Caietele Echinox, vol. 19, 2010: Communism – Negotiation of Boundaries 315 Ruxandra Cesereanu

The Romanian Anticommunist Revolution and the “Terrorists” of December 1989

Strange though it may appear – or ABSTRACT perhaps not so strange after all – the first to The so-called terrorist phenomenon marked talk about “terrorist actions” in December the bloodiest anti-communist revolution in 1989, was dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu, in Eastern Europe, i.e. the Romanian Revolu- his rallies against a would-be foreign plot a- tion. This study examines not only the nu- gainst , which the dictator de- ances the phenomenon in question acquired nounced during the last meetings held with during and especially after the events of the members of the Political Executive December 1989, but also its manipulations Committee (Comitetul Politic Executiv) – at the hands of the various factions involved CPEx. The phrase was also employed by his in the events of December 1989, pinpointing brother, General Ilie Ceauşescu upon seve- the implications and consequences of these ral official visits the latter paid to various manipulations. garrisons in Cluj, Arad, Oradea, in De- KEYWORDS cember 1989, during the Timişoara insur- Romania; Nicolae Ceaşescu; Anticommunist rection. In the course of these visits, Ilie Revolution 1989; ; Manipulation; Ceauşescu allegedly briefed the soldiers and Counterrevolution; Terrorists; Diversionists. the commanding officers by selling them stories about the existence of 2000 foreign RUXANDRA CESEREANU terrorists who were to carry out a massive ”Babeş-Bolyai” University, attack against Romania. It is very likely that Cluj-Napoca, Romania those who launched the phrase “terrorists”, [email protected] namely the forces that seized power after Ceauşescu’s flight, drew inspiration from the former dictator. The forces in question were the National Salvation Front (NSF), which became the new political body after the fall of Ceauşescu’s regime. Later on, at the garrison of Târgovişte, when charged with genocide and the murders that the so- called terrorists had committed among the civilians, spreading panic throughout the country, Ceauşescu, who was detained here, Ruxandra Cesereanu 316 suspected the terrorists persons spreading or publishing ru- were members of the mors, as well as confected or ten- Securitate, the notorious dentious information concerning the Political Police of communist Romania, exceptional situation [of the country even while considering himself betrayed by at the time], in order to mislead the the Securitate, despite the fact that, ironi- population and create panic (Siani- cally, the “terrorists” in question, who had Davies 2006: 211). instilled such fear in the population, could in that instance be but some of Ceauşescu’s It is important to mention from the loyalists. outset that the term terrorists was incor- The second person to use the term rectly used with reference to the identity of “terrorist” and the phrase “terrorist phenol- those persons who in December 1989 had menon”, between 22nd and 31st December, murdered both civilians and militaries, and was General Nicolae Militaru, whom NSF spread panic among the population. had appointed as head of the Ministry of Ivan Evseev, in his anthology Timi- National Defense (the acronym of which in şoara, 16-22 decembrie 19891, provides an Romanian is MApN). In an interview given apt definition of the term in circulation in on 23rd December 1989 to BBC, , December 1989. In his opinion, a “terrorist” who seized power after the overthrow of was Ceauşescu, thus becoming the new political leader, described terrorists as a word that was not employed in its original sense or with the purpose to certain groups of terrorists specially depict reality; rather, it was used to trained to fight against the people allude to a moral trait. (Evseev 1990: and to protect the dictator… fanatical 35) individuals acting with unpreceden- ted cruelty, firing shots at buildings A “terrorist” is typically defined as and citizens, and making victims a- someone who places bombs at strategic lo- mong militaries… (Siani-Davies cations, e.g. inside political institutions, 2006: 210). takes hostages from among the politicians, and murders politicians or public figures In an official statement that NSF known to have masterminded a social or released to the press on 28th December political movement. However, bombs are 1989, the new authorities defined the so- not always placed in key political in- called terrorists as stitutions. They will occasionally be planted in public locations with a view to kill as persons wearing fire arms and other many civilians as possible. The alleged ter- weapons of attack, ammunition, ex- rorists of December 1989 utterly failed to fit plosives, as well as any other kind of the profile of a terrorist, as defined above, destruction weapons or radio trans- hence the relative nature of the term and, mitters, and who fight against the consequently, the reason why it should not National Salvation Front and the vic- be employed with reference to the Roma- tors of free Romania. nian Revolution. This very incongruity prompted several analysts and historians of Furthermore, the label of “terrorists” the to use the term was also abusively applied to counter-revolutionaries instead, while others The Romanian Anticommunist Revolution and the “Terrorists” 317 preferred the term diversionists, which we seized power on consider to be the most appropriate. Brought 22nd December before the Commission of Inquiry into the 1989; Events of December 1989, Nicu Ceauşescu, - army officers, or of the Ministry of the dictator’s favourite son, detained after the Interior, USLA troops (the coun- the downfall of the Ceauşescu