“What’s the matter with being Indonesian?” A Social Representation Approach to Unravel Indonesian National Identity

MSc Social Research Dissertation School of Social and Political Science 2012 – 2013

Exam Number: B029071 Word Count: 14.461

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Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my supervisor, Ross Bond, since this research could not be completed without his invaluable guidance and patience. I sincerely thank the Directorate General of Higher Education (DGHE) Indonesian Ministry of Education and Culture for funding my education at the University of Edinburgh. Comments and feedback given by Rahkman Ardi, Reza Wattimena, and Charlotte Olcay have also been a tremendous help. I am also very grateful for the endless love and support given by my parents and brothers that kept me going. Finally, I would like to thank my friends and research participants who have been very helpful during this process.

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Abstract

Having announced its independence in 1945, Indonesia is still “a state in search of a nation.” Consisted of more than 300 ethnic tribes and around 600 local languages and dialects, ruthless religious, ethnic, ideology, region conflicts, and civil war have even been intensified after the New Order regime collapsed in 1998. By using Social Representation theory, online survey research involving 114 Indonesians living in the United Kingdom is used to explore these points; how Indonesian negotiate their ethnic, religious, and national identity, the historical theme and important figures in Indonesia’s history, and the connection between ethnic, religious, and national identity and attitudes towards the New Order. Research findings suggest that national and ethnic identity, as well as ethnic and religious identity, is consensual, while the relation between religious and national identity is emancipated. Independence theme is dominant in Indonesia’s history as the Declaration of Independence and Soekarno– Hatta are the prominent event and figures. The experience being under the rule of Soeharto is positively correlated with religious identity, indicates that Soeharto’s anti- communism project is remarked as an important accomplishment from a religious community standpoint. The research also found that people are not completely happy with the regime’s achievements, but do not strongly have contempt for the regime’s policies at the same time.

Keywords: Indonesia, National Identity, Ethnic Identity, Religious Identity, New Order Regime, Representation of History.

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT ...... 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... 2

LIST OF TABLES ...... 4

CHAPTER 1: Introduction ...... 5

1.1 National Awakening Era; Indonesian nationalism project ...... 5 1.2 Nation Building in Early Independence: Mission impossible ...... 8 1.3 Living in the Age of Terror ...... 10 1.4 The Javanese Pancasila and Ummah-State Relation ...... 11 1.5 Indonesia as a Post-authoritarian Society ...... 13 1.6 Research Questions ...... 15

CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Framework ...... 16 2.1 Anti-colonial Nationalism: In the eyes of constructionist ...... 16 2.2 National Identity; Personal or social? ...... 18 2.3 Social Representation of History ...... 19

CHAPTER 3: Research Design ...... 22

3.1 Survey Research ...... 22 3.2 Sampling ...... 22 1. Population ...... 22 2. Participant recruitment strategy ...... 23 3. Sample characteristic ...... 23 3.3 Method of Administration ...... 24 3.4 Questionnaire Design ...... 24 1. Clarifying variables, and developing indicators and questions ...... 24 2. Piloting/pre-testing ...... 26 3. Evaluating indicators ...... 27 3.5 Ethical Consideration...... 27

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CHAPTER 4: Research Findings ...... 28

4.1 National Identity Markers ...... 28

4.2 Identity Dilemma ...... 31

4.3 National Identity Historical Theme ...... 34

4.4 The New Order Regime and Identity ...... 37

CHAPTER 5: Conclusion and Limitation ...... 40

REFERENCES...... 43

APPENDICES...... 51

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List of Tables

Table 1. Parentage, Birth, and Residency Claims of National Belonging Asked Separately ...... 28 Table 2. Parentage, Birth, and Residency Claims of National Belonging Combined ...... 29 Table 3. Religion, Ideology, and Cultural/Local Knowledge Claims of National Belonging ...... 30 Table 4. Correlation Analysis between National, Ethnic, and Religious Identity ...... 32 Table 5. Five Most Important Events in Indonesia’s History ...... 34 Table 6. Five Most Important Figures in Indonesia’s History ...... 36 Table 7. Correlation Analysis between Attitudes towards the New Order and National, Ethnic, and Religious Identity ...... 37

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION: Key Issues of Indonesian Nationalism

Indonesia is often mentioned as an enigma by so many western analysts as the resources to deliver a solid nation-state “could not be more unpromising” (Elson 2008 p. xxiii). As a massive archipelago with up to 17.508 islands, almost 300 million citizens (Anon n.d.), 300 ethnic groups and more than 600 local languages and dialects (Akuntono 2012), Indonesia exists as a legitimate nation-state. Accordingly, Indonesia has been given so many pessimistic labels such as; “a state in search of nation” (Elson 2008), “a state in decay” (Van Dijk & Dijk 2001), “a chaotic state” (Smith 2001), and “a confusing and messy state” (Nordholt 2001). Having said that Indonesia is seemingly a miraculous nation-state, it is rather successful as a state. Placed in a considerably strategic area, Indonesia is quickly growing as one of the economic giants in Asia by gaining a 6.2% of the economic growth rate in 2012 (Bland 2013). It is therefore interesting to unravel how Indonesia developed its nature as a nation-state, the fundamental premise on which it should be based, the nature of its citizenship and the most crucial, how the sense of national conscience has grown for Indonesians despite its overwhelming disparity.

1.1 National Awakening Era; Indonesian nationalism project Many historians believe that “Indonesia” or “Indonesians” did not exist earlier than the late 19th century since “Indu-nesia” was coined by George Windsor Earl in 1850 (Van der Kroef 1951; Elson 2008; Brown 2003). However, he purely used this term for a geographical description rather than ethnographic or cultural. Therefore, Indonesia is “a merely shorter synonym of Indian Islands or Indian Archipelagic”, meanwhile ‘Indonesians’ is used for naming Indian Archipelagians or Indian Islanders (Elson 2008 p. 2). However, “Indonesia” encompassed the spirit of anti-colonialism, an expression of national unity, and political insurgency which was considered as a serious threat by the colonial government (Elson 2008). For that reason, no wonder that Dutch anthropologists were extremely reluctant to use “Indonesia” and chose to use “Netherlands East Indies”, “Indië”, or even “de Oost” (the East) instead. The usage of those terms was not only found in most academic texts, but also in all official decrees and proceedings that were issued by the colonial government (Van der Kroef 1951; Brown 2005). There are two aspects that are crucial in contesting Indonesian nationalism in this very early era; the rise of printed media and literature as well as the flourish of modern social movements. Even though the debate was not intense at the grass-roots level as the

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illiteracy number was considerably high (97%), the media played a crucial role in contesting Indonesian nationalism by spreading a shared sense of oppression amongst educated-aristocrats who were mostly Javanese and West Sumatrans (Elson 2005; Elson 2008; Ricklefs 2002). Most newspapers in the Indies were written in Dutch and thus became popular only amongst indigenous aristocrats and Dutchmen. Through the bulletin namely Hindia Poetra (Sons of the Indies), established during their time in exile in the Netherlands, Ernest Douwes Dekker, a radical Eurasian journalist, along with Soewardi Soerjaningrat and Tjipto Mangunkusumo (who were later on mentioned as Tiga Serangkai), promoted The Indies detachment with its colonial ruler. Hindia Poetra was also the first printed media that carries the recorded use of particular terms such as Indonesia, Indonesian, and Indonesians written by native Indonesians (Elson 2008; Elson 2005). Nonetheless, the effort to inject social meaning into the word “Indonesia” and to encourage the inhabitants of East Indies archipelago to proudly identify themselves as Indonesians has been evidently a daunting mission. Nationalism project was only spoken in the tongue of elitists and therefore should be transformed into a concrete and wider political expression and accordingly evoked the bloom of modern Indonesia- centric social movements (Ricklefs 2002; Elson 2005; Brown 2003). Boedi Oetomo was founded on 20 May 1908 by STOVIA (pre-independence medical school) students and the date later commemorated as National Awakening Day. Dr Soetomo, the founder of Boedi Oetomo, appears continually in Indonesian history schoolbooks regarded as the father of national awakening (Elson 2008; Brown 2003). Even though Boedi Oetomo generated radical nationalist activists and major future national leaders, it would not offer any radical political challenges to the Dutch, yet it is a meagre “polite protest”. Boedi Oetomo exclusively represented a particular regional, class and gender interest, namely aristocrat male Javanese. It predominantly aimed to restructure feudal Javanese society and to reinstate the dignity of the Javanese by campaigning for western-education for all “people bearing Javanese culture and value” (Ricklefs 2002; Vickers 2005; Brown 2003). Sarekat Dagang Islam or Sarekat Islam was the fastest growing Islam-based organisation and had proven to be more inclusive and in fact, established earlier than Boedi Oetomo. Its membership was not restricted to Javanese only, but also covered people from Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. It was also an all-embracing social class, from Muslim Javanese merchant to rural peasants (Brown 2003; Vickers 2005; Ricklefs 2002; Verdoorn 1946). Having said that Sarekat Islam had obviously buoyed plural society, it had vague political objectives. It turned out to be an un-revolutionary movement as HOS Tjokroaminoto, who was the first leader of SI addressed in the 1913 congress, “we are loyal to the government” and then said, “we are satisfied under Dutch

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rule”. It subsequently revealed that SI preferred to have self-government instead of absolute independence (Brown 2003 p. 120). Following up on the establishment of Volksraad which was a pre-independence local council with limited authority, Tiga Serangkai founded the first political party in the Indies namely Indishe Partij (IP) (Vickers 2005; Van der Kroef 1951; Elson 2008; Elson 2005). The party was a radical nationalist party and without fear stood up for Indonesian independence. Despite its failure to attract a mass base since the party supporters were mostly Indo-European, IP was beyond a mere political vehicle. It also served as a catalyst that transformed the national conscience as a sense of unity of all people of the Indies regardless of their ethnicity, religion, or region. The founder believed that the Indies is the homeland of every person who was born there, or lived there permanently, no matter whether they were Indonesian, Dutch, Chinese, Arabs or anything else (Elson 2005; Brown 2003). National awakening era climaxed with Youth Congress in 1928 in which various regional political groups came together and declared an oath that “they had one homeland, Indonesia, were one people, the Indonesian nation, and strove for one lingua franca, namely Bahasa Indonesia” (Vickers 2005 p. 80). Tiga Serangkai came up with the idea of Indonesian nationalism as a modern creation rather than primordial solidarities. Therefore, it became evident that a mere primordial connection is not an adequate situation that is able to grow the feeling of “nation-ness”. Borrowing Anderson's (2006) analysis, national consciousness is never about the past, yet tied to the future and shows the apparent sign of novelty. However, the discourse of Indonesia as a “modern nation-state” rather than as a “race” in this era was inadequate or borrowing Elson's (2008) term, “a sorry one.” The leaders might have had a strong opinion that Indonesia should be an independent state, but the idea of how it would be organised and administered or to whom it would stand for still remained vague. There was only a little attention given to how to compromise or facilitate the contentions between the people that might be likely to arise in the future. This was worsening as the Dutch insisted that Indonesia was never prepared to be self-sufficient. The pre- independence leaders were also rather neglectful to the people’s voices, never be responsive to what actually the people’s needs and never be bothered to canvass people’s opinions (Elson 2008; Brown 2003; Vickers 2005). In 1941 (World War II period), the Netherlands along with Allied Troops declared war on Japan, yet due to Japan’s military superiority, the Dutch should give away their colony in Southeast Asia, including the Indies, to Japan in 1942 (Vickers 2005; Brown 2003). Since the Dutch had been forced out of the Indies, it was hard to find anything in common amongst the people. It seriously caused a long-term and disastrous tragedy for independent Indonesia in the following era.

