EYES AND EARS:

A HISTORY OF FIELD TARGET

ACQUISITION

BY

BOYD L. DASTRUP, PH.D.

HISTORIAN

U.S. ARMY SCHOOL

FORT SILL, OKLAHOMA

2018

INTRODUCTION

The conversion from to at the beginning of the 20th Century dramatically changed field artillery target acquisition. Employing direct fire, cannoneers positioned their field pieces unprotected in the open at close ranges to see their enemy easily, to acquire their own targets, and to adjust their own fire. Prompted by rifled small arms and rifled field artillery fire during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 that annihilated the combatants’ field batteries sited in the open for direct fire, European field artillerymen slowly changed their tactics during the ensuing years. To protect their they decided to conceal them behind natural or artificial obstacles where the battery crew could not see the target without assistance; and this compounded a growing problem. By the 1870s the average European and American rifled field piece had a range of 4,000 yards and therefore could shoot considerably farther than the human eye could see even with binoculars. Unless armies could find a method of locating targets beyond the range of human eyesight, hiding field artillery behind an obstacle of some kind for protection and employing long-range field artillery would be problematic. Indirect fire offered the solution. It permitted gun crews to hide their for protection and simultaneously engage targets that could not be seen from the battery position. Although various methods of indirect fire had been employed for some years in Europe, they were more suited to warfare than mobile warfare. With this in mind, Lieutenant Colonel Karl Guk of the Russian army developed the most practical indirect fire method for a mobile battlefield. Introduced early in the 1880s, Guk’s concept of indirect fire involved using a forward observer, a compass, and an aiming point to hit targets beyond the of the battery. However, the reluctance to abandon tried and proven direct fire that was the prevailing gunnery technique where the gunner had to have a direct line of sight from the gun to the target slowed down adopting Guk’s method or any other form of indirect fire for that matter. The Japanese army’s employment of indirect fire crushed Russian field artillery positioned in the open for direct fire at the Battle of Sha Ho in the fall of 1904 and subsequent effective use of indirect fire during the rest of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904- 1905 convinced the Europeans and Americans to abandon direct fire for indirect fire. Notwithstanding the Russian disaster, the Europeans and Americans still clung to direct fire as an alternative to indirect fire. As late as 1914, they still taught their gun crews to abandon indirect fire during the last stages of the attack. They had to move their guns out into the open, move within them with small arms range, and employ direct fire to help press home the infantry attack. Ultimately, World War One forced armies to adopt indirect fire without qualifications. As anticipated by advocates, indirect fire profoundly transformed field artillery target acquisition. Unable to see the battlefield from their concealed positions on the reverse side of a slope, European and American field artillerymen initially turned to terrestrial forward observers to obtain targets and adjust fire. Positioned where they could see the targets, forward observers became the eyes of the Field Artillery; but they could not see targets beyond the horizon. Battlefield conditions during World War One quickly led to the introduction of more sophisticated means of target acquisition to overcome this inherent limitation of terrestrial ii

observation. Needing to locate deeply defiladed enemy batteries and other positions beyond the view of terrestrial forward observers, the combatants sent observers aloft in balloons and fixed-wing aircraft. Although aerial observation enabled seeing beyond the visible horizon and finding defiladed batteries and enemy positions, it forced armies to camouflage their positions to avoid detection by aerial observers. In response to this development, the combatant armies introduced sound ranging and flash ranging to find camouflaged targets that could not be spotted by terrestrial and aerial observers. As the evolution of target acquisition during the war suggested, the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) not only imitated its European counterparts but also improvised to satisfy immediate needs. Influenced by the Europeans’ success with sound ranging, flash ranging, and aerial observation in 1914-1917, the Americans adopted them without reservation but interestingly failed to give the Field Artillery any command and control over those assets. The AEF placed sound ranging and flash ranging under the Corps of Engineers where the expertise for such technology resided. However, engineers had little understanding of field artillery requirements and had difficulties meeting the Field Artillery’s needs. At the same time the AEF positioned aerial observation under the Air Service in the Signal Corps that had the aircraft and pilots and often had conflicting priorities with the Field Artillery. This arrangement for the command and control of sound ranging, flash ranging, and aerial observation created unwieldy coordination problems and left the Field Artillery at the mercy of other branches when terrestrial observation was inadequate. Although target acquisition organization was restructured between 1919 and 1942 to furnish the Field Artillery with organic sound ranging, flash ranging, and aerial observation, elusive mortars in World War Two brought further changes. Improvising once again to meet an unforeseen need, the American army modified antiaircraft radars to find ground targets, especially mortars, and attached them to sound ranging and flash ranging units. At the end of the war, American field artillery target acquisition consisted of terrestrial observers, aerial observers, sound ranging, flash ranging, and radars. These methods of organic target acquisition remained unchanged until the 1980s when organic aerial observation disappeared with the creation of centralized aviation in the division and when sound ranging and flash ranging with their range limitations were eliminated in favor of radars to complement terrestrial observation. With the introduction of precision munitions late in the 20th Century, the Field Artillery adopted target location sensors for the mounted and dismounted forces to pinpoint targets accurately and to complement radars and terrestrial observers. This monograph that was initially written in 2008 and revised in 2018 tells the story of the evolution of U.S. Army’s field artillery target acquisition from direct fire to indirect fire. It describes the challenges to create target acquisition capabilities to satisfy the requirements of the Field Artillery and the debates over technology, organization, and doctrine.

Boyd L. Dastrup, Ph.D. Field Artillery School Historian U.S. Army Field Artillery School

iii

LIST OF ACCRONYMS

ACH, Annual Command History AEF, American Expeditionary Force AHIP, Army Helicopter Improvement Program AHR, Annual Historical Review AIS, Artillery Intelligence Service ATACMS, Army Tactical System ATACS, Artillery Target Acquisition Counterfire System BFIST, Bradley Fire Support Team COLT, Combat Observation Lasing Team CRAM, Counter Rocket, Artillery, CSSG, Close Support Study Group FADAC, Field Artillery Digital Artillery Computer FCoE, Fires Center of Excellence FIST, Fire Support Team FSCOORD, Fire Support Coordinator G/VLLD, Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator HMMWV, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle HRDC, Historical Research and Document Collection JETS, Joint Effects Targeting System FIST, Fire Support Team FS3, Fire Support Sensor System LLDR, Lightweight Laser Designator Radar LCMR, Lightweight Countermortar Radar LRAS3, Long-Range Advance Scout Surveillance System LST, Landing Ship MLRS, Multiple Launch Rocket System MSTL, Morris Swett Technical Library NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization ODS, Operation Desert Storm OEF, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan OIF, Operation Iraqi Freedom PFED, Pocked-size Forward Entry Device QRC, Quick Response/Reaction Capability RPV, Remotely Piloted Vehicle TRADOC, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command UAV, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle USAFACFS, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and USAFAS, U.S. Army Field Artillery School USAFCoE, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence USAREUR, U.S. Army, Europe USFET, U.S. Forces, European Theater iv

WD, War Department

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page i Introduction ii List of Acronyms iv Table of Contents vi Chapter One, Transformation of the Field Artillery 1 Chapter Two, Consolidating and Proving 30 Chapter Three, Falling Behind 75 Chapter Four, Halting the Slide 102 Chapter Five, The Precision Revolution and Target Acquisition 137 Select Bibliography 160 Index 175

Photographs, pp. 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 136, and 159

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CHAPTER ONE

TRANSFORMATION OF THE FIELD ARTILLERY

The Industrial Revolution of the 18th and 19th Centuries with its rapid technological advances dramatically modified all aspects of European and American life. The revolution mechanized tedious, labor-intensive agricultural and industrial processes, made mass production of standardized parts possible, and dramatically improved communications to make the world smaller. Equally important, the Industrial Revolution transformed European and American warfare and field artillery.

THE DEATH OF DIRECT FIRE

During the latter years of the 19th Century and the first years of the 20th Century, European and American field artillerymen gradually abandoned direct fire for indirect fire in response to the introduction of rifled small arms and field artillery. While rifled small arms had ranges around 1,000 yards, rifled field artillery could engage targets out to 4,000 yards. This range was well beyond human eyesight that was around 1,700 yards. To take advantage of the long ranges and to protect their field guns from enemy rifled small arms and field artillery fire, field artillerymen replaced direct fire where they positioned their guns in the open to provide a direct line of sight to the target with indirect fire where they hid their guns on the reverse side of the slope and employed an observer to aim fire on enemy formations. Although direct fire had been used impressively on the battlefield since the introduction of gunpowder artillery in 14th Century, it had one critical weakness. Cannoneers had to see the target to hit it. Using direct fire, the gun crews aimed their smoothbore field pieces at a visible target, fired a projectile at a low trajectory, observed where the shot fell, and adjusted fire as needed.1 If an obstacle blocked or masked the line of sight from the to the target, the crew could not shoot at it. Constrained by direct fire’s line-of-sight requirement, European armies sited their field guns where they had a clear view of the enemy. By the 19th Century, they positioned their lighter field guns, commonly called battalion guns, in the open between infantry formations that were aligned shoulder-to- shoulder for volley fire from inaccurate smoothbore muskets with effective ranges of 50 to 100 yards. Simultaneously, armies located their heavier, less mobile field pieces on elevated ground behind the infantry line where they had an unobstructed view of the enemy to enable acquiring targets easily and to facilitate sweeping the battlefield with fire. Following the field artillery duel that opened the battle to neutralize enemy cannons and soften up the enemy infantry line, commanders maneuvered their battalion guns to keep them on line with the advancing infantry to minimize masking the enemy by friendly troops. Usually, the guns

1Philip J. Haythornwaite, The Napoleonic Source Book (New York: Facts on File, 1990), pp. 82, 106-07; E. Thionville, “Artillery in Battle Yesterday and Today,” trans. by Cpt John E. McMahon, Journal of the Artillery, 21(1904): 274

