Dr. Fred Ikle, Director, US Arms Control And

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. II FIRinG Line , Guest: Dr. Fred Ikle, director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Subject: "WHERE ARE WE HEADED WITH DISARMAMENT?"

SOUTHERN EDUCATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIA TlON \/ <. 1 /'/~/.\/ \ i\ ® FIRinG Line

HOST: William F. Buckley, Jr. Guest: Dr. Fred Ikle, director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Subject: "WHERE ARE WE HEADED WITH DISARMAMENT?" The FIRING LINE television series is a production of the Southern Educational Panelists: Sam Roberts, New York DaiZy News Communications Association, 928 Woodrow St., P.O. Box 5966, Columbia, S.C., Suzannah Lessard, The New Yorker 29250 and is transmitted through the facilities of the Public Broadcasting Service. Production of these programs is made possible through a grant from the Michael Kramer, New York Maaazine Corporation for Public Broadcasting. FIRING LINE can be seen and heard each FIRING LINE is produced and directed by WARREN STEIBEL week through public television and radio stations throughout the country. Check your local newspapers for channel and time in your area. This is a transcript of a FIRING LINE program taped in New York City on Aug. 6, 1975, and originally telecast on PBS on Sept. 6, 1975. sou I HE: RN f. [)lJC/\ T IONAL COMI\'ilJNIC/\ liONS /\SSOC!/\ I !ON

© Board of Trustees of the land Stanford Jr. University. MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Ikle is the director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as such is in charge of developing the strategy of secure disarmament. Recently he has been· beset by many problems. For one, the charge that the Soviet Union has been systematically cheating in observ ing the terms of SALT I. That agreement, you will recall, was in two parts. The first, which became a formal treaty, limited us to two sites which we might protect through the use of antiballistic missiles; in effect, we gave up ABMs. The second was an interim agreement governing permissible expansion of nuclear facilities and hardware pending SALT II. Last winter in Vladivostok, meeting with Brezhnev, President Ford initialed an understanding which serves as the guidelines to SALT II. . Second, Mr. Ikle has seen with dismay a recent sale by West Germany of huge nuclear plants to Brazil of a kind that could easily lend themselves to the development of an atom bomb. There, conceivably, would go our anti proliferation treaty. And third, Mr. Ikle sits in dumb fear lest, prodded by the glories of a Pulitzer Prize, some ingenious American reporter or columnist should undertake to reveal the secret devices by which we keep our infrared eyes on the activi ties of the Soviet Union. He wants Congress, please, to pass a law. that would ensure that such reporters admire their Pulitzer Prizes in jail. Mr. Ikle is the author of three books including How Nations Negotiate and Every War Must End. Mr. Ikle was born and raised in Switzerland, coming to this country in 1946. He attended the University of Chicago where he got an MA and subsequently a Ph.D. in sociology. In due course he became head of the social sciences division of the Rand Corporation, a research group oriented toward modern weaponry. Meanwhile he had taught at the Harvard Center for International Affiars and as professor of political science at MIT. He was named as head of the disarmament agency by President Nixon in April of 1973. I should like to begin by asking Mr. Ikle: Why would a country like, say, Japan consent to do without its own nuclear weapons system? MR. IKLE: The main reason is that they feel protected by our security guaran ©-1975 SOUTHERN EDUCATIONAL tee. That's a very important reason for a number of countries which have the COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION potential for developing nuclear weapons--Germany, of course. And it's an important reason we have to remember as we reconsider to what extent we can live up to our overseas commitments. We can't have it both ways: sort of pull back from these commitments and expect to have some influence against the spread of the bomb. MR. BUCKLEY: Well, is it reasonable to suppose that a number of Japanese, surveying our withdrawal from Indochina and our apparent indifference to events in Portugal, might feel that any reliance on the United States has be come surreal? MR. IKLE: We were concerned that as a result of the events in Indochina the opposition to the current policy in Japan--that is to say of not developing their own nuclear weapons--would be strengthened. This has not seemed to be the development so far. There seem to be rather few voices in Japan arguing for developing their own bombs. They, of course, also realize that in order really to have an effective deterrent force to prevent nuclear attack, you have to get into a very massive undertaking, as we ourselves experienced. It's one thing to have a few bombs; it's another thing to have a force that can deter massive nuclear attack. MR. BUCKLEY: Well, it's also true, though, that a relatively light system could serve a defensive purpose, correct? MR. IKLE: Not against a strong opponent such as the Soviet Union. It's very hard to have forces that could survive a first strike. This is our constant worry: that our forces should be sufficient to survive a surprise attack. For a smaller country beginning at the beginning like, say hypothetically, Japan, this would b~ a very difficult undertaking. It's a very difficult undertaking for France, for China. MR. BUCKLEY: But isn't the limitation on the ABM system to which the Soviet

© Board of Trustees of the L land Stanford Jr. University. alternative to a desperate search for secur)ty by getting their own nuclear Union and we have subscribed an invitation to what they used to call nth power bombs. And at this juncture, with many questions being raised about what countries to use atomic or hydrogen missiles in such a way as substantially to commitments our foreign policy should support, we must face this fact square threaten these major countries? Is it inconceivable that Japan might say, ly. The alliances protecting most of these potential nuclear countries and "We grant that you have the technology to pulverize our entire population, which make them willing to forego nuclear weapons would not survive without but rather than give in to you on this particular point concerning which there continuing American support," you yourself are, in effect, saying that those is a conflict we will expend our half-dozen bombs and account for the loss of are the alternatives: reliance on America and her network of treaties or a 20 million Russians even if this results in the loss of 100 million Japanese"? "desperate search" for their own nuclear bombs. If that is the dichotomy, MR. IKLE: This surrealistic