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1.2 Nation Building in Early Independence: Mission impossible

Japan was in a very difficult position since the Allied Troops repelled their attack by dropping atomic bombs in Nagasaki and Hiroshima and later announced its surrender to the Allied Troops six days after the bombings. Following up on the loss of Japan, major Indonesian leaders rashly declared independence on 17 August 1945, before the Netherlands claiming back its sovereignty (Brown 2003). The first disputation that Indonesia should cope with was the nature of the state. During the next two decades after declaring its independence (1945–1965), Indonesia entered a trial-and-error experiment with respect to determining its nature. It was firstly announced as a Republic. However, as the Dutch demanded in the Round Table Conference, the new state was later on declared as a Federation. The Dutch insisted that Indonesia was not ready to be independent so they felt obliged to offer “assistance” in the power transition process. On 27 December 1949, the United States of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat–RIS) which was consisted of 7 states had officially announced. RIS was not last more than three-and-a-half-year as it revealed that it was a mere Dutch’s divide-and-rule tactic–sharpening ethnic and regional boundaries for the sake of re-establishing the control over their former colony. Hence Soekarno, who initially preferred centralised government, agreed to abolish the federalism system and re-forming a Republic in 1950. Since then, federalism is never considered a choice and became a taboo as it is associated with colonial frustration (Vickers 2005; Nordholt 2003). Following the re-establishment of the Republic, the nation-state apparatus began to take shape. An explicit state-ideology that was wished to reinforce nationalism firstly went public in a Soekarno’s speech in 1945. It is Pancasila (the Five State Principles) that comprises “a free Indonesia in faithfulness to God Almighty, consensus or democracy, internationalism or humanitarianism, social prosperity, and nationalism or national unity” (Vickers 2005 p. 117). The national anthem and the flag as sacred symbols of the nation had come into being and commemoration of key national events. Soekarno had opted a piece of an old Sanskrit poem as the state jargon; Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). By introducing Pancasila and nation’s symbols, Soekano was considered to have united the “sacredness of the nation” with religiosity and deserved to be called as a great nation-builder (Vickers 2005 p. 118). The political consensus was an unbearable task to be achieved since Pancasila was not enough to satisfy everyone. This led to a series of murderous armed-conflicts plaguing ideological and regional-based movements throughout the archipelago. A brutal civil war between communist group under the command of Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia–PKI), with the help of the leftist army, and anti-communist exploded in Madiun, East Java in 1948. PKI was dissatisfied with the government’s policy, which in their opinion was weak and too cooperative with the Dutch (Heryanto

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2006; Vickers 2005; Brown 2003). The Madiun coup is still unforgiven until today and tends to be always brought up as evidence of PKI’s untrustworthiness (Brown 2003). Those who wanted to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state formed Republik Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State–RII) or Darul Islam based on West Java and South Sulawesi. Darul Islam was never considered a serious threat by the Army, yet its persistent existence alarmed Jakarta that the problem of Islam position in the state had still not been resolved (Brown 2003; Vickers 2005; Elson 2008). Since then, Islam and communism have been forever identified as “spectres” in the army’s view which have been delivering unimaginable horror throughout Indonesia’s history (Brown 2003). Soekarno was trying to bring these opposite factions together by promoting NASAKOM (Nationalist-Religion-Communist). People were not convinced by his move, especially for committed Muslims, because he was overly close with PKI leaders, the Soviet Union, and China. His closeness to communism, specifically during the Cold War period, put Soekarno in a dangerous position (Elson 2008; Vickers 2005; Palmier 1957). Regionalism was also a very serious threat as Soekarno’s romanticist view turned out to be an obsession. Projecting the new modern Indonesia as the successor of the ancient kingdoms of Majapahit and Srivijaya which was around 600 years before, Soekarno forced Papua, East Timor, and the Moluccas to join Indonesia. He insisted that Indonesia should go from Sabang (a small island near Aceh–the northern edge of Indonesia) to Merauke (In Papua) and later called it as Greater Indonesia or Nusantara (Brown 2003; Nordholt 2003; Palmier 1957; Weatherbee 2002). The obsession became an “adventurist and aggressive foreign policy” as Soekarno tried to confront the British with respect to taking over Sabah, Sarawak and Malay Peninsula which was later refused by Britain and Malaysia. Yet later Malaysian declared themselves as Federation Republic of Malaysia instead (Brown 2003 p. 194). However, delivering sovereignty in Papua, Moluccas, and East Timor had easily achieved by a number of military operations (Vickers 2005). Soekarno was, in fact, channeling most of his presidency into building a political reform in order to boost Indonesians’ self-esteem and to make them proud of their country. Inspired by Mao Zedong who once was a very powerful and centralistic leader, Soekarno announced martial law and Guided Democracy. It delivered an immense power to the army in respect to controlling the state politically and made himself an authoritarian leader by reducing the role of parliament significantly (Brown 2003; Vickers 2005; Palmier 1957; Bruinessen 1996). Imitating Napoleon’s style of leadership, he built a lot of monuments, statues, a huge mosque and parliament house, skyscrapers, and other landmarks in Jakarta symbolising the greatness of Indonesia and called them “the Memorials of Guided Democracy” (Vickers 2005; Brown 2003). Nation-building was tremendously expensive, while almost Indonesians were suffering from poverty. It had shown Soekarno’s negligence of the economic and development aspect. For that reason, people became more and more impatient for Indonesia’s development (Brown 2003).

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The hope of building a democratic and prosperous Indonesia had crashed by its leaders’ political ambition. Soekarno transformed a new yet peculiar national conscience which was “a combination of arrogant optimism and vacuous assertiveness” (Elson 2008 p. 238). Soekarno’s authoritarian tendency might have appalled those who gave birth to the idea of Indonesia. Soekarno regime’s most miserable legacy was the military and centralistic system which was maintained by the subsequent predecessor. Indonesia’s trajectory as a nation became more and more uncertain since the end of Soekarno’s era, Indonesia had to deal with the most horrific political turbulence in its history.

1.3 Living in the Age of Terror Soekarno’s power was weakening when the Army and Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) scrambled for political power. Soekarno’s presidency was at stake as he favoured PKI while the army leaders craved more power. The clash between the army and PKI leaders, which were the strongest yet very opposite political power, was inevitable and became the dominant theme of Indonesian politics in 1960s (Heryanto 2006; Brown 2003). PKI was growing rapidly by attracting more than 3.5 million members and 23.5 million affiliates, making it the biggest communist party outside the communist bloc (Brown 2003; Vickers 2005) and also the oldest communist party in Asia (Anderson 2004). The tension between PKI and Indonesian Army led to Gerakan 30 September (Gestapu–30 September Movement) and followed by a mass-killing of roughly 500.000 PKI and Soekarno’s supporters. Over 1.5 million were imprisoned and most of them were never heard back (Elson 2008; Brown 2003; Vickers 2005; Southwood & Flanagan 1983). Following his massive success in leading anti-communist military operation, Soeharto was appointed as president replacing the physically unwell Soekarno and later established a regime called the New Order or in Anderson's (1999) term, “The Spook” for the reason that the regime was thereafter very oppressive and military-centric one. Soeharto managed his empire on the basis of four key aspects. Firstly, Pancasila placed at the heart of the nation as “the one and only ideology” and even converted as a new cult (Elson 2008 p. 243). He stressed the role of Pancasila as a social glue that “guaranteed the tranquillity of Indonesians, capable to deliver material and spiritual prosperity”, and “was the realisation of the identity of the whole Indonesian nation” (Elson 2008 p. 243). Soeharto indicated that state philosophy was final and infallible. He stated that any other ideology including nationalism was a potential threat to Pancasila and subjected to removal (Aspinall & Berger 2001). At the end of the day, the regime’s version of Pancasila turned out to be Soeharto’s weapon to silence dissenting voices against his government (Bertrand 2004; Anderson 1999; Mann 2005). Secondly, centralisation became widely expanded and structured uniformly in all regions. As a melting pot policy, Soeharto was trying to eliminate ethnic, religious,

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cultural landscape boundaries for the sake of constructing the common characteristic of Indonesian people (Bertrand 2004; Weatherbee 2002; Nordholt 2001). Every policy and decision was made in Jakarta and only tiny chances given to the lower-level authority to take part. The government built military barracks or command units from the national to the village level. The army was playing an important role in keeping everyone under constant surveillance to ensure that the regime’s version of stability and security was delivered smoothly (Elson 2008; Weatherbee 2002; Aspinall & Berger 2001). Discussing race, ethnicity, religion, and class (Suku, Agama, Ras, Golongan– SARA) was a taboo and banned from the public discourse (Weatherbee 2002; Nordholt 2001; Schefold 1998). Structuring power in parliament was another important point to orchestrate the regime’s fake democracy. Through his political vehicle GOLKAR (Golongan Karya), the regime always won in the numerous general elections and gained majority seats in the parliament (Bertrand 2004; Aspinall & Berger 2001; Brown 2003). Development was also a key theme of the New Order era. Having received a weak and messy state-administration as an inheritance from the former regime, Soeharto rebuilt the state apparatus and achieved genuine massive economic improvements. The distribution of resources to periphery areas was terrific, so almost all regions had enjoyed the fruit of economic development. Soeharto’s development policies were efficient and thoughtfully planned. The poverty rate was massively reduced and by the early 1990s and major cities such as Jakarta and Surabaya were vibrant as the middle class was growing rapidly (Aspinall & Berger 2001; Elson 2008). After multiple embezzlement scandals plaguing himself, his family and his cronies began to be exposed at the same moment as the burst of Asian economic bubble in 1998, people were angry and starting to demand change. In the aftermath of the crisis, demonstrations, kidnappings, and killings were more and more intense. In May 1998, compelled by vast student demonstrations and riots, Soeharto finally announced his resignation as president after 32 years in office (Nordholt 2001; Weatherbee 2002).

1.4 The Javanese Pancasila and Ummah–State Relation In the early era, regionalism and ethnic identity were very salient and led to several armed-rebellions that could hardly be handled by Soekarno’s government. On the contrary, in the New Order era, the dissenting voices were completely silenced and forced consensus had peculiarly achieved. This was also strengthened by remarkable economic development and the political power of the Army in the parliament (Bertrand 2004; Nordholt 2001).

Javanese culture was indeed very central in the story of Indonesian nationalism. Almost all national symbols, jargon and even myths were taken from Javanese heritage (Elson

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2008). Imposing Javanese culture to the nation was also a central theme in Soeharto’s nation-building since it was the cultural circumstances in which he had been brought up (Nordholt 2001). Soekarno, as well as Soeharto, was devotees of Javanese mysticism, therefore both were obsessed to seek primordial connection. Pancasila in the eyes of Soekarno was not his creation, but extraction of ancient indigenous Indonesian (particularly Javanese) wisdom. Soeharto convinced that modern theories such as socialism, Marxism and so on were irrelevant in Indonesia as their people already had a better outlook taken from ancient wisdom. Javanese values are noble, shaping a virtuous outlook and giving the people practical concepts of living and enhancing daily life. Soeharto argued that such moral values have been familiar to Javanese, while non- Javanese ought to learn (Ward 2010).

Javanese value was so firmly rooted in the leadership style of both Soekarno and Soeharto. The feudalistic, hierarchical, and structured systems proved that both were in favour of classic Javanese value, which ironically something that Dr. Soetomo and Soewardi Soerjaningrat wanted to abolish in the very early era (Ward 2010; Nordholt 2001). No wonder since the day Indonesia’s independence declared, outer island inhabitants have been seeing Javanese as perpetrators replacing the Dutch (Elson 2008; Brown 2003). Particularly, Acehnese and Papuans had maintained a belief that Jakarta wanted nothing but their natural resources. They felt the government was being neglectful as their request of having a certain degree of regional autonomy was never being heard (Mann 2005; King 2002).

Even though Chinese descendants or often referred as Tionghoa peranakan (second or later-generation Chinese migrants who were born in Indonesia and spoke Malay or Bahasa Indonesia instead of Chinese) did not explicitly show their political interest, they have been very active in high government circles and enjoying economic superiority compared to indigenous Indonesians (Aguilar 2001). Social inequality between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians fuelled racism sentiment which was climaxed in 1998 riot at the same time when the regime awfully collapsed. Accusing them of not being loyal to the republic, Soeharto was rather oppressive to the Chinese. They had to bear Indonesian (or Javanese) sounded name and their cultural expressions were banned (Brown 2003; Elson 2008). The subsequent president, Abdurrahman Wahid who was once an influential Islamic leader, tried to infuse the inclusivity principles into Indonesian society. He admitted equal political and cultural rights for Chinese yet he did it quite radically (Nordholt 2001).

