens] Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu: Son Jin-doo-san ni Chiryō to Zairyū o!, [Accusation of the Korean Hibakusha Son Jon-doo: Medical Treatment and Residence to Son Jin-doo!] (Tokyo: Taimatsusha, 1978), 11-12. Hereafter cited as Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu. All translations have been made by the author.

lack of awareness of the existence of overseas hibakusha, few had questioned earlier the incomplete nature of these laws. It was Son Jin-doo’s appearance and claim to be hibakusha that made many people question why there were A-bomb survivors in South Korea and why they had to come to Japan without legal documents for medical treatment.

The Japanese suffered from “amnesia” when discussing World War II. For several decades they could not think of themselves “as aggressors,” but could “only remember their self-victimization in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”3 As John W. Dower put it, “Hiroshima and Nagasaki became icons of Japanese suffering […] capable of fixating Japanese memory of the war on what had happened to Japan and simultaneously blotting out recollection of the Japanese victimization of others. Remembering Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that is, easily became a way of forgetting Nanjing, Bataan, the Burma-Siam railway, Manila, and the countless Japanese atrocities these and other place names signified to non-Japanese.”4 This was reflected in the atomic bomb narratives, too. Despite the fact that ten percent of atomic bomb victims were Koreans, they were missing from the A-bomb discourse for a long time.5 Additionally, there were many Japanese Americans, a few

Brazilians, Peruvians, Chinese, Taiwanese, and other Asian victims as well as prisoners of war from the Allied powers in the two A-bombed cities, but their stories were excluded

3 Lisa Yoneyama, “Memory Matters: Hiroshima’s Korean Atom Bomb Memorial and the Politics of Ethnicity,” in Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age, eds. Laura Hein and Mark Selden, (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 203. Hereafter cited as Yoneyama, “Memory Matters.” 4 John Dower, “The Bombed: Hiroshimas and Nagasakis in Japanese Memory,” Diplomatic History 19.2 (1995), 281. 5 Jung Keun-Sik, ed., Kankoku Genbaku Higaisha Kutsū no Rekishi: Hiroshima – Nagasaki no Kioku to Shōgen, [History of the Suffering: Memory and Testimony of the A-bombed] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2008), 15. Hereafter cited as Jung, Kankoku Genbaku Higaisha Kutsū no Rekishi.

from the official narrative of the atomic bombing.6 This omission contributed to their memories fading away and, consequently, when Japan took relief measures to assist

Japanese A-bomb victims, overseas hibakusha were left out. Nowadays, awareness of the existence of Korean hibakusha is still low. However, due to the increasing number of tourists to the two A-bombed cities7 and recent scholarly works on the atomic bomb that mention Korean hibakusha, awareness of the existence of these overseas survivors is increasing.

Discrimination against Koreans in Japan goes back to the pre-colonial period.

However, in the 1970s Son Jin-doo’s case and the growing awareness of A-bomb victims residing outside Japan served as a sobering experience for a small segment of Japanese society. It helped debunk the myth about Japan’s place largely as a victim in World War II and gave rise to a strong revulsion against their country’s imperial past. Son’s landing convinced several Japanese citizens to reinterpret their history and served as an impetus for generating citizen-based support movements whose members began to advocate for the rights of Korean A-bomb survivors. Learning about the history and the current adversity of

Korean hibakusha was a major factor that brought grassroots sentiments to life and prompted these Japanese citizens to immerse themselves in their support on moral grounds.

The support movement initially focused on, but was not limited to, aiding Son Jin-doo’s lawsuit. Despite its gradual extension, it remained a small-scale movement involving only a

6 Shinpei Takeda and Naoko Wake, Hiroshima/Nagasaki Beyond the Ocean, (Nagasaki: Yururi Books, 2014), 7. 7 Memorials for Korean A-bomb victims in the peace memorial parks of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the peace museums offer limited information on Korean hibakusha.

few thousand people, yet it was powerful enough to make the Japanese government face its colonial legacy and recognize overseas A-bomb victims through a series of legal cases.

Grassroots assistance to Korean A-bomb victims was not confined to legal support.

Japanese supporters were aware that until the government implemented changes, they needed to provide Korea financial as well as medical assistance. Given the dearth of information on Korean hibakusha, members of the movement were convinced that it was the duty of the Japanese to examine the living and health conditions of A-bomb survivors in various areas of South Korea. Additionally, another important task was to raise awareness within Japanese society so that they could increase the number of proponents and bring about changes in people’s perceptions of Koreans in general. Many organizations engaged in various forms of support, but their goals were congruent: to help Korean (and other overseas) hibakusha secure the same medical and financial benefits as Japanese hibakusha.

This was accomplished in 2015, seven decades after the dropping of the bombs, following a major Supreme Court victory. Until then, Japanese citizens familiar with Japan’s colonial history and critical of its wartime atrocities against other Asian nations contributed to the support of Korean hibakusha either individually or as members of various organizations.

Without their hard work, the Japanese government might have never acknowledged the legal rights of Korean hibakusha. Changes in the Korean victims’ status were implemented by the government, but these were initiated and their cause supported for decades by a small number of Japanese citizens.

In the dissertation, I point out that the long-term Japanese grassroots support was a key factor that eventually secured governmental support of South Korean A-bomb

survivors and induced the Japanese government to extend the hibakusha relief measures to the Korean victims of the bomb. In spite of the hostile feelings towards Koreans in mainstream Japanese society, these citizens stood up for this group of marginalized people.

I interpret their efforts as an attempt to initiate reconciliation between the two nations and work towards a peaceful future based on friendly relations, mutual trust, and overcoming past grievances.

The fact that Korean hibakusha won numerous lawsuits in Japan is remarkable. Since the end of World War II, the Japanese government has consciously attempted to downplay its imperial past and its wartime aggression against other Asian nations, and repeatedly refused to pay reparations or to apologize officially to the victims. For instance, Mitsubishi and other corporations have never compensated the former foreign forced laborers through legal cases, although there have been examples of out-of court settlements.8 Also, the

8 In 2009, the Nishimatsu Corporate set up a “trust fund of 250 million yen” to “compensate the 360 Chinese men who were forcibly taken to Hiroshima Prefecture in 1944 to build a hydroelectric power plant at Nishimatsu’s Yasuno worksite—or their families, since most of the workers have already died.” Some of these former Chinese workers filed a suit against Nishimatstu but the Supreme Court rejected their demand for reparations in 2007, so the 2009 settlement by the corporation itself carried great significance and demonstrated Japan’s changing attitude and its gradual acknowledgement of its wartime accountability. For more information, see William Underwood, Kang Jian and Arimitsu Ken, “Assessing the Nishimatsu Corporate Approach to Redressing Chinese Forced Labor in Wartime Japan,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 7.47 no. 1 (2009), accessed May 31, 2017, http://apjjf.org/-William- Underwood/3256/article.html. Additionally, Mitsubishi Materials Corporation apologized to the former Chinese laborers still alive in June 2016 and decided to provide them with 1.7 million yen per person as consolation money, erect a monument for their memory, and seek other former workers or their family members. For more information, see “Settling wartime forced labor suits,” June 19, 2016. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/06/19/editorials/settling-wartime-forced-labor-suits/#.WS7cW- t97IW. (accessed: May 31, 2017). For more information on the recent court cases involving former Korean forced laborers, see David Palmer, “Foreign Forced Labor at Mitsubishi’s Nagasaki and Hiroshima Shipyards: Big Business, Militarized Government, and the Absence of Shipbuilding Workers’ Rights in World War II Japan,” in On Coerced Labor: Work and Compulsion after Chattel Slavery, eds. Marcel van der Linden and Magaly Rodriguez, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2016), 173-174. Hereafter cited as Palmer, “Foreign Forced Labor at Mitsubishi’s Nagasaki and Hiroshima Shipyards.”

debate over the formal compensation of “comfort women” has been one of the most heated pending issues.9 In light of this, addressing the Korean hibakusha problem and realizing the financial and medical governmental assistance of Korean A-bomb survivors in their own country carries great significance since the Japanese government rejected compensation to other wartime victims. Korean A-bomb survivors, with the assistance of Japanese activists, broke down the barriers little by little until the 2015 Supreme Court decision approved full reimbursement of their medical expenses in their home country.

The history of Korean hibakusha reveals ongoing legal discrimination against

Koreans, but at the same time, given the support of many Japanese, is an important example of attempts towards rapprochement between citizens of the two countries. The Japanese who confronted the Japanese government and stood up against the prevalent narrative of

Japan as a victim should be included in the records of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and postwar Japanese history. Social activism in Japan on behalf of the rights of minorities in the 1960s and 1970s is still an unmarked chapter of Japanese postwar history, and the activities of the Japanese who supported Korean A-bomb survivors was an important episode of this activism. Additionally, the story of these redress movements should be embedded in the history of the atomic bombings of Japan for playing a

9 In December 2015, the Japanese and South Korean governments signed a landmark deal to settle the “comfort women” issue. According to the deal, Japan agreed to allocate one billion yen to its former victims and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo offered his earnest apology to the victims. Japan transferred the fund in 2016 and emphasized that its purpose is to help its former victims and the fund cannot be regarded as compensation money. The former “comfort women” are discontent with the deal and stressed they demand an official apology and formally recognized reparations from the Japanese government. The debate has been ongoing, with the newly elected South Korean President Moon Jae-in casting his doubt on the previous deal. For more information, see “Japan and South Korea agree WW2 ‘comfort women’ deal,” December 28, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35188135 (accessed: May 31, 2017), and “South Korea’s new president questions Japan ‘comfort women’ deal,” May 11, 2017. http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/11/asia/south-korea- japan-comfort-women (accessed: May 31, 2017).

significant role in achieving the Korean victims’ receipt of equal benefits to their Japanese counterparts provided by the Japanese government. The atomic bombing discourse is not limited to the history of Japanese hibakusha, thus the role of the Japanese activists fighting for the equal treatment of Japanese and overseas hibakusha and the recognition of A-bomb victims residing outside Japan must be emphasized. With this work, I seek to restore this episode in Japan’s modern history and I also point out how some Japanese citizens, compelled by remorse and advocating for minorities victimized by their nation, contributed to easing historical tensions between their governments.

There is an extensive literature written in English about the atomic bombings of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but they are chiefly concerned with the decision to drop the bomb, the American and Japanese perspectives, collective memory of the bombing, the Japanese hibakusha community, and Japanese survivors’ testimonies. Only a few of them reveal that many survivors and victims were of foreign descent. There are no books written in English that exclusively discuss the history of Korean hibakusha and what we can learn from that history, let alone the emerging consciousness in Japan about the Korean hibakusha problem and the support movements established from the 1970s. A few historical studies that touch upon the Korean hibakusha problem or conclude with the possibility of historical rapprochement between South Korea and Japan include the following works.

In Beyond the Mushroom Cloud, Yuki Miyamoto examines the “message emerging from hibakusha testimonies.”10 She points out that hibakusha messages do not intend to

“evoke guilt in the ‘West,’” but through their “self-critical dimension,” they provide

“valuable insights concerning reconciliation.” When the author uses the term

“reconciliation,” she refers to the Japanese A-bomb survivors’ confronting the A-bomb experience and using it as a means to call for the abolition of nuclear weapons and

“preventing the future suffering of others.”11 Although she mentions Korean hibakusha, she does not focus on how they could reconcile with their colonial memories as well as the trauma caused by the A-bomb, or how hibakusha reconciliation can transcend borders.

Lisa Yoneyama’s book Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of

Memory contains a chapter called “Ethnic and Colonial Memories: The Korean Atom

Bomb Memorial” in which she discusses the debate beginning in 1990 over the relocation of the memorial to Korean victims in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. She focuses on

“the attempts to contain and domesticate these as yet unreconciled discourses on the nation’s past and on the resistance to such domestication” while concluding “the possibility of forging new alliances, questions, and visions that might exceed the boundaries of ethnicity and nationality.”12 Nevertheless, by highlighting the discrimination of zainichi

Koreans13 within Japanese society and the ideological conflicts within the zainichi

10 Yuki Miyamoto, Beyond the Mushroom Cloud: Commemoration, Religion, and Responsibility After Hiroshima, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 3. Hereafter cited as Miyamoto, Beyond the Mushroom Cloud. 11 Ibid., 4. 12 Lisa Yoneyama, Hiroshima Traces: Time, Space, and the Dialectics of Memory, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 153-154. 13 Zainichi means residing in Japan, and zainichi Koreans stand for the ethnic Korean residents living in Japan.

community, the message of the chapter leaves no space for a potential reconciliation between the Japanese and Koreans.

Akiko Naono’s essay “Conjuring up traces of historical violence: Grandpa, who is not in the photo” is about her “bumping into colonial memories in the memoryscape” of

Hiroshima and conveys the idea to the readers that Japanese citizens were also kagaisha

(victimizers) through the story of a former junior high school teacher.14 The chapter is about the author’s quest to “remember” her grandfather, who died of acute radiation sickness following the dropping of the bomb. During the process, the author became conscious of Japan’s wartime aggression and the suffering of Koreans through her encounter with a Japanese hibakusha. The work depicts how a Japanese A-bomb survivor could rid himself of the victim’s role and reinterpret his identity as a perpetrator once he learned about the Korean hibakusha’s multiple victimization. The author, by describing the colonization of Korea, the situation of the A-bomb victims at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Hiroshima, the hardships of Korean A-bomb sufferers upon their return to Korea, the legal history of Korean hibakusha in detail, mentioning the Son Jin-doo trial and the progress of the recent Korean hibakusha trials in Japan, reveals the ongoing discrimination against Korean hibakusha within Japanese society. While she alludes to the Japanese support groups and her sources include the books written by Junko Ichiba and the support associations, the essay’s main focus is Japan’s role of victimizer during the Asia-Pacific

War.

14 Akiko Naono, “Conjuring up traces of historical violence: Grandpa, who is not in the photo,” in Beyond the Frame: Women of Color and Visual Representation, eds. Angela Davis and Neferti Tadiar, (New York: Palgrave Press, 2005), 120.

In “The representation of absence and the absence of representation: Korean victims of the atomic bomb,” Michael Weiner emphasizes the suppression of the memory of

Korean hibakusha in the official narrative of the atomic bombing and lists the factors for

“the failure of Korean hibakusha […] to obtain adequate and consistent treatment” between

1945 and 1990.15 He provides a detailed description of the history of Korean A-bomb victims, from the annexation of Korea in 1910 to the 1980 medical treatment program. At one point, he mentions the Son Jin-doo lawsuit and the clinic built in Hapcheon in 1973. He also refers to Masaharu Oka’s association in Nagasaki and adds that the Nagasaki support association objected to the termination of the Korean hibakusha medical support program in

1986. In this sense, the essay is an important study about Korean A-bomb victims but does not elaborate on the relief activities that emerged from the 1970s.

Michael Weiner and David Chapman in “Zainichi Koreans in History and Memory” explore “the historical formation of the present-day Korean community in Japan, with particular reference to settlement in Hiroshima and Nagasaki” while elaborating on the formation of “a zainichi identity congruent with both a Korean cultural past and a Japanese cultural present.”16 The authors briefly narrate the history of Korean hibakusha, mentioning that there were some human rights organizations that assisted their legal cases in Japan.

Nevertheless, the essay does not interpret the support of these groups as an attempt for reconciliation between the Koreans and Japanese nor does it go beyond discussion of the

15 Michael Weiner, “The representation of absence and the absence of representation: Korean victims of the atomic bomb,” in Japan’s Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity, ed. Michael Weiner, (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 102. Hereafter cited as Weiner, “The representation of absence and the absence of representation.” 16 Michael Weiner and David Chapman, “Zainichi Koreans in History and Memory,” in Japan’s Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity, ed. Michael Weiner, (Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2009), 162. Hereafter cited as Weiner and Chapman, “Zainichi Koreans in History and Memory.”

legal assistance. However, through the example of the second- and third-generation zainichi

Koreans the study emphasizes that in the 1980s, “breaking away from first-generation dominance and the emergence of feelings of belonging and permanency in Japan eventually changed the relationship between the zainichi and the Japanese state,” referring to the positive turn in the relationship of the Japanese and the second-generation zainichi Korean residents.17

In “Contested spaces of ethnicity: zainichi Korean accounts of the atomic bombings”

Erik Ropers traces “the development of writing about the atomic bombings by Korean residents in Japan,” pointing out that unlike “Japanese writings on the subject, the hallmark of zainichi writings and testimonies concerning the atomic bombings delves deeply as a whole into the history of colonial and wartime Japan.”18 The author touches upon the

Korean hibakusha issue, providing a brief overview of the colonial history and mentioning

Takashi Hiraoka’s early report in the 1960s.

David Hundt and Roland Bleiker in the essay “Reconciling Colonial Memories in

Korea and Japan” illustrate the existing tensions between South Korea and Japan through the example of the historical textbook debate and the Japanese ministerial visits to

Yasukuni Shrine.19 After depicting the evolution of the conflict, the authors advance “three

17 Ibid., 175. 18 Erik Ropers, “Contested spaces of ethnicity: zainichi Korean accounts of the atomic bombings,” Critical Military Studies 1.2 (2015), 10. 19 Yasukuni Shrine is a controversial memorial enshrining the Japanese soldiers who died in Japan’s wars. Among these soldiers there are many A-class war criminals who are responsible for various atrocities the Imperial Japanese Army committed in East Asia during World War II. Thus, Asian nations, including South Korea and China, regard the visits by high-ranking Japanese politicians to Yasukuni Shrine as provoking and hostile, and consequently these events create tensions between Japan and its neighbors. For more information, see Akiko Takenaka, Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan’s Unending Postwar, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2015).

suggestions about how to promote a culture of reconciliation between Japan and Korea.”

First, they stress, “both parties need to be aware of the problematic nature of coming to terms with a violent colonial past.” Second, they highlight the “importance of dialogue, particularly the need to exchange ideas about how to represent (and teach) an understanding of history that is acceptable to both sides.” Third, they believe that it is of vital importance

“to accept that there will always be differences in how the past is represented and understood.”20 This essay, thematically similarly to my work, points out ways of historical reconciliation and does not end with merely narrating the colonial legacies and memories.

However, it considers the prospects of rapprochement from a political perspective and does not examine the civil society support groups, whereas my work focuses on the social aspects of the reconciliation endeavors.

David Palmer in “The Straits of Dead Souls: One Man’s Investigation into the

Disappearance of Mitsubishi Hiroshima’s Korean Forced Labourers” discusses Munetoshi

Fukagawa’s “case study of Korean workers at Mitsubishi’s Hiroshima Shipyard,” pointing out that “it is a case study that spans the history of Japan’s colonial control of Korea, its wartime role in providing Mitsubishi with forced labourers, and its subsequent concealing of the fate of a large group of these workers who tried to return to their home.”21 The author not only sheds light on Japan’s imperial past and the abuse of the Korean forced laborers by

Mitsubishi, but also explains Fukagawa’s pioneering investigation and how it prepared the

20 David Hundt and Roland Bleiker, “Reconciling Colonial Memories in Korea and Japan,” Asian Perspective 31.1 (2007), 63. 21 David Palmer, “The Straits of Dead Souls: One Man’s Investigation into the Disappearance of Mitsubishi Hiroshima’s Korean Forced Labourers,” Japanese Studies 26.3 (2006): 349. Hereafter cited as Palmer, “The Straits of Dead Souls.”

way for the emergence of some social movements in Japan bent on seeking justice and making the Japanese government acknowledge the rights of Korean A-bomb victims exploited by Mitsubishi. The author discusses Fukagawa’s initial research until his visit to

Iki Island and Tsushima. David Palmer’s work does not suggest that historical conflicts between Japan and South Korea are irreconcilable but proposes the idea that the two nations might come to terms with their shared history and are advancing towards a future with less tension. While he demonstrates the support of Korean hibakusha through

Munetoshi Fukagawa’s investigation, in this dissertation I consider the broader Japanese support network both at individual and structural levels.

The fact that some Japanese individuals and Japanese peace movements have engaged in relief activities to aid Korean hibakusha and to compel the Japanese government to recognize the rights of Korean hibakusha teaches us how these people were able to see beyond the limits set by the state authorities and cultural norms. Also, their example demonstrates how individual initiatives and benevolence can overcome past conflicts and can eventually bring about friendly relations. The above-mentioned works (except for

Palmer’s study and the essay published by Hundt and Bleiker) primarily convey the message that Japan was a perpetrator during the war inflicting multiple sufferings on

Korean A-bomb survivors by abandoning them and excluding them from the provisions of the A-bomb laws. It is essential to have a profound understanding of the history and the present situation of Korean hibakusha, but these sources contribute to further widening the gap between the two nations by stressing the conflicts and the Japanese government’s accountability. Most of these studies fail to indicate that there were Japanese committed to

the support of Korean A-bomb victims at a time when discrimination against Koreans within Japanese society was prevalent.

Japanese language sources about Korean hibakusha began to emerge in the 1970s and were written by peace activists and support movement members. These include books like

Henken to Sabetsu [Prejudice and Discrimination] and Muen no Kaikyō [Neglected Strait] by Takashi Hiraoka, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito [Those Who Brought Hiroshima

Back Home] by Junko Ichiba, and Umi no Mukō no Hibakushatachi: Zaigai Hibakusha

Mondai no Rikai no tame ni [Hibakusha Living on the Other Side of the Sea: For the

Comprehension of the Problem of the Hibakusha Residing Outside Japan] by Nobuto

Hirano. Besides focusing on the colonial period, the migration of Koreans to Japan, postwar situation, and the legal cases from the 1970s, these works provide critical background on the Japanese support activities at organizational and individual levels.

The Korean hibakusha narrative has gained importance at Japanese universities in

Peace Studies programs recently. For example, Shin Hyung-keun completed a doctoral dissertation at Hiroshima University in 2014 with the title “Kankoku Genbaku Higaisha

Mondai no Jittai to Igi ni tsuite no Kenkyū: Toku ni Kannichikan Kusa no Ne no Kyōryoku ni Chūmokushite” [Research of the Actual Situation and Significance of the Issue

Concerning Korean A-bomb Victims: Focusing on the Grassroots Cooperation between

South Korea and Japan]. He discusses the Korean hibakusha history in great detail, focusing on both past and recent legal cases, and partly touches upon the activities of the

Japanese support movements. Additionally, in 2012 he published an article “The Previous

Research of Korean Atomic bomb Survivors and the Problems to be Solved,” in which he

argues that “Efforts to recover and respect their [Korean hibakusha’s] basic human rights started among Japanese grassroots NGOs, and major improvements have been made from the court cases filed by grassroots organizations of the two countries.”22 With this, he emphasizes that Korean A-bomb survivors could win lawsuits in Japan due to the support of citizens both in Japan and South Korea.

In the past one year additional scholarly works have been published. Kazuyuki

Tamura’s book Zaigai Hibakusha Saiban [Overseas Hibakusha Trials] (2016) is an exhaustive study of the lawsuits in Japan launched by hibakusha living overseas, starting from the Son Jin-doo trials until the legal cases culminating in the 2015 Supreme Court victory. It touches upon the suits initiated by Brazilian and American hibakusha and their

Japanese support, which is significant in terms of the history of overseas hibakusha.

Sonomi Itō also published an academic essay in 2017 with the title “Kenri o Kachitoru made: Nihon de Zaikan Hibakusha o Sasaeta Hitobito,” which is an insightful work about various organizations and a religious group that were engaged in supporting Korean hibakusha. The Japanese publications differ from the English ones in the sense that most of them lack scholarly interpretations of the history of Korean hibakusha, the grassroots cooperation in Japan, and what this history tells us about the Japanese–Korean relations.

They offer primarily polemic discourses, yet their accurate account of how the events unfolded from the 1970s makes them invaluable sources for my dissertation.

This study is based on English and Japanese sources and does not include the works published in South Korea. Nevertheless, here I list some of the most important Korean

22 Shin Hyung-keun, “The Previous Research of Korean Atomic bomb Survivors and the Problems to be Solved,” Hiroshima Peace Science 34 (2012): 162.

publications dealing with Korean hibakusha. In 1975, Park Soo-bok, a reporter, published the first work about Korean hibakusha. In English the title translates to Without Voice,

Without Name. Thirty-year History of Korean A-bomb Victims.23 This book details the author’s eight-year study and it is regarded the first substantial work on Korean hibakusha

A-bomb experiences, their lives after returning to South Korea, and their health conditions.

From 1975, the Korean Church Women’s Association occasionally published results of their survey findings, along with the Korea Atomic Bomb Victims Association (hereafter

Korea Association). In 1990, the South Korean government launched its first survey among the A-bomb survivors and also published its results. Besides the survey findings, some academic papers came to light in the 1990s. Kim Jeong-gyeong wrote his Master’s thesis with the title “Research of the Welfare Measures for Korean A-bomb Victims;”24 the

Korean Church Women’s Association published “Hibakusha Relief Measures and Anti-war,

Anti-nuclear and Peace Movements,”25 and Lee Sang-hwa wrote “Life of Korean

Hibakusha and the Unresolved Compensation Problem.”26 From 2000, given the growing interest in human rights issues, some studies were published on the history of Korean hibakusha, but this issue was still largely absent from public consciousness. For example,

Jung Keun-Sik’s work A Painful History: Atomic Bomb Memory and Testimonies came out

23 ᮔ⚽㤼 , [Park Soo-bok] ㏢Ⰲ☚ 㠜┺ 㧊⯚☚ 㠜┺. 䞲ῃ㤦䙃䞒䟊㧦㦮 30 ⎚, [Sorido Eopsda Ireumdo Eopsda. Hangug Wonpok Pihaeja ui 30 Nyeon] (Sogensha, 1975). 24 㔠ṇ៞ , [Kim Jeong-gyeong] 䞲ῃ㤦䙃䞒䟊㧦⽋㰖╖㺛㠦 ὖ䞲㡆ῂ, [“Hangug Wonpok Pihaeja Bokjidaechaege Gwanhan Yeongu”] (Master’s thesis, Chung-Ang University, 1993). 25 䞲ῃᾦ䣢㡂㎇㡆䞿䣢 , [Hanguk Gyohoe Yeoseong Yeonhaphoe] 㤦䙃䞒䟊㧦 ῂ䢎㢖 ⹮㩚⹮䟋䘟䢪㤊☯, [Wonpok Pihaeja Guhowa Banjeon Banhaek Pyeonghwa Undong] (䞲ῃᾦ䣢㡂㎇㡆䞿䣢 [Hanguk Gyohoe Yeoseong Yeonhaphoe]: 1994). 26 ᮤ┦࿴ , [Lee Sang-hwa] 㤦䙃䞒䟊㧦㦮㌳䢲ὒ ⋾Ỿ㰚⽊㌗ ⶎ㩲, [“Wonpok Pihaeja ui Saenghwalgwa Namgyeojin Bosang Munje”] ⁒࣭䡚╖㌂ṫ㫢7 [GeunዘHyeondaesagangjwa 7] 䞲ῃ䡚╖㌂㡆ῂ䣢 [Hanguk Hyeondaesa Yeonguhoe] (1995): 192-210.

in 2005.27 Jeong believes the reason the Korean hibakusha problem was not a major issue for a long time in South Korean society is the division of the Korean Peninsula and the long-lasting military dictatorship in South Korea, which impeded the emergence of this awareness. Shin Hyung-keun also examines South Korean–Japanese joint scholarship. For instance, when Japanese lawyers representing the Korean hibakusha lawsuits donated the legal records to the South Korean National History Compilation Committee, the result was summed up in The Significance of the South Korean Hibakusha Lawsuits and the Unsettled

Problems in 2012.28 This is another effort by Japanese and Korean communities to comprehend their common past and overcome historical conflicts.

To sum up, most Korean scholarship on the history of Korean hibakusha includes survey results, reports on their health and living conditions, and translated publications of

Japanese supporters and the Korea Association itself. Just like among the Japanese sources, there are few studies by Korean historians critically interpreting the development of historical events or Japanese–Korean relations.

Most works written about Japanese–Korean relations dealing with prewar, postwar, and modern history present a simple narrative of conflict between the two nations that seems to be implacable. They discuss the exploitation of Koreans during the colonial era,

27 㒯᰿ᇰ, [Jung Keun-Sik] ed., ἶ䐋㦮㡃㌂㸸㤦䙃㦮 ₆㠋ὒ 㯳㠎, [Kotong ui Yeoksa: Wonpog ui Gieokgwa Jeungeon] (㍶㧎 [Seonin]: 2005). 28 䞲ῃῃ㌂䘎㺂㥚㤦䣢, [Hanguk Guksa Pyeonchan Wiwonhoe] ed., 䞲ῃ㧎㤦䙃䞒䟊㧦㏢㏷㦮㡃㌂㩗㦮㦮㢖 ⋾Ỿ㰚ὒ㩲 [Hangugin Wonpok Pihaeja Sosongui Yeoksajeok Uiuiwa Namgyeojin Gwaje] (䞲ῃῃ㌂䘎㺂㥚㤦䣢 [Hanguk Guksa Pyeonchan Wiwonhoe]: 2012). For more information about Korean sources, see ㎞஽᰿, [Shin Hyung-keun] “Kankoku Genbaku Higaisha Mondai no Jittai to Igi ni tsuite no Kenkyū: Toku ni Kannichikan Kusa no Ne no Kyōryoku ni Chūmokushite” [Research of the Actual Situation and Significance of the Issue Concerning Korean A-bomb Victims: Focusing on the Grassroots Cooperation between South Korea and Japan] (Ph.D. diss., Hiroshima University, 2014), 24-28.

Japan’s unjustly depriving the Korean community of their citizenship in the postwar period, the discrimination zainichi Koreans have faced, the “comfort women” issue, and recently the territorial dispute of Dokdo/Takeshima Island. Additionally, while most studies mentioning Korean A-bomb victims offer a careful account of the colonial era and their history or elaborate on the debate surrounding the Korean memorial in Hiroshima until the

1990s and the overseas hibakusha legal cases, they do not focus on how the support of concerned Japanese citizens contributed to the legal victory for these Korean victims.

By contrast, my doctoral dissertation presents the complexity of the grassroots support network of Korean A-bomb victims in Japan delineating both organizational and individual assistance in the 1970s and 1980s. The work covers the fields of postwar

Japanese history and Japanese social history, and provides new insights into the existing

Japanese–Korean relations. It focuses on Japanese social activism for the support of Korean hibakusha and demonstrates how a certain layer of Japanese society stood up for the rights of their former colonial victims. Additionally, it considers the socio-economic background of Korean hibakusha. I argue that the story of the successful Korean hibakusha lawsuits against the Japanese government cannot be discussed separately from the long-term support provided by Japanese citizen activists. Previous scholarly works about Korean A-bomb survivors lack detailed description of the Japanese grassroots collaboration and analysis of how these Japanese contributed to establishing good relations with South Korea through critically interpreting their country’s wartime abuses. This study is meant to fill this void.

As indicated above, Yuki Miyamoto in Beyond the Mushroom Cloud stresses that the general message of Japanese hibakusha is “not retaliation, but reconciliation” […] “through

sharing their testimonies” […] to realize “the global abolition of nuclear weaponry.”29

Through the story of Japanese grassroots advocacy of Korean A-bomb victims, my dissertation provides additional insight into hibakusha reconciliation: how Korean hibakusha victimized by Japan have found some measure of peace through the support of a group of Japanese citizens feeling remorse for their country’s wartime atrocities.

Reconciliation with the memory of the bomb is more complex in the case of Korean hibakusha since for them the main perpetrator was not the nuclear-armed United States but

Japan who colonized the Korean Peninsula and brought Koreans to Japan, where many of them wound up in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. My work investigates the reconciliation of

Korean hibakusha not from the perspective of collective memory, like Miyamoto’s work, but reveals how the reconciliation of Korean hibakusha can be viewed in a larger sociohistorical context.

This dissertation consists of three sections, and my primary focus is the initial support of Korean hibakusha provided by Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s.

In Section One, I elaborate on the legal assistance given to Son Jin-doo in the 1970s in three chapters. As indicated above, Son Jin-doo became an A-bomb victim in Hiroshima in 1945. In 1970, he entered Japan without a valid visa from South Korea, was arrested, and imprisoned. Afterward, he applied for an A-bomb certificate stating that he was a hibakusha. This marked the beginning of his seven-year legal battle against the Japanese government, which carried great legal and historical significance. In Chapter 1, after

29 Miyamoto, Beyond the Mushroom Cloud, 4, 13.

introducing Son’s background and the reasons he came to Japan, I touch upon the social context that enabled the formation of the initial support movements. Following that, I describe the major advocates in various cities: Takashi Hiraoka in Hiroshima, Rui Itō in

Fukuoka, and Tatsumi Nakajima in Tokyo. Chapter 2 explores the legal developments of

Son’s lawsuit until 1974, the Fukuoka District Court decision that ruled in favor of him, and the reverberation of the ruling. Additionally, I emphasize the pivotal role of the

Japanese citizen-based support and the extension of the movement over time. Chapter 3 focuses on the events from 1974 to 1978, revealing Son’s double legal cases: his fight to receive an A-bomb certificate and the revocation of his deportation order. Following his victory in 1975 at Fukuoka High Court, his case was taken to the Supreme Court, which reaffirmed the previous two rulings in 1978. The major thesis of the section is that Son succeeded in his drawn-out battle against the Japanese government thanks, in part, to

Japanese supporters who aimed to reform their own society and make it more just and responsible by achieving the equal treatment under law of the Japanese and non-Japanese

A-bomb victims.

Section Two is concerned with the support activities of Masaharu Oka, Toratarō

Kawamura, and Munetoshi Fukagawa. They put much more effort into assisting Korean hibakusha individually than as actors of various organizations, so in a separate section I emphasize their individual involvements in the Korean hibakusha support network.

Although they also set up their own associations, their dawning awareness of the need to back Korean A-bomb survivors had happened years earlier. Advocating for the rights of

Korean victims and facilitating their recognition by the Japanese government was of

paramount importance for these three Japanese, and although they worked in different fields of support, each dedicated themselves to the Korean hibakusha cause.

Chapter 4 portrays the activities of Reverend Masaharu Oka, a Protestant minister in

Nagasaki, who sympathized with the plight of Korean residents in Japan and Korean A- bomb victims since World War II. In 1965, he set up the Nagasaki Association to Protect the Human Rights of Koreans in Japan, whose members learned about the difficult situation of Korean hibakusha in the 1960s. After setting up a monument inside the Nagasaki Peace

Park dedicated to the memory of Korean victims in 1979, the Association began in 1981 the first thorough survey to reveal the condition of Koreans in Nagasaki at the time of the bombing. Oka was guided more by his ideals than pragmatism. He was driven by the desire to make Japanese society more righteous. He was never directly involved in the Korean hibakusha legal cases, but he played an important role in raising awareness of Japan’s wartime responsibility and in compelling Japan to face its imperial past. By holding many lectures nationwide, he educated Japanese about the adversity of Korean hibakusha. He was the leading support figure in the second A-bombed city, exerting a great influence on both regional politics as well as on Japanese citizens. Following Reverend Oka’s death, members of the Nagasaki Association established the Oka Masaharu Memorial Nagasaki

Peace Museum based on his lifework, which serves as a reminder of Japan’s wartime atrocities, the imperial era, and the existence of Korean A-bomb victims.

Chapter 5 examines the relief activities of Dr. Toratarō Kawamura, who was a pioneer in establishing medical treatment for Korean hibakusha in Japan. Besides legal assistance and raising consciousness within Japanese society, providing Korean A-bomb

survivors with medical support from specialists with expertise in treating radiation-induced diseases was of the utmost importance in an era when the Korean survivors had little access to medical services. After inviting many patients individually to his hospital in the 1970s,

Dr. Kawamura established the Hiroshima Committee to Invite Korean A-bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment in 1984. His commitment was based on having been born and raised in Korea. He felt remorse for Japan’s invasion of the peninsula and concluded that the existence of Korean hibakusha was Japan’s wartime responsibility. Instead of demanding that the government introduce relief measures, he focused on taking immediate action and providing medical treatment. Following his death in 1987, his son, Dr. Yuzuru

Kawamura, carried on his legacy and treated Korean A-bomb patients at the family hospital until 2016.

Chapter 6 discusses in detail Munetoshi Fukagawa’s pioneering investigation and support of former Korean workers at Mitsubishi who became victims of the atomic bomb.

Fukagawa worked at Mitsubishi’s Hiroshima Machinery Works in 1945 and was in charge of the dormitory for Korean workers. Later he learned that many of those Mitsubishi workers (hibakusha at the same time) had been lost at sea on their way to Korea in

September 1945 during the Makurazaki Typhoon and there had been no investigation into what had happened to them. This information led him in the 1970s to immerse himself in an investigation to discover how these victims had gone missing and what had happened to their bodies. He went to Iki Island and Tsushima where many bodies of Koreans suffering shipwreck had been found, talked to the local people, and constantly advocated for returning the remains to South Korea, although this has not been realized to date. His

research made many former Korean Mitsubishi workers conscious of their rights, and starting in the 1990s, many of them filed suit in Japan for wartime reparations, demanding unpaid wages and the issuance of A-bomb certificates. His investigation also revealed

Mitsubishi’s failure to pay these workers’ wages in 1944 and 1945, thus opening the path for those still alive to seek justice at Japanese courts and assert their rights. His investigation began with the quest of the 246 lost Koreans and their family members and concluded with the discovery of the multiple victimization of the Hiroshima Mitsubishi workers, who were not only victims of the atomic bomb but also one of Imperial Japan’s biggest wartime corporations. I delineate the later developments of the case, examining the excavations on Iki Island and Tsushima, Fukagawa’s negotiations with Mitsubishi, the current state of the remains, and the progress of the Mitsubishi legal cases after 1990.

In the last section, I discuss the activities of various Japanese movements whose objective was to provide support for Korean hibakusha at an organizational level, raise awareness among Japanese society of their plight, facilitate nationwide support, and urge the Japanese government to recognize them as A-bomb victims and compensate them. In

Chapter 7, I elaborate on the most important Japanese support and redress organization, which is the Association of Citizens for the Support of Korean Atomic Bomb Victims

(Kankoku no Genbaku Higaisha o Kyūensuru Shimin no Kai), having branches in Osaka,

Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. Its members have engaged in the aid of the Korea Association, bringing many of the registered Korean hibakusha to Japan for medical treatment, assisting their applications for A-bomb certificates, seeking out witnesses, and traveling to South

Korea to conduct surveys on the conditions of the A-bomb survivors living there.

Chapter 8 looks at other organizations that assisted the Korean survivors. One of these was the Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons (Kakkin Kaigi). It originally emerged as a Japanese hibakusha-supporting movement but began financial and medical support of Korean hibakusha from the late 1960s. I point out the significance of the

Hiroshima Paper Crane Group (Hiroshima Oriduru no Kai), which consisted of junior high school and high school students. Its members paid annual visits to South Korea in the

1970s to meet with hibakusha and formed close ties with the Second-Generation Korean A- bomb Victims (Pidulgi) Association. Additionally, I discuss The Nagasaki Testimonial

Society’s (Nagasaki no Shōgen no Kai) contribution in the 1970s that not only collected and published Korean hibakusha testimonies but also carried out two surveys in South

Korea in 1975 and 1985. The chapter also contains information about the Good Neighbor

Society (Zenrinkyō), a Shinto-derived religion (shinshūkyō) that began the financial assistance of Korean hibakusha in 1973 and provided the Korea Association with a headquarters office in Seoul until 2016. In Tokyo, the Citizens’ Council Addressing the

Problems of Korean A-bomb Victims (Shimin Kaigi) was founded in 1988. Its members pressured the government and sought redress for Korean A-bomb survivors. Finally, I discuss the formation of the Mugunghwa Study Group in 1996 in Hiroshima, whose goal was to raise funds and provide financial support for the Hiroshima Committee to Invite

Korean A-bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment.

The Japanese support network for Korean A-bomb survivors ranges from Hokkaido to Okinawa, although the major advocates have been concentrated in Osaka, Kyoto,

Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. Among its members there have been journalists, doctors, university professors, high school teachers, housewives, company employees, lawyers, and many students—in other words, people from all walks of life. Religious people (mostly

Christians) were filled with remorse when it came to Japan’s wartime activities and were more inclined to join the Korean hibakusha support groups as a sign of their condemnation of their country’s past atrocities. This socially diverse environment enabled the emergence of a firm support base. Although they remained small in numbers compared to other social and peace movements, through their cooperation and multifaceted activities they were vigorous enough to initiate changes in the status of the A-bomb victims residing in South

Korea and prompt the Japanese government to extend the hibakusha support measures to these people. Nevertheless, it took several decades to achieve this, during which time these

Japanese citizens provided financial, medical, and emotional support for Korean survivors, helping to restore their dignity as well as their faith in humanity while gradually facilitating movement towards the settling of historical antagonism between their nations stemming from the colonial period.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

To understand the history of Korean victims of the atomic bomb, a brief overview is necessary about the relations between Japan and Korea during the premodern times and the beginning of the Meiji period, the colonial period, the different postwar conditions of

Korean and Japanese hibakusha, the A-bomb measures taken in Japan, and the New Left.

Before the annexation of Korea, Japan cherished closer diplomatic and cultural relations with the peninsula in its premodern and early modern history. “For 160 years from the beginning of the fifteenth century the Ashikaga bakufu sent a mission to Korea sixty times and the Sō daimyo of Tsushima and other powerful Western clans themselves dispatched missions to Korea.”1 Despite the fact that Japan followed the policy of isolation during the Edo period, “Korea was the only state which had equal diplomatic relations with

Japan” during this time.2 The United States forced Japan to open its doors to trade in the

1850s. Japan applied a silimar practice in Asia and “secured the Treaty of Kanghwa with the Chosŏn government of Korea.”3 Consequently, “Japanese merchants and diplomats moved into extraterritorial settlements in Korea that were legally determined,” after which

“Tokyo stationed troops to protect these compounds.” Later, Japan waged a war against

China (1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905) “in the name of defending Japanese and

1 Etsuko Hae-Jin Kang, Diplomacy and Ideology in Japanese–Korean Relations: From the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century, (Basingstoke: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin’s, 1997), 3. 2 Ibid., 2. 3 Alexis Dudden, Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power, (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 9.

Korean national interests.”4 Following Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905, the two countries signed the Portsmouth Treaty, which not only established peace but also “granted

Japan the privilege to ‘protect its interests in Korea.’”5 After the treaty, the Second Japan-

Korea Agreement “named Korea a Japanese protectorate and gave international legal precedent to Japan’s control over Korea’s foreign affairs.”6 In 1907 Japan compelled Korea to sign a third treaty, according to which Korea had to turn over “internal administration to

Japan and pledged to obey the local Japanese government.”7 The gradual domination of the

Korean Peninsula began in the early Meiji period and culminated in 1910 with the annexation treaty.

There were various reasons that drove Koreans to Japan during the colonial period.

Following Imperial Japan’s occupation of Korea in 1910, the former empire remained a

Japanese colony until the end of World War II in 1945. During this period, Japan introduced several measures that gradually eroded the Koreans’ traditional way of living.

Following the Land Survey Enterprise in the 1910s, Korean farmers who collectively shared land were deemed to have no clear ownership rights and were deprived of their land.8 Furthermore, Japan promoted mulberry growing, silk production, and increased rice cultivation projects. However, given the Korean farmers’ lack of experience in these areas,

4 Ibid. 5 Ibid., 7. 6 Ibid. 7 Karina V. Korostelina, Political Insults: How Offenses Escalate Conflict, (New York: Oxford University Press: 2014), 96. 8 Junko Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito: “Kankoku no Hiroshima” wa Naze Umareta no ka., [Those Who Brought Hiroshima Back Home: Why Did Hiroshima in Korea Come into Existence?] (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 2000), 158. Hereafter cited as Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito.

they suffered serious losses and many of them ended up losing all their property.9

Consequently, people began migrating to Japan to find work, and many Koreans from

Hapcheon County, South Gyeongsang Province ended up in Hiroshima starting in the

1920s.10 The second reason many Koreans left their homeland was their involvement in independence movements culminating in 1919-1920; these dissidents went to Japan in an attempt to escape retaliation.11 The third reason was Japan’s introduction of military conscription and forced labor system after the outbreak of World War II. The National

Mobilization Law and the National Conscription Order were put into practice in 1938 and

1939 respectively and Koreans, as Japanese imperial subjects and Japanese citizens, were made to serve Japan in its wartime ambitions.12 As a result, many Koreans were residing in

Hiroshima and Nagasaki when the bombs were dropped, thus becoming victims not only of

Japanese colonization but also the atomic bomb. According to the assessments of the Korea

Atomic Bomb Victims Association, there were approximately 50,000 Koreans in

Hiroshima (among whom 30,000 died from the bombing) and 20,000 in Nagasaki (less than half of whom survived).13

Given the censorship the U.S. military government placed on Japan during the occupation to prevent the spread of any information concerning the effects of radiation,

9 Ibid., 161, 165. 10 Jung, Kankoku Genbaku Higaisha Kutsū no Rekishi, 15. See Hapcheon on Figure 1. 11 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 282. 12 Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, [Hiroshima Committee to Invite South Korean A- bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment] Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, [The Road to Bring South Korean Hibakusha to Japan for Medical Treatment] (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 25. Hereafter cited as Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi. 13 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 27.

Japanese hibakusha were unable to publicly raise their voices and talk about the horrors of the bombing until 1952. After the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect in 1952 and especially after the Lucky Dragon No. 5 fishing boat incident in 1954, hibakusha began to break their silence and people in Japan became increasingly conscious of the threat nuclear weapons posed to humanity and the effects of radiation.14 Hibakusha support groups began to form, the most influential of which was Nihon Hidankyō (Japan Confederation of A- and

H-Bomb Sufferers Organization, established in 1956). Following their repeated appeals to the Japanese government for the introduction of relief measures for the A-bomb victims, the first A-bomb law was enacted in 1957 (A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law), guaranteeing free medical treatment to hibakusha residing in Japan. The second law, the so- called Special Measures Law, came into effect in 1968 and provided hibakusha with monthly healthcare allowances. Thus, Japanese hibakusha residing in Japan received hospital treatment free of charge and financial assistance to help when various radiation- induced diseases prevented them from working.15

By contrast, the situation of A-bomb victims living in South Korea was dire. They were trapped in a vicious cycle of disease, unemployment, and poverty, and belonged to the

14 On March 1, 1954, the United States tested a hydrogen bomb on Bikini Atoll (known as the Bravo Test). The detonation “produced an incredible amount of radioactive fallout” and the crew members of a Japanese tuna trawler called the Daigo Fukuryu Maru (Lucky Dragon No. 5) that was “ninety miles east of the ground zero” were affected by the consequent radiation. “All twenty-three members of the crew were ill, and one later died from radiation exposure.” For more information, see Robert A. Jacobs, The Dragon’s Tail: Americans Face the Atomic Age, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2010), 30. 15 For more information about the two atomic bomb relief laws implemented by the Japanese government, see Hiroshima-shi Nagasaki-shi Genbaku Saigaishi Henshū Iinkai, [Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki] Genbaku Saigai Hiroshima Nagasaki, [Disasters of Hiroshima and Nagasaki] (Tōkyō: Iwanami Shoten, 1979), 187-195.

group of people with the lowest socioeconomic status.16 Moreover, while Japan experienced rapid economic growth beginning in the 1950s, the Korean Peninsula struggled through domestic conflict that culminated in the Korean War. The war left many dead

(including some hibakusha) and its legacy was a devastated economy and the formation of two separate Korean states, a totalitarian, communist regime in the north and a military dictatorship (from 1961) in the south. Under these circumstances, Korean hibakusha living in both halves of the peninsula were not in a position to ask for relief measures or to speak out against nuclear weapons. Due to the absence of a medical insurance system, most were unable to go to hospitals for decades because of the high cost of medical care, and many passed away with their condition largely unknown.17

In 1965 the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea

(hereafter Japan-Korea Treaty) was signed, normalizing diplomatic relations between the two countries. According to the treaty, Japan provided South Korea with $500 million in economic aid ($200 million of which was provided as a loan). With this, Japan considered the legal obligations resulting from its occupation of Korea settled. Despite the treaty not touching upon the problem of the atomic bomb survivors in South Korea, Japan argued during the Korean hibakusha lawsuits in the 1970s that their case had been resolved by the treaty.18 A-bomb victims living in South Korea hoped that the treaty would provide support, but they were left disappointed. Kim Jae-keun and Seo Seok-woo, two hibakusha in South

16 Takashi Hiraoka, Muen no Kaikyō: Hiroshima no Koe, Hibaku Chōsenjin no Koe, [Neglected Strait: Hiroshima’s Voice, Korean Hibakusha’s Voice] (Tokyo: Kage Shobō, 1983), 26-27. Hereafter cited as Hiraoka, Muen no Kaikyō. 17 Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, 12. 18 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 37.

Korea, realized that the Korean hibakusha problem was not addressed, so they decided to set up their own Korean A-bomb survivors’ organization, which was made possible with the financial assistance of Bae Do-hwan, a friend of Seo’s. The Korea Atomic Bomb

Victims Relief Association19 was established in August 1966, and it received permission from the South Korean government on July 10, 1967 to function as an incorporated association. It had 1,867 registered members by the end of 1967.

One of the major problems was that Korean hibakusha did not understand what it meant to be atomic bomb victims. Since there was little information about radiation available, they were not aware of the effects of radiation exposure and the harm it causes the human body. They had no information about the nature of the bomb dropped on

Hiroshima and Nagasaki and many who were treated in South Korean hospitals were mistakenly diagnosed with Hansen’s disease.20 For example, Uhm Bun-yeon, who entered

Japan in 1968 with the hope of receiving medical treatment, first learned that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was an atomic bomb from the Mindan (Korean Residents Union in

Japan) investigation group in 1965. If Korean hibakusha had earlier access to information about the atomic bomb, the effects of radiation, and the A-bomb laws implemented in Japan,

19 In 1971, the word “Relief” was removed and the association has since been known as the Korea Atomic Bomb Victims Association. See Junko Ichiba, “Zaikan Hibakusha no Tatakai ni Okeru Zaigai Hibakusha Saiban no Igi,” [The Significance of Overseas Hibakusha Lawsuits in the Korean Hibakusha’s Battle] in Zaigai Hibakusha Saiban, [Overseas Hibakusha Trials] ed. Kazuyuki Tamura, (Tokyo: Shinzansha, 2016), 224. Hereafter cited as Ichiba, “Zaikan Hibakusha no Tatakai ni Okeru Zaigai Hibakusha Saiban no Igi.” 20 Hansen’s disease is commonly known as leprosy. People suffering from leprosy have been ostracized in Korea throughout history and were subject to discrimination within society. The Japanese and South Korean authorities have operated a leper colony on Sorokdo Island. For more information, see Eunjung Kim, “Cultural Rehabilitation: Hansen’s Disease, Gender and Disability in Korea,” in Wagadu Volume 4: Intersecting Gender and Disability Perspectives in Rethinking Postcolonial Identities, ed. Pushpa Parekh, (Xlibris Corporation, 2008), Chapter 8.

they might have launched a movement many years earlier, and this could have resulted in earlier acknowledgement in Japan.21

Following the establishment of the Korea Association, many South Korean hibakusha became aware of their potential rights as A-bomb victims, learned about the hibakusha support measures in Japan, and some left for Japan in an attempt to apply for A-bomb certificates and demand medical treatment by specialists of A-bomb-related diseases. Their case drew the attention of some Japanese people, but the authorities kept rejecting the applications of even those who entered Japan legally. It was at this point that Son Jin-doo came into the picture, filed a suit against the Japanese government upon his arrest and, following many years of legal struggle, was able to bring about change in the status of

South Korean and other overseas atomic bomb survivors thanks to the support of Japanese citizen supporters.

The Korean hibakusha redress organizations in Japan were preceded and influenced by the New Left that emerged in the late 1950s and was active throughout the 1960s.

Takemasa Ando in Japan’s New Left Movements: Legacies for Civil Society highlights three waves of New Left activism in Japan: student movements, anti-war movements, and young workers’ movements.22 The emergence of the New Left began with protests against the renewal of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty in 1960 and continued with Beheiren (led by

21 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 42-45. For more information on the Korea Atomic Bomb Victims Relief Association, see Kankoku Genbaku Hibakusha Kyōkai, [Korea Atomic Bomb Victims Association] Enkaku, Genkyō, Jisseki 1967~1988, [History, Present Condition, Record 1967 – 1988] Box 1, HT0101500, HUA. 22 Takemasa Ando, New Left Movements and Civil Society: Legacies of the 1960s, (London, New York: Routledge, 2014), 11. Hereafter cited as Ando, New Left Movements and Civil Society.

Makoto Oda), the anti-Vietnam War movement.23 Beheiren operated on a large-scale and mobilized millions of Japanese nationwide. According to John Dower, “It is estimated that between 1967 and 1970 alone, more than eighteen million Japanese took to the streets to protest the war in Vietnam and demand the reversion of Okinawa to Japan.”24 The formation of Beheiren was “instrumental in presenting Vietnam as an occasion to rethink the Japanese narrative of the wartime period.” 25 The Vietnam War brought back memories of World War II for many Japanese. New Left activists “not only felt sympathy for war victims in Vietnam, they also felt responsible for the Japanese government’s support of the

USA.”26 Oda and the New Left’s view was that Japan, by “offering its support to the

American war effort in Vietnam, could return to playing the part of victimizer.”27 The political atmosphere of the Vietnam War and the increase in protests enabled citizens to see their government in a critical way, which exposed Japan’s accountability in World War II.

In addition to the anti-Vietnam War movement, thousands of students at the major universities raised their voice against the existing educational system and rising tuition fees, and demonstrations reached a crescendo in 1968.28 Many of these students engaged in other social issues, such as the support of minority groups. The New Left interpreted social and political issues “from the viewpoint of social justice,” and grassroots movements emerged in the 1970s that aimed to put human rights issues at the forefront. As an attempt to end the

23 Hidemi Suga, 1968 Nen, [The Year of 1968] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2006), 9, 72. Hereafter cited as Suga, 1968 Nen. 24 John W. Dower, “Peace and Democracy in Two Systems: External Policy and Internal Conflict,” in Postwar Japan as History, ed. Andrew Gordon, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 22. 25 Matteo Dian, Contested Memories in Chinese and Japanese Foreign Policy, (Oxford: Elsevier, 2017), 66. Hereafter cited as Dian, Contested Memories in Chinese and Japanese Foreign Policy. 26 Ando, New Left Movements and Civil Society, 11. 27 Dian, Contested Memories in Chinese and Japanese Foreign Policy, 66. 28 For more information on student movements and Zengakuren, see Suga, 1968 Nen.

discrimination of various minority groups in Japan, many Japanese citizens turned their attention to the difficult situation of the zainichi Korean community. According to Michael

Weiner and David Chapman, “For much of the post-1945 period, the attention of human rights organizations and other Korean organizations in Japan has focused upon broader concerns with civil liberties, particularly those pertaining to alien registration, immigration and nationality, employment and education, and welfare provision.”29 Zainichi civil right movements, characterized by “the unprecedented support of the Japanese community,” became active in 1970 with Pak Chong-sok’s employment discrimination suit and continued with Kim Gyeong-deuk’s case.30

Although New Left groups dissolved in the 1970s, their impact on later social movements and grassroots activities in Japan standing up for the rights of oppressed people is noticeable. New Leftists in the 1960s “were passionate about acting to redress the suffering of powerless people in Japan and other Asian countries.”31 As Japanese citizens became more conscious of the ongoing discrimination of zainichi Koreans by the early

1970s, they could easily take notice of other Korean-related issues. Such a social environment made possible the formation of Japanese citizen-based movements to support the rights of Korean hibakusha at a time when an A-bomb survivor residing in South Korea

29 Weiner and Chapman, “Zainichi Koreans in History and Memory,” 170. 30 Pak Chong-sok, a zainichi Korean resident, was hired by Hitachi, a Japanese company, and after Hitachi discovered his Korean background, dismissed him. Pak filed a suit against Hitachi in 1970 and won the case in 1974. For more information, see Kazuko Suzuki, Divided Fates: The State, Race, and Korean Immigrants’ Adaptation in Japan and the United States, (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), 71. Hereafter cites as Suzuki, Divided Fates. Kim Gyeong-deuk passed the bar examination but was refused membership in the Judicial Research and Training Institute since he did not have Japanese citizenship. Eventually he became the first zainichi lawyer in Japan in 1977 thanks to the support of both zainichi and Japanese communities. For more information, see David Chapman, Zainichi Korean Identity and Ethnicity, (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 67. 31 Ando, New Left Movements and Civil Society, 5.

showed up in Japan requesting free medical treatment already guaranteed to Japanese hibakusha. Consequently, when Takashi Hiraoka and other advocates recruited supporters for Son’s lawsuit, many citizens with a clear understanding of their country’s past and in opposition to the Vietnam War were willing to cooperate. It cannot be generally stated that

Korean hibakusha supporters belonged to the New Left, but one of the legacies of that dissident movement was the emergence of new civil right movements aiming to reform

Japanese society, one of which was grassroots cooperation for the support of Korean hibakusha.

SECTION ONE: SON JIN-DOO’S LEGAL SUPPORT IN JAPAN

Son Jin-doo was a South Korean atomic bomb survivor, one among 20,000 other hibakusha living in South Korea at the beginning of the 1970s. As Takashi Hiraoka put it, Son was

“neither a saint nor a hero. He was merely an ordinary citizen who was exposed to radiation” when Hiroshima suffered the A-bomb attack on August 6, 1945.1 “He held no noble or radical spirit and was not even the leader of any movement.”2 He was a common man who aspired to receive the same treatment provided to Japanese A-bomb victims. He is not a famous historical figure, but one will certainly come across his name in connection with the history of overseas A-bomb sufferers.

Son’s story is historically important because he was the first person to take the problems of Korean hibakusha to court in Japan. He confronted the Japanese government to have his rights recognized, and although his legal battle dragged on for seven years, he did not give up until the Supreme Court ruled in his favor in 1978. Although he was not the first A-bomb victim residing outside Japan to be issued the A-bomb certificate, following his initial victory at the Fukuoka District Court in 1974, his case opened the door for other overseas victims to apply for A-bomb certificates and receive free medical treatment in

Japanese hospitals specializing in treating A-bomb related diseases, as Japanese hibakusha

1 Takashi Hiraoka, “Heiwakokka no Giman o Shōsha: Kankokujin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo-san no Shi ni Omou,” [Unveiling the Deception of a Pacifist Nation: Thoughts Concerning the Death of Son Jin-doo] Chūgoku Shimbun, August 30, 2014: 15 in Kankoku no Genbaku Hibakusha o Kyūensuru Shimin no Kai Kikanshi: Hayaku Engo o!, [Bulletin of the Association of Citizens for the Support of South Korean Atomic Bomb Victims: Quick Support!] 145 (December 2014), 4. 2 Motoji Matsuda, “Son Jin-doo-san ga Kirihiraita Ikutsumo no Michi,” [Several Roads Opened Up by Son Jin-doo] Ibid., 3.

had been doing since 1957. It was Son’s legal case that raised awareness among other A- bomb survivors living outside Japan. By paving the way for others and making them conscious of their rights as hibakusha, he is regarded as a pioneer among overseas hibakusha.

Son Jin-doo’s story differs from traditional narratives of Japanese–Korean relations.

When talking about Japanese–Korean relations and the realities of Koreans residing in

Japan, there is often a discussion of mounting tensions, resentment, hatred, discrimination, and racismȹwith little or no focus on the possibility of reconciliation between the two nations. As Sonia Ryang puts it, “Koreans in Japan have faced, and continue to face and respond to, diverse forms of discrimination. Their experience in grappling with human rights violation and social injustice [...] is relevant to others’ experiences in the west and beyond.”3 Nevertheless, Son’s story demonstrates that it is also possible to discuss

Japanese–Korean relations in terms of friendship and respect. His story sowed the seeds of change in the mind of many Japanese citizens who condemned Japan’s wartime atrocities.

Consequently, some Japanese were bent on making their own society more righteous. They were familiar not only with the glorious but also with the dark side of their past and started to demand that their government pay reparations to the former victims. Son was the first foreign hibakusha carrying the burden of Japan’s colonial era who generated a grassroots level support movement among the Japanese people to stand up for overseas (especially

South Korean) hibakusha in the 1970s. Additionally, his lawsuit left no other choice for the

Japanese government but to acknowledge his identity as an A-bomb victim, while

3 Sonia Ryang, ed., Koreans in Japan: Critical Voices from the Margin, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 10. Hereafter cited as Ryang, ed., Koreans in Japan.

simultaneously compelling both the citizens and the government to face their downplayed imperial past and war crimes committed during World War II. Thus, besides being the first non-Japanese hibakusha who won a court case against the Japanese government, he was also a pioneer who, as a South Korean national, gained the assistance of a small number of

Japanese. His story spotlights not only the discrimination of the Japanese government against Koreans, but also the support of some Japanese civic groups and their ability to overcome the constraints of historical antagonism.

The lessons of Son’s lawsuit are instructive for how the larger process of Japan facing its past unfolded in the following decades. Providing overseas hibakusha with equal rights was a minor issue among the many unresolved problems concerning Japan’s colonization and wartime aggression in Asia. In the wake of World War II, ordinary Japanese citizens were unaware of the extent of the suffering their nation had caused in Asia. For them World

War II was “nothing other than a great evil, which destroyed their lives and imposed great suffering on them.” Consequently, they “were too much occupied with their own sufferings to consider the fate of others” who had been killed by Japanese soldiers or had been subject to intense suffering under Japanese imperialism.4 Although the demand of Asians victimized by Japan for state reparations culminated in the 1990s and it was at that time that some Japanese politicians began to acknowledge Japan’s wartime responsibility in Asia, the

Son Jin-doo lawsuit in the 1970s was a key event that aroused consciousness of Japan’s role as an aggressor during the war. The trial also served as an impetus for other groups of

4 Yasuaki Onuma, “Japanese War Guilt and Postwar Responsibilities of Japan,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 20.3 (2003), 604. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1227&context=bjil (accessed: August 31, 2016).

former victims (including forced laborers and “comfort women”) to stand up for themselves and prompt Japan to confront its imperial past.

CHAPTER 1: SIGNIFICANCE OF SON JIN-DOO’S LEGAL CASE

AND THE EMERGENCE OF HIS SUPPORT MOVEMENT

Raising awareness in Japan

Son Jin-doo’s litigation began in 1970. However, there were several Korean hibakusha who had come to Japan to apply for A-bomb certificates in the 1960s and had their requests approved. For example, a South Korean national referred as “U” came to Japan with a tourist visa as early as 1963, applied for a certificate in Hiroshima, and after following the necessary procedures, his or her request was accepted.5 Park Do-yeon from Daegu entered

Japan with a tourist visa for the Tokyo Olympics on November 5, 1964, was issued a certificate and then was hospitalized in the Hiroshima Red Cross Hospital.6 In the early

1960s the Ministry of Welfare’s position was that once people were confirmed to be A- bomb victims, they could be provided with A-bomb certificates.

These cases occurred before the signing of the Japan-Korea Treaty in 1965. Afterward, no Korean hibakusha were issued an A-bomb certificate in Japan until 1974. There were cases between 1965 and 1970 when some Korean hibakusha entered Japan either with tourist visas or without any documents and applied for A-bomb certificates, but the

Japanese authorities rejected their requests. One of those people was Son Gwi-dal, the younger sister of Son Jin-doo.7 According to the Chūgoku Shimbun, Son Gwi-dal landed on

5 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 10. 6 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 49. 7 See Figure 2.

the shores of Abu-chō in Yamaguchi Prefecture with other Koreans on October 1, 1968.8

However, as an undocumented entrant, she was arrested the following day. She claimed she was an A-bomb victim from Hiroshima and had come to Japan with the intention of receiving medical treatment. She was found guilty by the authorities on the grounds that

“she failed to follow the formal procedures when entering Japan, which is inexcusable,” hence being sentenced to six months of imprisonment, but was deported to South Korea on

November 8 before serving her sentence.9

Others who attempted to apply for A-bomb certificates included Lim Bok-sun and

Uhm Bun-yeon, who both came to Japan in December 1968. Lim said, “I became an A- bomb victim as a Japanese citizen while being mobilized at school. Since then, I have been bedridden. I want to get back my youth.”10 Uhm also argued that “we became A-bomb victims as Japanese citizens and the Japanese government must treat us as Japanese hibakusha.”11 However, the Japanese authorities rejected their applications in Hiroshima, so they had no choice but to return to South Korea, giving up the hope that they would get proper medical treatment and their health as well as living standard would improve.

We can see that even before Son’s arrival there had been unsuccessful attempts to acquire A-bomb certificates (except for those who applied before 1965). News of the rejected cases did not reach the general public and did not raise awareness either in Japan or

8 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Hiroshima de Hibaku, Chiryō o: Son Gwi-dal-san no Ani ga Mitsunyūkoku,” [A-bomb Victim from Hiroshima Seeking for Medical Treatment: Son Gwi-dal’s Brother Illegally Entered Japan] December 8, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, Hiroshima University Archives. Hiroshima University Archives is hereafter cited as HUA. 9 Asahi Shimbun, “Hibaku, Chiryō Uketai: Keisatsu ha Gimon Motsu,” [Wishing to Receive Medical Treatment for A-bomb Related Diseases: Police are Having Doubts] December 21, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA. 10 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 48. 11 Ibid.

in South Korea. However, according to articles published in the late 1960s, Son Gwi dal’s case did move a few people and some professors from Yamaguchi University, such as

Kazunari Abe, started the movement “Let’s Save Ms. Son.” When the Korean consul became her guarantor, she was hospitalized for a short time in the Hiroshima Red Cross

Hospital and had a thorough examination.12 Had her case been taken to court, it might have generated a support movement on a larger scale, as her brother’s case did two years later.

Unfortunately, before her incident could create a sensation, she was compelled to go back to South Korea, and with this Korean hibakusha remained unrecognized inside Japan.13

Before 1970 few Japanese had wondered about what had happened with the tens of thousands of Korean A-bomb survivors who had gone back to Korea after 1945. These people had been abandoned and experienced discrimination for decades both in Japan and in South Korea. Not only had they suffered during Japan’s colonization of Korea, but many of them—after losing their lands or being brought into Japan as forced laborers—became

A-bomb victims in Hiroshima or Nagasaki. After the war they were trapped in the vicious cycle of poverty and suffered from the aftereffects of radiation. Many described themselves as waiting for death and gave up all hope for a better life. However, Son put an end to this situation. He created a path for thousands of others to be finally acknowledged as

12 Asahi Shimbun, “Hibaku, Chiryō Uketai: Keisatsu ha Gimon Motsu,” [Wishing to Receive Medical Treatment for A-bomb Related Diseases: Police are Having Doubts] December 21, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA. 13 The fact that it was Son Jin-doo, and not his sister, who managed to generate a support movement for Korean hibakusha in Japan might also be related to gender issues. Japan and South Korea are both male- dominated societies (although this tendency is changing nowadays), where women do not receive equal treatment in society. This study follows not a gender but a socio-historical approach, nevertheless, further investigation must explore the reasons why Son Gwi-dal’s case was overlooked but Son Jin-doo was able to draw the attention of Japanese society.

hibakusha and receive appropriate medical treatment. The question is: Why Son Jin-doo?

Why not the other Korean hibakusha who attempted earlier to be recognized by Japan?

Takashi Hiraoka, one of the representatives of the Hiroshima branch of the movement called the Association of Citizens to Support Mr. Son (hereafter, Association of Citizens) in the 1970s, says that the 1960s were an era when people sympathized with the weak and the oppressed. During the 1960s people in Japan gradually started to gain more and more information about Korean hibakusha. This was the time when student movements and labor movements reached their peak. As mentioned earlier, many of these protesters moved progressively through many different issues, such as the rights and status of many minority populations. However, for nearly two decades after the war, humanitarian issues and respect for human rights were not central in Japanese society and people had often been indifferent or unaware of the Korean hibakusha problem.14

According to Keisaburō Toyonaga, former chairperson of the Hiroshima branch of the

Association of Citizens for the Support of South Korean Atomic Bomb Victims, it was extremely difficult for Korean hibakusha to come to Japan legally with a valid visa due to the lack of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea until 1965. Only those who intended to visit relatives or wished to come to the Tokyo Olympics (in 1964) could obtain a visa; these people were exceptions with special status–for common people it was impossible. For this reason, most South Korean hibakusha could not come to Japan during

14 Takashi Hiraoka. Interview with the author. Personal interview. Hiroshima, March 28, 2015. Hereafter cited as Hiraoka. Interview with the author. For more information about the student movements in Japan and other New Leftist movements in the 1960s- 1970s, see Takemasa Ando, Japan’s New Left Movements: Legacies for Civil Society, (London, New York: Routledge, 2014).

this time and there was a dearth of information on them (even within South Korean society).