notion regarding a democratic country with a then it seems to me that sensible statesmen abroad would begin their desperate parliamentarian system such as Japan-- It may be a real concern; I think it search for nuclear bombs. should be a real concern for us regarding some group, perhaps some country, MR. IKLE: They might want to hedge their bets, but so far I think we have some leadership that doesn't care about what happens to their people after managed to uphold our principal alliances: the security treaty with Japan they attacked a powerful nation such as the Soviet Union or the United States. and our commitment to NATO. And indeed just this-- And hence we really have this-- We are deeply troubled about the spread of MR. BUCKLEY: Japan hasn't been threatened. the bomb to more and more countries, to more and more places where this des MR. IKLE: But as far as our defensive commitment is concerned, we have been tructive potential might be controlled, induced in this fashion with no re upholding this, and indeed this last spring Congress has shown that it wants gard for what happens after. to maintain its commitment to our NATO alliance. MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, but there's-- This disposition is not to be, in my judg MR. BUCKLEY: Well, according to Admiral Zumwalt, we couldn't uphold our NATO ment, entirely contemned, it seems to me. I.e., the notion that you will use commitment if we wanted to now because of the impoverishment of our military. the entire resources of the nation in order to protect even the independence If we were actually to undertake to protect Turkey, say, or Greece from a of a small part of your territory or the physical safety for a few of your northern invasion, we simply wouldn't have the muscle to do it-- citizens has a rather ethically aristocratic lineage, it seems to me, so that MR. IKLE: Yes. one doesn't automatically say, "Well, the"-- A truly well-balanced statesman MR. BUCKLEY: --unless we threatened nuclear obliteration of the Soviet Union, is goi ng to say, "Let me see now. If we use our bombs to protect 5000 Japanese which you and I know off the record we wouldn't do. from being slaughtered by the Soviet Union, we can kill 10 million Russians MR. IKLE: There's a question of how much is enough in our conventional capa but then they'll turn around and kill 50 million Japs. No, the arithmetic bilities. doesn't work." Things don't necessarily happen that way, do they? MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. MR. IKLE: I know what you mean. This is the idea of Finland in 1939- MR. IKLE: And the reason, as you say, we want to maintain the conventional MR. BUCKLEY: Sure. capabilities is that we do not have to threaten for any type of attack the MR. IKLE: --fighting against tremendous odds. first use of nuclear weapons. MR. BUCKLEY: Or even Israel today. MR. BUCKLEY: Correct. Correct. Which was the whole exercise in a graduated MR. IKLE: Or Israel today. But what this notion leaves out here is if the response during the Fifties-- superior power, let's say the Soviet Union, knows that it may be attacked by MR. IKLE: Right. nuclear weapons by such a small country-- MR. BUCKLEY: --and Sixties especially. But we failed, didn't we? That is MR. BUCKLEY: It'll preempt. to say, we proved in the Sixties that the American temper is not capable of MR. IKLE: --it can strike first and take away all th~ nuclear weapons of that a graduated response. It's nothing or everything. In between we lose interest country and at the same time destroy it. This is the concern about the dif and we start rallying and start finding immorality in our actions and the rest ference between the first and second strike and the difficulty for a small of it. country of preserving its last resort weapon in such a way that it's really MR. IKLE: We succeeded in maintaining a limited response, a successful one, there when it needs it. in the Korean war when we had almost a monopoly in nuclear arms. And we have MR. BUCKLEY: Well, stop me if I'm asking you to tell me a secret, but we've since helped maintain the independence of South Korea. all been led to confide in the survival of our submarine fleet. So in the MR. BUCKLEY: Well, the success of the whole Korean enterprise really depends last analysis, if you've got four bombs or six bombs, all you need is one on what you imagine the mandate to have been. You will remember that the submarine, and it's impervious to that kind of preemptive strike, isn't it? United Nations authorized the reunification of Korea, and those were the orders MR. IKLE: If you are a big power that can run a submarine fleet efficiently. given to MacArthur in the fall of 1950. We certainly didn't manage the re MR. BUCKLEY: Well, the Japanese did pretty well with their submarine fleet unification of Korea. We retreated under the brunt of Chinese manpower and very recently. settled for a factitious line which continues to be a threat to the peace of MR. IKLE: Potentially, a country of an industrial capability and technologi the world. Still, I do think though that the impulses in this country 20 years cal capability such as Japan could probably develop an invulnerable deterrent ago are different from the impulses now. Now, it seems to me, we suffer so force. All I meant to say is not that it's not possible but that it's a rather much an erosion in faith in ourselves that the notion that we should protect major step requiring major investments over many years. ourselves by the threat of the use of force strikes many people as offensive. MR. BUCKLEY: But don't you think that modern countries as vulnerable as Japan Do you find that? can reasonably be expected to take major steps to guarantee their own security MR. IKLE: Well, there is some of that tendency, a lack of putting' courage given the apparent fragility of American alliances. I'm trying to think of an behind our convictio·ns, and a lack of following up with the necessary effort, alliance of ours on which I would bet my swimming pool, let alone my son's life. indeed. But, on the other hand, there are the encouraging signs of the will I can't think of one. Certainly not SEATO. When last heard from NATO was ingness of the people and of Congress to build up the conventional defenses .disintegrated in the East and meaningless in the Far West. All of our partners in NATO, to strengthen it. We have strengthened our forces over there since there are behind in their commitments. There's certainly no OAS alliance that they had a certain lull as a result of the draining down during the peak of seems to mean anything. So when you write--as you did, I thought, very cogent the Vietnam conflict. 1y--"For many nations, protection through a stable alliance is now the only