The relation between the state and Islam is even more problematic. Islam is indeed the strongest social force in Indonesian society but disengaged with political interest. Dating back to the beginning of the Republic’s conception, Islam through Sarikat Islam was tremendously important to soften ethnic barriers, yet very weak with respect to gaining political or economic influence (Mann 2005). Pious Muslims never championed

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Pancasila as it was considered as the new religion and sharia-less philosophy since it has been syncretised with Javanese mysticism (Bruinessen 2003; Ward 2010; Brown 2003). However, there were only a few people that were trying to impose Islamic value to be put into action in the state, so that they were very easy to be controlled through military oppression. Islam in Indonesia, as argued by Wertheim (1978), “is majority with minority mentality” (Bruinessen 1996). For that reason, despite the immense number of Muslims, Indonesia has never been an Islamic state.

The relation between ummah and the state is represented in two aspects; the Islamic political party and the formation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Bruinessen 1996). Islamic political party, since the Soekarno era up until today, have never been gaining majority votes. This is caused by three reasons; the regime deliberately weakened them by pushing Islamic leaders away from politics. Secondly, Muslims communities are quite diverse and a subtle difference is more than enough to cause disputation amongst them. At last, most Indonesian Muslims are “statistical Muslims” or borrowing Geertz’s (1957) terminology, abangan, whose faith is built on Hindu-Buddhism syncretisation. Abangans are quite reluctant to be completely committed to sharia law. For that reason, Islamic political party would never be able to represent abangan’s voice in the first place (Anderson 2004; Bruinessen 2003; Bruinessen 1996). The only deal that has been successfully negotiated between the ummah and the state was the formation of Ministry of Religion to which a limited Islamic rule is being put into action. The ministry never has a significant influence on the policies, yet brings a mere machine of co- optation in terms of providing jobs, managing public funds and facilities (Bruinessen 2003; Bruinessen 1996).

1.5 Indonesia as a Post-authoritarian Society

After the collapse of the New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia worsened. Being a victim of numerous inconsistent policies, the archipelago is even harder to manage. After experiencing the worst political turmoil, the archipelago seems more torn apart than before as murderous conflicts with respect to ethnicity, religion, and region are deteriorating especially in the past two decades. Dating back to 1997, at least up to 10,000 people were killed in only two years (Bertrand 2004). Sectarianism transformed into a series of murderous ethnic conflicts in West and Central Borneo involving Madurese and Dayaks. The local disputation turned out to be extremely dreadful as it led to the deaths of around 1000 people and hundreds of thousands of Madurese were forced to flee (Bertrand 2004; Mann 2005). Meanwhile in Moluccas and Central Sulawesi, numerous vicious conflicts involving Muslims and Christians made over 250 people killed and almost 70,000 left their homes (Mann 2005; Aragon 2001).

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Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM–Free Aceh Movement) clashed with the Indonesian Armed Forces and intensified and resulted in the casualties of almost 1.800 people, including civilians (Bertrand 2004; Mann 2005). Initially, people of Aceh only demanded special autonomy that allowed them to retain their Islamic tradition. Ignored by Jakarta, the request was growing into a separatist movement. Thus, GAM’s mission was to establish an independent Islamic state in Aceh (Aspinall & Berger 2001). Finally, in 2005, GAM and Indonesia signed a peace agreement which signaled the end of a brutal armoured conflict that had been on-going since 1976 (Vickers 2005).

Periphery areas, such as West Papua and East Timor, have been retaining a view that they do not have anything in common with the rest of the Republic since the day Soekarno declared Indonesia’s independence. Papuans are Melanesian, mostly Christians and sharing a cultural closeness with the island of Papua New Guinea rather than Indonesia. No wonder that Papuans never completely embrace their existence as a part of Indonesia (King 2002). Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement– OPM) established in 1964, but started to intensify their confrontation with the Republic shortly after the regime’s downfall. The armoured conflicts are still happening until now with over 20.000 people have murdered in three decades, 1.500 in 2001 alone (Mann 2005).

The former Portuguese colony, a vast Christian and Portuguese-spoken community, East Timor, which was forced to join Indonesia in 1975, openly expressed their desire to be independent after suffering from a ruthless civil war for three decades during New Order era. The government had no option but to send troops and to conduct military operations to retain its sovereignty in East Timor. Armoured conflict between Timorese and the Army resulted around 2000 people killed and 200.000 refugees (Mann 2005). In 1999, sponsored by the UN, Indonesian government finally agreed to hold referendum and then led to the break-ups of East Timor with Indonesia in 2002 (Aspinall & Berger 2001).

Historians argue that Soeharto was just stepping aside (Nordholt 2001 p. 887) since a total control of the state was still firmly in his hands. Some others agree that Indonesia in the reformation era is actually a post-authoritarian society as everyone could witness obvious authoritarian elements are still present and maintained (Smith 2001). For instance, GOLKAR continually exists and is still a considerably powerful political party (Smith 2001; Weatherbee 2002). Uncertainty has arisen with respect to national identity in this era since nothing is simply able to bring Indonesians together. Pancasila, which was incredibly powerful turned out to be mere rhetoric and often called as bloody ideology because it bears a traumatic episode of the dark period of Indonesia history (Vickers 2005; Nordholt 2001). Romo Mangunwijaya, an Indonesian historian, labeled post-New Order era as era kegelisahan (a chaotic period), “from which a new national conscience might grow”

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and he wrote that “the long way that Indonesian society had to go before democracy would become firmly rooted” (Nordholt 2001 p. 882).

Romanticism seems to be an Indonesians’ bad habit. Despite the achieved economic reliefs after the great economic crisis in 1998, a survey finding extracted from a research conducted by Indobarometer in 2011 revealed that most Indonesians were missing their time being under the rule of New Order regime and agreed that Soeharto is the best Indonesian leader, despite his vicious style of leadership and numerous corruption cases plaguing himself and his circles. Historians believe that unity in Indonesia may only be delivered by practicing a melting pot and autocratic policy (Errington 1999; Nordholt 2001; Vickers 2005).

1.6 Research Questions

Having said that Indonesia is an interesting case of a nation-state, I was surprised by the lack of scientific literature concerning how Indonesians retain and negotiate their identities and none of them provided empirical support. Most research that have been published internationally, were conducted by foreigners. Meanwhile, as argued by N. Nordholt (2001, p.883), “western analysts cannot avoid the limitations” in terms of the frame of reference with the local culture. I thereafter formulate the research questions as follows:

1. Under what circumstances could a person be called an Indonesian? 2. How do we draw the relationship between religious identity, ethnic identity and national identity of Indonesians? 3. What are important figures and events on Indonesian history corresponding to the nation-building theme? 4. Is there any relationship between Indonesians’ attitudes towards the New Order regime with religious identity, ethnic identity, and national identity?

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CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

My research was predominantly carried out using constructivists’ theoretical perspective for these following reasons; although two earliest Indonesia leaders often referred to primordial bond in arising nationalism, the history has spoken that the idea of Indonesia emerged as a compromise rather than as an inheritance from the past (Elson 2008, 2005; Anderson 1999). Consequently, constructivism can work very well with the research context. Secondly, primordialist theory does not provide a proper room for social interaction, social and political institutions to play significant roles in the interplay between state, nation, elites and common people on emerging national conscience and the construction of national identity. Such negligence potentially delivers a “nonsense and often very dangerous nonsense” (Anderson 1999 p. 1).

2.1 Anti-colonial Nationalism: In the eyes of constructivist

Anderson's (2006) theoretical model rather fits into Indonesia in terms of how it emerged, became popular, and transformed into an imagined community then ultimately became a legitimate state. However, as criticised by Chatterjee (1991, 1993), the Anderson model seems to overlook eastern wisdom and his claim that “nationalism has become modular” and “been able to be transplanted” is problematic–implied that he sought for the replication of Western history in the Eastern world. Given that Indonesian nationalism initially emerged as an anti-colonial expression, Indonesia shares a lot of things in common with other post-colonial countries in Asia and Africa rather than North America or European countries, where its national building process mainly lies in its political apparatus (Chatterjee 1991).

Therefore, I argue that the rise of Indonesian nationalism is able to be explained through Chatterjee's (1993, 1991) “non-Westocentric” post-colonial nationalism model that separates the social world into two domains; the material and the spiritual. The material posits every aspect that Chatterjee (1991 p. 522) argued that the West “has proven its superiority” – economy, science, and technology or also regarded as the “outside”. Whereas “the inner domain” or the spiritual conveys “the essential marks of cultural identity” that post-colonial societies retain in order to preserve their distinctiveness from the Western culture which they regard as the symbol of oppression (Chatterjee 1991; Chatterjee 1993; Özkirimli 2010). Consequently, the puzzle that post- colonial societies need to unravel is “to fashion a ‘modern’ national culture which is, nevertheless, not Western” (Chatterjee 1991 p. 522).

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Taking India as a case study, Chatterjee (1991) argued that post-colonial nationalism emerged and maintained in two different phases. In the first phase, local leaders ask the colonial authorities for help to reform the social structure of colonial society. In the first phase of the emergence of post-colonial nationalism, Chatterjee (1991, 1993) showed his support to Anderson’s (2006) “print-capitalism” that it provides a room to invent a new ‘modern’ national language. In post-colonial societies, especially in Indonesia, this phase is hardly seen as a genuine start of the emergence of nationalism since it produced a mere bourgeois, not popular nationalism (Hroch 2000; Mann 1995; Whitmeyer 2002). The elites were over-represented since they were the sole market of print-capitalism (Anderson 2006; Hroch 2000). Early Indonesian elites had come up with the idea of “inclusive Indonesia” yet were ignorant of the people’s voices and did not bother to ask the people what they actually wanted (Elson 2005, 2008). So no wonder the inclusivity of Indonesia-ness did not last long and the absence of this premise on Indonesian national identity has enticed never-ending internal disputations (Anderson 1999, 2004). Therefore, I argue that elites, vernacular language, and print- capitalism were prominent yet not essential aspects in evolving Indonesian nationalism (Elson 2005; Whitmeyer 2002; Chatterjee 1991).

If the former phase is ubiquitous, the subsequent phase is typically found in most post- colonial countries in Asia and Africa (Chatterjee 1991, 1993). In this phase, strong disapproval of permitting the colonial government to interfere in shaping “national culture” arises and is a dominant theme in public discourse. Non-cooperation social movements usually bloom in this phase. Chatterjee (1993 p. 522) highlights that in this phase, a sovereign community is started to be imagined and “is already a period of nationalism.” Indonesia, again, provides Chatterjee’s (1993) account with a shred of exemplary evidence. Both early leaders, Soekarno and Soeharto, expressed their refusal to so-called foreign systems and ideology. This phase indicated that “revealing authenticity” in order to underline the boundaries between “them” and “us” is the central theme of post-colonial nationalism, while Anderson’s (2006) “modular” nationalism is all about identity (Özkirimli 2010; Chatterjee 1991, 1993). A post-colonial state’s search for “national culture” is thereafter problematic if it is an overwhelmingly diverse society. The imposition of the dominant culture is indeed inevitable to impede dissent (Craigie 2010). However, major or popular nationalism, even though it may be nasty in some ways, is never considered as a threat to the stability of the state (Billig 1995). It is conversely often viewed as patriotism; as an expression of self-devotion to the homeland. It could happen because the dominant group expresses their nationalism implicitly–as a part of a routine that lies beneath our consciousness.

Nation-building, as argued by Billig (1995), continually appears in everyday mundane symbols such as flag, national anthem, certain national symbols on money, popular phrases, and so on. Repetitively injecting these symbols into everyday life reminds the people that the idea of nation, nationalism, and national identity truly exists. Inspired

17 by Sigmund Freud’s work, Billig (1995) argued that hidden ideology is indeed more powerful and extremely effective because it combines a subliminal nature, constant reproduction, and repetition. If it is supported by the largest ethnic groups, the government can easily establish their sovereignty and thus justify the state legitimacy. As soon as the state and the dominant groups become synonymous, the dominant value represents the way in which a state should be organised (Craigie 2010).

Chatterjee’s (1991, 1993) model of post-colonial nationalism is advantageous to my research, as it helps me to understand how Indonesian nationalism arose from the interplay between colonial policy, elites, and social movement–a context which Anderson (2006) is not completely aware of.

2.2 National Identity; Personal or social?

A series of classic psychological studies on group behaviour performed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner (1982) have demonstrated that social identity proves the existence of dynamic interplay between individual and situational factors in determining human behaviour. National identity formation generally begins with identifying certain noticeable objective criteria that people might choose to become apparent in order to justify their national belonging (Billig 1995; Bond 2006). Tajfel (1982) pointed out that the availability of such criteria is essential to the existence of a national group, in the sense of psychological sense. The prominent markers that are able to validate one’s national identity are residency, birth, and ancestry. By possessing these markers all at once, someone certainly has a straightforward claim to national identity (Bond 2006).