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could not keep pace with the infantry and fell behind only to have their line of sight masked.2 With few exceptions field artillerymen employed face-to-face communications or hand signals with infantry commanders to designate targets in support of infantry and cavalry formations or for counterbattery (field artillery fires designed to neutralize or destroy enemy field artillery) fire because they could easily see each other.3 Powerful, mobile, smoothbore bronze guns introduced by Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval of France, John Muller of Great Britain, and other Europeans during the latter years of the 18th Century paved the way for aggressive field artillery tactics and organizational reforms during the Napoleonic Wars. At the Battle of Friedland (modern Pravdinsk, Russia) in 1807, Brigadier General Alexandre Antoine Hureau de Senarmont, one of Napoleon’s corps artillery commanders, boldly pushed his field guns out in front of the French infantry line after winning the opening artillery duel against Russian cannons. He maneuvered his guns to within canister range (350-500 yards) of the Russian lines to tear them apart with furious canister fire. He subsequently pushed his guns within 60 yards of the enemy infantry line and opened fire with canister fire again, destroying the Russian lines and paving the way for the infantry advance. In view of Senarmont’s success, other European armies adopted his aggressive tactics.4 Smoothbore muskets of the early 19th Century with effective ranges of 50 to 100 yards made moving within canister range of the enemy possible because gun crews could fire canister from their smoothbore cannons at enemy infantry formations without being engaged by smoothbore musket fire. Meanwhile, the desire to mass fire from batteries of 30 to 40 cannons on enemy formations, initially advocated by the Du Teil brothers of France during the latter decades of the 18th Century to cause more damage than small batteries, encouraged European armies to abandon the battalion gun concept. With a few exceptions commanders centralized their field artillery at the division or corps to expedite forming huge batteries to blast holes in the enemy line for friendly infantry or cavalry to pour through. Together, new technology and centralized command and control gave smoothbore bronze field artillery a more lethal role on the battlefield than previously. Massed fire from smoothbore cannons grouped in large batteries positioned in the open for direct fire made field artillery deadly as the Napoleonic Wars of the early 1800s attested.5

2Haythornwaite, The Napoleonic Source Book, pp. 82, 106-07; E. Thionville, “Artillery in Battle Yesterday and Today,” p. 274 3B.P. Hughes, British Smooth-Bore Artillery: The Muzzle-Loading Artillery of the 18th and 19th Centuries (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1969), p. 61; Haythornwaite, The Napoleonic Source Book, pp. 82, 106-07. 4Hughes, British Smooth-Bore Artillery, p. 61; Haythornwaite, The Napoleonic Source Book, pp. 82, 106-07; Fairfax Downey, Cannonade: Great Artillery Actions of History, the Famous Cannons, and the Master Gunners (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 170-72. 5Boyd L. Dastrup, The Field Artillery: History and Sourcebook (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), pp. 26-28; J.B.A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (New York: The Military Press, 1989), p. 115; Chris Bellamy, Red God of War: Soviet Artillery and Rocket Forces (London: Brassey’s Defence Publisher, 1986) pp. 18-22; Paddy Griffith,

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Smoothbore bronze field artillery, aggressive tactics, and direct fire, however, experienced a short-lived heyday. Within a few years after the Napoleonic Wars, the Industrial Revolution continued sweeping through Europe and the United States and introducing new technology that upset the delicate balance between smoothbore cannons with effective ranges around 1,000 yards with solid shot and smoothbore muskets. Improving upon the work of Captain William W. Greener of the British army, Captain Claude E. Minié of the French army designed an elongated, cast-lead projectile in the 1840s to make rifled muskets a reality for military use. The Minié bullet, as it was called, made loading a rifled musket easier than before, increased rates of fire, improved accuracy, and extended ranges beyond 300 yards with some rifled muskets having the ability to kill at 400 yards.6 Meanwhile, Europeans introduced rifled field artillery, keeping pace with the developments in small arms. In 1846 Major Gionvanni Cavalli of the Italian army unveiled the first workable rifled, breech-loading field piece. He constructed a cast-iron gun with a spiral groove in the tube that ran from one end to the other and created an elongated projectile with two lugs to fit the groove that caused the projectile to spin as it traveled down the bore of the weapon. Subsequently in the 1850s, Joseph Whitworth of Great Britain, Sir William Armstrong of Great Britain, and other Europeans began manufacturing rifled breech-loading and muzzle-loading wrought-iron field artillery. The spinning action caused by the rifling gave rifled field artillery greater accuracy and longer ranges than smoothbore field guns. By the 1860s the typical European rifled field gun had an average range of 4,000 yards, while smoothbore field artillery had a range of 1,000 yards.7 Even though long-range, rifled field artillery permitted engaging targets at distances beyond human eyesight (approximately 1,700 yards), fighting at relatively close ranges and employing direct fire and fast-paced operations dominated tactical thinking in Europe in the mid-1800s. Such tactics, a legacy of the Napoleonic Wars where field artilleryman dashed gallantly around the battlefield with their guns in tow and fired at close ranges in support of densely packed linear infantry formations, discouraged finding methods to exploit long-range field artillery and to attack targets beyond human eyesight.8 Existing indirect fire techniques also inhibited shelling unseen targets and taking ______Battle Tactics of the Civil War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 176; Frank E. Comparato, Age of Great Guns: Cannon Kings and Cannoneers Who Forged the Firepower of Artillery (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1965), pp. 11-12. 6Dastrup, The Field Artillery, pp. 29-30; Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, pp. 73-74. 7Dastrup, The Field Artillery, p. 30. 8Boyd L. Dastrup, King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Artillery (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992), p. 84; J.B.A. Bailey, The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare (Camberly, Surrey, GB: The Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1996), pp. 7-8; Robert H. Scales, Jr., Firepower in Limited War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), pp. 5-7.

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advantage of long-range, rifled field pieces on the open, mobile battlefield. For years European armies had used mortars to lob projectiles over fortification walls, but observers were not generally in a position to adjust the fall of the shot, so hitting a particular unseen target was problematic. During the Crimean War of the 1850s, the combatants utilized long- range siege artillery to attack fortresses. To protect their siege guns from withering fire from heavily armed fortifications, the Europeans hid their weapons on the reverse side of the slope and employed an observer and a line of markers from the guns to the point at which the target could be seen to align the guns. Suitable for siege warfare and designed for assaulting stationary targets, indirect fire of the times was unusable on a mobile battlefield as envisioned by Europeans during the middle of the 19th Century.9 Meanwhile, a major factor blocked exploiting long-range, rifled field artillery and utilizing indirect fire in the United States during the middle years of the nineteenth century. The difficult terrain of most Civil War battlefields with their limited fields of fire and lines of sight compelled Union and Confederate armies to fight at close ranges where gun crews could see their targets. In view of this situation, no compelling tactical reason existed to employ long-range, rifled field artillery to engage targets beyond human eyesight and to introduce indirect fire although rifled field artillery occasionally displayed its ability of hitting targets at long ranges during the American Civil War when the targets could be seen with the aid of a telescope or binoculars and although indirect fire was used occasionally when circumstances were just right.10 Yet, as the American Civil War revealed, rifled muskets forced field artillerymen to make tactical adaptations to survive. The Battle of First Bull Run of 1861 demonstrated the futility of pushing field artillery within canister range of enemy infantry formations equipped with rifled muskets as American cannoneers had done in the Mexican War of 1846-1848 or in the Napoleonic Wars. Infantry armed with rifled muskets made this tactic suicidal by severely punishing batteries that dared to close within canister range. For protection from rifled musket fire, Civil War field artillerymen retreated to elevations behind the infantry line where they could still see their target for direct fire and yet be out of range of rifled muskets. Although the new rifled technology of the American Civil War did not compel field artillerymen to abandon direct fire, it suggested imperative of making tactical changes to survive. The lethality and ranges of rifled weapons, especially small arms, forced the offense to attack over greater distances in the face of intense fire before reaching its objective and made assaults bloody affairs and often failures and contributed to the importance of entrenchments. Based upon their Civil War experience, farsighted American army officers of the 1860s contemplated that the tactical defense would become even stronger as rifled

9Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 115-20; Bailey, The First World War and the Birth of the Modern Style of Warfare, pp. 7-11. 10Dastrup, King of Battle, pp. 118-19, 128; Prentice G. Morgan, “The Forward Observer,” Military Affairs, Winter 1959-60, pp. 209-12; Ben Crookshanks, “Eighteen-year Old Sergeant Milton Humphreys Changes the Nature of Artillery Forever with His Concept of Indirect Fire,” www.the historynet.com/AmericasCivilWar/articles. Sergeant Humphrey’s method of indirect fire never caught on and was never used besides him.

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weapons became more widespread in the future to create even more lethal battlefields and that tactical reforms would be essential for survival.11 Although rifled small arms and field artillery introduced greater accuracy, improved lethality, and longer ranges than their smoothbore counterparts, tactics forced field artillerymen to employ their rifled field guns at close ranges for direct fire as they did smoothbore artillery. To take advantage of the long range rifled field cannons, field artillerymen had to find a better method of attacking enemy targets.

NEW TECHNOLOGY AND DIRECT FIRE

During the three decades following the American Civil War of 1861-1865, technological advancements of the intensifying Industrial Revolution continued improving firepower and forcing tactical adjustments on the battlefield to be made. The Field Artillery had to adopt new tactics to take advantage of the new technology that was dramatically increasing in lethality. New gun metal and gunpowder enhanced lethality and spurred on new field artillery tactics. Through the 1840s, cannon manufacturers produced cast-bronze and cast-iron field artillery for the most part. Each metal had its strengths and weaknesses. Bronze, the favorite gun metal for centuries, was a combination of tin and copper, was elastic, and did not burst easily. Yet, it was expensive and too soft to hold rifling for any length of time because repeated firings wore out the rifling easily. Because of its high carbon content, cast iron was brittle and often burst upon being fired with little warning. To overcome this cannon manufacturers had to produce heavy, cast-iron artillery pieces to prevent the tube from bursting, making them heavy and immobile and unsuitable for field artillery. Although the availability of inexpensive iron ore sources caused the American army to introduce cast-iron field pieces during the first four decades of the 1800s, European armies retained their more expensive bronze ones. Such deficiencies with cast bronze and cast iron, however, encouraged armies to search for other types of gun metal. Cannon manufacturers had used wrought iron for years, but new refining techniques in the 1700s and especially the 1800s improved the metal and made it less expensive and more available than previously. Besides these qualities, wrought iron retained the rifling and was strong. In view of this, European and American armies started replacing their cast-bronze and cast-iron cannons with wrought- iron field pieces in the mid-1800s with the American M1861 3-inch Ordnance being a good example.12 Steel, however, provided the most significant breakthrough in gun metal. In 1857 Henry Bessemer of Great Britain developed a process for producing steel from pig iron by blowing air through molten ore. Along with the introduction of the Siemens-Martin open hearth method in France in 1864, the Bessemer process made the large-scale production of

11Dastrup, The Field Artillery, p. 30; Perry D. Jamieson, Crossing the Deadly Ground: U.S. Army Tactics, 1865-1899 (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1994), pp. 1-2. 12Comparato, Age of Great Guns, p. 209.