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© Board of Trustees of the L land Stanford Jr. University. i~ C~ngress MR. BUCKLEY: And the Israeli thing. in this country, about these international safeguards. Six MR. IKLE: And that has led to a temporary draining of equipment. We have mllllon dollars a year goes into it--$6 million to $9 million. improved our strategic doctrine to back up this commitment to NATO, put in a MR. BUCKLEY: And presumably any country that wanted to-- broader spectrum of deterrents as a result of the more flexible strategic MR. IKLE: For the whole world. doctrine which we have moved into over the last two years. MR. BUCKLEY: --could simply exclude it, couldn't it? MR. BUCKLEY: Well, what would a country like Brazil do with an atom bomb? MR. IKLE: Well, that's the second question. The first is: How large is the MR. IKLE: Well, one thing an atom bomb in an area where there aren't any will effort? It's a small effort. It's a well-functioning effort so far with good do is to start a program next door. dedicated people in Vienna, international civil servants here. But secondly, MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. of course, it's only an alarm system; it only monitors. It tells you when MR. IKLE:, And thus, in many instances, a country may merely become large and something was diverted. It can't stop it; there's no international power strong and conventionally superior. India comes to mind. But if there's a here. MR. BUCKLEY: Right. Right. Right. nuclear rivalry developing with the neighbors next door, actually that con MR. IKLE: It's clear. ventional superiority may be lost, so their security may go downhill for a MR. BUCKLEY: Right. Speaking of monitoring, it was, I think, back in October while-- MR. BUCKLEY: That's right. That's right. Yes. that. my brother, Senator Buckl ey, charged that the Soviet Uni on was 'cheati ng MR. IKLE: --for that kind of a country. and lt was roundly poopooed. Then in January the former Secretary of Defense MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. In that sense it becomes irrelevant, doesn't it. So it's Melvin Laird said in fact it was true. And a month or two later Admiral Zumwa~t i~ a status symbol-- charged that was true. Now, let me ask you this as a preliminary MR. IKLE: Right. Well, then of course you have the very destabilizing questlon: Are there Clrcumstances under which even if it were true you would effect we discussed before of these nuclear bombs, if they are meant for feel constrained before this audience to say it wasn't? military purposes, being most likely vulnerable. So the smaller country with MR. IKLE: ~here might be a circumstance in that we're preparing a position, its nuclear weapons could take away the nuclear armament of the larger country an explanatlon to Congress, and we're just putting it together--a full, rich possibly. story--and we may want to give it next week and I may not want to give it to MR. BUCKLEY: Well, so you think that in the case of Brazil-- Of course, we you today. don't want to charge Brazil with attempting to build a nuclear bomb, because MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. In which case would you say, "No comment," or would you we haven't any such evidence now. All we know is that-- say, "It's not true"? MR. IKLE: Right. They have stated they do not plan to do it. Right. MR. IKLE: I would say, "We're,putting a full explanation of this together and MR. BUCKLEY: That's right. But we know that they have the reprocessing plants I'd rather not"-- and the uranium enrichment facilities to do that if they want to. MR. BUCKLEY: Discuss it. MR. IKLE: They may acquire these from West Germany. Right. MR. IKLE: --"discuss it prior to that." MR. BUCKLEY: And has West Germany-- Have you negotiated with West Germany to MR. BUCKLEY: Okay. Now, I ask you the question formally. Are they cheating? try to prevent them from selling them? MR. IKLE: There has been no violation to our knowledge of the agreed text of MR. IKLE: We've talked to officials; I myself talked to senior German offi the SALT agreements, the interim agreement and the ballistic missile treaty. cials. We have talked on a technical level; we have talked to them on all There have been bigger ambiguities which were matters of serious concern. levels and conveyed our concerns and made our suggestions. And Senator Buckley and Melvin Laird and others have been drawing attention MR. BUCKLEY: And were you receptively received? to these areas where there were activities which we do not like which we did MR. IKLE: Well, our recommendations weren't fully accepted. We deal here not like or do not like to the extent that they are continuing.' with a friendly but sovereign country-- MR. BUCKLEY: Well, now, let's take, for instance, the question of what one deduces from the size of a silo. In SALT I, as I understand it there was a MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. cert~in MR. IKLE: --but in the last analysis, Germany had to make her own decisions. prohibition against the magnification of the weapon beyond physical But I think we conveyed what we were troubled about; namely, not the sale of ter~s. And ~ou all--I say you all; it was 'Jerry Smith then--came up w'ith a reactors. There've been some wrong charges that these were commercial reasons. notlon that lt shouldn't go beyond 70 cubic meters. And the Soviet Union said It wasn't that. It was the fact that two new pieces of equipment went in they wouldn't accept that, but they more or less agreed that maybe 10 to 15 there. One, the facil i ty for reprocessi ng plutoni um--whi ch is one route to per~ent.w~uld constitute the marginal increase beyond which a violation could make weapons; the other, the uranium enrichment facility--which is another be Justlflably alleged. And then our people said, "Well, let's stretch that route for making weapons. Now, both of these in the long run can also legiti and say 30 percent maximum." That was what Laird said. Now it is alleged mately fit into a peaceful nuclear fuel economy, but only in the long run. that our photographs establish that some of those have increased by 50 percent. MR. BUCKLEY: And you are engaged, if I understand one of your speeches, in Do you call that an ambiguity or a violation? attempting to devise a commission of sorts whose responsibility would be to MR. IKLE: This is a rich and detailed area and will take us a little while monitor these activities and to alert the community to any misuse of these to walk through it. I'll try not to take too much time. facilities. MR. BUCKLEY: I'm very interested. MR. ~KLE: Well, we now have an international organization, the International MR. fKLE: Right. We tried throughout the SALT I negotiations to pin the Atomlc Energy Agency which is located in Vienna, monitoring practically all Russians down to a limitation of the volume of the missile as a measure to these reactors except in a few countries that do not permit this monitoring, co~trol, to preven~ the competition in making evermore powerful missiles. and whenever we sell or when the Germans sell or the French sell a reactor ThlS would be a falrly good measure. Actually we can now think of better ,or one.of these facilities, they are put under these international safeguards. measures to control the destructi ve power of mi ssiles. The word "throw-wei ght" But, mlnd you, this is a small organization. refers to that. MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. MR. BUCKLEY: Because of the miniaturization of the-- MR. IKLE: You couldn't guess its budget even. And we talk about it so much MR. IKLE: Even the volume in itself-- Within a particular volume, by changing