If some theorists championed the idea that national identity is all about apparent categories–which assumes absolute uniformity within certain national groups, Cohen (1996) offers personal nationalism as an antithesis in understanding identity as such concepts do not give appropriate space for individual rumination. Cohen (1996) argued that identity has a self-consciousness dimension, in the sense that we actively construct the meaning of our membership of a national group. It does not come out simply because we hold membership of certain national groups and therefore, we are not “others” (Cohen 1996).

On top of that, national identity should be understood as a synthesis of personal experience and the social worlds we inhabit. It does not belong to individual as a package of fixed traits, but rather as a product “that emerges out of an interaction between the person and situation” (Liu & Laszlo 2007 p. 85). Individuals indeed construct their identity, “but not under condition of their own choosing”. Identity often comes out of “the crucible of colonialism, racial, and sexual subordination, and national conflicts” insofar as it is strongly affected by shared group history (Alcoff 2003 p. 3).

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Why would someone need national identity in the first place? Tajfel's (1982) social identity theory confirms that it fulfils one’s psychological needs, such as positive self- esteem, need of political power, security, feeling of belonging, status, prestige and authenticity (Brewer, Manzi & Shaw 1993; Luhtanen & Crocker 1992; Druckman 1994) insofar as it allows individuals to obtain knowledge about themselves and the social world (Liu & Laszlo 2007; Duveen & Lloyd 1990; Hogg & Abrams 1998). Thus, as argued by Duveen & Lloyd (1990) and Ernest Gellner (1983 p. 6), identifying ourselves with certain a national group is an imperative obligation, because “the idea of a man without a nation seems to impose a far greater strain on the modern imagination.”

Tajfel’s (1982) social identity theory (SIT) seems capable to accommodate personal and social features of national identity, yet is unable to explain the ambiguity of identity, since people belong to a number of different groups and therefore have more than one identity which all of those may be equally salient and mutually compatible in shaping intergroup behaviour (Liu et al. 2002; Billig 1995). The basic premise on multiple social identities given by SIT assumes that “at any moment, categorization at one level of identity, suppress identity at another level,” or later called as the principle of functional antagonism (Liu et al. 2002 p. 4). For that reason, SIT is never able to provide satisfying answers of the nexus between national, ethnic, and religious identity, which most of the time is contested (Liu et al. 2002). National identity, for certain historical reason, can be inter-correlated as “a network” with transnational identity, for instance, Scottish in the United Kingdom or Germans in the European Union, and thus, those are somehow inextricable, overlapping, or even disjointed (Hilton & Liu 2008). Additionally, SIT is criticised as it over-emphasises motivational and cognitive elements as if national identity is a mere cognitive schemata, while it does not take social and political sphere into account (Liu & Laszlo 2007). On the other hand, most sociological approaches are socially deterministic, as criticised by Cohen (1996) and Liu & Laszlo (2007). Either those overly stress obvious social categories or social forces, such as political and social institutions (Mann 1995) or ideology (Billig 1995). To understand national identity comprehensively, we need a concept in between social and personal level which is a gap that social representation theory (SRT) attempts to fill.

2.3 Social Representation of history

Moscovici (2008, 2000) introduced social representation as a form of widespread knowledge that is constructed, circulated, and maintained by the members of a certain social group. It was actually inspired by Durkheim’s collective consciousness, yet Moscovici rejected Durkheim’s presupposition that knowledge should be produced by a sole source of authority in order to unite the members, and thus, this knowledge remains intact (Moscovici 1988; Voelklein & Howart 2005). Moscovici (1988) embraced

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the fact that reality can be ambiguous, and hence he believed in the coexistence of conflicting versions of reality in the same community, culture, or even within an individual (Howarth 2006; Moscovici 2000). Social representation can be hegemonic– mutually agreed and accepted smoothly as a consensus, emancipated–opposing ideas exist, yet interact dynamically and do not annihilate each other, or polemical– conflicting ideas clash and often lead to a serious conflict between opposing groups (Liu & Hilton 2005; Liu et al. 2002).

Rooted in French Marxist tradition, social constructivism, and Freudian psychoanalysis, SRT embodies two inextricable routes; objectification and anchoring (Moscovici 2000; Farr & Moscovici 1984). Objectification is a two-layer process; firstly, it is acted as an individual cognitive system which enables individuals to inject meaning to “unfamiliar”, “remote” or “novel” experiences (it can be people, an object, an event; for instance, gender, class, identity, etc.) in a setting or context that transformed these experiences into everyday cognition. This cognitive system thereafter allows the members of a certain group to interact in order to share their experiences and to reach a consensus. At a wider layer, objectification involves public discourse–something that is deployed by social groups to strengthen in-group cohesiveness and to justify the differences between them and out-groups (Breakwell 1993, 2010; Moscovici 1988). Anchoring means an effort to transform social representation into something rather tangible, or in the other words, a process that projects a system of shared knowledge, beliefs, ideas, or memory to various forms of intergroup behaviour, such as collective remembering, social movements, patriotism, prejudice etc. (Moscovici 2000; Parker 1987; Howarth 2006).

When discussing identity from the SRT standpoint, history holds a special role in the body of theory since it holds the most powerful force in identity formation. History is not a mere series of events that happened in the past; it also contains present and future aspirations–predominantly present-day political agenda (Liu et al. 2005; Liu & Hilton 2005). No wonder that history is negotiable; underlining remarkable achievements while concurrently concealing the nation’s horrible and shameful tragedy (Liu & Atsumi 2008). History is not always akin to the truth or facts, so reading history is synonymous with reading a semi-fiction; credibility, coherence, and authenticity do not matter anymore (Liu & Laszlo 2007; Liu & Atsumi 2008). State apparatus often uses the nation’s past to justify various aspects; for instance, state legitimacy, mobilising public opinion and support to the state’s political agenda, suppressing political dissidents, and domestic and foreign policymaking (Liu 2005; Liu & Hilton 2005). Hence the state must control the reproduction of history through official commemoration and mass- education, while it should negotiate it with its people, who retain alternative versions of history through oral tradition, and with other states that may challenge the official version of history (Liu & Atsumi 2008).

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Liu & Hilton (2005) have formulated a definition of social representation of history as descriptive components which include prominent events and figures, sometimes referred to the narratives of origin which are important in narrating a nation’s history. These events and figures usually are mutually agreed across ethnic, religious, and regional groups (Liu & Hilton 2005; Hilton & Liu 2008). Liu et al.(2002) also hypothesised that positive correlations between ethnic (and religious) and national identity for both majority and minority groups relates to hegemonic/consensual social representations; emancipated social representation is expected to exist when correlation between ethnic (and religious) and national identity produces a nearly zero coefficient, while a negative correlation between ethnic (and religious) and national identity means that polemical social representation happens between those identities.

Understanding Indonesian national identity from social representation standpoint is very helpful to unravel the paradox of Indonesians’ identities. An Indonesian may identify themselves as a Muslim and a Javanese at once and consider their particular ethnic and religious group which they belong to as equally important as their national belonging. Overlapping identity is something that is not able to be explained by traditional social identity and social categorisation theory. The fundamental premise of social representation theory is also holistic; it neither overemphasises individuality nor social and political process in shaping identity.

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 Survey Research

In order to answer research questions given in the prior chapter, I undertook a survey research for these following reasons; having said that Wagner et al. (1999) argued that methodological strategy used to carry out a research from social representation standpoint should embrace complexity of the phenomena and give proper attention to the variety of opinions, Liu & Laszlo (2007) advised that looking at general pattern of collectively shared knowledge, belief, and opinion is also crucial to investigate social representation of history. Therefore, Liu & Laszlo (2007) offered survey research as one of the suitable options to generate knowledge about SR of history. Secondly, survey research is the most popular method applied by similar prior research on SR of history in various different contexts (Wagner et al. 1999).

3.2. Sampling

1. Population

Given that I could not afford the cost, had very limited time and access to Java area which is a mere small part of Indonesia, it was not possible to conduct fieldwork in Indonesia. By conducting research strictly in Java, it would be very hard to get an ethnically and religiously representative sample. For that reason, this study was limited to Indonesians who reside in the UK. The limitation of this decision had been considered and the duration of residency in the UK had been taken into account as a control variable, as according to Berry (1997), acculturation and assimilation process is influenced by the length of residency. As Indonesians who live in the UK are originated from various Indonesia’s regions, so they are ethnically and religiously diverse. However, it later revealed that the duration of residency had no substantial effect to all variables included in this study. This might be because most participants (78.1%) have been staying in the UK for less than 5 years.

A series of research on autobiographical memory have shown that events experienced in late adolescent or early adulthood have been proved to be the most memorable for each generation (Liu & Laszlo 2007). For that basis, I also restricted my research to 18-50 year olds.

Given that education represents the state control of history reproduction and as a focal medium to socialise shared knowledge (Liu & Atsumi 2008; Liu & Hilton

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2005; Liu & Laszlo 2007), I only involved those who have been educated in Indonesia, at least until Sekolah Menengah Atas (secondary education).

2. Participants recruitment strategy

I managed to recruit participants by putting an advert on a number of Facebook groups and mailing lists. Some of them were the Indonesian Diaspora Community, the Indonesian Students Association in the UK, the Indonesian Islamic and Christian Community, etc. This strategy was the most feasible to recruit participants since the Indonesian Embassy in the UK was idle when I made a request to help me circulating the questionnaire. Some generous participants helped me by forwarding the advert to other prospective participants.

I was aware that there are some limitations of recruiting participants through social media/mailing list forums. This research was therefore restricted only to those who have Facebook accounts and access to Facebook groups and/or mailing lists. The sample might be varied, yet apparently not representative (Best et al. 2001; Sue & Ritter 2007). The quality of the sample depends on the people who were visiting the Facebook group page or checking their email inbox and then finally agreeing to participate, which is also called volunteer effect. A sample taken from such ways is inadequate to infer generalisation (De Vaus 2002; Eysenbach & Wyatt 2002). It nonetheless had a lot of advantages; it was very cheap, flexible and fast. I could easily reach participants who stay in distant and dispersed geographical areas as well (Best et al. 2001; Sue & Ritter 2007).

To boost response rate, I offered participants a chance to win two £15 Amazon vouchers, since according to De Vaus (2002), offering incentives or prize draw is a powerful strategy to attract participants. Designing informative and convincing participant information letter (PIL) is also essential to increase the response rate. I created PIL using a structure that has been advised by Haddow (2012) and Eysenbach & Wyatt (2002). I included a few details about the study and underlined confidentiality and anonymity issues as well as the importance of participants’ involvement in the research (De Vaus 2002; Fowler Jr. 2001).

3. Sample characteristic

Participants were chosen by the basis of population criteria that have been indicated in the earlier section. The total number of participants involved in this research was 114 (N=114). Participants were 46.5% male and 53.5% women,

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mostly students (77%) and the rest were workers (11.4%) or were staying in the UK for other various reasons (11.4%). Ethnic minority and mixed background was surprisingly majority (65.8%), while Javanese which is seemingly the dominant ethnic group, were only 34.2% from total respondents. Compared to the actual demographic characteristic of Indonesia, even though Javanese is indeed the largest ethnic group in Indonesia (41.71%), it is still outnumbered by smaller ethnic groups combined together (58.29%) (Hugo 2003). As expected, most respondents were Muslims (69.3%), while the rest (30.7%) followed other religions. In terms of political view, 32.7% participants indicated that they are apolitical, while 67.3% respondents supported certain political parties.

3.3 Method of Administration

I administered the questionnaires using web-page or online survey for the following reasons; it is very cheap, practical, flexible and convenient for respondents who live in a disperse area (Sue & Ritter 2007; Eysenbach & Wyatt 2002; De Vaus 2002). The respondents were able to fill the questionnaire anytime and anywhere they preferred to insofar as it allowed me to record the responses immediately after the participants finished the survey. It was also inexpensive since the University of Edinburgh provides a free account of Bristol Online Survey (BOS). All instructions and questions were given in Bahasa Indonesia, so I translated those before starting to design the online questionnaire. All questionnaires, PIL, and informed consent have been attached to the appendices.