regime, ter-terrorism units), including offi- sardonically called the so-called terrorists cers of the Securitate or officers be- “aliens.” longing to the factions that supported Whatever their origin and identity, and approved of the Revolution. the so-called terrorists were depicted as Presumably, the officers in question some sort of “angels of death” or nocturnal acted on the orders of the NSF, with creatures who, from a symbolic point of General Nicolae Militaru, the new view, had acquired vampire-like attributes. leader of MApN, in command; They were believed to train in bunkers, to - members of the Army Intelligence move from one place to another by means Directorate (Romanian acronym DIA), of intricate underground passageways, and acting on the orders of the new poli- to possess sophisticated gruesome weapons. tical authorities that assumed power In what concerns the identity of the alleged following the overthrow of the Ceau- terrorists of December 1989, we hereby şescu regime; provide a rundown of the most relevant - the final theory claims that the ter- theories advanced by analysts of the phe- rorists never existed in the first place nomenon. In turn, terrorists may have been: and that the psychosis created around them was purposely fueled in order - members of the Securitate, loyal to to instill fear and psychological Ceauşescu, i.e. representatives of terror in the population. In this line certain nationalist factions; of line of argument, the casualties of - mainly, yet not exclusively, Roma- December 1989 were accounted for nian orphans raised by the Securitate as tactical errors, military negligence, and trained to serve in Ceauşescu’s or ricocheting bullets. Indeed it was personal guard; known by the nick- regrettable, it has to be said, that ma- name of “janissaries”, these orphans ny civilians had been given weapons were supposedly trained to become they did not know how to use, which kamikaze fighters; led to deadly accidents. - terrorists of Arab or Persian origin, e.g. Libians, Palestinians, Iranians, In the accounts of some analysts, etc.; several of the theories outlined above were - foreign agents, mainly Soviets and collapsed, precisely as a result of the am- Hungarians; biguous and elusive identity of the would-be - Soviet militaries recruited from a- terrorists. Constantin Lucescu, for instance, mong the people of Bessarabia, na- Counsel for the Defense in the Ceauşescu’s tive speakers of Romanian; trial, believed that the Securitate officers - independent snipers; and young orphan mercenaries trained to act - petty offenders from Romanian pri- as Ceauşescu’s personal guard formed com- sons, used either by the factions lo- mando units and disguised themselves as yal to Ceauşescu, or, on the contrary, officers of the Ministry of National Defense by the new political forces who in order to create confusion. In an attempt to Ruxandra Cesereanu 318 shed light on the myste- When questioned by the Commission ry surrounding the alle- of Inquiry into the Events of December ged terrorists, Sergiu 1989, General Iulian Vlad, former head of Nicolaescu, president of one of the two the Securitate, argued that the alleged Commissions of Inquiry into the Events of terrorists of the Romanian Revolution “were December 1989, argued that the entire not terrorists in the standard acceptation of terrorist scenario actually started as a the term.” Rather, they were “professional diversion orchestrated by the Securitate, killers” and few in number. According to whose purpose was aimed at maintaining Vlad, most of the people who died after 22nd authority and preventing the bloodshed. December were not killed by the so-called However, since the Army and the revolu- terrorists; rather, they died “by pure acci- tionaries acted on it, the initial diversion dent” because “shots were fired randomly” eventually turned into chaos. General Iulian and civilians were given weapons which Vlad reportedly tried to dispel the chaos, but they used irresponsibly. On the other hand, the phenomenon went out of control. Vlad went on to call attention to the fact that Nicolaescu classified the alleged terrorists incorrect orders led to the death of several into several mixed categories: foreign natio- officers, later to be deliberately labeled nals (Soviets from Bessarabia, Hungarians, “terrorists”; what is more, their bodies were etc.) who did not play an active part in the subject to physical abuse: cigarettes were Revolution; Romanians (officers of the Se- stubbed out in their eyes, they were deca- curitate, the Army and the Militia), and, pitated or urinated on. In other words, the finally, Arab terrorists (Stoenescu 2004: bodies of several officers murdered by 148-151). Later on, Nicolaescu reiterated mistake in the tumult of the Revolution his previous statements (Nicolaescu 2005: served as a convenient pretext to justify the 189, 539), opining that in December 1989 so-called war started by the so-called ter- the leading roles were played by native Ro- rorists (Săndulescu 1997: 203, 390). Under manians, who were members of the Se- these circumstances, Vlad’s opinion con- curitate, the Militia and the USLA, i.e. the trasts sharply with all the ten theories des- elite counter-terrorist force, while the actual tined to explain the identity of the alleged protagonists were Arab terrorists. According terrorists. To begin with, Vlad contented to to Gelu Voican-Voiculescu, who played a state that they “were not terrorists in the dubious part in the events of December standard acceptation of the term,” sugges- 1989 events, the Army itself appeared to ting that the term in question should be have been responsible for the terrorist phe- more likely interpreted as a metaphor, and, nomenon. Voican-Voiculescu went on to secondly, he would not even hint at the claim that the Army had in fact been in- possible identity of those whom he called volved in a coup d’etat attempt which “professional killers.” failed: During and immediately after the Re- volution, Major-General Ştefan Guşă, first The Army created the terrorist phe- deputy defense minister and chief of staff, nomenon as a diversion designed to did believe in the existence of the terrorists, maintain a state of tension that would whom he referred to as “gangs of hooli- give this institution the possibility to gans,” and considered to be involved in a serve the new political power (Stoe- “diversion war” (Guşă de Drăgan 2006: 86, nescu 2004: 210, 192). 