DOCSLIB.ORG

Air & Space Power Journal

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen John P. Jumper Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Donald G. Cook http://www.af.mil Commander, Air University Lt Gen Donald A. Lamontagne Commander, College of Aer Doctrine, Research and Education Col Bobby J. Wilkes Editor Lt Col Anthony C. Cain http://www.aetc.randolph.af.mil Senior Editor Lt Col Malcolm D. Grimes Associate Editor Maj Donald R. Ferguson Professional Staff Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Larry Carter, Contributing Editor Mary J. Moore, Editorial Assistant http://www.au.af.mil Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager Air and Space Power Chronicles Luetwinder T. Eaves, Managing Editor http://www.cadre.maxwell.af.mil The Air and Space Power Journal, published quarterly, is the professional flagship publication of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innova­ tive thinking on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other matters of na­ tional defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the official sanc­ tion of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal requests a courtesy Visit Air and Space Power Journal on-line line. at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil or E-mail to [email protected] Spring 2003 Volume XVII, No. 1 AFRP 10-1 A Word from the Chairman: Understanding Transformation . 5 Gen Richard B. Myers, USAF Developing Space Power: Building on the Airpower Legacy . 11 Hon. Peter B. Teets Prelaunch Notes . 17 Flight Lines Air and Space Power: Asymmetric Advantage for the United States . 18 Ricochets and Replies . 19 Vortices The Air and Space Nation Is in Peril . 20 Phillip S. Meilinger Needles in the Haystack: Hunting Mobile Electronic Targets . 32 Maj Michael Pietrucha, USAF PIREP F-35: The “F” Stands for “Future” . 41 John Kent Features High Ground over the Homeland: Issues in the Use of Space Assets for Homeland Security . 47 Lt Col (sel) S. Didi Kuo, PhD, USAF The Looming Biological Warfare Storm: Misconceptions and Probable Scenarios . 57 Col (Dr.) Jim A. Davis, USAF Not with Impunity: Assessing US Policy for Retaliating to a Chemical or Biological Attack . 69 Lt Col Harry W. Conley, USAF The Emerging Biocruise Threat . 81 Col Rex R. Kiziah, USAF Complexity-Based Targeting: New Sciences Provide Effects . 95 Col Robert W. Freniere, USAF Cmdr John Q. Dickmann, USN, Retired Cmdr Jeffrey R. Cares, USNR Attack Operations: First Layer of an Integrated Missile Defense . 101 Lt Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF Command and Control Doctrine for Combat Support: Strategic- and Operational-Level Concepts for Supporting the Air and Space Expeditionary Force . 113 Maj Gen Terry L. Gabreski, USAF James A. Leftwich Col (Dr.) Robert Tripp, USAF, Retired Dr. C. Robert Roll Jr. Maj Cauley von Hoffman, USAF Mission Debrief . 125 Air and Space Power Journal Board of Reviewers Prof. Tami Davis Biddle Dr. Tom Keaney US Army War College School of Advanced International Studies Lt Col Price T. Bingham, USAF, Retired Johns Hopkins University Melbourne, Florida Prof. Theodore Kluz USAF Air War College Lt Col Matthew Caffrey, USAFR Operations Directorate Dr. Charles Krupnick Headquarters USAF US Army War College Brig Gen Phillip D. Caine, USAF, Retired Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth Monument, Colorado RAND Dr. Don D. Chipman Lt Col David MacIsaac, USAF, Retired USAF Squadron Officer College Montgomery, Alabama Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun Dr. Karl P. Magyar US Army War College Montgomery, Alabama Dr. Mark Clodfelter Col Edward Mann, USAF, Retired National War College Colorado Springs, Colorado Dr. Jerome V. Martin Dr. James Corum Peru State College USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Col Phillip Meilinger, USAF, Retired Dr. Conrad Crane Science Applications International Corporation Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College Prof. John H. Morrow Jr. University of Georgia Dr. Dik A. Daso National Air and Space Museum Dr. Daniel Mortensen Smithsonian Institution USAF College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Dr. Lee Dowdy Alabama State University Prof. James Mowbray USAF Air War College Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Dr. Karl Mueller USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies RAND Brig Gen Charles Dunlap Jr., USAF Dr. Richard R. Muller Staff Judge Advocate USAF Air Command and Staff College USAF Air Combat Command Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Dr. Stephen Fought Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University USAF Air War College Dr. Reina J. Pennington Col David M. Glanz, USA, Retired Norwich University Journal of Slavic Military Studies Dr. James Smith Col Thomas E. Griffith Jr., USAF USAF Institute for National Security Studies USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Col James Spencer, USAF Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. USAF Academy The Ohio State University Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired Dr. Grant T. Hammond Toffler Associates Center for Strategy and Technology Air University Dr. James Titus USAF Academy Prof. Daniel Hughes USAF Air War College Col Mark Wells, USAF Dr. Thomas Hughes USAF Academy USAF Air War College Dr. Kenneth P. Werrell Lt Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Christiansburg, Virginia Space Division Dr. Harold R. Winton USAF Weapons School USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies 3 Air War Plans Division 1 The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler ASPJ STAFF In August 1941, four men, all former instructors at the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) at Maxwell Field, Alabama, reported to the Air War Plans Division (AWPD) in Washington, D.C., to lay the foundation for a comprehensive, strate­ gic air war plan. Lt Col Hal George called upon Maj Laurence Kuter, Maj Ken Walker, and Maj Haywood S. Hansell Jr. to answer a request from President Franklin D. Roosevelt for a “production plan to defeat our enemies”—one that would outline spe­ cific air requirements for industrial mobilization should the United States become embroiled in a war. After nine days, the team delivered a briefing to Gen Henry Arnold and Gen George C. Marshall that specified production requirements for 13,083 bombers; 8,775 fighters; 2,043 observation and photographic aircraft; 2,560 transports; and 37,051 trainers—an astounding total of 63,512 aircraft. Although these numbers were impressive, the planners ex­ ceeded Roosevelt’s tasking by recommending a strategy for prosecuting the war against the Axis powers. That strategy assumed that airpower could achieve strategic and political objectives in a fundamentally new way. Building upon untested airpower theories (taught throughout the 1930s at ACTS) that relied upon self- power, rail and canal transportation, petroleum produc­ defending, high-altitude daylight bombers, the team first tion, and other industries formed the backbone of any in­ envisioned a strategic defensive in the Pacific theater dustrial power. The AWPD staff also recognized that the while prosecuting an all-out air war against Germany. Air German Luftwaffe would mount a strong defense. Con­ forces would concentrate for 18 months before launching sequently, the enemy air force became an “intermediate an intensive six-month air campaign against Nazi Germany. objective of overriding priority.” Allied strategists later in­ The forces that had assembled at bases in Great Britain corporated elements of AWPD-1 into AWPD-42 and the would focus on industrial target systems—the “industrial plans for the Combined Bomber Offensive that com­ web”—that supported the German war effort. Electrical manders used to prosecute the air war against Germany. To Learn More . Biddle, Tami Davis. Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. Cate, James Lea, and E. Kathleen Williams. “The Air Corps Prepares for War, 1939–41.” In The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol. 1, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942. Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. 1948. New imprint, Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983. Faber, Lt Col Peter R. “Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air Corps Tactical School: Incubators of American Air- power.” In The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory. Edited by Col Phillip S. Meilinger. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1997. Hansell, Haywood S., Jr. The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler. Atlanta, Ga.: Higgins-McArthur/Longino & Porter, 1972. Murray, Williamson. “Strategic Bombing: The British, American, and German Experiences.” In Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. A Word from the Chairman Understanding Transformation GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, USAF CHAIRMAN,JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after changes occur. —Giulio Douhet HEN THE BOMBS fell on Pearl Insight from the Past Harbor in 1941, they shattered more than the silence of a The history of the US military is a history of peaceful Sunday morning; they the nation’s armed forces evolving to meet new destroyedW the illusion that the US military threats and opportunities. During the Civil forces were safe at home. During the three War, Generals Grant and Lee exploited the and a half years that followed, a world war telegraph for theaterwide information-sharing transformed the US armed forces into a first- and the railroad network to give their forces rate military. The urgency of fighting a global theaterwide mobility.
Recommended publications
  • The Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations

    The Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations

    The Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations Updated January 6, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44725 Position of Secretary of Defense: Statutory Restrictions and Civilian-Military Relations Summary The position of Secretary of Defense is unique within the United States government; it is one of two civilian positions within the military chain of command, although unlike the President, the Secretary of Defense is not elected. Section 113 of the United States Code states that the Secretary of Defense is to be “appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The section goes on to elaborate a key mechanism by which civilian control of the armed forces is maintained: A person may not be appointed as Secretary of Defense within seven years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force. The proposed nomination of General (Ret.) Lloyd Austin, United States Army, who retired from the military in 2016, to be Secretary of Defense may lead both houses of Congress to consider whether and how to suspend, change, or remove that provision. This provision was originally contained in the 1947 National Security Act (P.L. 80-253), which mandated that 10 years pass between the time an officer is relieved from active duty and when he or she could be appointed to the office of the Secretary of Defense. In 2007, Section 903 of the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181), Congress changed the period of time that must elapse between relief from active duty and appointment to the position of Secretary of Defense to seven years.
  • Process Makes Perfect Best Practices in the Art of National Security Policymaking

    Process Makes Perfect Best Practices in the Art of National Security Policymaking

    AP PHOTO/CHARLES DHARAPAK PHOTO/CHARLES AP Process Makes Perfect Best Practices in the Art of National Security Policymaking By Kori Schake, Hoover Institution, and William F. Wechsler, Center for American Progress January 2017 WWW.AMERICANPROGRESS.ORG Process Makes Perfect Best Practices in the Art of National Security Policymaking By Kori Schake, Hoover Institution, and William F. Wechsler, Center for American Progress January 2017 Contents 1 Introduction and summary 6 Findings 14 First-order questions for the next president 17 Best practices to consider 26 Policymaking versus oversight versus crisis management 36 Meetings, meetings, and more meetings 61 Internal NSC staff management 72 Appendix A 73 About the authors 74 Endnotes Introduction and summary Most modern presidents have found that the transition from campaigning to governing presents a unique set of challenges, especially regarding their newfound national security responsibilities. Regardless of their party affiliation or preferred diplomatic priorities, presidents have invariably come to appreciate that they can- not afford to make foreign policy decisions in the same manner as they did when they were a candidate. The requirements of managing an enormous and complex national security bureau- cracy reward careful deliberation and strategic consistency, while sharply punishing the kind of policy shifts that are more common on the campaign trail. Statements by the president are taken far more seriously abroad than are promises by a candidate, by both allies and adversaries alike. And while policy mistakes made before entering office can damage a candidate’s personal political prospects, a serious misstep made once in office can put the country itself at risk.
  • The History and Politics of Defense Reviews

    The History and Politics of Defense Reviews

    C O R P O R A T I O N The History and Politics of Defense Reviews Raphael S. Cohen For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR2278 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9973-0 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2018 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface The 1993 Bottom-Up Review starts with this challenge: “Now that the Cold War is over, the questions we face in the Department of Defense are: How do we structure the armed forces of the United States for the future? How much defense is enough in the post–Cold War era?”1 Finding a satisfactory answer to these deceptively simple questions not only motivated the Bottom-Up Review but has arguably animated defense strategy for the past quarter century.
  • Requirements for Military Effectiveness: Chile in Comparative Perspective Thomas C

    Requirements for Military Effectiveness: Chile in Comparative Perspective Thomas C

    Cover photo caption: Former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet reviews military troops during the Great Military Parade in 2014. Photo credit: Chilean government. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and are not an official policy nor position of the Na- tional Defense University, the Department of Defense nor the U.S. Government. About the author: Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgrad- uate School (NPS). Dr. Bruneau was Chairman of the Department of National Security Affairs from 1989 until 1995. He became Director of the Center for Civil Military Relations in November 2000 and continued until December 2004. He is the author of six books, editor or co-editor of a dozen books, and the author of dozens of academic articles. He specializes in various security issues including street gangs, civil-military relations, and intelligence reform. He can be reached at [email protected]. Editor: Pat Paterson Layout Design: Viviana Edwards Requirements for Military Effectiveness: Chile in Comparative Perspective Thomas C. Bruneau William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies Perry Center Occasional Paper March 2020 Requirements for Military Effectiveness: Chile in Comparative Perspective Thomas C. Bruneau Introduction This paper utilizes a framework we have developed to analyze civil-military relations in terms of both democratic civilian control and effectiveness.1 As the achievement of effectiveness only makes sense in terms of the roles and missions actually implemented by the security forces in a country, the roles and missions will be spelled out. The focus in this paper will be on comparative analysis of four countries that the author finds to be relatively successful in achieving both democratic civilian control and ef- fectiveness.
  • Lessons-Encountered.Pdf