Nonetheless, online survey has some weaknesses; there is no face-to-face interaction between researcher and participant, so participants may interpret the questions differently (Sue & Ritter 2006). However, I have stressed in the PIL that if respondents wanted to raise questions regarding the survey, they could contact me via email. Online survey requires voluntary participation, so it is hard to calculate response rate (De Vaus 2002).

3.4 Questionnaires Design

1. Clarifying variables, and developing indicators and questions Variables included in this research were as follows:

Identity Marker I was inspired by the questions given on Britishness and Scottishness in the 2006 British Social Attitudes Survey and secondary analysis of the 2003 Scottish Social Attitudes Survey conducted by Bond (2006). Prominent British and Scottish

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identity markers that I wanted to investigate whether those are meaningful in Indonesia are residency, parentage (ancestry), and place of birth (Kiely, Bechhofer & McCrone 2005). I also added several claims that might be essential as Indonesian national identity markers; such as cultural understanding (being able to speak local languages/performing cultural acts, etc.), religion (believing in one of religions that have been officially approved by Indonesian Government– Islam, Protestant, Catholic, Hindu, Buddhism, and Confucianism), and ideology (embracing Pancasila and disapproving communism/socialism). Identity marker questionnaire consisted of thirteen yes/no questions containing several combinations of claims. Respondents were asked to indicate whether someone with certain claims can be accepted as an Indonesian.

Social Identity (Ethnic, Religious, and National Identity) I used collective self-esteem scale (CSE) to measure respondents’ feelings and perceptions relating to their membership in certain social groups. CSE is a Likert scale and the original version of CSE contains 16 questions derived from 4 sub- scales; membership esteem which is an individual assessment of how valuable they feel themselves as members of certain social groups; private collective self- esteem means how positively they evaluate their membership of certain social groups; public collective self-esteem which measures how positively they think other people evaluate their membership of certain social groups; and importance to identity that reveals how important their membership in certain social group to their self-concept (Luhtanen & Crocker 1992). CSE has been used by most similar research on social representation of history (Bobowik et al. 2010; Liu et al. 2002; Paez et al. 2006; Liu et al. 2005).

In this research, I created three CSE scales to measure ethnic, religious, and national identity respectively. I reduced the number of questions for each scale, so I used only 5 questions out of 16 in the original versions. This is because I was worried that the questionnaires would be too exhaustive for participant if I included all original items. In designing national, ethnic, and religious CSE scale, I took one question that derived from three sub-scales respectively; membership esteem, private collective self-esteem, and public collective self-esteem, while two questions are taken from importance to identity. Particularly for national CSE scale, I added supplementary two items that are related to the ideological standard of being Indonesians according to Pancasila; whether they believe that their ethnic, religious, and national identity are equally important and whether they feel that they are treated equally as a part of Indonesians, regardless their religion, ethnicity, or region where they come from.

Social Representation of History (Events and Figures)

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SR of history questionnaire aimed to explore key events and figures that are pivotal in Indonesia’s history, how positive and important these events are, and how much respondents admire those figures. In constructing the questionnaire, I adopted several previous research on the similar topic (Liu et al. 2005; Liu et al. 2002). Key events and figures provided as options were adopted from my previous project for Data Collection course in semester 1 in which I undertook document analysis and a focus group. I offered “other” option to accommodate alternative answers that might arise.

Attitudes towards the New Order Regime As pointed out by Liu & Laszlo (2007), attitudes are derivative products of social representation of history that influence an individual’s opinion. For that reason, I chose to investigate if there is any causal relationship between people’s attitudes towards the New Order regime and national, ethnic, and religious identity. I opted for the New Order regime due to the following reasons; Soeharto might not create the national symbols as Soekarno did, yet reconstructing national identity was his top priority when he was in office (Nordholt 2003). Secondly, Soeharto was in office for 32 years and it makes him the longest-serving president in Indonesia. The questionnaire was a Likert scale and aimed to measure how positive respondents’ attitude towards the New Order Regime. Four key themes of the New Order’s policy that I have described in the introduction chapter gave me an idea to formulate the questions.

Demographic Data As suggested by Corbetta (2003), asking demographic features is a standard procedure in all survey research. I selected gender, the purpose of staying in the UK, duration of residency, year of birth, and which political value and political party that the respondent supported/felt the closest to. The selection of these features was supported by previous research which demonstrated that SR of history is varied across these categories (Liu et al. 2002).

2. Piloting/pre-testing

Since piloting/pre-testing is crucial in designing questionnaires (De Vaus 2002; Bryman 2012; Fowler Jr. 2001; Corbetta 2003), I asked four Indonesian people living in Edinburgh to test my questionnaire before it was published. I asked them to review whether all instructions were easy to follow and the questions were understandable and worked well. They also reviewed whether the whole

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instrument made sense. I had been given so many terrific feedback. They also suggested me to add some questions that they think were relevant and interesting. I finally added some additional questions as suggested and made few changes on the wording of questions and instructions.

3. Evaluating indicators

I could only measure reliability of the Likert scales (CSE and attitudes towards the New Order regime), while the rest were not possible to measure as those were rather descriptive questionnaires. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) of the original CSE scale is ranging from 0.7 to 0.8 (Luhtanen & Crocker 1992). Meanwhile, after performing internal consistency analysis, I have produced Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for CSE national identity, CSE ethnic identity, CSE religious identity, and attitudes towards the New Order regime as high as 0.787, 0.695, 0.855, and 0.763 respectively. These coefficients are quite satisfying, and therefore those scales were reliable. Performing validity analysis was not easy, yet I believe the questionnaires had fulfilled the assumption of content validity since I had tried to operationalize the variables as clear as possible and adopted the technique of measurement from previous research. I consulted all the questionnaire design with research supervisor (De Vaus 2002).

3.5 Ethical Consideration

Since it is imperative to obtain consent from research participant, I provided a separate page of informed consent as advised by Bryman (2012) If prospective respondents were agreeing to participate, they had to tick a checkbox. I did not ask respondents’ personal details and I do not have access to their personal information too, so anonymity and confidentiality are guaranteed (De Vaus 2002; Bryman 2012; Fowler Jr. 2001). This had been explained and highlighted in the PIL. For those who were interested to get a chance to win Amazon voucher, they needed to inform me of their email address through Google Docs spreadsheet. I could not relate their email address to their response in BOS system and therefore, anonymity can still be guaranteed. I stressed that I would not use their response other than academic purposes and would not pass on their email addresses to any third parties.

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CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH FINDINGS

4.1 National identity markers

At the first part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked whether one of these claims; having both Indonesian parents, having only one Indonesian parent, living in Indonesia, or born in Indonesia, is enough for someone to claim him/herself as Indonesian (see questions in Appendix 3a).

Table 1. Parentage, Birth, and Residency Claims of National Belonging Asked Separately Parentage (%) Born in Having both Having Only One Live in Indonesia Response Indonesia Indonesian Indonesian (%) (%) parents (%) Parent (%) Indonesian 94.7 72 73.3 52 Not Indonesian 5.3 25.3 22.7 40 Don’t Know 0 2.7 4 8 Sample Size (N) 114 114 114 114

As shown in Table 1 above, parentage, birth, and residency are all important, since at least a half of all respondents agree that possessing those criteria are enough as the basis of national belonging claim. However, parentage seems to be the most substantial marker since we can see that a vast majority consider someone who has both or only one Indonesian parent as an Indonesian. A huge majority of respondents (94.7%) confidently agree that having both Indonesian parents is a valid claim that someone belongs to Indonesia, while having only one Indonesian parent slightly reduces the respondents’ confidence (72%). However, born in Indonesia (73.3%) is slightly more convincing than having one Indonesian parent. Residency has proven to be the least important as only slightly more than half of respondents (52%) consider residency as a substantial claim of being Indonesian. When these claims are combined together, it produces a rather interesting result as we can see in Table 2 (see questions in Appendix 3a).

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Table 2. Parentage, Birth, and Residency Claims of National Belonging Combined Not Indonesian Don’t Know Claims Indonesian (%) (%) (%) Born and stays in Indonesia with both Indonesian 97.3 2.7 0 parents Born and stays in Indonesia, but one/both parents are 58.7 30.7 10.6 foreigners Born in Indonesia with both Indonesian parents, but 82.7 13.3 4 live abroad Born and stays abroad, but both/one of parents are 61.3 30.7 8 Indonesian Sample Size (N) 114

Possessing all three markers altogether is apparently an ultimately convincing claim of being Indonesian since only a few people (2.7%) disapprove of the claim, while no one answers “Don’t Know”. Parentage once again demonstrates that it is a very powerful marker since combining residency and birth together, yet having only one or none Indonesian parents convinces only slightly more than half of respondents (58.7%), while 10.6% answered don’t know. On the contrary, regardless of living or born abroad, someone could possibly claim that he/she is Indonesian if one or both their parents are Indonesian, according to 61.3% respondents. The less importance of residency is crystal clear as we can see that a vast majority (82.7%) of respondents agree that someone who was born in Indonesia from both Indonesian parents is definitely an Indonesian, even though he/she lives abroad. These research findings suggest that Indonesian national belonging is very close to ethno-nationalism or ethno-genealogical in Smith's (1991) terminology, which stresses common blood and kinship. Having said that there is no adequate theorisation that automatically connects national identity and citizenship (Aguilar 1999), it may be worthwhile to take a look at how Indonesian government set formal regulations regarding the nature of its citizenship to see how the research findings related to citizenship as a legal aspect of national identity.

Legally speaking, Indonesia adopts jus sanguinis citizenship and distinguishes between Warga Negara Indonesia Asli/Orang Indonesia Asli (native Indonesia citizen/authentic Indonesian people) and Warga Negara Indonesia karena Hukum (Indonesian citizen by law), according to Indonesian Nationality Act (Undang-Undang No. 12 tahun 2006) and 1945 constitution. Indonesian citizen by law possesses a very limited political right; they are allowed to give votes yet not able to run for election, whether it is presidential or parliamentary election at any level; regional or national level. Having examined the research findings, the nature of national identity is interconnected with citizenship as both are predominantly based on similar claim namely parentage.

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Table 3. Religion, Ideology, and Cultural/Local Knowledge Claims of National Belonging Not Indonesian Don’t Know Claims Indonesian (%) (%) (%) Born and stays in Indonesia with both Indonesian parents, but has a little understanding of local culture and symbols (cannot speak local language, does not 72 25.3 2.7 strictly follow the local custom, etc.)

Born abroad with foreign parents, but has an excellent understanding of local culture and symbols (can play Gamelan, speak high Javanese language (Krama Inggil) 25.3 66.7 8 very well, can dance Janger, etc.)

Born and stays in Indonesia with both Indonesian parents, but embraces communism and atheism 64 29.3 6.7

Born and stays in Indonesia with both Indonesian parents, but is sceptical about Pancasila and diversity 60 33.3 6.7 jargon

Born and stays in Indonesia with both Indonesian parents, but does not follow one of six official religions 72 25.3 2.7 approved by Indonesian government Sample Size (N) 114

According to the research findings shown in Table 3 above, other markers that earlier were predicted as prominence markers have demonstrated some interesting results (see questions in Appendix 3a). Being knowledgeable about local customs is apparently vital since we see in Table 3 that possessing three prominent markers (ancestry, parentage, and residency) at once, but having a little grasp of the local culture can only convince 72% of respondents. Meanwhile, having an adequate local knowledge makes the process of becoming Indonesian possible as we see that 25.3% respondents agree that someone could claim his/her national belonging if they have excellent knowledge of local cultural symbols, regardless of not possessing parentage and birth claim (Kiely, Bechhofer & McCrone 2005). However, local knowledge is less important than ideology claim.

Ideology claim, in the sense that embracing Pancasila and rejecting communism and atheism, seems to be quite important since we see in Table 3 that even though someone was born in Indonesia with Indonesian parents and reside in Indonesia, 29.3% respondents agree that he/she is not Indonesian if he/she embraces communism and atheism. Possessing parentage, residency, and birth claim are not enough to convince 33.3% respondents if someone is skeptical about Pancasila and diversity jargon. Religion nonetheless is slightly less important marker compared to ideology since it is clear in Table 3 that people who do not follow six official religions that are officially

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approved by Indonesian government are still considered as Indonesians by 72% respondents.

