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A Concluding Note A Concluding Note Overview Without a colonial past, Sweden remained politically distant from Africa until after the Second World War. The historical links to South Africa-established by emigrants, explorers, scientists, missionaries and businessmen-were, however, significant, and there emerged in the early 1960s a growing concern for the struggles for democracy and national independence in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola and Mozambique. Based upon a strong and active public opinion, Sweden became in 1969 the first Western country to extend direct official assistance to the Southern African liberation movements. Swedish intellectuals and students started in the 1950s to raise their voices against the South African apartheid regime. A fund-raising campaign in support of the victims of apartheid was launched even before the Sharpeville shootings of March 1960. Supported by the student and youth movements-as well as by church representatives after the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to Chief Luthuli-this campaign and other initiatives led at the beginning of the 1960s to the formation of a national anti-apartheid committee. Broadly based boycott campaigns against South Africa-inspired by ANC and supported by the powerful Swedish cooperative movement-soon thereafter gave birth to active local solidarity committees and to an involvement with the entire Southern African region. The emerging solidarity movement was assisted by a number of books and a wealth of articles on Southern Africa by Swedish writers and journalists, as well as by translations into Swedish of texts by prominent Southern African nationalists. Some of the leading national newspapers-such as the liberal Expressen and the social democratic Aftonbladet and Arbetet-joined the solidarity efforts, respectively organizing fund-raising campaigns for MPLA of Angola and SWANU and SWAPO of Namibia. One of the first initiatives by the emerging anti-apartheid movement was to offer study opportunities in Sweden to black students from Southern Africa. A number of students were in addition sponsored by the Swedish university unions or given scholarships by the official aid agency. Many represented nationalist organizations in their home countries. Actively participating in the debate and in the build-up of the organized solidarity movement, they played prominent parts in the development of the Swedish opinion towards Southern Africa. Skilfully acting as diplomats, several of the Southern African students managed to attract support for their respective movements among opinion makers and politicians far outside their local university milieus. The relations A Concluding Note thus established proved valuable when the leaders of the Southern African liberation movements in the mid-1960s intensified their diplomatic contacts with Sweden. In the beginning mainly raised by individuals and political organizations in the liberal political centre, the humanitarian concerns found an echo in the ruling Social Democratic government. As part of Sweden's aid policy, the government decided in 1964 to extend educational assistance to African-mainly Southern African- refugee youth. Responding to appeals by the United Nations, legal aid to political prisoners and their family members in South Africa and Zimbabwe was granted the following year. To advise the government, a broadly based consultative committee was appointed, counting several of the leading opinion makers on South and Southern Africa among its members. One of the first recommendations by the committee-subsequently endorsed by the government- was to channel official Swedish support to FRELIMO's Mozambique Institute in Tanzania. The contacts with FRELIMO were important for the 1969 decision to extend assistance directly to the Southern African liberation movements. 1 The constituent parts of the Swedish solidarity movement with Southern Africa were largely in place by the mid-1960s. A first generation of local antiapartheid committees-extending their activities to Zimbabwe and the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique-had been formed and the initial re-active humanitarian views had been replaced by a more pro-active and militant approach. In May 1965, the solidarity movement defined as one of its main objectives to "convince the Swedish government, parliament and public of support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa". The demand for an officially declared boycott against South Africa was at the same time gaining increasing support. By June 1965, not less than 20 out of Sweden's 24 regional councils refused South African products, and 139 out of the 384 members of the Swedish parliament supported the voluntary boycott declared by the youth in March 1963. The only political party that did not form part of the wider Swedish solidarity opinion was the conservative Moderate Party. The political youth leagues and the younger parliamentarians of the Left, Social Democratic, Centre and Liberal parties defended