In Japanese society, there was little awareness of their difficult situation for decades.

Moreover, during the colonial period, Japanese treated Koreans as second-class citizens and discriminated against them in many aspects. For this reason, even in the postwar era few

Japanese thought that Korean hibakusha should be aided in the same way as Japanese hibakusha.15 In this respect, the Japanese A-bomb-victim associations, such as Hidankyō and Gensuikyō (The Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs), had often been criticized for not assisting Son’s trials.16

Son’s story prior to 1970

Being familiar with Son’s early life is essential to comprehend the events that unfolded after he entered Japan without a valid visa. Our understanding of his A-bomb experience is drawn from the testimony he gave on October 1, 1971 in his application for the A-bomb certificate.

Son was born on March 15, 1927 in Osaka. His father was Son Yong-joo and his mother was Hwang Ddo-soon, who had come to Japan from Korea in the 1920s to find work. Son attended Japanese schools and acquired Japanese as his first language in spite of being Korean. After high school graduation, he started working at a paper manufacturing company and the whole family moved to Hiroshima in 1944 because of his father’s work.17

15 For more information about discrimination against the Koreans in Japan during the colonial period, see Ryang, ed., Koreans in Japan, 16-20. 16 Keisaburō Toyonaga. Interview with the author. Personal interview. Hiroshima, June 28, 2015. Hereafter cited as Toyonaga. Interview with the author. 17 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 25.

When the A-bomb was dropped, he was 18, and was 2.4 kilometers from the hypocenter. According to Son, during World War II his father worked at the Geiyō Paper

Manufacturing Company in Minami Kanon-machi and they lived in the company dormitory.18 After all the metal was confiscated in the factory due to the war in 1944, his father was dismissed. He was then employed at a telegraph company in Otemachi and Son often worked at the warehouse of the same company in Minami-machi.

On August 6, 1945, Son went to the telegraph warehouse in the morning as usual. He was alone inside the building and was about to move some tools when the A-bomb exploded at 8:15 a.m. The warehouse collapsed immediately from the blast. He was stuck in the rubble and lost consciousness for a short time. When he regained consciousness, he tried crawling out of the building, but he was severely injured and in pain. The entire building was destroyed; even the zinc roof could hardly be distinguished. It took him about one hour to walk back home from the warehouse.

When he arrived home around 11 a.m., his mother was waiting for him. Her leg had been seriously burned (she had been trapped under a telephone pole and the transformer of the pole caught fire and fell on her right leg). Son was badly injured and a lady from their neighborhood came over and put some iodine and hydrogen peroxide on his wounds (on his right wrist and arm, his neck, and his right thigh). During his testimony in 1971 he said these scars could still be seen on his body. Their house was partially destroyed by the bomb. At around noon, his father returned home. That morning, his father had gone to the telegraph company in Otemachi by bicycle, but he had to walk back home. He was also

18 His Japanese name was Iwakyu Mitsuyama.

severely injured; the nerve fibers were broken in the forefinger and middle finger of his right hand. He also suffered from nausea and vomited on his way back home as a result of his exposure to radiation. The following day his father’s hair completely fell out, his face turned yellow, and his mouth festered. The family went back to South Korea after Japan’s surrender (except for Son Jin-doo). Son’s father, following his return to Japan, died in 1948 presumably of radiation sickness.

Son’s younger sister also arrived home in the afternoon of August 6. She had been at the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries site as a mobilized student when the bomb was dropped. In the afternoon, they tried to fix their house. On August 7 a first-aid station opened near their home in Eba and Son remembered seeing two doctors and a few nurses there. He went to that aid station daily for the next ten days to have his wounds treated, received some medicine (iodine, acrinol, absorbent cotton and gauze), and was sent home to recuperate.

Two or three months after the bombing, he started feeling dizzy, had a temperature for unknown reasons, and often suffered from nausea. When he worked, he felt sluggish, a condition that was common among those exposed to radiation and which continued up until the day of his testimony.19

When the family repatriated to the Korean Peninsula in October 1945, Son decided to stay in Japan. Despite having Korean parents, he had never been to Korea before and did not regard it as his homeland. Having been brought up in Japan, he did not speak the

Korean language properly, he did not understand Korean customs, and under such circumstances he felt he would have been unable to start life from scratch and find work

19 Son’s A-bomb testimony is described in Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 65-69.

there. In addition, the A-bomb, whose stigma pervaded his whole life, was celebrated in

South Korea for liberating Koreans from Japanese colonial rule. Had he returned to Korea he felt he could not have been understood by Korean society. At first, Son acted as a broker engaging in black market activities; then he moved to Osaka where he assembled sewing machines.20

Having failed to register as a foreigner in Japan (following the signing of the San

Francisco Treaty), Son’s deportation order was issued by Omura Prison in February 1951.

Distressed at being sent to Korea during the Korean War, he reentered Japan after that but was deported for a second time in 1953. During the 1950s his health continued to deteriorate and in 1961 he was diagnosed in Busan with tuberculosis and was hospitalized there for three months in 1963. The following year he entered Japan again without documents and worked in the pachinko parlor of one of his friends in Osaka for one year. In

February 1969, while living in Kawasaki and regularly visiting the hospital, his deportation order was issued and he was again returned to South Korea. In July 1970 he was diagnosed with leukopenia (low white blood cell count) in one of the hospitals in Busan. He entered

Japan illegally once again in December 1970. This was the time when the Korean hibakusha problem came to the surface and his litigation commenced.21

Son’s undocumented entry in 1970

Following the deterioration of his health and the unsuccessful attempt of his sister to apply for an A-bomb certificate, Son was determined to come to Japan and assert his rights as a

20 Ibid, 25. 21 Ibid.

hibakusha, including receiving free medical treatment in one of the A-bomb hospitals with expertise in radiation-related diseases. Since it was not legally possible due to the limitations of the visa system and the high expense, he decided to enter Japan without permission. He landed with fourteen other Koreans people at Kushiura Port on December 3,

1970, was arrested on the spot and taken to Karatsu Police Station.22

Son Jin-doo was interviewed while in custody on December 7 by Yasuo Fujisaki, a photographer (whom he had met before in Busan) and Ro Takenaka, a reporter. He told them he was a hibakusha from Hiroshima and had entered Japan with the intention of receiving free medical treatment in a Japanese hospital. After this meeting, his story was reported by the Chūgoku Shimbun and Nagasaki Shimbun. While most people ignored the news, the story did manage to mobilize some Japanese supporters, mostly in Hiroshima given that people living there fully understood what it meant to be a hibakusha and the subsequent mental and physical problems caused by exposure to radiation.23

Following the first reporting, many people in Japan began to think about the Korean hibakusha problem. For instance, young members of the Hiroshima Research Association began discussing measures to assist Son after reading about his case in the local newspaper.

After emphasizing that he was an A-bomb survivor, Son underwent an examination in the

Karatsu Red Cross Hospital.24 The doctor in charge confirmed not only leukopenia and anemia, but also found a shadow on both lungs after the X-ray examination.25 He stressed

22 Ibid., 12. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., 13. 25 Mainichi Shimbun, “‘Mamoru Kai’ Chikaku Hossoku: Hiroshima no Ishira Undō,” [‘Support Association’ Almost Launched: Movement of the Doctors of Hiroshima] December 19, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

the need for further medical examinations, but had doubts that Son’s health condition was the result of radiation exposure.26 According to the December 19 morning edition of the

Chūgoku Shimbun, Dr. Akio Mori from the Hiroshima University Radiology Research

Institute and Dr. Shuji Hirose from the Hiroshima University Internal Medicine Clinic went to the Karatsu Police Station on December 16 to examine Son and found scars on his right wrist and on his right thigh, concluding that those were the results of cuts caused by glass fragments.27 Some suspected that Son was suffering from tuberculosis, but after seeing the medical results Dr. Mori argued that besides getting treatment at an internal medicine clinic,

Son should go through a thorough examination in Hiroshima or Nagasaki since such an examination was “necessary for humanitarian reasons.”28 Mori was the first doctor who stood up for Son and argued for examining and treating him in an A-bomb hospital. Son discussed his A-bomb experience with Mori and Hirose, and the two doctors passed along

Son’s story to local newspapers after they returned to Hiroshima. It was Mori who sowed the seeds of Son’s support and with other doctors, lawyers, and journalists, set up the

Hiroshima Association of Citizens.

News coverage of Son’s case

The information conveyed through the initial report largely contributed to the formation of support movements in several Japanese cities. In many of the earliest articles about Son

26 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 17. 27 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Seimitsu Kensa ga Hitsuyō: Mitsunyūkoku no Hibakusha – Son,” [Thorough Examination is Needed: Undocumented Entrant, Son] December 19, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA. 28 Mainichi Shimbun, “‘Mamoru Kai Chikaku Hossoku: Hiroshima no Ishira Undō,” December 19, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

published in December 1970, there is explicit reference to his being an “illegal immigrant,”

“entering Japan illegally,” “becoming an A-bomb victim in Hiroshima,” “coming to Japan for medical treatment for the A-bomb disease,” being “Son Gwi-dal’s elder brother,” and being “unemployed.” There are some phrases that emphasize his marginalized status, such as “illegal” and “unemployed,” casting him as an undesirable person, but at the same time most articles do not dispute his identity as an A-bomb victim and describe his real aim in entering Japan unlawfully.

The earliest article, from December 8, 1970 published in the Chūgoku Shimbun, clearly states in the title that Son Jin-doo is the elder brother of Son Gwi-dal, who had entered Japan without a visa two years before with the same intention. In addition, the article goes on to say that “at the time of the bombing, Son Gwi-dal’s family lived in

Kanon shin-machi in Hiroshima and their Japanese family name was Mitsuyama. They lived inside the dormitory of a paper manufacturing company.” Furthermore, the article claims that there was a Japanese witness of Son Gwi-dal named Yukio Fujii, who could testify that she was a hibakusha as early as in 1968, which makes Son Gwi-dal’s identity as a hibakusha indisputable at the time when she had entered Japan. The Chūgoku Shimbun was aware of this and conducted a personal interview with Fujii before the publication of the December 8 article, quoting him as saying: “I cannot clearly remember whether Gwi- dal’s brother was called Son Jin-doo or not. But they lived with their parents in the paper manufacturing company. He was a well-built person and could speak excellent Japanese, clearly with an Osaka dialect. He was in Hiroshima until the end of August 1945, but then disappeared. At that time, he was 17 or 18 years old. If I met him in person, I think I would

recognize him, and I could become his witness, too.” Although Fujii could not recall the name of Son Gwi-dal’s brother, it becomes clear from the article that Son Jin-doo and Son

Gwi-dal are siblings, supporting the claim that Son himself is a hibakusha.29

However, the Japanese authorities suspected Son to be smuggling people to Japan since his sister was allegedly reported to have recruited Koreans in Busan and Daegu in

January 1969, with the aim of entering Japan illegally. She was reported to be a member of a large-scale criminal organization specializing in human trafficking to Japan, and at the time the article was published she had been arrested because her involvement in those activities. As for Son, the Japanese authorities suspected that he, along with the captain of the ship, was a member of the same organization. After being caught in Japan and kept in custody, the authorities believed that Son had made up his story about being an A-bomb victim and coming to Japan to receive medical treatment. The article does not refute this accusation, but by stating that Son Jin-doo is the elder brother of Son Gwi-dal, who had been confirmed to be a hibakusha two years earlier, it confirms the fact that Son is also a hibakusha and had come to Japan for medical treatment.30

The articles appearing between December 17 and December 21 about Son specifically state that he is a hibakusha and that he is the brother of Son Gwi-dal. Their main topic is a discussion of support for Son, and instead of dissuading people from assisting an undocumented immigrant, the newspapers call for action; call for people’s support of the

A-bomb victim Son Jin-doo and for providing him with medical treatment. They do not call

29 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Hiroshima de Hibaku, Chiryō o: Son Gwi-dal-san no Ani ga Mitsunyūkoku,” [A-bomb Victim from Hiroshima Seeking for Medical Treatment: Son Gwi-dal’s Brother Illegally Entered Japan] December 8, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA. 30 Ibid.

for the deportation of Son Jin-doo. The December 17 Chūgoku Shimbun article starts with describing the miserable situation of Korean hibakusha, claiming that there are about 8,000 living in South Korea who suffer from diseases, unemployment and poverty, and because of the lack of welfare legislation in Korea, they cannot expect any help from the state. After confidently stating that Son is a hibakusha, the article says that a support movement is already being organized and there are witnesses who can verify that Son was in Hiroshima when the bomb was dropped.31 The December 18 and 19 Chūgoku Shimbun articles elaborate on the fact that some early action has already been taken in Tokyo for the assistance of Son. Additionally, they also report on Dr. Mori and Dr. Hirose’s visit to the

Karatsu Police Station and Dr. Mori’s assessment that Son’s thorough medical examination in Hiroshima was necessary.32 These articles do not mention the government’s position and do not refer to Son as a criminal who should be imprisoned or sent back to South Korea.

They describe Son without any racist tone and highlight his identity as a victim who deserves medical treatment in one of the A-bomb hospitals, listing all the diseases he was diagnosed with during his examination by the Karatsu Red Cross Hospital and by the two

A-bomb specialists from Hiroshima.

However, a December 21 Asahi Shimbun article casts some doubt on Son being an A- bomb survivor. While his medical results and confirmed diseases are described, the article states that “the Saga Prefecture Police Station presumes that Son said he is a hibakusha so

31 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Kankoku no Hibakusha o Sukue,” [Save Korean Hibakusha] December 17, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA. 32 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Nihon de Genbakushō no Chiryō Saseyō,” [Let Us Have the A-bomb Disease Treated in Japan] December 18, 1970 and Chūgoku Shimbun, “Seimitsu Kensa ga Hitsuyō: Mitsunyūkoku no Hibakusha – Son,” [Thorough Examination is Needed: Undocumented Entrant, Son] December 19, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

that he could get away with the crime of illegally entering Japan.” Additionally, the article argues that “Son was already caught in Yokohama in 1968, when he had the same argument, but the medical examinations at that time did not confirm his statement [that he is a hibakusha].” Moreover, it speculates that Dr. Mori made the diagnosis “too quickly, and for that reason the police cannot give special treatment to Son; he can only be treated as an illegal immigrant.” The author of the article does not take A-bomb expert Dr. Mori’s word for granted and claims that he did not have enough time to make a proper diagnosis, being cautious and uncertain about the statement that Son was a hibakusha.33

As the various early reporting demonstrates, on one hand, Son’s case is reported in a very positive manner by the Chūgoku Shimbun, the regional paper read by people in

Hiroshima City and Prefecture, and it refers to him as an A-bomb victim. It kept the readers up-to-date about the two Hiroshima doctors’ visit and examination of Son, emphasizing Dr.

Mori’s position about the necessity of further examinations in Hiroshima. Additionally, these articles reported much about the formation of various support movements in

Hiroshima, organized by some doctors and lawyers, serving as propaganda for recruiting many more advocates for Son.

On the other hand, national newspapers such as the Asahi Shimbun expressed doubt about Son’s hibakusha identity. Rather, this newspaper stressed the state’s position and elaborated on why Son’s word is unreliable, linking it to his sister’s involvement in illegal businesses and Son’s former medical records, which allegedly showed no sign of radiation

33 Asahi Shimbun, “Hibaku, Chiryō Uketai: Keisatsu ha Gimon Motsu,” [Wishing to Receive Medical Treatment for A-bomb Related Diseases: Police are Having Doubts] December 21, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

sickness. Nevertheless, it is important to note that later the Asahi Shimbun repeatedly reported on Son’s lawsuit in a supportive way, informing readers nationwide about developments in the case and raising awareness of the existence of Korean hibakusha and their plight.

Formation of the initial support movements

After receiving coverage in regional newspapers as early as December 8, 1970, Son’s case drew the attention of a number of Japanese people with a critical understanding of Japan’s colonial past and wartime aggression. Additionally, there were many Japanese who had been born and raised in Korea during the colonial period, and since they felt an affinity for

South Korea some believed it was time to stand up for Korean hibakusha and help them achieve what they had been denied for many years. Other Japanese citizens helped for humanitarian reasons and there were also some university students who sympathized generally with weak and oppressed peoples. Additionally, many Christians inspired by religious faith and striving to atone for Japan’s wartime aggression engaged in the support of Son Jin-doo and other Korean hibakusha. When they first heard about the existence of thousands of Korean A-bomb victims through Son’s case, these groups decided that some action must be taken on their behalf. Movements supporting Son emerged in many big cities, such as Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka, and advocates distributed the first flyers in Hiroshima soon after the appearance of the earliest newspaper articles.34

34 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 13.

The Hiroshima Association of Citizens was organized on December 18, nearly two weeks after Son’s arrest, and consisted of about twenty members. The main advocates were those doctors who examined him at the Karatsu Police Station and Takashi Hiraoka, a journalist at the Chūgoku Shimbun reporting on the Korean hibakusha problem since

1965.35 In addition, some company employees, teachers, students, and lawyers also added their support. One of those lawyers was Shōichirō Sakima, who was the first to meet with

Son to provide him aid.36 Their primary goal was first to bail out Son and then to see to it that he was hospitalized and received medical treatment in an A-bomb hospital. The quickest path to accomplish this was to go forward with the court case.37 The Association members soon became engaged in fund-raising campaigns and began collecting signatures in support of Son.

Also, in Tokyo a group of students took steps to collect additional supporters for Son and raise awareness of the Korean hibakusha problem. The December 18 article in the

Chūgoku Shimbun reported on the formation of the Executive Committee to Aid the A- bomb Survivor Son Jin-doo. This was a new left-wing organization comprising about thirty members who were students at various universities in Tokyo. On December 17, the organization distributed flyers in front of Shibuya Station in Tokyo and began collecting signatures to increase the number of supporters for Son, emphasizing that he should be released as soon as possible and should receive medical treatment. The Tokyo student

35 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Gaitō de Shomei ya Kanpa: Mitsunyūkoku no Son Jin-doo Kyūen Katsudō Hajimaru,” [Collecting Signatures and Fundraising: Support Activities for Undocumented Entrant Son Jin-doo Begin] December 21, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA. 36 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 13. 37 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Gaitō de Shomei ya kanpa: Mitsunyūkoku no Son Jin-doo Kyūen Katsudō Hajimaru,” [Collecting Signatures and Fundraising: Support Activities for Undocumented Entrant Son Jin-doo Begin] December 21, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

organization was in contact with the Hiroshima Association of Citizens and their main purpose was to expand their campaign into a nationwide support movement.38 In Hiroshima, some students became engaged in activities to support Son as early as December 20, distributing flyers and collecting donations for Son in Kinza-gai Horikawa-chō, one of the city’s biggest shopping districts. The report says that although the area was very crowded, there were only a few people who offered their help.39

The Hiroshima Association of Citizens adopted three policies on December 30. The first and foremost was advocating for a thorough medical examination of and treatment for

Son. The second was to get involved in the A-bomb survivors’ problem and helping them get an A-bomb certificate, which was only possible by applying in Japan. At that time, it already became possible to go to Japan from South Korea, yet the travelers needed to pay not only for the travel expenses but also to have their passport, visa, identification documents, and other documents certifying their guarantor issued.40 Moreover, there was no special visa category for overseas A-bomb survivors. Even when they came to Japan with a visa for medical treatment, they had to pay all their medical expenses and no A- bomb certificate was provided. But this was difficult given their low income.41 The

Association’s third policy was to develop into a movement that supported Korean

38 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Nihon de Genbakushō no Chiryō Saseyō,” [Let Us Have the A-bomb Disease Treated in Japan] December 18, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA. 39 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Gaitō de Shomei ya Kanpa: Mitsunyūkoku no Son Jin-doo Kyūen Katsudō Hajimaru,” [Collecting Signatures and Fundraising: Support Activities for Undocumented Entrant Son Jin-doo Begin] December 21, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA. 40 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 47. 41 Most A-bomb victims in South Korea had very low income or no income at all, since those suffering from the aftereffects of radiation could not work, or were employed as daily or physical workers for very low wages. Only a very few of them had qualifications that enabled them to find well-paid and permanent jobs. For more information on the economic situation of Korean hibakusha, see the 1978 survey result in Chapter 7.

hibakusha collectively, a point that was missing from the agenda of most Japanese hibakusha movements.6 As Son’s first trial was approaching, the Association personally interviewed Son, sent a letter to his mother, and set up further goals. Not only did it demand

Son’s medical treatment, but also took his case to court. In addition, it argued that beside the legal problem surrounding the immigration measures, Son’s case was also a human rights issue. It was determined to support Son until his case reached the Supreme Court. It aimed not only to realize Son’s medical treatment in Japan and have his A-bomb certificate issued, but also to have his special resident status approved by the Japanese authorities. The slogan of the Association was: “Medical treatment and legal resident status to Mr. Son!” 42

The Association raised a very important question: which is more important, abiding by immigration law, which made it basically impossible for overseas hibakusha to enter

Japan legally, or the fact that Son was an A-bomb victim and was in need of medical treatment? Should Japan prioritize law over human lives? Even though Son entered Japan without a visa, is it not unjust to regard him as a criminal and imprison him, contributing to the further deterioration of his health? Son only asked for what other Japanese hibakusha had petitioned and received in 1957: entitlement to free medical treatment in one of the A- bomb hospitals. He simply wanted to recover as quickly as possible so that he could work and lead a normal life, just like other people. Yet, why did he have to wait thirty-three years to have his A-bomb certificate issued, fighting for seven years with the Japanese authorities who did everything possible to send him back to South Korea before his claims could be

42 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 20-23.

validated? How is it possible that legislation stands over human rights and people can be treated in such an inhumane way in a modern society?

Key advocates: Takashi Hiraoka in Hiroshima

One of the key proponents of Son in Hiroshima was Takashi Hiraoka, who worked at the

Chūgoku Shimbun as a journalist at the time of Son’s lawsuit. At this point, a valid question arises: Why did this correspondent support “an illegal immigrant” rather than backing up the government’s position?43 Hiraoka was born in Osaka in 1929. Because of his father’s work, the family often moved from one place to another, also spending a considerable time in Korea. In 1945 they resided in Seoul where they witnessed Japan’s defeat and Korea’s consequent liberation. Then, Hiraoka was in junior high school. After the end of the war, they returned to Japan, as did most Japanese who had stayed in Korea during World War II.

When Japan lost the war, Hiraoka was seventeen years old and it was hard for him to comprehend these events from Korea’s perspective. It was only after the end of the war that he became conscious of what Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula really meant to those people and how much suffering Japan inflicted during the colonial period. He later admitted that he had known about the occupation earlier but had never thought about its profound meaning and never had any doubts about its legitimacy. He came to the realization that after Japan’s annexation of Korea all the hard work was done by the

Koreans, while the Japanese held the comfortable positions with which they easily and

43 The discussion of Hiraoka’s early life that reveals his motives for participating in Son Jin-doo’s support comes from his lecture held at Hiroshima University on June 18, 1977, which was reprinted in his book Muen no Kaikyō [Neglected Strait].

quickly made a lot of money. However, he admitted that it had seemed natural to him, just like for many other Japanese, and in his youth he had never considered its moral implications. When Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, he was working in a chemical factory as part of a mobilized students’ group. He had some Korean classmates, too, and admitted that he could never forget their rejoicing over Japan’s defeat.44

In September 1945 Hiraoka returned to Hiroshima with his family. When he recalled the condition of the city after the bomb, he claimed there was nothing left. Hiroshima was devastated and completely burned down; it looked nothing like the city where he used to live. Honkawa Elementary School, where he had studied before, was a few hundred meters from the hypocenter of the explosion, hence most of his former classmates were dead, except for two people.45 He had survived because was in Korea during the war, so in this sense, he was the opposite of Son. Living in Korea had saved him from becoming a hibakusha, whereas Son had become a hibakusha while living in Hiroshima when the bomb was dropped. Hiraoka continued living in Hiroshima for a few years, but became aware of the seriousness of the A-bomb problem only during the Korean War, after he had moved to

Tokyo. During the Korean War, U.S. President Harry Truman announced that the United

States was considering using nuclear weapons again.46 Upon hearing this news, his memory of the annihilated cityscape of Hiroshima became entwined with the image of his beloved

Korea. Being aware of how an A-bomb can impact a city and its people, he aimed to

44 Hiraoka, Muen no Kaikyō, 119-123. 45 Takashi Hiraoka, “Zaikan Hibakusha no Sengoshi,” in Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai o Kangaeru, ed. Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai Shimin Kaigi, (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 1988), 10. 46 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950, (Seoul: Yuksabipyungsa, 2002), 748.

prevent the United States from using the atomic bomb in Korea, so he got involved in collecting signatures for the Stockholm Appeal.47

Hiraoka became a reporter at the Chūgoku Shimbun in 1952. He was one of the first journalists in Japan to talk about the Korean hibakusha problem and to write articles about

Korean A-bomb survivors.48 In 1964 a desperate letter arrived at his newspaper office from a Korean hibakusha being hospitalized in Seoul. However, at that time, he failed to provide assistance because of the dearth of information about Korean hibakusha and the lack of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan. In 1965 an article in the Japanese newspapers about the survey conducted by the Korean Residents Union in Japan (Mindan) in South Korea was published, when the Mindan delegation went to South Korea to investigate the actual conditions of hibakusha living there.49 Hiraoka also went to South

Korea in September 1965, right after the Japan-Korea Treaty. Being his very first trip to

South Korea following his return to Japan in 1945, his experiences and encounters with many Korean hibakusha greatly affected him, contributing to his later involvement in Son’s support. First, he visited the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, where he had access to the name list containing information about 449 atomic bomb survivors. After learning their addresses, he visited six hibakusha in Seoul and three in Busan.50 During this stay in

47 Hiraoka, Muen no Kaikyō, 124-125. The Stockholm Appeal called for a complete ban on nuclear weapons, and it amassed 500 million signatures worldwide starting from 1950. The Appeal was adopted by the World Partisans of Peace in Stockholm on March 15, 1950. For more information, see W.E.B. Du Bois, In Battle for Peace: The Story of My 83rd Birthday, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 21-27. 48 Hiraoka. Interview with the author. 49 For more information about the 1965 Mindan investigation, see Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 37. 50 Takashi Hiraoka, “Wakai Sedai e Tsutaetai Koto,” [Message to the Young Generations] Lecture, Hiroshima, August 7, 2018.

South Korea, he came to the realization that it is impossible to talk about the Korean hibakusha issue without mentioning Japan’s wartime responsibility and the colonial issues, which Japan had been trying to downplay since its defeat in 1945. While walking around the slums of Seoul, where many hibakusha lived, seeing their desperate situation was a great shock for Hiraoka. Once back in Japan he organized meetings to which he invited zainichi Korean hibakusha living in Hiroshima. He conducted many interviews with them as well as with hibakusha in South Korea. Neverteheless, despite repeatedly talking about their plight, the lives of Korean hibakusha had not improved, so they became discontented with these interviews. In the second half of the 1960s, Hiraoka felt ashamed of himself for not being able to lend a hand to those people and help ease their long-term suffering, in spite of all of his efforts.51

After Son was arrested in December 1970, Hiraoka, as a journalist already involved in the Korean hibakusha problem, visited Son. Son told him that his biggest problem since being placed in custody was finding two witnesses in Hiroshima. At first, Hiraoka had doubts about Son’s identity as hibakusha, but felt inclined to help him, provided he could verify that Son was an A-bomb victim. After returning to Hiroshima, he went to Minami

Kanon-machi, where Son had lived with his family during the war, and showed Son’s photo to the passers-by, asking them if they could recognize him. He was able to find two witnesses in a few hours, so this confirmed Son’s statement and Hiraoka felt reassured about Son’s real intentions in entering Japan. He did not consider him to be a criminal, but an A-bomb victim whose rights had been repressed and who needed help. Hiraoka

51 Hiraoka, Muen no Kaikyō, 125-127.

supposed that Son’s case could be the first step to assert the rights of all Korean hibakusha.

Therefore, in December, Hiraoka, together with Dr. Mori and some lawyers, organized an association to help Son. He remained an active member of that group until the end of Son’s trial.52

As mentioned above, in addition to providing their own A-bomb testimony, the applicant was required to find two Japanese witnesses who could testify that the applicant had stayed either in Hiroshima or in Nagasaki at the time of the bombing to apply for an A- bomb certificate. These witnesses had to be Japanese; Korean witnesses were not accepted until the 1980s. Why was it often difficult for Korean hibakusha to find Japanese witnesses?

Hiraoka stressed in his book that those who were forced laborers had little contact with the local population, and Koreans tended to live and socialize among themselves therefore not coming into contact with many Japanese. Additionally, many Koreans did not speak

Japanese, so even when they had the opportunity to meet with the local population there was little communication between them. In short, even the application conditions were discriminatory and because of the exclusion of foreign witnesses in the 1970s, it was extremely difficult for the Koreans to meet the demands. Even if they managed to find two witnesses, there was no guarantee that they would then be granted a hibakusha certificate, as Son’s long legal battle proves. If Korean hibakusha illegally entered Japan and requested free medical treatment in an A-bomb hospital, not only were they treated as criminals, but again, the application system for A-bomb certificates required them to provide evidence of

52 Ibid., 138-139.

their being in one of the two A-bombed cities in August 1945. This was an example for the bigoted nature of the Japanese regulations.53

Hiraoka admitted in an interview that what he was doing in the 1970s was mostly raising funds for Son’s legal expenses. At that time, he was the associate director of the

Chūgoku Shimbun, and being in such a prestigious position, he could not allow his name to explicitly appear in the media because it would have resulted in his dismissal from the newspaper company. However, since the trials took place in Fukuoka, he went there many times to talk to the governor or to testify at Son’s trials, and since no one knew his name there (it was enough to say that he is from Hiroshima), his position at the Chūgoku Shimbun was not at risk. Many supporters were New-Left sympathizers, and once he was revealed to have such a political affiliation, he believed it would have meant the end of his career.54 He admitted that had the trials taken place in Hiroshima, he could not have gotten involved in the support of Son.55

Hiraoka wrote two books in Japanese about Korean hibakusha. The first was published in 1971 with the translated title Prejudice and Discrimination and second one

Neglected Strait in 1983. Hiraoka was a forerunner not only in the sense that he wrote the first articles about Korean hibakusha that appeared in the Chūgoku Shimbun in the 1960s, but also in that he published the first book in Japanese at the beginning of the 1970s about their predicament, describing his own personal experiences during his first visit in South

Korea and calling for the help of the Japanese government. He played a major role in the

53 Ibid., 138-139. 54 For more information about the New Left, see page 32-35. 55 Hiraoka. Interview with the author.

breakthrough and the recognition of Korean A-bomb victims in the 1970s, and his efforts and hard work were of great historical significance. When Son passed away on August 25,

2014, it was Hiraoka who wrote a commemorative article about him in the Chūgoku

Shimbun.56

To explicitly criticize the Japanese government and openly protect someone regarded an undesirable person and a criminal by the mainstream society in the 1970s could have cost Hiraoka his career. Instead, two decades after his engagement in the support movement,

Hiraoka became the mayor of Hiroshima City in 1991and served two terms until 1999. His example proves that after being actively engaged in the support of Korean hibakusha, which clashed with the position of the government, his career was not ruined. On the contrary, by holding the position of the mayor of Hiroshima for eight years, he became one of the most influential political figures in the city in the 1990s. His dedication to assisting the oppressed, engaging in anti-nuclear issues, and maintaining friendly relations with

South Korea were never shaken.

Key advocates: Rui Itō in Fukuoka

When Hiraoka began organizing Son’s support movement in Hiroshima he contacted Rui

Itō through students from the Hiroshima University “and asked for support concerning the lawsuit,” most of which took place in Fukuoka City.57 Itō was born in 1922 as the fourth

56 Takashi Hiraoka, “Heiwakokka no Giman o Shōsha: Kankokujin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo-san no Shi ni Omou,” Chūgoku Shimbun, August 30, 2014: 15 in Kankoku no Genbaku Hibakusha o Kyūensuru Shimin no Kai Kikanshi: Hayaku Engo o! 145 (December 2014): 4. 57 Masami Nishimoto, “My Life: Interview with former Hiroshima Mayor Takashi Hiraoka, Part 10,” October 22, 2009. http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=23426 (accessed: November 5, 2015).

daughter of Osugi Sakae and Noe Itō. In The Autobiography of Osugi Sake, Byron K.

Marshall writes in the introduction that Osugi “was a central figure in the left-wing radicalism of early twentieth-century Japan. Labeled a ‘pioneer of freedom’ and ‘the shogun of anarchism,’ he was admired by some of his fellow Japanese before and by many more after World War II for his rebellion against an overbearing state and an oppressive society.”58 Being a political anarchist, he opposed the Japanese political system, and following the chaos of the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake, the Japanese military police abducted and assassinated him on September 16, together with his second wife, Noe Itō, and his six-year-old nephew. Marshall further states that Osugi is regarded “as an early twentieth-century rebel who left a legacy of struggle against the establishment, even though he achieved little in the way of concrete political or social reforms in his own time.”59

Rui Itō was one year and three months old when her parents were murdered. In her memoir, she talks about being raised by her illiterate maternal grandparents. However, she gained a lot of wisdom about life from them and she recalled their words: “You mustn’t start a fire,” meaning that no one can interfere with other people’s lives. This was a criticism against Japan for annexing Korea in 1910, interfering in the lives of Korean people, oppressing them, and depriving them of their freedom. In her memoir, Itō admitted to having a bad conscience for being complicit in committing these acts by being Japanese and asked: “Now how can I face the Korean A-bomb victim Son Jin-doo? What could I say to him?” She wrote that unless she helped Son, she was afraid she would start a fire again.

58 Sakae Osugi, The Autobiography of Osugi Sakae, trans. Byron K. Marshall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), xi. Hereafter cited as Osugi, The Autobiography of Osugi Sakae. 59 Ibid., xii.

She believed that there would come a time when she could shake hands with Son with a clear conscience and would continuously support him until his wish was granted.60

According to Yasunori Takazane, former director of the Oka Masaharu Memorial

Nagasaki Peace Museum, Itō was a very humble person leading a simple life. Unlike

Hiraoka, she was neither an influential person locally nor was she involved in city politics.

However, her parents’ early death left a permanent scar on her life and from a young age she had been conscious of the crimes committed by the Japanese government towards which she had felt an inexpressible anger for taking away her family.61 In 1970 she learned about Son’s landing and his claim to be a hibakusha from the newspapers. Following contact with Hiraoka, she decided to support Son, whom she viewed as a victim of Japan’s colonization in Asia. Since being based in Fukuoka and being the leader of the Fukuoka

Association of Citizens, she played a major role in assisting Son during the trials in the district and high court.

Key advocates: Tatsumi Nakajima in Tokyo

Tatsumi Nakajima was the main advocate of Son in Tokyo and supported him during the

Supreme Court legal procedure. Nakajima became a freelance journalist after his graduation from Waseda University in 1952. In postwar Tokyo, there were many zainichi

Koreans suffering from discrimination, adjusting to Japanese society, and having difficulties finding employment. Nakajima first turned his attention to the zainichi Korean

60 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 62-63. 61 Yasunori Takazane. Interview with the author. Personal interview. Nagasaki, February 5, 2016. Hereafter cited as Takazane. Interview with the author.

problem in the 1950s and started reporting about this issue from that time. At the end of the

1950s there was a movement in Japan made up of those Koreans who wished to return to

North Korea and Nakajima covered these cases. He became acquainted with a journalist who reported about Korean hibakusha that had returned to North Korea and once Nakajima also helped his research. This proves that Nakajima already had familiarity with various

Korean-related problems, such as the zainichi Koreans, North Koreans living in Japan, and the North Korean hibakusha problem, and had engaged in their coverage as early as the

1950s.62

However, it was only in the mid-60s that Nakajima learned about the plight of South

Korean hibakusha in detail and became aware of the gravity of their problem. As mentioned earlier, in 1963 a South Korean A-bomb victim, “U” came to Japan, applied for the A-bomb certificate, was recognized as hibakusha, and consequently was hospitalized in

Hiroshima. He then ended up in Tokyo in 1965, when the Tokyo Friendship Group called

Nakajima and asked him if he would like to meet with “U”. Then, Nakajima, not knowing too much about the main issues of the Korean hibakusha problem, agreed to talk to “U”.

That was the first time he came face to face with an atomic bomb survivor residing in South

Korea. In the meantime, the Japanese Immigration Bureau kept a close eye on “U” and once he was discharged from hospital, the Immigration Bureau issued his deportation order.

When “U” asked for help, Nakajima submitted a written report to the Minister of Justice in

Tokyo asking for the extension of “U”’s residence and made every effort to help him.

62 Kankoku Hibakusha, [Korean Hibakusha] “Nakajima Tatsumi-san o Shinobu,” [In Memory of Tatsumi Nakajima] no. 50 (March 29, 2008): 2-3, accessed November 20, 2015, http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~hn3t- oikw/tobira/kaihou-50-kei.pdf.

Despite Nakajima’s efforts, the Ministry rejected the request. Nakajima learned from this case that after the Japan-Korea Treaty, the Korean hibakusha problem, instead of being resolved and Korean hibakusha being recognized as A-bomb victims, their problems had become even more complicated. He realized that even though there are a few Japanese individuals who are committed to assisting them, the Korean victims were powerless on their own. Finally, “U” disappeared and Nakajima had no further contact with him.63

Nakajima frequently went to Hiroshima in the 1960s to collect materials on Japanese hibakusha and wrote articles related to their compensation and support.64 That was when he came into contact with Hiraoka, who was already a leading journalist at the Chūgoku

Shimbun reporting on various minority issues. In the 1960s Nakajima became aware of the miserable conditions of hibakusha living in South Korea through the reports of Hiraoka and recognized their urgent need for support, but as in “U”’s case, the cooperation of only a few

Japanese people was insufficient to achieve a breakthrough and pressure the Japanese government to change its discriminative policies. When Son Gwi-dal entered Japan in 1968 without a valid visa, Nakajima immediately heard about her case and the initiatives of the locals to provide her assistance. Her deportation prevented the emergence of a potential support movement on a larger scale, which left Nakajima deeply disappointed, but after this event, his determination to assist Korean A-bomb survivors became more pronounced.

63 Ibid., 3. 64 Nagasaki Shimbun, “Undō no Tōtatsuten Mitodoke: Nakajima Tatsumi,” [Seeing the Movement’s Ultimate Goal: Tatsumi Nakajima] February 2, 2008, quoted in Kankoku hibakusha, [Korean Hibakusha] “Nakajima Tatsumi-san o Shinobu,” [In Memory of Tatsumi Nakajima] no. 50 (March 29, 2008): 8, accessed November 20, 2015, http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~hn3t-oikw/tobira/kaihou-50-kei.pdf.

Then came Son Jin-doo in 1970, who was finally able to achieve a breakthrough for

Korean hibakusha. Soon after Son’s arrest, Nakajima received a phone call from Hiraoka, who described the case and suggested getting involved in the support of Korean A-bomb victims. Nakajima had doubts if Son Jin-doo was the elder brother of Son Gwi-dal, and to confirm his identity, he visited the Hidankyō Office in Tokyo, asking them to call the Saga

Prefecture branch of Hidankyō for further information. The director of the Saga Prefecture branch office visited Son in person and told Nakajima that there was no doubt about Jin- doo’s and Gwi-dal’s relation as siblings. Then, following the first report about Son in the

December 8 issue of the Chūgoku Shimbun, many people in Hiroshima began to protect

Son and form a support movement. However, the news of Son divided the readers. A few felt inclined to assist him, while others had doubts about the righteousness of supporting an undocumented entrant. Furthermore, there were those who felt little chance for the success of the Korean hibakusha recognition since they were disillusioned after the failed support efforts of Son Gwi-dal two years earlier. After being convinced by Hiraoka about the need to form a support movement, Nakajima was among those who stood up for Son from the beginning.65

Nakajima had been in frequent contact with Hiraoka concerning Son’s case, and soon after the formation of the Hiroshima Association of Citizens, he set up a similar organization in Tokyo and became its representative. Additionally, Nakajima was one of the four people who testified for Son at his first trial at the Saga District Court, emphasizing

65 Kankoku Hibakusha, “Nakajima Tatsumi-san o Shinobu,” no. 50 (March 29, 2008): 3, accessed November 20, 2015, http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~hn3t-oikw/tobira/kaihou-50-kei.pdf.

the Japanese government’s discriminative behavior towards Korean hibakusha.66 He became Son’s main advocate during his trial at the Supreme Court. Following Son’s victory in 1978, he became more deeply involved in the legal cases of the Korean and other non-

Japanese A-bomb sufferers, helping them to obtain A-bomb certificates and to be paid compensation by the Japanese government.

Son Jin-doo’s illegal landing in Japan, his consequent arrest, and his claim to be an atomic bomb victim made many Japanese citizens conscious of the existence and the abandonment of hibakusha in South Korea. Weeks after his arrest, support groups formed in several Japanese cities. The members of these groups demanded that Japan issue Son an

A-bomb certificate and acknowledge him as an A-bomb survivor. Both regional and national newspapers reported on his case, and as a result many Japanese citizens began to grasp the scale of the Korean A-bomb survivors’ problem. By early 1971 there was an emerging grassroots network nationwide that assisted Son in his litigation against the

Japanese government and fighting for the recognition of his rights as hibakusha.

66 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 27.

CHAPTER 2: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS OF

SON JIN-DOO’S LAWSUIT TO 1974

Son’s first trial and verdict

Son Jin-doo’s first trial began at the Saga District Court on January 23, 1971. Four people testified for Son, and besides them, many students gathered from Kitakyushu to support him. During the trial, Takashi Hiraoka talked about the miserable conditions of Korean hibakusha that he had witnessed each time he visited South Korea since 1965. Then,

Tatsumi Nakajima testified about the Japanese government’s attitude towards Korean hibakusha, emphasizing the limitations of the 1965 Japan-Korea Treaty. Dr. Hirose elaborated on the A-bomb-related diseases and Son’s present health condition, and finally

Ro Takenaka testified about Son’s mother’s health condition and their living circumstances in Busan. These four witnesses demonstrated why Son had no other choice but to enter

Japan without a valid visa, in hope of a better life.67

Yet, the prosecutor’s position reveals that the prefectural side showed little compassion:

The accused emphasizes that his illness is the result of radiation, which is the consequence of the atomic bomb. According to the results of the medical examination carried out at the Karatsu Red Cross Hospital, Son’s white blood cells are decreasing and he is suffering from tuberculosis, but it has not been proven and it is doubtful if his present condition is the result of the atomic bomb. Even if there is a chance that he is an A-bomb victim, he cannot be considered a sick person and his illness is obviously not life-threatening. In addition, we

67 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 26-27.

suspect that he has acted as a stowaway broker, since when he was discovered he tore up his Korean residence card. For this reason, there is no room to sympathize with a criminal. If he is really a hibakusha, he could have entered Japan after taking the necessary legal procedures. People must abide by the law.68

Now, let us take a closer look at the prosecutor’s statement. He contradicts himself at many points. First, he clearly stated the results of Son’s medical examination carried out in the Karatsu Red Cross Hospital (decreasing white blood cells and tuberculosis), which are serious diseases needing immediate treatment, but then states that Son is not considered sick and his condition is not life-threatening. Additionally, although his present condition was “not life-threatening,” did the state intend to wait until Son’s health further deteriorated? In fact, this happened during his imprisonment.

The next ambiguous point is the denial of his identity as hibakusha, although the newspapers had previously confirmed it, and as we could see in Nakajima’s story, he also had it confirmed by the director of the Saga branch of the Hidankyō office. Yet, the prosecutor claimed that Son was a stowaway broker, illegally entered Japan, and smuggled many other Koreans with him; an assertion that the authorities could not prove. This further substantiates the biased nature of the Japanese authorities against the Koreans. Son’s advocates in their book about Son’s trial emphasize that to be able to come to Japan and to act as a broker, smuggling others, physical strength is necessary, but at that time, Son had already been sick.69 Obviously, the prosecutor did not understand the medical implications

68 Ibid., 27. 69 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai Henshū Iinkai [Editorial Committee of the Nationwide Association of Citizens] published their book about the Son Jin-doo trial in 1978, describing the legal proceedings in detail, with the title Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu: Son Jin-doo-san ni Chiryō to Zairyū o! [Accusation of

of being an A-bomb victim. He believed that only leukemia, cancer, and keloid scars were signs of radiation sickness, but actually many Japanese hibakusha reported experiencing fatigue, anemia, and other conditions similar to Son, which were known aftereffects of radiation exposure.70

Additionally, the prosecutor’s declaration that Korean hibakusha could come to Japan legally following the necessary procedures was not substantiated. As indicated above, conditons for Koreans to apply for a visa to Japan in the 1970s were very strict and there were not too many alternatives. They could enter Japan either with a tourist visa or with a visa for medical treatment, which required a lot of money in advance and restricted their stay to a limited period of time. However, since being atomic bomb survivors and having suffered from many diseases for decades, it was impossible for most of them to work, and consequently they would not have been able to apply for the visa for medical treatment in

Japan. As Lim Bok-sun and Uhm Bun-yeon’s case in 1968 demonstrates, even when they came to Japan after completing the necessary formal procedures (both of them had tourist visas), the Japanese authorities rejected their applications for A-bomb certificates. After their case, the problem of Korean hibakusha was first raised in the Diet on May 8, 1969, where the Ministry of Welfare and Ministry of Justice unilaterally positioned themselves against the application of the A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law and the Special

Measures Law to temporary visitors (i.e. to overseas hibakusha who visit Japan with a legal visa but have no permanent residence in the country). Nevertheless, after the Japanese

Korean Hibakusha Son Jon-doo: Medical Treatment and Residence to Son Jin-doo!]. Their book serves as the major source for this chapter. 70 Ibid., 28.

authorities refused to issue an A-bomb certificate to Lim Bok-sun and Uhm Bun-yeon,

Hiroshima City accepted the application of a Japanese American hibakusha in 1970, who came to Japan with a tourist visa for the Osaka world fair. This person was a temporary visitor not possessing permanent residence status in Japan, just like Lim Bok-sun and Uhm

Bun-yeon.71 This is a clear example that the Japanese authorities treated Koreans with prejudice and made concerted efforts to keep them from asserting the provision the A-bomb laws granted to Japanese and to foreign (except for Korean) hibakusha. This shows the prosecutor’s insincerity stating that it is possible to enter Japan following the necessary procedures and claim their rights as hibakusha. The fact that since 1965 no Koreans were issued A-bomb certificates reveals Japan’s deliberate exclusion of Korean victims from the framework of the A-bomb laws. However, their recognition of other non-Japanese victims points out Japan’s reluctance to address the issue of war responsibility and the suffering it inflicted on Koreans during the colonial period, preventing a massive influx of people seeking wartime reparations.

Mr. Hirano, Manager of the Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau Entry Screening, said that there are two kinds of overseas hibakusha: those who demand the application of the A-bomb laws and wish to get free medical treatment in Japan, and those who come to

Japan and get treatment at their own expense (the former group stayed in Japan with a temporary visa, therefore the laws were not applicable in their case).72 This implies that

Japan did not deny foreign A-bomb victims the option of coming to Japan and receiving medical treatment via self-expense. However, this also meant that Japan failed to apply the

71 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 48-49. 72 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 29.

A-bomb laws to them, making them pay for the medical costs from which hibakusha residing in Japan were exempt. Son and thousands of other hibakusha outside Japan were trapped in poverty and sickness. In light of this, it would have been impossible for these people to come to Japan legally and get treatment at their own expense. The early progress of Son’s case demonstrates the discriminatory nature of the Japanese authorities for specifically depriving victims of Japan’s colonial policy of free medical treatment in a country where doctors have the expertise to treat radiation-induced diseases.

The court announced the decision on January 30, 1971, according to which Son was sentenced to ten months of imprisonment. Chief Judge Itō acknowledged that Son had become an A-bomb victim in Hiroshima but claimed that there was no evidence that he was suffering from A-bomb-related illnesses. The verdict declared that Son’s health condition was not so serious that it would require medical treatment, thus the claim of the accused that he was suffering from radiation sickness was not accepted. Moreover, the Japanese authorities strongly suspected Son’s having acted as an illegal broker (or a helper to a broker), but the judge admitted that there was insufficient proof for this claim.73

Son, after hearing the decision, was deeply disillusioned: “Why does the Japanese court not believe what I am saying? Am I not an A-bomb victim? I have the right to receive medical treatment sponsored by the Japanese government. I do not know when my mother dies. If I go back to Korea like this, I cannot do anything at all. Therefore, I would like to go home after receiving treatment and after I manage to recover.” This was the first time that he emphasized his “right” as hibakusha; until then, he only requested medical treatment

73 Ibid., 30-31.

in Japan. Following this, Son expressed his desire for an appeal, therefore the Association of Citizens elected Shoji Inoue to be the lawyer for the appeal and he began his preparations.74 Following Son’s sentence, Hiraoka, together with other members of the

Association of Citizens, began writing and passing out flyers all over Hiroshima City. The text of those flyers called attention to the plight of Korean A-bomb victims and raised many of the questions that Son’s supporters did during his trial. This one was written by Hiraoka himself:

Have you heard about the case of the Korean man who stayed in Hiroshima during the A- bomb attack, therefore becoming a hibakusha? Now he is crying out from jail, asking whose fault it is that he and his family have gotten into a situation like this. We would like to convey his claims to all Japanese. Two Japanese can testify that Son was in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and the court acknowledges this fact. However, during his trial, the judge stated that “although he was affected by the bomb, he is not suffering from the aftereffects of radiation. In addition, he is supposed to have entered Japan illegally.” Because of this, Son’s request for medical treatment was refused. We, Japanese, cannot sit back and overlook injustices like this towards Koreans. After Son’s case, we should raise the following questions: 1. Why did so many Koreans become atomic bomb victims? 2. Why did Son have to enter Japan illegally? 3. So far, what have we (Japanese) done to assist Korean hibakusha? 4. What does the refusal of Son’s request for medical treatment signify? It is inexcusable for us, Japanese, to evade these questions. As a consequence of Japan’s policy of colonization, there had been many people of Korean descent residing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. However, the exact number of those Koreans who had become A-bomb victims is still uncertain. We do not know it because no one has ever conducted any surveys among them. After the war, among

74 Ibid., 32-33.

the Koreans who returned to their home country after Korea’s liberation from Japanese rule, there were many hibakusha, too, who were just barely alive. Today, about 10,000 hibakusha are estimated to be living in South Korea. However, not only did they have to endure the vicissitudes of the Korean War, but the social insurance system, which is supposed to assist them, has also been inadequate. The Korean survivors have received no support and they have been trapped in the vicious cycle of various radiation-related diseases, poverty, and the ignorance of their own society. As for us, Japanese, and the Japanese government, we have never offered these people a helping hand, either. What is more, for Korean hibakusha, there is no legal way to come to Japan and request medical treatment, nor do they have the necessary financial means to do so. Son last summer (in 1970) went to a medical check-up in one of the hospitals in Busan and according to his results, he was suffering from low white blood cell count. Since then, he has been seized with fear because of the effects of radiation on his body. Those Korean hibakusha whose only wish is to receive medical treatment in a Japanese hospital have no other choice but to come to Japan illegally. Every human being has the right to live. This universal human right takes priority over man-made laws of any kind. Hence, Son’s case cannot be resolved and accepted solely through the interpretation of the law. One of the judges has acknowledged that Son is a hibakusha, but he turned down Son’s request for medical treatment on the grounds that Son shows no symptoms of radiation sickness. Is it not a violation of human rights that the court made this judgment without possessing any medical certificate on Son’s health condition? If we lined up with the court’s decision, it means that we would deny the very essence of the Japanese hibakusha movement and what it has achieved so far. In addition, the judge’s claim–without any clear evidence (that “there is reasonable suspicion for Son’s being a stowaway broker smuggling people illegally into Japan”) makes the illusion that Son is a villain, and I am convinced that this statement will make us lose our interest in the Korean hibakusha issue again. His trial has evaded the most important questions, such as: 1. Why did Koreans become A-bomb victims? 2. Who is responsible for that?

Son only wished to hear answers to these questions. We do have to give answers to his questions. In my opinion, we must make an effort together to make Son’s wish come true. This is our obligation as human beings and our responsibility as Japanese.75

The flyer clearly raised the issues of Japan’s colonization, Japan’s wartime responsibility, abandonment of Korean hibakusha, the unjust treatment of Son, and the inhuman nature of the immigration laws. Hiraoka emphasized that everyone has the right to live, and Son’s case could not be resolved by simply applying the immigration laws, which prevented these people from legally entering Japan, thus denying their access to appropriate medical treatment.

Extension of the support movement

The second trial took place on May 19, 1971 at the Fukuoka High Court. The Association of Citizens intended to raise the following questions:

1. Why did so many Koreans become A-bomb victims? This was the core of the problem. 2. Why could Son enter Japan only illegally? Why did he not have any other alternative? 3. What have the Japanese government and the Japanese citizens done so far to assist Korean A-bomb victims? 4. Why did Son’s request for medical treatment fall on deaf ears and was refused?76

Inoue’s appeal statement demonstrates that he was well-prepared for the trial:

75 Hiraoka, Muen no Kaikyō, 70-73. 76 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 35.

1. Radiation sickness cannot be verified either medically or lawfully. However, one thing is beyond doubt: patients are full of anxiety, because they do not know when the symptoms would appear. 2. The fact that Son is a hibakusha was acknowledged at the first trial, but the question why there were so many Koreans in Hiroshima (and Nagasaki) was not raised, and now Inoue brings up this problem. 3. Moreover, he asks if there is any kind of medical treatment in South Korea for A-bomb related diseases and then argues about the different social perspective about the A-bomb there. Besides having no qualified doctors to treat the A-bomb related diseases, criticizing the bomb that had emancipated their country is taboo.77

To verify his statement, he presented the following proof:

1. Records about the forced conscription, proving that many Koreans were coercively brought into Japan during World War II, thus those residing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki becoming A-bomb victims. 2. Diet debate materials about the modification of the Special Measures Law. 3. Takashi Hiraoka’s record called “Visiting Korean Atomic-bomb Victims.” 4. Takashi Hiraoka’s record called “The Anger and Sorrow of Korean Hibakusha.” 5. Survey conducted by the Department of Interior on the migration of the Koreans. 6. For the demonstration of what radiation sickness is about, he read out some parts of “Twenty Years after the Day of Flame,” through which it became clear that radiation sickness is not only about leukemia, cancer, and keloid scars, but also includes fatigue and mental distraction.78

Afterward, three people testified for Son: Ishida, Dr. Harada, and Yoshikawa from the

Hiroshima Association of Citizens. About twenty members of the Association gathered for his trial to assist him, which reveals Son’s growing support.

77 Ibid., 36. 78 Ibid.

On June 7 the Fukuoka High Court dismissed Son’s appeal, claiming: “The accused was born and raised in Japan, then became an A-bomb victim in Hiroshima. Later, he secretly came to Japan to receive medical treatment, and in this respect, we should sympathize with him, but the previous resolution is so decisive that its annulment cannot be approved.”79 However, Son never asked for sympathy. What he was asking for was to be recognized as hibakusha, receive the A-bomb certificate, get medical treatment by A-bomb specialists in Japan seeing the fact that there was no such doctor in South Korea, and recover from the radiation-related diseases to lead a normal life. Nonetheless, the court sustained its position that law takes priority over human rights and rejected Son’s request.

Following the high court decision, the supporters were hesitant: should they take the case to Supreme Court or stop at that stage? Inoue’s position was that legally it would be impossible to win the suit at the Supreme Court given the state’s stance in the previous trials. Eventually there was no final appeal. The penalty of Son’s incarceration was finalized on June 25 and he was taken to Fukuoka Prison in Umi-machi, Fukuoka

Prefecture. With his imprisonment, further complications emerged: since the number of visits was restricted once he was detained, there was a problem with how the Association would communicate with Son. Despite all the efforts of the Association, Son lost motivation to continue the trials: “Now it’s enough. There is nothing we can do. The whole trial is nonsense.”80 He gave up hope that he would ever be granted a certificate and would ever be acknowledged as hibakusha. However, by that time, more people had become conscious of the Korean hibakusha problem, followed Son’s case in the newspapers, and

79 Ibid., 38. 80 Ibid., 39.

many of those who had been indifferent towards this issue before felt inclined to assist these victims. Although Son’s first two trials ended in failure, this was the first incident that a Korean A-bomb survivor filed a suit in Japan and was backed by Japanese citizens to secure his rights as an A-bomb survivor. What is more, his case provided an opportunity to raise awareness of the abandonment of Korean hibakusha among the Japanese, launching a process that eventually would not be stopped. Many people who were committed to Son’s court case later supported the rights of other Korean and overseas hibakusha, confronting the injustices of the Japanese legal system that Son’s case revealed.81

Each branch of the Association of Citizens gathered in Hiroshima on July 11 to determine their plan to move forward: not only did they agree to continue supporting Son’s claim for medical treatment, but they were also committed to address the Korean hibakusha problem on their own, separately from their support of Son. There were now several branches of the Association in Japan (in Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Osaka, Kyoto and Tokyo).

However, as long as they continued working as separate associations, they were not powerful enough to achieve a real breakthrough. They felt they needed to unite and cooperate with each other to function efficiently. Therefore, they reconfigured as a national association, with Fukuoka as its backbone. All associations supported Son’s claim for medical treatment, assisted him in obtaining resident status in Japan, and collected donations for his legal and medical expenses. During the meeting, the name of the new

Association was decided: “Medical Treatment to Mr. Son!” One of its central figures was

81 For example, Dr. Toratarō Kawamura began inviting many Korean hibakusha to his hospital and treating them via self-expense (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, Tatsumi Nakajima also ended up supporting the rights of other non-Japanese hibakusha until his death.

Kiyohiro Irie, a Protestant minister who engaged in Son’s support together with some church members and many university students. Meanwhile, the Association worked to find a hospital that would accept Son. A few institutes specializing in A-bomb-related diseases pledged that once Son was released, they would provide him a thorough medical examination.82

On July 25 there was another nationwide assembly in Fukuoka where the Association discussed additional actions needed to take. It had already found the necessary two witnesses in Hiroshima who could testify that Son had lived in the city on August 6, 1945 and was therefore an A-bomb victim. Nevertheless, Son’s description of his A-bomb experience was still necessary for the application of his A-bomb certificate, so the

Association knew it had to record his testimony.83

On July 27 Reverend Irie went to the prison to meet with Son for the first time.

Following the rapid deterioration of his health condition, Son urgently requested a consultation with an A-bomb specialist. Irie complied with his request and Dr. Mori (who had examined Son in the Karatsu custody in December 1970) and a lawyer called

Yamaguchi from Kitakyushu City visited Son in prison on August 2. Son’s tuberculosis had been aggravated and there was a significant chance that he had also developed lung cancer. Dr. Mori and Yamaguchi asked the prison to take appropriate measures and then discussed this matter with the Association. Hearing the news about Son’s declining health,

82 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 40-41. 83 Ibid., 41.

the Association realized that Son’s hospitalization allowed no delay and it felt compelled to demand Son’s immediate release.84

On August 9 Irie received a phone call from Fukuoka prison, saying: “We intend to suspend Son’s imprisonment; however, we would like you to become the guarantor. Could you come to the prison tomorrow in person?” On August 10 Irie went to the penitentiary together with Dr. Mori to undertake the role of becoming Son’s guarantor. The reason for

Son’s suspension was his need to receive medical treatment for tuberculosis and the need to confirm if he was suffering from lung cancer. The prison gave permission for Son to be hospitalized in the Fukuoka East Sanatorium. However, there was a problem with the choice of medical institution: it was not a hospital specializing in treating A-bomb-related illnesses. At the request of the Association, two hospitals in Fukuoka had already agreed to accept Son and preparations for his hospitalization had also begun in Hiroshima. Dr. Mori demanded that Son be taken to another hospital, but the prison flatly refused this request.

Irie was relieved that Son was temporarily released despite the inappropriate choice of the hospital, so he agreed to sign as guarantor.85

We learn from this incident that Fukuoka Prison decided to suspend Son’s imprisonment and release him because his health condition had further deteriorated.

However, when Dr. Mori had asked for Son’s transfer to a medical institute during his previous visit, the prison management had said that it had taken the necessary measures and there was no need for Son to be transferred, but unquestionably it was the prison’s negligence that contributed to the further deterioration of Son’s health condition. Son was

84 Ibid., 43. 85 Ibid., 46-47.

finally released on August 12, and although he had lost the trial, the suspension of his detention and the beginning of his hospitalization represented a partial victory for him. He claimed that his biggest relief was getting back his freedom. In the sanatorium, Dr. Tanaka, who was familiar with the A-bomb-related diseases, soon began thorough examinations of

Son.86 Though it took a lot of time, endurance, patience and effort, with this Son’s hospitalization in Japan was finally realized, although not in an ideal way. Had it not been for the initial backing of these Japanese citizens, Son might by then have been sent back to

South Korea without anyone being aware of his case and people might have not been aware of the omission of Korean hibakusha from the benefits of the A-bomb laws.

Son’s deportation order

While in custody, special prosecutor Miyahara conducted Son’s deposition on January 11,

1971 and concluded that Son “entered the country illegally.” According to the 48th article of the Immigration Act, it is the judge’s obligation to notify the accused (Son) about his entitlement to submit a letter of objection to the Minister of Justice within three days.

Thereafter, the decision is up to the minister. In certain cases he agrees with the accused, and there is a slight chance that if this had happened with Son, he would have received special residence status. In light of this, Son would have had the right to appeal until

January 14 had the special prosecutor notified him. However, Miyahara told him only that under no circumstances would he get a favorable judgment. He should give up (his request for an A-bomb certificate) and return to South Korea. Miyahara failed to inform Son of the

86 Ibid., 52-53.

three-day deadline, as he was obliged to do, thus the deadline expired without Son being aware of his potential rights. Since January 15 was a holiday (Coming of Age Day), Son’s deportation was issued on January 16. The 14th Article of the Administrative Case

Litigation Act further states that suits for withdrawing a trial decision can be filed within three months from the day the accused submitted their objection. This was also something of which Son was not made aware.87

The prison management put a document in front of Son on August 2, 1971 and ordered him to sign it, without providing any explanation. It was his deportation order. On

September 3 the Asahi Shimbun reported on Son’s case with the following headline:

“Deportation order to the Korean A-bomb victim who illegally entered Japan with the aim of receiving medical treatment.” The article went on saying that the period during which

Son could have filed a suit to challenge his deportation order had already expired.

According to the support side’s publication about Son’s trial, the information source was undoubtedly the Fukuoka Immigration Bureau and their aim was to mislead the public.

What really happened was Son was deprived of the opportunity to appeal.88

Irie met with Son on September 3 and finished all the procedures necessary to become Son’s guarantor for his permission for temporary release. The permission was not issued on that day but was taken to Irie’s house the following day (September 4) by one of the officers at the Immigration Bureau. In the meantime, another officer visited Son in the sanatorium. While taking Son’s photo for the release document, the officer demanded that

87 Son Jin-doo-san ni Chiryō o! Zenkoku Shien Nyūsu, no. 1 [Medical Treatment to Son Jin-doo! National Support News, no. 1] (1972 March), 5, Box 2, HT0202900, HUA. 88 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 54-55.

Son sign it as Son Ji-non and pay 2,000 yen. On September 6 Irie visited Son in the sanatorium and Son informed him about the happenings.

Afterward, Irie went immediately to the Immigration Bureau to demand an explanation. The officers told him that the photo was necessary for issuing the temporary release permission, but the source of the problem was the signature. The deportation order was issued on January 16 but was shown to Son on September 3. On August 12 Son signed it as Son Jin-doo, but on previous immigration-related documents he signed it with the name “Son Ji-non,” and it led to complications. He was asked to sign the deportation order again as “Son Ji-non” on September 3, since in case someone signs various documents with different names, those documents become invalid. With this, the day when the authorities showed Son the deportation order also changed to September 3 (since his signature was

Son Ji-non, like on other documents). In light of this, the September 3rd article of the Asahi newspaper clearly falsified information about his deportation and the invalidity of the appeal period on purpose. Another problem was the case of the 2,000 yen. After Irie transferred the money, the immigration officer demanded the same amount of money from

Son. The support side argued that the aim of the Immigration Bureau was to intentionally cut the relation between Son and Irie. If he has no guarantor, Son would become defenseless and the authorities could have easily deported him. There had already been some precedent of such cases. This attempt sheds light on the shady maneuverings of the authorities.89

89 Ibid., 57-59.

These early events demonstrate that the authorities consciously attempted to carry out

Son’s deportation before his case could move forward to the next appeal. Not only did they aim to stop a citizen-based movement supporting Korean hibakusha but this practice was also a standard procedure to deny Koreans their rights. Son’s example revealed the general treatment of Koreans in Japan and with this technique the Japanese government continued a power abuse that had remained from the colonial time onwards. To eliminate Son’s support movement and deport him swiftly like many other Koreans before, the authorities intentionally concealed his rights, remaining silent about his eligibility to object to the verdict within three days. Moreover, they charged Son with deliberately falsifying his name and therefore committing another crime simply because his name had changed during his childhood. Furthermore, the authorities also tried to defraud him of money by making him pay the temporary release permission fee that Irie had already paid. However, after all these vicissitudes, Irie and the members of the support movement clarified the truth about Son and realized his hospitalization, and the authorities eventually could not carry out his deportation. On September 10 the authorities issued Son’s foreign registration card and his temporary residence was indicated as the sanatorium’s address.

New challenges for the Association of Citizens

Although Son was hospitalized in August 1971, many problems remained. The Association faced new challenges. First, with the issuing of Son’s deportation order, it realized it had to make every effort to invalidate it so that Son’s hospitalization could continue and he could acquire his legal rights as a hibakusha. Second, it was necessary to get his A-bomb

certificate issued, which would enable him to get medical treatment in one of the A-bomb hospitals in either Hiroshima or in Nagasaki. However, before submitting the application for the A-bomb certificate, Son had to complete his written A-bomb testimony, which was done on October 1.90

Son submitted his application for the certificate to Hikaru Kamei, Fukuoka’s

Governor, on October 5.91 Son said: “If I had an A-bomb certificate in my hand, I could go to hospital anytime, which would fill me with relief and then I could work again.” Those hibakusha who possess an A-bomb certificate are entitled to enjoy the benefits of the A- bomb law that was implemented in 1957. According to the law, the certificate allows two health check-ups annually (if the patient wishes, they can take two additional examinations) and if any abnormality is found, a thorough examination and hospitalization will follow.

The Japanese government covers the expenses of the medical treatment and the patients are also entitled to a special healthcare allowance depending on their health condition. Those who were less than two kilometers from the hypocenter may receive a health allowance.92

The Fukuoka Association of Citizens held a meeting on October 6, began collecting signatures, and considered sending a letter to the prefectural governor about Son’s case.