Research findings have demonstrated that Indonesian national identity is based on blood rather than residency or birth. The idea of Indonesia as a “race”, as argued by Elson (2005) and Anderson (1995), seems to be supported by research findings. Ideology is another claim that is also proven to be more important than cultural and religion claims. However, it is not sufficient to conclude that Indonesian national identity is ethnic rather than civic, due to two following reasons; birth, blood, and residency cannot be seen as straightforward representations of either civic or ethnic identity, but rather as a subtler combination of both types (Kiely, Bechhofer & McCrone 2005). Secondly, the process of becoming Indonesians is absolutely possible if someone has excellent local knowledge, but indeed not easy without possessing ancestry claim. Unfortunately, how long a person should stay in Indonesia in order to be admitted as an Indonesian and the importance of language claim (being able to speak Bahasa Indonesia) is not investigated in this research, so it certainly can be improved by the future research.

4.2 Identity dilemma

The previous section is all about “objective criteria” of national belonging, yet in this section, we move beyond the obvious markers of social categorisation, namely respondents’ personal feelings and perceptions relating to their membership in ethnic, religious, and national groups. Ethnic and religious identity were measured by the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSE) constructed by Luhtanen & Crocker (1992) which is a 5-item Likert scale with 5 questions, while national identity was measured using modified CSE scale with 7 questions (see the scales in Appendix 3a). Personal feelings and perception of being a member of particular ethnic, religious, and national identity is reflected by individual mean score which was calculated in a way that Luhtanen & Crocker (1992) and Liu et al. (2002) suggested; score for each item was totalled and the total score was then divided by the number of questions. Kendall’s Tau correlation analysis was used to calculate correlation coefficients. A higher score of CSE indicates strongly positive feelings and perception of being a member of a certain group, while a lower score represents otherwise.

I contrast the correlation analysis between majority and minority group as suggested by Liu & Hilton (2005) because when looking at the relation between ethnic and national identity, it is important to see whether there is any divergence which might happen between majority and minority. The correlation coefficients for the relationship between national, ethnic, and religious identity across two groups of ethnicity (Javanese and

31 other ethnic minority) and religiosity (Islam/Muslim–majority and other minority religious backgrounds) are shown in Table 4.

Table 4. Correlation Analysis between National, Ethnic, and Religious Identity Ethnic Background Religious Background Overall Other Minorities Javanese Other Minorities Islam Correlation between 0.382** National Identity 0.448** 0.355** 0.381** 0.360* and Ethnic Identity

Correlation between 0.190* National Identity 0.231 0.108 0.189 -0.092 and Religious Identity

Correlation between Ethnic 0.312* Identity and -0.047* 0.422** 0.247* 0.441* Religious Identity N total=114 Sample Size 66 48 79 35 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level; *** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level

The result shown in Table 4 suggests that “melting pot” policy forced by the New Order regime, even though it was ruthless, has been seemingly fruitful to serve its purposes because we can see that ethnic and national identity seems to be positively correlated and therefore, it is consensual or hegemonic–socially shared and evident in symbolism and tradition (Liu & Hilton 2005). This result appears in all groups both in ethnically and religiously majority and minority. This is perhaps because Indonesian national identity contains primordial justification. Therefore, whoever possesses a bond with “Indonesian soil” will be permitted to claim that they are Indonesian, regardless of coming from ethnically majority or minority background. Descriptive analysis shows that 32.5% respondents agree that they prefer to identify themselves as Indonesians rather than as members of certain religious or ethnic groups, while 26.6% respondents answer strongly agree. A vast majority of respondents indicate that they feel proud (43.9%) or strongly proud (40.4%) to be Indonesian. When the respondents were asked if they think that their national, ethnic, and religious identities are equally important; a dominant voice indicates that they agree (37.7%) or strongly agree (31.6%).

Generally speaking, the correlation between national and religious identity is very weak and the relation between national and religious identity in religiously majority and minority group are almost zero. It indicates the relation between ethnic and religious identity in both Muslims and religious minority respondents is emancipated–conveys

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contradictory elements, but is not sufficient to cause a widespread conflict. The ideological basis of Indonesian national identity is Pancasila, which is a secular value and derived from indigenous Indonesians’ mysticism–something that is unacceptable in Islamic value. This may explain why the idea of being Indonesians and the fundamental principle of being Muslims are sometimes contradictory. Pancasila does cover monotheism, but it is not specifically mentioned Islam that obligates its believers to put Islamic values into their daily life wholeheartedly by implementing Sharia law (Federspiel 1977; Bruinessen 2003). On the contrary, even though Islam has never become the fundamental value of the state and Indonesia embodies secular values instead, the representations of other minority religious groups in most government bodies at the national level are not great and their political aspirations are left unheard accordingly. For that reason, religious minorities believe that they are not treated fairly and equally (Hoey 2003; Vandenbosch 1952).

Interestingly, the correlation between religious and ethnic identity in the Javanese group is also almost zero. It indicates the relation between ethnic and religious identity in Javanese respondents is emancipated too. It strengthens most historians’ contention that Islamic and Javanese values are actually dilemmatic (Ward 2010). Javanese values, at some points, fit into Islam yet in fact, most Javanese, or in Geertz's (1957) classification indicated as abangan, are reluctant to be completely obedient with Islamic rules. On the contrary, in other ethnic minority groups, the connection between religious and ethnic identity is positive and even much stronger than overall result. Certain religiosity is often deeply embedded in ethnicity for certain minority groups, so that adat (local custom) often overlaps with religious rituals (Schiller 1996; Vandenbosch 1952; Errington 1999). For instance, the concept of being Balinese is intertwined with Hinduism; Islamic values are in the core of Buginese, Acehnese, Betawi, and Sasaknese; while Christianity is quite deeply attached to Batak, Manado, and Papuans. It is thus quite peculiar to imagine a Muslim Balinese or a Christian Acehnese.

Chinese Indonesian or Tionghoa people were often alleged for not being loyal to the state and keeping their loyalty for another nation-state on distant shore (Aguilar 1999). It is thus worthwhile to particularly examine the Tionghoa respondents, yet correlation test is not possible to perform as I got only 16 respondents who identify themselves as Tionghoa. When Tionghoa respondents were asked if they prefer to see themselves as an Indonesian rather than using their religiosity and ethnicity as an identity reference, 31.3% Tionghoa respondents answer agree and 31.3% answer strongly agree. In another question where they were asked if being Indonesian is an important reflection of who they are, 31.3% answer agree and 37.5% answer strongly agree. Lastly, 43.8% Tionghoa respondents indicate that they feel proud to be Indonesian, while 31.3% say they are strongly proud to be Indonesian.

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4.3 National Identity historical theme

Social representation of history was investigated using a descriptive questionnaire consisted of 4 questions. Respondents were asked to indicate three most important historical events and figures that they think correspond to the nation-building theme, how positive they regard each event, and how much they admire each figure they had chosen (see questions in Appendix 3a). “Other” option is almost completely left empty, so there is no adequate alternative figure or event other than those that had been given in the options list. Due to no response, 21 cases are not included in analysis.

Table 5. Five Most Important Events in Indonesia’s History Positive/Negative

Events* N=93** % Very Very Negative Neutral Positive Negative Positive Proclamation of 90 96.77 % 0 1.11 0 26.67 72.22 Independence Youth Oath/Congress 46 49.46 % 2.17 0 0 37 60.83 The Birth of Pancasila 36 38.70 % 0 2.78 8.33 36.11 52.78 Soeharto’s resignation 19 20.43 % 0 5.26 10.53 57.89 26.31 May 1998 riots 15 16.12 % 40 6.67 6.67 13.33 33.33 *Most frequent answers amongst 15 possible events **Omitting 21 missing cases from 114 respondents in total

Table 5 shows the top 5 historical events that are most frequently mentioned by the respondents. When the result is contrasted across religious and ethnic groups, no meaningful divergence is found. The pattern, therefore, is consensual. As we see in Table 5, the proclamation of Indonesian Independence from Japan in 1945 seems to be the most popular historical event that embodies the idea of being Indonesian. Accordingly, it is inferred that Indonesian national identity predominantly comprises colonial insurgency elements. Since independence is corroboration of self- determination and a great success of abolishing colonialism, no wonder that a vast majority of respondents have a positive feeling towards it. Routine commemoration combined with a vast celebration may also be the cause of why Indonesians cherish the proclamation of independence more than other national events. This pattern, in fact, is ubiquitous in post-colonial countries; such as Indonesia’s neighbours; Malaysia and Singapore where the declaration of independence is also the most prominent event (Liu et al. 2002).

The second and third most popular event is Youth Congress and Oath in 1928 and the birth of Pancasila in 1945 respectively. Both events encompass Indonesian people’s triumph for negotiating unity. Youth congress and oath symbolises political consensus as it was when all local political power agreed to put aside their regional interest for the sake of greater good; the unity of Indonesia. The official state language of Indonesia was

34 also developed and agreed through the congress, which is another important remark of national identity foundation. Meanwhile, the birth of Pancasila represents ideological consensus in the sense that all contested ideologies were amalgamated into “one-size ideology”. Achieving unity is thus another crucial theme in Indonesian national identity and is not surprising that most respondents feel positive emotion towards both events.

The subsequent most frequently mentioned events are quite intriguing as both are actually unpleasant political turmoil and closely linked as those happened in the same year. In May 1998, there were a number of riots and student demonstrations throughout the country, but mostly in Jakarta and then followed by Soeharto’s resignation which happened only a few weeks after May 1998 riots. Initially, a number of student demonstrations unfolded as a protest against Soeharto’s corrupt behaviour, yet then it gradually deteriorated into vicious riots. May 1998 riots and demonstrations are the onset of Soeharto’s downfall and are also an enigma since those were very similar with Communist Riots in 1965, concealed with mystery and controversy. A series of riots sometimes looked spontaneous, but some other time seemingly orchestrated. Some riots fuelled by sectarianism and were aimed against Tionghoa people. One point that is agreed by most historians; the Indonesian Army was again the main actor of the riots (Heryanto 2006; Anderson 2004).

Having said that the demonstrations and riots were only intense in Jakarta, it is the most ruthless catastrophe that ever happened in Indonesia after Communist Riots in 1965. Having said that Soeharto’s regime was not completely vanished, his resignation is popularly believed as the symbol of the freedom from tyranny as well as the birth of new democracy (reformation). For that reason, it is plausible why most respondents attach a positive emotion to Soeharto’s resignation (positive–57.89%, very positive–26.31%) and feel uneasy about the riots (negative 6.67%; very negative–40%). I thus argue that both events contain a mixture of a glimmer hope for the future with aggravation and brutality. Therefore, annihilation and hope are subtle historical components of Indonesian national identity. In the end, the top 5 important events in Indonesia’s history support Liu & Laszlo's (2007) argument that national identity often emerges around extreme emotion, both positive and negative.

An anti-colonialism theme is again obvious in the selection of prominent figures. As seen in Table 6, Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta who declared Indonesian independence are the most popular leaders. Interestingly, Mohammad Hatta who was the first vice president of Indonesia is always mentioned secondly after Soekarno when respondents were asked to indicate which prominent figures who they think are influential on building national conscience. They are always come across as a duo, even the government named the biggest international airport in Jakarta after their name as a duo (Soekarno-Hatta International Airport). Anti-colonialism spirit is apparently very dominant in Indonesia’s history; hence Soekarno is always remembered as an important

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Indonesian leader, despite the powerful propaganda performed by Soeharto’s regime. Most respondents admit that they admire or greatly admire the Independence collaborators.

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Table 6. Five Most Important Figures in Indonesia’s History

Admiration Do not Prominent Figures* N=93** % Do not Admire Admire Neutral Admire Admire Greatly at all Soekarno 85 91.39 % 0 3.52 28.23 49.41 18.82 Mohammad Hatta 50 53.76 % 0 0 18 60 22 Soeharto 36 38.7 % 11.11 11.11 41.67 25 11.11 Dr Soetomo 27 29.03 % 0 0 40.74 48.14 11.11 Abdurrahman Wahid 24 25.8 % 4.16 4.16 12.5 62.5 16.67 *Most frequent answers amongst 15 possible events **Omitting 21 missing cases from 114 respondents in total

The presence of Soeharto on the top 5 figures is indeed not surprising, but how people feel towards him is thought-provoking. Most respondents neither admire nor hate Soeharto (41.67%) and a modest proportion indicate that they admire (25%) or greatly admire him (11.11%). Soeharto made a great accomplishment with his well-planned development policy and his domestication of national culture was also successful. On the other side of the coin, Indonesia’s economy relied on countless foreign loans, mostly from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. He also passed a number of irrational foreign investments, mainly related to energy areas, that have been inflicting a huge financial loss for Indonesia (Vickers 2005; Elson 2008). People felt safe under his rule, but the safety was built over fear and terror since he delivered his policies viciously. I, therefore, presume that Soeharto represents irony and ambiguity; people disgust his ruthless, corruptive, and controlled leadership, but at some point, feel nostalgic and regard his regime as “the good old days”.