the nationalist cause. To a new generation from the socialist parties and the liberal centre, solidarity with South and Southern Africa gained a particular significance. This largely explains why the issue of direct official support to the liberation movements never became divisive in Sweden. The four future Prime Ministers Olof Palme (SDP; 1969-76 and 198286), Thorbjbrn Falldin (CP; 1976-78 and 1979-82), Ola Ullsten (LP; 1978-79)2 and Ingvar Carlsson (SDP; 1986-91 and 1994-96)-continuously heading the 1 And, as noted, to PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau. 2 Ullsten also served as Minister for International Development Cooperation 1976-78 and Minister for Foreign Affairs 1979-82. Tor Sellstrbm government for more than twenty years of pro-active Swedish involvement in Southern Africa-all became concerned with Southern Africa in the 1950s or in the early 1960s. In 1988, the ANC leader Oliver Tambo thus characterized the links between Sweden and Southern Africa as "a natural system of relations [...] from people to people [...], which is not based on the policies of any party that might be in power in Sweden at any particular time, but on [.. a common outlook and impulse". In addition-although frequently frowned upon by conservative members of the Swedish diplomatic corps-the exiled leaders of the Southern African liberation movements started to visit Sweden and were received at the highest level of government from the beginning of the 1960s. Often invited by the ruling Social Democratic Party, many addressed the traditional Labour Day demonstrations. In the case of ANC, Oliver Tambo visited Sweden for the first time in 1961. The following year, he appeared at the First of May rallies in Gothenburg and in August 1962 he held discussions with Prime Minister Tage Erlander in Stockholm. Direct, bilateral Swedish contacts with the South African government were at the same time brought to an end.1 As a comparison, it could be noted that Tambo did not visit the Soviet Union until April 1963.2 What is more, it was only in November 1986 that the firstand last- meeting between the ANC President and the Soviet Head of State, at the time Mikhail Gorbachev, took place.3 Maintaining close rela tions with the apartheid regime at government level, the major Western powers were similarly late to recognize the leader of the South African majority. Tambo's first official visit to France was not arranged until 1984, and then through contacts with the Swedish Social Democratic Party.4 Only in September 1986 did he for the first time confer with a leading member of the British government, Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe. In January 1987, Tambo was, finally, received by the US Secretary of State George Shultz.5 In the case of South Africa, there was thus a difference of some twenty-five years between the first Swedish contacts with ANC at the highest level of government and corresponding contacts between ANC and the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain and the United States, all permanent members of the UN Security Council. 1 Within EFTA, official relations were maintained between Sweden and Portugal. No bilateral contacts were ever entered into with Ian Smith's Rhodesia. In the case of South Africa, it was only during the independence celebrations in Namibia in March 1990-attended by Nelson Mandela-that a direct encounter between a Swedish (Sten Andersson) and a South African ('Pik' Botha) minister took place (See interview with Roelof 'Pik' Botha, Cape Town, 12 September 1995). 2 Shubin op. cit. in African Affairs, p. 6. 3 Ibid., p. 13 andinterview with Thabo Mbeki, Cape Town, 8 September 1995. 4 Schori op. cit., p. 29. 5 Thomas op. cit., p. 205. A Concluding Note The often very personal relations between Swedish politicians and opinion makers and the Southern African leaders-as well as with Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania-facilitated a deeper understanding of the nationalist core of the liberation struggles.1 Talking about Olof Palme's early contacts, Sydney Sekeramayi of ZANU-who studied and worked in Sweden for more than ten years and entered the government of Zimbabwe at independence in 1980-said, for example, in 1995 that "having spoken to people like [Eduardo] Mondlane [of FRELIMO], [Herbert] Chitepo [of ZANU] and others, [Palme] could understand what they were saying. I think that they were able to impress on him that 'the issue at home is not an ideological issue between Communism and capitalism. It is one of [national] liberation. If we are able to liberate ourselves, we will be able to make up our minds about the best ideological position to take"'.2 Of significance was that the first sustained Swedish contacts were made with those movements that eventually became victorious in their respective countries, that is, ANC of South Africa, MPLA of Angola,3 FRELIMO of Mozambique and ZANU and ZAPU of Zimbabwe. In the case of Namibia, SWANUat the time aligned with ANC-initially played a prominent role, but SWAPO was from 1966 seen as the genuine nationalist representative.