Intelijen, Sensor, Dan Kebebasan

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Intelijen, Sensor, Dan Kebebasan Lahirnya Kopkamtib dan Legitimasi Kebijakan Represif Terhadap Kelompok Pendukung Sukarno dan Mereka yang Dituduh Terlibat G30S Sepanjang periode kehidupan Orde Baru sejumlah organisasi sipil dan militer khusus dibentuk dan dikembangkan untuk tujuan-tujuan pengawasan dan pengendalian penduduk Indonesia. Salah satu institusi pusat yang langsung berada di bawah komando Presiden adalah Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (KOPKAMTIB).1 Di bawah lembaga ini terdapat serangkaian organisasi militer atau non-militer yang melaksanakan tugas dan program lembaga ini. Lembaga intelijen seperti Bakin yang telah ada sebelumnya kalah pamor dengan Kopkamtib yang notabene kendalinya berada di tangan Soeharto sendiri. Kopkamtib dibentuk segera setelah terjadinya Peristiwa G30S, tepatnya pada 10 Oktober 1965.2 Di dalam Kopkamtib terdapat satgas intel yang terdiri dari dapur para ahli dalam bidang komunisme dan dapur para ahli dalam bidang agama Islam. Dari dapur ini pihak intelijen mengetahui mana kekuatan yang terlalu ekstrem dan apa konsep dari kelompok ekstrem yang ada.3 Badan Pelaksana Intelijen (BPI) yang merupakan lembaga inteleijen negara dibekukan oleh Soeharto karena dianggap banyak di antara orang-orangnya 1 Tak seberapa lama kemudian, Soeharto juga membentuk dinas khusus yang disebut sebagai Operasi Khusus (Opsus) di bawah pimpinan Ali Murtopo. Dinas khusus ini bekerja dengan kewenangan luar biasa termasuk melakukan aksi-aksi intelijen “hitam”. Banyak orang tak lagi bisa membedakan mana yang merupakan sebuah operasi di bawah komando Kopkamtib dan mana yang berada di bawah Opsus. Terjadi pertentangan di antara dua lembaga yang memiliki kewenangan melaksanakan aksi intelijen ini yang kemudian berpuncak dengan meletusnya Peristiwa Malari pada 15 Januari 1974. Operasi intelijen menjelang Peristiwa Malari yang dinamai sebagai Operasi Bunglon dilakukan BAKIN dengan menggerakkan intel-intel lapangan untuk berbaur dengan para mahasiswa dan menyadap telepon di kantor rektor UI. Lihat: Loka Manya Prawiro, Radius Prawito di Antara Para Tokoh, Penerbit Andi, Yogyakarta, 2006, hal. 66-69. 2 Sumber yang digunakan dalam hal ini adalah tulisan Richard Tanter, namun tak ada dokumen yang bisa menguatkan penjelasan tersebut. Penetapan tanggal 10 Oktober 1965 ini agak aneh mengingat Soeharto ditunjuk untuk memulihkan keamanan dan ketertiban oleh Presiden Sukarno baru pada saat penyerahan Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret pada 11 Maret 1966. Dokumen yang ada mencantumkan adanya sebutan Pangkostrad adalah Pangkopkamtib adalah berupa pesan radiogram dari KAS KOTI untuk Panglima Kostrad bernomor T-0265/G-5/1965 dengan nama pengirimnya adalah Kapten (inf) Soewarjo. Namun, bila merujuk pada Surat Keputusan No: KEP- 042/Kopkam/7/1967 Menteri/Panglima Angkatan darat Selaku Panglima Komando Operasi pemulihan Keamanan dan ketertiban yang ditanda-tangani Soeharto dikutip dalam klausul “mengingat” bahwa dasar pembentukan Kopkamtib adalah merujuk pada Surat Keputusan Presiden/Panglima Tertinggi ABRI/Panglima Besar Komando Operasi Tertinggi bernomor 179/KOTI/1965 tertanggal 6 Desember 1965. Lihat: Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Himpunan Surat-Surat Keputusan/Perintah Jang Berhubungan Dengan Kopkamtib 1965 s/d 1969, dikeluarkan oleh Sekretariat Kopkamtib (tanpa tahun), hal. 126-127. 