138). Nevertheless, he would not go so far as to arguing that the supposed terrorists The Romanian Anticommunist Revolution and the “Terrorists” 319 were members of the Securitate. Several been arrested under the years later, in 1993, Ştefan Guşă contributed suspicion of terrorism to the dubious radio-electronic war theory, were subsequently rein- which was believed to have been coordi- tegrated into the Securitate, at this point nated by the Soviets, who, according to him, absorbed by the Army, and, later on, per- had access to: haps even into the Romanian Information Service. Some voices claim that there was a two corner reflectors attached to counter-revolution lead by the Securitate weather balloons; the reflectors in defeated by the Revolution. question were placed between the Although (Generaţia balloon and the radiosonde, and irosită2… 1992: 230, 232) was among those some of those installations even had who identified the alleged terrorists as being a light bulb. These corner reflectors, part of the Securitate units, his theory was if sent into the atmosphere, create more nuanced. He believed that the so- images of targets. Air currents may called terrorists were members of the USLA push the installations in various di- troops, which totaled 800 registered mem- rections, thus creating the perfect bers, having been created in 1988 with the illusion of a helicopter (Guşă de purpose of preventing lethal attacks on Drăgan 2006: 494). Ceauşescu’s life. These units had been trained and equipped for a guerrilla-type of General Guşă suggested that those urban warfare, like the one that took place who possessed devices capable of creating between 22nd and 25th December 1989. Bru- such elaborate diversions could have easily can argued that the supposed terrorists could masterminded the terrorist scenario. have been recruited from among other In what follows, we reformulate the troops as well, such as the Military Acade- ten opinions concerning the identity of the my for officers of the Securitate at Băneasa, terrorists in light of the argument refine- that numbered 2000 officers, the 450-strong ments presented above: V Directorate, responsible for Ceauşescu’s 1. Official data indicate that many protection, and the Securitate for- people were arrested, some of whom at ces, comprising 600 officers. Brucan held random, under the suspicion of having been that, even though some of the terrorists were involved in terrorist acts: 1425 people were arrested, they were later on released by their detained, of whom 820 were militaries, 580 colleagues, who became legal employees of were civilians and 25 were foreign nation- the Army, once the Securitate surrendered nals. The partisans of the theory which held and came under its authority. that the terrorists were members of the A paper signed by Costache Codres- Securitate, belonging to various units loyal cu, which dwelled upon the role that the to Ceauşescu, argue that those persons were Army played in December 1989 (Armata released precisely because, in the end, both română în revoluţia din decembrie 19893…, the Securitate and other related forces had 1994), offers a detailed account of the way sided with the Revolution, and the new poli- in which the Army was virtually bombarded tical authorities were interested in destroy- with misleading information about the so- ying the traces of the so-called rebels who called terrorists. Such false information had acted either independently or on orders, claimed that there existed training camps for as anti- or counter-revolutionaries. These foreigners in Romania and that foreign ter- cases were covered up and those who had rorists had been parachuted into the country Ruxandra Cesereanu 320 in order to hit strategic The main target of the diversionists appears targets. Furthermore, the to have been the Television station because terrorists in question al- it was the only means by which Romanians legedly planned to infect drinking water throughout the country were kept up to date supplies, to mine certain buildings, trigger with the Revolution and with the entire epidemics, etc., none of which ever hap- situation at the time. pened. However, such deceptive intel did Marian Oprea in Conspiraţia Secu- cause an operational chaos among the Ar- rităţii4, 2004, put together the accounts of my. As a result, columns of armored ve- various persons involved in the events of hicles had to move from one location to December 1989; some of them spoke about another, depending on where the terrorists a complex electronically simulated air ope- were believed to be (Codrescu 1994: 116). ration designed to mislead the Romanian The Romanian Television channel was the Army in order to create a diversion; the air place where most of the false information operation was allegedly coordinated with was collected. Thus, this institution fabri- one on the ground. The use of the term cated an overblown image of the forces that “diversionists” instead of “terrorists” was opposed the Revolution, misled the Army, deemed valid as a