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A Federal Human Rights Act – What Implications for the States and Territories?

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A Federal Human Rights Act – What Implications for the States and Territories? 110 UNSW Law Journal Volume 33(1) A FEDERAL HUMAN RIGHTS ACT – WHAT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STATES AND TERRITORIES? JUSTIN GLEESON SC I INTRODUCTION This paper examines whether a federal Human Rights Act (‘HRA’), as recommended by the National Human Rights Consultation Committee (‘NHRCC’) in its Report, 1 would be likely to impact upon the exercise of legislative, executive or judicial power at the state level. Ostensibly, it should not, to any significant degree. While the NHRCC recommended that any federal HRA protect the rights of all people in Australia and all people who are overseas but subject to Australian jurisdiction, 2 it also made the following limiting recommendation: The Committee recommends that any federal Human Rights Act protect the rights of human beings only and that the obligation to act in accordance with those rights be imposed only on federal public authorities – including federal ministers, federal officials, entities established by federal law and performing public functions, and other entities performing public functions under federal law or on behalf of another federal public authority. 3 The reason which the NHRCC gave for this recommendation was that it would be ‘counter-productive and unwise’ to have federal Parliament impose on the states and territories a catalogue of human rights and a process for determining the regular limitation of those rights.4 The NHRCC contemplated that different jurisdictions might experiment with different laws and policies; and that over time, different human rights outcomes may emerge between different states or territories and indeed the Commonwealth. 5 Thus, the expressed intention of the NHRCC is that states and territories will be left to pursue their own approaches to human rights protection, both in deciding whether to have a HRA, and as to what rights and methods of protection Barrister, New South Wales Bar. 1 National Human Rights Consultation Committee, National Human Rights Consultation Report (2009) (‘Report’). 2 Ibid xxxv (Recommendation 21). 3 Ibid xxxiv (Recommendation 20). 4 Ibid 364. 5 Ibid 363. 2010 A Federal Human Rights Act – What Implications for the States and Territories? 111 would be reflected in any such Act. Whether a uniform, nationwide approach to rights protection will emerge, or what shape it might take, would be for future governments and peoples to decide. Proponents of strong rights protection will be disappointed with the modesty of the NHRCC’s approach. They would prefer that federal Parliament seized the initiative for the nation, legislated for all the rights found in covenants such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ,6 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 7 and Universal Declaration of Human Rights 8 and then allowed for section 109 of the Constitution to do its work invalidating any (and probably many) inconsistent state laws. However, the limiting approach of the NHRCC can be justified on four, mutually reinforcing grounds. Firstly, it is underpinned by a firm sense of realism: if overall there are sufficient perceived net benefits to strive for the introduction of a federal HRA, Australian political history strongly suggests that to seek to impose it formally and legally at the outset on the states is likely to provoke sufficient public opposition to scare off federal Parliament from any measure at all. Sections 10.2–10.4 of the Report contain a useful summary of the failed history of federal attempts to introduce rights protection, either by referendum or statue, which would have impacted directly and squarely on state power. 9 Particularly pertinent are each of the failed 1973 Murphy Bill, 1983 Evans Bill and 1985 Bowen Bill. Each Bill, to varying extents, sought to apply internationally recognised rights in a way directly binding the states; each provoked sustained opposition on this (as well as other) grounds and failed in the political process. 10 In an ideal world, a better solution might be the ‘entrenched but non- constitutional’ model recommended by Anne Twomey, where the federal and all state Parliaments would legislate a uniform, national set of rights protections. 11 Twomey’s argument draws strength at the theoretical level from the earlier analysis by Cheryl Saunders that, within a federation, the principle of equality between polities and the importance of consent suggest that matters such as rights protection, which lie at the heart of arrangements for the governance of the federation, ought to be dealt with on a national uniform standard. Indeed, Saunders went further and urged that the Constitution should be amended to protect human rights on the national level. 12 However, achieving rights protection by an amendment to the Constitution as suggested by Saunders was beyond the terms of reference of the NHRCC. 13 The political judgement of the NHRCC was 6 Opened for signature 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976). 7 Opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976). 