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steel possible. Because Bessemer and Siemens-Martin steel was stronger, more durable, and less expensive than other metals, European and American industrialists converted from cast- iron and wrought-iron machinery to steel machinery in their factories in the 1860s and afterwards. Realizing the benefits of steel, arms manufacturers with Alfred Krupp of Germany leading the way began producing steel field artillery in the 1860s. By the late 1880s, arms manufacturers and field artillery officers found steel to be an indispensable gun metal. Steel meant lighter, more mobile field guns with the ability to hold rifling longer than other metals.13 New field artillery technology continued to appear after the adoption of steel. In 1873 Krupp introduced one of the first workable on-carriage recoil systems for field artillery to increase rates of fire and to reduce the work required by the gun crew to fire the weapon. Because a cannon without an on-carriage recoil system rolled back on the ground upon being fired, the crew had to manhandle the weapon to get it back into battery and had to relay the cannon after every shot. This was time consuming and labor intensive. Krupp’s system allowed the tube to recoil on the carriage and return back into battery with minimal carriage movement and minimized the labor to fire the cannon. The recoil system also reduced the time required to relay the cannon. Soon, many European cannon manufacturers were producing steel field pieces with recoil systems, springs, spades, and other devices to dampen the recoil. In the 1880s Paul Vieille, a French chemist, produced the first smokeless (high explosive) powder for military use in small arms and field artillery. Besides greatly reducing the amount of smoke created by the powder explosion, smokeless powder increased the ranges of small arms and field artillery. Using high explosive as a propellant, a rifled steel field pieces could fire a projectile up to 6,000 yards and more, representing a 50 percent improvement over the ranges of black powder field artillery. Subsequently, the Europeans adopted smokeless powder as a bursting charge that splintered steel projectiles into razor-sharp fragments to increase the lethality of field artillery. In comparison, black powder produced only five to seven fragments when it detonated a shell. About the same time Europeans developed fixed ammunition by putting the propellant in a metal cylinder and attaching the projectile to it. This reduced the number of steps required to load and fire the weapon.14 Together, recoil systems and fixed ammunition led to the appearance of quick-fire field artillery in the 1890s with rates of fire of five to six rounds per minute to represent a significant increase over smoothbore field artillery’s rate of fire of one to two rounds a minute. In concert with magazine-fed, breech-loading, repeating small arms firing fixed ammunition and smokeless powder, long-range, rapid-fire steel field artillery gave defenders clear fields of fire against attacking soldiers and compelled the offense to cross long stretches

13Dastrup, The Field Artillery, p. 31; William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Forces, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 237; Comparato, Age of Great Guns, pp. 209-10. 14Dastrup, The Field Artillery, pp. 41-42; Heinrich Rohne, The Progress of Modern Field Artillery, translated by Montgomery M. Macomb. (Washington, D.C.: Gibson Brothers, 1908), pp. 14-16.

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of terrain under intense fire.15 In 1897 the impact of the technological revolution of the past three decades distinctly manifested itself. That year, the French introduced its breech-loading M1897 75-mm. field gun with a sophisticated recoil system, a rate of fire of 20 rounds or more a minute in an emergency, and a range of 9,500 yards. The French 75-mm. gun established the standard for rapid-fire field guns.16 In the meantime, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 that broke out at the beginning of the rifled weapons revolution prompted tactical innovations. During the war, devastating small arms fire from the French Chassepót rifle and the German Dreyse needle gun with ranges over 1,000 yards and rifled steel field artillery fire wreaked havoc with the offense, forced greater dispersion of the infantry, and annihilated field batteries positioned in the open for direct fire at the same time. In addition, Prussian and French armies had difficulties locating suitable firing positions for the large number of guns required to be assembled hub-to-hub to mass direct fire. Influenced by the war, the Europeans subsequently envisioned the tactical need of dispersing their infantry more than ever, hiding their field pieces, adopting indirect fire of some kind, and embracing the appropriate technology and techniques for target acquisition for survival on a battlefield that was more lethal than ever before. Yet, without target acquisition capabilities to locate targets that could not be seen by hidden batteries indirect fire would be impossible; and field artillerymen would be forced to position their batteries in the open and subject them to excruciating hostile small arms and field artillery fire.17 Although European armies tried different methods of indirect fire during the 1870s with varying degrees of success, Lieutenant Colonel Karl G. Guk of the Russian army wrote the seminal treatise on indirect fire, entitled The Covered Fire of Field Artillery (1882). The indirect fire method that had been used the most for several years depended upon a line of stakes from the gun to the point at which the target could be seen. Although this was reliable and simple, it was designed for siege warfare and was incompatible with mobile warfare practiced in Europe at the time. Searching for an indirect fire technique appropriate for mobile warfare, Guk advocated hiding the battery and engaging an unseen target by employing a compass, an aiming point, and a forward observer. The observer located the target, measured the angle created by the aiming point, the battery, and the target and sent the information to the battery. Upon receiving the data, the battery then traversed the base piece

15Dastrup, The Field Artillery, pp. 39-42; Rohne, The Progress of Modern Field Artillery, p. 20; Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Artillery (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993), p. 4; Jamieson, Crossing Deadly Ground, pp. 70-72. 16Dastrup, The Field Artillery, p. 43; Bellamy, Red God of War, p. 30. 171lt William E. Birkhimer, “Has the Adoption of the Rifle-Principle to Fire-Arms Diminished the Relative Importance of Field Artillery,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, 6(1885): 197, 227; Dastrup, The Field Artillery, pp. 42-43; Bellamy, Red God of Fire, pp. 16, 28; Bailey, Firepower and Field Artillery, pp. 115-19; Gudmundsson, On Artillery, pp. 1-16; John A. English, A Perspective on Infantry (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 4.

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the requisite number of degrees onto the target. Range was estimated and adjusted by the observer.18 Within years European field artillerymen adopted Guk’s method for indirect fire because it was effective and simple. As their 75-mm. field gun was appearing, progressive French field artillerymen affirmed the imperative of employing indirect fire by pointing out the vulnerability of locating a battery on the high ground, the ideal spot for direct fire, to field artillery and infantry fire. For the same reason, Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, a noted German field artillery expert of the late 19th Century, strongly supported indirect fire to protect German field guns from hostile field artillery and small arms fire. Recognizing the impact of the recent advances in field artillery technology, enterprising German field artillerymen pointed out that the increased ranges of modern field guns, the precision fire of modern small arms and field artillery, and the introduction of smokeless powder made utilizing natural and artificial cover essential.19 For field artillery to survive on such a lethal battlefield, it had to be concealed behind a natural or artificial cover and employ indirect fire. That meant adopting observers to locate targets and adjust fire to support the other combat arms and restructuring combined arms warfare in the process by moving the guns off the infantry line to covered positions to the rear, depending upon observers to follow the ebb and flow of the battle, and placing a premium upon a communications network to tie field artillery units to the other combat arms to orchestrate movements. Although many European field artillery officers understood the necessity of hiding their batteries to protect them and employing indirect fire, they were also suspicious of the technique. They feared that gun crews would sacrifice effect for safety and would lose their aggressiveness that had characterized field artillery tactics in Europe since the Napoleonic wars earlier in the 19th Century. The obsession of protecting the guns from small arms and field artillery fire interestingly prevented most European field artillerymen from fully comprehending the revolutionary implications of indirect fire upon combined arms warfare. Line-of-sight communication techniques, such as hand signals, between commanders, especially field artillery and infantry, would disappear except in unusual circumstances because field artillerymen would no longer be on line with the infantrymen. Commanders would have to find other methods of communicating.20 While the Europeans were making tremendous strides towards adopting more dispersed infantry formations on the offense to protect them from small arms and field artillery fire, improving their field artillery, and seeking new methods of fire direction during the latter years of the 19th Century, the Americans lagged far behind in field artillery developments. A surplus of Civil War bronze, cast-iron, and wrought-iron cannons and a

18Dastrup, King of Battle, pp. 126-29; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 118-19; Bailey, The First World War and the Birth of Modern Style of Warfare, p. 7; Bellamy, Red God of War, pp. 28-30; Cpt Ernest Hinds, trans., “Employment of Artillery Fire,” Journal of the United States. Artillery, Sep-Oct 1904, pp. 147, 156; Hinds, trans., “Employment of Artillery Fire,” Journal of U.S. Artillery, Jul-Aug 1904, pp. 55-57. 19Dastrup, The Field Artillery, p. 43; Bellamy, Red God of War, p. 30. 20Dastrup, The Field Artillery, p. 43; Bellamy, Red God of War, p. 30.

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lightly armed and elusive enemy, Native American, on the American frontier, discouraged the War Department from introducing new field artillery for 20 years after the Civil War. The most modern American cannon on the eve of the Spanish-American War of 1898 was the steel, breech-loading M1885 3.2-inch field gun. Adopted in the mid-1880s, the weapon lacked an on-carriage recoil system, fired one to two rounds per minute, employed black powder as a propellant and bursting change, and had a range of over 6,000 yards. The only real characteristic, however, that separated the M1885 from its smoothbore predecessors was its steel tube and carriage and long range.21 Although the M1885 did not represent state-of-the-art field artillery technology, American field artillerymen clearly understood the implications of its long range. Writing in 1885, First Lieutenant William E. Birkhimer, a rising field artillery intellectual in the U.S. Army and author of Historical Sketch of the Organization, Administration, Materiel and Tactics of the Artillery, U.S. Army (1884), explained the impact of long-range, rifled steel field artillery that was appearing in Europe and the United States.22 He noted, “Field artillery of the present day is capable of doing excellent work beyond the limit of distinct vision. The trouble is not with the gun but with the gunner. The telescopic sight, however, gives promise of solving this difficulty.”23 The sight would allow the gun crew to attack targets beyond human eyesight and permit the guns operating in the open far beyond small arms range. Although Birkhimer tacitly acknowledged the existence of indirect fire in the 1880s, he advocated direct fire. It was easier to use and more familiar to him and permitted engaging a visible target at a long range. At the same time he noted that field artillerymen should restrict the employment of indirect fire to attacking an “enemy protected by either natural or artificial cover.”24 According to Birkhimer, indirect fire was valuable for attacking troops in entrenchments but had limited utility on a mobile battlefield where guns had to shift their fire rapidly from target to target.25 As his writing intimated, Birkhimer envisioned a battlefield similar to those of the American Civil War except larger. In 1885 he wrote about opening up field artillery fire at approximately 3,000 yards to drive back the enemy’s advance guard and to cover the deployment of friendly infantry. As the attack continued, field artillery batteries would move forward with the infantry until they were within small arms range although this would jeopardize the safety of the crews. Closing with the enemy was imperative to furnish effective close support (field artillery fires designed to neutralize or destroy enemy forces that

21Dastrup, King of Battle, p. 144; Rohne, The Progress of Modern Field Artillery, pp. 11-20; Dastrup, The Field Artillery, p. 41; Gudmundsson, On Infantry, pp. 1-13; English, A Perspective on Infantry, pp. 1-6. 22William E. Birkhimer, Historical Sketch of the Organization, Administration, Materiel and Tactics of the Artillery, U.S. Army (1884, reprinted in 1968) was one of the first branch histories of a branch of the U.S. Army. 23Birkhimer, “Has the Adaptation of the Rifle-Principle to Fire-Arms Diminished the Relative Importance of Field Artillery,” p. 201. 24 Ibid., pp. 193-97, 201, 205, and 214-15. 25Ibid., pp. 193, 215, 229.

