<Xl{Thayetis in Piakartaon (Kopkamtib)
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KyotoKyotoUniversity University Seuth East Asian St"dies, Vol. 16, Ne. 4, March 1979 Notes Indonesia: After the Student Revolt Justus ]vl. san der KRoEF* ``Can lndonesia Remain C]alm For Capitalisrn?" a columnist in the U.S.' leading financial daily asked three "・eeks after the Peop]e's Consultative Cengress <xl{thayetis Rer- mttsy'aue;arataan RaKiat--MPR), rneeting in Piakarta on March 22, l978, had re-elected President Suharto to his third five year term as Indonesia's chief executive. Answering his own question (and, incidentally, also reflecting othcial U.S. opinion with his answer) the columnist wrote that Indenesia, despite reccnt scandals and anti-government pro- tests, hacl [`retained its ``appreciated stability" (something by ordinary people as well as and I)ig "efl'ective by generals powers"), and that, as it appiied preventive measures," `[the there were indications that Suharto regime is here to stay."i) Yet, it also colltinued te be evident that the Suharto stability remained government's ``preventive closely linked to further measures." On May 26, 1978, for example, a ``Command spokesman for Indonesia's chief national security agency, the for the Res- toration of Internal Security" (Kopkamtib), announced a tbrthceming decree banning "`unauthorized 'l-he meetings of more than five persons." purpose of this new measure reportedly was to prevent thc convening of polStical meet,ings disguised as religieus cen- gregations and appeared te be directed against certain Muslim critics of the regime.2) Anti-Suharto sentiment remains strong in Muslirn circles in lndonesia, including those ``United allied with the chief lslamic; political group, the Development Party" (Partai Pembangunan Per,vatuan-PPPI・. ' Intcr alia one must note that these Muslim anti-Suharto feelings are not of recent vintage but datc bac:k for more than a decadc. After the abortive l965 coup in lllja- karta, Sukarno's subsequent political f-all, and his replacement by General Suharto, various Muslim groups had begun .iockcying tbr power in the reconstituted parliament and public service, Politic:ally active Muslims, particularly those in the Partai Mustimin lvdone"ia (PMI),, which subsequently merged svith othc:r Islamic political greups into the PPP, soo]i charged that Suharto's new governrnent relied too much on Christian and secular "technocrats,'' cliscrirninated in the appiontment of Muslims to parliarnent and `[anti-Muslim" other posts, and, generally was because it refused to accord a constitution- al place to Islam{c Law. Over the ye.ars partisan politics sharpened these Muslim tttt tt t tt tt ttt tt t ttttt t tt ttt tt * Departmcnt of'Political Science, University of Bt'idgeport, Connectlcut, U.S,A. 1) Barry Newman in 7)Ve JVtilt Strett Jbrirnat, April 15, 1976. 2) Agencc France Presge despateh, Iljakurta, rVfay 26, l978 (Foreign Bruadcast Intbrmation Service, hereaft(-r FBIS, )v'tay 26, 197B). ・ 625 NII-Electronic Library Service KyotoKyotoUniversity University J,・,'・ lq!L"7 S,' J・ iijfYlti 16ts 4 committed antagonisms and eventually helped shape small extremist Muslim movements to the violent overthrow of Suharto's regirne, especially reflected what was repoi'ted to The new ban on unauthorized meetings ``hardening" ot' bc thc government's policy against bands of alleged Muslim extremists an lslamic state and who the socalled Komando ,1thad (``Holy War Command") who seek to East havc beeri engaged in various acts of terrorism ranging frem Northern Sumatra thc new ban was also Java since tsCarch, I977, Whatever its justification, however, its interpreted as part of the Suharto regime's continuing confrontation of the PPP and PPP's deputy secretary had allies. On April 12, 1978, Mahbub Junaidi, the general, `[criminal seized been arrested on charges of subversion'' by Kopkamtib agents, who also home. At the same time thatJunaidi was appre- a quantity ofdocuinents in・Junaidi's One was lsmait hended, two other prominent Muslim activists werc arrested, Prol'essor concurrently law Suny, rector (i.e. president) ot' Muhammidiyah University, and pro- been arrested and released in professor at the University of Indonesia. Suny had twice "sub- previous months because of critical comments on government corruption and on arrestecl versive" Army generals made during lectures to his students. The other person indepen- was Sutomo, better known as Bung Tomo, a prominent figure in Indonesia's who also has frequently voiced criticism of the Suhar'to regime. dence struggle, FI'echno- 'I"hen, on an unidentified lecturer at the Bandung Institutc of rLtay31, 1978, ot"and had been logy was arrestcd; it was known only that he had been a beard meniber active in the afiairs of the Institute's campus inosque. Ts・vo days eariier Information pt-linister Ali Murtopo, on the basis of a report to .the cabinet by Defense and Security Ministcr General Muharrimad Jusuf, had declared that security conclitions in Indonesia "nevertheless