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SOUTHERN EDUCATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIA TlON \/ <. 1 /'/~/.\/ \ i\ ® FIRinG Line HOST: William F. Buckley, Jr. Guest: Dr. Fred Ikle, director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Subject: "WHERE ARE WE HEADED WITH DISARMAMENT?" The FIRING LINE television series is a production of the Southern Educational Panelists: Sam Roberts, New York DaiZy News Communications Association, 928 Woodrow St., P.O. Box 5966, Columbia, S.C., Suzannah Lessard, The New Yorker 29250 and is transmitted through the facilities of the Public Broadcasting Service. Production of these programs is made possible through a grant from the Michael Kramer, New York Maaazine Corporation for Public Broadcasting. FIRING LINE can be seen and heard each FIRING LINE is produced and directed by WARREN STEIBEL week through public television and radio stations throughout the country. Check your local newspapers for channel and time in your area. This is a transcript of a FIRING LINE program taped in New York City on Aug. 6, 1975, and originally telecast on PBS on Sept. 6, 1975. sou I HE: RN f. [)lJC/\ T IONAL COMI\'ilJNIC/\ liONS /\SSOC!/\ I !ON © Board of Trustees of the land Stanford Jr. University. MR. BUCKLEY: Mr. Ikle is the director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and as such is in charge of developing the strategy of secure disarmament. Recently he has been· beset by many problems. For one, the charge that the Soviet Union has been systematically cheating in observ­ ing the terms of SALT I. That agreement, you will recall, was in two parts. The first, which became a formal treaty, limited us to two sites which we might protect through the use of antiballistic missiles; in effect, we gave up ABMs. The second was an interim agreement governing permissible expansion of nuclear facilities and hardware pending SALT II. Last winter in Vladivostok, meeting with Brezhnev, President Ford initialed an understanding which serves as the guidelines to SALT II. Second, Mr. Ikle has seen with dismay a recent sale by West Germany of huge nuclear plants to Brazil of a kind that could easily lend themselves to the development of an atom bomb. There, conceivably, would go our anti­ proliferation treaty. And third, Mr. Ikle sits in dumb fear lest, prodded by the glories of a Pulitzer Prize, some ingenious American reporter or columnist should undertake to reveal the secret devices by which we keep our infrared eyes on the activi­ ties of the Soviet Union. He wants Congress, please, to pass a law. that would ensure that such reporters admire their Pulitzer Prizes in jail. Mr. Ikle is the author of three books including How Nations Negotiate and Every War Must End. Mr. Ikle was born and raised in Switzerland, coming to this country in 1946. He attended the University of Chicago where he got an MA and subsequently a Ph.D. in sociology. In due course he became head of the social sciences division of the Rand Corporation, a research group oriented toward modern weaponry. Meanwhile he had taught at the Harvard Center for International Affiars and as professor of political science at MIT. He was named as head of the disarmament agency by President Nixon in April of 1973. I should like to begin by asking Mr. Ikle: Why would a country like, say, Japan consent to do without its own nuclear weapons system? MR. IKLE: The main reason is that they feel protected by our security guaran­ ©-1975 SOUTHERN EDUCATIONAL tee. That's a very important reason for a number of countries which have the COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION potential for developing nuclear weapons--Germany, of course. And it's an important reason we have to remember as we reconsider to what extent we can live up to our overseas commitments. We can't have it both ways: sort of pull back from these commitments and expect to have some influence against the spread of the bomb. MR. BUCKLEY: Well, is it reasonable to suppose that a number of Japanese, surveying our withdrawal from Indochina and our apparent indifference to events in Portugal, might feel that any reliance on the United States has be­ come surreal? MR. IKLE: We were concerned that as a result of the events in Indochina the opposition to the current policy in Japan--that is to say of not developing their own nuclear weapons--would be strengthened. This has not seemed to be the development so far. There seem to be rather few voices in Japan arguing for developing their own bombs. They, of course, also realize that in order really to have an effective deterrent force to prevent nuclear attack, you have to get into a very massive undertaking, as we ourselves experienced. It's one thing to have a few bombs; it's another thing to have a force that can deter massive nuclear attack. MR. BUCKLEY: Well, it's also true, though, that a relatively light system could serve a defensive purpose, correct? MR. IKLE: Not against a strong opponent such as the Soviet Union. It's very hard to have forces that could survive a first strike. This is our constant worry: that our forces should be sufficient to survive a surprise attack. For a smaller country beginning at the beginning like, say hypothetically, Japan, this would b~ a very difficult undertaking. It's a very difficult undertaking for France, for China. MR. BUCKLEY: But isn't the limitation on the ABM system to which the Soviet © Board of Trustees of the L land Stanford Jr. University. alternative to a desperate search for secur)ty by getting their own nuclear Union and we have subscribed an invitation to what they used to call nth power bombs. And at this juncture, with many questions being raised about what countries to use atomic or hydrogen missiles in such a way as substantially to commitments our foreign policy should support, we must face this fact square­ threaten these major countries? Is it inconceivable that Japan might say, ly. The alliances protecting most of these potential nuclear countries and "We grant that you have the technology to pulverize our entire population, which make them willing to forego nuclear weapons would not survive without but rather than give in to you on this particular point concerning which there continuing American support," you yourself are, in effect, saying that those is a conflict we will expend our half-dozen bombs and account for the loss of are the alternatives: reliance on America and her network of treaties or a 20 million Russians even if this results in the loss of 100 million Japanese"? "desperate search" for their own nuclear bombs. If that is the dichotomy, MR. IKLE: This surrealistic notion regarding a democratic country with a then it seems to me that sensible statesmen abroad would begin their desperate parliamentarian system such as Japan-- It may be a real concern; I think it search for nuclear bombs. should be a real concern for us regarding some group, perhaps some country, MR. IKLE: They might want to hedge their bets, but so far I think we have some leadership that doesn't care about what happens to their people after managed to uphold our principal alliances: the security treaty with Japan they attacked a powerful nation such as the Soviet Union or the United States. and our commitment to NATO. And indeed just this-- And hence we really have this-- We are deeply troubled about the spread of MR. BUCKLEY: Japan hasn't been threatened. the bomb to more and more countries, to more and more places where this des­ MR. IKLE: But as far as our defensive commitment is concerned, we have been tructive potential might be controlled, induced in this fashion with no re­ upholding this, and indeed this last spring Congress has shown that it wants gard for what happens after. to maintain its commitment to our NATO alliance. MR. BUCKLEY: Yes, but there's-- This disposition is not to be, in my judg­ MR. BUCKLEY: Well, according to Admiral Zumwalt, we couldn't uphold our NATO ment, entirely contemned, it seems to me. I.e., the notion that you will use commitment if we wanted to now because of the impoverishment of our military. the entire resources of the nation in order to protect even the independence If we were actually to undertake to protect Turkey, say, or Greece from a of a small part of your territory or the physical safety for a few of your northern invasion, we simply wouldn't have the muscle to do it-- citizens has a rather ethically aristocratic lineage, it seems to me, so that MR. IKLE: Yes. one doesn't automatically say, "Well, the"-- A truly well-balanced statesman MR.