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the friendly infantry from advancing) and to ensure victory.26 First Lieutenant Charles D. Parkhurst of the Fourth Artillery Regiment also recognized the significance of long-range field artillery and the new military technology in general. In an article in the Journal of the United States Artillery, published in 1892, he argued that human vision was about 2,500 yards but that sighting a gun on a target more than 1,000 yards away was difficult. He added, “Hence, what use [is it] to have a gun capable of being shot . . . two miles [3,520 yards], when you cannot see [that far]? The eye must have [an] aid, and the telescopic sight becomes an absolute necessity.”27 To be sure, Parkhurst understood the dilemma posed by the new field artillery technology. Although field pieces could shoot farther than the human eye could see, telescopic sights would allow exploiting the ranges. However, telescopic sights only permitted field artillerymen to see targets at great distances as long as the terrain was relatively flat and targets were in the open, extended the possibility of preserving the direct fire tradition, and minimized the need for sophisticated target acquisition capabilities. Basically, Parkhurst and other field artillery officers failed to comprehend the revolutionary impact of the new field artillery technology and relied upon tried-and-proven direct fire even though they acknowledged indirect fire’s existence. With indirect fire field artillery gun crews could engage targets and enemy formations far beyond human eyesight on the reverse side of the hill, especially if they had , before they could mass and attack. Coupled with long-angle field artillery that was beginning to appear, field artillerymen employing indirect fire could attack far more targets than with direct fire and also move their battery position less frequently. Yet, this was missed because of the narrow focus on direct fire.28 Besides Birkhimer and Parkhurst, the War Department, although it was aware of the discussions in Europe about the necessity of concealing guns to protect them from hostile fire and employing indirect fire, did not emphasize the new form of fire direction. Its official drill regulations of the late 1880s and the 1890s remained silent on indirect fire and championed employing direct fire even at ranges of 3,000 yards. As such, field artillerymen could take advantage of the increased ranges of their weapons without relying upon indirect fire, even though the War Department conceded the requirement for such fire to hit concealed targets beyond human eyesight. Favoring direct fire over indirect fire, War Department officials envisioned fighting on fairly flat terrain without obstacles blocking the line of sight. As such, they certainly did not stand at the vanguard of innovation during the latter years of the 19th Century and foresaw fighting battles along the lines of those in the

26Ibid., p. 221 271lt Charles D. Parkhurst, “Field-Artillery, Its Organization and Its Role,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 1(1892): 275. 28Ibid.; See Rohne’s The Progress of Modern Field Artillery for an outstanding discussion on the new technology that was appearing in Europe during the last three decades of the 19th Century. Birkhimer’s Historical Sketch of the Organization, Administration, Materiel and Tactics of the Artillery is good on American field artillery. See Boyd L. Dastrup’s King of Battle for more information on the Army's field artillery during the last three decades of the 19th Century.

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Civil War of the 1860s. In fact, maintaining tradition was more important than innovation because it was more comfortable and meant preserving the status quo.29 Although the War Department officially sanctioned direct fire and gave passing attention to indirect fire, Major Arthur L. Wagner, an instructor at the U.S. Army Infantry and Cavalry School, , Kansas, did not. In Organization and Tactics, initially published in 1894, reprinted in 1898, and used as a text at the school, Wagner examined the possibilities of indirect fire to hit targets at the long ranges of the modern field guns and the growing importance of concealing them from view. He pointed out, “It has been recommended by respectable authorities that shelter be obtained by withdrawing the guns slightly down the reverse slope of the crest and directing their fire by means of pointing rods.”30 At the same time he supported Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen of the German army who found indirect fire to be impractical on a mobile battlefield because it was too slow. Although Wagner was never a strong advocate of indirect fire, he did not dismiss it as the War Department was doing.31 In 1895 (later Major General) William Lassiter of the First Artillery Regiment, writing in the Journal of the United States Artillery, also expressed his thoughts about the new field artillery being introduced and indirect fire. After discussing the difficulties of detecting targets at the long ranges of the new field artillery, he advocated adopting indirect fire.32 In contrast to advocates of direct fire, Lassiter pushed the War Department to adopt indirect fire even though its effectiveness was questionable and was being hotly debated in Europe during the last decade of the 19th Century.33 As Lassiter observed, field artillerymen had to find a suitable method of engaging an unseen target. Otherwise, positioning field guns out in the open for direct fire would make them vulnerable to hostile field artillery and small arms fire as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 had demonstrated, would hamper effective close support for the other combat arms, and would hinder exploiting long-range field artillery. Such a situation would be catastrophic. Without the benefit of covering field artillery fire to neutralize or destroy

29Jamieson, Crossing the Deadly Ground, pp. 82-84; War Department, Artillery Tactics (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1888); War Department, Artillery Tactics (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1889); War Department, Drill Regulations, Light Artillery, 1891; and War Department, Drill Regulation, Light Artillery, 1896. See Vardell E. Nesmith’s “The Quiet Paradigm Change: The Evolution of the Field Artillery Doctrine of the , 1861-1905,” Doctoral Dissertation, Duke University, 1977, for an insightful examination of the challenges associated with the transition from direct fire to indirect fire in the U.S. Army. 30Arthur L. Wagner, Organization and Tactics (Kansas City: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Company, 1898), p. 387. 31Ibid. 322lt William Lassiter, “Range and Positioning Finding,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 4(1895): 239-40. 33Parkhurst, “Field-Artillery, Its Organization and Role,” p. 275; Lassiter, “Range and Position Finding,” pp. 239-40.

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enemy small arms and field artillery fire, the attacking infantry would assault strong defensive positions virtually alone and face possible annihilation. Fighting on the modern battlefield demanded relatively loose infantry formations that were being slowly adopted after years of debate, that complicated command and control, and that required indirect fire to pave the way for the attack and simultaneously protect the guns. However, as its advocates noted, indirect fire necessitated an effective communications network to tie the guns and infantry together.34 Despite the urgency, most European and American field artillerymen of the 1880s and 1890s did not eagerly embrace indirect fire for several reasons. Indirect fire was a revolutionary and an untested idea during those years and meant abandoning the romantic notion of gun crews racing around the battlefield and engaging the enemy at close ranges as Napoleonic cannoneers had done earlier in the 1800s. At the same time indirect fire caused some infantry soldiers to question the courage of field artillerymen and their ability to support the other combat arms effectively because they would not be up front where the action was and where they could see what was happening. Also, indirect fire was slower and more complicated than direct fire because it required basic mathematical computations and reliable technology for communicating between the observer and the battery. In view of this, some field artillerymen rightly feared being left out of the fight if they employed indirect fire on the modern, mobile battlefield because field batteries would not be able to shift fire rapidly enough around the battlefield as they had done during the direct fire days and becoming irrelevant. They envisioned irrelevancy if they employed indirect fire. Besides this, indirect fire’s requirement to range a target would demand more ammunition than direct fire would. For these reasons, most European and American field artillerymen at the end of the 19th Century resisted abandoning direct fire, although progressive ones wanted to adopt the new method of fire direction.35 As such, the War Department’s official drill regulations of the 1880s and 1890s more closely reflected the general attitudes of field artillerymen than Lassiter did. Relinquishing tried and proven direct fire for relatively untested and complicated indirect fire was not seen

34Dastrup, The Field Artillery, p. 43; Jamieson, Crossing the Deadly Ground, pp. 70- 73, 96, 99, 101-23, 128-29; Gudmundsson, On Infantry, pp. 1-13; English, A Perspective on Infantry, pp. 1-6. 35Dastrup, The Field Artillery, p. 44; “An Apparatus for Pointing by Means of an Elevated Line of Metal, Automatically Finding Concealed Position,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 9(1898): 215; Cpt C. Holmes Wilson, R.F.A., “The Employment of R.F. Artillery in the Field,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 21(1904): 49, 52-53; Heinrich von Brill, “A New Method of Indirect Laying for Field Artillery,” trans. by Lt Joseph E. Kuhn, Journal of the United States Artillery, 3(1894): 444-45; General Percin, “Masked Fire of the Artillery,” trans. by Lt Benjamin F. Castle, Field Artillery Journal, Jan 1913, pp. 98, 103; Maj Gen Moriz Edler von Reichold, “Indirect Fire,” trans. by 2lt J.A. Shipton, Journal of the United States Artillery, 8(1897): 170-71; 1lt Emery T. Smith, “Field Artillery: Its Organization and Employment,” Lecture, 10 Mar 1916, pp. 6-7, Morris Swett Technical Library (MSTL), Ft. Sill, Ok.

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as necessary or even desirable. After all, telescopic sights seemed to resolve the problem of seeing targets at long ranges and would still permit employing direct fire. To be sure, the Army found itself in a rapidly changing tactical and technological environment caused by the Industrial Revolution following the Civil War. Metallic cartridge case ammunition, smokeless powder, magazine-fed and bolt-action infantry , and quick- fire field artillery increased firepower and the lethality of the battlefield, spelled an end to Napoleonic warfare as the Europeans and Americans understood it, and compelled officers to search for new ways of fighting. In the 1890s the Army adopted loose-ordered infantry formations to help offset the revolution in firepower but failed to accept indirect fire. As the situation with firepower suggested, officers faced a dilemma. They could accept the new infantry tactics and indirect fire that placed a premium on effective communications and venture into the unknown or hold to the old ways and face possible slaughter in combat. By adopting loose-ordered infantry formations on the offense and failing to accept indirect fire, American army officers partially resolved the dilemma. Infantry formations would be dispersed, but field artillery units would still fight in the open and be vulnerable to enemy field artillery and small arms fire. For American field artillery, the Spanish-American War of 1898 highlighted the limitations of direct fire, the dangers of closing with an entrenched enemy on the modern battlefield, and the problems of falling behind technologically. As the Spanish retreated from San Juan Hill near Santiago, Cuba, on 1 July 1898, the American commander, Major General William R. Shafter, repositioned his field artillery. He directed the commander of the provisional field artillery battalion, Major John W. Dillenback, to move Captain Clermont Best’s and Captain Charles D. Parkhurst’s batteries to Kettle Hill in front of San Juan Hill to help Captain George S. Grimes’ battery sited at El Poso bombard enemy positions. Before Best’s and Parkhurst’s batteries could fire more than one round from their new locations, the Spanish had evacuated San Juan Hill and were moving into their main defenses near Santiago. To assist the American infantry line that was advancing in loose-ordered fashion with men assaulting in groups with one providing fire cover for the other and to help defend against a possible counterattack on San Juan Hill, Best relocated his battery to the crest of San Juan Hill. Heavy enemy small arms and field artillery fire, however, forced Best to retire to Kettle Hill.36 Commenting on the American field artillery positions on Kettle Hill and El Poso, Parkhurst remarked, “It was impossible for our guns to be of any service. San Juan Hill was higher and but a short distance in our front, and completely hid the enemy.”37 The Americans had sufficient range with their flat trajectory M1885 3.2-inch field guns to hit the main Spanish defensive lines from El Poso. However, they lacked the ability to employ indirect fire to engage unseen targets, while their flat trajectory field guns did not have the

36Report, Best, 15 Jul 1898, Annual Report (AR), Secretary of War (SW), Vol II, pp. 413-14; Report, Best, undated, AR, SW, Vol II, p. 416; Report, Parkhurst, 12 Sep 1898, AR, SW, Vol II, pp. 419-20; Report, Dillenback, AR, SW, Vol II, p. 411; Jamieson, Crossing the Deadly Ground, pp. 138, 146-47. 37Report, Parkhurst, 12 Sep 1898, AR, SW, Vol II, p. 420.