3 Lihat Ramadhan K.H, Op cit., hal. 189. yang memiliki garis politik Sukarnis. Pada 21 Agustus 1966 BPI digantikan dengan Komando Intelijen Negara (KIN) untuk kemudian diubah lagi menjadi Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (BAKIN) pada 22 Mei 1967. Pada pergantian ini semua kepala bagian KIN tetap menduduki portofolio mereka saat menjabat di BAKIN, kecuali Ali Murtopo yang memutuskan keluar agar dapat memusatkan perhatian pada Opsus.4 Bisa dikatakan lembaga ini merupakan jantung kekuasaan Orba yang mengoordinasi sejumlah badan intelejen, mulai dari Bakin sampai dengan intelejen dalam setiap bagian Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia. Malahan pada kasus-kasus yang dianggap dapat menganggu stabilitas politik dan ekonomi, Kopkamtib bisa menerobos wewenang departemen sipil, bahkan wewenang angkatan bersenjata sekali pun. Dengan memperkerjakan personel militer terpercaya untuk melaksanakan tugas-tugas yang bertujuan politik dalam artian luas dan luar biasa, maka Kopkamtib merupakan inti pemerintah Indonesia pada masa hukum darurat perang yang permanen. Pada 4 Oktober 1968 Jendral M. Panggabean selaku Wakil Pangkopkamtib mengeluarkan surat perintah bernomor ORIN-08/Kopkam/10/1968 yang memerintahkan Asisten I Pangad Mayjen TNI Sutopo Juwono yang juga merangkap sebagai pimpinan Panitia Kampanye Penerangan Kopkamtib untuk segera menyiapkan dan melancarkan aksi ‘’kampanye’’ dan ‘’penerangan’’ dalam rangka ‘’menciptakan kewaspadaan’’ dan ‘’aktivitas nasional’’ yang ditujukan kepada pemulihan keamanan dan ketertiban umum. Surat ini ditindak lanjuti dengan sebuah surat perintah lain tentang pembentukan panitia kampanye penerangan (Kampen) terdiri dari 52 orang. Sebagian besar anggota panitia adalah pejabat militer dan hanya ada 2 orang sipil yaitu Drs. Hidajat Mukmin dan Drs. Alwi Dahlan.5 Pada 10 Maret 1969, Mayjen Sutopo Yuwono yang tadinya adalah kepala STI Kopkamtib diangkat menjadi kepala BAKIN. Di bawah Sutopo ada dua orang deputi operasional yang merupakan alumni polisi militer. Deputi I dipegang oleh Brigjen Poerwosoenoe yang bertugas mengepalai keamanan negara dengan lingkup tugas meliputi kontra-subversi, perang psikologis, dan operasi melawan propaganda. Sedangkan deputi II yang bertugas menangani pengumpulan dan analisis informasi intelijen dipegang oleh Kolonel Nicklany yang sebelumnya 4 Pasca 1965 Soeharto tetap mengawasi beberapa jenderal angkatan darat yang dianggap memiliki garis Sukarnois. Di antara mereka adalah para petinggi Bakin. Setelah dilantik menjadi presiden pada Maret 1968, Soeharto segera mengambil berbagai tindakan pembersihan. Pada 21 November 1968 Soaharto tak hanya memecat Soedirgo sebagai kepada Bakin, tapi menjebloskannya ke dalam penjara. Bersama Soedirgo ikut beberapa jebndral lainnya yang dianggap bersimpati pada Sukarno. Lihat: Loka Manya Prawiro, Op cit., hal. 63. 5 Alwi Dahlan terakhir menjadi anggota Badan Penasehat Presiden mengenai P-4 (BP7) dan kemudian menjadi menteri penerangan menggantikan Harmoko yang terpilih menjadi Katua Golkar. 