The other Associations also spread information about Son.93

Members of the Fukuoka Association of Citizens visited the prefectural government building on October 12, where the person in charge claimed that Son’s application was

90 Ibid., 64. 91 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Mikkō no Kankokujin Hibakusha: Son ga ‘Techō’ Kōfu Shinsei,” [Korean Stowaway Hibakusha: Son Applies for the Issue of A-bomb Certificate] October 6, 1971, Box 4, HT0400700, HUA. 92 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 64; 72. 93 Ibid., 73.

under consideration. He stated that cases like Son’s cannot be fully resolved locally in

Fukuoka Prefecture. Legally, the problem is a question of residence and the officer’s answer suggested that the decision is in the hands of the Ministry of Welfare. Therefore, on

November 6 members of the Tokyo Association of Citizens visited the Ministry of Welfare to talk to the Public Health Minister. Since he was absent, the negotiations occurred with his assistant, Ishimoto, who said that was not legally possible to issue an A-bomb certificate to Son. Their conversation is important to grasp the position of both the support side and the ministry side.94

Association of Citizens: Concerning residence, the nationality of the applicant is not mentioned as a prerequisite in the A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law. Ministry: Although nationality is not set in the law, the applicant must stay for a specific period of time in Japan and must go through the legal procedures to become eligible. Association: How long should this specific period of time be? Son has been in Japan for nearly one year and he is expected to stay here for two more years for certain because of his tuberculosis treatment. Ministry: Son did not enter Japan legally, so in his case, it is not an issue of time. Since entering Japan illegally, the A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law is not applicable in his case. Association: Despite the fact that the Public Assistance Act and the Tuberculosis Prevention Law could be applied to him, how is it possible that the A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law is not applicable? Ministry: As for the Public Assistance Act, only Japanese citizens are eligible, but there are some exceptions. For instance, when someone in Japan gets sick and dies, it becomes a problem for Japan, and to prevent this, the law was to be applied to Son. Concerning the Tuberculosis Law, tuberculosis is a contagious disease and in case it is transmitted to other people, it creates further problems. Japan had no other choice but to apply these laws to Son,

94 Ibid., 73-74.

since it is an emergency situation. However, many Japanese citizens oppose the application of the Medical Care Law to Son. Association: I don’t think that’s the case. Ministry: But there are some people who do object to this decision. Association: Since he entered Japan illegally, right? Ministry: Exactly. Had he come legally, the situation would be different. Association: However, Japan does not allow foreign hibakusha to enter the country (i.e. to have their special visa issued) with the aim of getting medical treatment. The goal of the A- bomb Survivors Medical Care Law is to treat as many hibakusha as possible, but in spite of this, Japan does not permit their legal entry, and once they come illegally, their right for the application of the law and medical treatment is denied. Ministry: At this point, we cannot do anything. Association: What we would like you to do is to negotiate with the Ministry of Justice and urge the implementation of a law that legally allows foreign hibakusha to enter Japan. Japan brought these people forcefully into the country resulting in their becoming A-bomb victims (here, the Association refers to Japan’s accountability). Ministry: The case was settled in the 1965 Japan-Korea Treaty. Association: What was settled? Nothing was settled at all! Ministry: In any case, according to the interpretation of the law, Son is not entitled to the A- bomb certificate. Association: What about the fact that Fukuoka Prefecture holds a different view? Ministry: Even though the case belongs to Fukuoka Prefecture, it cannot make a separate decision. No matter where you submit the claim, the result will always be the same. Every authority is told about the rules. Association: When will we get the official notification? Ministry: Soon, following the decision of the Minister.95

Later, the Association again visited the Ministry of Welfare, where it learned that unless it gets a notification about the decision within six months it means that the Ministry

95 Ibid., 75-77.

automatically rejected the application. Ishimoto’s answers indicate that the Ministry was unwilling to recognize Son as an A-bomb survivor and refused to take measures that would allow other Korean hibakusha to come to Japan legally and apply for certificates.

First, Ishimoto declared that since Son entered Japan without valid documents, the A- bomb Survivors Medical Care Law is not applicable in his case. However, such a limitation is not mentioned in the law and a few years later the Supreme Court refuted this claim stressing that “both A-bomb laws apply even to those who temporarily stay in Japan with a tourist visa or to those who have illegally entered the country, provided they are A-bomb victims.”96

Second, in connection to the application of the Public Assistance Act and the

Tuberculosis Prevention Law, the Ministry’s stance was that Son’s situation created an emergency and Japan had no choice but to apply these laws to him so that he would not become a burden for the country and would not transmit the disease (to other Japanese citizens). The Public Assistance Act allows the immediate application of other laws and measures, which includes the A-bomb laws.97 In this respect, once the Public Assistance

Act is applicable to Son, it should have invoked the further application of the A-bomb laws in his case, but the Ministry refused to comply with his request. This reveals the discriminatory attitude of the authorities against Son and against Koreans in general, which was likely done in part to prevent thousands of Korean hibakusha from demanding compensation and the same rights afforded to Japanese hibakusha.

Third, Ishimoto added that many citizens objected to the application of the law to Son

96 The Fukuoka District Court’s 1974 ruling in favor of Son is discussed in more detail on page 104-106. 97 Ibid., 78; 82.

given the fact that he had entered the country without a visa. In their eyes, Son was nothing but a South Korean criminal who should be returned to Korea as soon as possible. With regard to this claim, there were certainly criminals among Japanese hibakusha too.

Committing a crime does not change the fact that someone was either in Hiroshima or

Nagasaki when the bomb was dropped and they were A-bomb victims. The A-bomb laws never stated that they exclusively apply to those who lack criminal records. For this reason, the fact that Son is an undocumented entrant should not deprive him of his rights as hibakusha. Hiraoka also stated that he was not interested whether Son had a criminal record or not. If he is hibakusha, he deserves support and the same rights as the A-bomb laws grant to the Japanese A-bomb victims.98

A fourth point is that the officer did not deny that for overseas hibakusha, there is no legal way to enter Japan with the aim of applying for an A-bomb certificate and receiving free medical treatment. At that time, there was no valid visa category for them, and the

Ministry was against the idea to take the necessary measures so that in the future these people could come to Japan. Instead, it tried to evade responsibility.

The fifth point was the officer’s statement according to which Japan’s wartime responsibility and the compensation of the victims concerned (he included Korean hibakusha, too) had been settled by the Japan-Korea Treaty. However, as previously discussed, there was no mention of Korean hibakusha in the treaty.99

Finally, the ministry emphasized its nationwide authority by saying that no matter where Son submits his application, all the authorities abide by the laws set by the Ministry

98 Hiraoka. Interview with the author. 99 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 37.

of Welfare, suggesting that each authority would treat him as an undocumented entrant and would reject his request.

Following this, Son petitioned the Minister of Justice for special resident status.

Meanwhile, the Association of Citizens also had to grapple with further complications. On

December 28 another nationwide meeting took place, where the details of the upcoming lawsuit in which Son challenged his deportation order were discussed. His legal case entered a stage when not only did he have to fight for his right to be recognized as hibakusha by the Japanese government, but he first had to gain eligibility to stay in Japan until the end of that trial, which called for another suit to appeal for invalidating his deportation order. Furthermore, given his lack of an A-bomb certificate, Son had to pay for his hospitalization and medical expenses, which led to additional problems. Son asked Rui

Itō to lend him 5,000 yen for his hospital bills in January 1972, which Reverend Irie provided the following day. The Association then launched another fund-raising campaign to cover the medical expenses for Son.100

The Fukuoka Association of Citizens made preparations for the lawsuit to appeal against the authorities’ rejection of Son’s application for an A-bomb certificate. In

Fukuoka, two lawyers (Yuichi Fukuchi and Katsuhiko Yamashita), and in Tokyo,

Yasufumi Kubota were in charge of supporting Son. The main point of their claim was that despite the fact that Son’s request for issuing an A-bomb certificate must be addressed immediately since he was an A-bomb survivor and was in urgent need of medical treatment, Hikaru Kamei, Fukuoka Prefecture’s governor, did not provide an answer for

100 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 79; 82.

five months, which is unlawful. On March 7, 1972 the evening issue of the Asahi Shimbun reported on Son’s case the following way: “He became an A-bomb victim in Hiroshima, was forcefully deported to South Korea, now entered Japan again without legal documents with the intention of getting medical treatment and applied for an A-bomb certificate. After filing a suit at the Fukuoka District Court, the Ministry of Welfare and Fukuoka Prefecture are reluctant to accept his claim. This case involves questions about Japan’s wartime responsibility, and is likely to cause a stir.”101

There were previous legal cases when foreign hibakusha (i.e. those not residing in

Japanese territory) tried to apply for an A-bomb certificate but lost the suit. One such incident happened in September 1965 when an A-bomb survivor living in Okinawa

(Okinawa was part of the United States then) filed a lawsuit requesting the application of the A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law. According to the court’s decision, for those who did not live in the country (i.e. Japan), the same laws that applied to Japanese citizens were not applicable.102

Son’s next appeal trial took place on April 28. The defense argued that Son was registered as a foreigner living in Japan (in Kogamachi, Fukuoka Prefecture, where the sanatorium is). Son at that time received medical treatment for tuberculosis that was insufficient given the fact that he had been exposed to radiation. Additionally, he belonged to the category of “special hibakusha,” which meant that not only the A-bomb Survivors

Medical Care Law but also the Special Measures Law should have been applied to him and

101 Ibid., 83-84. 102 Ibid., 84.

the state should have provided him with the benefits guaranteed by the two laws.103 The government admitted having received the plaintiff's application for an A-bomb certificate, but argued that since his residence status was unclear, his case was still under consideration. The second trial took place on May 2. The prefecture claimed that such a case of an undocumented immigrant was unprecedented, therefore it had no authority to make a decision on its own. For final resolution, the prefecture needed to make inquiries to the Ministry of Welfare, saying it would reach a decision within one month.104

On July 14, 1972 Fukuoka Prefecture sent its notification to Son about the rejection of his application for an A-bomb certificate claiming that the same law did not apply to him as to Japanese hibakusha. The necessary prerequisites were being a member of the local community and residing in Japan. The prefecture argued that Son did not meet these requirements, hence was not eligible for the benefits of the same laws.105

By then, the Asahi and other national papers regularly reported the developments about Son and in many cases they were against the state’s position. For example, the July

14 issue of the Asahi Shimbun heavily criticized the Japanese government for evading responsibility. The article made clear that because of Japan’s colonial past, there were

103 The category of “special hibakusha” was established in 1960 following the amendment of the A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law, and was in effect until 1974. According to the A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law enacted in 1957, hibakusha are entitled to free medical treatment covered by the state in case of radiaion- related diseases. In 1960, hibakusha who had been within the two-kilometer radius were categorized as “special hibakusha” and were exempt from medical expenses even in case of non-radiation related diseases. In 1963, following another amendment, those who stayed between two and three kilometers from the hypocenter were also listed as “special hibakusha.” After the ratification of the Special Measures Law in 1968, they were granted monthly healthcare allowance, too. In 1974 the category “special hibakusha” was abolished and these rights were extended to every hibakusha. For more information, see Nihon Hidankyō, “Hibakusha Taisaku no Rekishi to Genkōhō,” [History of the Hibakusha Measures and Current Laws] November 30, 2008. http://www.ne.jp/asahi/hidankyo/nihon/seek/seek6-02.html (accessed: April 21, 2016). 104 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 85-86. 105 Ibid., 86.

many Korean and Chinese hibakusha, thus it is Japan’s moral obligation to treat these victims on a par with Japanese hibakusha and extend the application of the A-bomb laws to them. Even if they come to Japan without a visa, the Japanese government is responsible for them. As for Son, the article said that it is Fukuoka Prefecture’s obligation to issue an

A-bomb certificate to him.106

There were many ambiguous points in Fukuoka Prefecture’s argument. First, although Son was in Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, it did not recognize him as hibakusha.

Second, Son had had a residence card in Japan since September 10, 1971, but the state did not regard him as a resident of this country. Third, the Tuberculosis Law was applied to him so that he did not transmit the disease to other citizens, and the Public Assistance Act, too, so that he would not collapse and die suddenly. However, according to the state, he was not entitled to the application of the A-bomb laws.107 It is apparent that Japan had already created legal artifice to avoid any responsibility related to Korean hibakusha. The government had already established this system before the appearance of Son, when it rejected Lim Bok-sun and Uhm Bun-yeon’s applications for A-bomb certificates despite their legitimate entry. This broken system was not simply in opposition to Son but towards all of Japan’s former colonial victims. The government was merely following a flawed course it had already set up when it came to compensating victims of colonization.

Receiving medical treatment, Son began to feel better physically, but mentally was very unstable. He became increasingly frustrated and uncertain due to the many legal procedures. Additionally, he still had not received any notification from the Ministry of

106 Ibid., 88. 107 Ibid., 90.

Justice regarding his petition about the special residence status, which made him even more disturbed. Members of the Association of Citizens wrote a letter of request in August and personally handed it to the Ministry. There, they talked with Mr. Hosa and Mr. Hirose, who knew the details of Son’s case. Their answer was that they were in not the position to override the previous decisions, but provided there was a request by Son, they could launch the investigation again; “however, letting Son stay in Japan simply out of sympathy would be a loss for Japan.” By then, Son’s legal case began to reverberate nationwide and a committee meeting of the The House of Representatives also brought up the problem of the rejection of Son’s application on August 8. Nevertheless, members of the lower house did not emphasize Japan’s wartime responsibility and did not raise the question why there were so many Korean A-bomb victims. They stressed the importance of residence status and agreed to leave this matter for the Ministry of Justice to decide. As for the refusal of the special residence status in March, they stated they could not investigate that case.108

Following the rejection of Son’s application for an A-bomb certificate, the

Association of Citizens started to make preparations for the lawsuit to revoke the decision.

Members of the Association in Osaka and Tokyo began collecting signatures for Son’s special residence permission. By that time, all the Associations in various parts of Japan cooperated with each other and maintained frequent contact. Meanwhile, the Hiroshima

Association of Citizens made every effort to ensure that Son was admitted to the

Hiroshima A-bomb Hospital (this is what Son had originally requested), yet the legal procedures were very complicated. First, the Fukuoka Immigration Bureau’s permission

108 Ibid., 91-94.

was necessary to transfer Son to another hospital. Then, there was the question of whether the hospital would accept him and how the Fukuoka High Public Prosecutor’s Office would react. This was the office that had suspended Son’s imprisonment so that he could be hospitalized in the sanatorium. However, once everything was arranged and Son was ready to be transferred to a different hospital, the dilemma was: how should the

Association operate afterward? It faced many obstacles while collecting signatures for the permission of Son’s special residence status and preparing for the appeal trial regarding his application for the A-bomb certificate.109

When Son was hospitalized in the sanatorium in August 1971, the Fukuoka High

Public Prosecutor’s Office ordered that the hospital must issue Son’s medical certificate periodically due to the suspension of his imprisonment and submit it to the Immigration

Bureau. Depending on his health condition, the bureau then renewed the temporary release permission every month. However, once his condition began to improve, the Prosecutor’s

Office would withdraw this permission and he would have to return to prison again.

Although technically released, he was still treated as a criminal in the hospital and the ongoing trials made his recovery even more difficult. The medical certificate issued on

August 20, 1971 stated that he was suffering from tuberculosis and the hospital expected two years of medical treatment to be necessary for his complete recovery.110

On July 31, 1972 the council extended Son’s hospitalization order for six months.

The next council was to assemble on January 31, 1973, and until then the Association aimed to transfer Son to the Hiroshima A-bomb hospital. The greatest challenge was to

109 Ibid., 95-97. 110 Ibid., 60-61.

find doctors who were willing to undertake Son’s medical treatment despite his not possessing an A-bomb certificate. Eventually Dr. Toratarō Kawamura and Dr. Tōmin

Harada in Hiroshima agreed to accept Son on October 17.111

An officer from the Prosecutor’s Office visited the hospital in November and stated that one year had already passed since Son’s imprisonment had been suspended, hence demanding the display of Son’s X-ray. In spite of being hibakusha, Son only received treatment for tuberculosis but had other health problems which were not treated, leading to a further decline in his white blood cell count.112

The guarantor’s agreement on changing the hospital, Son’s request for transfer to another hospital, together with the request for the modification of the restriction of residence and Son’s medical reports were submitted to the Fukuoka Prosecutor’s Office and to the Immigration Bureau. Son’s hospitalization in the Hiroshima Red Cross Hospital became official. He entered the hospital on January 26, 1973 and Dr. Ishida was chosen as his doctor. However, his medical treatment lasted only for three months. Son was discharged from hospital on May 2 and his imprisonment resumed, but this time in

Hiroshima. According to the final medical report, Son did not recover completely but was discharged. Nevertheless, the doctors agreed that there was a need for regular hospital visits. The medical records did not make clear whether the tuberculosis and the decline of the granulation in his white blood cells were connected to radiation. Finally, after 21 months of hospitalization, Son was returned to prison. Twenty days after his transfer to the

111 Ibid., 97-98. 112 Ibid., 98.

Omura prison, his appeal trial (for the A-bomb certificate) began.113

Appeal trials

On October 2, 1972 Son submitted a petition to the Fukuoka District Court, filing a suit for the revocation of the previous court decision that refused his application for the A-bomb certificate.114 In the meantime, after serving his ten-month prison sentence, he was released from the Hiroshima Prison on August 25, 1973. On that day, seven officials from the

Immigration Bureau waited and handcuffed him demonstrating that they still considered him a criminal and escorted him to Hiroshima Station, from where he was taken to Kyushu to be transferred to Omura Prison (in Omura City, Nagasaki Prefecture) owing to his pending legal cases. Three days later, four members of the Tokyo Association of Citizens went to the Ministry of Justice demanding Son’s hospitalization and objected to the extension of his incarceration. The Ministry’s answer was the following: “Son has recovered from tuberculosis. There is already a deportation order in effect and he is likely to be deported at the end of the year.” Apart from the cold attitude of the Ministry towards

Son, it became obvious to Son’s supporters that unless they took immediate actions against

Son’s deportation order, he would be sent back to Korea within a few months, which meant that all their efforts would be meaningless.115

Yukio Fujii, who in 1945 had lived in the same neighborhood as Son, testified for him and verified his A-bomb experience on October 4. During the seventh trial on January

113 Ibid., 99-103. 114 For more information about the trials, see ibid., 186-187. 115 Ibid., 107.

100

29, 1974, Tanaka, Hiraoka, Nakajima and Kawamura testified on the plaintiff’s side, talking about the reality of the atomic bomb attack, the aftereffects of radiation, and the medical implications. The next day Son gave his A-bomb testimony during which he used the expression “I inhaled gas” when referring to the radiation that affected him after the dropping of the bomb. For most Japanese, such a phrase sounded unnatural, but this was how people in Hiroshima at that time referred to radiation and only people in Hiroshima used that expression. Son’s phrasing also proved that he was in Hiroshima in August 1945.

Nevertheless, the lawyers defending the prefectural side, not being aware of such a phrase in postwar Hiroshima, mocked him by asking what kind of gas he inhaled since there was no coal mine explosion in Hiroshima.116

To sum up the main points of the A-bomb certificate trials, the plaintiff (Son) submitted his application for an A-bomb certificate on October 5, 1971 to Fukuoka’s governor. However, Fukuoka Prefecture, the defendant side, rejected the plaintiff's application on the grounds that those eligible for A-bomb certificates need to be members of a local (Japanese) community, need to reside in Japan, and need to contribute to the welfare of the nation. According to the defendant, unless the plaintiff fulfills these conditions, the A-bomb laws are not applicable. The plaintiff argued that nationality and residence is not mentioned in the A-bomb laws, therefore the court must revoke the decision that turned Son’s application down. Fukuoka Prefecture claimed that the A-bomb laws are social security laws, which aim at improving the welfare of the structural members of society, therefore resident status in Japan is necessary for their entitlement.

116 Ibid., 108; 123;188.

101

Son’s counterargument was that the A-bomb laws involve the issue of national redress, and for this, it is unjust to state that official residence in Japan is necessary. Additionally, the

Public Assistance Act had already applied to the plaintiff, therefore the prefecture’s claim according to which social security laws did not apply to temporary visitors was inconsistent. There was a debate surrounding the nature of the two laws, whether they are state redress or social security laws. The original purpose of the A-bomb survivor support groups was to create a law similar to the Law for the Relief of War Victims and Survivors, which provided state compensation for the Japanese wartime victims.117 The legal circles regarded the A-bomb laws as state redress measures for the A-bomb survivors.

Nevertheless, the Japanese government, lest other victims should begin demanding reparations, had the firm stance that the A-bomb laws are social security laws and did not acknowledge that they serve as compensation for wartime damages.118 During Son’s trial, the different standpoint of the state and the lawyers came to the surface.

Son’s supporters argued that the prefecture’s stance was clear: Son is Korean, and he illegally entered Japan. Therefore, the prefecture made his undocumented entry an excuse to exclude him from the benefits of the A-bomb laws that should be applicable to him. In their third preliminary document submitted to the court on January 24, the prefecture labeled Son as a “stowaway” and claimed that he was a “habitual liar.” The supporters

117 The Law for the Relief of War Victims and Survivors was enacted in 1952, and “under this law, former Japanese military personnel, army/naval civilian employees, paramilitary personnel and their surviving families received pensions.” For more information, see Miki Y. Ishikida, Toward Peace: War Responsibility, Postwar Compensation, and Peace Movements and Education in Japan, iUniverse, Inc. (July 2005). http://www.usjp.org/towardpeace_en/tpCompensation_en.html#mozTocId714832 (accessed: May 10, 2016). 118 “Kuroi Ame, Nuguenu Kioku: Asahi Shinbunsha Hibaku 60 Nen Anketo,” [Black Rain, Inerasable Memories: Asahi Newspaper Company’s Survey for the 60th Anniversary of the Dropping of the A-bomb] July 17, 2005. http://www.asahi.com/hibakusha/shimen/hibaku60/hibaku60-04_2.html (accessed: May 10, 2016).

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quoted some parts of the document: “The plaintiff claims he was born in Osaka and lived in Japan until his deportation in 1951, but his statement contradicts the truth. According to the family registry, he was born in South Gyeongsang-do Province (just like his younger sister, Son Gwi-dal) and his marriage with Park Il-dal on January 3, 1948 was also registered in Korea. Furthermore, their eldest son’s birth was registered on October 16,

1950 in Busan. This proves that the plaintiff was not born and raised in Japan and did not live here until 1951.” The prefecture claimed that “this part of Son’s testimony is certainly false.” It suggested that Son is not a hibakusha since he resided in Korea the entire time, but it is apparent that the prefecture falsified the family registry. Moreover, it accused Son of having many different names, such as Shin Tanaka, Mitsuyama Bunshu (Mitsu with two different Chinese characters), Kazuo Suzuki, Son Ji-noon, and Son Jin-doo, and eventually stigmatized Son as a habitual liar.

However, the prefecture made a serious mistake through which it exposed itself.

During one of the trials for the revocation of Son’s deportation order, in the preliminary document of Fukuoka Prefecture, their representative clearly stated that Son had resided in

Arakawa Ward, Tokyo from May 1947 to August 1950 and then lived in Nishinari Ward,

Osaka from September 1950 to January 1951. The mayors of Arakawa Ward and Nishinari

Ward confirmed this information in telegraphs and the police record of Son’s former flat mates also verified that he had lived in Japan then. This inarguably proved Son right, and

Fukuoka Prefecture, by contradicting itself and fabricating false information about him, facilitated Son’s upcoming victory.119

119 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 124-127.

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Son’s first legal victory and its reverberation

The Fukuoka District Court ruled in favor of Son on March 30, 1974. According to the judgment,

The A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law is applicable to non-Japanese hibakusha, too. The aim of the law is not the improvement of welfare society, as the prefecture has argued, but to assist the A-bomb survivors individually. The law does not require permanent residence. Whether or not hibakusha are entitled to long-term medical treatment depends on their condition. The A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law is applicable to those foreigners who stay in Japan. However, in case they are tourists or undocumented immigrants, there is a chance that they cannot enjoy all the benefits of the law because other regulations might prevent this, but it is inexcusable that they are denied of the application of the law and their request for an A-bomb certificate is refused for this reason. If someone is a hibakusha, even though they are non-Japanese, the law applies to them once they are in Japan. For this reason, both A-bomb laws apply even to those who temporarily stay in Japan with a tourist visa, or to those who have entered the country without visas, provided they are A-bomb victims. Therefore, the former resolution [that refused Son’s application for an A-bomb certificate] is revoked.120

The judge added that it is possible for undocumented entrants to be imprisoned and deported due to the application of other laws independent of the A-bomb laws. However, the state cannot reject their claim for A-bomb certificates on the grounds they entered the country without a visa once they are confirmed as hibakusha. With this, the judge acknowledged the prefecture’s unfair decision but at the same time emphasized the

120 Ibid., 133.

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limitation of the A-bomb laws.121

The news of Son’s victory created a sensation. The March 30 issues of both the

Chūgoku and Asahi Shimbun reported the case, the Chūgoku Shimbun mentioning it as a

“landmark victory,” and both papers supporting Son’s position. The title of the Chūgoku

Shimbun article was “A-bomb Certificate to Mr. Son! The Fukuoka District Court

Acknowledges Him as Hibakusha,” which explained that chief judge Saburō Ino recognized Son as an A-bomb survivor and ordered Fukuoka Prefecture to issue his A- bomb certificate.122 Furthermore, the article quoted Ino saying that according to the interpretation of the 14th Article of the Japanese Constitution, which states that “all of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin,” Fukuoka

Prefecture’s decision was unlawful.123 The Asahi Shimbun’s article also shows great compassion towards Son and supports the court’s decision in favor of him. It criticizes the prefecture by revealing that it called Son “a liar” arguing that his memory of the bombing is vague and was fabricated as an excuse for his undocumented entry into Japan. To refute their position, the article mentions that the judge admitted that Son was in Hiroshima at the time of the bombing, and he is an A-bomb survivor, just as he claimed. Moreover, the article criticizes the Japanese government for not taking any measures to assist Korean hibakusha, not even allowing them to enter the country with the aim of medical treatment,

121 Ibid., 134. 122 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Son-san ni Techō Kōfu o: Fukuoka Saibanketsu Hibaku Jijitsu mo Mitomeru,” [Issuing an A-bomb Certificate to Mr. Son: The Fukuoka Court Ruling Also Acknowledges the Truth about Being an A-bomb Victim] March 30, 1974, Box 4, HT0400900, HUA. 123 “The Constitution of Japan,” http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html (accessed: November 20, 2015).

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which aggravated the poverty they were trapped in. It depicts Son as a victim, explaining that the Busan hospital had already diagnosed him with leucopenia. Additionally, because of the existing prejudice against hibakusha within South Korea and the lack of appropriate medical treatment there, Son decided to enter Japan without a visa.124

The Korea Association welcomed the news of Son’s victory saying that it makes possible legally for twenty thousand Korean hibakusha to receive the A-bomb certificate, just as Japanese victims did. However, it had further demands:

1. Compensation of hibakusha residing in South Korea. 2. Besides medical and livelihood support, setting up an A-bomb hospital within South Korea. 3. Enactment of the Special Law Supporting Overseas Hibakusha. 4. Conducting a nationwide investigation into the actual condition of Korean hibakusha.125

Despite being a landmark decision in the history of Korean hibakusha and the first case when a Japanese court ruled in favor of a Korean A-bomb survivor, Son could not relax and enjoy the benefits of the A-bomb laws because of the appeal filed by Fukuoka Prefecture, which resulted in four more years of legal battle.

Directive No. 402

Although Son’s victory should have implied that Korean hibakusha, once they come to

Japan and are issued the A-bomb certificate, would automatically gain equal position to

124 Asahi Shimbun, “Kenkō Techō Kōfu Seyo: Mitsunyūkoku to ha Kirihanase,” [Let Us Have A-bomb Certificates Issued: Let Us Cut Off the Issue of Undocumented Entry] March 30, 1974, Box 4, HT0401001, HUA. 125 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 133.

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Japanese hibakusha in terms of medical benefits and monthly allowances, in practice this is not how things turned out. The Japanese government had a plan to put a stop to a massive influx of Korean hibakusha asserting their rights that later could have resulted in other wartime victims entering the country in large numbers seeking legal redress from the

Japanese government. To nip this tendency in the bud, the Public Health Director General of the Ministry of Health and Welfare passed Directive No. 402 on July 22, 1974, stipulating that “the A-bomb Special Measures Law is applicable to those A-bomb victims who reside inside the country, but once they leave Japan, the same law loses its validity.”126

In other words, even if Koreans applying for the certificate succeeded in being recognized by the Japanese government as hibakusha, once they went back to South Korea they were excluded from the provisions guaranteed by the two A-bomb laws and their certificate became nothing more than “a piece of paper.”127 If they wished to obtain medical treatment, they had to apply for a visa, return to Japan at their own expense, and go through complicated bureaucratic procedures to be able to use their certificates again. While in theory overseas hibakusha were eligible to apply for A-bomb certificates and then receive medical treatment and a monthly allowance in Japan following Son’s legal success, in practice their visas lasted only for a short period and it was impossible to remain in Japan indefinitely and take advantage of their newly acquired status. This was the Japanese government’s conscious effort to restrict the access of Korean hibakusha to the provisions

126 Nobuto Hirano, Umi no Mukō no Hibakushatachi: Zaigai Hibakusha Mondai no Rikai no Tame ni, [Hibakusha Living on the Other Side of the Sea: For the Comprehension of the Problem of Hibakusha Residing Outside Japan] (Tōkyō: Hachigatsu Shokan, 2009), 17-18. Hereafter cited as Hirano, Umi no Mukō no Hibakushatachi. 127 Masami Nishimoto, “Revised Law May Bring More Support for A-bomb Survivors Overseas,” November 13, 2008. http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/mediacenter/article.php?story=20081110184815212_en (accessed: April 21, 2016).

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guaranteed by the A-bomb certificate, and it followed the path it had started in the 1960s to evade its wartime responsibility.

The directive was in effect for 29 years and was repealed only in 2003, after Kwak

Kwi-hoon won a suit in the Osaka High Court in 2002. He filed a lawsuit in 1998 demanding that the application of the Atomic Bomb Survivors Relief Law (enacted in

1994) be extended to those hibakusha who live overseas.128 What he requested was the revocation of Directive No. 402. For nearly thirty years, this directive put a barrier in the health care subsidies and other benefits for hibakusha residing outside Japan, and during this period thousands died without receiving any assistance.

128 Hirano, Umi no Mukō no Hibakushatachi, 28, 31, 32.

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CHAPTER 3: THE CONTINUING LEGAL BATTLE:

1974 TO 1978

Son’s appeal to his deportation order

In August 1973 the Ministry of Justice informed the Tokyo Association of Citizens about

Son’s foreseeable deportation at the end of the year.129 At that point, in addition to proceeding with the A-bomb certificate trial, the biggest challenge to the Association and

Son was to invalidate his deportation order. Son filed a suit against the Fukuoka

Immigration Bureau for the annulment of his deportation order on October 15, which marked the beginning of his second legal battle against the state. The Immigration Bureau told them that the ship taking him to South Korea departs on 28 November. If Son had been deported, he would not have received medical treatment and would not have obtained an A-bomb certificate years later.130

On November 20 Son’s trial for the invalidation of his deportation order took place at the Fukuoka District Court. The court argued that it was impossible to make a decision before November 28, when the ship was scheduled to leave for South Korea. Furthermore,

Son’s A-bomb certificate trial, which was to announce the final resolution on March 30,

1974, was still in progress; thus, the court suggested postponing Son’s deportation. As a response, the Immigration Office stated that the South Korean Embassy had already confirmed that those having unfinished legal cases in Japan could not return to South

129 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 107. 130 Ibid., 107-110.

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Korea, implying that Fukuoka Prefecture was considering the suspension of the enforcement of the order. Consequently, the court temporarily withdrew Son’s deportation order, but his fight for its annulment continued for many more years, simultaneously with his trial for A-bomb certificate, while being imprisoned and hospitalized.131

Although being readmitted and discharged from various hospitals, Son’s lawsuit for the revocation of his deportation order continued in 1976. Chief judge Minami announced the judgment against Son on September 30, meaning the Immigration Bureau could deport him anytime. The judge added that the plaintiff bears all the legal costs and hurriedly left the room.132 Consequently, the Association members organized a demonstration in

Fukuoka with the slogan “condemning Son’s deportation order” and sent their letter of objection to the director of the Fukuoka Immigration Bureau.133 In the letter, signed by the

Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka Associations of Citizens, they quoted Son’s very first claim saying “I was born in Osaka. I became an A-bomb victim in Hiroshima.

My family is on the verge of dying out. Who did this to my body? I want my body to be cured.” The Association then pointed out that the Immigration Bureau had suppressed

Son’s request, which had already been acknowledged twice by the Fukuoka District and

High Court. The Association’s final demand to the Immigration Bureau was: “Make sincere effort to open the way for Son’s special residence status, which is his natural right to attain.” The court, by backing the Immigration Bureau’s position, ignored Japan’s colonial history, Son’s identity as hibakusha, and the fact that Son had already won a

131 Ibid., 110. 132 Son-san ni Chiryō o! Osaka Shimin no Kai, no. 28 [Medical Treatment to Mr. Son! Osaka Association of Citizens, no. 28] (1976), 1, Box 2, HT0206100, HUA. 133 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 164-166.

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different suit twice, which involved his entitlement to an A-bomb certificate and receiving medical treatment in Japan. However, Son did not yield to the Immigration Bureau. He filed his appeal against the court’s decision on October 14. The Association members also gave voice to their disappointment in their bulletins, asserting that Son’s claim for medical treatment and residence is legitimate as a Korean A-bomb victim.134

During the second appeal trial against the deportation order on April 28, 1977, Son’s side declared that the Koreans’ deprivation of their Japanese citizenship was unlawful.135

However, given the supporters’ lack of discussion of the Koreans’ citizenship status in

Japan laid down in the laws enacted during the occupation period (1945-52), their argument is not genuine and the laws prove the government’s decision to deport Son in

1951 right. In 1952, the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect, Article Two stating that “Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to

Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.”136 The Association argued that the peace treaty did not touch upon the change of the nationality of those

Koreans who stayed in Japan, and after its enforcement, Koreans automatically lost their

Japanese citizenship, which was illegitimate. Furthermore, the Association pointed out that

Japan issued and carried out Son’s deportation in Korea in 1951, one year before the implementation of the treaty, namely when Son lawfully held his Japanese citizenship.

Consequently, according to them, Son’s deportation order issued in 1951 and the

134 Son-san ni Chiryō o! Osaka Shimin no Kai, no. 28 [Medical Treatment to Mr. Son! Osaka Association of Citizens, no. 28] (1976), 1-3, Box 2, HT0206100, HUA. 135 Son Jin-doo-san ni Chiryō to Zairyū o! Son Jin-doo-san wo Mamoru Tokyo Shimin no Kai, no. 29 [Medical Treatment and Residence to Son Jin-doo! The Tokyo Association of Citizens Protecting Son Jin-doo] (August 3, 1977), 8, Box 2, HT0207300, HUA. 136 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period4.html (accessed: December 17, 2015).

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deprivation of his Japanese citizenship went against the law.137

However, the Association failed to consider the laws introduced after 1945 that affected the status of Koreans residing in Japan. First, following the enactment of the Alien

Registration Law in 1947, Koreans in Japan were consigned to foreign status and were required to register at the local authorities. During the occupation period, Koreans “were technically still Japanese nationals in the absence of an international arrangement of their nationality status.” Nevertheless, “since the law regarded Koreans as aliens, it was possible for the Japanese government to propose the ‘repatriation’ of those who technically still possessed Japanese nationality.”138 It meant that the Japanese government could execute the forceful deportation of those Koreans who failed to register as foreigners after 1947, and in this respect, Son’s deportation in 1951 given the lack of his registration as a foreigner in Japan could not be regarded illegal in terms of the interpretation of the law.

The ratification of the 1950 Nationality Law further strengthens the government’s position. The Nationality Law stated that one can be regarded a Japanese citizen provided

“the father or mother is a Japanese citizen at the time of birth,” reinforcing the “patrilineal jus sanguinis (by parentage) principle.”139 Son’s parents were ethnic Koreans who were both born in Korea. The 1950 law left no doubt on Son’s identity as a Korean citizen, and in this respect, his deportation in 1951 was legally justified given his illegitimate residence in Japan, although the moral implications of the new legal system were disputable as being

137 Son Jin-doo-san ni Chiryō to Zairyū o! Son Jin-doo-san wo Mamoru Tokyo Shimin no Kai, no. 29 [Medical Treatment and Residence to Son Jin-doo! The Tokyo Association of Citizens Protecting Son Jin-doo] (August 3, 1977), 7-8, Box 2, HT0207300, HUA. 138 Ryang, ed., Koreans in Japan, 20-21. 139 Ibid., 14, 22.

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discriminative, especially against the Koreans.

Additionally, concerning the San Francisco Treaty, it is true that the treaty itself did not mention the Koreans’ loss of Japanese citizenship, but the defense failed to take into account an important point: circular no. 438. It was issued on April 19, 1952, nine days before the San Francisco Peace Treaty went into effect, and it explicitly “stipulated the uniform loss of Japanese nationality by Koreans and Taiwanese as a result of the Peace

Treaty, regardless of their place and residence.”140 Although the defense’s ultimate goal was to achieve the revocation of Son’s deportation order, it seems to have overlooked or were unaware of the legal history of the Koreans’ status in Japan. Thus, making statements such as the Japanese government unlawfully deporting Son suggests either their unpreparedness or their reluctance to acknowledge the authenticity of certain laws enacted by the Japanese government. With this, the Association unintentionally played into the hands of the authorities by making the impression of presenting only one part of the story.

On March 1, 1978 Son’s fifth appeal trial against his deportation order took place at the Fukuoka High Court.141 The next deportation trial was to be held in June, but after an unexpected turn of events, the March 1 trial turned out to be the very last one. The

Supreme Court announced Son’s victory on March 30 in his A-bomb certificate suit.

However, his appeal trial against his deportation order was still unresolved and there was a fear that the authorities would either deport him or send him back to Omura Prison anytime. The members of the Association of Citizens knew that they had to settle this long- standing problem urgently. Especially in Tokyo, the Association members were concerned

140 Ibid., 22-23. 141 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 191.

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about Son’s receiving medical treatment without having to worry about his deportation order or residence status. For this reason, Kubota visited the Ministry of Welfare

Immigration Bureau office to negotiate with them over Son’s uncertain condition of residence. Consequently, through the mediation of Masahiro Yamamoto, who was a member of the Socialist Party and a member of the House of Representatives, the supporters assured the Immigration Bureau about the withdrawal of the appeal trial in return for the Immigration Bureau’s guarantee not to send back Son to Omura Prison.

Following the long negotiations, both parties managed to reach a compromise, and Son eventually received his special residence status in September 1978.142

The A-bomb certificate trials: 1974 to 1977

Although the March 30, 1974 decision marked Son’s landmark victory and would result in the automatic issuance of his A-bomb certificate, his vicissitudes were far from over. He still faced many obstacles, one of which was Fukuoka Prefecture’s appeal, filed on April 12 against the March 30 decision.143 Unless he won the appeal, the present victory would become meaningless. The other barrier that hindered him from getting his A-bomb certificate was his deportation order still being in effect; his trial for the invalidation of the deportation order continued well after the March 30 decision, as previously discussed.

Even if Hiroshima had issued the certificate to Son, once he was deported by the

142 Tatsumi Nakajima, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo Saiban no Kiroku: Hibakusha Hoshō no Genten, [Records of Korean Hibakusha Son Jin-doo’s Trial: Beginning of the Hibakusha Compensation] (Tokyo: Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai Shimin Kaigi, 1998), 144. Hereafter cited as Nakajima, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo Saiban no Kiroku. See Figure 7. 143 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 188.

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authorities he could not receive medical treatment in Japan. With Fukuoka Prefecture’s appeal and the annulment of Son’s deportation order, two different legal cases were going on simultaneously.144 Moreover, as long as the trials lasted, Son remained deprived of his freedom in Omura Prison. Having to fight with the Japanese government for his rights from jail was an additional burden on him.

The first appeal trial for an A-bomb certificate at the Fukuoka High Court took place on June 17. The prefecture explained the goals of the appeal and argued that Son’s hibakusha identity was dubious since his story about the date of moving to Hiroshima was inconsistent. It submitted only Osaka’s history and Hiroshima’s district map to demonstrate

Osaka’s air raid, offering no new evidence.145 However, the judge had already acknowledged that Son was an A-bomb victim in Hiroshima.146 During the second trial on

September 4, the prefecture quoted The Hiroshima Atomic Bomb Damage Magazine with the intention of proving that the building where Son was staying on August 6, 1945 only partially burned that day, not completely, as Son had claimed. According to the magazine, the building was 2.2 kilometers from the hypocenter. One block of wood buildings caught fire ten minutes after the explosion, and the fire spread to the warehouses where materials such as tobacco were stored. The building burned for three days and was completely destroyed except for the zinc roof, which marked the place of the warehouse. The prefecture stated that this part of Son’s testimony is based on false information because the building was not completely burned on August 6. It added that “it is strange that Son did

144 Son-san ni Chiryō o! Osaka Shimin no Kai, no. 16 [Medical Treatment to Mr. Son! Osaka Association of Citizens, no. 16] (July 1974), 1, Box 2, HT0205400, HUA. 145 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 136. 146 Son-san ni Chiryō o! Osaka Shimin no Kai, no. 16, 1.

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not mention the fire in his testimony.”147

In 1975 two trials took place at the Fukuoka High Court and the judge announced the decision on July 17. During the first one (on March 14), two people, Dr. Tōmin Harada and

Toshiko Uehara testified for Son. Dr. Harada stated that he had examined many Korean hibakusha and stressed their lack of receiving proper medical treatment, thus Son’s demand for an A-bomb certificate and getting treatment in Japan was relevant. Uehara argued that two Japanese witnesses had already confirmed Son’s identity as an A-bomb survivor, meaning he should be afforded the same medical treatment as Japanese hibakusha.148

During the sixth trial held on May 13, Kubota brought up the case of a Canadian woman who had come to Japan in December 1971 with a tourist visa, and after applying for an A- bomb certificate in Hiroshima the authorities approved her request.149 It occurred two months after Son had submitted his application for the certificate. Despite the fact that this woman had come to Japan with a temporary tourist visa, did not hold a permanent residence status, and did not contribute to the welfare of Japanese society, Japan issued her the certificate and recognized her as hibakusha, but at the same time refused to do so with

Son and other Korean hibakusha.150

Additionally, members of the Association of Citizens in many Japanese cities collected 6,000 signatures among Japanese and 200 among Korean hibakusha who were against the appeal trials and demanded that Japan issue an A-bomb certificate to Son.

147 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 142. 148 Son-san ni Chiryō to Zairyū o: Kyoto Shimin no Kai, no. 3 [Medical Treatment and Residence to Mr. Son: Kyoto Association of Citizens, no. 3] (June 4, 1975), 3, Box 2, HT0207600, HUA. 149 She was ethnically Japanese possessing Canadian citizenship at the time of her application (source: Motoji Matsuda, personal interview). 150 Son-san ni Chiryō o! Osaka Shimin no Kai, no. 22 [Medical Treatment to Mr. Son! Osaka Association of Citizens, no. 22] (June 1975), 2, Box 2, HT0205700, HUA.

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During the trial, representatives of the Association provided the list of signatures to the judge. Chief judge Kamegawa at the Fukuoka High Court announced the decision on July

17 upholding the legitimacy of the March 30, 1974 decision, which resulted in Son’s victory. However, Son’s legal struggle further continued when the prefectural side submitted an appeal to the Supreme Court on July 31.151

Nearly two years following the appeal of Fukuoka Prefecture, the Supreme Court scheduled an oral proceeding for the defense to make a counterargument against the

Ministry of Welfare’s reasoning for appeal for June 30, 1977. The Association of Citizens, as the backbone of legal support for Son, convened a national conference in Osaka on May

22, when it confirmed its main arguments and decided on the policies to follow on the June

30 trial. Nevertheless, on May 30 an unexpected notification arrived from the Supreme

Court about the postponement of the oral proceeding on the grounds that the judge in charge had become sick. Eventually the hearing never took place and the Supreme Court announced its final judgment in 1978.152

Major support activities of the Association of Citizens after 1974

Membership of the Association of Citizens in each city further increased by 1975 and it became more deeply involved in the support of Son. One of its key roles was to intervene with the authorities on Son’s behalf. At first, it tried to sway the Ministry of Welfare by collecting signatures for Son’s release from Omura Prison. As the Osaka Association of

Citizens summarized in their December 1975 bulletin, Son had already been in prison for

151 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 189. 152 Nakajima, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo Saiban no Kiroku, 202.

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two years and four months by then and had reached the limits of his strength. Moreover, despite having won the A-bomb certificate appeal trials twice, he had not yet received the

A-bomb certificate. Another problem was the further deterioration of his health. Therefore, the Association worked to achieve Son’s release and towards this end continued to enlist public support. By December, it already had 3,000 signatures, mainly collected in Tokyo, which was far more than it had first expected. This proved that there were many people among the Japanese who felt compassion for Son and believed that Korean hibakusha deserved the same rights as Japanese hibakusha. The goal of the Association was to submit the signatures to the Ministry of Justice, while at the same time negotiating with them about Son’s special residence status.153

Besides attempting to influence the authorities, the Association of Citizens played a pivotal role in providing Son with emotional support when he was on the verge of giving up his fight against the Japanese government. Following Fukuoka Prefecture’s appeal to the Supreme Court in July 1975, Son felt his case hopeless and wanted to put an end to his long struggle in Japan. On August 6 he sent a letter to the Tokyo Association of Citizens stressing his wish to stop the trial and to go back to South Korea. Members of the Tokyo

Association immediately contacted the Fukuoka branch, whose members urgently took action before Son could go back to South Korea and visited him in prison the following day. Fukuichi, Yamashita, Itō, and Yukawa hoped to talk to Son, but the prison management only permitted Itō and Yukawa to see him. Yukawa stated that Son’s condition had declined since their last meeting. His cheeks were sunken, he had a haggard face, and

153 Son-san ni Chiryō o! Osaka Shimin no Kai, no. 25 [Medical Treatment to Mr. Son! Osaka Association of Citizens, no. 25] (December 1975), 2, Box 2, HT0205800, HUA.

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the bright Son whom he saw in the Fukuoka Hospital was gone. Additionally, whenever he asked for medical care the hospital doctors refused to comply with his request. Not only was his condition ignored, but the infirmary section manager was frequently telling him to go back to South Korea quickly at his own expense. As a result, Son stated that he could not put up with the appeal trial at the Supreme Court while enduring such inhuman treatment in prison; he would rather return to Korea. He claimed he had many terrible experiences at the hands of other inmates and he was not willing to endure another suit with little chance of victory. The Association members understood that the uncertainty about the final resolution of his legal cases was gradually exhausting Son.154 On September

16 Reverend Irie submitted the request for Son’s temporary release at the Omura Prison, but on October 15 the prison notified them about the rejection of Son’s discharge.

Ironically, Son’s battle for his rights, which the Japanese courts had already acknowledged lawfully twice, continued for almost three long years amidst detention and hospitalization.

When Son was in need, the Association of Citizens also did not hesitate to assist him financially. On January 30, 1966 Irie received a phone call from Omura Prison and the management said it authorized Son’s temporary release the following day. For this, it requested that Irie come the next morning with 300,000 yen for deposit. This meant that he would have only one day to get the necessary amount, yet, given the large amount of money, he asked for a few days to make the required preparations, but the prison claimed

Son would be released on January 31 and it could not postpone it any longer. Irie managed to collect the money and went to the Omura Prison with a lawyer called Fukuchi the next

154 Ibid., 15.

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day, as requested. The reason Son was released so suddenly was that his latest X-ray result showed a shadow on his lung. Since there was a change in the medical results, the prison deemed it essential that Son have further medical examinations in a hospital. When Irie was about to write “Medical treatment and examination for A-bomb-related diseases” as the reason for Son’s temporary release, the prison management ordered him to modify it to

“Treatment for tuberculosis.” This demonstrates that the prison authorities still did not recognize Son as hibakusha, even though he had won two lawsuits. Up until January 30, the prison insisted that Son was healthy and receiving appropriate medical treatment, but the Fukuoka Hospital’s health check-up results after his release revealed that Son had lost a lot of weight and his health condition had gotten worse, but the X-ray test did not show any change. After a thorough medical examination Son was again hospitalized for three months.155 He felt relieved at regaining his freedom, but at the same time he was anxious that he would have to return to the Omura Prison following his discharge. He was panicking every time a deportation ship was about to depart. He spent his days in hospital amidst constant anxiety about when the ministry would send him back to South Korea.156

Son was discharged from hospital on May 24, and thanks to the assistance of the

Fukuoka Association of Citizens, was able to move to a boarding house in Koga-chō, from which he could regularly visit the hospital for health check-ups. However, following his discharge, the director of the Fukuoka Immigration Bureau Inspection Office and the chief guard visited the hospital and talked to Dr. Tanaka on May 25, trying to persuade him to

155 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 156-159. 156 Son-san ni Chiryō o! Osaka Shimin no Kai, no. 26 [Medical Treatment to Mr. Son! Osaka Association of Citizens, no. 26] (April 1976), 7, Box 2, HT0205900, HUA.

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allow Son’s imprisonment and to write this advice in the medical record. Tanaka refused their request saying that he was not willing to write a medical record that was disadvantageous for the patient. Following their unsuccessful attempt to put Son back in prison, the director and the chief guard wished Son a swift recovery.157 Due to the

Association’s assistance to arrange Son’s accommodation and Dr. Tanaka’s firm stance in rejecting the Immigration Bureau’s demand, he maintained his freedom, although its period was uncertain. He had to have his temporary release permission renewed on 27th every month at the Fukuoka Immigration Bureau. According to the interpretation of the law, however, the Immigration Bureau could withdraw this permission anytime and return him to prison.158 That summer, from July 30 until August 8, Son was again hospitalized, but this time in the Hiroshima A-bomb Hospital, where the director, Dr. Ishida, carried out the medical examinations.159

It was the Association that assisted Son when he had to go through complicated bureaucratic procedures during the monthly renewal of his temporary release permission.

Son stayed in Osaka for the memorial service held for the anniversary of his father’s death from October 12 to October 22. In his case, he needed to get the Immigration Bureau’s permission for each trip, and while staying in Osaka, his case was transferred to the Osaka

Immigration Bureau. On October 27 Irie showed up at the Fukuoka Immigration Bureau as usual for the renewal procedure of Son’s temporary release permission. Then, the officers

157 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 164. 158 Son-san ni Chiryō o! Osaka Shimin no Kai, no. 27 [Medical Treatment to Mr. Son! Osaka Association of Citizens, no. 27] (August 1976), 1, Box 2, HT0206000, HUA. 159 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 190. See Figure 3 and 4.

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told him that the report from Osaka had not arrived yet, and until then they could not complete the procedure, asking Irie to come back again on October 30. Meanwhile, the

Fukuoka Immigration Bureau tried to use this incident as an excuse to send Son back to

Omura Prison. To prevent this, about thirty Association members appeared at the bureau, demanding the renewal of Son’s permission which they managed to achieve following a heated negotiation. Thereafter, the renewal date was modified to 30th every month.160 This affair again proves the biased attitude of the Immigration Bureau against Son and the

Koreans. Nevertheless, owing to the persistence of the support side, Son remained out of jail while his deportation case was adjudicated.

1978: a breakthrough year

The Supreme Court made its final resolution in the A-bomb certificate suit on March 30 and the nearly seven-year litigation ended with Son Jin-doo’s victory.161 The decision of the Supreme Court can be regarded as a landmark victory in the history of the Korean (and overseas) A-bomb victims. According to the Supreme Court’s ruling, the state’s former rejection of Son’s application for A-bomb certificate was unlawful. It reaffirmed the

Fukuoka District and High Court’s 1974 and 1975 ruling in favor of Son and rejected

Fukuoka Prefecture’s appeal. The 1974 ruling stated that “provided someone is an atomic bomb victim, the state must issue the A-bomb certificate, regardless of their nationality, their status as a tourist or an undocumented immigrant. Therefore, Fukuoka Prefecture’s refusal [of Son’s application for an A-bomb certificate] is illegal.” The 1975 decision went

160 Ibid., 173-174. 161 See Figure 5.

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on to say that “the A-bomb attack occurred following the state’s [Japan’s] involvement in the war, and the common people are not to blame for this. […] On one hand, it is true that the nature of the A-bomb laws is similar to the nature of the social security laws, but on the other hand, this is a special legislation aimed at providing national compensation for the A- bomb victims.”162 The 1978 Supreme Court decision upheld the former rulings and acknowledged their legitimacy, adding that:

the atomic bomb has caused unprecedented health damage to people. The dropping of the bomb goes back to the time of the war and was brought about by the state [Japan]’s behavior [involvement in war]. However, one cannot overlook the fact that most A-bomb victims live in much more unstable conditions than the average war victims. Due to such peculiar war damage, which is the responsibility of the country that participated in the war, the Atomic Bomb Relief Law is supposed to provide support for the victims. The system of the laws is based on effectively taking into consideration the state reparations and no one can contravene this.

The opinion of the ruling went on to state that “the law focuses on the special health conditions of hibakusha and it is a humanitarian legislation designed to help those people.”

Furthermore, “the court acknowledges that both laws apply even to foreign [non-Japanese] citizens, provided they are hibakusha, and they are entitled to the state compensation, indicated by both laws.” The court admitted that “by ignoring these points in the case of someone who is an undocumented immigrant, it means that we disregard the humanitarian nature of the laws.” Concerning Son, the court admitted that he “possessed Japanese citizenship at the time of the bombing, however, he was forcefully deprived of it when the

162 Hiraoka, Muen no Kaikyō, 149-150.

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peace treaty went into effect. From the point of view of the state’s moral responsibility, we must agree with this [his recognition as hibakusha].”163 Nevertheless, the judge emphasized that in Son’s case, his lawsuit for an A-bomb certificate was a different legal case from his deportation suit. Although the court recognized him as hibakusha, it stressed that he could not evade responsibility for entering Japan without a visa, thus other laws also apply to him, which are independent of the A-bomb laws. “Even when the court allows the application of both A-bomb laws to undocumented immigrants, we cannot do anything to prevent the Immigration Bureau from following the procedure of their deportation laid down in the Immigration Laws.”164

April 3 was a day of historical importance for Son, since the authorities finally issued his long-awaited A-bomb certificate.165 This meant that the state, as confirmed by the Supreme Court, officially recognized Son as an A-bomb survivor and took responsibility for overseas atomic bomb victims. With this, Son’s time-consuming and strenuous legal battle against the Japanese government came to an end. Although he was on the verge of abandoning his goal and returning to South Korea many times, with the support of a broad range of people from Japanese civil society, he managed to accomplish this final victory and force the authorities to officially identify him as an A-bomb victim.

Repercussions of the 1978 Supreme Court ruling

All the major Japanese national and local newspapers welcomed the Supreme Court

163 Ibid.,150-151. 164 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 181. 165 Nakajima, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo Saiban no Kiroku, 201. See Figure 6.

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decision in favor of Son and reported positively about the case. The March 30 evening issue of the Chūgoku Shimbun announced the news with the title “Providing relief by transcending citizenship.” It began its reporting by quoting Son after the news of his victory came out: “I was only waiting and waiting, and this moment has finally come.

Thanks to the cooperation of the support group, we could achieve this. Although I won the first and second round [at the district and high court], I was very uncertain about the outcome of the Supreme Court ruling, so now I really feel happy about it.” Son’s main supporters were also very content with the verdict and emphasized that this was a groundbreaking decision that changed the situation of all overseas hibakusha. However, they remained concerned about the deportation trial. As Irie said, “I think the decision is of great importance not only for Son, but also for all non-Japanese hibakusha. I want to start the negotiations with the prefecture immediately. The lawsuit to revoke Son’s deportation order is still in progress and I want to protect him even from now on.”166 The April 20 article of the Chūgoku Shimbun demanded the granting of residence status to Son and the author heavily criticized Japan for extending the lawsuit for seven years. As for the reasons, they mention “Japan’s racist and discriminatory attitude and chauvinism against the Koreans.” The article further criticizes the major peace groups in Hiroshima and

Nagasaki for not standing up for Son and not supporting his trials and highlights that it was only a few civic movements that lent him a hand until the end.167

The March 31 issue of the Asahi Shimbun, when referring to the Supreme Court’s

166 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Kokuseki Koete Kyūzai o: Fukuoka Ken no Jōkoku o Kikyaku,” [Relief that Crosses Borders: Let Fukuoka Prefecture’s Appeal Be Dismissed] March 30, 1978, Box 4, HT0401202, HUA. 167 Keisaburō Toyonaga, “Son Jin-doo-san no Zairyū o Motomeyo,” [Let Us Demand Son Jin-doo’s Residence Status] Chūgoku Shimbun, April 20, 1978, HT0401202, HUA.

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having acknowledged the state compensation character of the A-bomb laws, used the phrase “epoch-making.” Fukuoka Prefecture argued that these were social security laws, but did not touch upon the essence of the law about state redress. The article further mentioned that there were approximately 6,000 registered members of the Korea

Association, but the same Association estimated that there might have been nearly 15,000 hibakusha living scattered all over South Korea who had failed to register until that point.168 Another article quoted Dr. Kawamura, who was one of the members of the

Hiroshima Association of Citizens and who had treated Son for a short time in 1975 in his hospital in Otemachi. Dr. Kawamura said, “I am very happy to hear the news of Son’s victory. Japan brought these people into the country as Japanese citizens, and after the war the government deprived them of their Japanese citizenship, excluding them from the medical benefits [of the A-bomb laws] saying they are foreigners. This sounds strange even to those common people like me who are not familiar with the legal system. Although there were times when I faced difficulties as a guarantor [of Son], now I feel it was worth the effort.”169 In his comment, Dr. Kawamura emphasized the Koreans’ unjust deprivation of their Japanese citizenship after the war and their consequent omission from the benefits of the Japanese relief laws aimed to help the war victims.

The April 1 issue of the Mainichi Shimbun also described the case in detail and characterized the decision as “groundbreaking” and “humane.” It urged Japan to turn its attention towards overseas hibakusha and dedicate the nation to their support. However, it

168 Asahi Shimbun, “Genbaku Hibakusha Taisaku o Tenkan Seyo,” [Let Us Change the A-bomb Victims Measures] March 31, 1978, HT0401202, HUA. 169 Asahi Shimbun, “Yatto Mukuwareta: Engohō mo Hayaku Jitsugen o,” [Finally Rewarded: Let Us Realize the Relief Law, too, Quickly] March 31, 1978, HT0401202, HUA.

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pointed out that Son’s victory not only raised consciousness among Korean hibakusha, but also among Japanese hibakusha, and it would not be surprising if they began demanding more compensation and support measures afterward.170

The Korean Association’s reception of the news was very positive, but at the same time it facilitated further demands from the Japanese government. Although the verdict

“was made from a humanitarian perspective,” the Korea Association emphasized the need for a special law for foreign hibakusha and urged the Japanese government to prepare for establishing an exchange program through which Korean hibakusha could go to Japan to receive medical treatment. It sent its statement to the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, to the

Korean Ministry of Health Care, and to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It expressed its gratitude to Son’s support groups in Japan, and regarding the final resolution, it stated that

“Japan’s conscience and common sense revealed itself.” Nevertheless, its main complaint was that even when it finally managed to achieve Japan’s issuing A-bomb certificates to

Korean hibakusha, once they leave Japan the certificate becomes invalid, hence the A- bomb survivors cannot receive free medical treatment in Korean hospitals. Additionally, it was still extremely difficult for Korean survivors to enter Japan legally. To avoid the repetition of Son’s deportation lawsuit, the Korea Association urged the introduction of some measures that would enable hibakusha to go to Japan for medical treatment.171

The above-mentioned examples demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision met with a warm response both in Japan and in South Korea. Korean hibakusha had very

170 Mainichi Shimbun, “Hibakusha Kyūzai no Gyōsei Shisei o Tadase,” [Let Us Rectify the Hibakusha Relief Administration’s Posture] April 1, 1978, HT0401202, HUA. 171 Asahi Shimbun, “Gaikokujin Hibakusha Tokubetsuhō Kankoku Engo Kyōkai ga Yōbō,” [Korea Relief Association Requesting the Special Law for Foreign Hibakusha] April 3, 1978, HT0401202, HUA.

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high expectations that Japan would finally compensate them and both nations would recognize them as hibakusha, implementing broad support both emotionally and financially. Interestingly, the newspapers did not report on Fukuoka Prefecture’s stance after losing the case for the third time. The Supreme Court officially refuted their claim that the A-bomb laws belong to the category of social security laws, therefore only those with permanent residence in Japan were entitled to enjoy the benefits. Rather, the court confirmed the state redress nature of the law aiming to provide relief for the war victims, regardless of their nationality and legal status. As many articles pointed out, this was unquestionably a just and humanitarian decision, compensating Son and other overseas hibakusha for their long years of suffering and restoring their dignity. It is true that Son had to go through many vicissitudes until the final victory and he was about to abandon his goal many times, but thanks to the continuous support of a large group of dedicated

Japanese citizens, justice prevailed in the end.

Events from the Ministry of Welfare and Fukuoka Prefecture’s perspective

As can be seen, Son had to grapple with two legal cases at the same time. One of them was his appeal against the decision that refused the issuance of his A-bomb certificate in 1972, and the other was the revocation of his deportation order that the Fukuoka Immigration

Bureau issued against him in 1973. During the A-bomb certificate suit, Son’s opponent was

Fukuoka Prefecture’s governor, and during the deportation suit, the defendant was the

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Fukuoka Immigration Bureau.172 Although these were two separate lawsuits, in both cases, it was the Japanese Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Justice that supervised them and dictated the rules.173 These legal cases brought to light Japan’s deeply buried wartime responsibility against other Asian nations, the annexation of the Korean Peninsula in 1910, and its failure to compensate the victims by raising the question of why there were so many

Korean A-bomb survivors. During the trials, many people testified about the actual conditions of Korean hibakusha living in extreme poverty, being abandoned by both Japan and South Korea. Thus, many Japanese citizens realized that the current situation of

Korean hibakusha was the direct consequence of Japan’s failure to extend the application of the A-bomb laws to these people and grant them the same rights as to Japanese A-bomb sufferers.

The attitude of the Japanese authorities during the lawsuits reveals a lot about Japan’s discriminative nature against Koreans and its reluctance to acknowledge that it was Japan who had victimized those people. For instance, the fact that special prosecutor Miyahara in

January 1971 ordered Son to go back to South Korea and failed to notify him about the nature of the document that he had signed was indeed his deportation order reveals that some authorities aimed to fraudulently send back Son to South Korea before he could file a lawsuit in Japan, as they had done with his sister in 1968.174 Also, in 1974, prior to the

Fukuoka District Court decision in the A-bomb certificate suit, the prefecture turned to

172 During the A-bomb certificate suit, at first Son was the plaintiff. However, after his victory in 1974 and following the appeal of Fukuoka Prefecture, he became the defendant. During the deportation trial, he filed a suit for the revocation of the order, which means that he was the plaintiff and the Immigration Bureau was the defendant. 173 Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 177. 174 See ibid., 54.

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illegitimate methods by falsifying Son’s family register and attempting to characterize everything Son had said about being hibakusha and living in Japan until 1951 as a lie.175

Eventually this was the very act that led to Son’s victory in 1974.

However, the prefecture did not reconcile itself to its defeat in the initial round. First, it passed the Directive no. 402 in an attempt to evade the Japanese government’s obligation to extend the hibakusha relief program to those living outside the borders. With this, Son’s

1974 legal victory lost its significance since the directive prevented foreign hibakusha possessing the certificate from receiving free medical treatment and healthcare allowance in their countries. Second, in hopes of being able to weaken Son and forcing him to submit, the prefecture filed their appeal to the Fukuoka High Court, and when it lost the second round in July 1975, it further appealed to the Supreme Court.

By throwing so many barriers before Son, putting him under pressure during the trials and repeatedly sending him to prison, the authorities were convinced his burden would be too much to endure and ultimately he would collapse mentally and physically and return to Korea. In that case, Japan would not have had to acknowledge Son’s rights and grant him the hibakusha status. Indubitably, this would have been the case without the assistance of the Association of Citizens. After the Fukuoka High Court declared Fukuoka

Prefecture’s refusal to issue Son’s A-bomb certificate unlawful for the second time, the state erected new conditions for non-Japanese hibakusha who came to Japan and applied for the A-bomb certificate. First, they needed to enter Japan legally. Then, they needed to

175 See ibid., 126-128.

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stay in Japan for at least one month to be able to submit their application.176 With this, the state authorized the issuance of the certificate under certain conditions, but by excluding those foreign hibakusha from the application of the A-bomb laws who entered Japan with no visas, it consciously endeavored to keep refusing Son’s right to an A-bomb certificate, purposely dragging on his lawsuit.

Additionally, as the supporters revealed during the sixth A-bomb certificate appeal trial on May 13, 1975, issuing an A-bomb certificate had nothing to do with nationality and residence. They cited the evidence of the Canadian coming to Japan with a tourist visa and receiving her A-bomb certificate only two months after Son’s application.177 In light of this, Japan’s recognition of non-Japanese hibakusha appeared to be a question of race and nationality and not a question of residence status, as Fukuoka Prefecture had argued.

Moreover, the state endeavored to keep Son in prison until the end of the lawsuits, making his case even more difficult to pursue. This was inarguably one of their strategies to keep him in terror and traumatize him with the aim of completely exhausting him emotionally.

For instance, the day after Son was discharged from hospital on May 24, 1976, the director of the Fukuoka Immigration Bureau Inspection Office and the chief guard personally attempted to manipulate Dr. Tanaka and make him write in Son’s medical certificate that he permits Son’s return to prison.178 Nevertheless, thanks to Dr. Tanaka’s integrity, conscience, and rectitude, he was able to handle the situation and flatly refused the

176 Asahi Shimbun, “Genbaku Hibakusha Taisaku o Tenkan Seyo,” [Let Us Change the A-bomb Victims Measures] March 31, 1978, HT0401202, HUA. 177 See Son-san ni Chiryō o! Osaka Shimin no Kai, no. 22 [Medical Treatment to Mr. Son! Osaka Association of Citizens, no. 22] (June 1975), 2, Box 2, HT0205700, HUA. 178 See Zenkoku Shimin no Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha Son Jin-doo no Kokuhatsu, 164.

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Immigration Bureau’s request.

Despite all the efforts of the prefecture to break Son and deny their responsibility in the Korean hibakusha problem, the 1978 Supreme Court decision went against their claim, emphasizing that even undocumented immigrants, provided they are hibakusha, are entitled to apply for an A-bomb certificate, and enjoy the benefits guaranteed by the A- bomb laws.

Consequences of the 1978 Supreme Court decision

As the above-mentioned events demonstrate, Son can be regarded as a forerunner among hibakusha living abroad. He paved the way for thousands of others to receive free medical treatment (once they were within the borders of Japan), as guaranteed by the A-bomb laws, although in practice they continued to face many barriers for decades. Despite the Supreme

Court ruling, the government’s aim was to minimize the ripple effects and prevent Japan’s wartime victims from starting to demand reparations collectively. Hence, it set up the

Committee for Fundamental Problems of Measures for the Atomic Bomb Victims

(Kihonkon) in 1979 that submitted a report to the government in 1980. This report addressed the notion of “endurance,” according to which in a state of war it is inevitable that residents of a country suffer great losses and are victimized; this is defined as “general sacrifice.” However, in such cases, all citizens have to endure these sacrifices equally, and with this, the government rid itself of all the accountability for the wartime affliction of its people.179 When it came to wartime damages, Koreans, having been Japanese citizens at the

179 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 67, 69.

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time of war, were urged to endure the suffering since it was the result of the war.

Nevertheless, when it came to the support measures for A-bomb survivors, the government turned down the Koreans’ request for A-bomb certificates arguing that they did not reside in Japan. The government, with the notion of “endurance,” attempted to keep suppressing wartime victims who had suffered under Japanese aggression. However, by that time, Son

Jin-doo’s case had already enlightened many Japanese citizens not only about the existence of Korean hibakusha but also about other war crimes committed by Imperial Japan.

Despite standing on the notion of “endurance,” the Japanese government took some steps to support Korean hibakusha (always emphasizing that it was not state reparations, only humanitarian aid). The Japanese and South Korean governments signed an agreement on October 8, 1980 to provide Korean hibakusha with medical treatment in Japan, but their new plan did not provide a sufficient and comprehensive solution for the Korean A-bomb survivors’ problems. The intergovernmental medical support program was scheduled to expire in 1986, and for six years South Korea sent a limited number of hibakusha to Japan for medical examinations and hospitalization. According to the agreement, one person could stay in Japan for only two months, but depending on the condition of the patient,

Japan agreed to extend the period to six months when necessary. The Japanese government covered the costs of hospitalization and health care while the South Korean government provided travel expenses of Korean hibakusha. With this, the first ten Korean A-bomb victims entered Japan to receive medical treatment on November 17, 1980.180 Japan and

Korea established this exchange program 35 years after the 1945 atomic bomb attacks on

180 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 68-69.

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Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 23 years after the enactment of the A-bomb Survivors

Medical Care Law. Previously, Korean hibakusha had lived in extreme poverty, being unable to work because of various radiation-related diseases. Not being able to break out from the lowest stratum of society, they remained invisible from the mainstream for many decades. After 35 years, however, there was hope that their situation might change, and it was Son’s legal case that raised public awareness on a larger scale.