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© Board of Trustees of the L land Stanford Jr. University. fuels and doing other things, you can increase the destructive power of the there, guidance equipment, how much that weighs. And then lastly how efficient missile. But at least the volume is a certain weight. the nuclear warheads are in these missile tips. MR. BUCKLEY: You can keep the volume static, yes. MR. BUCKLEY: Okay. But now everybody seems to agree that on the one hand MR. IKLE: But the Russians-- One of the difficulties of negotiating with Congress has enjoined the President--I guess we'd better make clear that, the Russians is that they don't want to be pinned down to specifics. It's Congress having no formal authority here, an enjoinment is really a resolution utterly frustrating. You spend a long time and you constantly have something of what they desire--in one of the various Jackson amendments to maintain ambiguous. So we didn't succeed in that. However, we did get a limitation equivalence or parity. Now the parity that the President brought back from on the silos containing the missiles. But we did there, too, not get the Vladivostok would appear to be a highly superficial parity. It says both limitation that the silo should not be en1arged--and there're two categories sides will have 2400 of these big, big deals and you can split them up any of heavy and light missi1es--that the light missiles shouldn't have their way you want between submarines and land-based things and only 1320 of those silos enlarged. We did not succeed in that. can be MIRVed. Now, this was hailed by Mr. Ford and by many others as a very MR. BUCKLEY: You mean in the SALT I agreement? significant achievement. But as people sat down to analyze it, they recog MR. IKLE: The SALT I agreement. We succeeded in that there should be no nized that even within the constraints of Vladivostok, we were walking into s~gnificant increase. And that of course didn't please us. The word "signifi a situation in which within a very few years the Soviet Union's throw-weight cant" is a rubber term, so we tried to pin that down further and that's where and mega tonnage could exceed our own by anywhere from three to six times. Is the 50 percent came in, 50 percent in the dimensions of the silo. Now, with this acknowledged by you? this certain increase of the silo size you can put in a missile that's bigger MR. IKLE: Let's separate two things here. in volume. But in addition you can do technological things within the missile MR. BUCKLEY: Okay. to make it much more powerful. And it's the second development which primarily MR. IKLE: The extent to which the Vladivostok ceilings constrain the arms has led to the more powerful Soviet missiles that are now replacing what are competition, prevent the Russians and us in response to what the Russians do, categorized in the SALT legal terminology as light missiles and which brings from moving ahead and adding more destructive power: That is one question. their destructive power very close toward the missiles which are categorized Is there a sufficient constraint? The other moral question you more directly as heavy missiles. meant: Are there inequalities in what they are limited to and what we are MR. BUCKLEY: Well, the-- limited to? I think there it's definitely fair to say that Vladivostok was MR. IKLE: And hence, for that reason, there's been no legal agreement between a breakthrough in that it reestablished the parity, the equality, in the us and the Russians thus limiting the missile destructive power. essential limitations. MR. BUCKLEY: Well, can an SS-16 fit into the same cavity that once held an MR. BUCKLEY: In the gross limitations. SS-8? MR. IKLE: In the essential limitations on this agreement there were perhaps MR. IKLE: Well, I think the designators here are a little mixed up, but only minor exceptions. And we have to distinguish here differences in capa there're-- And I'm not sure we want to go down this road because here for bilities between us and the Russians that emerge as the result of our volun classification reasons I may be not able to give you a fully detailed answer. tary programs. The Russians have a large air defense system. They've 10,000 But some of the more powerful missiles can fit into the silos ho1dinq missiles air defense missiles against aircraft. We have had thousands; we have further which were called light missiles, like our Minuteman -- reduced those. The Russians build bigger missiles, and they may build bigger MR. BUCKLEY: And you say any way that you could detect-- aircraft, but we are not constrained by the Vladivostok agreement in the size MR. IKLE: --without quantifying these silos beyond the agreed extension that of the missiles or the size of aircraft. was permitted. MR. BUCKLEY: So I think what you're saying is-- MR. BUCKLEY: And would you be able to detect that this was done? MR. IKLE: The constraints, the actual limitations are essentially equal on MR. IKLE: And that's where our national technical means of verification come both sides. And what each side will do under these constraints --there can be in. And the reason that you had all this discussion about new Soviet SS-18s, differences. Soviet SS-19s, 17s, is because we have a detection capability here. Right. MR. BUCKLEY: So what you're saying is, sure, it's true that the USSR's throw MR. BUCKLEY: So that you can in fact tell that this kind of thing is going on. weight vastly exceeds our own, but that's only because Congress doesn't do MR. IKLE: We try to follow very closely, of course, the developments of new anything about it. Right? Because if you wanted to we could simply power missiles, their increased destructive power, whether they are MIRVed--that is ours up to the level of the Soviet Union's and achieve parity in that way. to say, multiple warheads--and so forth. Is that what you're saying? MR. BUCKLEY: Well, this leads us to the matter of throw-weight. Would you, MR. IKLE: The first story's a bit richer there again. just for the convenience of our listeners, define throw-weight? Because I MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. know it's often confused with-- MR. IKLE: Given that we have limited, as we discussed a few