8 GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3 rd sess, 183 rd plen mtg, UN Doc A/Res/217A (10 December 1948). 9 National Human Rights Consultation Committee, above n 1, 230–7. 10 For further review of the history of previous rights proposals, see Cheryl Saunders, ‘Protecting Rights in the Australian Federation’ (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 177, 183–93. 11 Anne Twomey, Submission to the National Human Rights Consultation Committee, National Human Rights Consultation , 5 May 2009, 20–1. 12 Saunders, above n 10, 209–10. 13 National Human Rights Consultation Committee, above n 1, 383. 112 UNSW Law Journal Volume 33(1) that in relation to a non-constitutional model, the practical prospect of achieving unanimity across Australian Parliaments in the short to medium term is low. As is now apparent from the federal government’s response to the NHRC Report issued on 21 April 2010, 14 not even the pragmatism of the NHRCC has been sufficient to induce the government to progress a federal HRA at this time. Thus the issues discussed in this paper will await a future government’s enhanced bravery and ambition in the statutory protection of rights. Secondly, at a more theoretical level, defenders of a strong, functioning, evenly balanced federal system may be pleased with the NHRCC’s approach. It expressly resists the ‘opportunistic federalism’ often criticised in the United States (‘US’) where the national government cherry picks issues of state jurisdiction for political or ideological reasons without a systematic good government rationale. 15 Further, by recognising that the states have a legitimate role to play in determining human rights outcomes, as opposed to a single decision being made by the national representatives of all of the people, the NHRCC’s proposal respects the conception of the federation as involving a true balance of both federal and national elements, as appealed to many of the significant founding fathers. 16 It is also consistent with the view strongly expressed by Brian Galligan and others in 1990 that the federal Labor’s then failed attempts to nationalise standards for the protection of rights bespoke an unwise preference for centralism and a failure to allow the dynamic benefits from differential state experimentation on key issues of public policy, sometimes referred to as ‘competitive federalism’. Indeed, when complaint is often forcefully made of the lack of a clear conception in the constitution of federal values, leading to suggestions for a need for reform by (difficult to achieve) referenda, 17 modest restraint by the federal Parliament in not legislating to the full reach of its powers so as to bind the states would seem commendable. It is consistent with the practical, small steps agenda for revitalising federalism recently urged by Galligan. 18 Thirdly, the NHRCC’s proposal to limit the reach of the federal HRA coheres with its other recommendation for a dialogue model.19 Once the position at the national level is that incompatibility between a law and a protected right invites ‘dialogue’ between the Parliament and the courts but does not invalidate the law, 14 Australian Government, Australia’s Human Rights Framework (2010); Robert McClelland, ‘Launch of Australia’s Human Rights Framework’ (Speech delivered at the National Press Club of Australia, Canberra, 21 April 2010). 15 See Tim Conlan, ‘From Cooperative to Opportunistic Federalism: Reflections on the Half-Century Anniversary of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations’ (2006) 66 Public Administration Review 663. 16 See Nicholas Aroney, ‘Imagining a Federal Commonwealth: Australian Conceptions of Federalism, 1890–1901’ (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 265. 17 See, eg, Andrew Lynch and George Williams, ‘Beyond a Federal Structure: Is a Constitutional Commitment to a Federal Relationship Possible?’ (2008) 31 University of New South Wales Law Journal 395, 423–4; Anne Twomey, ‘Reforming Australia’s Federal System’ (2008) 36 Federal Law Review 57. 18 Brian Galligan, ‘Processes for Reforming Australian Federalism’ (2008) 31 University of New South Wales Law Journal 617. 19 National Human Rights Consultation Committee, above n 1, xxxiv (Recommendation 19). 2010 A Federal Human Rights Act – What Implications for the States and Territories? 113 it is difficult to justify why the consequences for an inconsistent state law should be more draconian for the inconsistent federal law: section 109 will render the inconsistent state law inoperable whereas the inconsistent federal law remains valid but subject to ‘dialogue’. 20 Fourthly, even in Canada and the US where statutory rights protection is far better (and longer) entrenched than in Australia, and federal protection extends in varying measures to bind the states, that position has been reached only after a sustained history of interaction between federal and state based instruments. 21 This history suggests that a cautious first step may over time result in a larger, more effective outcome. This paper makes the assumption that a federal government in the future returns to the recommendations of the NHRCC and takes up its proposals, but with the restraint reflected in Recommendation 20.
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