Yet the bilateral medical exchange program had too many restrictions. It could not be considered a full-scale relief program for Korean hibakusha. At that time, the Korea

Atomic Bomb Victims Association estimated that there were nearly 15,000 hibakusha in

South Korea, and this association also had, by then, nearly 9,000 registered members.

However, only 60 hibakusha were permitted to enter Japan for medical treatment annually through this program and their stay in Japan was often too short to fully recuperate.

Additionally, many elderly and seriously ill hibakusha in Korea were excluded, although they were the most in need of medical treatment. When the Korea Atomic Bomb Victims

Association demanded that Japan increase the number of patients able to enter Japan for medical treatment, Japan temporarily raised the annual number from 60 to 100, which still did not solve the overall problem of Korean hibakusha. Moreover, once the two-month treatment period ended, some patients suffered relapses of various diseases and needed further medical care. However, once they returned to Korea, Japan did not support their reentry and follow-up care.181 Japan and South Korea terminated the program on November

20, 1986. The South Korean government objected to its extension claiming that its national

181 Ibid., 74-75.

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hospitals were well-equipped to treat atomic bomb sufferers and there were no more seriously sick patients who required treatment in Japan.182 As Michael Weiner has pointed out, “for some Korean officials there was an element of humiliation inherent in accepting aid of this type from a former colonial power, particularly when it also highlighted the inadequacy of health provision in Korea.”183 Up through September 1986, 349 Korean hibakusha received medical treatment in the A-bomb hospitals in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

As there were more than 9,000 registered members of the Korea Association, we can conclude that the medical exchange program was ineffective in providing relief to Korean hibakusha in general.184 As Junko Ichiba put it, this was “a mere drop in the bucket.”185

Nevertheless, the medical support of Korean hibakusha did not end with the termination of the intergovernmental program. In Hiroshima, Dr. Kawamura set up the Hiroshima

Committee to Invite Korean A-bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment in 1984, which brought hundreds of hibakusha from South Korea to Japan (mainly to Hiroshima) for medical treatment until May 2016.186

182 Nagasaki Zainichi Chōsenjin no Jinken o Mamoru Kai, [Nagasaki Association to Protect the Human Rights of Koreans in Japan] Chōsenjin Hibakusha: Nagasaki kara no Shōgen, [Korean Hibakusha: Testimnies from Nagasaki] (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 1989), 254. Hereafter cited as Jinken o Mamoru Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha. 183 Weiner, “The representation of absence and the absence of representation,” 99. 184 Hirano, Umi no Mukō no Hibakushatachi, 19. 185 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 75. 186 For more information, see Chapter 5.

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Son Jin-doo’s seven-year legal journey with the Japanese government carries great historical significance. He was not the first Korean hibakusha who entered Japan without a valid visa with the aim of seeking medical treatment in a Japanese A-bomb hospital, but he was the very first Korean A-bomb survivor who initiated a lawsuit in Japan demanding his recognition as hibakusha and the vindication of his rights. His case was unique in that he was the first overseas hibakusha who managed to generate a nationwide Japanese support movement whose members were backing him even after his final victory at the Supreme

Court. The major newspapers frequently reported the progress of his lawsuits throughout the 1970s, drawing the attention of many Japanese, which resulted in raising public awareness of the plight of non-Japanese hibakusha.

In the 1970s, the support movement gradually expanded and the number of Japanese people who began to consider the Korean hibakusha problem to be an important issue and demand they receive the same treatment and rights as Japanese hibakusha gradually increased. After becoming conscious of the Korean hibakusha issue, many Japanese began to engage themselves in conducting surveys on their actual conditions and helping many coming to Japan to get A-bomb certificates. Son Jin-doo also opened the door for hibakusha living in North and South America. Since the news of his victory at the Supreme Court crossed borders, hibakusha living in the United States and Brazil started to demand the same rights in the 1980s and achieved the implementation of a medical exchange program between their country and Japan.187

187 In 1991, HICARE (Hiroshima International Council for Health Care of the Radiation-Exposed) was established in Hiroshima with the aim of assisting “victims of radiation exposure throughout the world by utilizing the expertise accumulated from the health care of A-bomb survivors and from various research

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Although overseas hibakusha were deprived of support comparable to their Japanese counterparts until September 2015, Son was the person who took the first step towards their recognition and who made it possible for many others to claim their rights in later court cases before achieving their final success. Nevertheless, the historical significance of his case goes beyond the acknowledgement of the rights of overseas hibakusha. Those

Japanese familiar with Son’s story began to question the history of their nation and began to think about Japan’s past critically, putting an end to the exclusion of the victimized

Asians from Japan’s official historical narrative. What Japan had been striving to conceal in the postwar period was, for many, revealed, and Son’s success inevitably facilitated the emergence of support groups of other Asian wartime victims that have demanded state redress from the Japanese government.

Without the support of a segment of Japanese society, this could not have been a success story. When Son was incarcerated in 1971, it was the members of the Association of Citizens, including Takashi Hiraoka and Rui Itō, who insisted on legally settling the problem, encouraging Son to initiate a lawsuit and fight for his rights. Following the appeal of Fukuoka Prefecture to the Supreme Court, Son had little hope of winning the final trial and was very close to succumbing to the pressure of the Japanese government and returning to South Korea. In that case, there might have been no decision at the Supreme activities on the health effects of radiation.” For more information, see Keisuke Yoshihara, “HICARE, providing support for victims of radiation exposure for 17 years,” March 20, 2008. http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=13514&query=HICARE+Korea (accessed: April 26, 2016). Since its establishment, HICARE has been inviting trainees from South Korea and other countries. It also dispatches medical professionals from Hiroshima to provide techincal guidance and medical training to the local doctors as well as to treat the A-bomb patients there. For more information, see “HICARE Mission to Korea,” http://www.hicare.jp/en/haken/92284d8c5612745651345ba58085f50b (accessed: April 26, 2016). HICARE is an example how the medical support of the Korean and other non-Japanese A-bomb victims continued and expanded in the 1990s.

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Court in favor of hibakusha living outside Japan for long years. Son succeeded in his drawn-out battle against the Japanese government thanks to the support of those Japanese citizens who were intent on reforming their own society and making it more accountable by establishing the equal treatment of Japanese and overseas atomic bomb victims.

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SECTION TWO: INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT

OF KOREAN ATOMIC BOMB SURVIVORS

Aside from Son Jin-doo’s lawsuit, there were other Korean hibakusha-related issues for which substantial Japanese support was of vital importance so that change could be achieved in their condition. As stated earlier, the Korea Association estimated that there were at least 15,000 South Korean hibakusha in the 1970s, most of whom never received proper medical treatment after the bombing. Therefore, these people would have needed special medical assistance in Japan the most. Additionally, raising awareness of the plight of Korean victims both in Japan and South Korea was another urgent issue. Until then, neither government had conduced any surveys so even the exact number of Korean hibakusha was unknown. In Hiroshima, due to the reports of the regional papers on the Son

Jin-doo lawsuit, awareness of Korean hibakusha began to emerge, but in Nagasaki people lacked consciousness on Korean victims in general. Thus, in the second A-bombed city there was a need for investigating into the conditions of Koreans and publishing materials through which the news of their dire situation could reach the public. Furthermore, many

Koreans became A-bomb victims as a result of being coercively brought into Japan during the war to work at Mitsubishi. The story of Korean A-bombed forced laborers was yet to be unveiled although they would have been entitled for multiple wartime reparations for being both A-bomb survivors and victims of forced conscription.

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Besides the citizens involved in Son Jin-doo’s backing, there were some Japanese individuals who largely contributed to the support of Korean A-bomb survivors in the above-mentioned unsettled issues. Although they were engaged in different fields of support, each of them distinguished themselves by their commitment to facilitate the equal treatment of Korean and Japanese hibakusha and to confront the Japanese government with its past atrocities against Koreans. Each of them set up associations for assisting Korean A- bomb survivors and recruited followers from Japanese society. However, they put more energy into the support privately than as members of organizations, so I highlight their activities and discuss separately from the organizational support.

These people were profoundly conscious of the suffering of Koreans under the hands of Japanese in the colonial era at an early age and felt compassion for them. Masaharu Oka and Toratarō Kawamura were driven by Christian ideals to help the oppressed and to atone for the sins their country had committed against other Asian peoples. Munetoshi Fukagawa was driven by his own conscience and the fact that he had had first-hand experience of the maltreatment of the former Korean forced laborers as one of their supervisors at Mitsubishi.

As an expression of their respect for the deceased, both Oka and Fukagawa were convinced that the remains of Korean hibakusha resting on Japanese soil must be returned to Korea.

Moreover, all of them raised awareness of the abandonment of Korean hibakusha and the urgent need to assist them in Japanese and Korean political circles. Given their hard work, they earned the respect of some Koreans and worked towards changing the Koreans’ negative presumptions about Japan in an era when the relations between the two nations was still tense and Koreans’ grudge against Japan for the historical grievances was at a high

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level. These three individuals acted separately from each other but their efforts altogether were essential to bringing about the Japanese government’s gradual, if begrudging, acknowledgment of the rights of overseas hibakusha and begin, after 2000, to compensate them. They paved the way for later support movements that eventually brought the

Japanese government to some measure of justice.

In the dissertation, I deal mainly with the assistance of the Japanese from Hiroshima, nevertheless, it is important to shed light on the amount of support from Nagasaki, thus in this section I partly focus on the activities of Masaharu Oka, who unveiled through his fact- finding surveys the wartime situation of the Koreans living in Nagasaki and their being A- bomb victims. Additionally, I consider Dr. Toratarō Kawamura, who was a forerunner in providing Korean hibakusha with medical assistance in Japan. He and the association he set up invited more Korean hibakusha to Japan for medical treatment than the South Korean and Japanese governments did in total through the 1980 bilateral medical program. In this sense, his citizen-based medical support program was more effective than the relief measures the two governments undertook in the first half of the 1980s. Finally, I elaborate on the activities of Munetoshi Fukagawa, who revealed Mitsubishi’s abuse of its Korean workers, Mitsubishi’s omission to provide the forced laborers with their full salaries,

Mitsubishi’s failure to take these Koreans safely back to Korea after Japan’s unconditional surrender, and these Koreans’ becoming atomic bomb victims due to the Japanese government’s conscription order which placed them in Hiroshima. After the war, many

Korean workers could never return to their homeland and many died at sea due to shipwrecks on their way home. Through his investigations, Fukagawa pointed out

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Mitsubishi and Japan’s need to settle the forced laborers’ problem and compensate the former Korean Mitsubishi workers still alive. Had these three individuals not stood up for

Korean A-bomb victims at an early stage, the Japanese government might never have implemented any change in their status.

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CHAPTER 4: REVEREND MASAHARU OKA’S RESEARCH ON

KOREAN HIBAKUSHA IN NAGASAKI

Masaharu Oka’s name1 might not be familiar to most Japanese, but he was one of the most respected people among the Korean community residing in Nagasaki, members of the movements that have assisted Korean A-bomb survivors, and the Protestant community of

Nagasaki. He was among those Japanese who had become conscious of the pitfalls and immorality of Japan’s imperial system at a very young age and refused to regard the emperor as a god-like figure. He had always been a social outsider since “he never made any compromise with state power; on the contrary, he always felt a deep affection towards the weak and the oppressed.”2 He witnessed the brutal treatment of Koreans and the discriminatory attitude of Japanese towards them during World War II, during the atomic bombing, and in the postwar period. He had profoundly been aware of Japan’s infringement upon the human rights of Koreans and never hesitated to give voice to his disillusionment since the end of the war. Oka continually emphasized Japan’s wartime responsibilities, the need for apologizing to victims of Japan’s war of aggression, and compensating them. As a fervent Christian, he had been feeling remorse throughout his life for being a Japanese who victimized other nations. Atoning for one’s sins is an essential topic in Christianity, and

Oka, as a Protestant minister, placed Japan’s war crimes into this context, stressing the need for penance and forgiveness.

1 See Figure 8 and 9. 2 Oka Masaharu Tsuitōshū Kankō Iinkai, Korui o Mamoru Tatakai: Tsuitō Oka Masaharu, [Struggle to Defend an Isolated Position: In Memoriam Oka Masaharu] (Nagasaki: Kōbunsha, 1995), 168. Hereafter cited as Korui o Mamoru Tatakai.

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Masaharu Oka was aware of his own limitations. He never went to South Korea to meet hibakusha there and carry out a survey on their actual condition; he was not directly involved in the legal cases of Korean hibakusha; despite his constant appeal, he was unable to persuade the Japanese government to compensate its wartime victims. As Nobuto Hirano, current leader of the Nagasaki branch of The Association of Citizens for the Support of

Korean Atomic Bomb Victims, said, Reverend Oka was dedicated to seeking justice and compensating Japan’s wartime victims in general. The Korean hibakusha problem was one among Japan’s many unresolved wartime issues therefore it was not possible for Oka to actively engage himself in all the legal and medical assistance.3 However, with an extended support network, members of these groups could cope with numerous other issues, thus

Oka counted on the cooperation of the younger generation (e.g. Hirano) to join the Korean hibakusha support movements.4 Reverend Oka’s early recognition of the essence of the

Korean hibakusha problem, his emphasis on Japan’s wartime accountability and its need to console the victims and apologize to them, his constant education of the younger generation about Japan’s violation of the rights of the Koreans, his establishing a movement that was bent on protecting the rights of zainichi Koreans, his accomplishing the erection of the monument inside the Nagasaki Peace Park commemorating Korean A-bomb victims, and most importantly, his conducting the very first comprehensive investigation about Korean hibakusha in Nagasaki all prove that he possesses a significant place in the list of those

Japanese who contributed to the support and protection of Korean A-bomb victims and who

3 Nobuto Hirano. Interview with the author. Personal interview. Nagasaki, February 5, 2016. Hereafter cited as Nobuto. Interview with the author. 4 Takazane. Interview with the author.

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played a key role in making the Japanese government eventually acknowledge the rights of

Korean hibakusha.

Prewar, wartime, and postwar years

Masaharu Oka was born in Osaka in 1918 and passed away in Nagasaki in 1994. Under his father’s influence, who was a peace-loving citizen filled with democratic ideas, Oka realized at an early age the untrustworthiness of the imperial system and the military state.

He read books of world history, economics, geography, literature, and theater, which distinguished him from his classmates.5 His elder brother belonged to the YMCA and read the English version of the Bible, thus Oka came into contact with Christianity relatively early.6 While in elementary school, following the recommendation of his music teacher, he attended the Sunday School of the Methodist Church, and these early influences played a significant role in his later decision to become a Protestant minister.7 After his father’s company burned down in 1933, he quit school to reduce the financial burdens on his family and enrolled in a naval school a year later. This decision left his father deeply disappointed since he held firm anti-war ideals and was against his son’s joining the navy.8

5 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 432. 6 Akira Nishimura, “Between the Two Sorts of Dead: Mourning and Consolation of Souls in the Case of OKA Masaharu,” Journal of Death and Life Studies 6 (2005): 40. Hereafter cited as Nishimura, “Between the Two Sorts of Dead.” 7 Nagasaki Shimbun, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha Chōsa ni Hitosuji,” [Devoted to the Survey about Korean Hibakusha] July 9, 2014, Oka Masaharu Memorial Nagasaki Peace Museum. Hereafter cited as Nagasaki Shimbun, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha Chōsa ni Hitosuji.” 8 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 434.

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With Japan’s escalating Second Sino-Japanese War, Oka was dispatched to Shanghai in 1937, and with this change he actively participated in Japan’s war against China.9 He later recalled having become one of those Japanese who had committed crimes against many Asian nations, “Despite not being a fervent patriot, as a result of my application, I became one of the members of the Imperial Japanese Navy, which was part of the army invading Asia. With this, I threw myself into [Japan’s war of aggression], getting consciously to the side of victimizers.”10 In the coming years, he was sent to many places from Rabaul in Papua New Guinea to the Marshall Islands, where he witnessed the brutality of the Japanese army, the suffering of the local population, and the maltreatment of Koreans, especially the Korean “comfort women” abused by the Imperial Army.11

However, his first encounter with Koreans and his recognition of the racist attitude of

Japanese society against them happened earlier. During a lecture that he held in Seoul in

1992, he admitted that while being an elementary and junior high school student, there had been many Koreans in his class. Out of 40 students, there were approximately ten students of Korean descent. Following Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, it became apparent for him that Japan had oppressed, discriminated against, abused, and overworked these people. According to Oka, Koreans were treated as slaves, and after Japan’s waging a war against China and entering World War II, their living standard was even worse than that of the slaves.12

9 Ibid., 433. 10 Quoted in Nishimura, “Between the Two Sorts of Dead,” 41. 11 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 27. 12 Ibid., 26-27.

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Another event also turned him against the imperial system: the sudden death of his older brother in 1941, at the age of 25.13 His brother had enlisted in the Imperial Japanese

Army, but he was subjected to constant abuse by one of his seniors and had to spend terrible days there. Finally, during one assault he suffered fatal internal injuries. After receiving the news of his brother’s death, Oka was overwhelmed with irrepressible resentment against the Japanese military regime: “I feel uncontrollable anger against the imperialist state power that killed my brother by using physical force. I demand that the emperor and all the instigators of the war take responsibility for my brother’s death. This is an irrevocable crime, and they have to atone for all their crimes they have committed.”14

This personal loss left a permanent scar on him and further strengthened his belief in the dysfunction of the imperial system and in the viciousness of war. His feeling of sympathy for Japan’s wartime victims began to emerge and facilitated his active role in the support of

Korean hibakusha from the 1960s.

Oka was employed as a teacher at the naval academy on Etajima Island, near

Hiroshima, from August 1943 to August 1945. There, he witnessed the misery of Korean laborers: they had to work eighteen hours daily and were compelled to dig air-raid shelters and underground arms factories.15 On August 6, 1945 he saw the mushroom cloud rising over Hiroshima, and soon afterward, black rain16 fell on Etajima Island, so in this sense,

Oka was also an A-bomb victim being exposed to radiation (although he never applied for

13 Masaharu Oka, Michi Hitosuji ni, [Devoted to One’s Path] (Nagasaki: Michi Hitosuji ni Hakkō Iinkai, 1975), 52. 14 Quoted in Nishimura, “Between the Two Sorts of Dead,” 40. 15 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 28. 16 Black rain refers to the nuclear fallout that emerged over Hiroshima following the atomic bombing. The fallout was full of radioactive particles therefore causing a lot of health damage when penetrating into the human body through the skin.

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an A-bomb certificate).17 As one of the teachers of the naval school, Oka had to send five of his students to Hiroshima as members of the rescue team. At the time of their dispatch,

Oka was not aware that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was an atomic bomb and explosion was accompanied by radiation. However, after realizing the health consequences of the bomb, he felt remorse for sending his students to the contaminated city, blaming himself for literally making them hibakusha (according to the 1957 A-bomb Survivors

Medical Care Law, they belonged to the third category of hibakusha), so in 1960 he apologized to them.18

From his subordinates returning from Hiroshima, he heard about the obliteration of the city, which reaffirmed his belief that the war must end as soon as possible.19 He gave voice to his anti-war feelings in the form of a speech at the naval school when he argued that the emperor must capitulate and this futile war must come to an end. Consequently, he was treated as a traitor and was banished from the island to Yakeyama (next to Kure City), where he was staying when the emperor announced Japan’s surrender. In spite of becoming conscious of Japan’s need to conclude World War II before the emperor’s surrender announcement, in his later speeches and writings he expressed regret for stressing his anti- war conviction only for six days despite serving in the navy for eleven years. Oka admitted that in the next few months, when the Koreans were about to return to their homeland following the end of Japanese occupation, he provided them with rice and canned food for

17 Masaharu Oka, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha to Watashi,” [Korean Hibakusha and I] Lecture, Hōsei University, Tokyo, May 28, 1982. Chōsenjin Hibakusha no Kiroku Eiga o Tsukuru Kai, [Association to Make a Documentary about Korean Hibakusha] 22. Hereafter cited as Oka, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha to Watashi.” 18 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 45. 19 Nagasaki Shimbun, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha Chōsa ni Hitosuji.”

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their journey, but his senior officer ordered him to stop. Despite the warning from someone of a higher position, Oka secretly continued the distribution of food among Koreans.

His desire to help Korean victims was further strengthened through witnessing the annihilated city of Hiroshima in November 1945. He claimed that the most appalling and painful scene for him was not the view of the city itself, but seeing the discrimination of

Koreans who remained in Hiroshima. That event exerted a great influence on him and was deeply etched in his mind, facilitating his devotion to assist Korean hibakusha and other wartime victims of Japan.20 Oka’s participation in World War II was apparently a life- changing experience for him in which he witnessed the immorality and discriminatory nature of the Japanese imperial system. Instead of lamenting over Japan’s defeat and adopting the stance of being victims of the war, as many Japanese had, Oka focused on

Japan’s atrocities, and how he himself was one of those perpetrators. Feeling an urgent need for penance eventually led to his support of disempowered minority groups in the coming decades. Despite being a forerunner in articulating Japan’s role as a perpetrator during the imperial period, he was resolute in his belief that this recognition came too late.

In April 1952, after the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force, the status of

Koreans residing in Japan drastically changed. According to the 126th article of the law,

Koreans were deprived of their Japanese citizenship and their status changed to “zainichi

Koreans.” With this, they were excluded from all the benefits enjoyed by Japanese citizens, including the state compensation delineated in the 127th article stating that only Japanese citizens injured in World War II or the bereaved Japanese families of the former soldiers

20 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 29, 45.

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were entitled. Although there were many Koreans serving in the Japanese army, because of their loss of Japanese citizenship in 1952, they were deprived of these supports.21

This was not the only discriminatory act against Koreans in the postwar period. Many

Japanese war criminals came to be incarcerated in Sugamo Prison for various atrocities they had committed during the war. Many former Korean soldiers participating in Japan’s war got also imprisoned. Even after the peace treaty came into effect and they were no longer Japanese citizens, Japan did not authorize their release. One of the Korean prisoners filed a suit at the Tokyo District Court, demanding his immediate release on the grounds that he was no longer a Japanese citizen. Since such a case was unprecedented, the district court forwarded the case to the Supreme Court which argued the following way: “At the time of committing the crime, you were Japanese, weren’t you? Therefore, you are not exempt from your sin,” and did not approve the plaintiff’s release. These examples demonstrate the Japan’s racist attitude towards the Koreans. When it came to wartime reparations, Koreans were excluded since they did not possess Japanese citizenship any longer, but when it came to their release from prison, Japan argued that they used to be

Japanese so the fact that they had committed crimes during World War II did not change with the modification of their citizenship. Reverend Oka was against Japan’s punishing

Koreans for its own war crimes while at the same time refusing to compensate them, so he began to collect signatures in Tokyo to protest this biased treatment. However, almost no one was publicly committed to this cause and most people showed indifference towards the zainichi Korean problem. These cases reinforced Oka’s resolution to fight against the

21 Ibid., 30.

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injustices that Koreans had to face in Japanese society and to prevent the further deterioration of their situation. Oka was conscious of both the Korean hibakusha problem and the zainichi Korean problem as early as the 1950s, though at that time he was without any followers and had little impact.22

Omura Prison

At the end of the 1950s there was a nationwide radio program called “Luther Hour.” The

Omura Prison formed a correspondence course group for Bible studies to listen to this program and teach the prisoners about the Bible and morality. There were nearly 170 participants and Reverend Oka became one of their teachers as a Protestant minister.

Omura Prison is situated in Nagasaki Prefecture and served as a prison designated by the

Ministry of Justice to confine zainichi Korean criminals and Korean undocumented immigrants who were to be deported since 1952.23 Oka moved to Nagasaki in 1956, and after obtaining a degree in theology became a missionary in the Nagasaki Lutheran Church.

From 1958 he worked as a Protestant minister. After being employed as a lecturer in Omura

Prison, he had access to the prison from the autumn of 1958 until the spring of 1959 and came into contact with many Korean prisoners. In the Christian world, doing missionary work in prisons is considered highly praiseworthy. From the spring of 1959, though, Oka received a notification in which the prison asked him to refrain from further visits.24

22 Ibid., 31-32. 23 Masaharu Oka, “Omura Shūyōjo to Chōsenjin Hibakusha,” [Omura Prison and Korean Hibakusha] (Nagasaki: Omura Shūyōjo to Chōsenjin Hibakusha Hakkōkai, 1981), 3-4. Box 1, HT 0102400, HUA. Hereafter cited as Oka, “Omura Shūyōjo to Chōsenjin Hibakusha.” 24 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 432.

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However, the short time spent among the Korean prisoners was enough for Oka to notice the unlawful nature of their confinement, after which he broke the silence and protested against their unjust treatment. Most of the Koreans incarcerated in Omura Prison had lived in Japan before World War II and even during the war, and some of them had been born there as Japanese citizens although their citizenship was taken away in 1952.

Once the war was over, they returned to Korea, but following the outbreak of the Korean

War, many fled to Japan and entered the country without visas in the hope of being reunited with their families. Nevertheless, upon their entering, they were often arrested for violation of the immigration laws, put into prison, issued deportation orders, and until the execution of their deportation, they were confined in Omura Prison and were treated as criminals.

Their period of imprisonment was indefinite. Oka argued that these people were victims of

Japan’s colonization, they used to be Japanese citizens, and the Japanese government, by labeling them as illegal immigrants and locking them up, demonstrated a lack of remorse for controlling Korea and exploiting its citizens for 36 years. Oka understood this problem because of his teaching experiences in Omura Prison, but most Japanese had no information about these Korean inmates.25

In the 1970s, Oka, as part of an investigation group, conducted research about the circumstances of those Koreans who were deported from Omura Prison to Busan. By then, a few Japanese being compassionate about the plight of various minority groups already participating in some social movements to stand up for the oppressed paid attention to the plight of the Korean prisoners. They believed that by imprisoning and deporting the

25 Oka, “Omura Shūyōjo to Chōsenjin Hibakusha,” 7.

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Koreans, the Japanese government was inflicting a double punishment, so many people demanded their release.26 Yasunori Takazane, the former chairperson of the Nagasaki

Association to Protect the Human Rights and former director of the Oka Masaharu

Memorial Nagasaki Peace Museum, was one of them. Oka was very active in the movement that demanded the release of the Korean prisoners from Omura. This provided him with the opportunity to meet with Takazane, who joined Oka’s Association in the

1970s, and who succeeded him as its chairperson in 1994 (after Oka’s death).27

The case of the Koreans confined in Omura Prison was significant. The prison served as part of the infrastructure through which the Japanese government kept oppressing

Koreans. Information about its existence gradually made clear the violation of the zainichi

Koreans’ human rights for those Japanese who condemned Japan’s invasion and atrocities in Asia during World War II. This rising awareness facilitated increasing support among the general public. More and more Japanese turned their attention to other problems concerning the discrimination of the Koreans, and one of these issues was the abandonment of Korean hibakusha.

The Nagasaki Association to Protect the Human Rights of Koreans in Japan and its support activities

Reverend Oka’s wartime experiences and witnessing of the discrimination of Koreans during the colonial period, his disillusionment with the Koreans’ deprivation of their citizenship and many of their rights in 1952, the abandonment of Korean hibakusha, and the

26 Ibid., 15-16. 27 Takazane. Interview with the author.

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unreasonable confinement of many Koreans in Omura Prison all convinced him to form an organization whose aim was to protect the human rights of zainichi Koreans.

In 1965 he set up the Nagasaki Association to Protect the Human Rights of Koreans in Japan (hereafter Nagasaki Association), at first attracting about 20 members. They gathered every month for a study session where they would make presentations about zainichi Korean problems or Korean hibakusha, after which they presented their own opinion on the given topic. They were engaged in problems surrounding the Korean schools in Japan, immigration orders (e.g. deportation orders for the Omura Prison detainees), the righteousness of the registration law for foreigners, the lack of assistance for Korean A- bomb victims, A-bomb certificate applications for Korean hibakusha, and a survey on their actual condition.28 The members learned about all these issues and were engaged in heated discussions about how to tackle these problems. If there was not enough information about a given topic they might choose to conduct their own research to determine the details.

Gradually they became aware of the core of the Korean hibakusha and the zainichi Korean problem, studied Japan’s colonization of Korea, the forced labor system during World War

II, and made efforts to determine the exact number of victims.29

Besides the monthly study sessions, the Nagasaki Association accomplished a lot, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Given the lack of surveys on Korean hibakusha in

Nagasaki, the Association took it as their mission to launch a comprehensive inquiry into their condition, which it carried out in 1981. Besides demanding the release of Koreans from the Omura Prison in the 1970s, the members raised funds to erect a monument for the

28 Oka, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha to Watashi,” 17. 29 Takazane. Interview with the author.

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memory of Korean A-bomb victims inside the Nagasaki Peace Park. They sought to put an end to discrimination against Koreans in Japan and to raise awareness of Japan’s colonial past.

Although Reverend Oka passed away in 1994, Takazane maintained the group and followed the original objectives set out by Oka. In 1995, one year after Oka’s death,

Takazane and the other members of the Nagasaki Association achieved Oka’s dream to open a museum that focused on Japan’s wartime atrocities in Asia, with a strong emphasis on the history and the numbers of Korean hibakusha.30

In May 1967, Matsuo Sadanao from Jōkōin Temple in Nagasaki sent a letter to Oka stating that in the cinerarium of temple there were the ashes of 153 Korean A-bomb victims.31 The government had requested that Jōkōin Temple store the ashes, and the temple then made a contract with the Ministry of Justice, which banned the removal of the remains from the temple. The ashes were first stored in Daionji Temple in the Imakago- machi district of Nagasaki with the condition that they remain there for an unspecified period of time. However, in 1952, due to repository problems, Daionji Temple requested the ashes to be removed, so Nagasaki Prefecture asked that the ashes be transferred for storage at Jōkōin Temple. Oka was perplexed after the sight of the remains:

I encountered the ashes of Koreans in May 1967. When I went to the underground room of

Jōkōin Temple, I saw that the ashes of 153 Koreans who had died after the A-bomb attack of

30 Ibid. 31 Originally the ashes of 154 Korean hibakusha were stored in Jōkōin Temple, but someone from Oita Prefecture showed up and took away the ashes of one victim. See Oka, “Omura Shūyōjo to Chōsenjin Hibakusha,” 25.

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Nagasaki were put into 38 small wooden boxes. It was a kind of ghastly or spine-chilling

sight. I still remember that at that moment I felt as if I heard the crying and the groan of these

people, who not only had met such a horrific death, but had been thrown away in such

manner, and could not hold back my tears.32

Following this experience, Oka was determined that a cinerarium be built for the ashes of those Korean A-bomb victims within the Peace Park and organized a committee to work towards this goal. In 1968 following negotiations with the Ministry of Justice and

Nagasaki Prefecture, he obtained a list of the names of the victims stored in Jōkōin Temple.

The association then managed to collect two million yen from fund raising campaigns, and

Oka sought the mayor’s cooperation to ensure a site for the cinerarium. He then contacted

Mindan (Korean Residents Union in Japan) and Chōsen Sōren (General Association of

Korean Residents in Japan), asking for their collaboration. However, Mindan was against building the cinerarium in the Peace Park saying that the Nagasaki Branch of Mindan had originally held the rights over the ashes so Chōsen Sōren and other associations should not intervene.33 Without taking the necessary legal procedures, Mindan removed the ashes from the temple and sent them to Mokpo City in South Jeolla Province in South Korea. There, it erected a memorial tomb where the remains were buried. Oka was disappointed since he

32 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 142. 33 Mindan was the organization for the Koreans born in Japan (zainichi Koreans) who ideologically connected to South Korea, whereas Chōsen Sōren members identified with North Korea. Given their different stance on political and ideological issues, the two zainichi Korean groups have been divided, for instance when it came to the return of the ashes of the Korean war dead to the peninsula. For more information on Mindan and Chōsen Sōren, see: Apichai W. Shipper, Fighting for Foreigners: Immigration and Its Impact on Japanese Democracy, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2008), 61-62.

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was convinced that the ashes should have been stored in Japan until the day South and

North Korea were reunited.34

This example demonstrates that Oka expressed his support and respect not only for the living but also for the deceased. This was another form of assistance through which he aimed to keep the memory of Korean victims alive and restore their dignity. As a Protestant minister, paying tribute to the dead and burying them with reverence was of utmost importance for him. Furthermore, he believed that the remains should only be returned to the Korean peninsula when the two Koreas are united again, respecting the fact that there were people from both countries among the victims and it would be unfair to collectively transfer them either to the north or to the south.

Following the unsuccessful attempt to place the ashes of the 153 Korean hibakusha previously stored at Jōkōin Temple in the Peace Memorial Park, Oka and the Nagasaki

Association built a memorial inside the park using the money that it had collected from fund-raising. This monument was unveiled on August 9, 197935, and the Nagasaki

Association added a pedestal to the memorial a year later. Receiving permission from

Nagasaki City for the erection of the monument, the Association could realize it after ensuring the necessary fund. Although both Mindan and Chōsen Sōren members were present during the unveiling ceremony, their permission was not necessary for the erection of the monument, thus the existing conflict between the two zainichi Korean groups did not hinder its inclusion in the Nagasaki Peace Memorial Park. The ceremony was broadcast by the NHK and the commercial stations nationwide. With this, people all over Japan learned

34 Nishimura, “Between the Two Sorts of Dead,” 46-48. 35 See Figure 34.

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about the existence of Korean A-bomb victims.36 The memorial contributed to challenging the dominant discourse that the Japanese were the only victims of the A-bomb, and people began to question the history presented exclusively from the victim’s perspective.

The inscription of the monument contains a very detailed description of Japan’s annexation of Korea, forced labor system, the number of Korean victims in Nagasaki, and finally, a sincere apology by those who erected the monument:

On August 22, 1910, the Japanese government put into effect a declaration to annex Korea

and to colonize the nation under the strict and complete rule of Japan. Koreans were deprived

of their liberty to live as free citizens within their own country and their human rights were

grossly neglected. Many were driven into Japan having no resource to live in Korea. The total

number of Koreans, most who were forcibly brought to Japan and put to slavery, is believed

to have been 2,365,263 according to the Home Ministry. Of those, approximately 70,000

were located in Nagasaki Prefecture just before the Japanese surrender in World War II. At

that time, over 31,000 Koreans lived in and around the city of Nagasaki and were engaged in

forced labor under atrocious conditions. On August 9, 1945, America dropped an atomic

bomb on Nagasaki, and some 20,000 Koreans experienced the blast of the bomb and were

exposed to the radiation. More than half of these people were instantly killed. Here we

apologize to Korea and the Koreans for the immeasurable suffering that we inflicted upon

them during those tragic years; threatening them with the sword and gun, colonizing and

annexing their peninsula, bringing them against their will and abusing them in slavery and

finally for the catastrophic way they had to die under the atomic bomb. We strongly appeal

36 Oka, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha to Watashi,” 19-20.

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for the total abolition of nuclear weapons from the face of earth, and we hope for the peaceful

unification of the Korean nation.37

The text was written in an extremely apologetic tone, stressing the immense suffering

Koreans endured due to Japan’s colonization, its forced labor system, and eventually it’s being attacked with atomic bombs by its wartime adversary. The Nagasaki monument clearly states the exact number of the victims, not simply using the words “many” or

“thousands,” as some other monuments when they refer to non-Japanese A-bomb victims.

The text is available in English, Japanese, and Korean, which way information about the fate of Korean victims and Japan’s responsibility in their misery reaches many tourists visiting the peace park. Although there is also a similar memorial for Korean hibakusha in

Hiroshima38, the phrasing of the two monuments and their messages differ in many points.

The detailed description of Japan’s aggression against Koreans, admission of the guilt felt by the Japanese, and their earnest hope for the unification of the two Koreas distinguishes the Nagasaki monument.

Oka pointed out another discrepancy between the two memorials during a lecture he held in South Korea in 1992:

[…] although they are the same memorials, their meaning is completely different. The one

built opposite the Peace Memorial Park in Hiroshima was not set up by the victimizer

Japanese side. However, the latter one was constructed by some Japanese volunteers who had

37 Monument for Korean Atomic Victims, Nagasaki Peace Memorial Park. 38 See Figure 33.

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collected 800,000 yen donation and who wish to express their apology with this. One would

assume that Japanese and Koreans suffered from the A-bomb attacks the same way.

Nevertheless, in case of the Japanese, it was the consequence of Japan’s war crimes in Asia,

while in case of the Koreans, they were deprived of their country and property, were

coercively brought to Japan, were tormented by famine and unjust punishment, and after

being made to work under cruel circumstances, those being positioned in Hiroshima or

Nagasaki became A-bomb victims despite having committed no crimes at all. Therefore, it is

natural that Japan apologizes to these people and builds a memorial to commemorate them.39

In his speech, Oka stresses that the Nagasaki monument was built by the Japanese while the

Hiroshima monument by the zainichi Korean members of Mindan. The Hiroshima monument, erected in 1970, eight years earlier than the one in Nagasaki, “ensured the presence of ethnic Koreans in Hiroshima’s history and society,” and “contested and denationalized the dominant ways in which Hiroshima memories are articulated.”40 It was built by the victimized side who, with this, raised awareness of their own tragedy.

Nevertheless, the monument in Nagasaki was set up by Japanese citizens, “the victimizer side,” in an apologetic manner who admitted their role as perpetrators in the war and sought for the forgiveness of Korean A-bomb victims. Furthermore, in his speech, Oka highlights the different status of Korean and Japanese A-bomb victims. He acknowledges that on the one hand, the dropping of the A-bombs on Japan should not come as a surprise seeing its wartime aggression and expansion in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, though, the

39 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 116. 40 Yoneyama, “Memory Matters,” 204-205.

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Koreans first had become victims of Japan’s colonialism, and then became further victimized when they had to experience the horrors of the A-bomb. In light of this, Oka stresses that the least the Japanese can do is to set up a monument for their memory and ask for their forgiveness. With this, Oka made an attempt to make Japan come to grips with its past and to make it into a more righteous nation by acknowledging its moral responsibility for the agony of Korean A-bomb sufferers.

Investigations on the conditions of Korean hibakusha in Nagasaki City

Reverend Oka became a member of the Nagasaki City Council in 1971, and since his participation in city politics, he continuously appealed to Nagasaki City to conduct a survey and to support Korean A-bomb victims. In the 1970s two minor surveys on Korean hibakusha took place in the second A-bombed city. Thanks largely to Oka’s active role,

Nagasaki City first launched their investigation on the conditions of Korean A-bomb sufferers in 1976, when it identified sixteen dormitories, construction camps, and accommodations of the former Korean laborers. However, it failed to provide any information on the actual number of Korean hibakusha in Nagasaki, the number of the deceased after the bombing, and their working conditions. Oka was conscious of the limitations of that survey and was determined to improve upon it.41

The Hiroshima-Nagasaki Korean A-bomb Victims Investigation Group formed in

1979. From November 2 to November 8, it immersed itself in research to delve into both the 1945 and the present conditions of the Korean sufferers of the bomb, with Oka as one of

41 Jinken o Mamoru Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha, 72.

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the members of the investigation group. In its report, published on December 15 the same year, it was critical of the Japanese government’s negligence of Korean hibakusha. It stated that not only had Japan failed to initiate such a survey so far, but Japan also discriminated against Korean victims when it came to the support of Japanese hibakusha. Nothing demonstrates investigation group’s point better than the extremely small number of Korean hibakusha possessing A-bomb certificates. Nevertheless, there were several pitfalls concerning the 1979 survey. Not only was the one-week period too short to get an accurate picture about the situation of Korean hibakusha, but there were only a limited number of victims involved in the survey (25 Korean hibakusha from Nagasaki and 52 from

Hiroshima).42

During the 1979 survey a few members of Kakkin Kaigi, the Nagasaki Testimonial

Society, the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Survivors Council, the International House of Japan, the Nagasaki A-bomb Hospital, the Nagasaki Association to Protect the Human Rights of

Koreans in Japan, and other hibakusha supporting group members also participated in the

Nagasaki research group. Their method of investigation was to listen to the testimonies of

25 hibakusha, determine how far they were from the hypocenter, talk to local people living near those places, and inspecting the sites mentioned in the testimonies. Among the 25 hibakusha, fourteen were members of Mindan, ten of Chōsen Sōren, and there was one naturalized Japanese citizen. Four of them did not possess A-bomb certificates. In Nagasaki,

42 Hiroshima Nagasaki Chōsenjin Hibakusha Jittaichōsadan, [Hiroshima Nagasaki Group Investigating into the Condition of Korean Hibakusha] Chōsenjin Hibakusha no Jittai Hōkokusho, [Report of the Actual Condition of Korean Hibakusha] (Hiroshima Nagasaki Chōsenjin Hibakusha Jittaichōsadan Jimukyoku, 1979), 9. Hereafter cited as Jittaichōsadan, Chōsenjin Hibakusha no Jittai Hōkokusho.

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28 places were inspected in total, including former Mitsubishi-related sites, dormitories, and construction camps, which was one of the main merits of the survey.

This investigation had taken place two years before the report of the Nagasaki

Association’s result was released, which means that the exact number of Korean hibakusha had not been known. However, Sadao Kamata estimated that in Nagasaki, about 13,000-

14,000 Korean fell victim to the A-bomb, among whom 3,000-4,000 people died in an instant.43 These numbers are much lower than the ones later reported by the Nagasaki

Association. Nevertheless, this one-week survey pointed out the need to engage in follow- up surveys about the conditions of Korean hibakusha. Also, it paved the way for the realization of the 1981-82 survey in Nagasaki carried out by Reverend Oka and the

Nagasaki Association.

In June 1981 Nagasaki City released additional data concerning the number of Korean hibakusha. The city estimated that there were 12,000-13,000 Korean A-bomb victims residing in Nagasaki, among whom 1,400-2,000 people died following the dropping of the bomb. However, neither the zainichi Korean community nor the Nagasaki Association seemed to be content with these numbers.44 This report made the Association members, especially Oka, immerse themselves in a thorough follow-up investigation, with the aim of finding out the real numbers of Korean hibakusha.

On July 5, 1981 the Nagasaki Association launched the very first long-term comprehensive survey on the 1945 and actual condition of Korean hibakusha who had resided in Nagasaki city at the time of the bombing. One of the main problems with the

43 Ibid., 33-35, 39. 44 Jinken o Mamoru Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha, 73.

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previous surveys was that they only took into account the Koreans staying within 2.5 kilometer radius from the hypocenter. In the 1981-82 survey, the Association conducted research in the sites that were situated outside the 2.5 kilometer radius but still close to the hypocenter. These areas included Tomachi, Sueishimachi, Fukahorimachi, and

Koyagimachi in the south; Kibachi, Nishidomari, Kosedo, Ohama, Fukuda, and Koura in the west; the Himi area in the east; and Kawahiramachi and the Urakamisuigenchi areas in the north. Additionally, Nagasaki City also failed to consider those Koreans who had entered the city as part of the rescue efforts, being exposed to radiation, and Oka emphasized that it was also necessary to carry out additional research about them.45 In total, the Nagasaki Association investigated 79 places, among which fifteen were newly discovered sites. Even in case of the other sites, it conducted a more thorough investigation, discovered more people, and made corrections to the previous surveys.46

During the one-year survey period, members of the Association formed teams consisting of five to six members. They carried out the investigation focused on inspecting the 79 sites, trying to get information on the 1945 and present conditions, and talking to as many witnesses (people living in the areas concerned) as possible. The newly discovered sites (construction camps, dormitories, and former living places) of Korean hibakusha were the Sumiyoshi tunnel, Urakami riverbank near the Showa intersection, the fourth

Mitsubishi underground arms factory, Shimoōhashi area, Yukimachitani area, the third

45 Nagasaki Zainichi Chōsenjin no Jinken o Mamoru Kai, [Nagasaki Association to Protect the Human Rights of Koreans in Japan] Genbaku to Chōsenjin: Nagasaki Chōsenjin Hibakusha Jittaichōsa Hōkokusho Volume 1, [Atomic Bomb and the Koreans: Report of the Fact-finding Survey on the Koreans Becoming A-bomb Victims in Nagasaki, Volume 1] (Nagasaki: Kōbunsha Insatsu, 1982), 9. Hereafter cited as Jinken o Mamoru Kai, Genbaku to Chōsenjin Volume 1. 46 Jinken o Mamoru Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha, 79.

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Mitsubishi Machinery Works, Saiwamachi (Korean forced laborers’ dormitory at

Mitsubishi), Takenokubo mountains, Kamitomachi and the Shintomachi areas,

Akizukimachi and the Omagari areas, Kouramachi area, temples close to Nagasaki Station, and the Himi area.47

Concerning the numbers, the Association found that at the time of the bombing, 6,356

Koreans were registered at the Nagasaki City Hall as Japanese citizens, meaning that all of them presumably became hibakusha. The number of Korean forced laborers living in construction camps and dormitories were 13,035, and 19,391 Koreans stayed in Nagasaki

City on August 9, 1945 in total. The number of Korean victims within 1.5 kilometers from the hypocenter was 2,760 people, but there were 5,138 others discovered who were further than 1.5 kilometers from the hypocenter. In their report, the Nagasaki Association emphasized that many Koreans further than 1.5 kilometers from the hypocenter died after the bomb, so it is unscientific to assume that only those within 1.5 kilometers could die.

Concerning the number of the deceased, the research confirmed that 9,169 Koreans had died after the bombing; both citizens and forced laborers.48 Oka and the Nagasaki

Association members highlighted that the numbers were not final; they were calculations following the one-year investigation, however, following later research, the Association discovered the existence of more Korean hibakusha. By 2014, it confirmed the existence of

24,719 Koreans who fell victim to the A-bomb in Nagasaki and published the results in the latest, seventh volume of Genbaku to Chōsenjin.49

47 Jinken o Mamoru Kai, Genbaku to Chōsenjin Volume 1, 10. 48 Ibid., 11-12. 49 Nagasaki Shimbun, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha Chōsa ni Hitosuji.”

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The Nagasaki Association has published seven volumes of Genbaku to Chōsenjin, six during Oka’s lifetime. In the 1980s and 1990s the Nagasaki Association was involved in surveys on the conditions of the Korean forced laborers and hibakusha on the islets near

Nagasaki City, on Gunkanjima Island, where many Koreans were made to work in the coal mines under miserable circumstances, in Sasebo City, in the northern part of Nagasaki

Prefecture, and in Saga Prefecture.50 The results were published in six volumes of Genbaku to Chōsenjin, providing an invaluable part of the literature on Korean A-bomb victims and

Korean forced laborers in Nagasaki. Oka, who initiated these surveys as early as the 1960s, was the first person to take action to find out the number of Korean A-bomb victims, their working and living conditions, and the actual number of the dead. He constantly emphasized the need for a thorough accounting. In the 1970s and early 1980s owing to his initiatives, Nagasaki City took the first step to investigate the conditions of Korean victims but failed to provide an answer to many essential questions surrounding the Korean hibakusha problem. As a result, Oka and the association took these early surveys as their starting point and pursued a more systematic one, focusing on the real numbers of Korean hibakusha and the deceased, and explored sites that had not been investigated during the previous surveys. During their first survey project, many other problems about Korean hibakusha and the forced laborers came to light. Therefore, their mission in the 1980s and

1990s was to find an answer to these unresolved issues and inform the Japanese people about the reality of Korean hibakusha and forced laborers in Nagasaki. The publication of

50 Oka Masaharu Memorial Nagasaki Peace Museum, “Book sales corner,” http://www.d3.dion.ne.jp/~okakinen/syoseki.html (accessed: February 20, 2016).

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these survey results fed a great deal of information about Korean hibakusha into public discourse.

Sekai no Hito e (To the People of the World)

Until 1981, roughly 40 movies and documentaries had been made about Japanese A-bomb victims in total.51 However, none of them focused on Korean hibakusha despite their high rate. Consequently, through the efforts of several citizens, especially members of the

Nagasaki Association, the shooting of the very first documentary about Korean hibakusha began, with Zenkichi Mori as the director. Although it was a forty-five-minute color movie made with a very low budget, it was revolutionary in the history of Korean A-bomb victims.

The documentary was not broadcast by the national TV channels in Japan or South Korea, but due to the efforts of the Nagasaki Association, screenings were organized all over Japan, from Hokkaido to Okinawa, which provided an opportunity for many Japanese to become familiar with the Korean hibakusha problem.52

The movie not only focuses on Korean hibakusha, but engages the issue of Japan’s wartime responsibility, elaborates on the colonial period, and shed lights on the agony of the Dutch and other Allied POWs who became A-bomb victims in Nagasaki. An interview with a Japanese woman helping runaway Korean forced laborers who could not endure the hard work at the construction of the Kobo dam is also included.53 The documentary makers

51 Zenkichi Mori and Yasunori Takazane, eds., Hakkakokugoyaku Sekai no Hito e, [Translation of To the People of the World in Eight Languages] (Tokyo: Dōjidaisha, 1994), 11. Hereafter cited as Mori, Hakkakokugoyaku Sekai no Hito e. 52 Takazane. Interview with the author. 53 Mori, Hakkakokugoyaku Sekai no Hito e, 98-99.

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requested that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries allow them to film inside the shipyard, but

Mitsubishi rejected their request. As a result, Oka filed a complaint and went to Nagasaki

City Hall to ask for Mayor Hitoshi Motoshima’s assistance. However, Motoshima said that he would not do anything in this matter, stressing that his task was to protect the interests of the companies in Nagasaki. The former mayor further argued that the site they wished to enter was eight kilometers from the hypocenter, so the story was irrelevant in terms of the bombing.54 Despite the protest of Oka and the Association, their admission into the shipyard was not approved.

Given the small budget, Oka collected 10,000 yen and during filming in Nagasaki he arranged for the crew to stay in his church, which helped reduce the expenses. He showed the crew around the construction camps where the Korean forced laborers had lived and made the necessary arrangements for the shooting on Gunkanjima (Hashima) Island.55 That island was commonly referred to as “a prison in the sea,” since many Koreans were brought there and forced to work in coal mines. One of those Koreans was Seo Jeong-woo, who had to leave his home behind and come to Japan at the age of fourteen. He was later transferred to Mitsubishi shipyard, where he was exposed to radiation on August 9, 1945. Seo, besides many other Korean hibakusha, also testified about the horrible period he had spent in

Nagasaki and described the ongoing discrimination that Koreans suffered while in Japan, even though many Japanese were still unaware why there were so many Koreans in

Japan.56

54 Oka, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha to Watashi,” 23. 55 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 140. 56 Mori, Hakkakokugoyaku Sekai no Hito e, 93, 100, 101.

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Oka was also interviewed at the end of the movie. He emphasized Japan’s failure to face its wartime responsibility and to ensure the decent burial of the Korean victims while simultaneously spending “so much money on recovering the remains of Japanese who died in the South Pacific.”57 When describing the ashes of the 153 Koreans discovered in the

Jōkōin Temple, he expressed his aspiration that the Japanese government in the future would contribute more to the support of Korean hibakusha.58 The conclusion of the movie expresses that despite the painful past, people must go on with their lives and build a better future, but at the same time, must seek to avoid the repetition of similar wrongdoings. The story of the atomic bombings must never be forgotten, just like the tragic narrative of

Korean hibakusha.59

Reverend Oka’s influence on city politics

Oka served in the Nagasaki City Council from 1971 until 1983. During this period, he was constantly working on behalf of the interests of Korean hibakusha. Although he did not manage to achieve a real breakthrough in catalyzing public support, he managed to positively influence many of the city’s leaders, especially Hitoshi Motoshima (Nagasaki’s mayor from 1979 until 1995), who became aware of the Korean hibakusha’s abandonment and Japan’s responsibility in their plight thanks to Oka’s efforts.

57 As of 2006, 1.24 million out of the 2.4 million Japanese war dead were returned to Japan. For more information about the return of the remains of the Japanese soldiers who died in Southeast Asia during World War II, see: Ikemi Nakamura, “Relatives Hunt for Japanese War Dead: Remains of 1.2 Million MIAs Overseas,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 4 no. 11 (2006), accessed January 16, 2017, http://apjjf.org/-Nakamura-Ikemi/2270/article.html. 58 Mori, Hakkakokugoyaku Sekai no Hito e, 93. 59 Ibid., 92.

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Motoshima had a lot in common with Oka. Both turned to Christianity before World

War II and refused to respect the emperor as a divine ruler. In addition, the encounter of the two was formative on Motoshima’s ideals and thoughts, especially on his later comments about Japan’s wartime atrocities and deeds such as apologizing to Korean hibakusha in person. Motoshima was the first mayor of the A-bombed cities who argued not only that the Japanese government should take responsibility for Imperial Japan’s wartime aggression, but the citizens also should, and hibakusha were no exception. He claimed that the common citizens supported Japan’s war industry by producing wartime materials and manufacturing guns. Men were mobilized from the age of fifteen and women from seventeen, so the imperial system coerced most citizens to get involved in the war efforts.

In the newspapers published during World War II, there were many approving articles about the heroic actions of the Japanese soldiers. The public mood was jubilant, and citizens became even more supportive of the war, so in this sense, Motoshima held the view that they actively participated in the victimization of other nations. Furthermore, he made the notorious statement in 1988 that “the Emperor bore a great responsibility for World

War II,” which led to an extreme rightist nearly assassinate him on January 18, 1990.

Motoshima’s “remarks broke an established Japanese taboo prohibiting even oblique criticism of the monarch” for which many Japanese, especially the right-wing extremists, were unprepared.60 This attempt on his life reaffirmed his belief that he must speak up and must not let others silence him. Consequently, from 1990 to 1994, in the annual peace declarations he highlighted Japan’s invasion of Korea and Japan’s aggression in the Sino-

60 Szajkowski Bogdan and Florence Terranova, eds., Revolutionary and Dissident Movements of the World, 4th ed. (London: John Harper, 2004), 250.

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Japanese and the Asia-Pacific War. He did not overlook the Allied POWs and foreign hibakusha, stressing the need for Japan to compensate these victims and apologize to them.

Motoshima was the first mayor of the A-bombed cities who went to South Korea while in office in 1992 with the aim of consoling Korean hibakusha. He visited the homes of some A-bomb survivors and the Korea Association’s headquarters, where he officially apologized for Japan’s annexation and forced labor system. He went on saying that Japan is to blame for their unfortunate life, something that no Japanese political leader had ever said before.61 His emphasis on the admission of Japan’s guilt and responsibility, asking for the forgiveness of the nations victimized by Japan, and denying Japan’s victimhood in the war made his thinking identical to Reverend Oka’s. Had there not been for Oka’s constant appeal for the Korean hibakusha aid in the City Council and had there not been for the

Association’s investigations in the 1980s, Motoshima might not have taken such a firm stance and might not have expressed his apology to Korean A-bomb survivors in person.

Oka’s impact on city politics from the mid-1970s is substantiated by Motoshima’s steps to seek justice for the war victims and make Japan come to terms with its imperial history.

Reverend Oka’s legacy and foundation of the Oka Masaharu Memorial Nagasaki

Peace Museum

Reverend Oka passed away on July 21, 1994. Nevertheless, his ideals and the support of

Korean A-bomb victims took form in a permanent institution after his death. During his

61 Nobuto Hirano, ed., Motoshima Hitoshi no Shisō: Genbaku, Sensō, Hyūmanizumu, [Motoshima Hitoshi’s Thoughts: Atomic Bomb, War, Humanism] (Nagasaki: Nagasaki Shinbunsha, 2010), 160-162, 218, 219, 249- 251, 260, 261.

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lifetime, he inculcated his ideals in many members of the Nagasaki Association, who carried on his work and unfinished projects. One of them was Yasunori Takazane, who succeeded him as the chairperson of the Nagasaki Association and played the most significant role in establishing the Oka Masaharu Memorial Nagasaki Peace Museum.

Since the end of the 1970s, he worked together with Oka, and in the 1980s, during various research in Nagasaki concerning Korean hibakusha and forced laborers, Takazane was an active contributor to those surveys and publications.62

Members of the Nagasaki Association established the Oka Masaharu Memorial

Nagasaki Peace Museum on October 1, 1995. It is among those few peace museums in

Japan that show an alternative to the prevailing narratives. While most Japanese peace museums depict the Japanese as victims of the war and narrowly focus on the horrors of the

A-bomb, this one explicitly reveals a previously undisclosed account on the massacres committed by the Imperial Japanese Army in Southeast Asia and the suffering of Koreans under Japanese colonialism, placing a large emphasis on Korean hibakusha. The museum refutes the dominant victim-conscious view and lets the visitors see the Japanese as aggressors, a position which Japan has largely neglected and has not been part of the school curriculum either. Oka had always called attention to the importance of founding such a museum to pass down this information to the younger generation.

By overemphasizing the damage caused by the A-bomb, the peace museums in

Hiroshima and Nagasaki create the impression that Japan was exclusively a victim in

62 Takazane. Interview with the author.

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World War II, ignoring its wartime responsibilities.63 The Oka Masaharu Peace Museum is privately funded, run by volunteers, and is maintained on a shoestring budget. Unlike the

Nagasaki National Peace Memorial Hall for the Atomic Bomb Victims, this museum is not promoted by the state or the city. It is not one of the places that one can find in the tourist guide books about Nagasaki. For this reason, there are only about 5,000 visitors annually, which is less than 1% of the number of annual visitors of the Peace Memorial Hall.

However, Takazane said he expected a lot from those 1%. He hoped that the perspectives and knowledge gained there will be engraved on the visitors’ memory and they will become conscious of the need for respecting the human rights of other people.64 This museum is among the most progressive ones in Japan, making “a hard-hitting call for peace by condemning the horrors of war, and the suffering of the Asians at the hands of the

Japanese.”65

Reverend Oka’s ideals

Following Oka’s lecture held in Seoul in September 1992, many Korean attendees had the impression that he was a very unique Japanese whom they could trust.66 It was not common in South Korean society that they openly expressed their respect towards a Japanese citizen.

As Min Gyo Koo has put it, “In the eyes of many South Koreans, hostility towards Japan

63 However, the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum has been changing and the Main Building that is currently being renovated and is scheduled to reopen in the spring of 2019 will display Japan’s wartime atrocities and the foreign victims of the atomic bombs in more detail. Interview with the director of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, Kenji Shiga, in Hiroshima City on July 9, 2018. 64 Nagasaki Shimbun, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha Chōsa ni Hitosuji.” 65 Philip A. Seaton, Japan’s Contested War Memories: The ‘Memory Rifts’ in Historical Consciousness of World War II, (London: Routledge, 2007), 159. 66 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 10.

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was deeply intertwined with national identity, and postwar Korean nationalism was thus imbued with anti-Japanese sentiments.”67 Since the end of World War II, Japanese-South

Korean relations were at a low ebb, despite the 1965 Japan-Korea Treaty, and these antagonistic feelings against Japanese hardly changed especially among the older generation given the fact that Japanese colonization had exposed them to lifetime trauma.

However, Oka, by stressing Japan’s need to apologize and compensate the victims and heavily criticizing the Japanese government for consciously hiding the truth about its wartime atrocities earned the respect of the Korean attendees.68

As Takazane said, Oka’s firm conviction was that Korean hibakusha were victims of

Japanese colonization and were brought into Hiroshima and Nagasaki against their will, which is how they ended up becoming A-bomb victims. Additionally, they were abandoned for long decades by the Japanese government, so it is Japan’s duty to provide assistance for these people as soon as possible, and given their manifold suffering, they deserve priority over Japanese hibakusha. At first, most people thought that his ideas were absurd, thus he could not find many supporters.69

During his lectures, Oka emphasized the different status of Japanese and Korean hibakusha. He argued that Japan was engaged in a war of aggression, had occupied and exploited many nations, and abused their citizens. He construed the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a kind of divine revenge for the suffering Japan inflicted upon other peoples. He thought, unlike the Japanese, Koreans were entirely

67 Min Gyo Koo, Island Disputes and Maritime Regime. Building in East Asia: Between a Rock and a Hard Place, (New York: Springer, 2010), 71-72. 68 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 10. 69 Takazane. Interview with the author.

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victims, they were coercively brought into Japan as forced laborers, or had to leave their home country after having lost their lands following the introduction of the strict economic measures Japan had imposed upon them. After becoming victims of the Japanese occupation, many of them, who happened to be in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, fell victim to the atomic bomb, multiplying their anguish, not to mention their harrowing experiences during the Korean War, and their exclusion from the benefits of the A-bomb relief laws in Japan. Given these misfortunes that had struck Korean A-bomb sufferers, Oka demanded that Japan build an A-bomb hospital in South Korea to treat the victims, send

Japanese A-bomb specialists to South Korea to examine hibakusha one by one, and issue

A-bomb certificates to them. According to Oka, it would be Japan’s duty to provide assistance instantly before Korean hibakusha die, and the Japanese government must address their problems before the implementation of further support laws for Japanese hibakusha. However, Japan failed to meet its obligation for decades, and Oka further stated that this is the reason why people like Son Jin-doo had to cross the ocean and enter Japan without visas, just to be labeled as stowaway illegal immigrants by the Japanese government.70 By indicating the unfair features practiced by Japan, Oka aimed to push his nation towards a more honorable path, devoid of immorality, prejudice, and untrustworthiness.

Oka not only stressed the plight of Korean A-bomb victims. As a member of the

Imperial Japanese Navy since the 1930s, he witnessed the atrocities the Japanese committed against other Asians. He was conscious of the weight of the Nanking massacre,

70 Oka, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha to Watashi,” 21.

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the “comfort women” problem, the forced conscription of hundreds of thousands of

Koreans and Chinese, the air raids in China, and the experiments of Unit 731. He was one of the few citizens seeking justice and demanded that the Japanese government properly compensate the victims of Japan’s war of aggression.

Oka’s ideals about Japan’s need to sincerely acknowledge its sins, apologize to its victims, pay them compensation were closely related to his religious belief. In 1938, during his enlistment in the navy, he was baptized, and by coming into contact with Christianity, he realized it is not proper to regard the emperor divine and blindly follow his orders, which caused tremendous pain and suffering to other nations. He was convinced that the

Japanese did not go against the instructions of the emperor and extolled him since they did not know the real god. This recognition inspired Oka to study theology, become a

Protestant minister, and proselytize the Japanese about the Christian god.71 Additionally, he admitted many times feeling remorse for preaching against the war only for six days while being a member of the armed forces for eleven years.72 He referred to himself as one of the

Japanese victimizers who was unable to bring the war to a quicker end and being powerless in preventing Japan from escalating the warfare.

His feelings of culpability and the need for atonement stemmed from Christian ideals, and these thoughts were mirrored in his interpretation of the events of World War II. When he first saw the ashes of the 153 Korean A-bomb victims in 1967 in Jōkōin Temple, he talked about “hearing the moan and the crying voices” of those people, feeling something

“unearthly,” and described the experience as “ghastly” and “spine-chilling.” Although these

71 Korui o Mamoru Tatakai, 29. 72 Nishimura, “Between the Two Sorts of Dead,” 42.

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people were complete strangers to him and he was not directly responsible for their death, he was overwhelmed with physical pain by the thought of these people having been discarded after their tragic death. Burying the dead and providing them with a decent resting place would ensure that their souls can rest in peace eternally and their earthly suffering is over. For this reason, Oka felt an obligation to temporarily place the remains in the Nagasaki Peace Park, but in his opinion, their proper burial place should have been in the united Korean Peninsula. With this, he placed idealism before pragmatism, since the reunification might never be accomplished and the social and political gap between the two

Koreas has been wide since the end of the Korean War.

Oka was seeking social justice, was against war and discrimination, and stood up for the weak and disempowered peoples. He joined anti-war movements, hibakusha support movements, and set up his own association to fight against the violation of the human rights of the Koreans in the 1960s.73 His anti-war and anti-imperialist thoughts took root during his childhood, following his father’s constant emphasis of the need for peace and putting an end to wars. His World War II experiences further fueled these ideals. As a result, when the United States escalated the war in Vietnam in the 1960s, he joined the Citizens’

League for Peace in Vietnam as an expression of his condemnation of war. Furthermore, he also joined the anti-Yasukuni movement, suggesting that it is improper to celebrate and commemorate those fallen Japanese soldiers who had committed atrocities during the Asia-

Pacific War. Members of the movement believed that “the commemoration of fallen soldiers supports a self-centered and unreconstructed view of the nation,” while visiting the

73 Nagasaki Shimbun, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha Chōsa ni Hitosuji.”

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shrine is discriminative against other Asian nations where Japan behaved as an aggressor.74

With his involvement in this movement, Oka expressed condemnation of the high social status of those who played a key role in the imperial subjugation, triggering the invasion of

Korea, and indirectly contributing to many Koreans’ becoming A-bomb victims.

74 Sandra Wilson, ed., Nation and Nationalism in Japan, (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 126.

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Reverend Masaharu Oka was an outsider in Japanese society throughout his life. Coming from a studious family, he recognized at an early age the threat Imperial Japan posed to other Asian nations. He was one of the few Japanese who disapproved Japan’s treatment of

Asian peoples and did not hesitate to give voice to his discontent since the end of the war.

He sympathized with the plight of Koreans during the colonial period. In hope of converting many Japanese to Christianity and cleanse them from their sins, he dedicated his life to working as a Protestant minister in Nagasaki from 1956.

In the 1960s, with the emergence of various minority groups standing up for their rights, seeking peace and aiming to stop wars, he played an active role in many of these movements and set up his own organization in 1965 to bring the unfair treatment of

Koreans residing in Japan to an end. That was the time when more and more people became conscious of the Korean hibakusha problem, and he emphasized the need to provide them with a dignified resting place as well as erecting a monument in their memory.

He also stressed the necessity to make up for the surveys on their 1945 and actual conditions and confirm the exact number of the victims. As a member of the Nagasaki City

Council, he helped raise awareness of the lack of support for Korean hibakusha. He could influence Hitoshi Motoshima, Nagasaki’s former mayor, who developed compassion towards Korean hibakusha and during his visit in South Korea in 1992 expressed his earnest apology.

Oka maintained that “the international society will not turn its attention to an exclusively victim-conscious appeal. Being aware of the past atrocities [committed by our

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nation] and showing signs of remorse is the key to sincere peace.”75 Consequently, after his death, his followers set up a museum that embodies his ideals and presents Japan’s wartime role as that of the perpetrator.

Oka was driven by the resolution to make Japanese society more righteous and this resulted in his early recognition of the importance of the Korean hibakusha problem. Had it not been for his commitment for the support of Korean A-bomb sufferers, most of those victims might have passed away forgotten by society, without receiving any support and without their rights being acknowledged.

75 Nagasaki Shimbun, “Chōsenjin Hibakusha Chōsa ni Hitosuji.”

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CHAPTER 5: DR. TORATARŌ KAWAMURA’S

MEDICAL SUPPORT OF KOREAN HIBAKUSHA

Dr. Toratarō Kawamura76 was a pioneer in providing South Korean atomic bomb victims with medical assistance and inviting them to his hospital in Hiroshima from 1973. He recognized that for Korean hibakusha, immediate medical assistance was of the utmost importance, and it should come before financial or any other support. Instead of waiting for the Japanese and South Korean governments to implement relief measures, he took action and began to treat South Korean hibakusha individually, independent of the governments.

In 1971 he visited South Korea as part of the first Japanese medical delegation to examine A-bomb patients there. He realized that Korean victims had been excluded from the hibakusha support laws, had been unable to go to hospitals and receive treatment because of the high cost, hence their situation was considerably worse than that of Japanese hibakusha. He dedicated himself to the medical support of Korean victims, invited many patients at his hospital in the 1970s, became Son Jin-doo’s guarantor during his trial, and established a permanent medical committee in 1984 that brought to Japan hundreds of

Korean hibakusha for medical treatment.

His commitment was profoundly rooted in his childhood experiences in Korea during the colonial period. He had thereafter always felt an affinity for Korea and felt remorse for

Japan’s invasion of the peninsula. He concluded that the existence of Korean hibakusha was Japan’s wartime responsibility. He once told Sumiko Kawamura, his daughter-in-law,

76 See Figure 10.

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that “I am doing this [treating Korean hibakusha] because I wish to atone for the fact that I did not understand the suffering that Koreans were enduring.”77 By providing medical support to Korean A-bomb survivors, he hoped to make amends for the crimes Japan had committed.