minutes ago, the MR. IKLE: I'll not try to give a fully technical- expansion of the silos, and given that at least for certain of their missiles, MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. a subset of the Soviet missiles, they're starting out with larger silos. Po MR. IKLE: --detailed definition here. But in essence what we're talking here tentially they might put more destructive' power into those silos than we could about is a destructive weight that can be delivered on target as distinct from into our smaller silos to the extent that you look at that part of the forces the weight that may lift off a missi1e-- Or if you weigh a missile back in the that'is in the land-based silos because part of our force is in the submarines. factory, how much can this lifting power deliver on a distant target. But the more important question is really: Do we want to compete along this MR. BUCKLEY: What is the correlation if any between throw-weight and mega dimension? Do we want to add to this enormous destructive power? Or, if we're tonnage? driven, because of further Soviet efforts to respond, maybe we want to choose MR. IKLE: That again is a good question as the correlation isn't all that a different response. Why should we just add to the destructive power given , close. that we have so much? There may be other things we may go on to do: making MR. BUCKLEY: It depends on whether it's MIRVed? our forces less vulnerable or in some other areas. MR. IKLE: That's one factor and how much-- There's additional equipment MR. BUCKLEY: Well, what importance do you attach to throw-weight? Now, Paul

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© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr, University, Nitze says that it is "the most useful verifiable measure of relative missile it so comprehensively interpreted as to include, say, the defense of Berlin? capacity." Is that simplistic? Or at the margin would one have to detach Berlin as we detached Indochina and MR. IKLE: I think that's a fair statement. It's a gross measure for the de before that Poland and so on? structive potential of a missile of a given size. And if technology moves MR. IKLE: Well, we didn't have a commitment to Poland. We have a clear- along then, depending on how much throw-weight you have, you can put in addi MR. BUCKLEY: No. But we joined as an ally a ceuntry that did. tional warheads or more destructive power. But there are other important MR. IKLE: We have a clear political commitment to Berlin. Precisely how measures: accuracy is very important. And from our point of view, because militarily we could-- we want to prevent nuclear war--we do not want to fight one ever, we want to MR. BUCKLEY: Is this supposed to be part of your concern, though? prevent--invulnerability of our missiles or the relative vulnerability is MR. IKLE: --under strain and stress uphold that commitment is really more a very, very important. I, military question. But part of my concern would be what do we do about our MR. BUCKLEY: Well, are you satisfied as to the invulnerability of ours given commitments. One reason we discussed earlier: because, I said, we'll rave the mega tonnage of theirs? an impact on how the nuclear bomb might spread. But second, because it's an MR. IKLE: Over the long term--that is to say, over the next ten years, fifteen important national objective to maintain the overall thrust of our foreign years--I think we have to be concerned. We have to watch very carefully. For I, pol i cy. one, that part of our force--that is in the fixed silos on land--is likely to MR. BUCKLEY: Well, but suppose per impossibiZe your counterpart i·n the Soviet become increasingly vulnerable because of increases in accuracy on the Soviet Uni on were to appear tomorrow at your offi ce and say, "Tell you wha t, Comrade side. And that combined with the heavy weight could destroy these missiles Fred. We're willing to reduce all of our nuclear weapons by 90 percent if even if they are in hard facilities underground. Then we constantly have to you will reduce yours by 90 percent." Now, if in fact they did that, this watch that there should be no technological surprise regarding our submarines would certainly be congenial to the interest of American security narrowly so that they could survive. defined, but it would certainly make Europe an instant hostage to the Soviet MR. BUCKLEY: Well, is Congress voting as much money as it ought to to exercise Union in terms of its tactical weapons. What would be your theoretical reac due diligence in these matters, in R&D and so on? tion to this in terms of your mandate? One of exuberance? MR. IKLE: They're pretty much accepted with some differences, the proposals MR. IKLE: Well, the instant reaction here would be the question of how can the administration put forward to them in the strategic area. We must keep you verify this kind of reduction. in mind, however, that the Russians are spending more in strategic forces and MR. BUCKLEY: No, that's a technical question. That's a technical question. have so for the last ten years. MR. IKLE: Assuming that it was possible, we could get a verifiable reduction MR. BUCKLEY: Well, now if you talk about things like accuracy, you are talking to that extent to nuclear weapons-- about the attitude of the contending powers in terms of confrontation, right? MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. Paul Nitze gives us this rather interesting historical example. He said, MR. IKLE: --what would it do? It would bring us back to the arsenals we had "We have had really only two great crises in which there was any prospect of some 25 years ago or 20 years ago, 25 years ago perhaps, with the difference a nuclear confrontation. One was over Cuba in 1962 and one was over Berlin that-- two years earlier. Now, in the Cuban situation we had overwhelming strategic MR. BUCKLEY: But Europe was overrun. power and overwhelming tactical power. In the Berlin situation we had still MR. IKLE: --the Soviet Union would also have nuclear arsenals and in some overwhelming strategic power but the tactical power was that of the Soviet sense our security as well as the security of our allies was perhaps greater Union. The Soviet Union retreated in both cases." In his judgment, there is when there weren't these massive destructive arsenals confronting them. Now, nothing as our defenses are presently constituted that would cause the Soviet the details of such a massive reduction that you have hypothesized here, of Union to give in on a Berlin crisis today. Tactically, they're vastly superior course, would have to be carefully examined from the point of view of what and strategically they are superior. What does this imply in terms of the they would do to our alliance commitments. And that's your question. politics of Europe? MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. MR. IKLE: Well, we still have some things in which we are superior. That is MR. IKLE: That question we're now addressing in these talks which have been our economic potential, our technological strengths. Now that might take a stalemated for so long in Vienna, the mutual balanced force reduction talks. long time to mobilize. But I think one thing a potential aggressor has to be MR. BUCKLEY: Mutual balanced-- Yes. It used to be "balanced," but they concerned about is stirring us up. dropped that out at-- MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. It hasn't helped Warsaw much and presumably it wouldn't MR. IKLE: We maintained the "balanced." It's an interesting history, as an help Berlin if they decided to take over. aside, that we never agreed on maintaining that "balanced" is the official MR. IKLE: And the area immediately under attack could not be saved by the title. And the official title was much longer, about 15 words. It was much mobilization potential that is inherent in our capability and in our economic too long to be used by the newspapers or anybody so our term prevailed with strengths. But it is something that may deter an aggressor because it could the "balanced" in it.. So we won that point. hurt him a few years down the road if he mobilizes to that extent. And secondly, MR. BUCKLEY: You won that one, yes. Well, therefore your commission would be of course, we do have the conventional defenses in NATO. Even though they may limited in such a hypothetical exchange, and you would have to go to the be criticized as not being adequate, they are kept up to date and we try to do president and say, "Define for me what do you consider to be our surviving our best there. And we do have the nuclear deterrent against nuclear attack responsibilities to Western Europe before I can advise you technically about primarily. the desirability of a disarmament on that scale." Right? MR. BUCKLEY: Your commission, Mr. Ikl~, is to evolve, as I understand it, a MR. IKLE: In some sense, yes. I mean, we would start from what our commit doctrine of disarmament consistent with the realization of American objectives, ments as understood by the administration, by the president, by Congress, to right? maintaining a relationship in the political order in the world at large. And MR. IKLE: Yes. We view arms control and disarmament moves as a contribution then we would derive from that as to what military capability we must maintain. to our national security and-- All I'm saying is the conclusion may turn out that if it was verifiable to have MR. BUCKLEY: Yes. But is our national security permitted to comprehend-- Is such a strong reduction of nuclear weapons it may be very much in the interests

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© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. of this country, I would guess, and the interests of our allies, too. MR. BUCKLEY: General Brown, the chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff, and MR. IKLE: I don't have a full answer there. I can see a problem. If it's one or two other people have warned in the last two or three months against only the government official, then maybe the enforcement might be very diffi the "staggering new Soviet strategic nuclear programs." What in your judg cult. Again, I would defer it to people in the Department of Justice or in ment is the motivation of the Soviet Union at this particular juncture in other branches of the government more competent than I. mounting staggering new nuclear programs? MR. ROBERTS: Well, suppose you were a reporter and you discovered through MR. IKLE: Well, this is a matter of deep and abiding concern. There may be some official that a nuclear test had taken place in the Soviet Union and a mixture of motivations. There seems to be a very strong drive coming out for whatever reasons the fallout from that test might be jeopardizing some of the military establishment for acquiring more and more strategic nuclear area of the United States. And suppose that the United States Government did weaponry. With what aim? To have more political influence, just to acquire not want to disclose that fact for fear that it would then jeopardize the these instruments within their country and playa larger role within the extent of its own monitoring system, that the Russians would then know just country; or even a more calculated aim, the kind which would trouble us particu how carefully the Americans could monitor tests like that. Now maybe tnat's larly--namely, eventually to get to a point where they could use that nuclear a far-fetched example, but what would you do if you were a reporter in that power against us. We cannot be sure, but we have been following this with case? deep concern, a movement that started back in 1963-65 as we began to hold back MR. IKLE: Now you're handing me an example which is too easy for me to turn in our strategic program. around, because if there's a hazard to this country from the radioactivity MR. BUCKLEY: You can't-- there'd be a lot of information here in this country which that reporter then MR. IKLE: This, of course, is what we tried to come to grips with in SALT, could use freely. But there could be other instances, in fairness to your to see whether we can get an explicit agreement that nails these developments question, where there would be an agonizing choice for the reporter-- down. MR. ROBERTS: Well-- MR. BUCKLEY: Can you call it a military-industrial complex over there? MR. IKLE: --and since the reporters do serve an important function in our MR. I KL E: Oh, indeed. open society, maybe you want to have a different approach for them as to the MR. BUCKLEY: Or does it lack the capitalist motivation that seems to be the government official or former government official. necessary solvent for the use of that word here? MR. ROBERTS: Well, that's what I'm interested in, though. Do you think that MR. IKLE: Well, it's a different economic order, but they have a large claim it should be left as a matter of agonizing choice for the press or should on economic resources. And given the greater secrecy in the Soviet Union- there be some sort of legislated restraints against the press, whether it's where it's a very closed society--of course you don't have anywhere near the pre-publication restraints or whatever? kind of debate, nothing like it, that we have in Western democracies in the MR. IKLE: I really couldn't-- And I'm not trying to dodge the answer. But West or here. this gets into broader legal questions which I, you know, haven't fully MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Sam Roberts is the home editor of the New York DaiZy News. examined and my colleagues in the government, in the Justice Department and Mr. Roberts. other places, would be far more competent than I to draw a line. MR. ROBERTS: Dr. Ik1e, you've expressed a great deal of concern about