    Lessons-Encountered.Pdf

    conflict, and unity of effort and command. essons Encountered: Learning from They stand alongside the lessons of other wars the Long War began as two questions and remind future senior officers that those from General Martin E. Dempsey, 18th who fail to learn from past mistakes are bound Excerpts from LChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: What to repeat them. were the costs and benefits of the campaigns LESSONS ENCOUNTERED in Iraq and Afghanistan, and what were the LESSONS strategic lessons of these campaigns? The R Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University was tasked to answer these questions. The editors com- The Institute for National Strategic Studies posed a volume that assesses the war and (INSS) conducts research in support of the Henry Kissinger has reminded us that “the study of history offers no manual the Long Learning War from LESSONS ENCOUNTERED ENCOUNTERED analyzes the costs, using the Institute’s con- academic and leader development programs of instruction that can be applied automatically; history teaches by analogy, siderable in-house talent and the dedication at the National Defense University (NDU) in shedding light on the likely consequences of comparable situations.” At the of the NDU Press team. The audience for Washington, DC. It provides strategic sup- strategic level, there are no cookie-cutter lessons that can be pressed onto ev- Learning from the Long War this volume is senior officers, their staffs, and port to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman ery batch of future situational dough. The only safe posture is to know many the students in joint professional military of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and unified com- historical cases and to be constantly reexamining the strategic context, ques- education courses—the future leaders of the batant commands.
  • Bound to Fail John J. Mearsheimer the Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order

    Bound to Fail John J. Mearsheimer the Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order

    Bound to Fail Bound to Fail John J. Mearsheimer The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order By 2019, it was clear that the liberal international order was in deep trouble. The tectonic plates that underpin it are shifting, and little can be done to repair and rescue it. Indeed, that order was destined to fail from the start, as it contained the seeds of its own destruction. The fall of the liberal international order horriªes the Western elites who built it and who have beneªted from it in many ways.1 These elites fervently believe that this order was and remains an important force for promoting peace and prosperity around the globe. Many of them blame President Donald Trump for its demise. After all, he expressed contempt for the liberal order when campaigning for president in 2016; and since taking ofªce, he has pur- sued policies that seem designed to tear it down. It would be a mistake, however, to think that the liberal international order is in trouble solely because of Trump’s rhetoric or policies. In fact, more funda- mental problems are at play, which account for why Trump has been able to successfully challenge an order that enjoys almost universal support among the foreign policy elites in the West. The aim of this article is to determine why the liberal world order is in big trouble and to identify the kind of inter- national order that will replace it. I offer three main sets of arguments. First, because states in the modern world are deeply interconnected in a variety of ways, orders are essential for facilitating efªcient and timely interactions.
  • Passing the Baton 2021: Securing America’S Future Together

    Passing the Baton 2021: Securing America’S Future Together

    Passing the Baton 2021: Securing America’s Future Together United States Institute of Peace Friday, January 29, 2021 Stephen Hadley: Good morning everyone. My name is Steve Hadley. I chair the board of the United States Institute of Peace, and I'm delighted to welcome you to Passing the Baton: Securing America's Future Together. USIP has hosted the Passing the Baton event after every change in administration for the last 20 years, starting in 2001, when President Clinton's National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, passed the baton to his successor, Condoleezza Rice, who we are honored to have with us again today. This year, we gather in the wake of a violent insurrection against our Capitol, the symbol and foundation of our democracy. The insurrection was marked by hateful expressions of white supremacy and anti-Semitism. These never are, and never can, be tolerated. There is no question that January 6 was one of the greatest tests of American democracy in recent memory. But as lawmakers gathered that same night to fulfill their constitutional duty, it was also the greatest measure of our democracy’s resilience. Ultimately, the events of January 6 underscore that despite the challenges and the fault lines, our democratic system remains the strongest, most powerful form of governance on earth, and the most effective vehicle for driving sustainable peace. Today, as we consider the formidable foreign policy and national security challenges facing the nation, we must recommit to navigating the road ahead together in the spirit, tradition, and principles of liberty and union that have been the bedrock of our republic.
  • Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed

    Why America's Grand Strategy Has Not Changed

    Why America’s Grand Strategy Has Not Changed Why America’s Grand Patrick Porter Strategy Has Not Changed Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment Why has U.S. grand strategy persisted since the end of the Cold War? If grand strategy is the long- term orchestration of power and commitments to secure oneself in a world where war is possible, the United States’ way of pursuing security has been re- markably stable.1 Long before the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States formed a grand strategy of “primacy,” often coined as “leadership.”2 This strategy was interrupted only occasionally. By the 1960s, it had set the parame- ters for Washington’s foreign policy debate.3 The strategy has four interlock- ing parts: to be militarily preponderant; to reassure and contain allies; to integrate other states into U.S.-designed institutions and markets; and to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons.4 These fundamental security commit- ments have proven hard to change, even amid shocks. Patrick Porter is Professor of International Security and Strategy at the University of Birmingham. The author is grateful to the anonymous reviewers and to Stephane Baele, Tarak Barkawi, Gregorio Bettiza, David Blagden, Sergio Catignani, Peter Feaver, Francis Gavin, Jonathan Golub, Ryan Grauer, Ted Hopf, Burak Kadercan, Michael Lind, Beverley Loke, Jason Reiºer, Robert Saunders, Catarina Thomson, and Hugh White. 1. See Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 13. 2. For accounts of U.S.
  • Civilian Control and the Military in Policymaking

    Civilian Control and the Military in Policymaking

    The Scholar EROSION BY DEFERENCE: CIVILIAN CONTROL AND THE MILITARY IN POLICYMAKING Polina Beliakova 55 Erosion by Deference: Civilian Control and the Military in Policymaking Delegating policymaking functions to members of the military profession can undermine civilian control in democracies, and yet democratic leaders continue to do just this. So why do leaders of democratic states delegate policymaking responsibilities to the military? Existing research does not provide a comprehensive answer to this question. To shed light on this understudied phenomenon, I advance a new concept of erosion of civilian control by deference. Using the Trump presidency as a case study, and considering additional evidence from the Clinton and Bush (43) administrations, I investigate three drivers of deference — boosting approval, avoiding responsibility, and cajoling the military. Relying on qualitative and quantitative analysis, I also show how deference to the military eroded civilian control under the Trump administration. “[I]f you want to get into a debate with a four- Specifically, the increased reliance on the military star Marine general, I think that that’s something in policymaking became a salient feature of U.S. highly inappropriate.” civil-military relations during the Trump admin- — Sarah Sanders, White House Press Secretary1 istration and is likely to have lasting consequenc- es. Trump’s initial set of appointees included Gen. he United States has experienced mul- (Ret.) James Mattis as secretary of defense, Gen. tiple episodes of civil-military tension (Ret.) John Kelly as secretary of homeland security, that have bordered on eroding norms of and Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Michael Flynn as national se- civilian control over the last 30 years.2 curity adviser.
  • World Order Power and Strategy.Pdf (9.473Mb)

    World Order Power and Strategy.Pdf (9.473Mb)