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ability to hit targets on the reverse slope.38 At San Juan Hill on the night of 1-2 July 1898, Dillenback placed his three batteries on line with the infantry to bombard the Spanish early in the morning of 2 July 1898.39 “When the batteries commenced[,] the enemy opened upon us with artillery and infantry [fire] from entrenched lines and sharpshooters but a few hundred yards away, and the men were unable, owing to the severe fire, to properly serve the guns,” Dillenback recorded in an after action report on 15 July 1898.40 Supporting Dillenback, Second Lieutenant Dwight Aultman of Parkurst’s battery pointed out: Our smoke hung in the air, obscuring our view absolutely, and we were instantly subjected to strong infantry fire from the Spanish trenches. . . . Our fire was unaimed and the results could neither be observed nor ascertained, as our view was absolutely obscured by our own smoke.41 Intense enemy field artillery and infantry fire forced Dillenback to withdraw his batteries to safer ground about one mile behind the infantry line for the rest of the battle around Santiago and revealed the deficiencies of black powder field guns and direct fire. From positions that were far behind friendly lines, American field artillery lacked the ability to engage the unseen enemy and played a minor role in defeating the Spanish at Santiago.42 Interestingly, American field artillerymen believed solving the problem with new technology. By focusing intently upon the amount of smoke blocking their view and disclosing their positions as the source of their dilemma and the slow rate of fire of one to two rounds a minute with the M1885 field gun, American field artillerymen pressed to introduce a modern, rapid-fire steel field gun after the war along the lines of those being adopted by European armies and employed by the Spanish in Santiago so successfully in 1898 and concurrently ignored tactical solutions, meaning indirect fire, as a way of keeping field artillery in the fight. This thinking led to the development of the M1902 3-inch steel field gun during the first years of the 20th Century. Patterned after the impressive French M1897 75-mm. field piece, the M1902 had an on-carriage recoil system, employed smokeless powder as a propellant and a bursting charge, could fire up to ten rounds a minute in an emergency, and had a range of over 6,000 yards. Like other rapid-fire field guns of the time, the M1902 had a ballistic shield to protect the gun crew when advancing within small arms range for direct fire engagements and also had the capability of employing indirect fire that was still a controversial.43

38Ibid.; Report, Shafter, 13 Sep 1898, AR, SW, Vol I, pp. 64-65. 39Report, Dillenback, 15 Jul 1898, AR, SW, Vol II, p. 411. 40Report, Dillenback, 15 Jul 1898, in C.D. Parkhurst, “The Artillery at Santiago,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 11(1899): 180. 41Report, Aultman, 16 Jul 1898, in Parkhurst, pp. 185-86. 42Report, Dillenback, 15 Jul 1898, in Parkhurst, p. 180; Report, Aultman, 16 Jul 1898, in Parkhurst, p. 186; Arthur L. Wagner, Report of the Santiago Campaign, 1898, (Kansas City: Franklin Hudson Publishing Company, 1908), pp. 102, 116-21. 43Dastrup, King of Battle, pp. 142-43, 145-47; Report, Shafter, 13 Sep 1898, AR, SW, Vol I, pp. 63-65; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 116; Rohne, The Progress of

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At the beginning of the new century, American field artillery found itself in a troublesome dilemma. On one hand, equipped with the lethal, rapid-fire M1902 in comparison to the M1885 3.2-inch field gun employed in the Spanish-American War, American field artillery kept abreast of rapid-fire field guns in Europe. On the other hand, most field artillerymen, ranging from junior to senior officers, remained intellectually tied to direct fire and the past, even though progressive thinkers within the Army embraced indirect fire as a means to exploit the new technology and to protect the guns from extremely lethal small arms and field artillery fire. Of short duration, the Spanish-American War demonstrated the validity of loose- ordered infantry assaults with one group advancing as another group provided covering fire and the obsolescence of direct fire and American field artillery technology. For many American field artillery officers the real lesson to be learned centered on the backward state of American field artillery technology. For success in the future, the Americans required modern field artillery comparable to the French 75-mm. field gun. They felt comfortable employing direct fire and reluctantly embraced indirect fire and did not feel any great urgency converting to indirect fire.

ADOPTING THE NEW METHOD

Although the Spanish-American War encouraged the development of new field artillery weapons, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 provided the most convincing argument for adopting indirect fire. It forced armies to recognize the lethality of the modern battlefield and the need to adapt their tactics, including field artillery tactics, and new communications technology. When the war began, the Russians had experience with indirect fire; but they preferred direct fire because it was easier to perform, was faster, and did not make gun crews dependent upon someone else for locating targets. In comparison, the Japanese concealed their field guns on reverse slopes to screen them from enemy field artillery and small arms fire and employed indirect fire to silence technologically superior Russian field artillery positioned in the open to deliver massed direct fire along the lines that Napoleon’s gunners had delivered a century earlier. To protect their guns from destructive counterbattery fire, the Russians soon converted to employing indirect fire as a normal means of fire direction and enjoyed great success with it during the latter days of the war.44 ______Modern Field Artillery, pp. 22-23; War Department (WD), General Orders No. 71, 14 May 1903 44Bellamy, Red God of War, pp. 30-33; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 118-19; Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, Firepower: British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 10, 12; Comparato, Age of Great Guns, p. 241; WD, Reports of Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria During the Russo-Japanese War, (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1906), 1: 19-22, 42, 55, 266-67; 3: 31-35; 5: 118-19; “Field Artillery Tactics,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 24(1905): 229; Cpt Tiemann N. Horn,

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The significance of indirect fire did not go unnoticed by American observers of the war. In their reports the Americans candidly noted the vulnerability of guns positioned in the open for direct fire against an enemy that used indirect fire. Critiquing field artillery employment in the war, American army officers concluded, “The Japanese made a great feature of indirect fire. . . . As the war progressed, the Russians also saw its advantages and used it more frequently.”45 As their accounts revealed, American observers appreciated the importance of the new form of fire direction and along with their European counterparts advocated adopting it.46 Although armies started introducing indirect fire following the Russo-Japanese War, they proceeded cautiously for it meant breaking with current tactics and fire direction procedures and depending upon unreliable visual and mechanical communications technology to tie the guns and observers together. As late as 1914, the French, Germans, Americans, and others still taught that field artillerymen should move their batteries within small arms range when pressing home the infantry attack, entrenching when necessary to consolidate the ground gained. Such field artillery tactics involved coming out in the open for direct fire engagements and risking destruction and obviated the requirement for communications because field artillerymen could see the movements of the other combat arms.47 Moreover, the design of existing field guns during the first decade of the 20th Century encouraged direct fire because they were developed and introduced before indirect fire had been fully accepted. For example, the French 75-mm. gun, the German 77-mm. gun, the Russian 76.2-mm. gun, the British 12-pounder gun (3-inch), and the American 3-inch gun were flat trajectory weapons with high rates of fire and were equipped with ballistic shields to protect the gun crew from small arms fire and shrapnel at close ranges. Addressing the rationale for the shields, Lieutenant William Neuffer of the Third Bavarian Regiment of Field Artillery in the German army wrote in the Artilleristische Monateshäft in November 1909 about the shields enabling “us to engage [targets] at reasonable ranges.”48 Although the ______“Present Method and Lessons in Regard to Field Artillery Taught by the Russo-Japanese War,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 30(1908): 254, 257; Dastrup, King of Battle, pp. 148-52; Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001), pp. 14, 17; English, A Perspective on Infantry, p. 7. 45WD, Reports of Military Observers attached to the Armies in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War, 5: 116. 46Dastrup, King of Battle, pp. 148-52; Horn, “Present Method and Lessons in Regard to Field Artillery Taught by the Russo-Japanese War,” pp. 254, 257; Bellamy, Red God of War, pp. 30-33; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 118-19; Comparato, Age of Great Guns, p. 241. 47Lt Gen Wilhelm Balck, Development of Tactics of World War, trans. by Harry Bell (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools Press, 1922), p. 22; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, pp. 120, 122; English, A Perspective on Infantry, p. 11. 48Lt William Neuffer, “What Lessons in the Employment of Field Artillery Should be