result. and spread confusion among the population The manipulation and the psychosis (Codrescu 1994: 121). The Army did not surrounding the alleged terrorists, identified believe most of the false information, other- with members of the Militia and the Se- wise military units would have probably en- curitate, played a major part in a particular ded up fighting one other or, as was, tra- instance in an incident which occurred in gically the case of the Otopeni incident, . In his book titled Moartea pândeşte when 49 people died, of whom 34 were sub epoleţi. Sibiu ‘89 (1993)5, Ion Ţârlea national servicemen. The victims were shot argues that psychological pressure, chaos without prior warning, although they had and widespread suspicion led various police been sent there precisely to defend the forces to open fire against one another and airport. It is likely that the mastermind be- that the illusion of the so-called terrorist hind this operation, as suggested by Co- threat was intentionally fueled by the new drescu, was the Securitate (even though the political authorities. Thus, it was claimed institution was not named as such). It is that, in Sibiu, the Revolution had been tar- possible that the alleged terrorists were di- geted at the Militia, which is the reason why versionists, predominantly young people wi- there were attempts to deliberately incri- thout an ID, dressed in civilian clothes and minate this institution and to fabricate so- armed, who attacked both civilians and called terrorists from among Militia offi- militaries; their number amounted to a few cers. As a result, several hundred Militia hundreds; they were physically fit and officers were ill-treated and humiliated for seemed to possess commando combat skills, almost a month, during which they had been as they were probably members of a certain held prisoners in a deserted swimming pool. Securitate unit. This type of diversionists According to Ion Ţârlea, in this particular acted mostly in the capital city, either indi- case, the ones that engineered this exploited vidually or in small groups, firing shots the existing confusion, manipulating the from rooftops, attics, vehicles, basements, common misconception that Militia and the drains, etc. Although held in custody as sus- Securitate members were one and the same, pects, following superficial inquiries, many the latter in turn, being believed to be one of them were released for lack of evidence. and the same with the so-called terrorists. The Romanian Anticommunist Revolution and the “Terrorists” 321 Teodor Filip in Secretele USLA6, Arab students and offi- 1999, holds that placing the equality mark cers who had been trai- between members of the Securitate and the ning at the Military A- so-called terrorists was in fact the diversion. cademy for officers of the Securitate at Filip makes reference to the confusing inci- Băneasa; one of them was allegedly mur- dent of the USLA members murdered out- dered and the rest flown back to Libya. Bru- side the Ministry of National Defense, can considered the supposed Arab terrorists whose bodies were left in the street and as part of the Securitate troops because they abused; the victims in question were later to had trained at the Băneasa Academy. In her be declared national heroes. The survivors paper, Revoluţia neterminată (1999)7, An- among the wounded were in turn arrested, neli Ute Gabanyi contributes an even more ill-treated and humiliated. In this instance, intriguing aspect concerning the presumed those who staged the terrorist plot were Arab terrorists. According to her, it was accused of using the death – or assassina- possible that they were not Libyans, Palesti- tion, as the case may be – of several officers nians or Iranians after all, but Soviet sol- to their own advantage only for the victims’ diers from the Muslim republics of the for- bodies to be later identified by the new poli- mer USSR (p. 200). Michel Castex tical authorities as those belonging to the so- (1990:81) pointed an accusatory finger at called terrorists. the media hype created around the Arab Disappointed in the Revolution of mercenaries paid by Ceauşescu. The new December 1989, international journalists i- political authorities used this potential iden- nitially wrote about the alleged terrorists, tity to their own profit, that is, to demolish whom they identified with members of the the myth of Ceauşescu as a nationalist dic- Securitate only to later denounce a massive tator because, by hiring Arab mercenaries to manipulation campaign specially designed fight against Romanians, he had, in fact, be- to prove that the alleged terrorists were trayed his own people. members of a Securitate unit which served 4. The supporters of the theory ac- as Ceauşescu’s Praetorian Guard and which cording to which the alleged terrorists were mercilessly opened fire on the civilians. agents of the foreign secret intelligence ser- 2. Dumitru Mazilu believed that the vices argued that those so-called terrorists so-called terrorists came from the units in were used in order to cause a civil war that charge of the presidential couple’s protect- would result in the intervention of foreign tion. The theory enjoyed several other a- troops in Romania, such as the member depts, who portrayed the alleged terrorists states of the Warsaw Pact or NATO. as extremely skilled, fanatical individuals, 5. Anneli Ute Gabanyi was the only equipped with highly efficient and sophis- analyst of the Romanian Revolution of De- ticated weapons. The supposed terrorists cember 1989 to put forward a new hypothe- were cast in an ominous light so as to stir a sis concerning the identity of the so-called general hysteria and to provoke a psychosis terrorists (Revoluţia neterminată, 1999: not only among the population, but also 200). They were allegedly Soviet soldiers among the commentators of the so-called who came from the Republic of , terrorist phenomenon. which in 1989 was known as the Soviet 3. Several analysts argued that the Socialist Republic of Moldova, and whose alleged terrorists may have been Arab citi- mother tongue was Romanian. zens. In his memoirs, Silviu Brucan spoke 6. The supporters of the theory ac- about the involvement of a group of 30 cording to which the alleged terrorists were Ruxandra Cesereanu 322 independent snipers, ar- pointing out from the very beginning the fact gued that the role of that, had the alleged terrorists been members these so-called terrorists of the Securitate or of Ceauşescu’s personal was to maintain a state of panic and tension guard, they would have taken action as early until Ceauşescu’s situation would have im- as 21st December 1989 or on the morning of proved and various forces would have re- 22nd December at the latest, covering Ceau- grouped around him. However, others şescu’s flight. It therefore seemed obvious believed that they were that the ‘terrorists’ were invented in order to create the illusion of a war, and were de- elite snipers, either Romanians or fo- finitely not loyalists of the dictator. In Bari- reign nationals, who acted on a given cada, no. 26, 1990, Vălenaş notes that scenario, firing shots in key locations It is strange why Iliescu’s regime in Bucharest. The rest was panic and adopted such a vehement attitude towards lack of training for such street the Securitate, that between 22nd and 30th fighting and urban guerrilla warfare: December the words “terrorist” and “mem- everybody shot at everybody, mili- ber of the Securitate” became synonymous. taries shot at militaries, militia mem- It appears that the role of the Securitate was bers shot at militia members and vice to conceal the identity of the real terrorists, versa. (Ursu Gheorghiu 1994: 23). and when the so-called terrorists disap- peared, Iliescu’s regime had to restore the 7. We previously listed the hypothe- image of the Securitate as an institution that sis according to which the so-called terro- was capable to secure the increasingly un- rists were imprisoned petty offenders. This stable position of the newly established re- hypothesis is rarely invoked, being the less gime. The appointment of Virgil Măgureanu plausible of all. Valentin Raiha, for in- in March 1989 as head of the Romanian stance, makes reference to it to it in his Information Service clearly demonstrates book În decembrie ’89, KGB a aruncat în the intentions of the new regime. aer România cu complicitatea unui grup de Liviu Vălenaş thus concludes that the militari8, 1995. Ion Iliescu – Virgil Măgureanu team skill- 8. Some analysts assert that the sup- fully devised a plan according to which the posed terrorists were officers of the Minis- so-called terrorists were fabricated from try of National Defense and the Ministry of among militaries that had shot militaries. Interior, of the Securitate even, obeying Later on, the Romanian Information Service orders issued by the new political power and took on at least half of the former members acting under the command of General of the Securitate; once the new political Nicolae Militaru. Proponents of this theory authorities had official dead bodies at their claimed that there may have been an ope- disposal, they manipulated the public opi- ration called “Terrorists,” designed to sug- nion by presenting the victims as terrorists, gest the danger of a civil war. Thus it ap- which is why those bodies were left in the pears that the mission of those militaries, street at the mercy of the population, and whether they acted individually or in small abused. To illustrate this, Vălenaş cited the groups, was to stage a counter-revolution. iconic case of the Sibiu militia members, 9. In the series about the events of taken prisoners in December 1989 and held December 1989, published in 1990 in the in a deserted an empty pool for almost a newspaper Baricada9, Liviu Vălenaş paid month during which they were humiliated special attention to the terrorist issue, and ill-treated on account of being terrorists. The Romanian Anticommunist Revolution and the “Terrorists” 323 Şerban Orăscu in Ceauşismul10 (2006: young people, because 213-214), analyzed the way in which the the youth strongly op- new political authorities employed the term posed communism in terrorists: general, not only Ceauşescu’s dictatorship. Although a few hundred members of the as from December 22nd 1989 on- respective assault troops were arrested, they wards, the population and the new were later on released precisely because political leaders used the term ‘ter- they had acted at the orders of the newly rorists’ to designate armed men established regime. Pavel Coruţ on the other whose identity was obscure and who hand holds that the terrorists were ex- were known to have acted intermit- clusively officers of the Ministry of Na- tently as independent snipers, firing tional Defense, who had made a special deal shots systematically, from December with Iliescu’s putchists concerning 22nd until the end of the month, at the people of Bucharest but not at the the military targets to be attacked so members of the new political regime; that the Army would then rise a- On the basis of the existing data, the gainst the Securitate, […] the per- so-called terrorists were elite officers sons to be murdered in order to cause of the Securitate, snipers who acted terror, the rumors to be spread so as according to an urban guerrilla war- to stir panic among population, and fare plan contrived by the Securitate the persons who under no circum- and adapted to the new circumstan- stances were to be shot, not even by ces. mistake. (Coruţ 1993: 196).