from all were good, but requiring vigilance quarters,"3) was widely taken io mean that Suharto's re-election in no way .The Iatterphrase itvieMred as subversive. augured a modcrating ol' the government's campaign against those received on ]Vrarch 31, 1978, little more than a ":eek after Suharto had the Alreadv ' MPR's ncw mandate, Kopkamtib chiet' Admiral Sudomo had announccd that authorities in various of the were holding 300 persons, including more than 200 studcnts, parts "Canti-government thc months.4) country, on charges of activities'' during previous three All or most of the 100 or so non-students arrested, and at least 50 to 60 of the detained however, students, would be put on tt'ia], SudomQ said. Sudomo was ctuick to add, now come to restore relations between students and that the time had good government. "af'ter `[are The students, all,'' according to Sudomo, our own childrcn who have been led astray.'' And in subsequent days the Admiral was at pains te stres$ that the.iudicial ``revenge" action against the students was not a matter of for their often voci- planned "a in months but was ferous public criticism of Suharto and the governTiient previous matter ol' upholding the law." pt(uslirn opponents o{' Suharto and the A possible connection between political student dissidents continued to bc intimated by the government in the days and weeks 3) Antara despatch, Iljakarta, May 29, 1978. 4) .ALgenc'e France Presse despatch, Piakarta, Marcrh 81, 197S {FBIS, April 3, }978). 626 NII-Electronic Library Service KyotoKyotoUniversity University Justus M. van der KRoEF: Indonesia: After the Student Revolt after term Suharto7s third inauguration, For example, on May 8, Sudomo was ``confirmed" reported to have to the press that the recently arrested Professor Suny, "links Sutomo, and Mahbub I]ljunaidi,had with pelitical activities of college students."5) And in the investigation in early April of an alleged arson and bombing some 40 plot by [`Islamic members of the Youth Group" (Gabungan Pemudd klam-GPI> in Eljakarta simi- "links" Iar with restive WestJava university students were reportedly uncovered. As was to be feared, however, the tension the Suharto persistent belween regime and the Muslim community foliowing the President's new mandate ceuld readily lend itself to exploitation by provocateurs in either camp. On the night of April 14, a plastic bomb exploded in the Istiqlal rnosque, in the heart of D,jakarta, The expiosion, which fortunately only wounded one of the faithfu1 inside the mosque, and caused some minor damage, came at almost the same time that the government announced the arrest of yet another prominent Muslim political figure, the sixty-seven-year-old eqafruddin Prawiranegara, former and mini$ter, and defense tbreign latera leaderof the one-time "Inclonesian secessionist Revolutionary Government" (Pemerintah Rapttbtik Revolvsioner indbnesia-PRRI) in WN'estSumatra during the late nineteen-fifties. eqafruddin, an im- leader in the now portant banned and dissoived Muslim party Mas.jumi, had been ar- rested because of allegedly ttnti-government comments made in recent religious,lec- tures, He was released again on May 2 without any action having been .iudicial taken against thus him, illustrating again what Suharto critics consider to be the regirne's typical pattern of haraspment oC' its opponents, i.e. arrest (or frequent re-arrest, as in the case of Professor Suny) and detention fbr days and semetimes weeks, without clear specification of charges and evidence, and, then, a release, often accompanied by a "undesirable" warning tp avoid conduct. Public bombings have been rare, thus far, in independent Indoncsia's history. While Ibjakarta police eventua]ly blamed the GPI for the Istiqial Mosque incident, clear evidence oi' this has not been established. Taken in the context of the, indeed pro- "Komatido ven, terrorist depredations of adherents, and of' cenflict .lihad" generally between Muslim leaders and the Suharto regimc, however, the Istiqlal bombing marked a disquieting escalation ol' tensions at the very start of Suharto's new Presidential term. There isnot enly no sign that the government sees wisdom in attempting to calm down its conflict with the Muslim community, but, on the contrary there are other in- "preventive dications that the government's measures" policy is not del'using antagonism toward it. Already onJanuary 2n, 1978, and during three days fbllowing, in the midst of the student campaign that urged Suharto net to seek a thircl Presidential term, the government had ordered the banning of seven major newspapers because ot' their ex- tensive reporting on the mounting opposition to Suharto's intended re-election. It was perhaps the rnost extensive press ban since the end of`January, 1974. 0n that occasion, similarly in the wake ot' student unrest over the Suharto regime's alliance with fbreign bigbusiness,over alleged abuses of pnwer by the military, and over rising prices, fbur ma- jor dailies and several periodicals had been banned.