His medical support was widely reported not only in the local Chūgoku Shimbun, but also in national papers such as the Mainichi and Asahi Shimbun. Dr. Kawamura was a forerunner in Hiroshima in that he heightened awareness of the Korean hibakusha problem and facilitated their inclusion in the narrative of the atomic bombing of the city, taking a critical first step towards their formal recognition. He embodied the values of peace, aspirations for a nuclear-free world, and a lifetime devotion to provide medical treatment for atomic bomb victims. Although he was aware of Japan’s responsibility in the suffering of Korean hibakusha, he did not explicitly criticize the Japanese government like Reverend

Oka, but instead focused on the medical treatment of those people, so the local peace culture considered him a benevolent doctor in the first A-bombed city. By inviting Korean

A-bomb patients to his hospital at his own expense (beginning in the 1970s), Kawamura aimed to inspire other doctors in Japan and South Korea to follow suit and dedicate themselves to their medical support. Following his death in 1987, Dr. Yuzuru Kawamura, his son, carried on his legacy and treated Korean A-bomb patients until May 2016 in the family hospital.

77 “‘Wish to Atone’: Hiroshima Doctor Carries on Father’s Legacy of Treating Korean Hibakusha,” June 29, 2015. http://www.japanbullet.com/news/wish-to-atone-hiroshima-doctor-carries-on-father-s-legacy-of- treating-korean-hibakusha (accessed: July 15, 2016).

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His early life and influences

Dr. Kawamura was born on February 2, 1914 in the North Gyeongsang Province of Korea, which was then Japanese territory. He lived in Korea until the end of World War II, after which the whole family repatriated to Hiroshima Prefecture. Spending his youth in Korea contributed significantly to his later sympathy with the plight of Korean A-bomb survivors.

Dr. Kawamura studied medicine at Keijō Imperial University in today’s Seoul and graduated in 1942.78

He came into contact with Christianity in Korea. He recalled in his personal memoirs that he used to despise Christianity; he identified it with the western powers–the enemies of

Japan. However, a very significant event changed his mind forever. His father had worked as the president of a bank, but was imprisoned when Dr. Kawamura was a sophomore due to suspicion of his being involved in a bribe case. Suddenly, the family became impoverished, and to make matters worse Dr. Kawamura’s younger brother developed tuberculosis. The family could not afford expensive medical treatment, but a Korean

Christian doctor, Dr. Shinji Iguchi, agreed to examine Dr. Kawamura’s brother free of charge. As Dr. Kawamura said, he could never forget the happiness he felt when the doctor agreed to provide his brother’s medical examination and treatment. Unfortunately, his brother later died, however his funeral expenses were covered by the church. The family was struck by multiple tragedies as his younger sister also died of tuberculosis. However,

Dr. Kawamura never forgot the benevolence of Dr. Iguchi and decided that he would also

78 Kawamura Toratarō Ikōshū, Iryō to Shinkō, [Medical Treatment and Faith] (Hiroshima: Kawamura Chiwa, Kawamura Junichi, Kawamura Yuzuru, and Matsuoka Kazue, 1992), 237. Hereafter cited as Kawamura, Iryō to Shinkō.

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become a doctor who would help the poor. He was subsequently baptized and his Christian values both affected his worldview and influenced the actions in life.79

Following Japan’s defeat in World War II, Korea was liberated and all the Japanese residing in the Korean Peninsula had to leave Korea for Japan. The Kawamura family was of no exception. Dr. Toratarō Kawamura was then 31 years old, married, and already a father. The destination of his family—who had never lived in Japan before—was

Hiroshima. Nevertheless, immediately after the atomic bomb attack on the city, why did the family decide to move to Hiroshima, a city that was completely devastated and irradiated?

According to Dr. Yuzuru Kawamura, the Kawamura family (Dr. Toratarō Kawamura’s maternal ancestors) had a family property in Saijō, a small town near Hiroshima City, and following his mother’s advice, Dr. Toratarō Kawamura moved there with his family.80

However, given the lack of friends and the lack of Christian churches in Saijō, he felt out of place and moved to Hiroshima City in 1947.

He opened an internal medicine hospital in Otemachi, very close to the hypocenter, in

July 1947 and engaged in treating hibakusha (most of them Japanese).81 Reverend Kim Sin- hwan, a Christian priest working in Hiroshima, reported in his memoirs that among his zainichi Korean church adherents there were many A-bomb victims suffering from various radiation-induced diseases. Being generally impoverished, many in the Korean community in Japan could not cover the high medical costs of treatment. However, Reverend Kim learned from his parishioners that there was a doctor in Hiroshima who treated

79 Ibid., 33, 76. 80 Yuzuru Kawamura. Interview with the author. Personal interview. Hiroshima, July 10, 2016. Hereafter cited as Kawamura. Interview with the author. 81 Ibid.

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impoverished zainichi Korean hibakusha free of charge. This doctor was Kawamura.

According to his patients, Dr. Kawamura was “a god-like person;” he was “very kind- hearted, and does not make fun of the Koreans;” “he examines us politely, without any discrimination;” “he does not accept or demand money from those who cannot pay for the medical examination;” “he is an excellent doctor who returned from Korea.”82 In short

Kawamura had been treating some zainichi Korean hibakusha residing in Hiroshima before his involvement in the medical support of hibakusha residing in South Korea. With this, he established himself among the Korean community of Hiroshima as a Japanese doctor with a good reputation for his generosity and fairness.

Medical visits to South Korea

Dr. Kawamura was unaware of the existence of A-bomb survivors in South Korea until

1968. He attended a symposium in Hiroshima about the hibakusha problem where he heard from one of the Mindan members that there were many hibakusha in South Korea, who were suffering.83 This news came as a shock to Dr. Kawamura. According to Dr. Yuzuru

Kawamura, his father had always cherished his memories of Korea. He had been accustomed to life in Korea before 1945 and had many friends there. Korea was not merely

82 Kim Sin-hwan, “Kankokujin Hibakusha to no Kakawari,” [Connection with South Korean Atomic Bomb Survivors] in Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] No. 51, November 25, 2010: 2 in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, [Hiroshima Committee to Invite South Korean A-bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment] Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, [The Road to Bring South Korean Hibakusha to Japan for Medical Treatment] (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 542. Hereafter cited as Kim, “Kankokujin Hibakusha to no Kakawari.” 83 Toratarō Kawamura, “Tonichi Chiryō no Torikumi no Hajimari,” [Beginning of the Program to Treat South Korean Hibakusha in Japan] in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 5. Hereafter cited as Kawamura, “Tonichi Chiryō no Torikumi no Hajimari.”

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a foreign country for him—it was the land where he had been born and spent the most formative period of his life. He had always thought of Korea with nostalgia, and this was one reason why he responded so emotionally to the news that hibakusha also lived in South

Korea.84

In Hiroshima, the Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons (Kakkin Kaigi) sought to generate support for South Korean hibakusha since 1968. In 1971, it suggested dispatching a group of doctors to South Korea with expertise in treating A-bomb related diseases to examine hibakusha living there. Tadataka Murakami, chairperson of the

Hiroshima branch, asked Dr. Kawamura to join the medical group. Murakami argued that the other proposed members had never been to South Korea and were unfamiliar with the country. Therefore, Dr. Kawamura, being raised there and being accustomed to the land, people, and practices, would be a key team member. Given the shock he had felt after hearing about the existence of hibakusha in South Korea at the 1968 symposium, Dr.

Kawamura accepted the invitation. However, there was another reason he agreed to join. As a doctor in Hiroshima treating A-bomb patients since 1947, he was convinced that hibakusha must be assisted in every possible way and their problems could not be separated from the issue of banning nuclear and hydrogen bombs. He stated, “so that human beings could lead a meaningful life, nuclear weapons must be abolished since they have the potential of annihilating humanity. The profit of the state must be ignored and nuclear weapons must be eliminated so that peace could truly be realized.”85 His affinity with

84 Kawamura. Interview with the author. 85 Kawamura, “Tonichi Chiryō no Torikumi no Hajimari,” 5-6.

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Korea, his commitment to treat A-bomb survivors, and his anti-nuclear and anti-war ideals led him to participate in the medical team and return to Korea after twenty-six years.

Additionally, Dr. Kawamura met Sin Yeong-soon in August 1971, who was the chairperson of the Korea Association. Sin came to Japan to talk about the plight of Korean hibakusha and ask for the help and cooperation of the Japanese. Sin, like thousands of other hibakusha in South Korea, had not possessed an A-bomb Certificate and had never received medical treatment for radiation sickness. He had lost his left ear in the A-bomb attack on

Hiroshima and had visible keloid scars, the sight of which came as a shock to Dr.

Kawamura. This was another event that strengthened his previous determination about the need to go to South Korea and provide hibakusha there with medical treatment.86

In September 1971 the first Japanese medical team including four doctors was dispatched to South Korea. At first, Dr. Kawamura and Dr. Sada Ishida (director of the

Hiroshima A-bomb Hospital internal medicine department) went to South Korea. From

September 23 to 24, they carried out examinations of 60 hibakusha in Seoul, and then headed to Busan for further examinations.87 There, they examined 65 people in the Busan

Evangelical Hospital.88 The director of the hospital showed interest in the examinations,

86 Ibid., 5. 87 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Hibakugo Hatsu no Jushinsha mo Sōru de no Chiryō Oeru,” [Patients Undergoing the First Medical Examination and Treatment since the A-bomb Attack Finish in Seoul] September 27, 1971, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA. 88 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Hibakusha 117 Nin o Shinryō: Hōkan Ishidan Dai 2 Jin Kaeru,” [Treating 117 Hibakusha: The Second Group of Doctors Visiting South Korea Returns Home] October 11, 1971, Box 4, HT0400700, HUA. Hereafter cited as Chūgoku Shimbun, “Hibakusha 117 Nin o Shinryō.”

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saying that they intended to acquire the necessary skills to treat hibakusha and provide them with similar medical treatment later.89

On October 2 the two doctors returned to Hiroshima, after which Dr. Haruo Ezaki and

Dr. Haruto Uchino from the Hiroshima University Radiology Research Institute went to

South Korea and examined 117 A-bomb survivors in Hapcheon between October 2 and

10.90 This visit left an impact on all the doctors. Dr. Ishida said, “Poverty and high medical expenses make hibakusha even more miserable. Discrimination against them is strong, and they hold a grudge for having been abandoned for 26 years.” Dr. Kawamura found that “the first thing we have to do is to eliminate their financial burden, and it is necessary to support them from Japan so that they can have access to free medical treatment. During this visit, public opinion inside South Korea to support hibakusha started to build up, and I would like to advance such a movement in Japan, too.”91 Dr. Ishida noticed their dire situation and pointed out the discrimination they had faced within their own society following their return to the Korean Peninsula. Dr. Kawamura in his medical report stressed their need for free medical treatment. To achieve this, he proposed the establishment of a support network in Japan and South Korea.

Through this visit, the doctors got a clear picture of the discrepancies among Korean hibakusha living in various parts of the country. According to Dr. Kawamura, the situation of hibakusha living in Seoul was the most unfavorable. Since it was a big city, people were

89 Chūgoku Shimbun, “‘Kusuri Hoshii’ to Hibakusha: Hōkan Ishidan, Busan de Shinryō,” [Hibakusha Say, “We Want Medicine!” The Doctors Visiting South Korea Treat Patients in Busan] September 29, 1971, Box 4, HT0400700, HUA. 90 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Hibakusha 117 Nin o Shinryō.” 91 Chūgoku Shinbun, “Hinkon ni Kurushimu Hibakusha: Muryō Shinryō ni Enjo Hitsuyō,” [Hibakusha Struggling with Poverty: It Is Necessary to Help Them Receive Free Medical Treatment] October 2, 1971, Box 4, HT0400700, HUA.

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more indifferent and there was no awareness of the problem. Most of these hibakusha lived isolated, in shabby houses, on the outskirts of the city. When the doctors went to Busan, they noticed that the condition of hibakusha there was slightly better. Busan is an important port city which meant that even the economically disadvantaged like hibakusha had access to fresh fish. Additionally, there was a Christian hospital in Busan where some hibakusha had already received medical treatment. In Hapcheon, one of the most rural areas in South

Korea, the situation was different. Before the war, it was called Hiroshima Prefecture

Hapcheon County because of the large number of people who migrated to Hiroshima. Most

Hapcheon migrants were not forced laborers in Hiroshima. They went to Japan to find work after losing their lands given Japan’s strict economic measures, but then many of them could improve their living standard. Most of the patients the doctors examined had less resentment towards Japan than those in Seoul and Busan; rather, they thought of Hiroshima with a feeling of nostalgia. They asked Dr. Ezaki about the present condition of Hiroshima, spoke fluent Japanese, and sang Japanese songs from the pre-war period. In contrast, the attitude of the former forced laborers was not comparable to that of hibakusha in Hapcheon: one of them said, “During World War II, the Japanese government ordered us to work for the country as Japanese citizens, and then we became A-bomb victims. However, the truth is that none of us wanted to leave our hometown for Hiroshima. Then, when the war was over, the Japanese government claimed that since you are not Japanese, we do not issue A- bomb certificates and you cannot get the medical treatment guaranteed by the A-bomb laws, and we were abandoned.” As a result, many were filled with anger and resentment towards

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Japan.92 As the above accounts demonstrate, hibakusha within South Korea were divided.

Those living around Seoul were the most forsaken and held a grudge against Japan, while hibakusha in the south of the country had slightly better economic situations. Moreover, those living in Hapcheon regarded Hiroshima as their second hometown, were curious to know what happened with the city after their return to Korea, and received the two

Japanese doctors with hospitality.

On September 25 Dr. Kawamura and Dr. Ishida took part in an informal meeting about the hibakusha problem at the YMCA in Seoul. At the meeting, many influential

Koreans were present: leaders of Christian groups, the Korean Medical Association,

Korean insurance company members, Christian medical group members, YMCA, YWCA,

Christian academics, and writers. Dr. Kawamura and the Japanese medical team were full of both anxiety and expectations. During the meeting, some Koreans criticized them saying that there was no point in only examining hibakusha but not treating them. However, before the atmosphere turned hostile, Dr. Kawamura broke the ice and read out a letter written by

Reverend Morita from the West-Chūgoku Parish of the United Church of Christ in Japan that was addressed to the Korean Church. In the letter, the Japanese Christians apologized to South Korea for not being able to stop Imperial Japan from inflicting an enormous suffering on many people and expressed Japan’s wartime guilt. Reading this letter changed the atmosphere of the meeting, and the Korean participants present, mostly Christians, began to believe in the good will of the Japanese doctors.93

92 Kawamura, “Tonichi Chiryō no Torikumi no Hajimari,” 7-8. 93 Ibid., 8-9.

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This mission left a huge impact on Dr. Kawamura and influenced his later commitment to invite hibakusha from South Korea to Japan for medical treatment. Not only had he returned to his original homeland after twenty-six years, but as a doctor providing

A-bomb survivors with medical treatment in Hiroshima, the experience of witnessing hundreds of hibakusha who had never received any medical assistance left him devastated.

As he said, sickness and poverty are the worst things that could ever happen to someone.94

He had first-hand experiences of being impoverished during his university years, so he identified with the plight of Korean hibakusha. The Japanese medical team took important steps towards broadening social awareness of the Korean hibakusha problem in both countries, laying the groundwork for a support network.

Kakkin Kaigi did not cease its support activities after the return of the medical team to

Japan in 1971. It sent a group of doctors to examine and treat hibakusha 22 times in 25 years, until 1995, treating nearly 5,600 hibakusha in total. Dr. Kawamura was the most active member of the medical team, participating in the first twelve visits until October

1984.95 This was a civic movement independent of both governments, where citizens, doctors, and hospitals cooperated towards the improvement of the situation of Korean hibakusha.

The second visit took place in October 1972, with Dr. Kawamura and Dr. Ishida as the primary medical experts. They stayed in South Korea from October 2 to 16, during

94 Son-san ni Chiryō o! Osaka Shimin no Kai, no. 17 [Medical Treatment to Mr. Son! Osaka Association of Citizens] (1974), 8, Box 2, HT0205500, HUA. 95 Sada Ishida, “Zaikan Hibakusha no Kenkōshindan no Hōkoku,” [Report on the Medical Examinations of Korean Hibakusha] in Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] No. 47, November 28, 2008: 4 in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 506. Hereafter cited as Ishida, “Zaikan Hibakusha no Kenkōshindan no Hōkoku.”

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which time they examined 206 hibakusha in Seoul, Busan, and Hapcheon.96 Then, Kakkin

Kaigi had already been planning to set up a medical clinic in Hapcheon and arrange the surgeries for hibakusha with keloid scars, and the medical team made advances in these issues, too, during their visit.97 According to Dr. Kawamura, this time they received a warm welcome at the airport, some Korean journalists greeted them in Japanese, and their attitude towards the Japanese medical group was more receptive than in the previous year.

Additionally, the Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare deputy minister met with Dr.

Kawamura. He talked about the Ministry’s plan to endorse his initiatives and assist Korean hibakusha. The positive changes in South Korean society concerning the hibakusha issue in one year were noticeable. People became more conscious in part because of the Japanese medical group’s visit—politicians and doctors promised to help Dr. Kawamura’s work, which was a significant step forward. Furthermore, with the Japanese team’s return in 1972,

Koreans began to trust their Japanese counterparts. The visiting doctors were famous, respectful members of society and experts in their field who had participated in many medical conferences and had already established a reputation in Japan. The Koreans appreciated that excellent doctors were sent, and it demonstrated that the Japanese were sincere in their desire to help and improve the situation of hibakusha.98 These recurrent medical visits indisputably contributed to a slight improvement in Japanese-Korean relations.

96 Ibid., 505. 97 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Kotoshi mo Kankoku e Ishidan: Souru nado de Hibakusha Shinryō,” [Medical Group to South Korea Also This Year: Medical Treatment of Hibakusha in Seoul and Other Places] September 7, 1972, Box 4, HT0400800, HUA. 98 Kawamura, “Tonichi Chiryō no Torikumi no Hajimari,” 9-10.

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Kakkin Kaigi, with the cooperation of Dr. Kawamura, established the Atomic Bomb

Victims Medical Center in Hapcheon in December 1973, specializing in treating A-bomb patients. The medical center was later sponsored by both Kakkin Kaigi and the South

Korean government. Following its establishment, Japanese and Korean doctors began to examine hibakusha.99

Inviting A-bomb survivors from South Korea to Hiroshima for medical treatment

The two visits to South Korea provided Dr. Kawamura with a life-changing experience and after seeing the plight of Korean hibakusha, he gradually put his own work aside to engage in medical assistance to this community.100 Now, he felt the time had come to dedicate his life to helping the underprivileged. Sin told him during his visit in 1972: “Please invite hibakusha to Japan. At present, there is no advantage for them to be members of the Korea

Association. However, once they have the opportunity to go to Japan and get medical treatment there, they receive encouragement.”101 Dr. Kawamura responded to Sin’s request and beginning in 1972 he made preparations to invite hibakusha from South Korea to his hospital, covering their travel and medical costs.

There was another reason why Dr. Kawamura decided to commit himself to the medical assistance of Korean A-bomb victims. In the 1960s Dr. Noboru Iwamura went to

Nepal to treat tuberculosis. At that time, many people from India migrated to Nepal, and the

99 Ishida, “Zaikan Hibakusha no Kenkōshindan no Hōkoku,” 505. Chūgoku Shimbun, “Kankoku Hibakusha ni Sukui no Te: Hiroshima no Ishidan ga Shuppatsu,” [A Helping Hand to Korean Hibakusha: The Medical Team from Hiroshima Departs] December 13, 1973, Box 4, HT0400900, HUA. 100 Kawamura. Interview with the author. 101 Kawamura, Iryō to Shinkō, 73.

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spread of various diseases, including tuberculosis, was on the rise.102 Nepal needed help to tackle this problem. The Japan Overseas Christian Medical Cooperative Service (JOCS) dispatched Iwamura who continued to work in Nepal until the early 1980s. The Iwamura’s

Supporter Association was founded in 1963 as a civil movement through which citizens of

Hiroshima aided the Nepalese. With this, Iwamura set up a grassroots movement that connected Japan and Nepal and channeled funds towards the Nepalese through their medical services. Kawamura was touched by Iwamura’s philanthropy and his initiatives to help the underprivileged. This also inspired him to later engage in the medical support of

Korean hibakusha and establish a similar network between Japan and South Korea.103

Kawamura was not the first or only Japanese doctor who invited South Korean hibakusha at his own hospital at his own expense. A few months before his first patient arrived in Japan, Dr. Tetsuo Ezaki, a plastic surgeon living in Tokyo, brought a hibakusha to his hospital, the Ezaki Clinic, and performed a surgery to remove her keloid scars. An

Hi-sook arrived in Japan in July 1972 and became the first South Korean A-bomb victim whose traveling and medical costs were covered by a Japanese doctor. The patient was hospitalized despite not possessing an A-bomb certificate. Dr. Ezaki was not in touch with

Dr. Kawamura or with Kakkin Kaigi. He heard about Korean hibakusha from some young

Japanese who often visited Busan. As Dr. Ezaki put it, “I think it is weird that so far no one has ever deeply thought about Korean hibakusha. No one looks after them and they are

102 Kawamura. Interview with the author. For more information on the Indo-Nepali relations including migration, see: Kishore C. Dash, Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 69- 73. 103 Kawamura, Iryō to Shinkō, 51-52.

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completely abandoned in spite of their being Japanese at the time of the dropping of the atomic bomb.” Additionally, Dr. Ezaki’s grandmother had fallen victim to the A-bomb in

Nagasaki and died, leaving a deep emotional scar in the surgeon. He graduated from the

Nagasaki School of Medicine. After living in Nagasaki for many years, he became familiar with the atomic bomb and the suffering of the victims, consequently he was intent on helping those hibakusha who had no access to medical services.104

In Hiroshima, another doctor also sponsored a South Korean hibakusha’s visit to

Japan to receive treatment in his hospital. This doctor was Tōmin Harada, the director of a surgical clinic in Hiroshima. In 1972 Sin told him about the dire situation of Korean hibakusha and asked Dr. Harada to provide the survivors with medical treatment in Japan.

Then, Dr. Harada heard the first-hand experiences of members of the Hiroshima Paper

Crane Group, who had already been to South Korea and encountered hibakusha. It was after these events that he decided to privately cover the medical treatment of Korean hibakusha and brought the first patient to his hospital on November 13, 1973.105

As the above-mentioned examples illustrate, there were other Japanese doctors who provided Korean A-bomb survivors with medical assistance, but no one sustained such treatments for as long a period as Dr. Kawamura. These doctors never received any support from Hiroshima City or the Japanese government—they acted individually. When

Kawamura began his medical support in 1973, no South Korean hibakusha—even those

104 Asahi Shimbun, “Hibaku Kankoku Josei o Chiryō ni Maneku. Okizari Okashii: Nagasaki de Sobo Ushinatta Ishi,” [Inviting a South Korean A-bomb Survivor Woman for Medical Treatment. Abandonment is Weird: A Doctor Who Lost His Grandmother in Nagasaki] July 21, 1972, Box 4, HT0400800, HUA. 105 Asahi Shimbun, “Kankoku kara Chiryō ni Raihiro: Hibaku Fujin, Harada Ishi ga Shōtai,” [Coming to Hiroshima from South Korea for Medical Treatment: Dr. Harada Invites a Hibakusha Woman] November 14, 1973, Box 4, HT0400900, HUA.

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who had legally entered Japan and could find the necessary two Japanese witnesses— possessed A-bomb certificates, meaning that none were entitled to free medical treatment in

Japan.106

A South Korean woman, Kim Yeong-ja was the first hibakusha invited by Dr.

Kawamura at his hospital. Following Sin’s suggestion about treating South Korean A-bomb victims in Hiroshima, Dr. Kawamura contacted him and asked him to select people from the Korea Association who could be sent to Japan. Dr. Kawamura then secured permission for the legal entrance of hibakusha from the consulate in Shimonoseki. Dr. Kawamura took this first step hoping to create a precedent in which similar movements would develop nationwide with Japanese doctors inviting Korean A-bomb victims to their hospitals and providing medical support.107 Kim arrived in Hiroshima on March 27, 1973 and was hospitalized in the Kawamura Hospital.108 She submitted her application for an A-bomb certificate on April 11. She was in the Hirose Kita-machi district of Hiroshima inside her house when the bomb was dropped and repatriated to Korea with her parents in September

1945. As of 1973, she was 31 years old, married, and had three children. However, she

106 No South Korean hibakusha were issued A-bomb certificates by the Japanese authorities between 1965 and 1974. Although there were a few cases when they were given certificates in the early ‘60s, before the signing of the Japan-Korea Treaty, their number was very small. After the Japan-Korea Treaty, none of those hibakusha coming to Japan following Dr. Kawamura’s invitation possessed or could be issued A-bomb certificates until Son Jin-doo’s first legal victory in 1974. Sin Yeong-soo was the first who was given the certificate in July 1974. 107 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Jihi de Maneki Chiryō e,” [Inviting Patients for Medical Treatment via Self-expense] January 21, 1973, Box 4, HT0400900, HUA. 108 Chūgoku Shimbun, “I wa Jinjutsu ni Kokkyō Nashi: Kankoku Hibakusha, 27 Nichi ni Hiroshima e,” [There Is No Border to Humanistic Medicine: A Korean Hibakusha Arrives in Hiroshima on 27th] March 24, 1973, Box 4, HT0400900, HUA.

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often got sick and spent eight months a year in bed.109 Although having gone through all the legal procedures, the Japanese authorities rejected her application for an A-bomb certificate. Dr. Kawamura invited a second patient from South Korea at the Otemachi

Hospital in December 1973. From that point on, he brought hibakusha from South Korea to

Hiroshima regularly until 1980, when the Japanese–South Korean intergovernmental exchange program was formally launched. Over eight years he examined and treated 50 people.110

Efforts to build up a support network

Dr. Kawamura made effort to mobilize members of the South Korean and Japanese society to collaborate towards the medical support of Korean hibakusha beginning in the 1970s. As a graduate of Keijō University, he took advantage of his connections in South Korea and contacted many former classmates who had by then become prominent doctors.

Additionally, as a member of numerous Christian groups and associations, he sought to convince religious leaders of the need to help Korean A-bomb survivors. He recognized that to be able to provide thousands of hibakusha with medical care, a wide-ranging support network had to be created. Despite some success, such a network was never achieved.111

With the heavy emotions following the first medical visit, he spoke about the miserable and unsupported conditions of Korean hibakusha at the general meeting of the

109 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Hibaku Techō o Shinsei: Rainichi, Chiryōchū no Kankoku Fujin,” [Applying for the A-bomb Certificate: A Korean Woman Coming to Japan Being Under Medical Treatment] April 12, 1973, Box 4, HT0400900, HUA. 110 Kawamura, Iryō to Shinkō, 74. 111 For Dr. Kawamura’s discussing the support of Korean hibakusha with Munetoshi Fukagawa and other supporters, see Figure 12.

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Japan Christian Medical Association (JMCA) in the summer of 1972 in Okayama City, asking for the cooperation of the members. In response, JMCA promised to consider some means of support, after which the National Christian Council in Japan (NCC) agreed to cooperate. The Japan NCC contacted the Korean NCC who also offered their assistance, so

Dr. Kawamura had succeeded in mobilizing religious organizations to cooperate towards the assistance of Korean hibakusha.112

During his second trip to South Korea in October 1972, he visited the vice president of the Yonsei University Graduate School of Medicine in Seoul. The professor showed interest in the medical treatment of hibakusha and asked for Dr. Kawamura’s help to train him to acquire the necessary skills for treating radiation-induced illnesses. Moreover, Dr.

Kawamura visited a professor from the medical faculty of Hanyang University who agreed to carry out medical examinations of hibakusha. Both professors were also leading members of the Korean Christian Medical Association and were eager to work together with JMCA. When the Japanese medical team moved on to examine hibakusha in Busan, some city leaders and the Minister of Welfare in Busan visited the Christian Hospital to express their gratitude to the Japanese doctors. The politicians also met with some hibakusha in person, which had not happened during the Japanese team’s first visit.

Additionally, the South Korean Minister of Health went to Hapcheon to greet the Japanese medical team, which was the first time a high-ranking politician visited an off-the-beaten- track area. The South Korean politicians showed endorsement in the cause of Korean hibakusha although the government itself failed to implement any relief measures until the

112 Kawamura, “Tonichi Chiryō no Torikumi no Hajimari,” 9.

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1980 intergovernmental medical exchange program. It can be noted that the Japanese medical team was apparently able to facilitate smaller social changes while making the

Korean politicians aware of the Korean hibakusha problem. The Korean politicians welcomed and respected the Japanese medical group at the time when conflicts between the two governments seemed intractable. The medical team, with Dr. Kawamura as the leader, played a significant role in changing the existing preconceptions about the Japanese as prejudiced who abandoned Korean wartime victims.113

The South Korean hibakusha’s inability to break out of the cycle of poverty stemmed partly from the restrictions set by the 1961 Livelihood Protection Act in South Korea. The act provided subsidy “to about 5 percent of the population, with 60 to 80 percent of recipients living in rural areas. […] Not all of the poor were covered, budgetary constraints limited participation, and residency requirements made it hard” for many Koreans trapped in abject poverty to receive welfare benefits. “In October 2000, the Livelihood Protection

Act was effectively supplanted by the Minimum Living Standards Security Act, which tripled the share of the population eligible for assistance,” yet this support came too late for many hibakusha who had been excluded from the benefits of the welfare system until then.114 Dr. Kawamura realized after his first visit that the lack of an effective social assistance program further stalled the improvement of the hibakusha’s conditions.

113 Ibid., 10. 114 James W. McGuire, Wealth, Health, and Democracy in East Asia and Latin America, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 208.

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Another factor that hindered hibakusha from having access to universal health care was the absence of an extended health insurance system in South Korea until 1989.115 As a result, those who received medical care had to pay the whole fee, which was not affordable for A-bomb victims given their low income. This meant that no matter how well-equipped the Korean hospitals were, as long as the medical expenses were high, hibakusha could not enjoy the benefits of the health care system. Therefore, Dr. Kawamura appealed for the establishment of a medical center that treated hibakusha free of charge. Such a medical center was set up in Hapcheon in December 1973 by Kakkin Kaigi. However, Dr.

Kawamura was aware that the maintenance of the institute required great effort and substantial funds for which they asked for the assistance of the South Korean government.

The government assured the medical team and the Council members about their endorsement and also asked for Japan’s cooperation. In addition to the medical center built in Hapcheon, Dr. Kawamura argued that similar institutes needed to be set up in Busan and

Seoul, given the large number of hibakusha living in those cities. Concerning Japan, he suggested that the Association of Citizens for the Support of Korean Atomic Bomb Victims should be extended and it should collaborate with the NCC and other religious organizations. Unfortunately, his initiatives did not find any adherents and no such center was founded in other areas within South Korea.116

115 For more information on the South Korean health care system, see: Shin Dong-won, “Public Health and People’s Health: Contrasting the Paths of Healthcare Systems in South and North Korea, 1945-60,” in Public Health and National Reconstruction in Post-War Asia: International Influences, Local Transformations, eds. Liping Bu and Ka-che Yip, (London; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2015), 108. 116 Ibid., 12.

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Reverend Kim Sin-hwan was Dr. Kawamura’s most important aide from 1972 in his efforts to treat Korean A-bomb patients in Japan. He was engaged in the administrative tasks, translation, and recruiting supporters nationwide. In Japan, some Christian organizations expressed their wish to cooperate, and Reverend Kim could mobilize the

Kuwana Church in Mie Prefecture. In 1978 they set up the Association to Invite Atomic

Bomb Survivors from South Korea to the Hospitals in Hiroshima, which marked the beginning of the organizational medical support of Korean hibakusha.117 Dr. Kawamura was the leader of this small civic group and as indicated above paid the applicants’ roundtrip ticket, application fee, medical costs in his hospital and additional costs in Japan.

The Kuwana Church helped Dr. Kawamura with the administration and in searching for witnesses necessary for the application for A-bomb certificates.118 The Association collected nine million yen from fund-raising in total from 1978 to 1984. It was the forerunner of a larger organization that Dr. Kawamura established in 1984.119

Dr. Kawamura’s efforts to negotiate with various groups were not in vain. The

Korean Christian Medical Association planned to examine hibakusha in 1973 but for this it asked for the help of JMCA.120 Furthermore, after Dr. Kawamura’s appeal to provide

117 Kim Sin-hwan, “Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai: 24 Nen no Ayumi,” [Hiroshima Committee to Invite Korean A-bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment: A History of Twenty-four Years] speech at the Kiyoshi Tanimoto Peace Prize Presentation Ceremony, November 25, 2007. Text obtained from Sumiko Kawamura on December 31, 2016. Hereafter cited as Kim, “Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai: 24 Nen no Ayumi,” December 31, 2016. 118 Kim Sin-hwan, “‘Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai’ no Kessei to ‘Tonichi Chiryō’,” [Formation of the ‘Hiroshima Committee to Invite Korean A-bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment’ and ‘Coming to Japan for Medical Treatment’] in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 17-18. Hereafter cited as Kim, “‘Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai’ no Kessei to ‘Tonichi Chiryō’.” 119 Kim, “Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai: 24 Nen no Ayumi,” December 31, 2016. 120 Ibid.

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hibakusha with medical treatment in South Korea, Yeungnam University in Daegu City followed suit and began treating the A-bomb victims. Additionally, the Severance Hospital of the Yonsei University in Seoul organized the Yonsei Medical Association to Treat the A- bomb Victims and treated 2,000 hibakusha in Hapcheon. The Korean Christian Church

Women Association continued its financial assistance of hibakusha and played a significant role in conducting various surveys on their health and living conditions.121

Dr. Kawamura had worked hard to induce various religious and medical organizations in Japan as well as South Korea to cooperate in securing medical assistance for Korean A- bomb survivors. He achieved some success in Seoul and Daegu and obtained the assistance of some Christian groups. Although he had never been involved in politics, he drew the attention of many politicians in South Korea who praised his relief efforts. For his medical assistance of Korean hibakusha, he received a letter of appreciation from the Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Japan. Furthermore, in 1984, he was given a presidential award by Chun Doo-hwan for his long-term support of South Korean atomic bomb survivors.122

121 Kim, “‘Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai’ no Kessei to ‘Tonichi Chiryō’,” 22. 122 Kawamura, Iryō to Shinkō, 71. See Figure 11. It is important to note that although Dr. Kawamura received an award from Chun Doo-hwan, the former South Korean President was an authoritarian army general infamous for ordering the murder and torture of thousands who protested for democracy in 1980 (known as the Gwangju Massacre). For his involvelemt in the massacre he was sentenced to death in 1996 but later received presidential pardon. In light of this, it is less likely that Chun was motivated by supporting humanitarians when awarding Dr. Kawamura. Rather, the former South Korean President’s endorsement of Kawamura’s pacifist efforts is indicative of his anti- Japanese nationalism and condemnation of Japan’s colonization of Korea.

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The Hiroshima Committee to Invite Korean A-bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical

Treatment

As elaborated in Chapter 3, the Japanese and South Korean governments made an agreement to bring hibakusha from South Korea to Japan for medical treatment in 1980.

This was the very first support measure taken by the two governments on behalf of Korean hibakusha, and the impact of Dr. Kawamura’s individual assistance program in the 1970s on the governments’ actions as well as the positive outcome of the Son Jin-doo trial is clearly noticeable.123 With the beginning of the government exchange program, Dr.

Kawamura stopped inviting hibakusha to his hospital.124 However, there was a two-month limit for each person and they were not provided with another opportunity to return to

Japan for a second treatment if their health condition worsened. For this reason, many of these patients asked Sin if there was any way for them to receive medical treatment once again. Sin visited Hiroshima in June 1984 and informed Dr. Kawamura about the nearly twenty people in the Korea Association who wished to return to Japan for a second treatment. He asked Dr. Kawamura if it was feasible to invite these people once more, independent of the government program. This prompted Dr. Kawamura to set up an association that provides medical treatment for hibakusha who had been in Japan for treatment but whose disease had recurred.125

123 Kim, “‘Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai’ no Kessei to ‘Tonichi Chiryō’,” 18. 124 Kawamura. Interview with the author. 125 Toratarō Kawamura, “Nyūsu Hakkan ni Yosete,” [Contributing to the News Publication] in Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] No. 1, May 1985: 1 in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 1. Hereafter cited as Kawamura, “Nyūsu Hakkan ni Yosete.”

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Following Dr. Kawamura’s invitation, 23 people gathered in the conference room of the Kawamura Hospital on August 2, 1984. That was the day when the Hiroshima

Committee to Invite Korean A-bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment (hereafter

Hiroshima Committee) was established. Dr. Kawamura said at the meeting, “[with the current government program,] the nearly 20,000 hibakusha in South Korea will not be saved. We should act as an intermediary and invite [for medical treatment] as many people as possible.” Prominent leaders from the region were present at the meeting, including the chairperson of the Prefectural Medical Association, the head of the City Medical

Association, the general director of YMCA, a representative of Mindan, presidents of labor unions, the director of the Kumahira Bank, the director of the Hiroshima Radiology

Research Institute, and the executive director of the Chūgoku broadcast.126 This shows that

Dr. Kawamura was able to mobilize affluent and prestigious members of society, doctors, people from the media, and those having been involved in the Korean hibakusha support since the 1970s. Takashi Hiraoka and Munetoshi Fukagawa were also among the founding members.127

At the founding of the group, Dr. Kawamura told the members that “concerning the medical program that invited Korean hibakusha to Japan for medical treatment, there is a big discrepancy in how Japanese and Korean hibakusha are treated. Therefore, this committee was launched out of the goodwill and wish for compensation of some private

126 Kim, “‘Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai’ no Kessei to ‘Tonichi Chiryō’,” 18. 127 Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, [Hiroshima Committee to Invite South Korean A- bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment] Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, [The Road to Bring South Korean Hibakusha to Japan for Medical Treatment] (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 30.

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citizens who now invite Korean hibakusha to Japan to provide them with medical treatment.

When it comes to the Korean hibakusha problem, honesty and good intentions are of vital importance.” He further added that “instead of discussing the problem [and waiting until the condition of hibakusha further deteriorates], it is time to take action.”128 The Committee believed that the Japanese government had to take some measures to support and compensate the wartime victims, but seeing its stance after the Japan-Korea Treaty there was little prospect for the introduction of some relief measures in the near future.

The Committee maintained itself through fund-raising programs and membership fees to provide for Korean hibakusha’s medical treatment in Japan. It published its bulletin called Hiroshima Committee News to inform the citizens about the Committee’s activities as well as the actual situation of Korean hibakusha. Dr. Kawamura always regarded the

Committee as a participant in the peace and anti-war/anti-nuclear movement. Instead of forming a political movement, it focused on the medical assistance through which it disseminated the message of “No More Hiroshima” and “No More Hibakusha.”129

In the initial years, a small number of Korean hibakusha were treated in Japan due to the Hiroshima Committee’s shoestring budget, but the patients received good care and there was no limit on their hospitalization period. The applicants could request a visa for medical treatment that lasted for thirty days, but those who wished to stay in Japan for a longer medical treatment could have their visa renewed. South Korean hibakusha could also apply

128 Toratarō Kawamura, “Aratana Shisaku o Saguru,” [Searching for a New Measure] in Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] No. 6, November 1986: 1 in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 25. 129 Kim, “‘Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai’ no Kessei to ‘Tonichi Chiryō’,” 18.

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to return for a second or third treatment to Hiroshima three years after their first treatment.

However, beginning in 1999, owing to the large number of applicants, the treatment of one person was limited to two months so that more hibakusha could receive treatment. The

Kawamura Hospital bore the greatest burden and received 75% of the patients, but other hospitals, such as the Mitajiri Hospital in Hōfu, Yamaguchi Prefecture; the Nagasaki Yūai

Hospital in Nagasaki City; and the Hannan Chūō Hospital in Matsubara City cooperated, too. 22.3% of hibakusha coming to Japan were hospitalized in the Hiroshima Kyōritsu

Hospital.130

Although the Committee made great efforts to bring to Japan as many hibakusha as possible and intended to fill gaps in the intergovernmental medical program, it faced many challenges that were not easy to overcome. Unlike in the 1970s when Dr. Kawamura individually invited Korean hibakusha at his hospital despite most of them not possessing

A-bomb certificates, this time the Committee could only ensure medical treatment for those with certificates. Thus, finding witnesses and applying for the certificate many years after the bombing was a serious problem for the Committee members. The Committee could not cover the medical costs, so those patients without certificates could not be hospitalized.

Furthermore, language barrier meant another problem. In the initial years, mostly older hibakusha participated in the program who could speak Japanese, but later, with the increase of younger people many of the hibakusha could only speak Korean. Thus, the

Committee had to employ interpreters twice a week in the Kawamura and Kyōritsu

Hospital. Moreover, the seriously sick people who would have been in need for medical

130 Ibid., 19-20.

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assistance the most could not endure the journey to Japan, hence they could not enjoy the benefits of this program.131

The Committee members were engaged in fund-raising activities to cover the expenses of hibakusha coming to Japan. For each person, approximately 100,000 yen was necessary. As a result of the hard work of the Committee, the hospitalization of two hibakusha could be realized in December 1984, and two more people came to Hiroshima in the following March.132

The Committee continued the program to bring South Korean hibakusha to Japan from 1984 until 2016 (for 32 years). Dr. Toratarō Kawamura passed away on June 21,

1987, having provided both Japanese and Korean hibakusha with medical treatment until the end of his life. Following his death, his son, Dr. Yuzuru Kawamura became the chairperson of the Committee and carried on his father’s legacy. He has said that Korean hibakusha are “historical living proofs” of “what the Japanese had done to Korea in the past and had shown a cold attitude [abandoned them and denied their financial and medical assistance] afterward.” He first began treating Korean A-bomb survivors in his father’s hospital in 1981 but he claims that until 1993 he could not identify with their suffering.

However, a trip to Gyeonju, South Korea changed him forever. There, his father’s close friend asked him to make a speech on August 15 (Independence Day in South Korea) in the local church. Then, he stated that the Hiroshima Committee was a movement launched with the goal to “make remorse about the crimes the Japanese had committed against the

Koreans in the past” and asked for the forgiveness of the victims. Following his speech, he

131 Ibid., 20-22. 132 Kawamura, “Nyūsu Hakkan ni Yosete,” 1-2.

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talked with many church members, after which he became more devoted to providing

Korean hibakusha with medical treatment.133 Concerning the Committee’s activities, Dr.

Yuzuru Kawamura said: “as long as there is even one applicant who wished to get medical treatment in Japan, we will go on with it.”134 Until 2016, with the help of nearly 1,000

Committee members, the medical treatment of 572 South Korean hibakusha could be realized.135 Meanwhile, both Japan and South Korea acknowledged the Hiroshima

Committee’s hard work and achievement. At first, Reverend Kim received the Kiyoshi

Tanimoto Peace Prize in 1996, and eleven years later the Committee itself was given the same award.136 Additionally, as a proof of their appreciation, the Korean Minister of

Foreign Affairs Award was presented to the Committee in March 2015.137 “With this award, the Korean government recognizes the group’s efforts to bring A-bomb survivors from

Korea to Hiroshima to provide medical care to them at no cost.”138

The work of the Committee over 32 years demonstrates that bi-national grassroots cooperation could help more people altogether than the two governments did in the 1980s.

133 Quoted in the documents shown at Dr. Yuzuru Kawamura’s house on July 10, 2016. 134 Kim, “‘Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai’ no Kessei to ‘Tonichi Chiryō’,” 22. 135 Mainichi Shimbun, “Shimin Dantai ‘Yakume Oeta:’ Iryōhi Shikyū Jitsugen de, Hiroshima de Kaiken,” [Citizens’ Group Finished Its Duty: The Supply of Medical Expenses Is Realized; Press Conference in Hiroshima] May 13, 2016. http://mainichi.jp/articles/20160513/ddl/k34/040/634000c (accessed: July 15, 2016). 136 Concerning the list of the Kiyoshi Tanimoto Peace Prize winners, see (in Japanese): Kōeki Zaidan Hōjin Hiroshima Pisu Senta [Hiroshima Peace Center Public Interest Incorporated Association], “Tanimoto Kiyoshi Heiwashō Jushōsha: Dantaimei Ichiran,” [Kiyoshi Tanimoto Peace Prize Winners: List of the Group Names] http://www.hiroshima-peace-center.jp/peace_award/list.html (accessed: January 12, 2017). Kiyoshi Tanimoto was an atomic bomb survivor from Hiroshima and a key hibakusha activist who helped spread the narrative of the atomic bombing both in Japan and in the United States. After his death, the Kiyoshi Tanimoto Peace Prize was established (in 1987) to honor those who excelled in peace-related activities. See: Caroline Chung Simpson, An Absent Presence: Japanese Americans in Postwar American Culture, 1945 – 1960, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001), 119. 137 See Figure 13. 138 Michiko Tanaka, “Korean Government Gives Award to Hiroshima Group Which Supports Korean A- bomb Survivors,” April 3, 2015. http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=42701 (accessed: July 15, 2016).

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While the governmental program from 1980 to 1986 invited 349 hibakusha to Japan, the

Hiroshima Committee provided medical treatment for 572 A-bomb survivors for more than three decades. The Committee collected funds through membership fees and fund-raising events to cover medical fees and travel expenses of the patients. When the Japanese and

South Korean governments discontinued the Korean hibakusha medical relief program in

1986, these Japanese citizens remained the only organization providing medical assistance for Korean hibakusha free of charge. The Committee received those who were on the waiting list to come to Japan through the government program but were unable due to its termination.139 From the 1990s, the Hiroshima Kyōritsu Hospital received many of these patients, with Dr. Hiroshi Maruya as one of the main advocates of the program.140

The Committee’s activities came to a close in May 2016 yet there were still many hibakusha in South Korea waiting for medication. Following the landmark decision of the

Supreme Court “in favor of full reimbursement of medical expenses to survivors living overseas” in September 2015, the Committee believed it had accomplished its mission. At a press conference held in Hiroshima City on May 12, 2016, Dr. Yuzuru Kawamura said,

“My father was always telling me that he would not be able to retire until the day the government started covering the survivors’ medical expenses. But that day has finally come, and we’d like to express our gratitude to the many people who have offered us their

139 Nearly 200 people were on the waiting list who could not get medical treatment in Japan through the government medical program because of its termination but were gradually invited to Japan through the Hiroshima Committee. For more information, see Kim, “‘Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai’ no Kessei to ‘Tonichi Chiryō’,” 18. 140 Ishida, “Zaikan Hibakusha no Kenkōshindan no Hōkoku,” 508.

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support.”141 Had it not been for Dr. Toratarō Kawamura’s initiatives to treat Korean hibakusha in Japan free of charge, hundreds of these victims might have passed away without ever receiving proper medical treatment, and probably no awareness of their difficult situation would have emerged in Japan or South Korea.

141 Mizukawa Kyosuke, “Hiroshima Group Supporting Korean A-bomb Survivors to End Its Activities,” May 13, 2016. http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=60281 (accessed: July 15, 2016).

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Dr. Toratarō Kawamura was committed to the medical assistance of atomic bomb survivors until the end of his life. He treated his patients without discrimination, regardless of whether they were Japanese or Korean. At the time when Korean hibakusha were emotionally and physically worn out, he opened up new possibilities for them with his medical assistance programs. As Dr. Kawamura said once, his life mission was to help the sick and live his life in the spirit of Christianity.142

Whereas the Japanese government’s constant emphasis on having resolved all the wartime-related issues between Japan and South Korea in the 1965 Japan-Korea Treaty

(although not providing any compensation for victims such as hibakusha, forced laborers, and women sexually abused by the Japanese army) adversely affected the South Korean–

Japanese relations, Japanese grassroots initiatives for backing the Korean victims of Japan’s colonial period contributed to the Koreans beginning to trust the good intentions of the

Japanese that led to a gradual improvement in the relation of the two nations. Dr.

Kawamura, through his medical visits to South Korea to treat and examine hibakusha there and launching his individual medical relief program by inviting hibakusha to Japan for medical treatment that expanded into an organizational support movement in time, played a pivotal role in building a bridge based on peace, friendliness, and confidence between

Japan and South Korea.

His most important legacy is the citizen-based Hiroshima Committee that he set up in

1984 with the aim of inviting South Korean A-bomb survivors to Japan for medical treatment. Although being a small-scale organization with a limited budget, the Committee

142 Kawamura, Iryō to Shinkō, 45.

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embodied the inclination of some Japanese to change the living standard of Korean hibakusha for the better, and with this, attempted to promote reconciliation between the two nations. As indicated above, from 1984 to 2016, the Committee could accomplish the medical treatment of 572 hibakusha. After 1986, it remained the only organization that implemented the medical treatment of Korean hibakusha in Japanese hospitals while receiving no funds from the national government or city authorities. With its continual medical aid, the Committee undoubtedly paved the way for the 2015 Supreme Court decision that guaranteed complete reimbursement of the medical expenses of Korean hibakusha. This ruling has settled one of the most long-standing wartime conflicts and contributed to easing the tensions over entrenched historical antagonism between South

Korea and Japan.

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CHAPTER 6: CASE OF THE KOREAN A-BOMB VICTIMS’

UNRETURNED ASHES: MUNETOSHI FUKAGAWA’S INVESTIGATION

Munetoshi Fukagawa143 was different from the earlier described supporters in that neither did he provide medical or direct legal assistance for Korean hibakusha, nevertheless, his contribution in this area is significant, and he deserves to be mentioned among those

Japanese activists who worked hard for the relief of Korean atomic bomb victims. He sympathized with the plight of Koreans in the colonial period and was convinced that the dead must be honored and must have a decent burial place in their homeland. He was determined to realize the repose of the souls of a certain group of Korean A-bomb victims who had survived the bombing but had never made it back to their homeland due to the shipwreck they had suffered at sea. One might argue that his activities were insignificant since those already passed away could not be compensated, however, this was a sign of his respect for the dead, and his goal was to console their souls. He was aware how desperately these Koreans had wished to return to their homeland after the war, and he aimed to pay tribute to them through his investigation.

Fukagawa worked at Mitsubishi’s Hiroshima Machinery Works and conducted administrative duties in the western dormitory of the Korean workers in 1945. Unlike other

Japanese supervisors, he felt a deep sympathy for the plight of Koreans. He learned that many of the Mitsubishi Korean laborers exposed to the atomic bomb had disappeared at sea in September 1945 on their way back to Korea and Mitsubishi had never launched any

143 See Figure 14 and 15.

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investigation to find out what had happened with them. In the early 1970s he immersed himself in an investigation to discover how these victims had disappeared and what had happened to their bodies. He visited Iki Island and Tsushima where the bodies were suspected to have been washed ashore, talked to the local people, and made strong efforts to return the remains of the victims to their bereaved families in South Korea, although he could never achieve this. Until the end of his life Fukagawa firmly believed that the remains must be returned to South Korea so that the disappeared Koreans could receive a decent funeral in their homeland.

The significance of Fukagawa’s investigation went beyond the case of the 246

Koreans lost at sea. His research brought to surface other unresolved wartime issues between Japan and South Korea. Most importantly, he pointed out that the Korean forced laborers in Hiroshima were A-bomb survivors at the same time, suffering multiple damages under Imperial Japan’s colonial rule, so they deserved multiple compensations. With this, he facilitated awareness among many former Korean Mitsubishi workers of their rights, and from the 1990s on, many of them filed a suit in Japan demanding wartime reparations for forced labor, the atomic bomb damage, and they also requested the return of their unpaid wages from Mitsubishi. Although they have never received any reparations from Mitsubishi to date, the Japanese government compensated them for being hibakusha in 2007, after twelve years of legal battle. Fukagawa’s research revealed the negligence of Mitsubishi and other zaibatsu144 and their brutal treatment of the Korean and other workers145 during

144 Zaibatsu means “financial clique” and they “were huge trusts with holdings in a wide range of industries and commerce that dominated Japan from the era of industrialization in the late ninteenth century through the

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World War II. With this, he paved the way for many of these former workers still alive to seek justice at Japanese courts and claim their rights. Additionally, the Japanese government and the zaibatsu’s failure to take the former workers safely back to their homeland was also unfolded, calling into question Japan’s post-war settlement with its former colonies. Not only did the zaibatsu exploit the conscripted workers but after the war failed to return the ashes of those who had died during work in Japan and whose remains had been placed in Japanese temples. To date the problem of the unreturned ashes is still unresolved, and besides the Korean workers about whom Fukagawa was investigating, there are other known cases that the remains of Koreans are stored in Japan and have not been taken back to South Korea yet.146

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in Hiroshima

Following Japan’s ambition to expand its empire all over Southeast Asia and the escalation of the Second Sino-Japanese War, Japan needed a substantial workforce that could maintain and foster its developing war industry, thus resorting to the practice of forced recruitment. There was no discussion of the Korean forced laborers in Japan until the 1965

Japan-Korea Treaty, and it was Park Kyung Sik’s work Chōsenjin Kyōseirenkō no Kiroku

(Record of Korean Forced Mobilization) published in 1965 that first shed light on Imperial end of World War II.” For more information, see Palmer, “Foreign Forced Labor at Mitsubishi’s Nagasaki and Hiroshima Shipyards,” 161-167. 145 With Japan’s territorial expansion in Southeast Asia, apart from the Koreans, the empire forced many Chinese, Manchurians, Western POWs, Javanese, Burmese, and Malays in the occupied territories to work under abhorrent conditions. For more information on forced labor in Imperial Japan, see Werner Gruhl, Imperial Japan’s World War Two, 1931-1945, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007), 107-128. 146 For more information on the unreturned ashes of the Koreans who died in Japan until August 1945, see Asahi Shimbun, “Rekishi to Mukiau Dai 5 Bu: Shinjitsu to Wakai: 5: Ima Sagasu, Chōyō no Ikotsu,” [Part 5: Facing History: The Truth and Reconciliation] December 21, 2006.

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Japan’s exploitation of the Korean people and played an important role in raising awareness of Japan’s wartime responsibility.147 Even nowadays, many Japanese keep denying the existence of forced labor, and they emphasize that Koreans working in Japan during the war crossed over “of their own free will and were not ‘forced’ in the sense of being compelled to work.”148 Nevertheless, at present, the issue of coerced labor appears in

Japanese popular culture, and the Japanese textbooks briefly touch upon this issue, too, implying that Japan, albeit grudgingly, is treading the path of resolving issues lingering from wartime period. Hahakigi Hōsei’s famous novel, Mitabi no Kaikyō (Three Trips

Across the Strait), which was turned into a movie in 1995, accurately depicts the conditions of the Korean workers in Japan during the war and unveils their despondent situation.149

Japan began to recruit Koreans and bring them to Japan from 1939. Conscription had three periods: “‘recruitment through private hiring’ from September 1939 to February 1942;

‘recruitment through official mediation’ from March 1942 to August 1944; and

‘recruitment through national conscription’ from September 1944 to August 1945.”150

Initially, they targeted 85,000 Korean workers. From 1941, recruitment continued through the bureaucracy, aiming for 120,000 more people. By 1944, Japan had been involved in the

Asia-Pacific War for three years, and after the initial successful battles and territorial gains, things turned for the worse for the Asian empire. For going on with the war Japan was in

147 For more information on Park Kyung Sik’s activities, see Takashi Yoshida, “Remembering Colonial Korea in Postwar Japan,” in ‘History Wars’ and Reconciliation in Japan and Korea: The Roles of Historians, Artists and Activists, ed. Michael Lewis, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 21-24. 148 Hisako Naitō, “Korean Forced Labor in Japan’s Wartime Empire,” in Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire: Unknown Histories, ed. Paul H. Kratoska, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 92. Hereafter cited as Naitō, “Korean Forced Labor in Japan’s Wartime Empire.” 149 For more information on Hahakigi Hōsei’s Mitabi no Kaikyō, see Naitō, “Korean Forced Labor in Japan’s Wartime Empire,” 90-92. 150 Ibid., 93.

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desperate need for new workforce. Hence, the government introduced conscription and that year 200,000 Koreans had to come to Japan and work in factories producing war materials or in coal mines under miserable circumstances. Those who got the conscription order and failed to obey were threatened with arrest and punishment. The authorities promised the families remaining on the Korean Peninsula that half of the wages of their conscripted relatives would be remitted to them every month. However, in most cases the families hardly received anything from Japan. Most of these conscriptions took place in Gyeonggi- do, Pyeongtaek-gun, Anseon-gun, and Hanseong-gun (former name for Seoul). The majority of the conscripted was born in 1923 and was 21 years old at that time.151

Mitsubishi in Hiroshima started its operation in March 1944. It had two main factories:

Mitsubishi Machinery Works in Kanon-machi and Mitsubishi Shipyard in Eba-machi. At first, Mitsubishi only employed Japanese workers but from May 1944, 1,500 Korean conscripted laborers were newly admitted. In October 1944 further 1,200 Koreans entered

Mitsubishi and they were accommodated in two dormitories, the western and northern dormitory. Nevertheless, their living condition was very dire. Many workers were huddled together in one room where they had a one-mat sleeping place (1.53 m2) on a very thin futon. Additionally, Mitsubishi did not ensure them decent food. They went to bed starving so they spent their little salary mostly on food on their days off which was merely two days

151 Mitsubishi Hiroshima Genchōyōkō Hibakusha Saiban o Shiensuru Kai, [Association to Support the Lawsuit of the Former Mitsubishi Hiroshima Conscripted Laborers Who Were Exposed to the Atomic Bomb] Han Mitsubishi, Hiroshima: 46 Nin no Kankokujin Chōyōkō Hibakusha, [Grudge against Mitsubishi, Hiroshima: 46 Korean Conscripted Laborers Exposed to the Atomic Bomb] (Tokyo: Sōshisha, 2010), 22. Hereafter cited as Genchōyōkō Hibakusha Saiban o Shiensuru Kai, Han Mitsubishi, Hiroshima.

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a month.152 Compared to the Japanese workers, their salary was much less, the quality of their meal was much worse, which led to frequent riots and incidents in the dormitory.153

By the summer of 1945, Japan’s inevitable defeat became apparent not only for many

Japanese exhausted from the war but also for the Korean forced laborers. As a result, many

Koreans escaped from Mitsubishi and by August 15, their number dropped from 2,800 to

900 in the two factories.154 When the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, both Mitsubishi factories were approximately four kilometers from the hypocenter, and given the relative distance there were no fatalities, although many workers suffered serious injuries from glass fragments and the buildings were partially destroyed.155

In the following days, Mitsubishi gave no instruction for the workers neither did it provide the injured with medical assistance. Those who left the dormitories had to find accommodation and food on their own, and while walking through the irradiated city, they were exposed to a significant amount of residual radiation. The conscripted workers were officially released on August 30, after which they strove to get back to their liberated homeland. Whereas Mitsubishi would have been responsible for the safe return of the workers to Korea, it failed in its duty. Most former laborers left Hiroshima to return to

Korea by themselves, either from Shimonoseki or from Hakata on vessels that were not safe enough to cross the Sea of Japan back to Busan. Some of these boats suffered shipwreck due to typhoons in September and October and many workers died along their

152 Ibid., 22, 27. 153 Munetoshi Fukagawa, Chinkon no Kaikyō: Umi ni Kieta Hibaku Chōsenjin Chōyōkō, [Straits of Dead Souls – The Korean Forced Laborers, Survivors of the Atomic Bomb, Who Vanished into the Sea] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1992), 19. Hereafter cited as Fukagawa, Chinkon no Kaikyō. 154 Ibid., 26. 155 Palmer, “The Straits of Dead Souls,” 342.

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way, never to make it back to their homeland. Even those former Mitsubishi workers who safely returned to Korea suffered from injuries that had not been treated in the wake of the bombing. They developed various diseases in the coming years due to their exposure to radiation, thus being unable to work and fend for their families.156

Fukagawa and Mitsubishi

Munetoshi Fukagawa was born in Hiroshima in 1921. In the wartime period, he served in the navy; however, after contracting tuberculosis, he retired from service.157 He was employed by Hiroshima Mitsubishi in July 1945 as a supervisor of the Korean workers in the western dormitory.158 His Korean assistant was No Seong-ok, who was born and raised in Hiroshima.159 No’s older brother, No Jang-su worked as the leader of Hiroshima

Kyōwakai, and given his prestigious position, No Seong-ok was appointed as an instructor at Mitsubishi.160 Fukagawa and No experienced the atomic bombing together in the western dorm, which was a “bond between the two men that could not be severed.”161 Fukagawa recalled that although the building itself did not collapse, there were glass fragments all over the place, and following the blast he lost consciousness. After regaining consciousness,

Fukagawa claimed everything was dark as if it had been nighttime, and after leaving the building they were caught by the black rain. After a few days of searching for his younger

156 Genchōyōkō Hibakusha Saiban o Shiensuru Kai, Han Mitsubishi, Hiroshima, 20. 157 Ibid., 34. 158 Palmer, “The Straits of Dead Souls,” 339. 159 See Figure 16. 160 Genchōyōkō Hibakusha Saiban o Shiensuru Kai, Han Mitsubishi, Hiroshima, 26. Kyōwakai was an organization established during the war with the aim of regulating and maintaining order over the Koreans residing in Japan. For more information, see Genchōyōkō Hibakusha Saiban o Shiensuru Kai, Han Mitsubishi, Hiroshima, 26 and Palmer, “The Straits of Dead Souls,” 338. 161 Palmer, “The Straits of Dead Souls,” 342.

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sisters, Fukagawa returned to the dormitory finding himself to be the only supervisor staying in the building.162

Following Korea’s liberation, the workers were bent on going back to Korea to be reunited with their families. No Seong-ok informed Fukagawa in September that he would escort 240 workers from the western dormitory and would be leaving Hiroshima on

September 15, together with his five family members. No Jang-su and Fukagawa saw the

246 Koreans off at Hiroshima Station and that was the last time he had met them. They were supposed to arrive in Busan by September 20, however the notification that they made it back safely had never arrived in Hiroshima. Given their disappearance, twenty days after the departure of the Koreans, their families from Korea contacted Mitsubishi and informed them that the former workers had not arrived yet and asked for investigation into this case.

Mitsubishi neither replied nor conducted any investigation.163

In the postwar years, “Fukagawa was also living a desolate life, for he too had been affected by the bomb and felt hopelessly uncertain about the future.”164 After being dismissed from Mitsubishi, he continued his career as a tanka poet, wrote poetry about his

A-bomb experience, and was also a peace activist in the anti-nuclear movements. He had always kept in mind the memory of the former Korean workers but lost contact with all his

Korean acquaintances following the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.165 In 1967 he suggested an investigation into their case for the first time at the Japan Arts Council and

162 Fukagawa, Chinkon no Kaikyō, 22-25. 163 Ibid., 26-29. 164 Keisaburō Toyonaga, “About Survivors of Hiroshima Living in Korea,” in Perilous Memories: the Asia- Pacific War(s), eds. Geoffrey M. White, Takashi Fujitani, and Lisa Yoneyama, (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001), 387. Hereafter cited as Toyonaga, “About Survivors of Hiroshima Living in Korea.” 165 Ibid.

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repeatedly emphasized his proposal at the Hiroshima Peace Education Research Institute’s first meeting in 1973. His appeal for unfolding the truth did not find followers, so he decided to launch his individual research and investigation into the case of the 241 former

Mitsubishi workers and five family members who had left Hiroshima on September 15,

1945.166

Fukagawa’s Investigations into the Disappearance of 246 Koreans

Fukagawa published the development of his investigation in detail in 1974 in the book called Straits of Dead Souls–The Korean Forced Laborers, Survivors of the Atomic Bomb,

Who Vanished into the Sea.167 To substantiate the thorough work he had done for the

Mitsubishi forced laborers hibakusha, I use his book as a primary source in this part.

Fukagawa realized to retrace the route of the 246 Koreans, first he needed to find the port of departure and go on with his investigation based on eye-witness accounts. Most repatriates were departing from Senzaki, Hakata, and Shimonoseki, but there were some smaller ports, too, so Fukagawa began his journey in Senzaki in July 1973 to find out if this was the departure point of the Koreans concerned.168 After talking to the locals, Fukagawa realized that in 1945 boat accidents repeatedly happened due to either typhoon or naval mines at sea. His theory was that provided the 246 people got shipwrecked, the reason was either typhoon or naval mines. However, there were no official records of any boat accidents between Senzaki and Busan, but Fukagawa came across a Mainichi Shimbun

166 Fukagawa, Chinkon no Kaikyō, 29-30. 167 This English translation was used by David Palmer. 168 For the location of the potential ports of departure, see Figure 17.

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newspaper article from September 19, 1945 mentioning that heavy rain and typhoon hit

Yamaguchi Prefecture on the evening of September 17, which was the presumable date of departure of the 246 Koreans. Additionally, Fukagawa could meet with Yu Arisawa, one of the former members of the Association for the Relief of the Koreans.169 He said that in those days there were many Koreans waiting to return home and those who could not enter the refugee camp rented boats and set off by themselves. Arisawa heard rumors that some of those boats had sunk. Then, Fukagawa described the clothes the Mitsubishi workers had been wearing at that time, but the former association member could not recall such a group of people. Although Fukagawa did not get any information about the 246 Koreans at

Senzaki, which left him disappointed after all his efforts, at least he had a few theories what could have happened with them, and had some clue how to go on with the investigation.170

The next step was to trace the whereabouts and get into contact with No Jang-su, who had returned to Korea separately from his brother, and who, Fukagawa believed, lived in

South Korea then. Fukagawa remembered that Jang-su used to live in the Kusatsu-chō district of Hiroshima City. He went there and could talk to Jang-su’s former neighbor who recalled that Jang-su and his wife had gone back to Korea later than Seong-ok from the

Kusatsu fishing port on a wooden ship, boarding together with 200 other Koreans. Then,

Fukagawa could talk to one more person, a zainichi Korean, who heard some rumors according to which the 240 former Mitsubishi workers threw Seong-ok and his family into

169 It was a civilian-based group assisting the repatriation of Koreans, and their activities were highly praised by the prefecture. For more information, see Fukagawa, Chinkon no Kaikyō, 59. 170 Fukagawa, Chinkon no Kaikyō, 54-60.

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the sea as a revenge for their maltreatment at Mitsubishi. This was the third theory

Fukagawa had to consider.171

Next, Fukagawa contacted Korean journalists who, he believed, could help him find

Jang-su in South Korea. First, he got into touch with Park Dong-soon, the special representative of JoongAng Ilbo dispatched to Tokyo, who encouraged Fukagawa to go on with his investigation and helped him contact Im Joo-hyeon, a journalist at the Daegu head office of JoongAng Ilbo. Park conducted some research on No Seong-ok, and according to his report, the 246 Koreans had departed from Tobata Port, a smaller one, not from Senzaki, given the large number of people waiting to repatriate in the major ports. There, they had rented a one-hundred-ton wooden vessel, departed, and then had gone missing. All this information came from No Jang-su, whom Fukagawa was desperately searching for. Jang- su, upon his return to Korea in 1945, had visited the homes of the former conscripted workers and learned that none of the 240 one had made it back to Korea. Following this discovery, Fukagawa immediately made a phone call to Gimcheon-shi and could talk to

Jang-su, who remembered Fukagawa’s name from Mitsubishi. Jang-su confirmed that the

246 workers had departed from Tobata and he had also been looking for them in 1945 before his return to Korea. Also, Jang-su told Fukagawa he had witnessed hundreds of

Koreans being buried on Iki Island, which came as a shock to Fukagawa.172 Jang-su stated that the islands near Nagasaki were full of the bodies of Korean repatriates who became victims of either naval mines or typhoons. He had gone around Iki Island, all the ports and beaches, tried to talk to the locals but eventually gained no information about his brother

171 Ibid., 60-63. 172 For the location of Iki Island and Tsushima, see Figure 18.

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and the others who had boarded the same ship. Upon his return to Korea, he had contacted the bereaved families but after the outbreak of the Korean War they lost contact, and now

(1973) he did not have their addresses any more. In light of this, Fukagawa found a new path to continue his investigation: his next destination was Tobata in search of eyewitness accounts.173

Before that, he visited the Shimonoseki Meteorological Observatory to learn about the weather conditions between September 15 and 20, 1945. On September 17 the wind became stronger at 2 pm, and the northeast wind averaged 13.7 m/s, which already showed signs of the approaching typhoon. At 10 pm, the northern wind increased to 23.2 m/s and at

10:30 pm, already to 37.1 m/s. On that day, strong wind coupled with downpour: from

September 16 at 10 pm to September 17 at 10 pm, 146.7 mm precipitation was measured, which was record high. Furthermore, Fukagawa heard that vessels at that time were of weak structures, had no radios which meant they could not contact anyone in case of emergency, and could easily turn over if the wind was stronger than 10 m/s. With such a vessel, it took about eighteen hours under normal circumstances to get back to Busan.