    Texas Volume 1, Issue 1 December 2017 Print: ISSN 2576-1021 National Online: ISSN 2576-1153 Security Review WORLD ORDER, POWER, & STRATEGY Volume 1 Issue 1 MASTHEAD Staff: Publisher: Managing Editor: Copy Editors: Ryan Evans Megan G. Oprea, PhD Autumn Brewington Sara Gebhardt, PhD Editor-in-Chief: Associate Editors: Katelyn Gough William Inboden, PhD Van Jackson, PhD Stephen Tankel, PhD Celeste Ward Gventer Editorial Board: Chair, Editorial Board: Editor-in-Chief: Francis J. Gavin, PhD William Inboden, PhD Robert J. Art, PhD Beatrice Heuser, PhD John Owen, PhD Richard Betts, PhD Michael C. Horowitz, PhD Thomas Rid, PhD John Bew, PhD Richard H. Immerman, PhD Joshua Rovner, PhD Nigel Biggar, PhD Robert Jervis, PhD Elizabeth N. Saunders, PhD Hal Brands, PhD Colin Kahl, PhD Kori Schake, PhD Joshua W. Busby, PhD Jonathan Kirshner, PhD Michael N. Schmitt, JD Robert Chesney, JD James Kraska, JD Jacob N. Shapiro, PhD Eliot Cohen, PhD Stephen D. Krasner, PhD Sandesh Sivakumaran, PhD Audrey Kurth Cronin, PhD Sarah Kreps, PhD Sarah Snyder, PhD Theo Farrell, PhD Melvyn P. Leffler, PhD Bartholomew Sparrow, PhD Peter D. Feaver, PhD Fredrik Logevall, PhD Monica Duffy Toft, PhD Rosemary Foot, PhD, FBA Margaret MacMillan, CC, PhD Marc Trachtenberg, PhD Taylor Fravel, PhD Thomas G. Mahnken, PhD René Värk, SJD Sir Lawrence Freedman, PhD Rose McDermott, PhD Steven Weber, PhD James Goldgeier, PhD Paul D. Miller, PhD Amy Zegart, PhD Michael J. Green, PhD Vipin Narang, PhD Kelly M. Greenhill, PhD Janne E. Nolan, PhD Policy and Strategy Advisory Board: Chair: Adm. William McRaven, Ret. Hon. Elliott Abrams, JD Hon.
  • TERRY ANDERSON Terry Anderson Is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Executive Director of the Property and Environment Research Center

    TERRY ANDERSON Terry Anderson Is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Executive Director of the Property and Environment Research Center

    TERRY ANDERSON Terry Anderson is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the executive director of the Property and Environment Research Center. His research helped launch the idea of free-market environmentalism and has prompted public debate over the proper role of government in managing natural resources. Anderson is an avid outdoorsman who enjoys fi shing, hiking, skiing, horseback riding, and archery hunting, especially in Africa. SCOTT W. ATLAS Scott W. Atlas, MD, is the David and Joan Traitel Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution. He investigates the impact of government and the private sector on health care access, quality, pricing, and innovation. His most recent book is “Restoring Quality Health Care: A Six Point Plan for Comprehensive Reform at Lower Cost” (2016). PETER BERKOWITZ Peter Berkowitz is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is the author of 4 books and hundreds of articles about, among other things, constitutional government, conservatism and progressivism in the United States, liberal education, national security and law, and Middle East politics. MICHAEL J. BOSKIN Michael J. Boskin is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, a professor of economics at Stanford University, and a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Boskin served as chairman of the President’s Council of Economic Advisers from 1989 to 1993. In addition he advises governments and businesses globally. DAVID BRADY David Brady is a professor of political science in the Stanford Graduate School of Business and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. At Stanford University Brady has served as associate dean for academic affairs in the Graduate School of Business, as vice provost for Distance Learning, and as a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences; he was also elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
  • American Aviation Heritage

    American Aviation Heritage

    National Park Service U.S. Department of the Interior National Historic Landmarks Program American Aviation Heritage Draft, February 2004 Identifying and Evaluating Nationally Significant Properties in U.S. Aviation History A National Historic Landmarks Theme Study Cover: A Boeing B-17 “Flying Fortress” Bomber flies over Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio, in the late 1930s. Photograph courtesy of 88th Air Base Wing History Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. AMERICAN AVIATION HERITAGE Identifying and Evaluating Nationally Significant Properties in U.S. Aviation History A National Historic Landmarks Theme Study Prepared by: Contributing authors: Susan Cianci Salvatore, Cultural Resources Specialist & Project Manager, National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers Consultant John D. Anderson, Jr., Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, University of Maryland and Curator for Aerodynamics, Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum Janet Daly Bednarek, Ph.D., Professor of History, University of Dayton Roger Bilstein, Ph.D., Professor of History Emeritus, University of Houston-Clear Lake Caridad de la Vega, Historian, National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers Consultant Marie Lanser Beck, Consulting Historian Laura Shick, Historian, National Conference of State Historic Preservation Officers Consultant Editor: Alexandra M. Lord, Ph.D., Branch Chief, National Historic Landmarks Program Produced by: The National Historic Landmarks Program Cultural Resources National Park Service U.S. Department of the Interior Washington, D.C.