It therefore appears that the aim of Călin Cernăianu, author of Diploma- the so-called terrorists was to consolidate ţia lupilor…12, 1997, supported in his book the position of the Perestroikists led by Ion the theory of the internal conspiracy, argu- Iliescu, even though these characters were ing that the so-called terrorists were puppets members of the former Political Police. operated by the new political authorities, Victor Loupan, author of La Révolution n’a grouped around Iliescu; if the alleged pas eu lieu…11, 1990, embraces the theory terrorists had been forces loyal to Ceauşes- according to which in December 1989 Ro- cu, they would have attempted to free the mania witnessed a coup d’état. He believes dictator from the Târgovişte garrison, to that the terrorist affair was a manipulation prevent the Revolution from being broad- orchestrated by the new political authorities cast on television and murder the new lea- with the help of the “Revolutionary Secu- ders; under no circumstances would they ritate”, as he ironically termed it, that is, the have randomly fired shots at people. This is factions of the Securitate which had backed the reason why Cernăianu asserts that the and catalyzed the coup d’état, and which identity of the so-called terrorists was pat- were subsequently coordinated by the neo- terned on militaries and members of the Se- communist group that had seized power. curitate under the orders of Iliescu’s group, Victor Frunză (1994) argues that the a subordination which was made possible so-called terrorists were members of assault through the intermediary of various Gene- troops, i.e. Securitate assassins, trained to rals. The so-called terrorists were invented shoot the population; they were employed so as to create the false impression that the by the new regime to liquidate particularly Army and the revolutionaries were fighting Ruxandra Cesereanu 324 a powerful enemy they attitudes that unsettled Ion Iliescu’s team. could only defeat by Ion Cristoiu, author of De la o lovitură de working together. The stat la alta15, 2006, believes that the terrorist mission of the alleged terrorists was ex- affair was a “show of sounds and lights,” plicit: to murder civilians, militaries even at whose climax was the trial of the Ceauşescu random and in small numbers. couple and their execution. Vladimir Tismă- 10. The most fervent supporter of the neanu in Revoluţia română văzută de zia- theory which claims that the purported ter- rişti americani şi englezi16, 1991, makes a rorists were members of the Army Intel- case for the purpose of the NSF being that ligence Directorate or DIA, is Valentin Rai- of attenuating the anticommunist reaction of ha, author of În decembrie ’89, KGB a the population. By amplifying the panic aruncat în aer România cu complicitatea caused by the so-called terrorists, Iliescu’s unui grup de militari, 1995. He argued that team could seize power much more easily. they were elite diversionists, trained as In his interpretive model, National Televi- such; moreover, the Army Intelligence Di- sion played an instrumental role in building rectorate was the only one equipped with air the terrorist psychosis as it broadcasted a target simulators and the only one able to series of misleading information and diver- suggest the idea of a radioelectronic war, to sions. In a book by Teodor Brateş, pu- instill the possibility of a like war in the blished in 1992, the author argued that from mind of the Romanians or wage a war of a certain point onward, a group of militaries this kind. was charged to investigate the vital items of 11. The advocates of the theory ac- information, so as to prevent false news cording to which the so-called terrorists from being broadcast; it is possible that never existed in flesh and blood, being a these militaries reduced indeed the quantity mere psychosis fueled by the new political of diversionary information, but it is just as leaders, rely on hard core facts to support possible that they deliberately disseminated their hypothesis, such as the tension and this type of information. tumult of the December 1989 events, or the Radu Portocală (1991) argued that panic reactions that led to fatal errors, stray the alleged terrorists had to be invented in bullets and tactical errors. They also point to order to feed the mass psychosis surroun- possible small vendettas between various ding the live-broadcast Revolution, and factions, a hypothesis put forward by histo- were demonized and portrayed as dreadful rian Dennis Deletant in România sub re- superman-like individuals so that the new gimul comunist13, 1997; however, the same authorities could feign a civil war. How- historian claimed, in Ceauşescu şi Securi- ever, Portocală does acknowledge that the tatea14…, 1995, that the terrorists did exist so-called “terrorists stage” of the Revolution after all and they were members of the was dominated by diversions. A typical USLA troops or officers of the V Direc- example invoked as evidence to support this torate of the Securitate. Other authors, like concerned the shooting simulators that only John Simpson, 1990, for instance, used the Securitate had in its arsenal. terms such as “revolutionary madness” and While the terrorist phenomenon may “paranoia” to explain the psychosis which, have been a purposely implanted psychosis, as some believe, was purposely created and several real, flesh-and-blood people were fueled in order to divert the attention of the arrested, nonetheless. The advocates of the population from the radical anticommunist “inexistent terrorists” theory argue that the attitudes displayed by the street protesters, persons arrested were innocent people who The