Fukagawa also checked out the newspapers from September 15 and 16, which failed to report the approaching typhoon and downpour.174

Then, Fukagawa headed to Wakamatsu and Tobata City Hall in search for notification from the bereaved families, but despite the cooperation of the authorities he could not find any clue. At Tobata Port, he could talk to Ryōhei Kinoshita, the captain of a ship, who told

173 Fukagawa, Chinkon no Kaikyō, 63-66. 174 Ibid., 71-72.

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him that at that time many motorsailers had sunk due to Makurazaki Typhoon, but again there was no concrete information about the lost 246 Koreans he was looking for.175

In the newspapers published in September 1945, Fukagawa read some reports about the damage caused by Makurazaki Typhoon. 21 ships departing from Hakata Port had sunk and 20 grounded. From Wakamatsu, 22 motorsailers sank and five grounded. Moreover, thirteen motorsailers had sunk that had departed from Kanmon Port, and 60 barges were washed away. The number of ships departing from Tobata Port that had disappeared was not indicated. As we can see, many ships loaded with Korean returnees suffered shipwreck and even when the bones were found it would require a very thorough scientific investigation to determine whether they belong to the 246 Korean workers.176

After going around these smaller ports in Kyushu, Fukagawa headed for Tsushima

Island and arrived on October 18, 1973. There, many locals confirmed they had seen the bodies of Korean returnees washed ashore. Matsutarō Abiru was one of the witnesses and stated that there were no survivors following the typhoon, and a few days after they had buried about 20 bodies, but needless to say they could not identify those victims and had not known which area of Japan they had been living and working. Following that,

Fukagawa went to Iki Island and talked to Hatsuo Takeshita, who had returned to Iki from

Kagoshima on September 19, 1945, just in time to witness nearly 200 dead bodies of the victims of Makurazaki Typhoon. After hearing the testimonies of the locals, Fukagawa

175 Ibid., 73-74. 176 Ibid., 75.

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came to the conclusion that No Seong-ok and his group had sunk somewhere near Iki

Island, before reaching Tsushima.177

By then, Fukagawa heard a lot of information about the weather conditions and the many Koreans washed ashore on Iki Island and Tsushima but did not get closer to the solution of the mystery surrounding the case of the 241 Mitsubishi workers and their five family members. On November 19, 1973 he went to South Korea by ferry and the following day he could finally meet with No Jang-su in Busan, after 28 years. On

November 22 he arrived in Seoul, talked to some journalists, and then a report on his investigation was published both in JoongAng Ilbo and in Dong-a Ilbo. While being in

Seoul, he met the Japanese ambassador, Torao Ushiroku, who by then had read the articles about Fukagawa’s activities and highly praised his efforts. He said, “although the talks between Japan and Korea are over, settlement of the postwar issues has not finished yet,” adding that “if the bodies found on Iki Island and Tsushima turn out to be the bodies of the former Mitsubishi workers, the Japanese government has to handle that issue.”

Nevertheless, Fukagawa was aware that after 28 years, even when the remains are excavated, there is no way to identify those people.178

Instead, his new mission was to find the bereaved family members with the help of the Korean media. He went to the Tongyang Broadcasting Company’s studio and on the morning show he talked about the former Korean Mitsubishi workers. People all over

South Korea could see this program and could get information about Fukagawa’s investigation. Then, he could meet with the Korean Minister of Health and appealed for

177 Ibid., 76-85. 178 Ibid., 86-94.

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publishing a report on this case and the excavation and the return of the remains to South

Korea. Following the TV program and the newspaper reportage, Fukagawa managed to raise awareness in Korea and people quickly reacted. In the Suwon office of JoongAng Ilbo, two former conscripted laborers from Hiroshima showed up. Then, he was interviewed by the Jugan Jungang and his investigation had a big impact on the reporter. With his growing reputation, he began to change the existing perceptions about the Japanese among those

Koreans who learned about his research. In the hall of the JoongAng Ilbo head office, a person called Kwon O-bok was waiting for Fukagawa. His father had been working in

Hiroshima for Mitsubishi, sent a letter to the family that he would be back by September 18 but he had never returned. Fukagawa remembered his father’s name. Thanks to the media report, the family members of the lost Mitsubishi workers gradually showed up, and

Fukagawa’s investigation filled them with hope that they could find out the truth and the remains of their family members might be soon returned to South Korea. His one-week stay in South Korea was coming to a close, but during his first visit he had accomplished a lot.

Not only could he serve as a mediator between the Embassy of Japan and the South Korean government, but he could also have his investigation reported by the Korean media.179

Six months had passed since Fukagawa began his search for the lost Mitsubishi workers, and during this period, he visited the ports and the islands, collected testimonies, could contact some family members in South Korea, and could present the case in South

Korean–Japanese diplomatic circles, which was a remarkable achievement. In December

1973 Jong-su sent him a letter informing that someone appeared who claims he had met

179 Ibid., 94-100.

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with the Korean group and No Seong-ok in Shimonoseki and Tobata and had seen them off before their departure. Fukagawa, on the day he received Jong-su’s letter, went to the

Korean Consulate to apply for a visa to enter South Korea again. He was firmly determined to find out the truth and put a lot of hope in the new witness.180

Fukagawa crossed the sea again in January 1974 and continued his investigation in

South Korea. The new witness, Cheo Se-won, was a former conscripted worker who had met the group at Tobata and said that the vessel with the 246 Koreans on board departed on

September 17 at 10 am. Cheo also intended to board the same ship but was refused on the grounds it was already full; thus he could stay alive. Due to the typhoon, he could depart on

September 18 at 10 pm, and after two and a half days at sea he arrived in Busan safely. As a witness, he substantiated Fukagawa’s supposition that the 246 Koreans left from Tobata port and they got shipwrecked due to the Makurazaki Typhoon between Kyushu and

Busan.181

Additionally, Fukagawa could meet with new family members, and the number of them showing up gradually increased since the media broadcast. Before he left Seoul, together with No Jang-su and Kwon O-bok they held a preparatory meeting for the formation of the Association of the Bereaved Families of the Hiroshima Mitsubishi

Conscripted A-bombed Workers Who Were Lost at Sea (hereafter Bereaved Families

Association). The goal of the Association was to conduct a thorough survey on the remains of the Koreans washed ashore in 1945, focusing on Iki Island. Furthermore, it intended to propose the excavation and the return of the remains to the Korean and Japanese

180 Ibid., 111-114. 181 Ibid., 116, 145-146.

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government. Besides, it was bent on demanding compensation for the workers’ unpaid wages. Last but not least, it believed that erecting a monument for the memory of the 246

Koreans vanished at sea was of utmost importance. These were the challenges the

Association had to tackle with, however, Fukagawa was not alone anymore in his mission seeking for justice. He had the support of No Jang-su, the bereaved family members, and a few former Mitsubishi workers from the same dormitory still alive. Within a short period of time, he found many family members and heightened consciousness both in South Korea and in Japan of this long-forgotten tragedy of the Korean forced laborers. The Bereaved

Families Association was officially set up in Seoul on April 22, with No Jang-su as its chairperson.182

On April 23 members of the Association visited the Japanese ambassador and handed over a letter of request addressed to the Japanese government. They explained about the formation of the Association and their plan to confirm where the bodies were buried on Iki

Island, their request concerning the return of the remains, and compensation for the unpaid wages. The ambassador’s answer was that it would be difficult to address all three demands but first they try looking into the case of the remains. Then, they visited the South Korean

Ministry of Health and Welfare, which showed sympathy and ensured their cooperation with the issuing of passports in case the representatives needed to travel to Japan. They also met with a lawyer who was a Member of Parliament, and he promised to bring up the problem of the lost Mitsubishi workers and the requests of the Association on May 4 at the

182 Ibid., 151, 296.

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Japan-South Korea MP informal meeting and in the judicial committee, trying to legally investigate the Mitsubishi’s failure of paying the workers’ salary.183

On May 8, 1974 Fukagawa visited the Mitsubishi Shipbuilding Company’s general affairs department and could find two people working there who were familiar with the wartime conditions. After handing over the letter of request written by the Bereaved

Families Association, he claimed that Mitsubishi is accountable for not only No Seong-ok’s death but also for the 240 other workers’ since their safe return to Korea would have been

Mitsubishi’s responsibility, meaning that “Mitsubishi’s Japanese management, not a

Korean, should have leadership over a new group.”184 Additionally, he demanded the reimbursement of their unpaid wages, the paying of the compulsory savings, and financial support of the bereaved families.185 However, Fukagawa seemed to have forgotten one very important detail. Mitsubishi had paid the 241 workers before they left Hiroshima on

September 15, 1945. The conscripted workers were officially released on August 30 but there were hundreds of those who had already escaped either before the atomic bomb attack or during its chaos, and for those Mitsubishi obviously had not handed over their salary.

Nevertheless, those who left Mitsubishi after August 30 were provided with their wages, indeed. This means that the 241 workers did receive their payment from Mitsubishi, however, they could not testify it since no one ever repatriated to South Korea and

183 Ibid., 174-175. 184 Palmer, “The Straits of Dead Souls,” 340. 185 Fukagawa, Chinkon no Kaikyō, 183-184.

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presumably all of them died at sea on their way home.186 Given this fact, demanding the unpaid wages of the 241 workers was unsubstantiated.187

The Mitsubishi representatives showed Fukagawa a copy of the deposit records from

1948 at the Hiroshima Legal Affairs Bureau. According to the document, 1,950 workers’ salary of altogether 178,479 yen 66 sen was deposited there, and this is the deposit money that Fukagawa called the unpaid wages of the forced laborers.188 However, the 246 workers he was investigating about had received their share from Mitsubishi, so they were not included among the 1,950 workers for certain. It is true that many workers had returned to

Korea without receiving their wages, but as mentioned earlier, they were escapees who had left Mitsubishi before their official release. Despite Mitsubishi’s depositing the salary of

1,950 Koreans, it has never made any effort to return that money either to them or to their families.189 Fukagawa constantly asked for viewing list of the names of those Korean workers whose money had been deposited, however, the Hiroshima Legal Affairs Bureau rejected his request each time on the grounds that “the list could be shown only to individuals whose names appeared on it.”190 Nevertheless, the names of those Korean workers were in Japanese since Japan had forced them to adopt Japanese names in the colonial period. Following Korea’s liberation, most repatriated Koreans got rid of their

186 Mineo Masaki. Interview with the author. Personal interview. Hiroshima, November 3, 2016. Hereafter cited as Masaki. Interview with the author. 187 The former Korean workers suiting Mitsubishi in the 1990s did not receive their wages since their leaving Mitsubishi before August 30, 1945, nor did Mitsubishi made any efforts to return the savings to them deposited from 1948 at the Hiroshima Legal Affairs Bureau, which means their claims for the unpaid wages was substantiated. 188 Fukagawa, Chinkon no Kaikyō, 184. 189 Masaki. Interview with the author. 190 Toyonaga, “About Survivors of Hiroshima Living in Korea,” 389.

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Japanese names and given this inconsistency of having different names in the wartime period, it was not possible even for them to have access to those documents.

The formation of the Bereaved Families Association and Fukagawa’s encouragement to demand compensation inspired the former Mitsubishi workers to stand up for themselves and ask for reparations from Mitsubishi that had exploited them during the war. On May 12,

1974 the South Korean Atomic Bomb Victims Mitsubishi Conscripted Laborers

Association was founded (hereafter Conscripted Laborers Association) that sent a letter to the Tokyo headquarters of Mitsubishi the following day. At the beginning of August,

Fukagawa received an answer from Mitsubishi that the Conscripted Laborers Association’s representatives should come to Japan for negotiation and Fukagawa helped arranging their visit. Four representatives, including No Jang-su and Park Hae-goon, went to the

Mitsubishi Shipyard in Hiroshima and asked for the relief of the former Korean Mitsubishi workers from a humanitarian perspective who had been exposed to the A-bomb. Mitsubishi reacted the following way: “We are aware of the suffering of Korean hibakusha but assistance from Mitsubishi seems to be difficult. We believe that once a detailed proposal about their claims is completed, the problem can smoothly be solved through negotiations with the Japanese government.”191 Although this was a problem touching upon corporate liability rather than state accountability, Mitsubishi rid itself of all responsibility and suggested the former workers negotiating with the Japanese government, whose answer, as in all such cases, was that all wartime reparations issues had been settled in the 1965 Japan-

191 Asahi Shimbun, “Kongo Seifukan Kōshō de Kaiketsu o: Kankokujin Hibakusha Mondai de Mitsubishi Gawa,” [In the Future, Resolution Through Negotiations between the Two Governments: Mitsubishi’s Position on the Issue of Korean Hibakusha] August 9, 1974, HUA, Box 4, HT0401000.

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Korea Treaty. Fukagawa was also present during the talks, brought up the issue of the 241 workers’ disappearance, and claimed it would have been Mitsubishi’s duty to return the workers safe and sound.192

A year later, on August 29, 1975 representatives of the Bereaved Families

Association visited the Hiroshima Mitsubishi Shipyard again demanding Mitsubishi pay consolation money to the bereaved family members as corporate liability. The Association had 44 members by then, and this was the first time it submitted a detailed demand to

Mitsubishi. Fukagawa helped the efforts of No Jang-su and the other visiting members, but

Mitsubishi showed no willingness to admit its default and provide the victims with compensation. In their letter of demand, the Association requested two-million-yen consolation money to each family members. Additionally, it wanted Mitsubishi to invite the family members to Iki Island for visiting the burial places of their family members as well as the collection and the return of their ashes to South Korea. The Association also proposed the erection of a memorial in Suwon City for the memory of the deceased workers and requested thirteen million yen from Mitsubishi to carry out this project. At

Mitsubishi, Manager Kawano replied the following way: “We sympathize with the bereaved families and the victims. However, given the lack of documents this case goes beyond the judgement of one corporation. If the Japanese and South Korean governments make a decision through diplomatic procedure, we will cooperate with them, yet, concerning the right of the bereaved family members to demand consolation money, it was

192 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Miharai Chingin nado Harae: Hibaku Kankokujin Chōyōkō Daihyō Mitsubishi Hiroshima ni Yōkyū,” [Pay the Unpaid Wages: Korean Hibakusha Forced Laborers’ Representative’s Demand to Mitsubishi Hiroshima] August 9, 1974, HUA, Box 4, HT0401000.

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expired in the 1965 Japan-Korea Treaty, which means we cannot respond to the current demands.”193 Despite the pressure from both associations demanding redress, Mitsubishi did not acknowledge its accountability and kept refusing to comply with their request.

Fukagawa set up the Association for the Support of the Bereaved Family Members of the Former Mitsubishi Workers on June 29, 1976. Their major aim was to carry out the excavation of the remains of the Koreans that had been buried and abandoned on Iki Island at Kuyoshihama, Ashibechō, and at Cape Ryūjin for 31 years.194 Fukagawa claimed, “by exhuming the remains on Iki Island, I want to mobilize the media and ask from the public if it is justified that Mitsubishi has abandoned the bereaved families.” He believed if the people become aware of the truth, it can be a powerful weapon against Mitsubishi.195 The exhumation works, led by Fukagawa, began on August 10 and ended on August 12. In three days they excavated the remains of 86 people.196 The day before the excavation began,

Fukagawa and Mineo Masaki, his important aide, learned at the Ashibechō public office that the Koreans buried on the island had been washed ashore after the Akune Typhoon in

October 1945. Among those victims there were many women and children, and the witnesses did not remember them wearing overalls, which were the uniforms worn by the

Mitsubishi workers. Fukagawa and Masaki found the records of 154 dead and 33 survivors, however, among No Seong-ok’s group, there were no survivors as No Jang-su had confirmed it in 1945 after his return to Korea. According to the witnesses, the survivors at

193 Mainichi Shimbun, “Mitsubishi Jūkō e Yōkyū: 44 Nin Isharyō Ichi Oku Hyaku Man En,” [Demand to the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries: 101 Million Yen Consolation Money to 44 People] August 30, 1975, HUA, Box 4, HT0401201. 194 For the enlarged map of Iki Island, see Figure 19. 195 Mineo Masaki, “Mitsubishi Danshō [A Fragment of Mitsubishi] (1),” North East Asian Information Center 5 (December 2007): 22. 196 See Figure 20.

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the time collected their family members’ bodies, cremated them and took them back to

Korea. In light of this, Masaki was aware that they would dig out the ashes of a different group of Korean repatriates, and this action would not facilitate the resolution of the mystery over the disappearance of the 246 Mitsubishi workers.197 Nevertheless, he believed that regardless of whether these are the Mitsubishi workers or not they had been looking for, it is certain that these people had been wartime victims resulting from Japan’s colonization of Korea.198 During the excavations, they discovered the remains of a baby, too, who had been hugged by someone supposed to be its mother, and the Korean workers Fukagawa was searching were all young men in their early twenties, so the fact that a baby was also found suggested that these were another group of Koreans suffering shipwreck on their way home.199

Concerning the witnesses, a local man testified on Iki Island that after his demobilization he had seen many dead bodies washed ashore in September 1945, which strengthened Fukagawa’s theory that the 246 Koreans had died near Iki Island and had been buried there. Nevertheless, during the current investigation, no one could confirm that the bodies had been buried in September or October, and out of the excavated remains

Fukagawa and his team could not identify any of the 246 Koreans in question, which weakened his assumption. Among the bones exhumed, some had turned black so Fukagawa presumed there could be hibakusha among them so the possibility that they found some of

197 Mineo Masaki, “Mitsubishi Danshō (2),” North East Asian Information Center 6 (March 2008): 18. 198 Mineo Masaki, “Mitsubishi Danshō (14),” North East Asian Information Center 18 (March 2011): 24. 199 Fukagawa, Chinkon no Kaikyō, 209-211.

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the 246 people should not be excluded.200 The Hakozaki (before its merging with

Ashibechō) authorities had issued fourteen death certificates on October 11 (after the

Akune Typhoon) including ten women, which had been buried at Cape Ryūjin, and this means these could not be the workers’ bodies. Regarding Tagawa (part of Ashibechō before its merger), there is a record of the discovery of 154 bodies that had been temporarily buried at Kuyoshihama, where citizen volunteers built a monument for the Korean victims in 1947. According to newspaper reports, the remains of 90 people at Kuyoshihama and 50 people at Cape Ryūjin had been exhumed and then reburied, and a fisherman who had been involved in the excavation at that time confirmed these numbers to Fukagawa. However, the person who had erected the memorial claimed that there had been the remains of about

20 people, which creates contradiction in the testimonies. Concerning the present excavation, Fukagawa and his team exhumed the remains of 86 people at Kuyoshihama, and if the two numbers (86 and the previously excavated 90) are added up, this new number

(176) exceeds the one recorded in the city documents (154), questioning the credibility of

Ashibechō’s records. Furthermore, another fisherman testified that he remembers nearly

200 bodies being washed ashore at Hakozaki two or three days before the Akune Typhoon, which was a new perspective.201

Apparently, the more they got involved the more uncertain they became about the whereabouts of the bodies of the 246 Koreans, but Fukagawa was bent on finding new evidences that could lead him to the resting place of the Mitsubishi workers. The materials

200 Although it has not been proven scientifically, Fukagawa stated that in Hiroshima rumor says it that when hibakusha are cremated, their bones turn black. See Fukagawa, Chinkon no Kaikyō, 210. 201 Fukagawa, Chinkon no Kaikyō, 211-213.

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found at the Ashibechō public office testified that most bodies found on the island had been washed ashore after the Akune Typhoon, but Fukagawa’s stance was that “there are many errors in the records of the public offices. We have no choice but to collect more testimonies than we have done before, and wait for another investigation to find out if the bodies were those of the A-bombed Mitsubishi workers. The current investigation would bring up the problem of the Koreans whose dead bodies had been abandoned and had never been returned to their home country.”202 With this, Fukagawa pointed out Japan’s negligence in the postwar period to carefully examine the accidents of the Koreans at sea and transferring the bodies of the dead to their homeland out of respect and as a sign of its remorse for their longtime suffering under Japanese rule.

After the exhumation of the ashes of 86 people, the remains were cremated and

Fukagawa took them back to Hiroshima, where they came to be temporarily stored in various Buddhist temples until 2003. However, Fukagawa’s most ardent wish was the return of the remains to South Korea, and as he said, this was not only the problem concerning the Mitsubishi workers’ bereaved families but it had become his own personal problem, too.203

Although the Bereaved Families Association suddenly disrupted their activities in

1979 given the lack of progress in the search of their lost family members, Fukagawa and

Masaki did not give up on their mission and continued the movement for the return of the ashes. By then, Fukagawa’s investigation had already raised consciousness in Japan. Tetsu

Noda and Manso Hamamoto, Members of Parliament affiliated with the Japan Socialist

202 Ibid., 211-215. 203 Ibid., 234.

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Party, brought up the issue of the former Mitsubishi workers’ shipwreck accident at the

National Budget Committee since 1977. After asking for Chūryō Morii’s cooperation, who was a member of the House of Representatives and the Socialist Party, Masaki sent a petition to the Diet in 1982 requesting the investigation of the bodies that are scattered on

Iki Island and Tsushima and their subsequent return to South Korea. Morii put Masaki’s proposal on the agenda of the Committee on Social and Labor Affairs, and with this,

Fukagawa and Masaki were able to mobilize the Japanese government to launch a follow- up survey.

Following Morii’s lobbying, the Japanese Ministry of Welfare and the Japanese

Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted a survey on Iki Island and Tsushima from May 18 to

May 29, 1983 to locate the burial places of the Korean repatriates.204 The ministries confirmed two places (Shinagi Island and Mitsushima-chō Ikehata) on Tsushima where

Koreans had been buried in 1945 and exhumed the remains. On Tsushima, the delegation found a record from 1974 claiming that there are six burial sites on the island, and after the war approximately 80 people had been buried there. However, four places had already been washed away by the waves where, the government officials decided, excavation was not possible, so they focused on the remaining two burial sites.205 In the end, the excavation group found 32 bodies on Shinagi Island and thirteen at Mitsushima-chō Ikehata.

According to the records, most bodies had been drifted ashore on Shinagi Island at that time.206 According to the government report issued after the excavation, the local

204 Mineo Masaki, “Mitsubishi Danshō (5),” North East Asian Information Center 9 (December 2008): 21. 205 For the enlarged map of Tsushima, see Figure 21. 206 Mineo Masaki, “Mitsubishi Danshō (7),” North East Asian Information Center 11 (June 2009): 21.

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documents and testimonies prove that the bodies on Iki Island had been washed ashore after

Akune Typhoon in October 1945 and on Tsushima following the Makurazaki Typhoon in

September. They also confirmed that the deceased were Korean repatriates, however, there is no evidence that would suggest they belong to the former Mitsubishi workers that the civic groups had been searching. Altogether the bodies of 45 people were exhumed, and the ministries left them in a cinerarium in Mitsushima-chō on Tsushima.207

According to Masaki, the remains exhumed on Tsushima suggest that these were young people in their early twenties and were wearing overalls, which was the uniform of the Mitsubishi workers, and he believes that those are the remains of No Seong-ok and the former Mitsubishi workers, although to date this has not been scientifically proved.208

Fukagawa, Masaki, and other citizen volunteers deserve the credit for mobilizing the

Japanese government that finally completed the survey that they had been demanding.

Nevertheless, the Mitsubishi workers could not be identified and the remains were not returned to South Korea after their excavation; they continued to stay on Japanese territory and this meant that Fukagawa was still far from achieving his goal.

Later developments in the Missing Koreans

The ashes exhumed in 1976 on Iki Island by Fukagawa were stored at Zenkyōin Temple,

Fukusenbō Temple, and Betsuin Temple in Hiroshima Prefecture until 2003. Then,

Fukagawa agreed with the Japanese Ministry of Welfare to hand them over the ashes on

207 Report about the survey on Iki Island and Tsushima, September 12, 1983. Source: Mineo Masaki. 208 Masaki. Interview with the author.

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March 26 that would transfer them immediately to Konjōin Temple209 in Tokorozawa City,

Saitama Prefecture for temporarily storage until their return to South Korea is arranged.210

The remains found in 1983 on Tsushima as a result of the survey carried out by the

Japanese government were taken to Konjōin already in 1993, and since 2003 both findings have been stored there.211

To date they have not been returned to South Korea because of the disagreement concerning the conditions between the Japanese and South Korean governments.212 In

South Korea, there is a national cemetery called “Hill for the Homesick” where Koreans having died in a foreign country are buried, and this way the country pays tribute to their sacrifice. Masaki said he hopes that the ashes stored at Konjōin Temple would be returned at least there, since 60 or 70 years after the war it is no longer possible to identify the bereaved families and return the ashes to them. At present, what the Japanese government should accomplish is to send the ashes to the “Hill for the Homesick” where the Korean repatriates could find their eternal resting place and could finally finish their long journey.

As Masaki said, he feels that the war is still going on for these Koreans.213

The latest developments surrounding Fukagawa and Masaki’s investigation were reported in February 2010. The South Korean government confirmed that the remains of the 131 victims stored at Konjōin Temple belong to former Korean conscripted workers

209 For the location of Konjōin Temple, see Figure 22. 210 Munetoshi Fukagawa, “Kankokujin Ikotsu no Hikiwatashi Hōyō ni tsuite Goannai,” [Information about the Buddhist Memorial Service on the Handover of the Ashes of the Koreans] March 6, 2003. Source: Mineo Masaki. 211 Mainichi Shimbun, “Sokoku Mokuzen ni Sōnanshi,” [Dying Due to Shipwreck Right Before Coming Home] February 20, 2005. 212 Masaki. Interview with the author. 213 Mainichi Shimbun, “Sokoku Mokuzen ni Sōnanshi,” February 20, 2005.

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who had died at sea while trying to repatriate to Korea after World War II.214 This was the first time that the Korean government acknowledged the victims being Koreans, and there was a ray of hope that after this negotiations between the Korean and Japanese governments about the return of the ashes would accelerate.

However, to date the reality is that they have not been returned to South Korea. These

Korean wartime victims had not only been exploited by Mitsubishi and had been under the mushroom cloud when America dropped the A-bomb on Hiroshima, but had met their death under tragic circumstances at sea while trying to repatriate. Even 70 years after the end of the war, they have not been able to return to their homeland and have not been able to rest in peace, despite all the efforts of Fukagawa and the citizen-based movement he founded. Ironically, the very same governments and the same corporation that had abused them are those that deprive them of a peaceful afterlife by not letting their souls return home.

Lawsuit against Mitsubishi

Fukagawa deserves credit not only for his pioneering investigation into the disappearance of the 241 Mitsubishi workers and their five family members, but also for enhancing consciousness on corporation liability during World War II and the default of the zaibatsu to pay the salary of the conscripted laborers. Many former Mitsubishi workers alive became aware of their potential rights to demand compensation from the former zaibatsu, and in the

214 Mineo Masaki, “Mitsubishi Danshō (11),” North East Asian Information Center 15 (June 2010): 19.

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1990s, following the encouragement and support of Fukagawa, they initiated suits against

Mitsubishi and the Japanese government.

On December 11, 1995 six former Mitsubishi workers, also victims of the A-bomb who had been compelled to work for Mitsubishi Heavy Industries during World War II, filed a suit against the Japanese government and Mitsubishi demanding national redress for the forced labor system, their unpaid wages, and for being abandoned as A-bomb survivors, with the support of five lawyers and civil groups, and Fukagawa as their main advocate.215

Although Fukagawa suffered brain infarction in 1990 and lost his ability to speak, he was present during the trials and provided the plaintiffs and the lawyers with the documents necessary for the oral proceedings.216 On March 25, 1999 the Hiroshima District Court rejected all the claims of the plaintiffs. Mitsubishi and the Japanese government gained exemption from accountability for wartime conscription, the unpaid wages, and the A- bomb damage, and this was followed by the former Mitsubishi workers’ appeal.217 The lawsuit dragged on twelve years and on November 1, 2007 the Japanese Supreme Court ruling ordered the government to compensate the plaintiffs with 1,200,000 yen per person

(out of which 200,000 yen was allocated to the lawyers) for the exclusion of these overseas hibakusha from the medical services as a result of Directive 402. By then, only 28 of the original 46 plaintiffs were alive.218 While the court acknowledged the illegal nature of the directive, the plaintiffs received no compensation from Mitsubishi for their unpaid wages.

In this sense, the November 2007 ruling can be regarded a partial victory for failing “to

215 Genchōyōkō Hibakusha Saiban o Shiensuru Kai, Han Mitsubishi, Hiroshima, 64. 216 Keisaburō Toyonaga. Interview with the author. Personal interview. Hiroshima, October 31, 2016. 217 Genchōyōkō Hibakusha Saiban o Shiensuru Kai, Han Mitsubishi, Hiroshima, 70. 218 Hirano, Umi no Mukō no Hibakushatachi, 36-37.

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address larger issues of the atomic bomb and forced labor compensation.”219 Following this resolution, overseas hibakusha residing in South Korea, the United States, and Brazil began demanding the same reparations as the state granted to the 28 plaintiffs in November 2007.

Then, 2,803 overseas hibakusha in succession filed a suit at Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and

Osaka District Courts until March 2010. Hence, the state, for its reluctance to go on with the legal cases, provided all overseas hibakusha with the same compensation.220 Fukagawa passed away on April 24, 2008. Although he could hear the news of the Mitsubishi workers’ victory at the Supreme Court, the news that the state compensated overseas hibakusha, which could be accomplished partly because of his efforts, could never reach him.

219 David Palmer, “Korean Hibakusha, Japan’s Supreme Court & the International Community: Can the U.S. and Japan Confront Forced Labor and the Atomic Bombing?,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 6 no. 4 (2008), accessed August 15, 2006, http://apjjf.org/-David-Palmer/2670/article.html. 220 Genchōyōkō Hibakusha Saiban o Shiensuru Kai, Han Mitsubishi, Hiroshima, 95.

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Fukagawa Munetoshi felt compassion for the plight of Koreans who first became victims of not only Imperial Japan but also the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Unlike other

Japanese supervisors at Mitsubishi, in the postwar period he had been concerned about what had happened with the 241 Korean laborers and their five family members he had seen off at Hiroshima Station on September 15, 1945, and in the early 1970s he began his own individual investigation. Searching for the 246 Korean hibakusha became his mission, and his research involved on-the-spot investigation, going around all the harbors of Kyushu, visiting South Korea, Iki Island and Tsushima, talking to the locals, collecting testimonies, studying documents recorded after the 1945 typhoons, and looking for family members.

Thanks to his efforts, the case of the 246 Koreans vanished at sea drew the attention of a small layer of the Korean and Japanese society, and he was able to mobilize both the

South Korean and Japanese governments to search, exhume, and return the ashes of the victims to South Korea, although their return to their homeland has not been accomplished.

With the help of a Japanese civic group, he excavated the remains of 86 Koreans on Iki

Island in 1976, and although evidences suggested that those people were a different group of repatriates, Fukagawa believed he could find the bodies of the lost Korean Mitsubishi workers. As Mineo Masaki said, before the ashes were taken from Betsuin Temple to

Konjōin Temple in 2003, Fukagawa requested to see the ashes once more, and he always considered them as the remains of some of the 246 Koreans he had been looking for. He wanted to believe that he successfully completed his mission and his work paid off.221

221 Mineo Masaki, “Mitsubishi Danshō (3),” North East Asian Information Center 7 (June 2008): 25. Hereafter cited as Masaki, “Mitsubishi Danshō (3).”

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Fukagawa found many followers and critics during his journey to discover the whereabouts the bodies of the Mitsubishi workers who had been under his supervision in

1945. For instance, one of the widows he met in South Korea in the 1970s was touched that hitherto Fukagawa was the only person who had ever visited them concerning the search of their family members.222 Others, such as surviving former Mitsubishi workers, heavily criticized him for only supporting the bereaved families and putting all his energy into looking for the dead instead of focusing on asserting the rights of the living. Some even accused him of getting payment from Mitsubishi and were doubtful that he worked voluntarily, which filled Fukagawa with grief but did not discouraged him from going on with his mission.223

As David Palmer stated, Fukagawa’s “story is an investigation not only of events from the 1940s, but also the subsequent cover-up through legal action and social movement mobilization that sought justice and compensation for these forced laborers.”224

Fukagawa’s research shed light on Mitsubishi’s and other zaibatsu’s wartime abuse of the conscripted workers, and facilitated the emergence of social movements that assisted the former victims to demand compensation from Mitsubishi and the Japanese government.

Fukagawa pointed out the multiple victimization of the Korean Mitsubishi workers as being not only forced laborers who had not received proper wages from Mitsubishi but also hibakusha who had suffered serious health damages due to the atomic bomb and consequently must be granted the same legal rights as Japanese hibakusha. Following

222 Mineo Masaki, “Mitsubishi Danshō (13),” North East Asian Information Center 17 (December 2010): 21. 223 Masaki, “Mitsubishi Danshō (3),” 24. 224 Palmer, “The Straits of Dead Souls,” 336.

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increasing awareness among the former Mitsubishi workers, they initiated a lawsuit against the Japanese government and Mitsubishi in 1995. Although they had been fighting against

Japan for twelve years, the government in 2007 finally acknowledged the unlawful nature of Directive 402, their hibakusha status, and compensated them for the A-bomb damage, after which hundreds of overseas hibakusha could receive the same rights and reparations from Japan. Kwak Kwi-hoon, a Korean hibakusha who won a suit against the Japanese government in 2002, concluded: “If Mr. Fukagawa had not stood up [for our rights], nothing [no social movement] would have emerged.”225

225 Asahi Shimbun, “Genchōyōkō Hibakusha o Shienshita Kajin, Fukagawa-san Hibakuchi kara Kagai no Tsumi Tou,” [Mr. Fukagawa, a Poet Assisting the Former Forced Laborers Hibakusha, Utters the Perpetrators’ Crime from the City Hit by the Atomic Bomb] June 13, 2008.

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SECTION THREE: ASSOCIATION OF CITIZENS FOR THE

SUPPORT OF KOREAN ATOMIC BOMB VICTIMS

AND OTHER SUPPORT GROUPS

There were many grassroots organizations assisting Son Jin-doo’s legal case, and the individual assistance delineated in Section Two also carries great significance in terms of the Korean hibakusha support in Japan. Nevertheless, there were other citizen-driven groups in Japan that were taking on the Korean hibakusha issue. Some of them set up with the aim of advocating for the rights of the A-bomb victims in South Korea, while for others it constituted part of their activities.

Some were religious groups that aimed to atone for their country’s atrocities committed during the war. Others consisted of children who had a broader view of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They deemed it important to be aware of the difficult circumstances of survivors in South Korea and provide them with support tantamount to that of the Japanese A-bomb survivors. Additionally, other groups were collecting hibakusha testimonies or contributing to the medical assistance programs.

Most of these groups were set against political parties. They were based in Hiroshima,

Osaka, Tokyo, Fukuoka, and Nagasaki: they provided assistance from all parts of Japan.

Their support of Korean hibakusha embraced a wide range of activities. Many of them raised funds that they donated to the Korea Association. Economical support of the Korean victims before they were recognized by the Japanese government was of vital importance

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for maintaining their association in South Korea. Moreover, these Japanese grassroots groups conducted surveys on the actual conditions of the A-bomb victims residing in South

Korea starting from the 1970s that served as an important tool for negotiating with the

Japanese government and heightening awareness both in Japanese and South Korean society. They searched for witnesses and helped the Korean survivors’ A-bomb certificate application process as well as their hospitalization in Japan. They engaged in various activities, all of which played a role in compelling the Japanese government to eventually acknowledge and compensate Korean A-bomb survivors. Many of these movements worked jointly towards a common goal: achieving the equal status of Japanese and Korean hibakusha.

In this section, I describe the major Korean hibakusha support movement in a separate chapter and elaborate on the activities of some additional organizations in a second one to demonstrate how complex and multifaceted the citizen support base of Korean A-bomb victims has been in Japan.

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CHAPTER 7: ASSOCIATION OF CITIZENS FOR THE SUPPORT OF

KOREAN ATOMIC BOMB VICTIMS

The Association of Citizens for the Support of Korean Atomic Bomb Victims (hereafter

AOC) has been the main citizen-based organization in Japan advocating for the rights of

Korean atomic bomb survivors since the early 1970s. Its central office is in Osaka but currently it also has branches in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and they have worked jointly to achieve the compensation and recognition of the South Korean hibakusha by the Japanese government, forming a nationwide peace movement.

This association has provided direct financial and medical aid to the Korea Atomic

Bomb Victims Association since its establishment, enabling the maintenance and operation of the only organization in South Korea whose members consist of A-bomb survivors.

Additionally, the AOC members have visited various parts of South Korea, talked with hibakusha in person, and conducted several surveys on their actual conditions. Moreover, they have collected signatures all over Japan for the support of Korean hibakusha and petitioned the Japanese government repeatedly on paying national compensation to Korean victims and implementing relief measures for overseas hibakusha. Besides, through their publications, photo exhibitions, and screenings, they have played a key role in informing

Japanese society about the existence, plight, actual condition, and history of South Korean

A-bomb victims. Not only have they assisted hundreds of Korean hibakusha to receive A- bomb certificates and get medical treatment in Japan, but since their establishment they

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have also served as a pressure group within Japanese society to make the Japanese government extend the hibakusha relief measures to Korean victims.

The AOC has been voluntarily assisting Korean hibakusha for 46 years, yet in this dissertation I focus on their support and achievement in the 1970s and 1980s. The bulletins of the AOC and personal interviews with the major support members serve as the main primary sources in this chapter.

Different branches and their objectives

The AOC was founded in December 1971 in Osaka. Earlier that year, Yoshiko Matsui1, one of the founding members, saw an article published by Sin Yeong-soo in the Asahi Graph, a photo journal. As a Christian condemning Imperial Japan’s invasion of Korea, the Korean hibakusha issue immediately drew her attention. She exchanged a few letters with Sin and invited him to Japan, listening to his experience and learning about the actual condition of

Korean hibakusha. Seeing his face full of keloid scars, she decided to set up a support movement to aid this community and this is how the AOC was established. The first chairperson was Yoshihiro Motoyoshi, leader of the Korean Kobe Group, and among the members there were many Christians (following Matsui’s recruitment of church members),

Buddhists, housewives, students, policemen, and nurses. It was a very versatile group whose members were from all spheres of life, which meant they constituted a strong

1 See Figure 23.

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support base and there was a significant chance that they could effectively support Korean hibakusha. The Association distanced itself any political parties.2

At the time of its establishment, the AOC was based on three pillars. First, for inflicting multiple sufferings on Koreans during the colonial period, it stressed that the

Japanese government must provide national reparations for Korean hibakusha. Second, until the realization of the Japanese government’s compensation of the victims, it was bent on actively supporting Korean A-bomb survivors. Third, one of the goals of the movement was to eliminate racial discrimination within Japanese society, which was still prevalent against Koreans in the 1970s.3 Its aim was to build a bridge between Japanese and South

Korean hibakusha and then reach out to other overseas A-bomb victims. Additionally, it aimed to create a movement through which citizens could hear about the Korean hibakusha problem in all areas: school, workplace, factories, and at home. It was approaching the

Korean hibakusha problem from the viewpoint of perpetrators and emphasized the need for compensation and apology given the fact that thousands of Koreans were still suffering from the legacies of the colonial period.4

An essential part of the AOC’s support activities was assisting the Korea Association economically. Its objective was to collect ten million yen and donate it to the Korea

2 Sonomi Itō, “Kenri o Kachitoru made: Nihon de Zaikan Hibakusha o Sasaeta Hitobito,” [Until We Obtain Our Rights: People Who Supported Korean Hibakusha in Japan] Buraku Kaihō Kenkyū 23 (January 2017), 114-115. Hereafter cited as Itō, “Kenri o Kachitoru made.” 3 Junko Ichiba, “Zaikan Hibakusha Shien Undō no Muzukashisa,” [The Difficulties the Korean Hibakusha Support Movements face] in Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] No. 18, December 15, 1993: 1 in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 119. 4 Kankoku no Genbaku Hibakusha o Kyūensuru Shimin no Kai Kikanshi: Hayaku Engo o! [Bulletin of the Association of Citizens for the Support of South Korean Atomic Bomb Victims: Quick Support!] 1 (February 25, 1972), 1-4. In this chapter, I use various issues of the same bulletin, and I cite them as Hayaku Engo o! issue (date), page number.

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Association.5 In the first year, it realized that there is no nationwide support network for

Korean hibakusha, which made fund-raising difficult, and although there were other groups dealing with the Korean hibakusha issues in Hiroshima, Tokyo, and Fukuoka, they acted separately from the AOC (those were involved in the support of the Son Jin-doo trial). In other words, the Korean hibakusha support in Japan was characterized by a lack of unity, and one of the major tasks of the AOC was to extend the movement to other Japanese cities and mobilize citizens to take on the Korean hibakusha issue. It was aware that to achieve political changes in the status of Korean A-bomb victims, it must cooperate with other groups and make the Japanese government collectively face its colonial past.6 The news of their efforts to form a unified support movement also reached the media and it was reported by the Chūgoku Shimbun. As a first step, the Osaka AOC convened a meeting in Hiroshima on August 2, 1972 with other support groups from Yamaguchi Prefecture and Hiroshima to discuss the need to extend the movement and work jointly.7

In Hiroshima, Keisaburō Toyonaga, who visited South Korea one year earlier and met hibakusha there, made attempts to set up a branch of the AOC as early as 1972.8

Nevertheless, it was on November 5, 1974 that the first meeting of the Hiroshima branch took place and the members decided its main policies and activities. The first chairperson was Dr. Toratarō Kawamura, with Munetoshi Fukagawa as the vice president and

Keisaburō Toyonaga as the secretary general. Twenty members, including teachers,

5 Hayaku Engo o! 5 (December 28, 1972), 2. 6 Hayaku Engo o! 4 (October 7, 1972), 1. 7 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Shien Gurūpu Hiroshima-shi de Shūkai,” [Support Groups Gather in Hiroshima] August 3, 1972, Box 4, HT0400800, HUA. 8 Hayaku Engo o! 3 (August 1, 1972), 8.

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company employees, and students took part in the meeting and they launched the Korean hibakusha support movement in Hiroshima, in collaboration with the Osaka main office.9

In the following year, Dr. Kawamura stepped down as the chairperson and was followed by

Fukagawa.10 The Hiroshima branch was active in fund-raising, searching for witnesses, helping hibakusha with the A-bomb certificate application process, arranging their hospitalization, organizing various exhibitions, and broadening the atomic bomb narrative by including the story of Korean hibakusha.

On April 22, 1975 some members of the Japan Christian Women’s Organization

(Kyōfūkai), the National Christian Council in Japan (NCC) Women’s Committee, and the

Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) established the Tokyo branch of the AOC.

With this, the Korean hibakusha support organization was extended to Hiroshima and

Tokyo. Tokyo was strategically important since the support members there could approach the government easily. Also, Hiroshima, as the first A-bombed city with many hospitals specialized in treating A-bomb patients, played a key role in the support network. The first meeting of the Tokyo branch opened on July 10 with twenty participants, and Ai Kuroki was elected as the chairperson.11 It functioned as a pressure group to petition the Japanese government and present the demands of the AOC in terms of Korean hibakusha support.

However, since the members were working in full-time jobs and could not immerse themselves in the support activities in the late 1970s, the dissolution of the Tokyo branch

9 Hayaku Engo o! 11 (November 30, 1974), 1. 10 Hayaku Engo o! 13 (July 31, 1975), 2. 11 Ibid.

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became official in September 1980.12 Afterward, the Korean hibakusha support was limited to Osaka and Hiroshima, but despite the difficulties the AOC went on assisting the Korea

Association.

In Nagasaki, there were no branches of the AOC for two decades. Masaharu Oka and

Sadao Kenta were engaged in surveys on the Korean victims of the bomb in the second A- bombed city, but they acted separately from the AOC.13 It was on August 4, 1992 that the

Nagasaki branch was set up, with Nobuto Hirano as chairperson. Nobuto was the leader of

Japan Teacher’s Union of the Second-Generation Atomic Bomb Victims, thus the Nagasaki branch emphasized interacting with Korean second-generation hibakusha. Furthermore, it made efforts to find hibakusha from Nagasaki in South Korea and conduct surveys on their conditions given the relatively low numbers of Nagasaki hibakusha registered at the Korea

Association. After 2000, in collaboration with the Osaka branch, it helped the lawsuits not only of South Korean hibakusha but also the Taiwanese, Dutch, and Brazilian hibakusha.14

Although the Nagasaki branch was set up later than other branches, today it functions as a base for the Korean hibakusha support in Japan.

Major figures

Initially, the AOC had 500 members, and by December 1972 this number grew to 700.15

During its forty-six-year-old history, many people joined and left the organization, but its

12 Hayaku Engo o! 32 (November 15, 1980), 10. 13 For more information on Masaharu Oka and the Nagasaki Association’s surveys, see page 161-167. For more information on Sadao Kenta and the Nagasaki Testimonial Society’s surveys, see page 316-317. 14 Itō, “Kenri o Kachitoru made,” 118-119. 15 Motoji Matsuda. Interview with the author. Personal interview. Kyoto, February 24, 2017. Hereafter cited as Matsuda. Interview with the author.

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number was usually between 500 and 1,000. It reached its peak in 1974, when it boasted about 2,000 members.16 Nowadays, it still has a membership of 650 Japanese citizens.17

There were various reasons why people joined a movement confronting their country’s wartime atrocities and made them consider events from the perpetrator’s side.

Matsui was a Christian and a member of the non-church movement18, which enabled her to recruit many Christian adherents from those religious communities. In the late 1960s there was a movement among the Japanese Christians that supported the rebuilding of the Jeam- ri Church in South Korea as a sign of their penance for Imperial Japan’s cruelty during the colonial era. The infamous Jeam-ri Church Massacre took place on April 15, 1919. It was the time of the March 1 Independence Movement (Samil Movement) when a group of

Koreans revolted against the Japanese rule. On the day of the massacre, the Japanese army locked 29 Korean rebels inside the Jeam-ri Church, set the church ablaze, with all the rebels inside.19 After the war, the Japanese Christians felt remorse for the crimes committed by

Japan so many of them stood up for the wartime victims, including Korean hibakusha.

Many of the Christians joining the AOC in the early 1970s were previously involved in the movement to raise funds for the rebuilding of the Jeam-ri Church.20 A later chairperson,

Hayaku Engo o! 5 (December 28, 1972), 1. 16 Hayaku Engo o! 10 (July 15, 1974), 6. 17 Matsuda. Interview with the author. 18 In Japan, the non-church movement is associated with the beliefs of Uchimura Kanzō. “He and his followers attempted to witness for the Christian gospel without ecclesiastical organization and without financial support from Western missionary societies.” The adherents believed in Jesus Christ but refused to be a member of any church. For more information, see Joseph M. Kitagawa, Religion in Japanese History, (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966), 303. 19 For more information on the Jeam-ri Massacre, see George Katsiaficas, Asia’s Unknown Uprisings Volume 1: South Korean Social Movements in the 20th Century, (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012), 45. 20 Matsuda. Interview with the author.

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Nishi Sekitō was driven by such motives and believed that Japan must apologize and must compensate Korean A-bomb victims.21

One of the members whose report was published in the AOC’s bulletin learned about the situation of Korean hibakusha from the Asahi Shimbun. He was a university student majoring in Korean and noticed that the history of colonialism was missing from the public discussion in Japan. Another member was a teacher who intended to educate young people about how Asian people had suffered during the war because of Imperial Japan.22 There were those who sympathized with the plight of Koreans and treated the Korean hibakusha issue as their own problem, while some members heard about the AOC from their friends or family members and decided to help the association’s work.23

In what follows, I introduce the major support figures and elaborate on the reasons why they became committed to assisting Korean hibakusha.

1. Keisaburō Toyonaga24

Keisaburō Toyonaga was born in 1936 in Yokohama, and his family moved to Hiroshima when he was three years old. He experienced the atomic bombing of Hiroshima at the age of nine. Given his relative distance from the hypocenter (he was in Saka-machi on his way to the hospital, roughly thirteen kilometers from downtown Hiroshima), he did not suffer injuries. Nevertheless, his mother and his younger brother were 1.5 kilometers from the

21 Hayaku Engo o! 30 (March 20, 1980), 2-3. 22 Hayaku Engo o! 5 (December 28, 1972), 6. 23 Hayaku Engo o! 6 (April 20, 1973), 11. 24 Details of his life are based on the personal interviews with the author between 2015 and 2017 in Hiroshima. See Figure 24 and 35.

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hypocenter so he entered the city with his grandfather the following day to search for them and was exposed to residual radiation. He found his family on August 8 at a refugee center in the mountains near Hiroshima Station, in Higashi Ward. His mother had suffered serious burns on her face but his brother miraculously escaped injury. Their house (in Higashi

Ward, near the current Onaga Elementary School) was entirely destroyed by the blast and the fire, so after the war they moved to Funakoshi-machi in Aki Ward, where Toyonaga lives currently.25 He is recognized as an A-bomb survivor by the Japanese government.

He came into contact with the Koreans as a sixth grader in elementary school. Then, there were three classes in his school and about seven Korean students were admitted to his class. Even in the postwar period, Koreans were discriminated against within Japanese society, but as a child Toyonaga was not conscious of this problem. According to Toyonaga, the Koreans in Japan lived in their own community until the beginning of the Korean War in 1950, so they had not frequently come into contact with the Japanese in the years immediately after the bombing. They established their own schools, but these were closed down when the Korean War broke out. The reason was that Japan (under pressure from the

United States) feared that communist ideas would infiltrate the Korean communities and these would spread at the Korean schools because there were many Koreans in Japan supporting the North Korean side. This change provided Toyonaga with the opportunity to meet with Korean students. He remembered that these Koreans and their environment had a bad odor, and the dominant image about them within Japanese society was very negative.

25 Keisaburō Toyonaga. Interview with the author. Personal interview. Hiroshima, March 19, 2017. Hereafter cited as Toyonaga. Interview with the author. Hiroshima, March 19, 2017. (Date is indicated given the multiple number of interviews with Keisaburō Toyonaga.)

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Toyonaga admitted he himself was also one of those Japanese students who discriminated against the Koreans in the past given the racially biased environment he grew up.26

Toyonaga became aware of the gravity of the discrimination problem as a teacher at the end of the 1960s when he was employed at the Hiroshima Technical High School. It was very difficult for zainichi Koreans to find good jobs in Japan even in the 1970s, so many Korean parents sent their children to the Hiroshima Technical High School in hopes that by learning a vocation, they could rise out of poverty in the future. Well after the end of the war, many Koreans used Japanese names to avoid discrimination.27 For instance,

“Kim” could be called “Kaneyama” or a common name for “Pak” was “Kimura.”28

Toyonaga came to this realization, started to sympathize with the plight of the Koreans, and encouraged them to cherish their Korean background and proudly use their Korean names at school.

Toyonaga went to South Korea for the first time in August 1971. Then, the South

Korean Government demanded that Japanese schools that enrolled many zainichi Korean students should follow the South Korean educational pattern, and from 1971, Japanese teachers were dispatched to South Korea for training. In 1971 Toyonaga was chosen as the representative of Hiroshima and he went to South Korea in August. Before his study trip, he had learned about the existence of the Korean hibakusha and wished to meet with them.

His stay in Seoul coincided with August 15, which is the Liberation Memorial Day, a national holiday for South Koreans, and on that day, he did not have training. Toyonaga

26 Toyonaga. Interview with the author. Hiroshima, June 28, 2015. 27 Ibid. 28 For more information on Japan’s name-changing policy in Korea that began in 1940, see Suzuki, Divided Fates, 31-32. Kim assumed various Japanese names, such as Kaneda or Kanemoto.

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stayed in a diplomat’s house during the training course who took him to the Korea

Association where Toyonaga could meet with Korean hibakusha for the first time. The office of the association was in Seoul, on the second floor of a shack, where he met four or five people. In that part of Seoul, people lived in poverty, and there were barracks everywhere. These hibakusha talked about their difficult situation; neither the South Korean nor the Japanese government had assisted them until that point. Additionally, due to repressive policies of the military dictatorship in power, they were unable to launch a peace movement, so instead they had founded their own association. Their situation came as a shock to Toyonaga and he returned to Japan with the determination that he needed to provide assistance.29

He learned about the establishment of the AOC in Osaka from the newspapers, after which he contacted Yoshiko Matsui and joined the citizen-led association that was determined to assert the rights of Korean hibakusha. In 1974 he set up the Hiroshima branch and has since served as a major supporting member in the first A-bombed city, significantly aiding the central office in Osaka. He retired as the chairperson in 2016 due to health issues, and Etsuko Nakatani became the new leader of the Hiroshima branch.30

Local newspapers such as the Mainichi Shimbun and the Chūgoku Shimbun often reported about him and the activities of the Hiroshima AOC. Toyonaga has always emphasized Japan’s wartime responsibility and the need to feel remorse about the past. He has argued that once Japan becomes aware of being a victimizer during the war, this will

29 Toyonaga. Interview with the author. Hiroshima, June 28, 2015. 30 Ibid.

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make possible the improvement of the healthcare system for Korean hibakusha, such as establishing an A-bomb hospital in their country.31

2. Nobuto Hirano32

He was born in 1946 as a second-generation hibakusha (nisei). His mother and his two- year-older sister were exposed to the atomic bomb in Nagasaki. 1985 marked the 40th anniversary of the dropping of the bomb. By then, hibakusha were aging and people believed it was the task of the second generation to pass down the story of the A-bomb to future generations. Born in 1946, Hirano was one of the oldest people among nisei, so he became the president of the Group of Second-generation A-bomb Victims. At first, this organization advocated for the abolition of nuclear weapons. In 1987 Hirano went to Seoul and Busan as the representative of the nisei group to speak out against nuclear weapons and talk about the horrible experiences of the A-bomb survivors. Before his trip, he had attended Masaharu Oka’s lecture and heard about the existence and the history of Korean hibakusha. He did not have much information about them, though, so this trip provided him with the opportunity to learn about their actual situation.33

In South Korea, he noticed that although South Korean and Japanese hibakusha suffered the same human consequences of the A-bomb, their position and background were fundamentally different. He said, “in case of Japan, nuclear weapons were used as a

31 Mainichi Shimbun, “Senmon Iryō ni Enjo o: Nihon no Kagai Sekinin Jikakushite,” [Support for Treatment by Medical Specialists: Being Aware of Japan’s Responsibility as a Perpetrator] November 20, 1985, Box 5, HT0500700, HUA. 32 Details about the life of Nobuto Hirano and his involvement in the overseas hibakusha support come from his interview with the author made on February 5, 2016 in Nagasaki. See Figure 25. 33 Hirano. Interview with the author.

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punishment for Japan’s war of aggression, but Koreans had nothing to do with Japan’s wartime atrocities. In fact, they were Japan’s victims who happened to be right in

Hiroshima and Nagasaki when the bomb was dropped.” His interpretation was that South

Korean and Japanese victims of the bomb are not the same hibakusha given their different position and background, and this was a great shock for Hirano to realize. Then, he visited some Korean hibakusha homes during his stay and witnessed their keloid scars since these people had never undergone any surgery as had Japanese hibakusha. This was the same recognition Dr. Kawamura had made in the early 1970s. The Japanese survivors had received medical treatment and had undergone various operations since 1957 and consequently their former wounds and scars were removed, so the fact that they were hibakusha was not noticeable. This experience made Hirano realize the serious nature of the

Korean hibakusha problem and he decided that these people must no longer be abandoned, so he became engaged in their support.34

Following his visit, he formed close ties with the South Korean nisei group. The

Japanese nisei association provided some Korean second-generation hibakusha with scholarships to cover their tuition fees. Additionally, it invited some Korean second- generation hibakusha to Japan to various A-bomb-related events and also to the symposium about nisei.35

34 Ibid. 35 Nobuto Hirano, “Nagasaki no Zaikan Hibakusha Shien Undō ni tsuite,” [About the Korean Hibakusha Support Movements in Nagasaki] in Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] No. 15, September 1, 1992: 2 in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 94.

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In 1987 there were nearly 1,800 registered members of the Korea Association, yet most hibakusha were from Hiroshima. There were only 79 registered hibakusha from

Nagasaki. After Japan’s surrender, according to the data of the Korea Association, more than 8,000 Koreans returned from Nagasaki to their homeland, and Hirano argued that it was not possible that by 1987 only 79 of those 8,000 people were alive. Regarding possible reasons for the low numbers of Korean hibakusha from Nagasaki, he concluded:

1. Many lived scattered in the countryside.

2. Many of them returned to North Korea and there is no information on them.

3. In the case of Nagasaki, the dormitories of the Korean workers were further from the

hypocenter, and given the distance they had no visible keloid scars as hibakusha from

Hiroshima did. However, many of them had entered the city after the bombing to help

cremate the bodies and clean the rubbles, thus being exposed to residual radiation. Given

their lack of injuries and the lack of information on radiation in South Korea, many of

those people were not aware that they themselves were hibakusha.

4. The Korea Association did not possess sufficient information on the condition of Koreans

in Nagasaki, thus it had difficulty searching for victims of the second A-bombed city.

For this reason, Hirano and the Japanese nisei association launched a survey in South Korea in quest of hibakusha from Nagasaki in 1990, focusing on South Jeolla and Chungcheong

Provinces. As he had presumed, he came across many Koreans who had worked in the

Kawaminami shipyard in Boseong County and Wando County, South Jeolla Province, and there were many former Nagasaki Mitsubishi laborers living scattered in Chungchong

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Province. Then, there were no branches of the Korea Association in these provinces, which made it difficult to identify themselves as hibakusha and organize themselves. Many turned out to have entered the contaminated city later and spent a little time there, after which they returned to South Korea on illegal ships.36

Nobuto Hirano set up the Nagasaki branch of the AOC and since then he has been one of the most committed members in support of Korean A-bomb victims. He delved into the situation of hibakusha from Nagasaki and was searching for them in South Korea personally, helping to make them aware of their potential rights as hibakusha. Additionally, he was advocating for the return of the Urakami prisoners’ ashes to their bereaved families.

The Urakami Prison was situated 260 meters from the hypocenter and out of the 81 inmates,

45 were Korean and Chinese. Hirano made efforts to find the bereaved families of some of those Koreans, and with the help of the Korea Association, they could discover three family members. It turned out that Nagasaki never sent the death certificate to the family members; the deceased were indicated as “missing.” Moreover, the Nagasaki branch of the AOC engaged in the support of the South Jeolla branch of the Korea Association, and it was making efforts to find as many Nagasaki A-bomb victims as possible in that area. However, it was not possible to search for those who resided currently in North Korea. Hirano emphasized that many of the forced laborers in the Kawaminami shipyard were from

Pyongan Province, and with this brought to the surface the problem and the inaccessibility of North Korean hibakusha.37

36 Ibid., 94-95. 37 Ibid., 96.

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While the Osaka central office mainly focused on assisting hibakusha in South Korea,

Nobuto Hirano and the Nagasaki branch took on a wider range of activities and also supported Taiwanese, Brazilian, and other overseas hibakusha in their legal cases against the Japanese government.

3. Junko Ichiba38

She was born in 1956 in Fukuyama City, Hiroshima Prefecture.39 Since living close to

Hiroshima City, her parents took her to the Peace Memorial Museum several times as a child, so she could learn about the tragedy of the atomic bombing at a young age.

Nevertheless, it was not until the 1970s that she learned about the existence of Korean victims. She enrolled in the Kyoto University in 1975 and moved to the Kansai area, where the largest number of zainichi Koreans reside in Japan. After coming into contact with them, she heard about the colonial history and the fact that ten percent of the A-bomb victims are

Koreans for the first time. Afterward, she took Korean language courses and learned about the history of Korea in detail.40 By the time she entered university, Motoji Matsuda, the current secretary general of the Osaka main branch, had already been leading a student circle at Kyoto University for the support of Korean hibakusha. One of their aims was to assist the Son Jin-doo lawsuit (they often went to Fukuoka for the trials), and another was

38 See Figure 26. 39 “Intabyū: Beikoku ni Shazai Motomeru Mae ni Nihon no Sekinin mo Toubeki,” [Interview: Before Demanding Apology from the United States, Japan’s Accountability Should be Questioned] May 24, 2016. http://japan.hani.co.kr/arti/international/24221.html (accessed: March 10, 2017). 40 Junko Ichiba, “Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito: ‘Kankoku no Hiroshima’ wa naze Umareta no ka o Kaite,” [Writing Those Who Brought Hiroshima Back Home: Why Did Hiroshima in Korea Come into Existence?] http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~hn3t-oikw/kaihou/No_31/0107_08.html (accessed: March 10, 2017). Hereafter cited as Ichiba, “Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito: ‘Kankoku no Hiroshima’ wa naze Umareta no ka o Kaite.”

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to help the administrative work of the Osaka AOC (the administrative office was at

Yoshiko Matsui’s place). Ichiba joined the student circle upon entering university, which marked the beginning of her involvement in the Korean hibakusha assistance.41

Concerning the survey the AOC conducted in 1979, Ichiba visited South Korea first as a member of the AOC delegates. That was the first time she talked directly with Korean hibakusha. Although having supported Son Jin-doo’s legal case for three years, she never had the chance to talk with him directly. She met with Sin Yeong-soo, who helped her work during the survey process. Sin translated from Korean to Japanese for those hibakusha who did not speak Japanese. As Ichiba said, hibakusha’s living circumstances were much worse than that of the normal households. Following that, she visited South Korea again in the summer of 1979, this time to continue the surveys in Daegu. She conducted interviews with nearly 150 hibakusha and she then decided that she needed to master Korean so that she could talk with hibakusha, which demonstrates her commitment towards their cause.

Years later when she became fluent in Korean, she could comprehend the difference between the Japanese and Korean versions of the Korean hibakusha testimonies.42

In the 1980s she became the secretary general of the Osaka main office, and in 1999, following Yoshiko Matsui’s resignation, she took the post of the chairperson and has been leading the AOC ever since. Besides being a key member of the survey delegations, she has negotiated with the Japanese Ministry of Welfare and Ministry of Foreign Affairs many times, has held lectures and speeches nationwide about the history and conditions of

Korean hibakusha, and has interacted with the Korea Association members, visiting them

41 Matsuda. Interview with the author. 42 Ichiba, “Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito: ‘Kankoku no Hiroshima’ wa naze Umareta no ka o Kaite.”

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many times each year and inviting them to Japan to attend various atomic-bomb-related events. In 2000 she published a book called Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito about the history of Korean hibakusha, the Korea Association, the colonial period, and Hapcheon, thus contributing significantly to the scholarship on Korean atomic bomb victims.

As the above-mentioned examples illustrate, many support members were Christians, hibakusha, second-generation hibakusha, teachers, and students. They sympathized with

Korean victims and after learning about their situation cooperated to help them, despite the prevailing racial prejudices in Japanese society against Koreans and the Japanese government’s reluctance to acknowledge and compensate its wartime victims. Many AOC members considered the Korean hibakusha problem as their own, engaged in fund-raising, raised awareness, and pursued every effort to make the Japanese government implement some relief measures for them. Although it was a small grassroots organization that never received any governmental support, the strong will of the members, their hard work, and constant backing of the Korean hibakusha helped to bring about changes in the status of the

South Korean survivors.

Assisting A-bomb victims in South Korea and cooperating with the Korea Atomic

Bomb Victims Association

One of the major goals of the AOC was to provide direct aid to the Korea Association and through them all hibakusha members.

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1. Financial support

One way to accomplish this was financial support that the AOC realized through collecting membership fees and raising fund.

The AOC collected one million yen in the first four months, and its ultimate goal was ten million yen, which, it believed, would be a substantial fund for the Korea Association and each hibakusha.43 By the end of the first year, it collected 3,040,598 yen, out of which it donated 1,364,784 yen to the Korea Association.44 Although this was a small amount of money in terms of medical and livelihood assistance, it enabled the maintenance of the only hibakusha association in South Korea. The AOC not only supported the main branch in

Seoul but also the other branches of the Korea Association all over South Korea. For instance, in 1978 it sent 3,447,470 won to the Busan branch, out of which the Busan branch could cover the medical treatment of 22 hibakusha in the Busan Evangelical Hospital.45

Since its establishment until June 4, 1979, the AOC sent 12,593,088 yen in total to the

Korea Association. Generally, it donated more than one million yen annually but there were periods (1974 and 1976) when this amount exceeded two million yen.46 This was a significant amount of donation coming from a single citizen-driven group that collected this amount through fundraising activities, without governmental assistance. With this, the

Korea Association could operate in the 1970s and the AOC established itself as the backbone of the Korean hibakusha support.

43 Hayaku Engo o! 2 (May 6, 1972), 2. Hayaku Engo o! 3 (August 1, 1972), 8. 44 Hayaku Engo o! 5 (December 28, 1972), 5. 45 Hayaku Engo o! 26 (June 20, 1979), 8. 46 Hayaku Engo o! 27 (August 20, 1979), 8.

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2. Seeking for witnesses and helping hibakusha with the A-bomb certificate

application process

Following Son Jin-doo’s first legal victory at the Fukuoka District Court in March 1974, as discussed in Section One, it became possible for Korean hibakusha to apply for A-bomb certificates in Japan. Nevertheless, finding witnesses was one of the major barriers that hindered many A-bomb survivors from receiving certificates. To facilitate their application process, it was the AOC, especially the Hiroshima branch, that provided them with assistance when it came to seeking out witnesses.

Sin Yeong-soo received his A-bomb certificate on July 22, 1974. He was the first

Korean national to be issued an A-bomb certificate since the Japan-Korea Treaty. He had worked for a Japanese company and with the help of the Hiroshima AOC he found four witnesses in the Funairimachi district.47 The next person who was issued an A-bomb certificate was Choi Yeong-soon.48 No Jang-soo, who was demanding the return of the ashes of the 246 Korean forced laborers lost at sea with Munetoshi Fukagawa, was also issued a certificate on September 2, 1975 while receiving medical treatment in the

Kawamura Hospital.49 Nevertheless, the Japanese authorities were initially still reluctant to grant certificates to Korean survivors and the screening process was difficult to complete.

This explains the small number of Korean hibakusha holding A-bomb certificates in the

1970s.

47 Hayaku Engo o! 11 (November 30, 1974), 6-7. 48 Hayaku Engo o! 12 (March 30, 1975), 6, 10. 49 Hayaku Engo o! 14 (October 5, 1975), 1.

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It was not until Son Jin-doo’s victory at the Supreme Court in 1978 that the first

Korean hibakusha’s application was approved who had no witnesses. Dr. Kawamura, jointly with the Kuwana Church, raised funds and invited Lee Soon-ok to Hiroshima for medical treatment. Hiraoka, in his book Henken to Sabetsu wrote about her and also

Fukagawa recorded her A-bomb experience during his visit to South Korea in 1974, so Lee

Soon-ok had been known for the AOC for many years. Although the Hiroshima branch, together with Hidankyō, was seeking witnesses through the media, it could not find anyone since Lee had only arrived in Hiroshima one month before the dropping of the bomb, and besides her landlord Mr. Kunisawa, she had no other Japanese acquaintances.50 On August

14, 1979 Kwak Kwi-hoon also received his certificate although four years earlier

Hiroshima City had rejected his application.51 The authorities’ approval of their applications demonstrates increasing tolerance and leniency in the screening process, which was accomplished thanks to the Son Jin-doo trial’s groundbreaking verdict and to the

AOC’s constant support and emphasis on the rights of Korean hibakusha.

