Political Status of Ethnic Groups in Malaysia

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Political Status of Ethnic Groups in Malaysia Malaysia Ethnicity in Malaysia Group selection Malaysia’s “multi-racial society” contains many ethnic groups (3169). 3169 [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020] Malays and other indigenous groups officially form the native con- stituents of the country labelled Bumiputera (“sons of the Earth”) and together made up 67.4% of the total population in the 2010 census (3170). The Malays form the largest individual group com- 3170 [Department of Statistics, Malaysia, 2011] prising roughly half of the total population. By constitutional def- inition, all Malays are Muslim. About a quarter of the population is ethnic Chinese, a group which historically played an important role in trade and business. Malaysians of Indian descent East Indi- ans comprise less than 10% of the population and include Hindus, Muslims, Buddhists, and Christians. Population density is highest in peninsular Malaysia, home to some 20 million of the country’s 28 million inhabitants. The rest live on the Malaysian portion of the island of Borneo in the large but less densely-populated states of Sabah and Sarawak. More than half of Sarawak’s residents and about two-thirds of Sabah’s are from indigenous groups part of the Bumiputera, the largest of which are the Dayaks and Kadazans. The indigenous peoples of Peninsu- lar Malaysia are collectively known as Orang Asli comprising 18 recognized subgroups. Power relations 1957-1963 The Federation of Malaya, which included the formerly British- ruled territories on the Malay Peninsula except Singapore, became independent in 1957. After independence, the Malay ethnic group formed the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) with its leaders holding most federal and state offices and the kingship ro- tating among the various Malay sultans. The Chinese, on the other hand, were granted liberal citizenship rights and maintained strong economic power (3171). The UMNO then “forged a perennially victo- 3171 [Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020] rious electoral coalition with the major Chinese and Indian parties, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)” (3172). Therefore, the Malay are coded Senior 3172 [Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020] Partner with Chinese and Indians holding Junior Partner status. For this period, the group sizes for the relevant groups (Malays, Chinese and Indians) are derived from the census of 1957 for “Penin- epr atlas 1197 sula Malaysia”(3173, 13). 3173 [Chander, 1975] 1964-1965 In September 1963, Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore formed Malaysia. A significant part of Sarawak’s population were opposed to the unification fearing to lose political influence and autonomy. As in Sabah, the integration of Sarawak into the Federation of Malaysia only took place after it was granted high levels of auton- omy and a number of special laws guaranteed the protection of the indigenous populations. Thus, the main indigenous groups of Sarawak (Dayaks) and Sabah (Kadazan) become politically relevant and are coded with regional autonomy. Other indigenous groups (like the Bidayuh, Orang Asli, Bajau) cannot be considered as politi- cally relevant in national politics in this period. For this period, the group sizes for Malays, Chinese and Indians were calculated by combining population estimates from the 1970 census for “Peninsula Malaysia,” “Sarawak,” “Sabah” (3174; 3175) 3174 [Chander, 1975] and Singapore’s reporting on these groups in the country’s 1970 cen- 3175 [Minority Rights Group International, 2010] sus likewise (3176). For the other minority groups, the relative group 3176 [Department of Statistics, Singapore, 2020] sizes are kept static for the entire coding era as reported in Nagaraj et al. (3177). As no specific ethnic figures for this period could be 3177 [Nagaraj et al. 2015] found, these numbers have to be viewed as an approximation to re- flect the ethno-demographic changes occurring after the secession of Singapore in 1965. 1966-2009 Singapore, with its predominantly Chinese population (3178) became 3178 [Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020] an independent country in 1965 thus ensuring “that Malays were a majority in the remaining Federation of Malaysia” (3179). To reflect 3179 [Minority Rights Group International, 2010] this shift, the group sizes were adjusted to more recent population figures of 2000 as reported in Nagaraj et al. (3180). (It was the most 3180 [Nagaraj et al. 2015] comprehensive report on ethnic group sizes at hand for this period.) Malaysia’s predominant political party, the United Malays Na- tional Organization (UMNO), held power in coalition with other parties continuously from independence to 2018. Malaysia has a constitution which protects a number of basic human rights yet en- trenches the “special” position and rights of the Malay population and Islam as the country’s official religion. The UMNO coalition’s share of the vote declined in national elections held in May 1969. Demonstrations following strong electoral gains by political oppo- sition parties associated with Indians and Chinese minorities led to what are known as the 13 May race riots, in which almost 200 people were killed, most of whom were Chinese. The government declared a state of emergency and suspended all parliamentary activities. The race riots were seen as occurring partly because of the economic weakness felt by the Malay majority in relation to the Chinese. As a result, the Malaysian government adopted an affirmative action programme under the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 that epr atlas 1198 was designed to increase the share of control of the economy by the Bumiputeras (3181). 