the MR. ROBERTS: Well, do you have any personal inclinations on it? disclosure of information about United States capabilities in monitoring MR. IKLE: Well, I-- Look, it's my job here to identify the problem, the nuclear tests and nuclear proliferation around the world. Precisely how would need. That is to say, to protect our monitoring capability against irresponsi you balance First Amendment rights with national security in cases like that? ble disclosure which would destroy it. There-- MR. IKLE: What you want is a free and open discussion about the implications MR. BUCKLEY: Well, you agree there should be sanctions. I mean, you don't of our arms control policy, of our armaments policy. I've been myself arguing mind saying that? publicly that there should be more openness about what we're doing, about the MR. IKLE: There should be some sanctions and maybe with some rather limited implications of nuclear destructiveness which people no longer can follow be sanctions that may be sufficient to establish a code of ethics, which in the cause they're so remote and arcane. And I've been arguing myself for the con last analysis is what we have to rely on here--not on laws but a code of ethics tinuing open involvement by Congress and by the media. And then here you have both among the government officials and among the reporters. And this has to draw a line to protect what? To protect the monitoring capabilities which worked for a long time. We haven't really been constrained in the past by laws, we use to verify our arms control agreements, because in these vital areas we and we haven't had this problem. It only has occurred in the last few years cannot rely on trust. Why do we have to protect them? Because if you describe primarily. t~e capability exactly, you're sort of handing a blueprint to a potential MR. BUCKLEY: Miss Suzannah Lessard is with The New Yorker magazine. Yes, vlo1ator who can then figure out how to avoid it. I think a solution can be The New Yorker. found. Precisely how it's to be worded, that's up to our legislative branch. MS. LESSARD: I don't really understand this monitoring capability. That We do have legislation, for example, for the design of nuclear weapons which sounds to me like a potential, what we potentially can do. And it's unclear seems to have worked quite well. to me why you zeroed in on this ability which sounds to me to be somethinQ that MR. ROBERTS: Well, what would you propose, not necessarily in terms of the we can use in many different patterns, etc., etc., that there's some sort·of government officials who violate rules against secrecy, but against the re one secret that a reporter can find out and publish and that the Soviet Union, porters who print them or the newspapers that publish them? unable presumably to get the same information--which I also find sort of hard MR. IKLE: Well, that is a very difficult line there and there are difficult to believe--receiving this information will then know everything about our ~egal provisions which have to be worked out. I don't claim full competence monitoring capability. It sounds completely-- Obviously I know very little ln these legal matters. To what extent, this is your question, should not only about it, but I'd like to know a little more about this system that's-- the government official or the ex-government official who violates the trust MR. IKLE: Well, essentially we're talking here about our eyes and ears and that was put on him by telling others--should not only he come under penalties smell and whatever it is-- but the reporter who picks up this piec~ of news and then prints it? MS. LESSARD: Yes. MR. ROBERTS: That's right. MR. IKLE: --to talk in metaphors, for observing that the agreements that we conclude with the Soviet Union are being adherred to, that they don't have

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© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr. University. bigger missiles if bigger missiles are prohibited or more if more are pro or not American submarines should violate Soviet territorial waters on a spy hibited-- mission? MR. BUCKLEY: Were you looking for a historic first? MR. IKLE: Well, you're talking here about different interpretations of inter MR. IKLE: --or multiple warheads. And perhaps I can best explain it with national law, first ,of all. We want broad public discussion--or not broad an analogy. If you have a protective system in a building, you don't want public discussion--broad Congressional involvement in potential violations of the intruders you want to keep out to know exactly where the sensors are. our intelligence organizations of our laws. But when it comes to the ques MS. LESSARD: Yes. tion of making observations, sending in a spy in some country, obviously you're MR. IKLE: Otherwise they could cut through it too easily. violating the laws of that country, you might even have to violate internation MS. LESSARD: Well, presumably 1-- Don't we know a great deal about the al law in sending the guy through customs or whatever it is. Soviets' m9nitoring capability? I would expect-- I mean, you don't want to MR. KRAMER: Yes, but what I'm-- know exactly where the tripper for the burglar alarm is. Is that the sort of MR. IKLE: And essentially it comes down to the fact that intelligence observa thing you're talking about? tions, the kind of which may be needed to round out the information we rely MR. IKLE: Well, that's the sort of thing we try to keep private or secret, on even in arms control agreements, may violate laws of some other country. ri ght. MR. KRAMER: Well, let me ask-- MR. BUCKLEY: Suppose they send out a hundred fishing trawlers. We can prob MR. IKLE: If we discuss that in public it may be no longer possible to conduct' ably assume that ten of them have a lot of monitoring equipment, but we don't the information-gathering operation. know which ten, do we? And if we knew exactly which ten they were, it would MR. KRAMER: Let me ask you this: Could you distinguish between the source make it a lot easier for us to foil them, right? To interfere with them. and the result of the information? For example, is it always necessarily true MR. IKLE: I think you can best really grasp-- We cannot bring precise de that if a reporter were to publish a certain fact about Soviet nuclear capa tails. Otherwise we would be violating-- bility that that would automatically reveal the capability that allowed you MS. LESSARD: Yes. All right. to develop that information? MR. IKLE: --my own prescription obviously. But you can best grasp it by MR. IKLE: No. thinking about a different area. For example, here, say, in a large city the MR. KRAMER: Someone could tell you it. You could turn a KGB agent and he police department always has a detective bureau that pursues, say, organized could tell you the same thing you would find out from a satellite, for example. crime. And they