Despite the more favorable treatment by the authorities, thousands of hibakusha in

South Korea could not obtain A-bomb certificates and never received medical treatment in

Japan. Applicants were required to submit their applications to the local authorities in Japan in person, which meant that they needed to come to Japan for the application process. For seriously sick people or for hibakusha with no income this was not feasible so they remained excluded from the Japanese government’s support program and could not be recognized officially as A-bomb survivors. The Japanese government announced in

50 Hayaku Engo o! 24 (October 10, 1978), 9. 51 Hayaku Engo o! 28 (October 30, 1979), 6.

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December 2008 that hibakusha were eligible to apply for certificates at foreign consulates or embassies, meaning that they need not enter Japan anymore to acquire A-bomb certificates. Although nowadays overseas atomic bomb victims can go through the bureaucratic processes in their own country, finding witnesses seven decades after the dropping of the bomb is extremely difficult and in most cases it is the reason that their application is refused.52 As of February 2017, 71 out of the 2,407 registered members of the

Korea Association did not possess A-bomb certificates.53 Although being members of the

Association, they cannot enjoy the benefits guaranteed by A-bomb certificates since no one can testify that they stayed in one of the A-bombed cities in August 1945. Nevertheless, the

Hiroshima and Nagasaki branches of the AOC as well as the Korea Association have been eager to help them not only seek for witnesses but also to litigate in Japan.

3. Facilitating the Korean A-bomb survivors’ medical treatment

The AOC, jointly with the Korea Association, helped arrange medical treatment in Japan for Korean hibakusha’s many times, and it also provided beds in some South Korean hospitals for their hospitalization. Additionally, from the 1980s it donated a smaller amount of funds to various branches of the Korea Association each month contributing to the members’ medical expenses.

After Choi Yeong-soon returned to South Korea, the AOC contacted the Busan

Evangelical Hospital and made arrangements for her hospitalization there and proper

52 Kazuyuki Tamura, ed., Zaigai Hibakusha Saiban, [Overseas Hibakusha Trials] (Tokyo: Shinzansha, 2016), 290. Hereafter cited as Tamura, ed., Zaigai Hibakusha Saiban. 53 Hayaku Engo o! 150 (April 2017), 11.

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aftercare if necessary, ensuring a bed for her. This was the first time that a South Korean hospital maintained a bed for hibakusha, and this was achieved through the AOC’s efforts.54 Although initially it was only one hospital bed, this progress gave hope to Korean hibakusha and they had expectations that their medical treatment in their country could be realized soon.

Next, it was the Severance Hospital in Seoul that provided beds for hibakusha from

1980. The Korean Church Women’s Association, the Korea Association, and the AOC cooperated to provide free medical treatment for some hibakusha. The KCWA supported a medical health check-up program among hibakusha during which the more seriously sick patients could be selected and hospitalized. The AOC donated funds for both the health check-ups and the maintenance of the hibakusha ward in the hospital.55 Later, other South

Korean hospitals such as the Kyung Hee University Hospital, Yonsei University, and

Yeungnam University followed suit and began providing medical treatment for hibakusha.56 The AOC, Dr. Kawamura, the Korea Association, and the KCWA had thus collaborated and succeeded in establishing medical aid for the A-bomb survivors in South

Korea, though in a small-scale.

In 1980 Toyonaga set up the Association for Sending Medicine to Lee Soon-ok, and some members of the Hiroshima branch engaged in fundraising to buy and donate medicine to her. She had received medical treatment in Japan in 1974, however, upon her return to

South Korea, her condition had worsened and she was in desperate need of additional

54 Hayaku Engo o! 13 (July 31, 1975), 6. 55 Hayaku Engo o! 30 (March 20, 1980), 6. Hayaku Engo o! 31 (August 5, 1980), 5. 56 Hayaku Engo o! 43 (December 28, 1983), 6-7.

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treatment. In 1980 she sent a letter to the AOC claiming that she had run out of medicine and was suffering from unbearable pains. In spite of possessing the A-bomb certificate, she could not come to Japan for a longer period since she was a housewife with a big family.

Instead, she wished to receive medicine from the AOC that would temporarily ease her pains. Therefore, Toyonaga, together with about sixteen members in the Hiroshima branch, launched another fund-raising event for Lee’s medical support. Through this example,

Toyonaga pointed out the inadequacy of the governmental medical relief program that began in 1980 and stressed that the Korean hibakusha problem was far from being settled.

Lee’s case demonstrates that a one-time medical treatment is insufficient for hibakusha.

Her condition worsened in the following years, so Toyonaga called attention to the fact that the government should also address the issue of aftercare, although it was never realized.57

Independently from the Hiroshima Committee, the Osaka main branch of the AOC aided Hyeon Jeong-ja’s hospitalization in the Matsubara Hannan Hospital, the extension of her visa, and medical treatment in Japan in 1987. Hyeon’s parents were from Jeju Island, but she was born in Osaka in 1936. After the war, she repatriated but was dissatisfied with the medical treatment in South Korea. She wished to receive medical treatment in Japan, where doctors specialized in treating A-bomb-related diseases. In 1973 she entered Japan without permission and due to her undocumented immigrant status, she could not apply for an A-bomb certificate. She was arrested and deported in February 1986, but a year later she reentered Japan with a valid tourist visa and was hospitalized in Matsubara. The period of validity for her visa was two months, after which she would have had to leave Japan, in the

57 Hayaku Engo o! 36 (November 30, 1981), 2-3.

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middle of her hospitalization. To prevent this, the AOC requested the authorities to approve her application for the extension of her visa. Although facing difficulties many times, the authorities finally approved her request for extension, which meant she could continue her medical treatment in Japan.58 Additionally, thanks to the contribution of the AOC, the

Osaka Immigration Bureau granted her special residence status in Japan. With this, she overcame the legal obstacles that hindered her from receiving medical treatment. Following

Son Jin-doo, she was the second Korean hibakusha who had entered Japan without a visa but later was issued the special residence status, which could not have been accomplished without the strong support of the AOC.59

4. Providing emotional support by visiting South Korea and inviting members of

the Korea Association to Japan

In the 1970s representatives of the Korea Association (Sin Yeong-soo and Kwak Kwi-hoon) often came to Japan in August to talk about the actual conditions and the history of Korean hibakusha nationwide.60 Raising awareness and seeking assistance that time of the year was easier and people were prone to be more sympathetic towards the A-bomb victims as it corresponded with national commemorations of the nuclear attacks. Additionally, Sin and

Kwak negotiated with the Japanese government a few times, especially when they were asking for relief measures in general or discussed the major points of certain decisions. For instance, Kwak visited the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of Foreign

58 Hayaku Engo o! 58 (October 31, 1987), 6. 59 Hayaku Engo o! 61 (October 15, 1988), 9. 60 Hayaku Engo o! 9 (May 25, 1974), 5.

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Affairs in January 1980, after the Japanese and South Korean government announced the details of the medical relief program, and he requested the establishment of a separate A- bomb hospital in South Korea.61 In August, he repeatedly visited the ministries and participated in gatherings in Hiroshima, Kobe, and Sapporo, where he talked about the difficult situation of Korean hibakusha that had lasted by then for 35 years.62 When there were rumors about the termination of the medical program in 1985, Sin also came to Japan, gave a speech in Osaka, and demanded the continuance of the program. The AOC listened to their wishes in all cases, endeavored to address their demands, and launched a signature- collecting campaign in 1985 as a sign of its protest against the termination of the relief program that it later submitted to the government.63

Members of the AOC went to South Korea many times, in particular when they were conducting surveys, recording testimonies, investigating the conditions of the survivors, and seeking for further hibakusha living scattered in the countryside. When the Korea

Association launched the first larger-scale survey program in 1975, the AOC helped their work. For example, Yoshiko Matsui went to Seoul, Busan, Pyeongtaek, Kimcheon, and

Daegu in 1977 to cooperate and meet with the chairperson of those branches.64 The AOC also conducted surveys in South Korea in 1978 and 1979 and then spent a considerable period among Korean hibakusha. Moreover, some members participated in the annual memorial service for Korean hibakusha in Seoul, representing the Japanese side and

61 Hayaku Engo o! 30 (March 20, 1980), 4-5. 62 Hayaku Engo o! 31 (August 5, 1980), 2. 63 Hayaku Engo o! 51 (November 30, 1985), 3. 64 Hayaku Engo o! 20 (July 20, 1977), 1-4.

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expressing their feelings of remorse and compassion.65 To observe the change in the condition of the A-bomb victims, some AOC representatives talked with those hibakusha in

1981 with whom they had made interviews in 1978. Whereas three years earlier they had been concerned about their diseases and talked about their A-bomb experiences, in 1981 they were more worried about their children and grandchildren.66 To be fully aware of the actual conditions of Korean hibakusha and the changes in their life, the AOC made such investigations from time to time. Sometimes when the AOC members witnessed that hibakusha were trapped in poverty, they decided to donate additional funds for the improvement of their living standard. This happened during Matsui’s 1988 visit, after which she called for a large-scale fundraising event and managed to collect more than two million yen that the AOC donated to Korean survivors with little or no income.67

Conducting surveys on the A-bomb survivors in South Korea

The AOC carried out two significant surveys on the actual conditions of Korean hibakusha in 1978 and 1979. Using the data of the survey conducted by the Korean Church Women’s

Association (hereafter KCWA) in 1979, they jointly published the three survey results in

1983, completing the first comprehensive work on the reality of Korean hibakusha.

There were had been preceding investigations in the 1970s. Yumiko Morikawa, a medical student at the time and member of the AOC, visited South Korea with two other medical students in August 1973 and examined the conditions of twenty hibakusha in

65 Hayaku Engo o! 31 (August 5, 1980), 7. 66 Hayaku Engo o! 37 (February 28, 1982), 5. 67 Hayaku Engo o! 60 (May 20, 1988), 7.

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Busan, Hapcheon, and Seoul. They looked into their living circumstances and learned that by then all hibakusha with acute symptoms of radiation sickness had already passed away.

At the time of the survey, those alive struggled to work and had difficulty making ends meet, yet there were also many bed-ridden people.68 This research made clear to the members of the AOC the desperate situation of Korean hibakusha and prompted them to go on with their relief activities. In October 1975 the Korea Association launched its survey project among the registered members and by the end of that year it recorded 1,207 hibakusha’s data.69 The Korean Association carried out the project and the AOC provided the necessary funding for its implementation.

To increase the effectiveness of the survey, the AOC commenced a supplementary one in Seoul and in the nearby areas from August 10 to 26, 1978. The survey group examined the A-bomb survivors’ health, standard of living, life history, awareness of the A- bombing, and their children’s condition. There were three AOC representatives and six from the Korea Association, who conducted interviews with 113 hibakusha in total.70 This was an interview-based survey and the group members directly visited hibakusha households and workplaces. They studied the condition of the survivors living in the capital in more detail than the survey begun in 1975. Out of 113 hibakusha, 107 were from

Hiroshima and six from Nagasaki. Despite the high number of the Nagasaki victims, only a few of them were included in the survey.71 More than half of the interviewees were above

68 Hayaku Engo o! 8 (October 25, 1973), 3. 69 Hayaku Engo o! 15 (January 20, 1976), 6. 70 Zaikan Hibakusha Jittai Hojū Chōsa, [Supplementary Survey on the Actual Condition of Korean A-bomb Victims] (Kankoku no Hibakusha o Kyūensuru Shimin no Kai: December 10, 1978), 1. Box 1, HT0101400, HUA. Hereafter cited as Jittai Hojū Chōsa. 71 Ibid., 2.

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50: they were forced laborers at Mitsubishi and other zaibatsu at the time of the war, and it became obvious that most hibakusha in Seoul were also the victims of forced conscription.

Many of them were between two and three kilometers from the hypocenter or outside the three-kilometer radius.72

When asked about their health condition, 83% (94 people) claimed they suffer from some kind of diseases. Despite that, only 15% of those, namely fourteen people, had been to any hospital. 69% of them, 65 people, were only taking medicine and the rest had neither access to hospital care nor medicine. There were only three people who received medical treatment regularly through health insurance. The reason most people had not gone to the hospital was their inability to pay for the medical expenses.73

As for their livelihood circumstances, their family consisted of three to six people, and only 38% of them possessed their own houses. The others were renting small rooms, in many cases no more than 20 m2.74 Less than 55% were employed, and most of them often changed their workplaces, had no stable income, and were engaged in physical labor. Only nine interviewees were either company employees or public employees, with a stable and higher salary. 72 people had less income than 100,000 won a month, with 40 of them having no income at all.75

Regarding their awareness, 89% were informed about the aftereffects of radiation due to books and pamphlets distributed through the Korea Association, and because of that 87% stated they were concerned about their future (health, financial conditions, and their

72 Ibid., 3. 73 Ibid., 4. 74 Ibid., 8-9. 75 Ibid., 11.

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children).76 Surprisingly, there were thirteen people who were unaware that A-bomb certificates guarantee free medical treatment in Japan, and even those who had heard about it, 26 were not familiar with the details.77

When they were asked about discrimination due to being hibakusha, fourteen of them had such experiences. They received unfavorable treatment when it came to marriage or employment. Furthermore, eight people experienced misunderstanding in society since their diseases were believed to be contagious. This demonstrates the lack of awareness of the A-bomb and the effects of radiation in South Korean society.78

The survey group examined the A-bomb survivors’ children, too, most of whom were born between 1952 and 1969. 95% of hibakusha answered that their childbirth went without complications, nevertheless, there were cases that they had given birth to healthy children before the bombing but their children born after that were stillborn. In addition to the 113

A-bomb survivors, the group also studied the condition of 298 second-generation hibakusha. Among them, 136 said they had no health problems, 41 claimed to be slightly sick, and 121 turned out to be frequently affected by various diseases. Almost one third of them were ill at the time of the survey, many citing gastroenteric diseases, anemia, and skin diseases.79 Most of them were unemployed and lived in the same household with their parents.

76 Ibid., 17. 77 Ibid., 18. 78 Ibid., 19. 79 Ibid., 22-23.

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Since the Mindan’s 1965 survey in South Korea, this was the first comprehensive one conducted by Japanese citizens.80 The goal of the AOC with this survey was to get a detailed understanding of the reality of the life of Korean hibakusha. The Association believed that the overseas hibakusha problem had to be interpreted from the viewpoint that

Japan had waged a war against other countries and consequently the A-bombs were dropped. The major problem was that Korean hibakusha were kept away from medical assistance whereas they would need it more than other wartime victims due to the persistent and often late-occurring nature of radiological illnesses. The AOC realized that unless the

Japanese and Korean governments took relief measures, there would be no amelioration in their standard of living and they would not get out the vicious cycle of disease, unemployment, and poverty.81 It summarized and published the survey results and informed the Japanese about the conditions of Korean A-bomb survivors through various exhibitions and lectures afterward.

From July 24 to August 7, 1979, five representatives of the AOC jointly with the

Korea Association conducted their second supplementary survey, this time focusing on hibakusha residing in Daegu and Busan (North Gyeongsang Province). In total, they examined the conditions of 152 A-bomb survivors. Most of them were originally from

80 Concerning Japanese hibakusha, the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare conducted the first major survey among them in 1965, and the second one in 1975. For comparison and more information on the survey results, see Genbaku Saigai Hiroshima Nagasaki, 155-174. Additionally, Junko Ichiba points out that there was another survey conducted among Japanese hibakusha in 1977. It examined the conditions of 7,741 A-bomb victims and the result was the following: 58% suffered from diseases, 75% was hospitalized or seeing a doctor on a regular basis, and 32% had difficulty making ends meet. It can be seen from the survey results among Korean and Japanese hibakusha that in the 1970s the Japanese hibakusha’s living and health conditions improved thanks to the benefits guaranteed by the A-bomb laws, while A-bomb survivors in South Korea struggled with many diseases and received no financial benefits, so their living standard was much lower given the lack of relief measures for A-bomb victims in South Korea. For more information, see Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 73-74. 81 Jittai Hojū Chōsa, 27-29.

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Hapcheon, however, upon their return to Korea after the war they moved to the nearby cities in hope of finding work.82 This explains the large number of A-bomb survivors from

Hapcheon in the two cities. During the second survey, the AOC and the Korea Association discovered many hibakusha who had not registered yet at the Korea Association.83 With the two surveys, the AOC had information on the actual conditions of hibakusha living in

Seoul, Daegu, and Busan.

The Korean Church Women’s Association completed a separate survey in Seoul,

Gyeonggi, Busan, and Hapcheon among the A-bomb victims in September and October

1979. It examined the condition of 1,070 first generation and 493 second and third generation hibakusha based on the following aspects:

- Family structure at the time of the bombing

- Current family state

- Their condition at the time of the bombing

- Appearance of any abnormalities and symptoms of radiation sickness in the wake of

the bombing and at the time of the interview

- Current living circumstances

- How conscious they are of the atomic bomb and radiation

This was the most wide-ranging survey hitherto, studying and recording the state of more than 1,500 hibakusha and their descendants.84

82 Hayaku Engo o! 28 (October 30, 1979), 4, 8-10. 83 Hayaku Engo o! 29 (December 25, 1979), 3. 84 Hayaku Engo o! 39 (September 10, 1982), 3.

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In 1982 the AOC acquired the KCWA’s report on the 1979 survey results and had it translated into Japanese by the members of the Zainichi Christian Church in Osaka. Its goal was to summarize the results of the two surveys into one book and publish a Japanese version, which the AOC accomplished a year later.85 The “Joint Report of the Survey on the Actual Condition of South Korean Atomic Bomb Victims” was completed by

September 1983. The publication carried great significance by including the survey results of hibakusha living in various parts of South Korea and reporting on their health condition, history, and living circumstances. Although the surveys covered only a fraction of all A- bomb survivors, that was the most inclusive publication about them until then. This was accomplished by citizen supporters, without any governmental contribution, so in this respect this demonstrates the power of the grassroots support of Korean hibakusha. The reports shed light on the aggravating health and living condition of these people given the lack of relief measures, so it served as a primary source when it came to negotiating with the Japanese government.86

The publication of survey results was reported by some newspapers. The Yomiuri

Shimbun (Hiroshima issue) claimed, “[The publication] introduces the history, the actual condition, and the support of Korean hibakusha within South Korea through examples. It provides a chronological table and reference materials, and sums up various problems related to Korean A-bomb victims in a straightforward way.”87 Additionally, the newspaper

85 Ibid. 86 Hayaku Engo o! 42 (September 30, 1983), 1-2. 87 Yomiuri Shimbun, “Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai o Hakkō: Shimin no Kai Rekishi, Jittai nado Shōkai,” [Publishing about the Korean Hibakusha Problem: Association of Citizens Introduces History and Actual Condition] August 27, 1983, Box 5, HT0500500, HUA.

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quoted the support gropus’ criticism of the bilateral medical relief program highlighting the small number of patients and the limited period of the medical treatment, and announced

Toyonaga’s address so that citizens interested in the new publication about Korean hibakusha could contact him. This way, not only did the Yomiuri article give out information about the first larger Korean hibakusha survey but also let the public know about the AOC’s support activities, making their survey results available for the citizens.88

The problem with the AOC’s and KCWA’s survey was that most hibakusha were from Hiroshima. Out of the 1,070 A-bomb victims examined by the KCWA, merely 41 were from Nagasaki, and of the 264 people interviewed by the AOC in total, 10 became A- bomb victims there. With the extremely low number of hibakusha from Nagasaki, they could not get a clear picture on the reality of the second A-bombed city and the A-bomb experiences of Koreans there. The AOC members presumed that most Nagasaki victims resided in Jeolla Province, thus they intended to next investigate the conditions of those people.89 Nevertheless, such survey was not implemented until the early 1990s, when

Nobuto Hirano began to search for victims from Nagasaki.

It can be concluded that the Osaka and Hiroshima branches mostly interacted with the

Korea Association and hibakusha in Seoul, Pyeongtaek, Hapcheon, Daegu, and Busan. As mentioned earlier, in the 1980s, the AOC members visited the various branches annually in

South Korea and frequently studied their conditions. For example, from 8 to 13 August

88 There are some other publications that include information about the Korean hibakusha surveys. See Jinken o Mamoru Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha, 275; Jung, Kankoku Genbaku Higaisha Kutsū no Rekishi, 499; Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 71-74; and Mitsuko Nitta, Sensō to Kazoku, 91. For an earlier survey carried out in 1977 by the Korean Church Women’s Association, see Hiraoka, Muen no Kaikyō, 40-49. 89 Hayaku Engo o! 46 (August 1, 1984), 1, 3.

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1988, they made interviews with 58 hibakusha living in South Gyeongsang Province.90 Not only did they publish and exhibit their research results, but they also reported on them in their bulletins that were issued three to four times a year. These surveys informed the general public about the reality of Korean hibakusha and helped increase the number of supporters who felt sympathetic towards their cause and demanded the enactment of relief measures.

After the surveys, the AOC noticed that “although almost all Korean hibakusha claim that the Japanese government must take responsibility and must introduce support measures, what they need at present (early 1980s) is health care support, an A-bomb hospital, and medical treatment in South Korea.”91 In their survey, the AOC came to the same conclusion as Dr. Kawamura in the early 1970s concerning the importance of medical assistance and its members took an active part in various medical support programs implemented in the

1980s both by the two governments and other grassroots organizations.

Advocating for the rights of Korean hibakusha in Japan

One of the main tasks of the AOC has been to demand the support of Korean hibakusha from the Japanese government. It requested that through the introduction of a special legislation, the government should extend the benefits of the A-bomb laws to overseas

(especially South Korean) hibakusha. The major support members frequently negotiated with the ministries and although the government was reluctant to acknowledge its wartime accountability and pay national compensation, in 1990 it provided Korean A-bomb victims

90 Hayaku Engo o! 61 (October 15, 1988), 2. 91 Jinken o Mamoru Kai, Chōsenjin Hibakusha, 275.

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with 4,000,000,000 yen as humanitarian aid. Additionally, the AOC got the support of some Diet members, who endorsed them in later court cases.

In September 1972 the AOC wrote a letter of demand, stating that the Japanese government must acknowledge that Korean hibakusha are victims of Japan’s colonization and must compensate them as soon as possible. Furthermore, it claimed that all overseas hibakusha should be entitled to come to Japan, be issued A-bomb certificates, and enjoy the benefits of the relief laws. Additionally, considering the situation of zainichi Korean hibakusha, it demanded the A-bomb laws be applied to all foreign A-bomb victims residing in Japan without any discrimination. Besides, it emphasized the need for a hibakusha welfare center in South Korea, as requested by the Korea Association. However, to achieve these goals, information was necessary on the actual conditions of Korean hibakusha, so the

AOC stressed that the government first should conduct a fact-finding survey among Korean

A-bomb survivors. Last but not least, it called for the enactment of the A-bomb Victims

Relief Law that would also include foreign hibakusha.92

After summarizing the most urgent issues the members felt the government should address, Yoshihiro Motoyoshi, the first chairperson of the AOC, gave this letter to the

Japanese foreign minister Masayoshi Ōhira on October 8, 1972. The minister replied, “We heard about the problem of Korean A-bomb survivors from the South Korean government last month in Seoul, at the Japanese-Korean Joint Ministerial Conference. There are A- bomb survivors in San Francisco and Los Angeles, too, and I intend to treat the issue collectively as the problem of overseas A-bomb victims. The number of Korean hibakusha

92 Hayaku Engo o! 4 (October 7, 1972), 10.

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amounts to ten percent of all hibakusha [from Hiroshima and Nagasaki in total], so I am going to assist these people as much as possible.” He concluded that “the government should take special legal measures to support all A-bomb victims living abroad.”93

Motoyoshi regarded the meeting with the foreign minister and his supportive attitude an important first step and expected the government to launch a survey to investigate the conditions of hibakusha in South Korea.94 However, despite the positive response and sympathy from the government side, it took no relief measures in the 1970s, nor did it carry out any survey in South Korea among the survivors. Nevertheless, the AOC kept petitioning the government on implementing relief measures for Korean hibakusha.

In December 1976 some AOC and YWCA members visited the Ministry of Health and Welfare, repeatedly requesting support for Korean hibakusha, however, the Ministry’s reaction was that it could only act within the scope of the laws currently in effect. Moreover, the support members demanded that the Ministry carry out a survey in South Korea, dispatch a group of Japanese doctors to examine and provide medical treatment for hibakusha, and simplify the application process for A-bomb certificates.95 Although the government did not comply with the AOC’s survey request, the application process gradually became more tolerant and simpler. As mentioned before, the authorities issued a certificate for the first time in 1978 to an applicant who had no witnesses, and from the

93 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 54. 94 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Tokubetsu Rippō o Kōryo: Gaishō ga Yakusoku Gaikokujin Hibakusha no Kyūsai,” [Considering Special Legislation: Foreign Minister Promises to Aid Foreign Hibakusha] October 9, 1972, Box 4, HT0400800, HUA. 95 Hayaku Engo o! 18 (January 10, 1977), 14-15

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1980s, not only Japanese but also Korean witnesses were also accepted. This was an important step towards increasing the number of Korean hibakusha acknowledged by Japan.

On June 18, 1979 the AOC, conjointly with Kyōfūkai, NCC, and YWCA visited the

Ministry of Health and Welfare. They claimed that the Korean hibakusha support should be addressed from the position of national reparations, not humanitarian assistance, since the

Japanese government is responsible for these people being in Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the time of the bombing. They called for medical and livelihood assistance, and by then the two governments had already agreed on the details of the medical relief program.

Additionally, the AOC was collecting signatures as a proof of public support of the Korean hibakusha cause, and with that it aimed to pressure and persuade the government to urgently implement real changes in the status of Korean victims.96

The AOC negotiated with the Ministry of Health and Welfare on April 27, 1984 and handed over the signatures of 8,937 Japanese citizens. This time, it talked about the pitfalls of the medical relief program and attempted to make the government improve the existing system. It complained about the small number of participants, the exclusion of the many seriously ill people, their difficulty in coming to Japan and leaving their family behind, and the lack of aftercare. It also highlighted that in 1979 the two governments agreed upon dispatching Japanese doctors to South Korea and training Korean doctors in Japan, which had never been realized. Consequently, the AOC demanded the government address the above-mentioned issues and begin the medical exchange of the South Korean and Japanese doctors. Among all the suggestions of the Association, the ministry promised to consider

96 Hayaku Engo o! 27 (August 20, 1979), 2-3.

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providing the South Korean hospitals with research materials on the aftereffects of radiation and organize medical research meetings in South Korea where Japanese A-bomb specialists would give speeches.97 In spite of all the efforts of the AOC members and the positive response of the ministerial side, the government did not change the existing medical system nor did it take support measures in the following years.

Their next visit to the ministry took place in 1986, after the two governments officially announced the termination of the medical relief program. On April 18 some members of the Association submitted the signatures of 16,305 citizens who, in agreement with the AOC’s position, were against the discontinuation of the governmental support program. Additionally, the AOC demanded that the Japanese government cover the travel expenses and raise the number of patients from 100 to 200. The Ministry said it supported the maintenance of the program, yet the South Korean government finalized its termination.

They concluded that the decision was in the hands of South Korea.98 On October 21 Sin

Yeong-soo, Yoshiko Matsui, and Ryūseki Rikihisa went to the Ministry of Welfare and appealed for the continuation of the Korean hibakusha’s receiving medical treatment in

Japanese hospitals. The Ministry replied that it discussed the matter with the Director

General of the Health Policy Bureau (of the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare), who claimed that most hibakusha had general health problems such as high blood pressure, thus instead of participating in a medical treatment program in another country that has a lot of restrictions, it is better for them to get treated in their own country.99 Nevertheless, the

97 Hayaku Engo o! 45 (July 1, 1984), 1-3. 98 Hayaku Engo o! 53 (July 5, 1986), 1-3. 99 Hayaku Engo o! 55 (January 5, 1987), 7-8.

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director general failed to consider the lack of relief measures, the invalidity of A-bomb certificates in South Korea, the high medical expenses, and the significant poverty of

Korean hibakusha that made it difficult for them to get regular medical treatment in South

Korean hospitals. Afterward, the Socialist Party, Gensuikin (The Japan Congress Against

A- and H-Bombs), and the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (JCTU) members submitted a joint letter of demand to the Ministry of Welfare on October 28. Besides expressing their objection to the termination of the medical program, they demanded that the A-bomb laws be applicable to hibakusha living in South Korea, their continued medical treatment in Japan, the lifting of the six-month maximum limit, and the Japanese government’s providing compensation for them and financing the travel expenses of the medical program.100 Despite the AOC’s many-sided appeal for the continuance of the

Korean hibakusha’s medical treatment program in Japan, it came to a halt in November

1986. Nevertheless, the Association made every effort to maintain it and succeeded in mobilizing anti-nuclear and leftist groups, thus widening the circle of the supporters of the

Korean A-bomb survivors’ rights in Japan.

One year later, on November 30, 1987 the AOC petitioned the government on paying

$2,300,000,000 compensation to Korean A-bomb victims for the forced labor system, A- bomb damages, and its abandonment of Korean hibakusha in the postwar period.101 Later, the Korea Association called for the same amount. In the meantime, the AOC members began collecting signatures again, this time on a larger scale, and on March 29-30, during their negotiations with the Ministry of Welfare and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they

100 Ibid., 7-9. 101 Hayaku Engo o! 59 (February 23, 1988), 3.

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handed over the signatures of 35,000 citizens.102 By then, the Japanese government’s attitude was changing and showed willingness to support the A-bomb victims in South

Korea. While the government constantly emphasized in the 1970s that Japan resolved all wartime issues in the 1965 Japan-Korea Treaty, its stance in the 1980s was that it supported

Korean survivors as a humanitarian gesture, yet it failed to admit its wartime responsibility and refused to pay national reparations. On May 24, 1990 Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki

Kaifu at the Japan-South Korea summit meeting expressed his “sincere apology” to those

South Koreans who had suffered due to Japan’s “behavior” and offered a humanitarian aid worth 4,000,000,000 yen to Korean atomic bomb survivors. Although this large sum of donation marked a turning point in the Japanese government’s hitherto policy towards

Korean hibakusha and demonstrated that the Japanese support groups’ hard work had paid off, the Korean side was dissatisfied with the amount and the Japanese government’s conditions. South Korea used the fund to partially cover the hibakusha’s medical expenses and to build a welfare center for them, which was realized in 1996 in Hapcheon.103

However, Korean victims were not entitled to receive a monthly welfare support. The

Japanese government argued that the fund was restricted to medical assistance since “it is each country’s own duty to take welfare measures for its economically underprivileged citizens.”104 Despite the strict conditions of the fund, it covered a certain amount of the

Korean hibakusha’s medical expenses in the 1990s and could be used to establish a welfare

102 Hayaku Engo o! 63 (May 15, 1989), 1. 103 Ichiba, Hiroshima o Mochikaetta Hitobito, 83-84. See Figure 31. 104 Hayaku Engo o! 63 (May 15, 1989), 6.

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center, which the Korea Association and other Japanese support groups had been demanding since the 1970s.

Raising awareness in Japan

Since the 1970s, the AOC has been calling attention to the plight of Korean hibakusha and asking for citizens’ support in Japan by introducing their history and actual condition through screenings, photo and slide exhibitions, symposiums, pamphlets, and other publications. As a result, hundreds of thousands of people learned about the existence of

Korean A-bomb victims, the colonial period, and the lack of relief measures in South Korea, many of whom joined the AOC or gave their names to its petitions.105

The AOC has been publishing bulletins regularly since its establishment. The first issue was published on February 25, 1972, and until 1989, the number of bulletins amounted to 65. As of April 2017, there have been 150 issues that the Association published in 45 years. It reported about the current issues, progress of the lawsuits, and petitioning the government. Additionally, the AOC analyzed the legal rulings, introduced many hibakusha in detail whom the supporters visited, described its support activities, elaborated on the most serious problems and considered the solutions, included letters from the members, and described the progress of its fund-raising and current budget in detail.

105 It was not only the AOC that raised awareness of Japan’s wartime responsibility in the late 1960s and 1970s. The Vietnam War fostered anti-war sentiments in Japan, and made many citizens aware of Japanese atrocities in World War II. Aside from Korean hibakusha support movements, “past and present aggression and complicity can be seen in the Japanese United Church of Christ’s 1967 admission of complicity in wartime Japan, Kaikō Takeshi’s novels of disillusionment in Vietnam, and Honda Katsuichi’s reportage on Japanese aggression in China.” Mitsubishi and “comfort women” redress movements emerged later, in the 1990s. For more information, see James Joseph Orr, The Victim as Hero: Ideologies of Peace and National Identity in Postwar Japan, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 174.

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Although this is not the only grassroots organization that has published bulletins

(Hiroshima Committee, Kakkin Kaigi, Son Jin-doo’s support movement, and Shimin Kaigi also issued their publications from time to time), the AOC has been reporting about the

Korean hibakusha problem since the early 1970s (i.e. the beginning of the support movements and the Son Jin-doo legal case), so in this sense it has provided the most extensive sources on the history and struggle of Korean atomic bomb victims.

Following the completion of various surveys in South Korea in 1978 and 1979, the

AOC organized photo exhibitions and slide projections to report on their research results and inform the public about the conditions of Korean A-bomb survivors. The October 1978 issue reported on exhibitions in Tokyo (three locations), Nagoya, Kyoto, and Hiroshima, which meant that within one month the AOC exhibited the survey results in many Japanese big cities. Not only did it conduct a larger-scale survey among hibakusha in Seoul, but it also worked towards getting this information to many Japanese citizens.106 Besides, the

Chūgoku Broadcast in the evening news on April 18, 1978 also reported on the AOC’s survey in South Korea. After Keisaburō Toyonaga described the significance of the survey, the members talked about A-bomb survivors in South Korea in general and the announcer concluded that “this kind of movement has only been advanced by a few citizen-based groups,” suggesting that the government should also commence a large-scale survey.107

Through this media coverage, many people in the Chūgoku region could hear about the existence and situation of Korean hibakusha and the support activities of the AOC. Besides, the Chūgoku and Asahi Shimbun also dedicated an article to the association’s investigation

106 Hayaku Engo o! 24 (October 10, 1978), 2. 107 Ibid., 13.

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in South Korea. The photo exhibitions continued in 1979, when the visitors could listen to the tapes recorded by the AOC members during the interviews. The exhibitions took place in Tokyo, Nagano, Matsumoto, Hamamatsu, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe, Tokushima,

Matsuyama, Hiroshima, and Sapporo, extending to many regions in Japan, from Hokkaido to Shikoku and the south of Honshu.108 The AOC spread information on the 1979 survey the same way, and this time it was covered not only locally but also by the NHK, the nationwide broadcast company.109

In July 1980 the AOC dispatched four representatives to South Korea (to Seoul and

Busan) to record hibakusha testimonies, make new videos and recordings, and take photographs.110 In some A-bomb related exhibitions, it used many of these materials as well as the previous survey sources. For instance, from July to August 1980, the YWCA organized A-bomb painting exhibitions in Osaka, Kobe, and Kyoto, where the AOC also put 24 photographs on display.111 By the end of 1981, many Japanese nationwide asked the

AOC about renting its videos and panels.112 This showed an increasing interest in the

Korean hibakusha problem in Japanese society and suggested that the wider supporters could distribute this information the more inclined people were to support these victims.

The exhibitions continued well into the 1980s, usually taking place in summer when there were many peace-related events all over Japan commemorating World War II and the atomic bombings.

108 Hayaku Engo o! 25 (March 30, 1979), 8-12. 109 Hayaku Engo o! 28 (October 30, 1979), 10. 110 Hayaku Engo o! 31 (August 5, 1980), 2. 111 Ibid., 7. 112 Hayaku Engo o! 36 (November 30, 1981), 3.

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Meanwhile, the Hiroshima branch of AOC began screenings at local schools and universities to educate students about these issues. Additionally, the members were holding exhibitions in the Peace Park. In a city where most of the population was first, second, and third generation hibakusha, local people could understand why the Korean survivors were in urgent need of help. On June 12 and 13, 1981 the AOC showed videos taken during its survey to the students at Hiroshima University.113 On March 21, 1982 a peace meeting took place in the Peace Memorial Park during which the group “Hibakusha no Tsudoi” arranged speaking sessions with Japanese A-bomb survivors at the Hiroshima Youth Center, where the Hiroshima branch exhibited 30 Korean hibakusha panels. At the peace event, there were

200,000 visitors in total, and through the AOC’s exhibition, many citizens learned not only about Japanese but also Korean victims of the bombing. Some Japanese survivors were deeply moved to see photos of Koreans. One Japanese hibakusha said, “I have been involved in the hibakusha movement for long years but this is the first time that I have seen photos of Korean hibakusha, who had been abandoned after the A-bomb attack.”114

There were cases when the Korean hibakusha issue was displayed at school festivals.

One such event occurred at Hiroshima Kokusai Gakuin High School in the fall of 1982, when ten teachers, members of AOC, set up an exhibition about Korean A-bomb survivors with the help of the students. Naoto Furuya, a high school student, was the central organizer behind the event who had immersed himself into the Korean hibakusha problem. He visited survivors in person when they were in the A-bomb Hospital, was bent on conducting a separate survey on their conditions, and with the support of his classmates made a

113 Hayaku Engo o! 37 (February 28, 1982), 9. 114 Hayaku Engo o! 38 (June 10, 1982), 6.

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presentation with the title, “What the anti-nuclear and peace movements forget.” Moreover, he played a key role in putting together the exhibition material about the colonial history and measures, the governmental medical relief program and its pitfalls, and the 1979 survey results. Also, he displayed the letter of demand addressed by the AOC to the Japanese government and introduced the individual stories of those hibakusha who had strong connections with the AOC (Sin Yeong-soo, Choi Yeong-soon, Uhm Bun-yeon, and Lee

Soon-ok). The exhibition and presentation were highly instructive for the students after which one of them said that “although the war is over, there are still many unsettled issues.”

Another one noticed that “there are so many people who do not even know that there are many Koreans among those who fell victim to the A-bomb.” In the end, all of them agreed that each hibakusha deserves equal treatment and rights.115 Furuya’s display was not only reported by the AOC’s own bulletin but also by the Chūgoku Shimbun, stating that “a high- school student is making an appeal for the realization of Korean hibakusha support measures.” The article praised his efforts to help hibakusha and understand their history by personally visiting Korean A-bomb survivors hospitalized in Hiroshima and sharing their stories with other students in his school.116

Some murals of The Hiroshima Panels painted by Toshi Maruki and Iri Maruki were exhibited in Kobe from June 16 to 21, 1982. The AOC helped organize the event and arranged that the panel called Crows was among those on display.117 It is the 14th piece of

115 Hayaku Engo o! 40 (December 25, 1982), 2-3. 116 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Kankokujin Hibakusha ni Kyūsai o: Kōkōsei ga Taisaku Jūjitsu o Uttae,” [Help to Korean Hibakusha: A High-school Student Calls for Satisfying Measures] November 20, 1982, Box 5, HT0500400, HUA. 117 For more information on Crows, see John W. Dower and John Junkerman, eds., The Hiroshima Murals: The Art of Iri Maruki and Toshi Maruki, (Tokyo; New York: Kodansha International, 1985), 82-85.

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the panel series and depicts the forsaken bodies of Koreans being eaten by crows after the

A-bomb attack. The painting is very graphic and conveys the message that Koreans were discriminated against by the Japanese even after death. It had a strong impact on the visitors and made them more conscious of peace-related issues and the suffering of Koreans.

Besides, the AOC set up a separate Korean hibakusha corner within the building where it screened videos. Many of the 30,000 visitors heard about the existence of Korean victims for the first time.118

On April 12, 1980 a Symposium on Korean A-bomb Survivors was held in Hiroshima, where Dr. Ishida, Dr. Kawamura, Kan Moon-hee (from Mindan), and Keisaburō Toyonaga gave presentations. This was the first smaller-scale symposium dealing with the Korean hibakusha problem.119 Next, as the 40th anniversary of the atomic bombing was approaching, Hidankyō organized the Hiroshima Atomic Bomb Victims Conference at the

Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, with 200 participants.120 On this occasion, Toyonaga gave a speech about Korean hibakusha. It was an important development that he could incorporate the story of Korean victims into the Hiroshima A-bomb narrative at an event set up by the major anti-nuclear and hibakusha support group in Japan. Nevertheless, depending on the theme of the conference, the audience did not always receive the presentation on Korean survivors positively. For example, when Toyonaga talked about the same issue on the 15th Conference on the War Damage and Aerial Bombings on August

11–12, 1985, he could not reach the audience by emphasizing Japan’s wartime

118 Hayaku Engo o! 39 (September 10, 1982), 9-10. 119 Hayaku Engo o! 31 (August 5, 1980), 7. 120 Hayaku Engo o! 48 (February 20, 1985), 10.

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responsibility and the Korean hibakusha’s tragic fate.121 At this conference, Japan’s victim viewpoint was central, and according to the AOC’s bulletin, there was no room for discussing its wartime atrocities. Another major conference about the Korean hibakusha issue took place on March 20–21, 1988 in Tokyo with 161 participants. It exerted such a great influence on the participants that soon after a new movement advocating for Korean

A-bomb victims called Shimin Kaigi was set up, and the support base was reestablished in the capital after the dissolution of the Tokyo branch of AOC in 1980.122

The AOC organized many movie screenings starting in 1987 to introduce Mō Hitotsu no Hiroshima [One More Hiroshima]. In the movie, a zainichi Korean hibakusha (residing in Japan) and a zaikan Korean hibakusha (residing in South Korea) can be seen talking.

Their encounter is significant because it demonstrates the different afterwar experiences of

Koreans residing in different countries. This is the first movie in which the perspectives of zaikan and zainichi Korean A-bomb victims intermingle. The same nationals fell victim to the same nuclear weapon, and in spite of their taking different paths after the war, their constant struggle and discrimination within mainstream society was a common point.123

The movie was screened in major Japanese cities including Osaka and Kyoto. Due to the

AOC’s active advertisement of the event, it recruited many viewers to each screening and by October 1987 the number of viewers rose to 10,000.124

121 Hayaku Engo o! 51 (November 30, 1985), 8. 122 For more information on Shimin Kaigi, see page 321-322. 123 Hayaku Engo o! 55 (January 5, 1987), 11. Comparing and contrasting the different experiences of Korean A-bomb victims staying in Japan and returning to South Korea after World War II would be worth further elaboration in a separate study. 124 Hayaku Engo o! 58 (October 31, 1987), 14.

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Criticism of the AOC and its pitfalls

Especially in the 1970s, the AOC received a lot of criticism within Japan. A society that was still coming to terms with its past and was reluctant to admit its country’s wartime behavior did not welcome a movement that was advocating for the rights of its former colonial people. Additionally, discrimination against Koreans was still common; many people could not sympathize with their struggle and showed indifference. Yoshiko Matsui said in a speech that one day a Japanese A-bomb survivor asked her, “Why do you immerse yourself in helping Korean victims when there are many hibakusha in Japan, too?” demonstrating people’s lack of understanding towards the Korean hibakusha problem.125

Some questioned why a Japanese association assists Korean hibakusha when even Japanese hibakusha do not get enough support. Furthermore, they argued that if the AOC aims to engage in helping war victims, there would be many people in war-stricken areas such as

Vietnam or Eastern Pakistan who would need immediate assistance.126

Some support members such as Dr. Ishida had doubts at first that a grassroots movement could achieve a real breakthrough. He said, “as long as negotiations on the governmental level both in Japan and South Korea do not move forward, real solution is not possible.”127 Nevertheless, the AOC repeatedly petitioned the government and consequently it achieved some success in the 1980s and 1990s.

125 Yoshiko Matsui, “Kare Susuki ni Hana wa Saita ka: Kankokujin Hibakusha no Genjō,” [Were Flowers Blooming on Dead Susuki (Japanese Pampas Grass)? – Reality of Korean A-bomb Victims] in Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] No. 13, September 1, 1991: 3 in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 77. 126 Hayaku Engo o! 1 (February 25, 1972), 1. 127 Hayaku Engo o! 9 (May 25, 1974), 7.

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Although the AOC was not aware of the Japanese government’s passing Directive No.

402 in 1974 until the early 1990s, it is important to point out that it never brought up the issue why Korean hibakusha possessing A-bomb certificates were not eligible to receive free medical treatment in South Korea and why the Japanese government discontinued the medical healthcare allowance once they left the country.128 For many hibakusha being issued a certificate, it would have been of vital importance to continue their medical treatment in their own country since most of them could not afford to come to Japan for another treatment. Not finding out about the earlier directive put a major barrier in the overseas hibakusha benefits and not demanding its termination in the 1970s and 1980s during the negotiations with the Japanese government can be interpreted as one of the flaws of the Korean hibakusha support movement.

In spite of their long-term and substantial support of Korean victims, the AOC members did not always receive a warm welcome in South Korea. For example, when

Matsui visited some hibakusha households in March 1988, one A-bomb survivor said the following: “You have been here many times but all you can do is just taking photos. We do not want you to take photos of our miserable life. […] You do not provide us with medical treatment or support fund despite our becoming A-bomb victims is your [Japan’s] fault…

We do not want to see you [Japanese] anymore.” The harsh words were not personally addressed to Matsui but presumably to Japan and the Japanese government. After this experience, she was filled with grief but she acknowledged that this person is right and they need to achieve real results. Afterward, she launched a fundraising drive for hibakusha

128 See Directive no. 402 in detail on page 106-108.

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trapped in poverty and later distributed the money among them.129 The AOC’s new fundraising activity was reported by the Chuugoku Shimbun, too, informing people about the support activities of the AOC and encouraging them to donate for the improvement of the

Korean hibakusha’s living standard.130

Nowadays, since the major barriers have been removed and the Japanese government provides Korean hibakusha with medical and financial assistance, one might argue that the

AOC could expand its scope of activities by focusing on other Korean-related problems such as the lack of franchise and citizenship of zainichi Koreans born in Japan and the government’s denial to provide tuition subsidies to Korean high schools (“Chōsen gakkō,” the Korean schools related to North Korea).

Yet, the AOC’s resistance to the criticisms reflects the transformation of Japanese society by the 1970s. When the Korean hibakusha-support movement was criticized for not assisting Japanese hibakusha and victims of the Vietnam War, it did not alter their original agenda and went on advocating for the rights of Korean hibakusha. New Left and

Christianity had a great influence on the members, and their belief to realize the equal treatment of Japanese and Korean hibakusha was firm enough not to abandon their original objectives when their activities were disapproved by other fellow Japanese. In this respect, the AOC was regarded a dissenting group in the eyes of many Japanese, especially those affiliated with the right-wing. The AOC’s refusal to back off when it received condemnation enabled the realization of its goals and helped restore the dignity of a

129 Hayaku Engo o! 60 (May 20, 1988), 7. 130 Chūgoku Shimbun, “200 Man Mokuhyō ni Kinkyū Bokin: Zaikan Hibakusha no Shien Dantai,” [Emergency Fund-raising Targets 2 Million Yen: Support Group for Korean Hibakusha] June 15, 1988, Box 5, HT0501000, HUA.

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marginalized group of people victimized by their nation, thus taking an important step towards establishing friendly relations between Japanese and Korean civil societies.

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The AOC has been the movement that has contributed the most to realizing the medical and financial assistance of Korean A-bomb survivors as well as their recognition by the

Japanese government since the early 1970s through its versatile support activities. This grassroots organization was a forerunner for being the first Japanese group to have conducted a larger-scale survey on the actual conditions of A-bomb survivors in South

Korea. Surveys were essential to elucidate the existence and history of Korean hibakusha and the absence of relief measures in their country, thus served as the basis to gather supporters as well as substantiating their claim when the AOC members demanded the

Korean hibakusha’s support from the Japanese government. Moreover, the AOC raised awareness by presenting its survey results at public exhibitions and making the tapes and videos taken in South Korea available to the Japanese public. Additionally, until the

Japanese government extended the relief measures to South Korean victims, it was the

AOC that donated regular funds to the Korea Association both for its management and for partially covering the hibakusha’s medical expenses.

By frequently negotiating with the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, the AOC played an important role in the Japanese government’s implementation of the medical relief program in 1980 and donating four billion yen to the

Korean victims in 1990. From 1995, the Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki branches set up the Association to Support the Lawsuit of the Former Mitsubishi Workers at Hiroshima

Who Became Victims of the Atomic Bomb, and together with some lawyers they actively supported the Mitsubishi trials until their victory at the Supreme Court in 2007.131 Later in

131 Genchōyōkō Hibakusha Saiban o Shiensuru Kai, Han Mitsubishi, Hiroshima, 59.

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the 1990s, the AOC got the backing of some Diet members and Junko Ichiba in 2000 set up the Meeting of Diet Members related to the Problem of Overseas A-bomb Victims. 50 members formed the Informal Meeting of Diet Members to Realize the Application of the

Relief Laws to Overseas A-bomb Victims. This group of high-ranking politicians served as the backbone during the Kwak Kwi-hoon lawsuit and according to Ichiba, without their help, it would not have been possible to win the Supreme Court trial in 2002.132 Since the

1990s, the AOC has been providing most of the assistance during the legal cases along with other support groups, and by breaking down the barriers that Korean hibakusha faced, their hard work contributed to the Japanese government’s eventual recognition of the rights of

A-bomb survivors residing in South Korea.

132 Itō, “Kenri o Kachitoru made,” 115-116.

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CHAPTER 8: ADDITIONAL SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS

The Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons (Kakkin Kaigi)

Kakkin Kaigi was set up in 1961 as a result of domestic ideological division within the main anti-nuclear organization, Gensuikyō. It was the only major anti-nuclear group in the

1960s that worked to support both Japanese and Korean A-bomb victims. Aside from providing financial aid, it played a key role in obtaining medical assistance for Korean hibakusha in South Korea.

The first major anti-nuclear movement, Gensuikyō, was established in 1955. Many members were affiliated with the Japanese left and their primary goal was the abolition of nuclear weapons. In the beginning, politics did not interfere with the operation of the group.

Nevertheless, the changing political and social events had an impact on Gensuikyō, which became dominated by communist sympathizers and party members by the end of the 1950s.

Due to ideological tensions within Gensuikyō and conflicting stances over the 1960 U.S.-

Japan Security Treaty, members of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Socialist Party seceded and set up a new anti-nuclear movement, Kakkin Kaigi, in 1961.133 Where

Gensuikyō criticized US possession of nuclear weapons, Kakkin Kaigi opposed possession and use of nuclear weapons by all countries. It is a nationwide organization with headquarters in Tokyo and 22 organizations in 38 prefectures. It has financed its activities

133 Anthony DiFilippo, Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 71. Ideological tensions within Gensuikyō did not end with the formation of Kakkin Kaigi. With the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, “socialists opposed nuclear testing by any country, while the communists were willing to accept Soviet testing.” This further ruptured Gensuikyō, resulting in the Socialist Party leaving the group and establishing Gensuikin, in 1965. For more information, see ibid.

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through fundraising programs and membership fees. Its goal has been the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, and to realize this, Kakkin Kaigi has been appealing to various governments all over the world. During the Cold War, it repeatedly protested against the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and other nuclear-armed nations conducting nuclear tests. Additionally, to raise awareness of the use of atomic weapons, it held A-bomb exhibitions in South Korea, Germany, Pakistan, India, and France.

In the Peace Memorial Parks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it erected some of the peace monuments, such as the Flame of Peace in Hiroshima and the Peace Fountain and Peace

Forest in Nagasaki. Its slogan is: “a loving hand to hibakusha!” and it has been raising funds for the support of hibakusha since 1961. Not only has Kakkin Kaigi provided gift money to hibakusha on hospital visits, but it has also donated medical equipment to the A- bomb hospitals, including health check-up cars, shuttle buses, stretchers, wheelchairs, and automatic manometers. In 50 years, its budget exceeds 1,300,000,000 yen, and its relief activities also included the aid of Korean A-bomb victims.134

On August 1, 1968 Kakkin Kaigi organized a national assembly in Hiroshima, where

Kan Moon-hee, a member of Mindan who had already been involved in the Korean hibakusha support then, discussed the plight of A-bomb survivors living in South Korea.135

He revealed that out of the 1,700 registered members of the Korea Association, 300 were in

134 Itō, “Kenri o Kachitoru made,” 108-109. 135 Zainippon Daikanminkoku Mindan Hiroshima Chihō Honbu Kankoku Genbaku Higaisha Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai, [Korean Residents Union in Japan, Main Main Office of Hiroshima District, Special Committee to Take Measures for Korean Atomic Bomb Victims] Kankokujin Genbaku Higaisha 70 Nenshi Shiryōshū, [Source Book of the 70-year History of Korean Atomic Bomb Victims] (Hiroshima, Zainippon Daikanminkoku Mindan Hiroshima Chihō Honbu Kankoku Genbaku Higaisha Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai: 2016), 20. Hereafter cited as Mindan, Kankokujin Genbaku Higaisha 70 Nenshi Shiryōshū.

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urgent need of medical treatment.136 This paved the way for the emergence of support movements and inspired others (e.g. Dr. Kawamura) to aid Korean hibakusha.

After learning about the existence of Korean A-bomb survivors, Kakkin Kaigi, together with Mindan, set up the Japanese-Korean Council for the Relief of Korean A- bomb Survivors in October 1968, with Tadataka Murakami as the chairperson. This was the beginning of the support of Korean hibakusha by a Japanese organization. Their policies included advancing the issue of A-bomb certificates for zainichi hibakusha, assisting those who had difficulties making ends meet, providing medical treatment for South Korean hibakusha in Japan, issuing the medical certificate to South Korean hibakusha who needed medical treatment in Japan, authorizing the Korean hibakusha’s entering Japan for medical purposes, and ensuring scientific exchange programs between the Japanese and South

Korean to enhance understanding of the effects of radiation and its treatment.137 The council not only sought to aid Korean hibakusha residing in Japan, but also took steps to support hibakusha in South Korea. This opened the way to recognition of the importance of

Korean hibakusha receiving medical treatment in Japan and facilitated their later medical support by Japanese doctors and grassroots movements.

In 1968 Kakkin Kaigi emerged as the leading support movement of Korean hibakusha, in collaboration with Mindan. It engaged in fund-raising programs, and between 1968 and

1972, it sent a one-million-yen annual donation to the Korea Association. Kakkin Kaigi sought to establish an independent hibakusha community that would facilitate their being able to work and live in their own settlement, without any discrimination and isolation from

136 Itō, “Kenri o Kachitoru made,” 109. 137 Kankokujin Genbaku Higaisha 70 Nenshi Shiryōshū, 20.

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the rest of the South Korean society. As a first step, the Council purchased some building sites on the outskirts of Seoul and sent machines necessary for their daily lives. However, the land was for public facility construction, which meant that Kakkin Kaigi could not construct an independent village there. Despite its initial efforts and investment, this hibakusha village could never be established in South Korea.138 Although its attempt was unsuccessful, it was the first support group in Japan that organized around the Korean hibakusha issue and aimed to facilitate the improvement of their living standards. Moreover, at that time, the newly established Korea Association hardly received any financial support, so Kakkin Kaigi’s early donation was an important contribution to the Association’s survival.

To realize the medical treatment and examination of the A-bomb victims residing in

South Korea by Japanese medical experts on the effects of radiation, Kakkin Kaigi set up the Preparatory Committee to Dispatch a Group of Medical Specialists for the Medical

Treatment of Korean Atomic Bomb Victims in 1971. The Hiroshima Paper Crane Group and various other medical and religious groups cooperated with Kakkin Kaigi in the formation of the Committee, demonstrating that an increasing number of associations deemed support for Korean hibakusha an important issue. Then, Japanese doctors were not entitled to conduct medical examinations in South Korea and to obtain permission,

Murakami visited the South Korean Embassy in Japan, explained the gravity of the situation, and asked for their cooperation in authorizing the Japanese doctors’ visit to South

Korea and treatment of hibakusha there. As a result, the South Korean government

138 Ibid.

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officially gave permission for the Japanese medical group’s visit on August 23, 1971, and the first group of medical experts with Dr. Kawamura and Dr. Ishida crossed the sea to meet, examine, and treat A-bomb survivors. This event exerted a great influence on all the participating doctors as well as accompanying members and made it possible for Kakkin

Kaigi to establish the lack of medical services for hibakusha in South Korea and its serious consequences, prompting them to devote themselves even more to the support of Korean hibakusha. This was followed by annual visits until 1995, and during 25 years, 74 Japanese doctors were dispatched to South Korea with an expertise to treat radiation-induced diseases, examining and treating 4,313 A-bomb survivors altogether. Although this was usually a one-time medical treatment, according to Kakkin Kaigi’s report, thanks to the medical care and medicine provided for Korean hibakusha, contagious diseases, internal secretions, and blood diseases decreased among those treated by the Japanese doctors.139

Kakkin Kaigi was aware that Korean hibakusha required medical treatment in their own country, although it was not possible for them given the lack of hospitals that specialized in treating A-bomb diseases until the 1970s. Because of this, the Japanese anti- nuclear organization planned to set up such a clinic in Hapcheon, which it eventually accomplished in December 1973. Thousands of hibakusha lived in Hapcheon County, nevertheless, due to its relative distance and isolation from the major cities in South Korea there were hardly any doctors in the local, mountainous villages, thus Kakkin Kaigi chose this region as the location for an A-bomb clinic. After its completion, Kakkin Kaigi donated medical equipment to the Korean A-bomb Victims Medical Center and in the following

139 Ibid., 21.

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years contributed to the maintenance of the hospital.140 After its opening, the annual medical examinations organized by Kakkin Kaigi took place at the clinic. Kakkin Kaigi collected the necessary money through civic fundraising. At first, it donated an electro cardiogram, microscopes, blood cell count devices, and other medical treatment as well as medicine sufficient for a couple of months. In April 1974 it further provided the institute with a set of X-ray devices, medicine for stomach and skin diseases, and electric appliances such as refrigerators, radios, mini TV cameras worth three million yen.141 Kakkin Kaigi not only set up the hibakusha medical center in South Korea but it also took care of its maintenance and effective management. From 1974, there was a South Korean doctor in the facility who underwent training at the Hiroshima University Radiology Research

Institute for a year and who by then had expertise in treating A-bomb victims.142 Some medical specialists from the Kawamura Hospital also visited the Hapcheon clinic to aid the work of the South Korean doctors working there.

Meanwhile, Kakkin Kaigi mobilized other Japanese organizations and companies to donate money or equipment for the maintenance of the Hapcheon clinic. Independently of

Kakkin Kaigi and Mindan, a group called People of Hapcheon Origin Residing in

Hiroshima Prefecture also donated an ambulance car to the A-bomb clinic. Furthermore, the Korean Women’s Association in Hiroshima Prefecture also raised funds and purchased an additional ambulance to the Hapcheon Medical Center on March 22, 1979.143 The

140 Itō, “Kenri o Kachitoru made,” 110. 141 Mainichi Shimbun, “Kankoku no Hibakusha Shinryō Senta,” [Medical Center for Korean A-bomb Victims] April 5, 1974, Box 4, HT0401001, HUA. 142 Ibid. 143 Kankokujin Genbaku Higaisha 70 Nenshi Shiryōshū, 23.

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citizen-based support activities of Korean hibakusha started by Mindan and Kakkin Kaigi gradually expanded and thanks to their efforts increasing numbers of Japanese engaged in their support and contributed to the maintenance of the only A-bomb medical center in

South Korea. The facility began to decay and in 1992 the management was transferred to the Hapcheon Health Center.

Besides medical and financial support, Kakkin Kaigi carried out surveys on the conditions of Korean hibakusha from 1972 to 1982, playing a key role in spreading information on them. The representatives directly visited hibakusha homes and conducted interviews with them, and in ten years examined the conditions of 5,001 A-bomb victims in total. From the 1980s, in collaboration with the Hiroshima Committee to Invite Korean A- bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment, Kakkin Kaigi collected donations so that more South Korean hibakusha could enter Japan for medical treatment. Furthermore, the

Council helped Korean doctors to receive training in Japan and invited second-generation

Korean hibakusha to its nationwide conferences. Even today, Kakkin Kaigi dispatches delegates to Hapcheon, raises funds, and continues the assistance of the Korean hibakusha that it commenced in 1968.144 Its nearly five-decade long work has paid off and its role is indisputable in providing many Korean A-bomb survivors access to basic medical services.

Whereas Gensuikin, Hidankyō, and other major Japanese hibakusha support groups turned a blind eye to the Korean hibakusha problem, Kakkin Kaigi was among the first associations to engage in their support and sought to bring Korean A-bomb victims to the consciousness of the Japanese public.

144 Itō, “Kenri o Kachitoru made,” 110-111.

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The Hiroshima Paper Crane Group

The Hiroshima Paper Crane Group consisted of junior high school and high school students who engaged in various peace activities in Hiroshima beginning in 1958.145 Its members visited South Korea many times during the early 1970s, met with some hibakusha in person, and formed a close tie with the Second-Generation Korean Hibakusha Association, raising funds for their support. Its goal was to raise public awareness of the difficult situation of

Korean hibakusha and to continue peace activities in Hiroshima that included the narratives of Korean hibakusha. This organization is an excellent example of how children (most of whom were second-generation hibakusha) could recognize the limitations of traditional A- bomb narratives and took on the support of people abandoned by both the South Korean and Japanese governments.

Ichirō Kawamoto, a janitor in Hiroshima Jogakuin High School, was the person in charge of the group. Its activities included visiting hibakusha households, visiting hibakusha patients in hospitals, collecting donations on the street, and cleaning the A-bomb

(including Korean) memorials in the Peace Memorial Park. The members learned about

Korean hibakusha at a relatively early stage, in the 1960s. The organization signed a cooperation agreement with the Korea Association on February 16, 1969, which marked the beginning of its engagement in assisting Korean A-bomb survivors.146

145 The Hiroshima Paper Crane group was established in an attempt to advocate for the establishment of the Children’s Peace Monument in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. See “Kikakuten o Miyō,” [Let Us See the Planning Exhibitions], http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_j/exhibit/exh0107/exh01075.html (accessed: April 25, 2017). 146 Kankokujin Genbaku Higaisha 70 Nenshi Shiryōshū, 25.

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By 1970, the group had 50 members, and on August 24, its representatives headed to

South Korea for the first time, spending one week to personally meet hibakusha. Their visit preceded Son Jin-doo’s support movement and the dispatch of the first Japanese medical team by Kakkin Kaigi, so in this respect the Hiroshima Paper Crane Group was a forerunner as a Japanese peace group to visit hibakusha households in South Korea and learn about their situation. The representatives departed to South Korea following the invitation of the South Korean government, and after their arrival, they visited the Korean

Ministry of Health and Welfare, appealing for surveys on the actual conditions of Korean

A-bomb victims and for setting up a hospital to treat A-bomb patients. The Ministry’s reply was: “The Korean hibakusha problem came to the surface about four years ago. Until then there were no materials, and even if we had wished to take measures we had not known their actual condition. From now on, we will carefully deal with it as one of South Korea’s social issues that needs to be addressed. We will launch a survey soon, however, we would like to receive instructions from Japan, especially from the medical specialists in

Hiroshima.” Despite the positive response of the Korean government, it implemented relief measures jointly with the Japanese government only in 1980. Nevertheless, the young members of the Hiroshima peace group were enthusiastic about cooperating with and helping zainichi and zaikan hibakusha to lead stable lives.147

The Hiroshima Paper Crane Group’s first visit to South Korea encouraged second- generation Korean hibakusha to set up their own association that same year. They called

147 Asahi Shimbun, “Hisan na Kankoku no Hibakusha: ‘Hiroshima Oriduru no Kai’ ni Kiku,” [The Tragic Korean A-bomb Victims: Asking Hiroshima Paper Crane Group] October 12, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

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themselves Pidulgi148 and their aim was to appeal for peace and form close ties with the

Hiroshima Paper Crane Group. Its members were junior high school and high school students, the same age group of young people as the Hiroshima organization, and initially

Pidulgi had eighteen members. The interaction of the two second-generation hibakusha groups is a great example of a younger generation that was willing to overcome existing conflicts between the two governments and who made efforts to promote friendly, mutual relations in the name of peace.149

A year later, the Hiroshima Paper Crane Group set off for South Korea again in

August to deepen its understanding of the Korean hibakusha problem. Two students from

Hiroshima Women’s Commercial High School, one student from Hiroshima Jogakuin High

School, two students from Hiroshima Jogakuin Junior High school, one student from

Yasuda Women’s High School, and the person in charge, Yamamoto were the members of the delegation.150 They met hibakusha in Seoul, Busan, Uijeongbu, and Daegu and listened to their testimonies. Afterward, they visited the mayors of those cities together with Korean hibakusha and asked for their support. They also had a get-together with the members of

Pidulgi in Seoul and established a sister-organization relationship with them on August 20.

They gave a 20,000-yen donation to Pidulgi that they had collected through fundraising in

Japan.

148 Pidulgi means dove in Korean. 149 Asahi Shimbun, “Kankoku ni Hibaku Nisei no Kai,” [Second-Generation A-bomb Victims’ Group in South Korea] November 17, 1970, Box 4, HT0400600, HUA. See Figure 27. 150 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Zaikan no Hibakusha o Imon: Hiroshima Oriduru no Kai Chikaku Shuppatsu,” [Visiting Korean A-bomb Victims: The Hiroshima Paper Crane Group’s Approaching Departure] August 11, 1971, Box 4, HT0400700, HUA.

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Upon their return, the students went to the Hiroshima City Hall to greet Mayor Setsuo

Yamada and after talking about how they witnessed the current conditions of Korean hibakusha, they asked for the mayor’s cooperation in their support. Furthermore, the

Hiroshima Paper Crane Group wished to invite a few members of Pidulgi for the following year’s Peace Memorial Ceremony and the members proposed this idea to the Mayor.151

Before their departure, Michiko Takaki, a sixteen-year-old first grader at that time at the

Hiroshima Jogakuin High School, said: “I would like to go to South Korea and see with my own eyes the actual condition of A-bomb survivors there. Besides, I wish to deepen the cultural ties with second-generation Korean hibakusha. After coming back to Japan, I would like to utilize this experience and continue the activities of this peace movement.”152

Their second visit was not merely a study trip. The Hiroshima Paper Crane Group extended its activities by meeting some South Korean mayors, presenting the hibakusha problem in higher circles, and appealing for their support. Additionally, the members reported about their experiences to Hiroshima’s mayor, seeking his help and making him conscious of the gravity of this issue.

In 1972 six Pidulgi members came to Hiroshima and participated in the Peace

Memorial Ceremony for the first time.153 Hiroshima Paper Crane Group, with the support of Kakkin Kaigi, raised funds to invite Pidulgi members to Japan and promote mutual

151 Chūgoku Shimbun, “4 Shi de Hibakusha Imon: Hiroshima Oriduru no Kai Shōjora Kankoku kara Kaeru,” [Visiting Korean A-bomb Victims in Four Cities: The Hiroshima Paper Crane Group’s Girls Come Home] August 27, 1971, Box 4, HT0400700, HUA. 152 Asahi Shimbun, “Kankoku Hibaku Nisei no Kai to Engumi o Kinen ni Hata,” [Flag for Celebrating the Bond with the Korean Second-Generation A-bomb Victims] August 16, 1971, Box 4, HT0400700, HUA. 153 See Figure 28.

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interaction.154 Following their visit in Hiroshima, the Pidulgi members headed to Nagasaki to join the peace ceremony there. Their visit was followed by the dispatch of six Hiroshima

Paper Crane Group members for a third visit to South Korea from August 18 for one week.155 They further deepened ties with Korean hibakusha and Pidulgi in 1973 through their fourth visit, when four zainichi Korean second-generation hibakusha born in

Hiroshima also accompanied them. This time not only did they go to Seoul and Busan but also visited Hapcheon for the first time, which was the most instructive among all their visits given the large numbers of hibakusha there.156 Going to more places in South Korea, interacting with more hibakusha, and inviting zainichi Korean second-generation hibakusha showed the gradual extension of their activities.

In the 1970s representatives of the Hiroshima Paper Crane Group continued going to

South Korea to meet hibakusha each year except for 1974. From 1978, the organization cooperated with the Kuwana Christian Church to raise funds to invite hibakusha from

South Korea to Hiroshima for medical treatment.157 News of its exchange programs echoed in Japan and contributed to raising awareness of the Korean hibakusha issue.158 According to a former Hiroshima Paper Crane Group member who went to South Korea three times in the 1970s, after graduating from high school she was not engaged in peace-related activities

154 Anonymus former Hiroshima Paper Crane Group member, e-mail message to author, July 11, 2017. 155 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Engo ni Chikara o Iretai: ‘Oriduru no Kai’ra ga Miokuru,” [I Intend to Go on with the Support: Sent Off by Members of the Hiroshima Paper Crane Group] August 14, 1972, Box 4, HT0400800, HUA. 156 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Joseitora 12 Nin Shuppatsu: 4 Dome, Kōryū Fukameru,” [12 Female Students Depart: Deepening the Interactions for the 4th Time] August 17, 1973, Box 4, HT0400900, HUA. 157 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Jokōseira 3 Nin ga Zaikan Hibakusha Imon: Hiroshima Oriduru no Kai, 18 Nichi Shuppatsu,” [3 Female High School Students Visiting Korean Hibakusha: Hiroshima Paper Crane Group Departs on 18th] August 16, 1978, Box 5, HT0501400, HUA. 158 Kankokujin Genbaku Higaisha 70 Nenshi Shiryōshū, 25.