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statement was ambiguous, Neuffer undoubtedly advocated employing direct fire within small arms range. However, he conceded, “Artillery seen is artillery lost” and cautioned against employing direct fire if the losses would be too great.49 General Heinrich Rohne, a noted German field artillery expert of the early 1900s, also furnished a well-argued reason for the shields.50 In his critical work, The Progress of Modern Field Artillery (1908), Rohne wrote how the shield would protect the gun crew from small arms fire and field artillery projectiles, such as shrapnel. In Rohne’s mind field artillery had to move into small arms range and use direct fire to attack targets when necessary.51 As Rohne’s and Neuffer’s comments suggested, field artillerymen encountered the challenge of making the intellectual transition to the new form of fire direction and simultaneously adopting new technology. Logically, they understood that the lethality of modern small arms and field artillery necessitated dispersed infantry formations on the offense, indirect fire for protection of the field guns, and forward observers for target acquisition. Their attachment to the old ways, however, still had a hold on them even after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 had demonstrated the futility of direct fire because they were uncomfortable with severing their ties completely with the past for an uncertain and complicated future, made provisions for direct fire in their tactics, and adopted field pieces designed for direct fire and indirect fire operations. Equally as important, European field artillerymen simultaneously encountered opposition from infantrymen and cavalrymen who preferred field artillery batteries to be deployed on line with them where they could be seen for morale purposes rather than hidden behind cover somewhere to the rear, fearing close support would not be available when and where it was needed. Infantry and cavalry officers understood the implications of indirect fire perhaps more than field artillery officers did who stressed using it to protect the guns. If indirect fire was adopted and employed, combined arms warfare as infantry and cavalry officers understood it would disappear because the field artillery would not be on line with them as in the past. The guns would be somewhere to their rear. As with dispersed fire-and-movement tactics that were becoming more prevalent in response to the dramatic increase in firepower during the last decades of the 19th Century and the first decade of the 20th Century and that raised questions about maintaining command and control of infantry formations under heavy fire with primitive telephones, indirect fire also depended upon unreliable telephone for communications. Simple stated, employing indirect fire in place of direct fire meant abandoning accepted combined arms warfare practices for new and untested tactics with their unprecedented reliance upon undependable communications technology.52 ______Deduced from the Experiences of the Russo-Japanese War?” trans by Maj G. LeR. Irwin, Field Artillery Journal, Apr-Jun 1911, p. 208. 49Ibid., pp. 208-09. 50Rohne, The Progress of Modern Field Artillery, p. 22. 51Ibid. 52Dastrup, The Field Artillery, p. 45; Neuffer, “What Lessons in the Employment of Field Artillery Should be Deduced from the Experiences of the Russo Japanese War?” pp. 208, 212, 213; WD, Drill Regulations for Field Artillery, 1905, pp. 72-73; Rohne, The

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As might be expected, American field artillerymen shared the recognition about the need to abandon direct fire following the Russo-Japanese War as their European contemporaries did. In a letter to the President of the Board for the Preparation of Field Artillery Drill Regulations in January 1904, Major C. Woodward exclaimed, “We don’t know anything about indirect fire, but it was critical because it would protect the guns from hostile fire.”53 One year later, Chief of Artillery, Brigadier General John P. Story (1904-1905), acknowledged that the effective employment of indirect fire by the Japanese was a reason for their success against the Russians in 1904-1905 and pushed for its adoption. From Story’s perspective, the War Department had to develop tactics to allow field artillerymen to employ the natural cover of hills and ridges to shelter their guns from enemy fire. Otherwise, destruction would be inevitable.54 Encouraged by Story, Brigadier General J.I. Rogers, a former artillery officer, and the Russo-Japanese War, the War Department revised its field artillery tactics over a period of several years. Although it did not totally forsake direct fire, the War Department published new drill regulations for field artillery in 1905 that centered on the aiming point method of indirect fire.55 A couple of years later in 1907, the War Department explained importance of hiding the guns and pointed out in Drill Regulations (1907), “When not incompatible with the effective accomplishment of the duty to be performed, concealment from view is always to be sought.”56 The regulation continued, “By rendering the guns inconspicuous, or entirely concealing them, their sustained service may be counted upon, while the difficulties of the enemy in locating his targets and adjusting his firing [on friendly artillery] are increased.”57 Thus, as many other armies were doing, the War Department acknowledged the value of indirect fire but retained direct fire as a viable option to demonstrate its hesitancy to adopt something new. Major Oliver L. Spaulding, an American field artillery expert, reflected the same ambivalence. In Notes on Field Artillery for Officers of All Arms which was a popular field artillery handbook and was adopted by the War Department as a standard text in its schools, he advocated direct and indirect fire.58 Spaulding’s 1908 edition pointed out, “Direct laying, is that method commonly employed when the target is clearly visible through the sights;

______Progress of Modern Field Artillery, p. 22; Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, p. 119. 53Ltr, Maj C. Woodward, Fort Sheridan, IL, to Maj Eli Hoyle, President of the Board for the Preparation of Field Artillery Drill Regulations, 26 Jan 1904, Correspondence to the President of the Board for the Preparation of Field Artillery Drill Regulations, 1904, MSTL. 54Dastrup, King of Battle, p. 149; Nesmith, “The Quiet Paradigm Change,” p. 322; Ltr, Woodward to Hoyle, 26 Jan 1904. 55AR, Chief of Artillery, 1906, p. 28; AR, War Department (WD), Vol 2, Report of the Chief of Artillery, p. 261. 56WD, Drill Regulations for Field Artillery, 1907, p. 163. 57Ibid. 58Steven A. Stebbins, “Indirect Fire: The Challenge and Response in the U.S. Army, 1907-1917,” unpublished masters thesis, University of North Carolina, p. 70.

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indirect fire, or indirect laying . . . [is] adopted when it [the target] is not so visible.”59 In the 1914 edition to his popular book, he wrote, “If the target cannot be seen, . . . ‘indirect laying’ . . . [is] resorted to.”60 Even though Spaulding clearly favored indirect fire, he did not make a complete break with the old form of fire direction by supporting it as late as 1917 if the situation warranted.61 As such, he was not that different from his colleagues by clinging to the tried and proven form of fire direction. In the 1917 edition of his book, however, Spaulding provided definitive guidance for employing each type of fire. Perhaps, more confident than other field artillerymen and simultaneously aware of the impact and limitations of indirect fire in World War One, Spaulding wrote, “Concealment is always to be sought unless it interferes with effect. The degree of concealment depends upon the situation.”62 Indirect fire, at least for Spaulding, was the preferred method of fire direction. If direct fire was more likely to provide the desired effect, then it should be used. Nine years after Spaulding had made his first pronouncement on indirect fire, his position had not changed that much by writing that the method of fire direction to be used was relative to the situation.63 If accepting indirect fire as a theory was difficult, putting it into practice proved to be as equally as challenging. For the purpose of learning indirect fire, the War Department authorized forming a provisional regiment at Fort Riley, Kansas, in 1904. As the pressure mounted to train field artillerymen on the latest fire direction procedures, the War Department disbanded the regiment before it could accomplish any training and created two provisional regiments early in 1905 – one at Fort Riley and the other at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. When the two regiments were disbanded in November 1905 before any concrete results could be made, the War Department opted to use the School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery at Fort Riley to train field artillerymen in indirect fire procedures. Unfortunately, the perennial shortage of personnel to staff the batteries, the inadequate ammunition allowances, and the practice of rotating units rapidly through the school prevented any serious instruction and left the Field Artillery without trained personnel.64 Over the next several years, the War Department failed to find a suitable means of training field artillerymen in indirect fire. Neither the garrison schools on army posts nor the Mounted Service School at Fort Riley, the successor to the School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery, with its emphasis upon theoretical training and equitation produced competent field artillery officers and enlisted personnel. In view of this, President Theodore Roosevelt who displayed a great interest in military matters dispatched Captain Dan T.

59Oliver L. Spaulding, Notes on Field Artillery for Officers of All the Arms (Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Cavalry Association, 1908), p. 62. 60Oliver L. Spaulding, Notes on Field Artillery for Officers of All the Arms (Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Cavalry Association, 1914), p. 82. 61Oliver L. Spaulding, Notes on Field Artillery for Officers of All the Arms (Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Cavalry Association, 1917), p. 130. 62Ibid. 63Ibid. 64Dastrup, King of Battle, p. 152.

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Moore to observe field artillery training in Europe in 1908-1909. Particularly impressed with the German Artillery School at Jüterborg, Moore recommended patterning an American school after it. Based upon Moore’s proposal and the need for qualified field artillerymen, the War Department subsequently sent Moore to Fort Sill late in 1910 to open the School of Fire for Field Artillery in 1911.65 Although the School of Fire graduated trained officers and enlisted personnel, it did not eliminate the inability to perform indirect fire. The Commandant of the School of Fire, Lieutenant Colonel Edward McGlachlin, Jr., who replaced Moore in 1914 and held that position until 1916 when the War Department closed the school and deployed students and staff to guard the Mexican border during the crisis with Mexico questioned the competency of the graduates to conduct indirect fire just as Moore had done previously. Some of the most experienced student officers could perform indirect fire; but most lacked the requisite skills. Thus, on the eve of World War One, American field artillerymen’s ability to execute indirect fire effectively, although it had been an official doctrine since 1905, was doubtful.66 Those field artillerymen who embraced indirect fire enthusiastically, however, clearly understood that its effectiveness hinged upon target acquisition capabilities and communication systems. Although the War Department’s Drill Regulations for Field Artillery (1905 and 1907) discussed the significance of observation, the first real examination of the topic came in the 1908 edition of the Drill Regulations for Field Artillery. It advocated positioning the officer conducting the fire where he could see his immediate target and the terrain that might be assigned to him to attack. Observers had to occupy the most favorable positions that combat permitted. Preferably, they should be as near as possible to the enemy. If they were near the guns, they should be posted on the flanks in elevated positions in a tree, on the top of a building, or on a tower for unobstructed vision. Even though progressive field artillerymen were examining the possibilities of employing balloons, dirigibles, or aircraft for observation purposes and understood the ground observer’s inability to see beyond visible horizon, the Drill Regulations for Field Artillery (1908) failed to mention anything about aerial observation of any kind and focused its attention upon terrestrial observation.67 Although the War Department’s subsequent edition of Drill Regulations for Field Artillery (1911) repeated much of what the 1908 edition had discussed, it emphasized target acquisition more strongly. If the observation station was near the guns, it had to be protected from hostile artillery fire. If the observers were neutralized, the guns would be useless. To

65Ibid., p. 153. See Cpt Dan T. Moore’s report on the School of Field Artillery Fire at Juterbog, Germany, for a full assessment, MSTL. 66Dastrup, King of Battle, p. 155; Stebbins, “Indirect Fire: The Challenge and Response in the U.S. Army, 1907-1917,” pp. 58-61. 67WD, Drill Regulations for Field Artillery (Provisional), 1905; WD, Drill Regulations for Field Artillery (Provisional), 1907; WD, Drill Regulations for Field Artillery (Provisional), 1908, pp. 125-25; Edgar F. Raines, Jr., Eyes for Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2000), p. 8.