Dr Soetomo, the founder of Boedi Oetomo placed at the fourth. Although he seemingly had important contribution on building the nation, some historians such as Vickers (2005), Elson (2008), and Brown (2005) highlight that his role is actually overrated since Soewardi Soerjaningrat had given a better contribution. Official Indonesian history acknowledges him as the Father of National Awakening and popularised the birth of Boedi Oetomo as the commemoration of National Awakening Day (Van der Kroef 1951). It is therefore plausible how he grabbed such popularity–most respondents admit that they admire him (48.14%). Therefore, the story about Dr Soetomo is rather obscure in Indonesian history schoolbook and he is not mentioned any further than his role in Boedi Oetomo. That may explain why a significant number of respondents have a neutral feeling towards him (40.74%).

Abdurrahman Wahid, the fourth president of Indonesia who initially introduced pluralistic cultural policy finishes at the bottom of the top 5. Having said that his presidency did not last longer than 2 years, he made quite important contributions in building national conscience, especially from minorities standpoint (Nordholt 2001). I was interested in finding out if Abdurrahman Wahid would be more popular amongst

37 religious and ethnic minority respondents, particularly for Tionghoa people. However, it revealed that the pattern is consensual; Soekarno, Hatta, and Soeharto are more popular than Abdurrahman Wahid in all groups, both ethnically and religiously majorities or minorities.

4.4 The New Order Regime and identity

Attitudes towards the New Order regime were measured using a Likert scale consisted of 8 questions. I did item-total correlation analysis and all questions are strongly intercorrelated with correlation coefficients ranging from 0.37–0.67, indicated the singularity of the construct and high reliability of the scale (Norman 2010). Therefore, I totaled each score from all questions and to count the individual average score which later was used in the analysis. In order to calculate the strength of correlations between variables, I used Kendall’s Tau correlation technique. The correlation result is shown in Table 7. A higher score of attitudes toward the New Order indicates a stronger positive attitude, while a lower score reflects otherwise.

Table 7. Correlation Analysis between Attitudes towards the New Order Regime and National, Ethnic, and Religious Identity Ethnic Background Religious Background Other Overall Other Javanese Islam Minorities Minorities Correlation between Attitudes and -0.003 -0.065 0.034 -0.014 -0.003 National Identity

Correlation between -0.004 0.058 0.063 -0.063 0.031 Attitudes and Ethnic Identity Correlation between Attitudes and -0.001 0.316* 0.297* 0.038 0.223* Religious Identity Sample Size 66 48 79 35 N total=114 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level

Table 7 shows that the correlation between attitudes towards the New Order regime and religious identity seems to be stronger than any other identities and the only statistically

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significant result. It may relate to public belief that Soeharto was cleansing Indonesia of atheist PKI supporters who threatened monotheism and Pancasila accordingly. Therefore, PKI was an ideological enemy of all religions, notwithstanding the fact that some prominent PKI leaders started their political career in Muslim organisations; such as Sarekat Islam (Ricklefs 2002). Some PKI supporters were indeed involved in a number of violent acts against Muslims, especially in several areas in Central and East Java, as argued by several historians such as Brown (2003) and Vickers (2005). Their involvement in those riots sharpened the belief that PKI is intertwined with atheism and moral derogation. Even though Soeharto was not popular amongst pious Muslims, this group is too small for being influential in shaping Muslims’ opinions towards Soeharto. Most Muslims are “statistical Muslims,” in the sense that they are a type of Muslims who do not obey Islamic rule completely (Mann 2001; Bruinessen 1996; Federspiel 1977).

On the other hand, the correlations between respondents’ attitudes towards the New Order and national and ethnic identity are incredibly small and statistically insignificant. Speaking about national identity and national belonging, Soekarno-ism and anti-colonialism are irreplaceable, even though Soeharto had been imposing Pancasila in order to establish solidarity throughout his presidency. Additionally, as the implication of excessive propaganda of Pancasila combined with a touch of terror, Pancasila has become meaningless rhetoric. Therefore, people’s impression of Soekarno as the creator of Pancasila and other national symbols is stronger than their impression of Soeharto’s regime. Another possibility that may arise is the presence of other variables in the relationship, for instance, the degree of narrative empathy (Liu & Laszlo 2007). Borrowing Bruner's (1991) concept of narrative construction, reading history is synonymous with reading a story; narrative forms is always present, and therefore, the degree to which people showing uncritical empathy to the angle of official or alternative versions of history shapes their personal opinion (Liu & Laszlo 2007). People’s opinion towards Soeharto’s regime depends on how tolerant they are of historical error or fabrication. On the other hand, national identity and national symbols often contain myth, historical error and fabrication as well; because history is conditioned by the present and future aspirations (Liu & Hilton 2005). Therefore, narrative empathy might have an effect on the strength of national identity and people’s opinion on the New Order regime.

Strengthening findings in the earlier section, the ambiguous feeling towards the New Order regime becomes even clearer. When people were asked their opinion about communism, centralistic government, and development policy, the majority of respondents tend to answer “disagree” or “strongly disagree”. Meanwhile, when they had to indicate their opinion towards Pancasila indoctrination and PKI, interestingly, most respondents answer “agree” or “strongly agree”. It implies that respondents do not completely dislike Soeharto’s regime, but the findings are not sufficient to lead to the conclusion that respondents are happy with the regime. Nonetheless, an interesting

39 finding that is similar to Indobarometer (2011) survey findings is the fact that 30.7% and 47.4% of respondents answer agree and strongly agree when they were asked if Soeharto is the best Indonesian president.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND LIMITATION

Having gone through data analysis, it is crystal clear that Indonesian national identity marker is built on the basis of the “roots” on Indonesian soil, something that Anderson (1999, 2004, 2006) argued as something that urgently should be amended. Relying on bloodline as the foundation of identity entices a subsequent question; which ethnic group should rule the state. The easiest answer is indeed the majority and it possibly turns out to be very nasty in the sense that enticing ethnic conflict and civil war (Mann 2004; Anderson 2006). However, in Indonesia, there is no ethnic group that is completely dominant; Javanese are less than 50% of total population and the subgroups of the Javanese is also too diverse (Mann 2004; Brown 2003), while Moscovici (2000) suggests a partial consensus (around 50% of the group members) is required to establish stability.

Apparently, the blood-based principle of national identity is also found in its neighbourhood in Southeast Asia; such as in Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam (Aguilar 1999). Interestingly, social exclusion in those countries, except for Thailand, are also involving Chinese descendants. Tsinoys (Filipino Chinese), huaqiao (Chinese migrants in Vietnam), and Malayan Chinese were treated differently and even were segregated. The situation in those countries is quite similar to Indonesia, Chinese descendants are economically superior and thus detonates social jealousy amongst indigenous inhabitants (Aguilar 1999).

One point that seems to be missed by Indonesian leaders is that nationalism project is an invitation, not a conquest. An important lesson should have been learned from the case of Papua, Aceh, East Timor, and Moluccas; forcing “the other” to join the imagined community has been proven to be highly murderous. Therefore, it is impossible to invite a disperse society into a nationalism project if the criteria of those “who are allowed to enter the gate” are impossible to have for some people. Anderson (1999, 2004, 2006) offers a requirement that a nation should make it salient beyond primordial bond, namely lingua franca. Language enables all members in a society to share historical experience and by highlighting language, “one could be ‘invited into’ the imagined community” (Anderson 2006 p. 145). Promoting language should never be a daunting task since Indonesia is the only country that uses Bahasa Indonesia and therefore, it also conceives commitment and loyalty. Although a number of historians argue that the concept of Indonesia is nothing more than “a new race” (Elson 2005; Anderson 1999) and research findings shows the similar pattern, the practical usage of Bahasa Indonesia gives a hint of hope–almost all separatist movements named their organisation using Bahasa Indonesia instead of their local language (Anderson 2004).

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Research findings also suggest that national and ethnic identity is in a consensual form, socially shared and vivid in national symbols. Consensual national and ethnic identity is a fortune that Indonesians inherited from the colonial and military regime era. Research findings have also demonstrated that independence is a central historical theme in building national conscience. Independence theme, at some point, is beneficial to unite a diverse society and to create a consensus in constructing national identity, and it has been also found in Singapore and Malaysia (Liu et al. 2002).

On the other hand, the relation between religious and national identity is emancipated, which indicates that the idea of being Indonesians are incongruous with religious aspirations. This seems plausible, because religious boundaries are quite strict compared to ethnicity since ethnic boundaries can be softened by intercultural marriage which is very common in Indonesia nowadays (Jones 2007). In fact, interfaith dialogue and cooperation across religious groups should be urgently intensified until at the grass- root level, since it is only common amongst religious leaders.

A very interesting result generated through the research is the indication that respondents have equivocal opinions towards the New Order regime. A thought- provoking point made by Anderson (1999 pp. 10–11) corresponded to this findings is that he put forward a slogan “Long Live Shame” for Indonesian. He argues that no one deserves to be called a nationalist when they are “incapable of feeling ‘ashamed’ if their state/government commits crimes,” especially when the government slaughter their own citizens (Anderson 1999 pp. 10–11). Although not everyone has been directly contributed to the catastrophe, as a member of an imagined community, everyone should feel morally discomfort in every bad thing that happens in the name of the nation.

On the other hand, Indonesians, who seems to be suffering from Stockholm syndrome, are still far away from embedding collective guilt to the society. Stockholm syndrome is an intriguing psychological disorder whereby the victims of crime develop peculiar positive emotion or bond, sympathy, and loyalty towards their captors and often rationalise their captors’ behaviour in order to make it more tolerable (Adorjan et al. 2012; Namnyak et al. 2008). It comes out as a result of extreme fright or terror acts performed by the captors in order to make their victims helpless, completely submissive, and powerless. Under such circumstances, any kind of slight kindness/goodness showed by the captors will lead the victim to perceive the criminals as “good guys” (Adorjan et al. 2012). Stockholm syndrome works at the individual level, but Graham (1994) suggests that it also possibly work at a wider societal level. In the case of Indonesia, the presence of the major factor, which is a tremendous length of time (Soeharto was 32 years in office), is sufficient to be the basis of this argument; the symptoms of Stockholm syndrome in Indonesia are apparent. People do not completely adore Soeharto as if he is a national hero, but the ambivalence of people’s opinions towards him clearly indicates

42 the absence of collective guilt. The consequence of this peculiarity is quite worrying namely the emergence of “See No Evil, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil” mentality (Anderson 1999 p. 11).

Finally, this research has some inevitable limitations and those are mostly related to the methodology chosen. When investigating identity, survey is better to be combined with other methodologies (Kiely, Bechhofer & McCrone 2005). This is because survey data is hardly seen as representations of how people actually behave in the real world, especially when researcher wants to particularly look at how social inclusion and exclusion process actually works, so other techniques such as focus group, in-depth interview, document analysis, etc. will complement the findings generated from survey research (McCrone & Bechhofer 2008). Additionally, Wagner et al. (1999) strongly recommend conducting a mixed-method research for investigating social representation in order to accommodate the complexity of the phenomena under investigation and to give proper attention to the research context as well as the diversity of opinions. Subsequently, gathering and analysing multiple types of data from various sources is probable to be improved by future research. At last, the number of participants involved and taking samples from participants who live in Indonesia are other points that could certainly be improved by future research as well. Although this research is limited at some points, I believe that the findings are quite interesting and fruitful for the next research on a similar topic.

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LIU, J.H. 2005. History and identity: A system of checks and balances for Aotearoa/New Zealand. New Zealand identities: Departures and destinations [online]. Available from: http://www.europhd.it/html/_onda02/07/PDF/12th_lab_scientificmaterial/jodel et/liu_nz_2005.pdf [Accessed March 30, 2013].