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anymore. However, her encounter with the Korean hibakusha problem and visiting South

Korean hibakusha personally as a high school student made her conscious of the painful experiences of the Koreans under Japan’s colonial rule at a time when discrimination against Koreans was prevailing in Japanese society.159

The Nagasaki Testimonial Society

The Nagasaki Testimonial Society was founded in 1968 with the aim of listening to and collecting testimonies of hibakusha from Nagasaki. The second A-bombed city has never received as much attention as Hiroshima and hibakusha stories from there are less known to the general public. To pass down the story of the Nagasaki atomic bombing to future generations, this movement began its activities in the late 1960s and contributed largely to raising awareness of the destruction and the suffering of people in Nagasaki. Its work was not limited to Japanese hibakusha testimonies. It also learned about the plight of Korean hibakusha and included these narratives in their publications.

The central figure of the movement was Sadao Kenta, a university professor at the

Nagasaki Institute for Peace Culture within the Nagasaki Institute of Applied Science. At first, the group collected zainichi Korean hibakusha testimonies and was also interested in hibakusha in South Korea, but at that time it only had limited information on them based on the reports of Takashi Hiraoka in the Chūgoku Shimbun. This was one of the reasons the group got involved in the Korean hibakusha issue. Additionally, as described in Chapter 4, at the end of the 1960s the news of Korean hibakusha’s ashes being stored at Konjōin

159 Anonymus former Hiroshima Paper Crane Group member, e-mail message to author, July 11, 2017.

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Temple came to the surface and Masaharu Oka and his peace movement were working towards erecting a cinerarium for them in the Nagasaki Peace Memorial Park. There was an emerging awareness in Nagasaki about the abandonment of Korean hibakusha and Kenta decided to become involved in their support and inform the public about their condition.160

In March 1975 representatives of the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Survivors Council,

Nagasaki UNESCO Juvenile Department and the Nagasaki Testimonial Society went to

South Korea for the first time as the Korean Hibakusha Medical Survey Group.161 They conducted a small-scale survey in Seoul, Busan, and Hapcheon, where they listened to the testimonies of many hibakusha that they included in the Volume 7 of Nagasaki no

Shōgen.162 After their return to Nagasaki, they completed a report on their experiences, printed 500 copies and sent 30 of those to hibakusha in South Korea. All branches of the

Korea Association highly praised the report and expressed their gratitude to the Nagasaki group. The A-bomb victims in South Korea regarded the Survey Group’s work as an effort to foster solidarity and friendly relations between Japanese and Korean hibakusha.163

Although it was not a pioneer in being the first Japanese group of citizens to go to South

Korea to learn about the conditions of hibakusha, its visit was significant in terms of the

Korean hibakusha support in Nagasaki.

160 Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai Shimin Kaigi, [Civilian Council Addressing the Problems of Korean A-bomb Victims] Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai o Kangaeru, [Considering the Problem of Korean A-bomb Victims] (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 1988), 134, 138. Hereafter cited as Shimin Kaigi, Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai o Kangaeru. 161 Nagasaki no Shōgen Nyūsu, [Nagasaki Testimonial News] 29 (June 11, 1975), 2, http://naosite.lb.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10069/36290/1/No.29.pdf (accessed: March 2, 2017). Hereafter cited as Nagasaki no Shōgen Nyūsu, [Nagasaki Testimonial News] 29 (June 11, 1975). 162 Nagasaki no Shōgen Nyūsu, [Nagasaki Testimony News] 28 (March 25, 1975), 1, http://naosite.lb.nagasaki-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10069/36289/1/No.28.pdf (accessed: March 2, 2017). 163 Nagasaki no Shōgen Nyūsu, [Nagasaki Testimony News] 29 (June 11, 1975), 2.

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Toshiyuki Hayama, the secretary general of the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Survivors

Council, also accompanied the group to South Korea. Then, he initiated the invitation of three hibakusha from South Korea to Nagasaki for medical treatment in the second half of the 1970s, which was significant because it happened prior to the governmental medical relief program. After 1980 members of the Nagasaki Testimonial Society visited Korean hibakusha in the hospitals and listened to their testimonies.164

In 1985 the Medical Survey Group, together with the members of the Nagasaki

Testimonial Society visited South Korea for the second time. Three Japanese A-bomb victims were also among the delegates, and with this, the group promoted the interaction between Japanese and South Korean hibakusha. During their visit, the delegates noticed a serious problem that prevented hibakusha from receiving proper medical treatment in South

Korea. In the South Korean medical institutes, there was hardly any data (medical records of the examinations) about A-bomb victims, whereas hospitals in Japan accumulated a lot of materials about them and radiation-induced diseases. Nevertheless, to provide hibakusha with effective medical treatment, case studies in this area would have been of vital importance. Their study trip revealed that South Korean hospitals had not developed expertise in the treatment of A-bomb patients despite the advances in medicine.165

The Nagasaki Testimonial Society was bent on conveying hibakusha testimonies to subsequent generations by immersing their audience in a more multimedia experience. Not only did it focus on written testimonies but also photos, drawings, and works of art.166

164 Shimin Kaigi, Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai o Kangaeru, 140. 165 Ibid., 140-141. 166 Ibid., 142.

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Aside from the narratives of Japanese A-bomb victims, it took into account Korean survivors and played an important role in collecting and preserving the testimonies of those

Korean hibakusha who fell victim to the A-bomb dropped on Nagasaki.

The Good Neighbor Society (Zenrinkai/Zenrinkyō)

Zenrinkyō is a new religion based on Shintoism established by Tatsusai Rikihisa in 1947 under the name of Tenchi Kōdō Zenrinkai.167 Its name changed to Zenrinkai in 1960 and it was renamed Zenrinkyō in 1992.168 Its headquarters are in Chikushino City, Fukuoka

Prefecture. In 2006 it had 450,000 adherents.169 The group has shrines in South Korea, too, and currently has a nominal Korean membership of 300.170

Since the Japanese government did not recognize Zenrinkyō as an independent religion in the pre-war period, it was part of Shintō Jikkōkyō, one of the thirteen sects of prewar Shinto (a state Shinto sect), and Tatsusai Rikihisa’s father, Tatsusaburō Rikihisa, was the head of a regional branch.171 Following his father’s death in 1926, Tatsusai

Rikihisa succeeded him as the leader of Shintō Jikkōkyō locally.172 Afterward, as one of the representatives of Shintō Jikkōkyō, Tatsusai Rikihisa went to Korea during the colonial

167 It registered as a legal religious corporation under the Religious Corporations Ordinance in 1948. In the postwar era, the new Constitution guaranteed freedom of religion, so it became easier for new Shinto-based religions and sects to be granted the status of a religious corporation. For more information, see Norman Havens, ed., An Encyclopedia of Shinto: Volume Three: Groups, Organizations, and Personalities, (Tokyo: Kokugakuin University, 2006), 42, 117. Hereafter cited as Havens, ed., An Encyclopedia of Shinto: Volume Three. 168 George D. Chryssides, Historical Dictionary of New Religious Movements, (Lanham, Toronto, Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press: 2012), 384. 169 Havens, ed., An Encyclopedia of Shinto: Volume Three, 118. 170 Itō, “Kenri o Kachitoru made,” 119. 171 Havens, ed., An Encyclopedia of Shinto: Volume Three, 117. For more information on Shintō Jikkōkyō, see ibid., 55-56. 172 “Zenrinkyō no Ayumi,” http://www.zenrinkyo.or.jp/ayumi.htm (accessed: June 12, 2017).

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period.173 With this, he took part in the spreading of Shintoism in the peninsula and supporting Japanese military nationalism.

In the 1960s and the 1970s the Japanese government put a lot of effort into searching for and collecting the remains of the Japanese soldiers who died in World War II all over

Asia. Nevertheless, the local population heavily criticized Japan for its neglect of the long- term suffering it had inflicted upon its former colonies during the war. Then, Zenrinkai turned its attention towards the Asian victims of the Japanese Empire, and this is how it found out about hibakusha in South Korea. Given the founder’s missionary work in Korea in the 1930s and his subsequent attachment to the peninsula, Ryūseki Rikihisa, the founder’s son and Zenrinkyō’s leader from 1965 to 2010, was feeling remorse for the suffering of those Koreans and began to support them in 1973. The Shinto-derived religion deeply regretted being unaware of the existence of Korean hibakusha until then, hence the young members of the group became a major source of support. During the colonial period, the founder had received a lot of help and affection from Korea, so his son felt it was his turn to reciprocate the assistance and work towards ameliorating the condition of Korean

A-bomb survivors.174 Whereas many Shinto shrines, especially Yasukuni Shrine, have commemorated the fallen Japanese soldiers and regarded them heroes, Zenrinkyō broke with the traditional Japanese pattern to elevate soldiers who committed various atrocities in

South Korea and chose to stand up for the people victimized by Japan.

173 Ryūseki Rikihisa, “Sensō no Fukai Kizuato o Mitsumetsudukeru,” [Continuing to Face the Deep Scars Caused by the War] in Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai o Kangaeru, ed. Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai Shimin Kaigi, (Tokyo: Gaifūsha, 1988), 112. 174 Ibid., 112-114.

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The young members of Zenrinkyō launched fundraising efforts. The leader of the group gave the collected fund to the chairperson of the Korea Association in person while making a deep bow and apologizing for not knowing anything about the Korean hibakusha problem, which left a deep impression on all the A-bomb survivors present. During their fundraising activities, Zenrinkyō members told the passers-by about the plight of Korean hibakusha, so with this, they were not only contributing to their financial support but also enhanced awareness of their abandonment.175 Since its participation in the Korean hibakusha support, Zenrinkyō has been sending donation to the Korean Association each year, between 100,000 yen and 1,000,000 yen. Since 1985, it has been interacting with the

Korean second-generation hibakusha group, whom they invite to Japan and grant scholarships.176 Additionally, Zenrinkyō provided a building for the main office of the

Korea Association in Seoul until 2016, which was its most significant source of assistance.

The Korea Assoication’s main office was relocated from Seoul to Hapcheon in 2016, but

Zenrinkyō still maintains the building for the Seoul branch office.177

Concerning their support of Korean A-bomb victims, Ryūseki Rikihisa said, “The reason that we engaged in the aid of Korean hibakusha is that we felt remorse for not being able to put an end to the war. We would like to focus not only on commemorating the deceased but also on supporting the wartime victims still alive.”178 Although Zenrinkyō is a new religion based on Shintoism, its motives for the support of the Korean victims is

175 Ibid., 114. 176 Itō, “Kenri o Kachitoru made,” 119-120. 177 Matsuda. Interview with the author. 178 Itō, “Kenri o Kachitoru made,” 120.

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similar to that of the Christians. Zenrinkyō is one of those groups that began assisting hibakusha in South Korea in the 1970s and has continued ever since.

The Citizens’ Council Addressing the Problems of Korean A-bomb Victims

(Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai Shimin Kaigi)

Due to the lack of support groups in Tokyo, Shimin Kaigi (English translation: Citizens’

Council Addressing the Problems of Korean A-bomb Victims) was founded on May 20,

1988 to serve as the base for the Korean hibakusha support in the Japanese capital.179 Prior to its establishment, a symposium about the Korean hibakusha problem took place in

Tokyo on March 20 and 21, 1988. That was the first time that a major symposium about

Korean A-bomb survivors had been organized in the capital. There were 161 participants at the symposium including journalists, lawyers, church members, A-bomb victims, and former members of the Tokyo Association of Citizens for the Support of Mr. Son.180

Among the presenters were Takashi Hiraoka and Tatsumi Nakajima, which showed that they were important actors in the Korean hibakusha support movement even one decade after Son Jin-doo’s victory. Additionally, Sin Yeong-soo also took part in the symposium and made a welcoming speech, stressing the following: “You can regard Koreans as the victims and the Japanese as the victimizers. However, I would like to think about this problem from the standpoint that we are the same human beings, and not from the position of victims and perpetrators. I am working towards the sincere friendship between South

179 Itō, “Kenri o Kachitoru made,” 122. 180 Hayaku Engo o! 60 (May 20, 1988), 11.

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Korea and Japan.”181 In his speech, Sin made it clear that he had no intention of blaming

Japan for the atrocities it had committed during the colonial period. Rather, it was important to respect each other, to regard one another as equal human beings, to make efforts to improve relations between the two nations, and to put an end to dwelling on historical grievances. This event greatly influenced both the participants and the speakers and served as an impetus for Tatsumi Nakajima to set up a support organization in Tokyo.

Shimin Kaigi was organized two years after the termination of the governmental medical relief program. Its major objectives were to negotiate with the Japanese government about the reintroduction of the previous relief measures, demand the compensation of Korean hibakusha, and increase awareness in Japanese society of the existence and the plight of A-bomb victims in South Korea.182 This was a pressure group that aimed to make the Japanese government recognize Korean A-bomb survivors.

Currently, the organization is still in operation although the remaining members are aging, so its activities have decreased.183

The Mugunghwa Study Group184

Some university students organized the Mugunghwa Study Group in Hiroshima in 1996 to contribute to the support of the Hiroshima Committee to Invite Korean A-bomb Survivors

181 Asahi Shimbun, “Zaikan Hibakusha Ninshiki o: Engo Kangaeru Shinpo Kaisai,” [Understanding Korean Hibakusha: Opening a Symposium Discussing Their Support] March 21, 1988, Box 5, HT0501000, HUA. 182 Chūgoku Shimbun, “Shimin Kaigi 20 Nichi Hata Kakage: Hoshō ya Chiryō Saikai o Yōkyū,” [Civilian Council Forms on 20th: Demanding Compensation and Restart of the Medical Treatment Program] May 16, 1988, Box 5, HT0501000, HUA. 183 Matsuda. Interview with the author. 184 Mugunghwa means hibiscus in Korean and it is the national flower of South Korea. See Figure 29.

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to Japan for Medical Treatment. The aim of the group was to raise funds at various events to support the Korean hibakusha’s receiving medical treatment in Japan. Its leader was

Yumi Kayano, a third-year university student at that time at Jogakuin University.185 This group cannot be regarded a forerunner in the support of Korean hibakusha, yet it played an important role in the second half of the 1990s by financially assisting them and enabling many to participate in the Hiroshima Committee’s medical relief program. The reason that another citizen-driven group emerged in the late 1990s was that even five decades after the dropping of the bomb, many hibakusha in South Korea still had no access to medical treatment and were unequal in terms of medical benefits to Japanese hibakusha.

Kayano had been interested in the Korean hibakusha problem and chose it as a topic of her presentation at a university seminar. A few months earlier she heard Dr. Yuzuru

Kawamura stating that the Hiroshima Committee might end its activities since its funds were gradually decreasing and the Committee faced financial difficulties. This meant that no more hibakusha would be able to come to Japan for medical treatment six or seven years later despite their suffering from various diseases and not getting adequate treatment in their home country. Hearing about the possible termination of the only medical support program from Japan, Kayano began to work as a volunteer to help the activities of the

Hiroshima Committee. After recruiting a few additional members, they set up the

185 “Mugunfa no Kai ga Tanjōshimashita,” [The Mugunghwa Group Was Born] in Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] No. 24, November 30, 1996: 15 in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 189.

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Mugunghwa Study Group. Not only did the group raise funds for Korean hibakusha but it was also determined to heighten awareness of their conditions.186

The Mugunghwa Study Group did not raise funds in the usual way. First, it collected unused household goods from citizens, then the group members sold the items in the markets and gave the funds to the Hiroshima Committee. The Mugunghwa Study Group set up a stall four times and collected 135,000 yen until May 1997. Simultaneously, the members informed people about the Hiroshima Committee’s activities, and with this they likely increased the number of donators to the Committee’s medical program. Aside from the fundraising programs, the newly established group held study sessions once a month when each member talked about the Korean hibakusha problem, their way of exploring the

A-bomb testimonies, the situation of the zainichi Koreans, and the reason why they joined the group. With this, they developed a profound understanding of peace-related issues and the history of Korean hibakusha, and they were able to grasp their history in a manner different than that of many young Japanese.187

From July 31 to August 6, 1997, the Mugunghwa Group organized an event during the period of the Peace Memorial Ceremony. Given the media’s reporting on the event, there were many visitors who learned about the activities of the group and Korean hibakusha in general. The Mugunghwa Group continued to raise awareness and funds through selling used household goods. During the one-week period, it collected 100,000

186 Ibid. 187 “Mugunfa no Kai Desu. Yoroshiku.,” [We Are the Mugunghwa Group. Please Help Our Work.] in Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] No. 25, May 25, 1997: 1 in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 191.

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yen that enabled one more hibakusha’s getting medical treatment in Japan. The members claimed that the visitors became more peace-conscious after hearing about the hibakusha problem and the relief activities of some Japanese citizens.188

For two years, the Mugunghwa Group’s activities were limited to Hiroshima, however, in February 1998 the members visited South Korea the first time and learned about the hibakusha problem there. They visited Hapcheon and the Welfare Center, where there was a lady who referred to Hiroshima as her hometown, which made a great impact on them.189 Yumi Kayano had already been studying in South Korea and by then she had visited Daegu and Hapcheon, where she had witnessed the conditions of hibakusha, most of whom were extremely impoverished. Nevertheless, hibakusha in Hapcheon did not bear a grudge against Japan and they expressed their gratitude to the Hiroshima Committee and the Mugunghwa Group for their constant support.190 By visiting Hapcheon, not only did the

Korean hibakusha problem seem real to the Japanese peace group but the survivors could feel the care of these young Japanese who, they knew, could play an essential role in passing down their stories to the coming generations.

188 “Mugunfa Natsu Matsuri Hōkoku,” [The Mugunghwa Group’s Summer Festival Report] in Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] No. 26, December 1, 1997: 13 in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 211. 189 Kyōko Higashihara, “Hapcheon o Tazunete,” [Visiting Hapcheon] in Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] No. 27, May 20, 1998: 1-2 in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 213-214. As for their visit to Hapcheon, see Figure 31. 190 Yumi Kayano, “Sinchon de no Seikatsu,” [Life in Sinchon] in Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] No. 28, December 5, 1998: 1-4 in Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi, (Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016), 223-226.

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The Mugunghwa Study Group’s main role was to support the Hiroshima Committee, although it played a minor role in the overall support. The emergence of a new assistance group consisting of young people during the late 1990s was crucial since the members of the major support associations set up in the 1970s and 1980s were rapidly aging. The

Korean hibakusha support movement needed ambitious, enthusiastic young people who could carry on with the support of Korean A-bomb victims. Although the Mugunghwa group dissolved after three years of active support (from 1996 to 1998) following the graduation of its members, it contributed to the prolongation of the medical assistance program and raised awareness of the plight of Korean A-bomb vitcims among many

Japanese during those years.191

191 Sumiko Kawamura, e-mail message to author, June 30, 2017.

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The groups discussed in this chapter played a minor role in the general Korean hibakusha support, yet they all contributed to the process of their gradual recognition in Japan. While none of these groups provided legal support, they were active in other areas such as economic and medical assistance as well as heightening awareness in society. Kakkin Kaigi, the Hiroshima Papercrane Group, the Nagasaki Testimonial Society, and Zenrinkyō became involved in the support of Korean A-bomb victims after their formation, so for them supporting Korean A-bomb survivors was one part of their activities. On the contrary,

Shimin Kaigi and the Mugunghwa Study Group were organized with the aim of immersing themselves exclusively in the Korean hibakusha issue.

Members of various associations often worked conjointly to facilitate the improvement the situation of Korean hibakusha. For instance, Zenrinkyō cooperated with the AOC and together they provided financial assistance for the Korea Association.

Additionally, the Mugunghwa Group helped the work of the Hiroshima Committee, enabling more hibakusha to come to Japan for medical treatment. In the 1970s, members of the Osaka AOC supported Son Jin-doo’s lawsuit while expanding the overall Korean hibakusha support network in Japan. Also, from the late 1980s, Shimin Kaigi was in contact with the AOC and helped its work from the capital, negotiating with the government many times. The Nagasaki Testimonial Society can be regarded a forerunner for the Nagasaki branch of the AOC and it was active in conducting Korean hibakusha surveys before Nobuto Hirano set up the Nagasaki branch of the AOC in 1992. The joint work of these groups played an important role in the government’s final recognition and compensation of Korean A-bomb survivors. Moreover, they demonstrate the power of

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grassroots cooperation by being able to achieve social reforms in Japan and making the government change its stance on contested historical issues.

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CONCLUSION

“Hibakusha are hibakusha no matter where they are.”1 These are the famous words of

Kwak Kwi-hoon that became the title of his book published in 2016, which truly express the overseas hibakusha’s wish to be recognized as A-bomb survivors by Japan and the world.2 The history of foreign and especially Korean hibakusha shows that until recently they were deprived of inclusion in the A-bomb narrative of Hiroshima and Nagasaki despite their substantial numbers. They could only engrave their existence into the memory of the atomic bombing through a decades-long legal struggle against the Japanese government, during which they gained the support of thousands of Japanese who, in the process, learned to critically evaluate their own country’s colonial past and atrocities.

According to Junko Ichiba, Japanese citizen-led support of Korean hibakusha is based on the belief that it is the Japanese citizens’ duty to investigate Japan’s wartime responsibility and to be aware of Japan’s role as a victimizer.3 Ever since their formation,

Japanese grassroots organizations advocating for Korean A-bomb victims have been guided by these principles and have continued their relief activities in this spirit. Japanese supporters of Korean hibakusha not only facilitated awareness of A-bomb survivors living outside Japan and of their exclusion from the hibakusha relief measures, but also brought about important social changes in the former colonizer and in the citizens’ perception of

Japan’s colonial victims. As it turned out, these Japanese, before engaging in supporting

1 The original Japanese sentence is “Hibakusha wa doko ni itemo hibakusha.” 2 For more information, see Kwak Kwi-hoon, Hibakusha wa Doko ni Itemo Hibakusha, [Hibakusha Are Hibakusha No Matter Where They Are] Kankokujin Hibakusha Kwak Kwi-hoon Shuki Shuppan Iinkai: 2016. 3 Ichiba, “Zaikan Hibakusha no Tatakai ni Okeru Zaigai Hibakusha Saiban no Igi,” 225.

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Korean hibakusha, were not unsympathetic with Koreans in Japan, but were unfamiliar with the Korean hibakusha issue and their continuing suffering decades after the dropping of the bomb.

Beginning with Son Jin-doo’s lawsuit in the early 1970s and Hiraoka Takashi’s early reports about the conditions of Korean hibakusha, grassroots movements began to form demanding that Korean atomic bomb survivors receive the same amount of aid from the

Japanese government as their Japanese counterparts. Support within Japanese society was multilayered. Many new organizations were established across Japan with the aim of providing medical, legal, emotional, and financial assistance. Moreover, they investigated the current health and living conditions of Korean hibakusha through multiple surveys conducted across South Korea. In the meantime, supporters reinterpreted their previously established national identity as Japanese, learned to accept their complicity as victimizers, and began to observe their government critically, demanding compensation be given to its wartime and colonial victims. Additionally, through their long-term support, they challenged deeply ingrained stereotypes against Koreans within Japanese society, working towards their acceptance in Japan and consequently towards favorably influencing the relations between Japan and South Korea.

For the Korean victims of the bomb, the story of the atomic bombing is not primarily about the United States as the perpetrator. Rather, they hold Imperial Japan accountable for their suffering during and after World War II. Scholarly works that touch upon the issue of

Korean hibakusha work to break down Japan’s firmly-held victim-centric narrative, yet they fail to delve into ways that many Japanese helped Korean hibakusha alleviate some of

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the trauma of colonization as well as to obtain treatment for the physical injuries they suffered from the atomic bombing. The significance of this study lies in the fact that the example of Japanese grassroots cooperation for the support of South Korean hibakusha suggests critical attempts at historical rapprochement through the atomic bomb discourse.

This is an extensive study on the history of Korean hibakusha and the colonial period.

Nevertheless, the discussion goes beyond the painful memories of the past and illustrates how the existing conflicts can be resolved and how the citizens of two countries can establish relations at the grassroots level that eventually influenced official policy resulting belatedly in a measure of justice for a long-neglected group of Korean hibakusha.

From the late 1960s, there were two major movements that advocated for the recognition of Korean hibakusha. One of them was the grassroots support network in Japan, and the other was the civil initiatives made in South Korea. In South Korea, as pointed out above, hibakusha demanding compensation and immediate assistance set up their own association known as the Korea Atomic Bomb Victims Association in 1967. They created their own community, informed the members of their potential rights and the existing A- bomb laws in Japan, and with the cooperation of various Japanese organizations, the Korea

Association has been successful in maintaining itself ever since, providing its members with direct financial and emotional support. Experiencing the atomic bombings in either

Hiroshima or Nagasaki was a common bond that helped the members manage their past trauma and find their voice to claim their rights. Additionally, another major supporting actor in South Korea was the Korean Church Women’s Association, which conducted numerous surveys on the actual conditions of Korean hibakusha in the 1970s and 1980s and

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constantly appealed for their support within South Korean society. Similarly to Japanese civil society advocacy, South Korean grassroots cooperation for the support of Korean A- bomb survivors by both hibakusha and non-hibakusha communities kept alive the Korea

Association, heightened awareness of the existence of Korean atomic bomb victims, facilitated their recognition by the Japanese government, and contributed to the emergence of anti-nuclear sentiments in South Korea.4

Aside from South Korea, hibakusha live in many other countries, including the United

States (mostly Japanese Americans), China, Canada, Brazil, Taiwan, and North Korea.

Overseas hibakusha have different historical backgrounds, and what benefits they have received from the Japanese government depends on their country’s relation with Japan and their medical insurance system. For example, hardly any hibakusha living in North Korea possess A-bomb certificates due to the lack of diplomatic relations between their country and the Japanese government. Their history shows how political conflicts between two governments have barred a marginalized group of people from asserting their rights as victims and demanding support from Japan as did their counterparts in South Korea and elsewhere.

Nevertheless, grassroots movements were established in Japan to support other overseas hibakusha. Nobuto Hirano has been involved in advocating for the rights of

Taiwanese hibakusha, who were compensated by the Japanese government in 2012.5 The

4 In the 1980s anti-nuclear movements in South Korea were against nuclear power plants and demanded the removal of all nuclear weapons placed by the United States on South Korean soil (this was carried out in 1991.) For more information, see Yok-shiu F. Lee and Alvin Y. So, eds., Asia’s Environmental Movements: Comparative Perspectives, (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 97-99. 5 “Japan compensates Taiwanese atomic bombing survivors,” March 16, 2012. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/03/16/2003527925 (accessed: June 22, 2017).

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situation of A-bomb survivors living in the American continent is more complex owing to the lack of a national health insurance system. There are private health insurance companies and the members are obliged to pay a monthly premium. The Japanese government has not agreed yet to cover both the premiums and the medical expenses.6 However, hibakusha on the American continent are entitled to reimbursement of the medical costs the same way, although the bureaucratic procedures take at least a year following their submission of the medical bills.7 American and Brazilian hibakusha set up their own associations and they have also been supported by some Japanese citizens and lawyers, especially during the lawsuits they filed against the Japanese government (Association of Citizens for the

Support of Brazilian and American Atomic Bomb Victims was founded in 2002).8

Although hibakusha living in America still struggle with multiple problems, Japanese citizens have assisted them, too, in claiming their rights as A-bomb survivors. However, the redress of Taiwanese hibakusha and the complete reimbursement of the medical expenses for all overseas hibakusha possessing A-bomb certificates demonstrate other success stories among the non-Japanese hibakusha community that was accomplished thanks to Japanese civil-society advocacy.

The former Korean forced laborers at Mitsubishi filed a suit in South Korea in May

2000 against Mitsubishi similar to the one filed in Japan in 1995. A support group consisting of Japanese and South Korean lawyers backed the former workers and the legal

6 Matsuda. Interview with the author. 7 Toyonaga. Interview with the author. Personal interview. Hiroshima, June 26, 2017. 8 For more information on the lawsuits in Japan filed by American and Brazilian hibakusha, see Tamura, ed., Zaigai Hibakusha Saiban, 275-281. For the impact of the 2015 Supreme Court ruling on American and Brazilian hibakusha, see ibid., 127-128.

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case came to be known as “the Korea Mitsubishi Lawsuit.” In South Korea, the plaintiffs could not demand reparations from the Japanese government, so they sued the Korean government and Mitsubishi, making the same demands as to the Japanese government. In

2005 the South Korean government acknowledged that “A-bomb victims, the former

‘comfort women’ of the Imperial Japanese Army, and those South Koreans residing in

Saharin were excluded from the reparations guaranteed by the 1965 Japan-Korea Treaty,” and concluded that the Japanese government is legally responsible for them.”9 This was the first time the South Korean government recognized hibakusha and admitted Japan’s complicity. Despite this statement, the South Korean government made no attempts to negotiate with the Japanese government concerning the compensation of the former victims.

Therefore, 109 former “comfort women” filed a suit against the South Korean government at the Constitutional Court in July 2006 for abandoning them despite its earlier claim about its duties and Japan’s responsibilities. In October 2008 all hibakusha members of the Korea

Association (2,745 people) joined the suit. In the end, they won the case, and the

Constitutional Court ordered the South Korean government to settle the redress cases with the Japanese government instantly since the victims are aging and many of them have already passed away. The Mitsubishi trials, too, ended with the legal victory of the former conscripted workers. On August 25, 2016 the Supreme Court of Korea ordered Mitsubishi to pay 90 million won compensation (9 million yen) per person.10 Although Mitsubishi in

Japan has never acknowledged its wartime abuse of the Korean workers and refuses to

9 Ichiba, “Zaikan Hibakusha no Tatakai ni Okeru Zaigai Hibakusha Saiban no Igi,” 243. 10 Ibid., 243-247.

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compensate them11, at least Mitsubishi in South Korea faced the corporation’s wartime responsibility and paid reparations, although 71 years after World War II. This is another example of how Japanese and South Korean civil advocates cooperated and succeeded in their attempts to obtain justice for Japan’s former colonial victims.

Among the overseas hibakusha grassroots advocacy in Japan, the South Korean hibakusha support network has been the most extensive. This work deals primarily with the initial support activities of the Korean hibakusha advocates, focusing on the 1970s and

1980s, yet it sheds light on later major Supreme Court decisions (in 2002, 2007, and 2015).

Nevertheless, these carry more significance than just being one out of many legal rulings made by the Supreme Court on a daily basis. With these rulings, the Japanese government, as a step towards making amends for its past mistakes and confronting its colonial past

(although reluctantly), extended the support measures to Korean hibakusha. Behind these rulings lies the decades-long support of many Japanese citizens, who, although unable to change Japan’s wartime and colonial history, accomplished the recognition and compensation of one minority group previously victimized by their country. Through this process, these Japanese supporters took important steps towards promoting friendship between their nations.

The narrative of Korean atomic bomb victims and their Japanese advocates conveys a momentous postwar history and concludes with an uplifting message: with a profound understanding of the past and through mutual interaction, it is possible to move towards a more peaceful future that overcomes discrimination and eases historically-based political

11 See the Supreme Court ruling of November 2007 on page 242-243.

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and social tensions. The Japanese citizens engaged in the movements to recognize Korean hibakusha occupy an important place in this sociohistorical process.

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FIGURES

Figure 1: Map of South Korea highlighting the major places with red that are mentioned in the dissertation.

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Figure 2: Son Jin-doo and his sister, Son Gwi-dal. (Source: Chūgoku Shimbun, “Taiho no Kumiin ga Jikyō,” [The Arrested Gangster Confesses] February 28, 1973, Box 4, HT0400900, HUA.)

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Figure 3: Son Jin-doo arrives in Hiroshima for medical treatment in 1976 and he is welcomed at Hiroshima Station by his supporters. (Source: Chūgoku Shimbun, “Gaikokujin ni Techō o,” [A-bomb Certificate to Foreigners] June 3, 1984, Box 5, HT0500600, HUA.)

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Figure 4: Son Jin-doo receives medical treatment at Hiroshima A-bomb Hospital in 1976. (Source: Mainichi Shimbun, “Son-san Genbaku Byōin de Jushin,” [Mr. Son Is Examined at A-bomb Hospital] August 3, 1976, Box 5, HT0501400, HUA.)

Figure 5: Son Jin-doo learns the news of his legal victory at the Supreme Court on March 30, 1978. (Source: Asahi Shimbun, “Yabureta Gyōsei no Kabe: Kōseishō, Saikentō Semarareru,” [The Wall Set by the Government is Broken Down: The Ministry of Welfare Urges Reexamination] March 30, 1978, Box 4, HT0401202, HUA.)

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Figure 6: Son Jin-doo receives his A-bomb certificate following the 1978 Supreme Court decision. (Source: Chūgoku Shimbun, “Son-san no Hibakusha Techō Soshō Shōso,” [Mr. Son Wins the A-bomb Certificate Lawsuit] April 7, 1978, Box 4, HT0401202, HUA.)

Figure 7: Son Jin-doo is given Special Permission of Residence in September 1978. (Source: Mainichi Shimbun, “Son-san Tokubetsu Zairyū Kyoka,” [Mr. Son Obtains Special Permission of Residence] September 21, 1978, Box 5, HT0501400, HUA.)

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Figure 8: Reverend Masaharu Oka (Source: Nishinihon Shimbun, “Fukai Ningenai de Shinnen Tsuranuku,” [Sticking to His Beliefs with a Deep Feeling of Philanthropy] July 23, 1994.)

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Figure 9: Reverend Masaharu Oka gives a talk on the Korean A-bomb victims of Nagasaki in 1990. (Source: Asahi Shimbun, “‘Nagasaki ni Manabe’ to Tsudoi,” [Gathering about “Come to Nagasaki to Study”] September 16, 1990, Box 5, HT0501200, HUA.)

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Figure 10: Dr. Toratarō Kawamura. (Source: Chūgoku Shimbun, “12 Nen Sude ni 50 Nin Chiryō,” [Providing Medical Treatment to Already 50 People in 12 Years] January 10, 1984, Box 5, HT0500600, HUA.)

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Figure 11: Dr. Toratarō Kawamura receives the Presidential Award from Chun Doo-hwan for his long-term support of Korean hibakusha in 1984. (Source: Kawamura Toratarō Ikōshū, Iryō to Shinkō, 93.)

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Figure 12: Dr. Toratarō Kawamura (third from the right) and Munetoshi Fukagawa on the right talk with other Korean hibakusha supporters about raising fund for the Korea Association. (Source: Chūgoku Shimbun, “Kankoku no Hibakusha Sukuō,” [Let’s Save Korean Hibakusha!] December 14, 1982, Box 5, HT0500400, HUA.)

Figure 13: Dr. Yuzuru Kawamura receives a certificate from the South Korean Consulate General in Hiroshima on March 17, 2015 for the long-term support activities of the Hiroshima Committee. (Source: Hiroshima Iinkai News 58, May 31, 2015, p. 1.)

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Figure 14: Munetoshi Fukagawa in 1974. (Source: Chūgoku Shimbun, “Aru Shūnen no Tansaku: Nihonjin no Sekinin Tou,” [In Search of Tenacity: Holding the Japanese Responsible] September 25, 1974, Box 4, HT0401001, HUA.)

Figure 15: Munetoshi Fukagawa in September 2004. (Photo provided by Itsuko Yoshioka.)

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Figure 16: No Seong-ok. (Source: Genchōyōkō Hibakusha Saiban o Shiensuru Kai, Han Mitsubishi, Hiroshima, 26.)

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Figure 17: Location of the ports the Korean returnees had departed from in 1945 and some of which Fukagawa visited in 1973.

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Figure 18: Location of Iki Island and Tsushima.

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Figure 19: Enlarged map of Iki Island.

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Figure 20: Excavations on Iki Island in 1976, led by Fukagawa. (Source: Genchōyōkō Hibakusha Saiban o Shiensuru Kai, Han Mitsubishi, Hiroshima, 32.)

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Figure 21: Enlarged map of Tsushima.

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Figure 22: Location of Konjōin Temple, where the ashes of 131 Koreans died at sea have been stored since 2003.

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Figure 23: Yoshiko Matsui giving a speech in 1991. (Source: Hiroshima Iinkai News 13, September 1, 1991, p. 2.)

Figure 24: Keisaburō Toyonaga giving a speech in 2003. (Source: http://tomura.lolipop.jp/01~12/peace70/70-3.3.4.25zaigai21-27.htm [accessed: June 5, 2017.])

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Figure 25: Nobuto Hirano giving a speech in 2011. (Source: Hiroshima Iinkai News 53, November 25, 2011, p. 1.)

Figure 26: Junko Ichiba giving a speech in 1997. (Source: Hiroshima Iinkai News 26, December 1, 1997, p. 1.)

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Figure 27: Members of the Hiroshima Papercrane Group send a flag to Pidulgi in 1971 as a sign of their friendship. (Source: Asahi Shimbun, “Kankoku Hibaku Nisei no Kai to Engumi o Kinen ni Hata.” [Flag for Celebrating the Bond with the Korean Second-Generation A-bomb Victims.] August 16, 1971, Box 4, HT0400700, HUA.)

Figure 28: Members of the Hiroshima Papercrane Group see off the four visiting members of Pidulgi at Hiroshima Station in 1972. (Source: Chūgoku Shimbun, “Engo ni Chikara o Iretai: ‘Oriduru no Kai’ra ga Miokuru,” [I Intend to Go on with the Support: Sent Off by the Members of the Hiroshima Papercrane Group] August 14, 1972, Box 4, HT0400800, HUA.)

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Figure 29: Members of the Mugunghwa Study Group in 1997. (Source: Hiroshima Iinkai News 25, May 25, 1997, p. 1.)

Figure 30: Members of the Mugunghwa Study Group are listening to the testimony of an A-bomb survivor in Hapcheon in 1998. (Source: Hiroshima Iinkai News 27, May 20, 1998, p. 1.)

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Figure 31: Hapcheon Welfare Center for Atomic Bomb Victims. (Photo taken by the author on March 31, 2016.)

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Figure 32: Lee Soo-yeong, an A-bomb survivor living in the Hapcheon Welfare Center in 2016. (She was 89 years old at the time of the interview.) (Photo taken by the author on March 31, 2016.)

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Figure 33: Monument in Memory of the Korean Victims of the Atomic Bomb, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. (Photo taken by the author in Hiroshima on August 6, 2016.)

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Figure 34: Monument for Korean Atomic Bomb Victims, Nagasaki Peace Park. (Photo taken by the author on February 5, 2016.)

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Figure 35: Keisaburō Toyonaga with the author in front of the Monument in Memory of the Korean Victims of the Atomic Bomb at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. (Photo taken on June 26, 2017 by Naohiro Yamada.)

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Figure 36: Takashi Hiraoka giving a lecture in Hiroshima on August 6, 2017. (Photo taken by the author.)

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Figure 37: Keisaburō Toyonaga giving an A-bomb testimony in Hiroshima. (Photo taken by the author on August 6, 2017.)

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Figure 38: Junko Ichiba giving a speech at the Symposium to Consider the Number of Korean A-bomb Survivors in Hiroshima on March 3, 2018. (Photo taken by the author.)

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APPENDIX A: LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Names of the organizations and associations used in the dissertation

Japanese name English name Abbreviation Founding

Nihon Kirisutokyō Japan Christian Women’s Kyōfūkai 1886 Fujin Kyōfūkai Organization Kirisutokyō Joshi Young Women’s Christian YWCA 1905 Seinen Kai Association Nihon Kirisutosha Japan Christian Medical JCMA 1938 Ika Renmei Association Zainippon Korean Residents Union in 1946 Daikanminkoku Japan Mindan Mindan Zenrinkai / Good Neighbor Society Zenrinkai / 1947 Zenrinkyō (from Zenrinkyō 1992) Kankoku Kyōkai Korean Church Women’s KCWA 1948 Josei Rengōkai Association Nihon Kirisutokyō National Christian Council in NCC 1948 Kyōgikai Japan Gensuibaku Kinshi The Japan Council Against Gensuikyō 1955 Nihon Kyōgikai Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs Zainippon Chōsen Sōren General 1955 Chōsenjin Association Sōrengōkai of Korean Residents in Japan Nihon Gensuibaku Japan Confederation of A- Hidankyō 1956 Higaisha Dantai and H-Bomb Sufferers Kyōgikai Organization Hiroshima Oriduru Hiroshima Paper Crane Hiroshima 1958 no Kai Group Paper Crane Group Kakuheiki Kinshi Council for Peace and Kakkin Kaigi 1961 Heiwa Kensetsu Against Nuclear Weapons Kokumin Kaigi Gensuibaku Kinshi The Japan Congress Against Gensuikin 1965 Nihon Kokumin A- and H-Bombs

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Kaigi

Nagasaki Zainichi Nagasaki Association to Nagasaki 1965 Chōsenjin no Jinken Protect the Human Rights of Association o Mamoru Kai Koreans in Japan Kankoku Genbaku Korea Atomic Bomb Victims Korea 1967 Hibakusha Kyōkai Association Association Nagasaki no Shōgen The Nagasaki Testimonial The Nagasaki 1968 no Kai Society Testimonial Society Son Jin-doo san ni Association of Citizens to Association 1970 Chiryō to Zairyū o! Support Mr. Son (collective of Citizens Zenkoku Shimin no term for all the organizations (in Section Kai in Hiroshima, Fukuoka, One) Osaka, Kyoto and Tokyo that were set up to assist Son Jin- doo) Kankoku no Association of Citizens for AOC 1971 Genbaku Higaisha o the Support of Korean Kyūensuru Shimin Atomic Bomb Victims no Kai Nihon Hiroshima Association of the Bereaved Bereaved 1974 Mitsubishi Jūkōgyō Families of the Hiroshima Families Kankokujin Mitsubishi Conscripted A- Association Hibakusha bombed Workers Who Were Chinbotsu Izokukai Lost at Sea Kankoku Genbaku South Korean Atomic Bomb Conscripted 1974 Higai Mitsubishi Victims Mitsubishi Laborers Chōyōsha Dōshikai Conscripted Laborers Association Association Zaikan Hibakusha Hiroshima Committee to Hiroshima 1984 Tonichi Chiryō Invite Korean A-bomb Committee Hiroshima Iinkai Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment Zaikan Hibakusha Civilian Council Addressing Shimin Kaigi 1988 Mondai Shimin the Problems of Korean A- Kaigi bomb Victims Mugunfa no Kai Mugunghwa Study Group Mugunghwa 1996 Study Group

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APPENDIX B: LIST OF COURT DECISIONS AND GOVERNMENTAL MEASURES

List of Landmark Court Decisions in the History of Korean Hibakusha and the Major Governmental Support Measures

Date Event March 30, 1974 First victory of Son Jin-doo at the Fukuoka District Court. July 17, 1975 Son won the appeal to the Fukuoka High Court. March 30, 1978 The Supreme Court ruled in Son Jin-doo’s favor and claimed that “the A-bomb laws should be applied also to those who entered Japan without a visa or with a tourist visa, provided that they are A-bomb survivors, and the application of the laws should not be restricted to the members of Japanese society.” With this, Korean and other overseas hibakusha became eligible to apply for A-bomb certificates. October 8, 1980 The Japanese and Korean governments decided about the medical support program of the Korean hibakusha in Japan (one person: medical treatment for two months in Japan, in special cases, a maximum of six months; medical costs sponsored by the Japanese government; travel expenses covered by the Korean government.) Korean hibakusha hospitalization in Japan began on November 17. November 20, 1986 The intergovernmental medical support program was terminated. 349 Korean hibakusha were hospitalized in Japan over six years. November 7, 1989 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs transferred 42 million yen to the Korean Red Cross Society as humanitarian aid to Korean hibakusha, and its use was left to the Korea Association. With this money, the Association covered the remaining 15% of the medical expenses, realizing the free medical treatment of the Korean hibakusha inside South Korea for the first time. May 24, 1990 At the Japan-Korea Summit Meeting, Japanese PM Toshiki Kaifu offered “sincere apology” to South Korea and offered four billion yen to Korean hibakusha to be used for the hibakusha’s medical treatment in South Korea and the Hapcheon A-bomb Sufferers Welfare Center was built from the fund in 1996. The money was transferred in 1991 and 1993. December 5, 2002 The Osaka High Court ruled in favor of Kwak Kwi-hoon, who demanded the application of the 1994 Atomic Bomb Victims Relief Law not only in Japan but also in the country where overseas hibakusha live. On December 18 the Japanese government confirmed the illegal nature of Directive 402 and abolished it, after which hibakusha in South Korea possessing A-

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bomb certificates began to receive healthcare allowances (it took effect in March 1, 2003.) November 1, 2007 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Korean hibakusha from Mitsubishi who demanded compensation for Directive 402 preventing them for long years to receive healthcare allowance. They received 1,200,000 yen per person, yet Mitsubishi did not pay compensation for their unpaid wages. December 15, 2008 Overseas hibakusha became eligible to apply for A-bomb certificates at their own embassy or consulate. January 25, 2010 The Hiroshima District Court ruled that the 128 Korean hibakusha plaintiffs demanding compensation for their exclusion from the 1994 Atomic Bomb Survivors’ Support Law will be given 1,100,000 yen each. September 8, 2015 The Supreme Court ruled that the Japanese government must fully cover the medical expenses of Korean hibakusha, thus removing the annual limit on the fund for medical expenses

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

“‘Nagasaki ni Manabe’ to Tsudoi.” [Gathering about “Come to Nagasaki to Study.”] Asahi Shimbun, September 16, 1990. Box 5, HT0501200, HUA.

“12 Nen Sude ni 50 Nin Chiryō.” [Providing Medical Treatment to Already 50 People in 12 Years.] Chūgoku Shimbun, January 10, 1984. Box 5, HT0500600, HUA.

“200 Man Mokuhyō ni Kinkyū Bokin: Zaikan Hibakusha no Shien Dantai.” [Emergency Fund-raising Targets 2 Million Yen: Support Group for Korean Hibakusha.] Chūgoku Shimbun, June 15, 1988. Box 5, HT0501000, HUA.

“2003 Nen 4 Gatsu 25 Nichi, ‘Hibakusha wa doko ni itemo hibakusha!’ Zaigainichi Hibakusha e no Shien o Yōkyūsuru Shūkai, ‘Sankakoku Daihyō o Koete’ 21-27.” [April 25, 2003, ‘Hibakusha are hibakusha no matter where they are!’ Association Demanding Support for Overseas Hibakusha, ‘Going beyond the representatives of three countries,’ 21-27.] Accessed June 5, 2017. http://tomura.lolipop.jp/01~12/peace70/70-3.3.4.25zaigai21-27.htm.

“4 Shi de Hibakusha Imon: Hiroshima Oriduru no Kai Shōjora Kankoku kara Kaeru.” [Visiting Korean A-bomb Victims in Four Cities: The Hiroshima Paper Crane Group’s Girls Come Home.] Chūgoku Shimbun, August 27, 1971. Box 4, HT0400700, Hiroshima University Archives (hereafter HUA).

“Aru Shūnen no Tansaku: Nihonjin no Sekinin Tou.” [In Search of Tenacity: Holding the Japanese Responsible.] Chūgoku Shimbun, September 25, 1974. Box 4, HT0401001, HUA.

“Chōsenjin Hibakusha Chōsa ni Hitosuji.” [Devoted to the Survey on Korean Hibakusha.] Nagasaki Shimbun, July 9, 2014. Oka Masaharu Memorial Nagasaki Peace Museum.

“Engo ni Chikara o Iretai: ‘Oriduru no Kai’ra ga Miokuru.” [I Intend to Go on with the Support: Sent Off by Members of the Hiroshima Paper Crane Group.] Chūgoku Shimbun, August 14, 1972. Box 4, HT0400800, HUA.

“Fukai Ningenai de Shinnen Tsuranuku.” [Sticking to His Beliefs with a Deep Feeling of Philanthropy.] Nishinihon Shimbun, July 23, 1994.

“Gaikokujin Hibakusha Tokubetsuhō Kankoku Engo Kyōkai ga Yōbō.” [Korea Relief Association Requesting the Special Law for Foreign Hibakusha.] Asahi Shimbun, April 3, 1978. HT0401202, HUA.

371

“Gaikokujin ni Techō o.” [A-bomb Certificate to Foreigners.] Chūgoku Shimbun, June 3, 1984. Box 5, HT0500600, HUA.

“Gaitō de Shomei ya Kanpa: Mitsunyūkoku no Son Jin-doo Kyūen Katsudō Hajimaru.” [Collecting Signatures and Fundraising: Support Activities for the Undocumented Entrant Son Jin-doo Begin.] Chūgoku Shimbun, December 21, 1970. Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

“Genbaku Hibakusha Taisaku o Tenkan Seyo.” [Let Us Change the A-bomb Victims Measures.] Asahi Shimbun, March 31, 1978. HT0401202, HUA.

“Genchōyōkō Hibakusha o Shienshita Kajin, Fukagawa-san Hibakuchi kara Kagai no Tsumi Tou.” [Mr. Fukagawa, a Poet Assisting the Former Forced Laborers Hibakusha, Utters the Perpetrators’ Crime from the City Hit by the Atomic Bomb.] Asahi Shimbun, June 13, 2008.

“Hibaku Kankoku Josei o Chiryō ni Maneku. Okizari Okashii: Nagasaki de Sobo Ushinatta Ishi.” [Inviting a South Korean A-bomb Survivor Woman for Medical Treatment. Abandonment is Weird: A Doctor Who Lost His Grandmother in Nagasaki.] Asahi Shimbun, July 21, 1972. Box 4, HT0400800, HUA.

“Hibaku Techō o Shinsei: Rainichi, Chiryōchū no Kankoku Fujin.” [Applying for the A- bomb Certificate: A Korean Woman Coming to Japan Being Under Medical Treatment.] Chūgoku Shimbun, April 12, 1973. Box 4, HT0400900, HUA.

“Hibaku, Chiryō Uketai: Keisatsu ha Gimon Motsu.” [Wishing to Receive Medical Treatment for A-bomb Related Diseases: Police are Having Doubts.] Asahi Shimbun, December 21, 1970. Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

“Hibakugo Hatsu no Jushinsha mo Sōru de no Chiryō Oeru.” [Patients Undergoing the First Medical Examination and Treatment since the A-bomb Attack Finish in Seoul.] Chūgoku Shimbun, September 27, 1971. Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

“Hibakusha 117 Nin o Shinryō: Hōkan Ishidan Dai 2 Jin Kaeru.” [Treating 117 Hibakusha: The Second Group of Doctors Visiting South Korea Returns Home.] Chūgoku Shimbun, October 11, 1971. Box 4, HT0400700, HUA.

“Hibakusha Kyūzai no Gyōsei Shisei o Tadase.” [Let Us Rectify the Hibakusha Relief Administration’s Posture.] Mainichi Shimbun, April 1, 1978. HT0401202, HUA.

“HICARE Mission to Korea.” Accessed April 26, 2016. http://www.hicare.jp/en/haken/92284d8c5612745651345ba58085f50b.

372

“Hinkon ni Kurushimu Hibakusha: Muryō Shinryō ni Enjo Hitsuyō.” [Hibakusha Struggling with Poverty: It Is Necessary to Help Them Receive Free Medical Treatment.] Chūgoku Shimbun, October 2, 1971. Box 4, HT0400700, HUA.

“Hiroshima de Hibaku, Chiryō o: Son Gwi-dal-san no Ani ga Mitsunyūkoku.” [A-bomb Victim from Hiroshima Seeking for Medical Treatment: Son Gwi-dal’s Brother Illegally Entered Japan.] Chūgoku Shimbun, December 8, 1970. Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

“Hisan na Kankoku no Hibakusha: ‘Hiroshima Oriduru no Kai’ ni Kiku.” [The Tragic Korean A-bomb Victims: Asking Hiroshima Paper Crane Group.] Asahi Shimbun, October 12, 1970. Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

“I wa Jinjutsu ni Kokkyō Nashi: Kankoku Hibakusha, 27 Nichi ni Hiroshima e.” [There Is No Border to Humanistic Medicine: A Korean Hibakusha Arrives in Hiroshima on 27th.] Chūgoku Shimbun, March 24, 1973. Box 4, HT0400900, HUA.

“Intabyū: Beikoku ni Shazai Motomeru Mae ni Nihon no Sekinin mo Toubeki.” [Interview: Before Demanding Apology from the United States, Japan’s Accountability Should be Questioned.] May 24, 2016. Accessed March 10, 2017. http://japan.hani.co.kr/arti/international/24221.html.

“Japan and South Korea agree WW2 ‘comfort women’ deal.” December 28, 2015. Accessed May 31, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35188135.

“Jihi de Maneki Chiryō e.” [Inviting Patients for Medical Treatment via Self-expense.] Chūgoku Shimbun, January 21, 1973. Box 4, HT0400900, HUA.

“Jokōseira 3 Nin ga Zaikan Hibakusha Imon: Hiroshima Oriduru no Kai, 18 Nichi Shuppatsu.” [3 Female High School Students Visiting Korean Hibakusha: Hiroshima Paper Crane Group Departs on 18th.] Chūgoku Shimbun, August 16, 1978. Box 5, HT0501400, HUA.

“Joseitora 12 Nin Shuppatsu: 4 Dome, Kōryū Fukameru.” [12 Female Students Depart: Deepening the Interactions for the 4th Time.] Chūgoku Shimbun, August 17, 1973. Box 4, HT0400900, HUA.

“Kankoku Hibaku Nisei no Kai to Engumi o Kinen ni Hata.” [Flag for Celebrating the Bond with the Korean Second-Generation A-bomb Victims.] Asahi Shimbun, August 16, 1971. Box 4, HT0400700, HUA.

“Kankoku Hibakusha ni Sukui no Te: Hiroshima no Ishidan ga Shuppatsu.” [A Helping Hand to Korean Hibakusha: The Medical Team from Hiroshima Departs.] Chūgoku Shimbun, December 13, 1973. Box 4, HT0400900, HUA.

373

“Kankokujin Hibakusha ni Kyūsai o: Kōkōsei ga Taisaku Jūjitsu o Uttae.” [Help to Korean Hibakusha: A High-school Student Calls for Satisfying Measures.] Chūgoku Shimbun, November 20, 1982. Box 5, HT0500400, HUA.

“Kankoku kara Chiryō ni Raihiro: Hibaku Fujin, Harada Ishi ga Shōtai.” [Coming to Hiroshima from South Korea for Medical Treatment: Dr. Harada Invites a Hibakusha Woman.] Asahi Shimbun, November 14, 1973. Box 4, HT0400900, HUA.

“Kankoku ni Hibaku Nisei no Kai.” [Second-Generation A-bomb Victims’ Group in South Korea.] Asahi Shimbun, November 17, 1970. Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

“Kankoku no Hibakusha o Sukue.” [Save Korean Hibakusha.] Chūgoku Shimbun, December 17, 1970. Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

“Kankoku no Hibakusha Shinryō Senta.” [Medical Center for Korean A-bomb Victims.] Mainichi Shimbun, April 5, 1974. Box 4, HT0401001, HUA.

“Kankoku no Hibakusha Sukuō.” [Let’s Save Korean Hibakusha!] Chūgoku Shimbun, December 14, 1982. Box 5, HT0500400, HUA.

“Kenkō Techō Kōfu Seyo: Mitsunyūkoku to ha Kirihanase.” [Let Us Have A-bomb Certificates Issued: Let Us Cut Off the Issue of Undocumented Entry.] Asahi Shimbun, March 30, 1974. Box 4, HT0401001, HUA.

“Kikakuten o Miyō.” [Let Us See the Planning Exhibitions.] Accessed April 25, 2017. http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_j/exhibit/exh0107/exh01075 .html

“Kokuseki Koete Kyūzai o: Fukuoka Ken no Jōkoku o Kikyaku.” [Relief that Crosses Borders: Let Fukuoka Prefecture’s Appeal Be Dismissed.] Chūgoku Shimbun, March 30, 1978. Box 4, HT0401202, HUA.

“Kongo Seifukan Kōshō de Kaiketsu o: Kankokujin Hibakusha Mondai de Mitsubishi Gawa.” [In the Future, Resolution Through Negotiations between the Two Governments: Mitsubishi’s Position on the Issue of Korean Hibakusha.] Asahi Shimbun, August 9, 1974. HUA, Box 4, HT0401000.

“Kotoshi mo Kankoku e Ishidan: Souru nado de Hibakusha Shinryō.” [Medical Group to South Korea Also This Year: Medical Treatment of Hibakusha in Seoul and Other Places.] Chūgoku Shimbun, September 7, 1972. Box 4, HT0400800, HUA.

“Kuroi Ame, Nuguenu Kioku: Asahi Shinbunsha Hibaku 60 Nen Anketo.” [Black Rain, Inerasable Memories: Asahi Newspaper Company’s Survey for the 60th Anniversary

374

of the Dropping of the A-bomb.] July 17, 2005. Accessed May 10, 2016. http://www.asahi.com/hibakusha/shimen/hibaku60/hibaku60-04_2.html.

“‘Kusuri Hoshii’ to Hibakusha: Hōkan Ishidan, Busan de Shinryō.” [Hibakusha Say, “We Want Medicine!” The Doctors Visiting South Korea Treat Patients in Busan.] Chūgoku Shimbun, September 29, 1971. Box 4, HT0400700, HUA.

“‘Mamoru Kai’ Chikaku Hossoku: Hiroshima no Ishira Undō.” [‘Support Association’ Almost Launched: Movement of the Doctors of Hiroshima.] Mainichi Shimbun, December 19, 1970. Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

“Miharai Chingin nado Harae: Hibaku Kankokujin Chōyōkō Daihyō Mitsubishi Hiroshima ni Yōkyū.” [Pay the Unpaid Wages: Korean Hibakusha Forced Laborers’ Representative’s Demand to Mitsubishi Hiroshima.] Chūgoku Shimbun, August 9, 1974. HUA, Box 4, HT0401000.

“Mikkō no Kankokujin Hibakusha: Son ga ‘Techō’ Kōfu Shinsei.” [Korean Stowaway Hibakusha: Son Applies for the Issue of A-bomb Certificate.] Chūgoku Shimbun, October 6, 1971. Box 4, HT0400700, HUA.

“Mitsubishi Jūkō e Yōkyū: 44 Nin Isharyō Ichi Oku Hyaku Man En.” [Demand to the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries: 101 Million Yen Consolation Money to 44 People.] Mainichi Shimbun, August 30, 1975. HUA, Box 4, HT0401201.

“Mugunfa Natsu Matsuri Hōkoku.” [The Mugunghwa Group’s Summer Festival Report.] In Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] 26 (December 1, 1997). In Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai. [Hiroshima Committee to Invite South Korean A-bomb Survivors to Japan for Medical Treatment.] Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi. [The Road to Bring South Korean Hibakusha to Japan for Medical Treatment.] Hiroshima: Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō Hiroshima Iinkai, 2016. 211-212. (Hereafter Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi. 2016.)

“Mugunfa no Kai Desu. Yoroshiku.” [We Are the Mugunghwa Group. Please Help Our Work.] In Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] 25 (May 25, 1997). In Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi. 2016. 191.

“Mugunfa no Kai ga Tanjōshimashita.” [The Mugunghwa Group Was Born.] In Hiroshima Iinkai Nyūsu [Hiroshima Committee News] 24 (November 30, 1996). In Zaikan Hibakusha Tonichi Chiryō no Michi. 2016. 189.

“Nakajima Tatsumi-san o Shinobu.” [In Memory of Tatsumi Nakajima.] Kankoku Hibakusha. [Korean Hibakusha.] 50 (March 29, 2008). Accessed November 20, 2015. http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~hn3t-oikw/tobira/kaihou-50-kei.pdf.

375

“Nihon de Genbakushō no Chiryō Saseyō.” [Let Us Provide Medical Treatment of A-bomb Related Diseases in Japan.] Chūgoku Shimbun, December 18, 1970. Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

“Rekishi to Mukiau Dai 5 Bu: Shinjitsu to Wakai: 5: Ima Sagasu, Chōyō no Ikotsu.” [Part 5: Facing History: The Truth and Reconciliation.] Asahi Shimbun, December 21, 2006.

“Seimitsu Kensa ga Hitsuyō: Mitsunyūkoku no Hibakusha – Son.” [Thorough Examination is Needed: Undocumented Entrant, Son.] Chūgoku Shimbun, December 19, 1970. Box 4, HT0400600, HUA.

“Senmon Iryō ni Enjo o: Nihon no Kagai Sekinin Jikakushite.” [Support for Treatment by Medical Specialists: Being Aware of Japan’s Responsibility as a Perpetrator.] Mainichi Shimbun, November 20, 1985. Box 5, HT0500700, HUA.

“Settling wartime forced labor suits.” June 19, 2016. Accessed May 31, 2017. http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/06/19/editorials/settling-wartime-forced- labor-suits/#.WS7cW-t97IW.

“Shien Gurūpu Hiroshima-shi de Shūkai.” [Support Groups Gather in Hiroshima.] Chūgoku Shimbun, August 3, 1972. Box 4, HT0400800, HUA.

“Shimin Dantai ‘Yakume Oeta:’ Iryōhi Shikyū Jitsugen de, Hiroshima de Kaiken.” [Citizens’ Group Finished Its Duty: The Supply of Medical Expenses Is Realized; Press Conference in Hiroshima.] Mainichi Shimbun, May 13, 2016. Accessed July 15, 2016. http://mainichi.jp/articles/20160513/ddl/k34/040/634000c.

“Shimin Kaigi 20 Nichi Hata Kakage: Hoshō ya Chiryō Saikai o Yōkyū.” [Civilian Council Forms on 20th: Demanding Compensation and Restart of the Medical Treatment Program.] Chūgoku Shimbun, May 16, 1988. Box 5, HT0501000, HUA.

“Sokoku Mokuzen ni Sōnanshi.” [Dying Due to Shipwreck Right Before Coming Home.] Mainichi Shimbun, February 20, 2005.

“Son-san Genbaku Byōin de Jushin.” [Mr. Son Is Examined at A-bomb Hospital.] Mainichi Shimbun, August 3, 1976. Box 5, HT0501400, HUA.

“Son-san ni Techō Kōfu o: Fukuoka Saibanketsu Hibaku Jijitsu mo Mitomeru.” [Issuing an A-bomb Certificate to Son: The Fukuoka Court Ruling Also Acknowledges the Truth about Being an A-bomb Victim.] Chūgoku Shimbun, March 30, 1974. Box 4, HT0400900, HUA.

“Son-san no Hibakusha Techō Soshō Shōso.” [Mr. Son Wins the A-bomb Certificate Lawsuit.] Chūgoku Shimbun, April 7, 1978. Box 4, HT0401202, HUA.

376

“Son-san Tokubetsu Zairyū Kyoka.” [Mr. Son Obtains Special Permission of Residence.] Mainichi Shimbun, September 21, 1978. Box 5, HT0501400, HUA.

“South Korea’s new president questions Japan ‘comfort women’ deal.” May 11, 2017. Accessed May 31, 2017. http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/11/asia/south-korea-japan- comfort-women.

“Taiho no Kumiin ga Jikyō.” [The Arrested Gangster Confesses.] Chūgoku Shimbun, February 28, 1973. Box 4, HT0400900, HUA.

“The Constitution of Japan.” Accessed November 20, 2015. http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

“Tokubetsu Rippō o Kōryo: Gaishō ga Yakusoku Gaikokujin Hibakusha no Kyūsai.” [Considering Special Legislation: Foreign Minister Promises to Aid Foreign Hibakusha.] Chūgoku Shimbun, October 9, 1972. Box 4, HT0400800, HUA.

“Undō no Tōtatsuten Mitodoke: Nakajima Tatsumi.” [Seeing the Movement’s Ultimate Goal: Tatsumi Nakajima.] Nagasaki Shimbun, February 2, 2008. In Kankoku Hibakusha. [Korean Hibakusha.] “Nakajima Tatsumi-san o Shinobu.” [In Memory of Tatsumi Nakajima.] 50 (March 29, 2008). Accessed November 20, 2015. http://www.asahi-net.or.jp/~hn3t-oikw/tobira/kaihou-50-kei.pdf.

“‘Wish to Atone’: Hiroshima Doctor Carries on Father’s Legacy of Treating Korean Hibakusha.” June 29, 2015. Accessed July 15, 2016. http://www.japanbullet.com/news/wish-to-atone-hiroshima-doctor-carries-on-father- s-legacy-of-treating-korean-hibakusha.

“Yabureta Gyōsei no Kabe: Kōseishō, Saikentō Semarareru.” [The Wall Set by the Government is Broken Down: The Ministry of Welfare Urges Reexamination.] Asahi Shimbun, March 30, 1978. Box 4, HT0401202, HUA.

“Yatto Mukuwareta: Engohō mo Hayaku Jitsugen o.” [Finally Rewarded: Let Us Realize the Relief Law, too, Quickly.] Asahi Shimbun, March 31, 1978. HT0401202, HUA.

“Zaikan Hibakusha Ninshiki o: Engo Kangaeru Shinpo Kaisai.” [Understanding Korean Hibakusha: Opening a Symposium Discussing Their Support.] Asahi Shimbun, March 21, 1988. Box 5, HT0501000, HUA.

“Zaikan Hibakusha Mondai o Hakkō: Shimin no Kai Rekishi, Jittai nado Shōkai.” [Publishing about the Korean Hibakusha Problem: Association of Citizens Introduces History and Actual Condition.] Yomiuri Shimbun, August 27, 1983. Box 5, HT0500500, HUA.

377

“Zaikan no Hibakusha o Imon: Hiroshima Oriduru no Kai Chikaku Shuppatsu.” [Visiting Korean A-bomb Victims: The Hiroshima Paper Crane Group’s Approaching Departure.] Chūgoku Shimbun, August 11, 1971. Box 4, HT0400700, HUA.

“Zenrinkyō no Ayumi.” [History of Zenrinkyō.] Accessed June 12, 2017. http://www.zenrinkyo.or.jp/ayumi.htm.

Akechi, Junji. “Kwak Kwi Hoon, honorary president of the South Korean Atomic Bomb Sufferers Association, speaks in Hiroshima.” June 13, 2009. Accessed April 26, 2017. http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/?p=19815.

Ando, Takemasa. New Left Movements and Civil Society: Legacies of the 1960s. London, New York: Routledge, 2014.

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Chryssides, George D. Historical Dictionary of New Religious Movements. Lanham, Toronto, Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press: 2012.

Cumings, Bruce. The Origins of the Korean War: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950. Seoul: Yuksabipyungsa, 2002.

Dash, Kishore C. Regionalism in South Asia: Negotiating Cooperation, Institutional Structures. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

Dian, Matteo. Contested Memories in Chinese and Japanese Foreign Policy. Oxford: Elsevier, 2017.

DiFilippo, Anthony. Japan’s Nuclear Disarmament Policy and the U.S. Security Umbrella. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Dower, John W., and John Junkerman, eds. The Hiroshima Murals: The Art of Iri Maruki and Toshi Maruki. Tokyo; New York: Kodansha International, 1985.

Dower, John W. “Peace and Democracy in Two Systems: External Policy and Internal Conflict.” In Postwar Japan as History, edited by Andrew Gordon, 3-33. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

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Dudden, Alexis. Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005.

Fukagawa, Munetoshi. Chinkon no Kaikyō: Umi ni Kieta Hibaku Chōsenjin Chōyōkō. [Straits of Dead Souls – The Korean Forced Laborers, Survivors of the Atomic Bomb, Who Vanished into the Sea.] Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 1992.

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Hanguk Guksa Pyeonchan Wiwonhoe, ed. [The National History Compilation Committee of the Republic of Korea.] Hangugin Wonpok Pihaeja Sosongui Yeoksajeok Uiuiwa Namgyeojin Gwaje. [The Significance of the South Korean Hibakusha Lawsuits and the Unsettled Problems.] Hanguk Guksa Pyeonchan Wiwonhoe: 2012.

Hanguk Gyohoe Yeoseong Yeonhaphoe. [Korean Church Women’s Association.] Wonpok Pihaeja Guhowa Banjeon Banhaek Pyeonghwa Undong. [Hibakusha Relief Measures and Anti-war, Anti-nuclear and Peace Movements.] Hanguk Gyohoe Yeoseong Yeonhaphoe: 1994.

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