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prevent this, field artillerymen had to take appropriate precautions to prevent observation posts, or observation stations as they were called, from being destroyed by enemy action. Without good observation indirect fire would be impossible and combined arms warfare would breakdown, meaning the cavalry and infantry would not have fire support as they attacked. Equally important, the guns would have to fire unprotected in the open.68 To circumvent falling back upon direct fire, the War Department introduced state-of- the-art communications systems as part of the transition to the new form of fire direction. By 1912 each field battery maintained three telephones, while each field artillery regiment and battalion had two which greatly sped up the transmission of fire commands from the forward observer to the battery.69 Even though the telephone offered much promise not only to field artillery units but also to all army units, it had one pivotal weakness. Wires linking one telephone with another could be cut or damaged during battle and cut communications. This prompted the War Department to retain signal flags and other forms of communications as backup measures. In 1912 Colonel E.A. Miller, President of the Field Artillery Board which tested new equipment and materiel, wrote about signal flags being an “indispensable adjunct” to the telephone. They allowed instant communication and could be used until telephone lines could be laid. Yet, they also revealed the observer’s position and were dangerous when riflemen were present.70 Major (later Major General and Chief of Field Artillery in the 1930-1934) Harry G. Bishop, a rising American field artillery expert, First Lieutenant Emery T. Smith of the Fifth Field Artillery Regiment, and Spaulding also understood the close relationship between indirect fire and observation or target acquisition. In Elements of Modern Field Artillery (1914), Bishop candidly conceded the requirement of good observation for effective indirect fire.71 A contemporary of Bishop, Smith also cautioned in 1916, “The success of indirect fire depends on observation.”72 Although the Field Artillery lacked forward observers on the eve of World War One that worked closely with the other combat arms, each battery had a reconnaissance officer who established the battery observation post that depended upon telephones to communicate with the battery. The post was manned by either the reconnaissance officer or the battery commander.73 In his book, Notes on Field Artillery for

68WD, Drill Regulations for Field Artillery (Provisional), 1911, p. 159. 69Cpt Oliver L. Spaulding, “The Use of Field Artillery,” Journal of the United States Artillery, May-Jun 1912, p. 24; WD, Regulations for Field Artillery, 1911, p. 271. 70Ltr, Cpt Adrian S. Fleming, Adjutant, 4th Field Artillery, to Adjutant General’s Office, 27 May 1911, 7th Endorsement by Field Artillery Board, Fort Riley, Kansas, 26 Oct 1912, File No. 413.77, Field Artillery Board, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, RG 177, National Archives; Lt Col John E. McMahon, “The Field Artillery of the United States: Its Organization and Tactical Use,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Mar 1912, pp. 96-97. 71Harry G. Bishop, Elements of Modern Field Artillery (Menasha, WI: George Banta Publishing Company, 1914), p. 84. 721lt Emery T. Smith, “Field Artillery: Its Organization and Employment,” Lecture, 10 Mar 1916, p. 12, MSTL. 73U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Close Support Study Group Final Report, 21 Nov

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Officers of All Arms (1917), Spaulding addressed the importance of observation equipment in the observation post – the battery commander’s telescope and observation ladder. Based upon battlefield conditions during World War One, he warned that smoke, irregularities in the ground, and indistinct targets would make observation difficult.74 As Spaulding’s writings revealed, field artillerymen with few exceptions clearly grasped the symbiotic relationship among indirect fire, observation, and communications. Without effective observation capabilities to acquire targets and communication systems to tie the observer to the guns, indirect fire would not function properly; and field artillerymen would have to rely on direct fire to furnish close support to friendly infantry as it attacked with its fire-and-movement tactics and provide counterbattery fires, endangering themselves and their guns in the process. Basically, pre-World War One doctrine in the American army dictated employing direct or indirect fire, depending upon the tactical situation, on an open, mobile battlefield and shifting fires rapidly and responsively to attack the gravest threat to the advancing friendly infantry.

THE TESTING GROUND

As might be expected, World War One challenged the assumptions about the Field Artillery’s professed ability to locate targets for indirect fire using aerial and terrestrial observation. Before the war American field artillerymen employed ground observation as their major method of target acquisition which only gave them observation capabilities to visible horizon and were looking into the possibilities of employing balloons, dirigibles, and aircraft for aerial observation to see on the other side of the hill or behind enemy lines. They quickly encountered the reality of adopting sound ranging and flashing ranging to locate well-camouflaged firing batteries. Even though aviation was in its infancy and untested in combat, a number of officers eagerly sought to exploit it for acquiring targets, therefore seeing its potential. As early as 1910, this led to the publication of the War Department’s Field Service Regulations (1910) that specified the formation of an aerial company in each corps-size unit upon mobilization but left the mission open. Four years later, the new edition of the Field Service Regulations (1914) proclaimed strategic reconnaissance, tactical reconnaissance, and field artillery observation as the fundamental missions of aviation and implied the use of armed aircraft to protect friendly observation aviation as a fourth mission. Technology and other considerations, however, handicapped aviators and field artillerymen. Poorly designed and underpowered aircraft with limited carrying capacities crashed to earth with regularity and caused pilots to gain experience at the cost of injury and even death. Just as important, the Field Artillery lacked a large cadre of officers who were qualified to employ indirect fire. Primitive air-ground communications technology further hampered aerial observation because the observers had difficulties transmitting their information to the batteries on the ______1975, p. A-1-4, MSTL. 74Spaulding, Notes on Field Artillery for Officers of All Arms, 1917, pp. 60-61, 101-02.

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ground. In view of these shortcomings, aerial observation faced challenges before it could become a reality.75 Yet, many Army officers optimistically envisioned a bright future and critical role for aerial observation. Early in 1915, Brigadier General George P. Scriven who was the Army’s chief signal officer published a sophisticated analysis of aviation that covered the early campaigns of World War One and that touted the accomplishments of aviation and aerial observation in support of the ground forces. Later in 1915, the Signal Corps announced plans to equip every aero squadron attached to a division with eight aircraft for battlefield observation and field artillery spotting, two “high speed machines” with counter air and long- range reconnaissance responsibilities, and two aircraft for bombardment missions in the event of mobilization. As their European counterparts were discovering in the crucible of war, American army officers who were still on the sidelines of World War One appreciated aviation and aerial observation and projected capitalizing on them to support the ground forces.76 In an article published in the Field Artillery Journal during the first months of 1916, Major (later Major General) William S. McNair, a field artilleryman, enthusiastically endorsed aerial observation and aviation. He dismissed the problems of aerial observation and focused his attention on the ease of adjusting fire onto targets employing terrestrial or aerial observers. “If a battery [or any other enemy position for that matter] can be brought . . . under the observation of an observer provided with a means of communicating his observations to the adjusting battery, . . . the target will be in great danger of annihilation,” he wrote.77 Finding and destroying enemy field artillery and infantry seemed to be relatively simple, according to McNair who based his conclusions on the initial experiences of the belligerents in 1914-1915, especially if the friendly forces had aerial observation and could spot targets hidden from terrestrial observation. However, he conceded the requirement for effective communications to make indirect fire usable.78 Combat action early in the war attested to Scriven’s, McNair’s, and other Army officers’ optimism and conclusions about aviation, aerial observation, and target acquisition. Even though a balloon or a dirigible provided observers with an unprecedented matchless view of the battlefield, aircraft during the war spotted field artillery positions and other targets for the first time from angles never considered possible before. Unlike balloons and dirigibles that generally hovered high in the air behind friendly lines, were tethered to the ground, had limited mobility, and had difficulties spotting shell bursts from such distances, aircraft actually ventured over enemy territory to give commanders the ability to attack deep targets that previously had been unseen and invulnerable to enemy action, to exploit long-

75Raines, Eyes of Artillery, pp. 8-11. 76Ibid. 77Maj William S. McNair, “Concealment and Protection of Artillery from Artillery Fire,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Mar 1916, p. 43. 78Ibid. Harold E. Porter’s Aerial Observation: The Airplane Observer, the Balloon Observer, and the Army Corps Pilot (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1921) offers insights into the American experience with aerial observation in .

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range field artillery, and to spot shell bursts more easily. As Major Harold E. Porter of the Air Service noted after the war, aircraft gave armies over-the-hill observation capabilities far beyond those furnished by balloons. During the initial weeks of the war, for example, the French army, using aircraft circling overhead and behind enemy lines for observation missions, discovered the German army’s movement towards the southeast when other available information indicated that Paris was the objective. This intelligence allowed the French and British to hit the German right flank hard and lay down devastating field artillery fires to help stop the German army at the Marne River in the fall of 1914 to end its bid for a quick victory.79 Although the employment of aircraft for aerial observation permitted engaging heretofore invulnerable targets, it also inadvertently complicated target acquisition. Because of the practice of placing field pieces in straight lines, the dust and smoke created by firing, the shiny shields, and the gun flashes, observers aloft in aircraft could easily spot batteries for counterbattery fire and photograph them, while the aircraft could even strafe the batteries if properly armed. Natural or artificial obstacles no longer provided protection from enemy field artillery as advocates of indirect fire had argued.80 Early in the war, it became apparent to many combatants that a “battery seen is a battery lost.”81 In view of this unanticipated development just as they were beginning to accept and employ indirect fire, armies early in the war turned to camouflage to hide their guns and other positions from the prying eyes of aerial observers. Reflecting on the emergence of camouflaging, Spaulding pointed out in 1917, “No artillery position is to be considered as concealed unless it has overhead screening.”82 Continuing, he wrote, “It therefore becomes of greatest importance to conceal a battery against observation from . . . overhead.”83 By camouflaging their guns and other positions to hide them from inquisitive eyes in the sky, armies made visual aerial observation for counterbattery work even more difficult.84

79Comparato, Age of Great Guns, p. 140; Herbert M. Mason, Jr., The : A Turbulent History (New York: Mason-Charter, 1976), p. 24; Lee Kennett, The First Air War: 1914-1918 (New York: The Free Press, 1991). p. 25; Porter, Aerial Observation, pp. 21, 24; Air Service Advanced Flying School, Manual of Aerial Observation, 1925, pp. 6-7. 80Manual of Aerial Observation, 1925; 1lt F.W. Honeycutt, Lecture on Cover for Artillery in the Battlefield and Methods of Using Aeroplanes in Reconnaissance of Target and Observation of Fire, 15 Apr 1915, School of Fire for Field Artillery, pp. 1, 8-12, MSTL; Cpt N.E. Margetts, Report on Cover for Artillery on the Battlefield and Use of Aeroplanes in Reconnaissances, Observations, and Direction of Artillery Fire, 25 Mar 1915, pp. 4-5, in Honeycutt Lecture; Cpt F.B. Hennessy, Thesis on Cover for Field Artillery in War, Spring 1916, pp. 1-7, MSTL; Porter, Aerial Observation, pp. 113-15. 81Ibid., p. 207 82Spaulding, Notes on Field Artillery for Officers of the Other Arms, 1917, p. 11. 83Ibid. 84Ibid., pp. 44-46; Bidwell and Graham, Firepower, p. 109; Benedict Crowell, America’s Munitions, 1917-1918 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1919), p.