3181 [Minority Rights Group International, 2010] The previous alliance of communally based parties was replaced with a broader coalition–the Barisan Nasional (BN) or National Front–beginning with the 1974 elections, although the main players in the BN represent the same ethnicity-based parties in power be- fore. In the 2008 general elections, the dominance of the incumbent coalition was challenged by opposition parties, which prevented the BN from obtaining its customary greater than two-thirds majority in the lower house of parliament, preventing it from altering the constitution at will. In five of eleven state elections in peninsular Malaysia, the BN failed to reach a simple majority. These electoral results reflected a shift in voting behavior by non-Malays away from traditional ethnic parties. The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) was formed in the early 1950s to represent the interests of the Chinese population. It has historically been part of the country’s governing coalition under the Barisan Nasional. Chinese activists and politicians who protested against the NEP and the erosion of non-Malay culture and education were arrested, as late as 1988, and detained without trial under the Internal Security Act (ISA). Although the Chinese are rep- resented in the government, they are marginalized in the key policy decision-making process. In successive elections, the majority of Chi- nese votes have gone to Chinese-based opposition political parties. This was particularly evident in the 2008 polls. Resentment over the privileges given to Bumiputeras remains high among members of this minority, though the Chinese have also benefited from the country’s relatively good economic performance of recent decades. Overall, the Chinese have been a “junior partner.” The Indian group’s economic situation has tended to deteriorate with the closure of many rubber plantations and their exclusion from the Bumiputera policies. Although the Malaysian Indian Congress has been part of the ruling Barisan Nasional, Indians do not have the demographic weight to be able to exercise any large degree of political power. They continue to face significant poverty and rela- tively low levels of education as compared to the Chinese minority. In November 2007 the ethnic Indian community staged its biggest ever anti-government street protest in Kuala Lumpur when more than 10,000 protesters faced riot police to voice complaints of racial discrimination. On December 13, police arrested five Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) leaders and organizers of the protest un- der the Internal Security Act and indicated they would be held with- out trial for a period of two years. Local and international NGOs and civil society groups condemned the detention under the ISA and appealed to the government to charge the five in an open court. HINDRAF leaders subsequently urged ethnic Indians to withdraw their support for the BN. The demographic weight of the indigenous peoples allowed them to exert significant political and legal roles soon after independence, epr atlas 1199 with one political party associated with the Kadazan-Dusun, the United Pasok-Momogun Kadazan Organization, governing Sabah from 1963 to 1967, and another, the Parti Bersatu Sabah, also able to rule from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. This in turn ensured that these minorities had extensive legal and constitutional provi- sions to guarantee - at least to some degree - traditional land rights and customary law. The relative strength of the indigenous peoples began to weaken from the 1980s due partially to internal divisions within and between the various indigenous groupings. Political parties representing Dayak interests succeeded in gaining a substantial number of seats in the Sarawak Assembly in the 1980s, but have also weakened dramatically since then, partially as a result of their deregistration - under sometimes dubious grounds - and of internal divisions. 2010-2021 The national UPKO party representing the Kadazan people in Sabah, widened its focus to Perak state in 2009 and thus started to represent the political interests of the Orang Asli on the Malaysian Peninsula as well. It can therefore be assumed that the Orang Asli gained political relevance. However, they are coded powerless, as they are not effectively involved in national politics. Neither is there any indication of regional autonomy (3182). Moreover, as described 3182 [Minority Rights Group, 2015] above, the Dayak and Kadazan continuously lost political influence at the regional level. Thus, with the introduction of the new coding period, they are no longer coded with regional autonomy.
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