may be on the trail of something, and if they had to discuss MR. IKLE: There's a lot of new information which can be given, as you should in the daily press every day whom they're pursuing, where they're listening know, without giving away the source or the method with which the information in, whom they think is selling heroin wholesale and so on-- was collected. This depends from case to case. MR. BUCKLEY: Who the informants are. MR. KRAMER: So it becomes increasingly difficult to draft legislation. And MR. IKLE: --they could never bring the case to court. And who the informants I want to ask you, since you spent years drafting legislation to control the are. nuclear capabilities of both Russia and the United States and yet you've found ~lS. LESSARD: That's right., But we don't have laws which would put a reporter that there were still ambiguities that concerned you greatly: Why do you think in jail who actually did report that sort of thing. I think it's unlikely- it would be so easy to draft legislation that would be so clear-cut that we MR. BUCKLEY: That's the trouble. wouldn't have any violations by a reporter? MR. IKLE: That is what we have been discussing. Then we have been discussing MR. IKLE: Two points: I didn't say it would be all that easy. I said I have how to draw the line. Should it just be the reporter or the ex-detective of confidence in our Legislative Branch that they could do it right. Second, the detective bureau who tells the reporter who the informants were that made we have a good system of courts and independent review and interpretation. In it possible to catch the big heroin ring? an international agreement between us and the Russians we have a commission MS. LESSARD: I guess my problem with it is that it's an imaginative one. I to discuss ambiguities, but we can't take it to a supreme court. mean, if we're literally talking about the place where the burglar alarm is MR. KRAMER: I understand-- Okay. I wanted to ask you one other thing about set off, and there are many places like that presumably, then it's in incredi your position regarding-- You seem to assume a stupidity almost on the part bly complex system which is not likely to sort of suddenly leak into the press. of the Russians, and I think Mr. Buckley's comment about Philip Agee's book Now, one or two prippers-- perhaps assumes the same thing. Do you agree, for example, that the Russian MR. BUCKLEY: You might have a blueprint. secret service didn't know the names of those agents in Latin America or the MR. IKLE: Would that you were right. safehouses-- MR. BUCKLEY: You might have a blueprint. This fellow Philip Agee wrote a MR. IKLE: No. book identifying every CIA safehouse in Latin Americ~ . It's a big book, MR. KRAMER: --and that this is all new information? but the Soviet Union doesn't mind spending the $1.10 to buy it. So Mr. Ikle's MR. IKLE: I can't address this particular example because I don't have the talking about blueprints. knowledge here. The Soviet intelligence system indeed knows a great deal MS. LESSARD: Yes. from open sources as well as from, what you might call, espionage. And then MR. BUCKLEY: And anyway, also there're techniques. there're some other things that they may not know. MR. IKLE: Details. MR. BUCKLEY: Well, it's certainly true that we don't know a great deal about MR. BUCKLEY: Techniques, too. what's going on there. I mean, what-- MS. LESSARD: Yes. I-- MR. KRAMER: Are you sure? MR. IKLE: I think in a way what you're saying here will help the solution on MR. BUCKLEY: We know a great deal about where the silos are, because we've your question in that it's really such technical details which we try to keep got this stuff tracking around. But it's not every day that we get a Colonel secret and not the broad questions of policy where we do want public partici Penkovskiy-- ' pation and hence publicity--or hence openness, I should say. MR. KRAMER: Wouldn't it be foolish, though, for us if we did know to say that MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Michael Kramer is with New York Magazine. Mr. Kramer. we knew? MR. KRAMER: Dr. Ikle, would you welcome broad public discussion as to whether MR. BUCKLEY: Sure.

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© Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Jr, University, MR. KRAMER: So you can't be sure that we don't know. MR. BUCKLEY: It would not be foolish for us to act on that knowledge as we acted on the secret codes that we broke in 1938 throughout the war. MR. KRAMER: Exactly. Exactly. MR. BUCKLEY: But there's a case-- I mean, after all, the Germans weren't dumb and yet for six years we knew exactly what was going on because we had broken the codes. MR. KRAMER: Right. And if you have-- MR. BUCKLEY: There's the very recent historical example of bright people who were an ene~y and yet the survival of a secret over a protracted period, isn't that ri ght? MR. IKLE: The important thing, of course, also to keep in mind is the symmetry in openness and secrecy. The mass of information is available about our mili tary programs and the constant tendency for secrecy which also comes out in " the difficulty we have in nailing down specific prohibitions in specific language. It's the same phenomenon there. MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Roberts. MR. ROBERTS: What controls would you place on your own staff if you suspected them of leaking information, for instance? MR. BUCKLEY: Bug them? MR. ROBERTS: Would you be inclined to bug them if necessary? MR. IKLE: Well, there are legal procedures if that's necessary with the court order; it strictly follows the law in what's to be done. I would turn this over to the appropriate authorities. It's not my own-- I'd get legal advice on thi s one. MR. ROBERTS: Presumably you would only resort to legal wiretaps. MR. IKLE: Well, of course. MR. ROBERTS: How sure are you that the United States has a capability at this point of detecting proliferation of weapons or nuclear devices around the world? MR. IKLE: We can't be that sure. What we know about, of course, are the facilities, installations, reactors, reprocessing plants. But in some areas we may not be quite sure what goes on. Some of these plants can be quite small. MR. ROBERTS: Just how foolproof do you think the system is, though, or isn't? MR. IKLE: Some small facilities might escape detection. In addition you have the kind of noted facilities which are the inspection of the international agency. But again that agency might potentially be fooled. MR. ROBERTS: But are you reasonably certain that no large facilities or weapons manufacturing areas could escape-- MR. IKLE: No massive program, yes. Of that we can be reasonably certain. But, you know, a few destructive devices, that'~ harder in some countries. MR. BUCKLEY: Thank you very much, Mr. Ikle. And thank you ladies and gentle men of the panel. Thank you all.