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LIU, J.H. et al. 2002. Social representations of history in Malaysia and Singapore: On the relationship between national and ethnic identity. Asian Journal of Social Psychology [online]. 5(1),pp.3–20. Available from: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1467-839X.00091.

LIU, J.H. and T. ATSUMI 2008. Historical Conflict and Resolution between Japan and China: Developing and Applying a Narrative Theory of History and Identity In: T. SUGIMAN et al., eds. Meaning in Action. London: SAGE, pp. 327–341.

LIU, J.H. and D.J. HILTON 2005. How the past weighs on the present: social representations of history and their role in identity politics. The British Journal of Social Psychology [online]. 44(Pt 4),pp.537–56. Available from: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16368018 [Accessed March 7, 2013].

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Appendix 1a PIL – English Translation

Participant Information Letter Dear Sir/Madam, I invite you to participate in the final research project (Dissertation) that I am currently working on, which is a part of my postgraduate programme at the University of Edinburgh. Before you choosing to participate or not participate, please take a look at some information below. The information covers what the research is all about, why this research is being conducted, why I am asking your participation, and what kind of participation that I expect. I would therefore like to suggest you to go through this information letter very carefully.

Who is conducting the research? My name is Rizqy Amelia Zein and I am a master student studying Social Research at School of Social and Political Science, the University of Edinburgh.

What is this research all about and why is it conducted? Regardless of the fact that I am Indonesian, I am very interested in finding out how Indonesians negotiate their national, ethnic, and religious identity. Indonesia is often labelled with so many pessimistic titles from westerns analysts, since Indonesia is too religiously, ethnically, geographically, and culturally diverse. One of the most prominent statements from western analyst is from Robert Elson who once said that Indonesia “could not be more unpromising to be a solid nation-state.” It is therefore barely believed that Indonesia could survive as a legitimate nation-state. Even though diversity has been embraced as the uniqueness of the nation, it is also being accused as the cause of numerous widespread conflicts in regards to ethnicity, region, religion, and ideology. In this research, I am interested in finding out how Indonesia’s history plays a role in shaping national identity. Moreover, I am particularly looking at whether the experience being under the rule of the New Order regime could affect the construction and negotiation of national, ethnic, and religious identity.

Why have I been selected to participate in this research and what does participating means? I am asking you to take part since you fulfil respondent’s criteria that I expect. This research requires respondents with some criteria as follows; Indonesia citizens aged around 18-50 years old currently reside in the UK (for any kind of purpose; studying, working, or anything else) and have finished primary and secondary education in Indonesia. I expect you to fill a series of questionnaires as the form of your participation. Once you finish reading this information and then decide to take part, you will be directed to an online survey on the next page. Please do read all instructions carefully before filling out the questionnaires.

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How long does it take to participate in this research? It takes around 20-25 minutes to fill the questionnaires.

How will the information that I disclose be used and stored? Your responses that you are going to disclose in this research will be discussed in the last chapter of the research report. Soon after officially announced that I have passed Dissertation course by the Board of Examiner, I will destroy all data and also the questionnaire from Bristol Online Survey system. Until then, I will keep it safe and I will not pass your information on other third parties. However, if it is necessary, I will show the anonymous recap to my research supervisor and the Board of Examiner who will mark my research report. Your disclosed information will be used for academic purpose only.

How about confidentiality and anonymity issues that might be arisen? I do not have access and will not ask your personal information. I can therefore guarantee your confidentiality. Under certain circumstances, if this research is feasible to be published, I will publish it in national or international journal. However, if you are interested in getting a chance to win two £15 Amazon vouchers, I will ask you to inform me your email address in a separate spreadsheet, so I can get back to you. I will not pass your email address on to any third parties.

Do I have to take part in this research? Certainly, no. participation is completely voluntary and it is completely your decision. You will not receive any consequences for not taking part. If you choose not to take part, you do not need to let me know the reason.

If I choose to take part, what should I do? You can continue to the next part by clicking “CONTINUE” on the bottom of this page. After that you are allowed to continue to the next section.

Contact details of the researcher If you have any question regarding this topic or you are interested to further discuss the study, please do not hesitate to contact me on this following email address: [email protected]

Thank you for taking you time to read this letter.

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Appendix 2a Informed Consent – English Translation

Informed Consent

I agree with these following statements:

It is my own decision to take part in this study and I am aware that it is completely voluntary. I have read and understood the Participant Information Letter and I have been given opportunity to raise a question and to discuss the study. I am not being financially rewarded for participating in this research, but I am aware that I have been given a chance to enter a prize draw. I understand that information that I disclose on this questionnaire will be only kept by the researcher until the Dissertation marks is confirmed. The researcher will keep the research report for an indefinite period of time and will publish the report, if it is feasible to be published. I understand that personal information will not appear anywhere in the report. My answer of the questions also will not be published anywhere.

Hereby I confirm my willingness to take part in this study.

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Appendix 3a Questionnaires – English Translation

Please indicate an ethnic group you belong to: Jawa Bali Cirebon Sunda Minang Sasak Bugis Melayu 1. Mixed ethnic group, Madura Tionghoa please indicate Betawi Arab Hadrami ______Banjar Batak __ 2. Other ______

CSE Ethnic Group

Please think about your membership in a particular ethnic group that you have indicated earlier to answer these following questions. Please tick one option that suits you best. There is no right/wrong or true/false answer.

Strongly Neither Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Disagree nor Disagree Agree My ethnicity is an important reflection of who I am. I am actively involved in every ceremony or cultural event related to my ethnicity. Others respect my ethnic group. I feel myself closer to my ethnicity rather than my religion or my country. In general, I'm proud to be a member of my ethnic group.

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Please indicate a religious group you belong to: 1. Islam 2. Katolik 3. Protestan 4. Hindu 5. Budha 6. Konghucu 7. Other______

CSE Religious Group

Please think about your membership in a religious group that you have indicated earlier to answer these following questions. Please tick one option that suits you best. There is no right/wrong or true/false answer.

Neither Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree nor Agree Disagree Agree Disagree My religion is an important reflection of who I am. I actively participate in every celebration, ceremony or other activities related to my religion. Others respect my religious group. I feel myself closer to my religion rather than my ethnicity or my country. In general, I'm proud to be a member of my religious group.

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CSE National Identity

Please think about yourself as an Indonesian to answer these following questions. Please tick one option that suits you best. There is no right/wrong or true/false answer.

Neither Strongly Strongly Disagree Agree nor Agree Disagree Agree Disagree Being Indonesian is an important reflection of who I am. I actively take part in every celebration, ceremony or other activities related to the idea of being Indonesian. Others respect my country. I prefer to see myself as an Indonesian rather than as a member of particular religious or ethnic group. I believe that my religion and my ethnicity are equally important with my identity as Indonesian. I believe that I am treated equally, regardless of my ethnicity or religious background. In general, I'm proud to be an Indonesian.

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Who is Indonesian?

Someone could be considered as an Indonesian, because he/she ______Please tick all that apply

Indonesian Not Indonesian Was born in Indonesia Live in Indonesia Born with both Indonesian parents Born with only one Indonesian parent Was born and live in Indonesia with Indonesians parents. Was born in Indonesia with Indonesians parents, but does not live in Indonesia. Was born in Indonesia and does live in Indonesia, but one or both parents are not Indonesians. Was born abroad and does not live in Indonesia, but one or both of his/her parents are Indonesians. Was born in Indonesia with both Indonesians parents and lives in Indonesia, but has a little understanding of local culture and symbols (cannot speak local language, does not strictly follow the local custom, etc.) Was born abroad with foreign parents, and is not Indonesian citizen, but has an excellent understanding of local culture and symbols (can play Gamelan, speak Javanese (Krama Inggil) very well, can dance Janger, etc.) Was born in Indonesia with both Indonesians parents and lives in Indonesia, but embraces communism and atheism. Was born in Indonesia with both Indonesians parents and lives in Indonesia, but is sceptical about Pancasila and diversity jargon.

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SR of History Questionnaire

1. Dating back to 1908 in which is often called the National Movement Era until today, these are key events that shaping Indonesia’s history. From these following events, which three historical events do you think have the most influential impact on building Indonesian national identity?

a. The formation of Boedi Oetomo (1908) b. Youth Congress and Youth Oath (1928) c. Proclamation of Independence (1945) d. The birth of Pancasila (1945) e. Round Table Conference (1949) f. Indonesia become the member of UN (1950) g. The UN gave away West Irian (1961) h. 30 September Movement/PKI (1965) i. Supersemar was signed and led to the formation of Kopkamtib (1965) j. Bangkok Agreement, The birth of ASEAN and Indonesia became the member of OPEC (1962-1967) k. Green Revolution and self-sufficiency in rice production (1984-1989) l. Great monetary crisis (1997-1998) m. President Soeharto’s resignation (1998) n. Mei 1998 Riot, Trisakti and Semanggi tragedy (1998-1999) o. Disintegration issues in post-Soeharto (the rebellion of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Organisasi Papua Merdeka, and Republik Maluku Selatan as well as the separation of Timor Timur) (1980-2002) p. Other ______

Please put your answer in the box below. Number 1 should be filled with the most important event following by the less important in the box number 2 and 3.

Important Event no.1 Important Event no.2 Important Event no.3

2. How positive or negative do you regard each historical event? 5 scale ranging from ‘strongly positive’ to ‘strongly negative’

Neither Strongly Strongly Negative Positive nor Positive Negative Positive Negative Event no.1 Event no.2 Event no.3

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3. Among these historical figures below, please opt for three people, who are, in your opinion, the most influential in planting the idea of being Indonesian, despite your personal opinion of them.

a. Dr. Soetomo b. RA Kartini c. Soewardi Soerjaningrat d. Ir. Soekarno e. Mohammad Hatta f. Soeharto g. Dr. Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie h. Dr. Amien Rais i. KH. Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) j. Megawati Soekarno Putri k. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono l. Other______

Please put your answer in the box below. Number 1 should be filled with the most important person following by the less important in the box number 2 and 3.

Figure no.1 Figure no.2 Figure no.3

4. How much do you admire each figure that you have chosen? 4 scale ranging from ‘greatly admire’ to ‘do not admire at all’

Do not Do not Admire admire at Admire admire Greatly all Figure no.1 Figure no.2 Figure no.3

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Attitudes towards New-Order Regime (5 points likert-scale [strongly agree-strongly disagree])

Some people believe that democracy is all that we need in Indonesia to ensure that everyone is treated equally. Having said that we had gone through a difficult time under the rule of New Order regime, some people believe that Soeharto is one of the best Indonesia presidents as he successfully delivered some key achievements in economic and national stability sector. I am therefore interested in finding out your opinion about the New Order regime.

Please tick one option that suits you best. There is no right/wrong or true/false answer.

Strongly Neither Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Disagree nor Disagree Agree To ensure unity in a diverse Indonesia, we should get back to Pancasila and internalize the value through P-4 socialization, just like the previous regime did before. Indonesian Communist Party’s violation of Pancasila had been evident and therefore, fully deserved what they have already got. I do believe that, until now, communism should be seen as a latent danger and thus should be permanently banned in Indonesia. Indonesia was much more stable, peaceful, and wealthy under the rule of the New Order regime. Centralistic and highly-controlled policy is necessary to achieve stability, security and unity. Given that today’s Indonesia is getting nowhere but worse, I believe that democracy is not currently needed. I believe that the New Order regime is the most effective government with respect to economic development. Generally, Soeharto is the best president that Indonesia ever had.

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Demographic Question

1. How long have you been away from Indonesia? a. Less than a year b. Between 1-5 years c. Longer than 5 years d. Other______

2. Please indicate the year that you were born ______

3. Please indicate your gender M/F

4. I am staying in the UK for… a. Studying b. Working as a ______(Please tick one option below) i. Private sector employee ii. Entrepreneur/business owner (self-employed) iii. Professional (Doctor, Lawyer, Psychologist, Consultant, Lecturer, Teacher, etc.) iv. Other (please indicate) ______c. Other Please indicate ______

5. Please indicate a party politics that is closer to your political view a. Democrats b. Golkar c. Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-Perjuangan) d. National Awakening Party (PKB) e. Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) f. United Development Party (PPP) g. National Mandate Party (PAN) h. People’s Conscience Party (HANURA) i. Great Indonesia Movement Party (GERINDRA) j. Other______k. I’d rather not to say

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