2 membawahi satuan khusus Detasemen Pelaksana Intelijen Polisi Militer (Den Pintel Pom) yang bertugas melacak sisa-sisa PKI. Kopkamtib rupanya merasa tak cukup hanya membentuk Kampen. Pada15 April 1969, Jendral M Panggabean mengeluarkan surat keputusan bernomor KEP- 16/Kopkam/4/1969 yang membentuk proyek film Kopkamtib dengan menetapkan Asisten 1 Pangad Mayjen TNI Sutopo Juwono untuk menjadi ketua/pengawas umum proyek film. Untuk ”mengamankan ’’ jalannya pembangunan, Kopkamtib pada 22 Mei 1969 membentuk Sekretariat Sektor Q yang tugasnya selain mengoordinasi, mengintegrasi, menyinkronisasikan, juga mengawasi semua departemen, lembaga pemerintahan, lembaga non-pemerintahan serta semua sektor pembangunan. Sektor Q sesungguhnya merupakan badan staf utama yang berada langsung di bawah Pangkopkamtib. Kegiatan yang menonjol dari Sektor Q selama Repelita I (1969-1973) adalah ‘’mengamankan’’ jalannya Pepera di Papua Barat pada 1969, ‘’ mengamankan’’ Pemilu 1971 dan memenangkannya bagi Orde Baru, serta ‘’mengamankan’’ Sidang MPR pertama hasil Pemilu 1971. Di kemudian hari sebagai buntut Peristiwa Malari pada 1974, Soeharto mencopot Sutopo Yuwono sebagai Kabakin dan seluruh kegiatan Opsus dilikuidasi. Dengan demikian, Ali Murtopo menggabungkan seluluruh operasi yang tadinya berada di bawah kendalinya ke posnya sebagai Deputi III Bakin yang bertugas menangani penggalangan. Di antara sekian banyak proyek rahasianya, Opsus tetap meneruskan tradisi membentuk opini publik. Perhatian Deputi II Bakin lebih terfokus pada kelompok ‘’5 M’’ yaitu muslim, militer, mediamassa, mahasiswa dan money (pemimpin bisnis). Kelompok ini dibentuk sedemikian rupa agar berpihak kepada pemerintah dalam program pembangunan nasional.6 Namun, akibat kritik berbagai kalangan, termasuk sejumlah organisasi internasional mengenai buruknya hak asasi manusia di Indonesia, pada 1988 Presiden Soeharto membubarkan lembaga ini dan menggantikannya dengan Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional (Bakorstranas). Bakorstranas bertujuan untuk memulihkan, mempertahankan dan meningkatkan stabilitas nasional, juga bertindak sebagai penasehat dan dikepalai oleh Panglima tertinggi Angkatan Bersenjata yang langsung melapor kepada presiden. Walau demikian hampir seluruh staf Kopkamtib dan seluruh peran yang dimainkan oleh organisasi terdahulu juga dilakukan oleh lembaga baru ini. Melalui Kompkambtib dan Bakorstanas inilah sesungguhnya pemerintah Orde Baru bukan lagi sekadar menjalankan fungsi kontrol atas kebebasan sipil warganya melalui pemberlakuan kebijakan sensor, tapi juga menciptakan sebuah hegemoni.7 Dalam struktur intelijen, baik Kopkamtib maupun Bakin, 6 Loka Manya Prawiro, Op cit., hal. 68. 7 Sensor adalah sebuah tindak pengawasan melalui pemeriksaan semua surat-surat, pemberitaan media, buku, barang-barang cetakan, kaset rekaman, film dan sebagainya. Dalam 3 terdapat bagian counter intelijen atau penggalangan. Pada bagian inilah intelijen ‘’menggarap’’ media massa dan media elektronik, organisasi masyarakat, lembaga swadaya masyarakat, individu, dan kelompok-kelompok dalam masyarakat lainnya. Organisasi Kopkamtib dan Bakin mengalami pasang-surut sesuai perkembangan kepentingan penguasa terhadap dua lembaga ini. Kewenangan kedua lembaga
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