Romanian Anticommunist Revolution and the “Terrorists” 325 had probably died in the tumult of the Revo- an open conflict be- lution, but who seemed dubious to those tween the Army and the who had arrested them; it is possible that, in Securitate so as to ei- some cases, the dead bodies of the so-called ther feign a civil war or to make the request terrorists were actually bodies of people for foreign military intervention appear who had died in battle; however, for one imminent. The armed revolutionary civili- reason or another, the victims in question ans contributed, even while unawares, to were labeled as terrorists, which led to their legitimating the rumors, by firing shots at bodies being abused. random, and being often mistaken for the Doina Cornea (1990) claimed that alleged terrorists. the terrorist affair was a manipulation or- In Istoria loviturilor de stat. Revolu- chestrated by the National Salvation Front, ţia din decembrie 1989 – o tragedie româ- which had played on the population’s fear nească18 (2005: 660), Alex Mihai Stoenescu of the Securitate. Vartan Arachelian, author examines the diversionist-terrorist phenol- of Revoluţia şi personajele sale17 (1998: menon, focusing on three main hypotheses 112), cited the opinion of Gheorhe Raţiu, a that he deems problematic: 1. the terrorist former colonel of the Securitate, who phenomenon did not exist; 2. the terrorist claimed that the alleged terrorists never e- phenomenon was orchestrated by an ob- xisted; rather, they were fabricated by scure political eminence which had been Nicolae Militaru, who had wished to make Ceauşescu’s brainchild and whose members it seem as though there was a counter-re- (albeit not necessarily Securitate members) volution going on. He apparently did so in were fanatics; and 3. the terrorist phenolme- order to consolidate his position within the non was engineered by an Army unit, pro- new regime, as there were multiple power bably the Army Intelligence Directorate. centers and factions disputing leadership. Stoenescu considered Nicolae Militaru to Raţiu did not state clearly whether the so- play the lead in this diversionary phenolme- called terrorists were a mere psychosis or, non; Stoenescu also believed that, alongside on the contrary, real officers of the Ministry Ceauşescu, Militaru was the second major of National Defense, obeying General Mili- assassin in the events of December 1989, taru’s orders, but he did seem to suggest the the manipulative decisions he had made first variant. Filip Teodorescu (1992), a for- leading up to genocide. Militaru allegedly mer officer of the Counterintelligence Di- triggered the diversionary operation under rectorate of the Securitate tried in the Timi- the control of the Soviets, who wanted Ro- şoara trial, asserted, in his turn, that the i- mania to remain under Russian influence. It dentification of the alleged terrorists with was General Ştefan Guşă who opposed the members of the Securitate was a complex potential Soviet intervention which the diversion. Even though Teodorescu did not diversionary phenomenon triggered by state it clearly, he insinuated that the diver- Militaru was meant to accelerate. sion had been engineered by the new political authorities. * To these are added other interpreters who believe that the rumors concerning the Between December 22-31, 1989, 942 so-called terrorists were started and circu- people died. It is obvious that such a large lated by groups of diversionists, yet there is number of deaths could not have been no mention as to whom these were affi- caused by tactical errors, ricocheting bullets, liated. The rumors were meant to generate etc., although such incidents did occur. The Ruxandra Cesereanu 326 fact that some of the led indeed to his death and later on his family people who were killed found him at the city morgue under a John starting from 22nd De- Doe identity, although his identity was defi- cember had been shot in the head, clearly nitely known because he had a hospitaliza- indicates that the shots had been fired by tion certificate on his chest, written in inde- snipers who were under specific orders. lible ink and reading: terrorist. (Tatulici There occurred indeed major tactical errors 1990: 157-162) as well, among which counts the incident at the Otopeni airport, when 49 people died, of Bibliography whom 34 were national servicemen who had not been trained for combat. Therefore, the *** Însemnări din zilele revoluţiei. victims could not have been terrorists, coun- Decembrie 1989, Editura Militară, Bucu- ter-revolutionaries or diversionists. There reşti, 1990 were probably many other similar situations; *** Întrebări cu şi fără răspuns. De- however, the death of the 942 people be- cembrie 1989 (volum îngrijit de Iosif Cos- tween December 22-31 cannot be blamed tinaş), Memorialul Revoluţiei. Centrul Na- solely on the accidents and the chaos of the ţional de Documentare, Cercetare, Informa- Revolution, on tactical errors, etc. It is sig- re Publică despre Revoluţia din Decembrie nificant to note that in some instances the 1989, Editura Mirton, 2001 identity of the so-called terrorists has indeed *** Procesul Ceauşeştilor, 25 de- been proven to have been confected, yet the cembrie 1989. Stenograma integrală şi ca- identity of those who confected it remains seta video originală, Editura Excelsior C.A., uncertain. We have already mentioned the Bucureşti, 1991 case of several officers who died in the *** Raportul Serviciului Român de Revolution as a result of the tactical errors Informaţii despre evenimentele din decem- committed: their bodies were used afterwards brie 1989, ediţia electronică to support the terrorist diversion, as some of *** Revoluţia română văzută de zia- these bodies bore notices with the word rişti americani şi englezi, Free Romania Fund. terrorist written on them. The corpses were şi Editura Evenimentul, Bucureşti, 1991 left in the street where they were abused and *** Timişoara 16-22 decembrie 1989, mutilated. In some instances, the victims were Editura Facla, Timişoara, 1990 USLA members who had been called to sup- *** Vom muri şi vom fi liberi, Edi- port the Revolution only to be murdered ei- tura Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1990 ther by mistake or intentionally, whereas in Arachelian, Vartan, În faţa dumnea- other instances they were revolutionaries voastră. Revoluţia şi personajele sale (cu- whose identities remained unknown for a vânt înainte de Florin Constantiniu), Editura while. Cristian Lupu was a revolutionary Nemira, Bucureşti, 1998 who, according to eyewitnesses, had fought Ardeleanu, Tana; Savaliuc, Răzvan; to protect the Romanian Television head- Baiu, Ion, Procesul Ceauşescu, Editura Ziua quarters. After being lightly wounded and – Omega Press Investment, Bucureşti, 1996 taken to hospital, he was turned into a ter- Brateş, Teodor, Explozia unei clipe. rorist for reasons which are yet to be dis- 22 decembrie 1989. O zi în studioul 4, Edi- covered; while in hospital, he failed to re- tura Scripta, Bucureşti, 1992 ceive medical care on grounds of being a Brucan, Silviu, Generaţia irosită. suspected terrorist, which meant it was all Memorii, Editurile Univers şi Calistrat Hogaş, right to be left to die. Lack of medical care Bucureşti, 1992 The Romanian Anticommunist Revolution and the “Terrorists” 327 Castex, Michel, Un mensonge gros Oprea, Marian, comme le siècle. Roumanie, histoire d’une Conspiraţia Securităţii, manipulation, Albin Michel, Paris, 1990 Editura Lumea Maga- Cernăianu, Călin, Diplomaţia lupilor. zin, Bucureşti, 2004 Erată la literatura aplicaţiei tactice din de- Orescu, Şerban, Ceauşismul. Româ- cembrie 1989, Editura Nemira, Bucureşti, nia între anii 1965 şi 1989, Editura Alba- 1997 tros, Bucureşti, 2006 Codrescu, Costache (coord.), Armata Portocală, Radu, România – autopsia română în revoluţia din decembrie 1989. unei lovituri de stat – în ţara în care a tri- Studiu documentar preliminar, Institutul de umfat minciuna (traducere de Ioana Canta- istorie şi teorie militară, Bucureşti, 1994 cuzino), Agora Timişoreană şi Editura Con- Cornea, Doina, Faţa nevăzută a lu- tinent, 1991 crurilor (1990-1999). Dialoguri cu Rodica Raiha, Valentin, În decembrie ’89, Palade, , Cluj-Napoca, 1999 KGB a aruncat în aer România cu com- Coruţ, Pavel, Fulgerul albastru, Edi- plicitatea unui grup de militari, Editura tura Miracol, Bucureşti, 1993 Ziua – Omega Press Investment, Bucureşti, Cristoiu, Ion, De la o lovitură de stat 1995 la alta. Eseuri, note, documente, Editura Saucă, Alexandru, KGB-ul şi revo- Historia, Bucureşti, 2006 luţia română. Intensificarea ofensivei for- Deletant, Dennis, România sub regi- ţelor antiromâneşti, Editura Miracol, Bucu- mul comunist (traducere de Delia Răzdo- reşti, 1994 lescu), Fundaţia Academia Civică, Bucu- Sava, Constantin; Monac, Constan- reşti, 1997 tin, Revoluţia română din decembrie 1989 Domenico, Viorel, Ceauşescu la Târ- retrăită prin documente şi mărturii, Editura govişte, 22-25 decembrie 1989 (cuvânt înainte Axioma Edit, Bucureşti, 2001 de Florin Constantiniu, postfaţă de Ion Cris- Săndulescu, Şerban, Decembrie ’89. toiu), Editura Ion Cristoiu, Bucureşti, 1999 Lovitura de stat a confiscat Revoluţia Ro- Filip, Teodor, Secretele USLA, Edi- mână (ed. a II-a), Editura Ziua-Omega Press tura Obiectiv, , 1999 Investment, Bucureşti, 1997 Frunză, Victor, Revoluţia împuşcată Siani-Davies, Peter, Revoluţia Româ- sau PCR după 22 decembrie 1989, Editura nă din decembrie 1989, traducere de Cris- Victor Frunză, Bucureşti, 1994 tina Mac, Bucureşti, Editura Humanitas, Gabanyi, Anneli Ute, Revoluţia ne- 2006 terminată, Editura Fudaţiei Culturale Ro- Stoenescu, Alex Mihai, Interviuri des- mâne, Bucureşti, 1999 pre Revoluţie, Editura Rao, Bucureşti, 2004 Guşă de Drăgan, Daniela Veronica, Stoenescu, Alex Mihai, Istoria lovi- Condamnat la adevăr. Generalul Ştefan Gu- turilor de stat din România. Revoluţia din şă, Editura Rao, Bucureşti, 2006 decembrie 1989 – o tragedie românească, Loupan, Victor, La Révolution n’a Editura Rao, Bucureşti, vol. 4 (I), 2004, vol. pas eu lieu... Roumanie : l’histoire d’un coup 4 (II), 2005 d’État, Robert Laffont, Paris, 1990 Tatulici, Mihai (coord.), Revoluţia Lucescu, Constantin, Procesul Ceau- Română în direct, Televiziunea Română, şescu. Soluţie justiţiară a unui moment is- Bucureşti, 1990 toric, Editura Sylvi, Bucureşti, 1997 Ursu-Gheorghiu, Mihai, Cine l-a îm- Nicolaescu, Sergiu, Lupta pentru Pute- puşcat pe Ceauşescu?, Editura Plumb, Ba- re. Decembrie '89, Editura All, Bucureşti, 2005 cău, 1994 Ruxandra Cesereanu 328 Vălenaş, Liviu, „Lovitu- ra de palat din Româ- 8 In December ’89, KGB Blew Up Romania nia”, in Baricada, no. with the Complicity of a Group of Militaries 22, 26, 28-30, 37 1990 (n.t.) 9 The Barricade (n.t.) 10 Ceauşescu’s regime (n.t.) 11 The Revolution Never Happened (n.t.) Notes 12 The Diplomacy of Wolves… (n.t.) 13 Romania under the Comunist Regime 1 Timişoara 16-22 decembrie 1989 (n.t.) (n.t.) 2 The Lost Generation… (n.t.) 14 Ceauşescu and the Securitate (n.t.) 3 The Romanian Army in the Revolution of 15 From One Coup d’Etat to Another (n.t.) December 1989 (n.t.) 16 The Romanian Revolution Through the 4 The Conspiracy of the Securitate (n.t.) Eyes of English and American Journalists 5 Death Spies from under the Epaulets. Si- (n.t.) biu ‘89 (n.t.) 17 The Revolution and Its Characters (n.t.) 6 The Secrets of the USLA troops (n.t.) 18 The History of Coups d’Etat. The Revo- 7 The Unfinished Revolution (n.t.) lution of December 1989 – A Romanian Tragedy (n.t.)