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Faced with the challenge of locating carefully camouflaged German batteries that were devastating friendly infantry and field artillery, the British and the French searched for additional means of target acquisition. Ground observation posts and aerial observers “picked up a great deal of information;” but they could not find concealed batteries at all.85 In view of this, the French and the British wondered if it would be possible to identify the location of enemy guns by the sounds and flashes that they emitted upon firing. In 1914 and early 1915 the French and the British formed sound ranging and flash ranging units to find elusive enemy batteries for destruction or neutralization by friendly field artillery fire.86 Specifically, sound ranging required an arc of microphones facing the enemy lines. Each microphone recorded the sound of the enemy guns as it passed overhead and sent the recordings via miles of wire to a central station where the distance and direction of the battery were calculated. Flash ranging depended upon high-powered telescopes to spot gun flashes that were miles away and were connected with wire to a central station that calculated the direction and distance of the battery.87 Although the principle objective of sound ranging and flash ranging was finding enemy artillery for counterbattery work, field artillerymen also employed them to adjust friendly fire by locating the bursts when they were not busy searching for enemy artillery. Unlike ground and aerial observers who could spot silent as well as active hostile batteries and other kinds of targets and track enemy movement, sound ______383; Kennett, The First Air War, pp. 26, 221; General Headquarter, Army Artillery Instruction Division, Artillery Information Bulletin, Nov 1917, pp. 2-3, 2-4, in MSTL. 85Ibid.; Col R.G. Alexander, Lecture on Sound and Flash Ranging, Army Center of Artillery Studies, 7 Mar 1919, p. 1, in MSTL. 86Report, Chief of Artillery, AEF, pp. 206-07; Cpt George A. Monagon and Cpt James Bruce, “The Artillery Information Service,” Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1919, p. 438. 87J.B. Cress, “Ranging Equipment of the U.S. Army,” The Military Engineer, Jan-Dec 1920, p. 275; William R. Bursell, “American Sound Ranging in Four Wars,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1981, p. 53; Daniel J. Kevles, “Flash and Sound in the AEF: The History of A Technical Service,” Military Affairs, 33(1969): 374-75; Maj Howard W. Hodgkins, “Flash and Sound Ranging,” Journal of the United States Artillery, Jan 1920, p. 47; Edward D. Stephenson, Sound Ranging: The Location of Guns by Sound with Special Reference to the Bull-Tucker System (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), pp. 4-10; General Bourgeois, Lecture on Locating Batteries by Sound, trans by Army War College (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), p. 5; Coast Artillery School, Flash, Sound, and High Burst Ranging (Provisional), 1920, pp. 1-3; HQ AEF, Flash and Sound Ranging, Jan 1918, p. 3, MSTL; Col Quinn Gray, Lecture, Flash and Sound Ranging, Army Center of Artillery Studies, AEF, undated, p. 1, MSTL; GHQ, AEF, Observation Section: Flash Ranging, 1918, pp. 1-20; GHQ, AEF, Procedure Followed by American Sound Ranging Sections, 1918, pp. 1-24. See John R. Innes’ Flash Spotters and Sound Rangers: How They Lived, Worked and Fought in the Great War (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1935) for an excellent discussion of the British experience with sound and flash ranging.

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ranging and flash ranging could only locate firing field guns.88 Nevertheless, impressed with the ability of Allied sound ranging and flash ranging to discover enemy batteries hidden from the eyes of ground and aerial observers, the Commanding General of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), General John J. Pershing, took action. He cabled the War Department in 1917 about the AEF requirement for physicists for finding enemy guns through sound ranging and flash ranging.89 In response, the War Department turned to the National Research Council that had been created by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 for help. The council recommended appointing August Trowbridge, a professor of physics at Princeton University and a major in the Signal Corps Reserve, to organize the ranging service. Acting upon this advice, the AEF subsequently placed Trowbridge under the G-2 section (intelligence) on Pershing’s staff that was headed by Colonel Roger G. Alexander of the Corps of Engineers. Under Trowbridge’s and Captain Theodore Lyman’s guidance, the AEF formed sound ranging and flash ranging units in the Signal Corps and then transferred them to the Corps of Engineers in October 1917. Sound ranging and flash ranging units had the mission of finding well-protected and well-camouflaged enemy batteries for destruction or neutralization to prevent them from harassing American trenches, roads, batteries, and other sensitive points as easily. After considerable experimentation with different sound ranging systems, the AEF finally outfitted its sound ranging units with the British Bull-Tucker system and equipped its flash ranging units with high-powered telescopes in 1917-1918.90 Assigned to cover a particular sector of the front, American sound ranging and flash ranging units first went into action early in the spring of 1918. On 10 March 1918 Sound Ranging Section No. 1 under Captain Charles B. Bazzoni, an American physicist, took up its position in the American 1st Division sector at Mandres, a small, shell-torn French village on south side of the St. Mihiel salient. After a few weeks of operations, the section began pinpointing enemy batteries within 50 feet of their location that French sound and flash rangers had been unable to find. In fact, Sound Ranging Section No. 1 could report the location of a new gun within three or four minutes after the first boom.91

88Cress, “Ranging Equipment of the U.S. Army,” p. 279; Col Alexander, Lecture on Sound and Flash Ranging, pp. 2-3; HQ AEF, Flash and Sound Ranging, Jan 1918, p. 1; Kevles, “Flash and Sound in the AEF,” p. 378; General Headquarter, Army Artillery Instruction Division, Artillery Information Bulletin, Nov 1917, p. 2-31, in MSTL. 89Bursell, “American Sound Ranging in Four Wars,” p. 53; Kevles, “Flash and Sound in the AEF,” p. 374. 90Ibid., p. 53; Maj Howard W. Hodgkins, “Flash and Sound Ranging,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 52(Jan 1920): 41; Charles B. Bazzoni, Notes on the Accuracy of Sound Ranging Locations (29th Engineers, 1918), p. 1, MSTL; Kevles, “Flash and Sound in the AEF,” pp. 374-77 91Kevles, “Flash and Sound in the AEF,” p. 378; Arthur R. Hercz, History and Development of Field Artillery Observation (Target Acquisition) Battalion (Fort Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 1977), p. 13; Kevles, “Sound and Flash in the AEF,” p. 379; Lt Vergil D. Reed, “The Corps Artillery Information Service,” Field Artillery Journal,

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Soon, Sound Ranging Section No. 2 and Sound Ranging Section No. 3 joined Sound Ranging Section No. 1 to replace the two French sound ranging sections that had been pulled out of the salient. Together, these three sections covered over 23 kilometers of the St. Mihiel front. On the map, the wires running back from the microphones to the central station looked like a giant spider groping towards the German guns. Fog, mist, and clouds might have curtailed ground and aerial observation, but the three sound ranging sections located German batteries with amazing accuracy and directed the fire of American guns.92 In the meantime, Flash Ranging Section No. 1 occupied its first position on the St. Mihiel salient. By mid-July 1918 the section had fixed 96 enemy batteries for counterbattery work and impressed field artillery commanders in the process. As field artillerymen’s confidence in flash ranging grew to dispel initial skepticism, the demands for it increased. During the American counterattack through Belleau Wood in the summer of 1918, for example, flash ranging found 46 hostile batteries for counterbattery fire, proved that it could meet the demands of a war of movement, and received a commendation from the Chief of Artillery, AEF, Major General Ernest Hinds. Rather than being competitive with sound ranging, flash ranging complemented it. Working as a team, they made possible collecting accurate targeting information when weather prevented aerial observation from photographing enemy field artillery.93 Through the summer of 1918, the AEF restricted its sound ranging and flash ranging sections to defensive operations because it had been on the defense. In September 1918, however, the AEF initiated its first real offensive when it attacked the St. Mihiel salient with the goal of seizing Metz or at least cutting the highway running from Metz all the way to Antwerp, the enemy’s main line of lateral communications. Sound and flash rangers who had been operating with the divisions so far were reassigned to the Artillery Information Service (AIS) of the First Army and had sufficient numbers to make up the 2nd Battalion, 29th Engineers, with Lyman in command. From this time to the end of the war, the AIS served as a subsection of the intelligence section of the staff of each field artillery command (army, corps, and division). AIS supervised the collection of information or intelligence gathered from airplane observation, balloon observation, sound ranging, flash ranging, air photographs, terrestrial observation, intelligence obtained from other combat arms and branches of the service, and other sources, such as enemy prisoners of war, captured ______Nov-Dec 1924, pp. 552-56; US Army Combat Developments Command Artillery Agency, The History of Target Acquisition, 1964, p. B-2, Historical Analysis File, MSTL; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1948, pp. 252-57; Maj Robert Arthur, “Counter Battery,” Coast Artillery Journal, Feb 1925, pp. 100-18. 92Kevles, “Flash and Sound in the AEF,” pp. 376-77. 93Hercz, History and Development of Field Artillery Observation (Target Acquisition) Battalion, p. 13; Kevles, “Sound and Flash in the AEF,” p. 379; Reed, “The Corps Artillery Information Service,” pp. 552-56; US Army Combat Developments Command Artillery Agency, The History of Target Acquisition, 1964, p. B-2, Historical Analysis File, MSTL; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1948, pp. 252- 57; Arthur, “Counter Battery,” pp. 100-18.

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documents, and intercepted messages, for use in counterbattery fire and acted as the G-2 (intelligence) for the field artillery commander to keep him informed about the general situation.94 During the offensive of 12-15 September 1918, flash rangers readily kept up with the infantry advance with their mobile equipment, while sound rangers, equipped with less mobile instruments that often required two days to be set up, lagged behind, and failed to provide effective support until the front stabilized. Throughout the offensive American flash ranging and sound ranging located hostile batteries for neutralization or destruction with the former being the primary means of detecting enemy guns. In fact, of the 425 enemy batteries located on the St. Mihiel salient, more than 50 percent had been located by sound ranging and flash ranging. Based upon the accurate location of enemy guns, friendly field artillery silenced most of the German batteries, and American casualties were correspondingly light during the attack. Testifying to the effectiveness of sound ranging after the war, Bazzoni found that many enemy batteries had been correctly located but had never been fired on.95 Sound ranging and flash ranging demonstrated strengths and weaknesses during the war. Of the two forms of ranging, sound ranging found more enemy batteries for the AEF and proved to have uncanny accuracy by locating gun positions within 50 to 60 feet. While flash ranging worked best at night when aerial observation was degraded and furnished responsive support when the AEF was on the tactical offensive, sound ranging performed well in stabilized conditions when the front did not change rapidly.96 Contributing to Benedict Crowell’s America’s Munitions: 1917-1918 (1919), Lieutenant Colonel J.B. Cress and Major W.D. Young, two sound ranging experts in the AEF, wrote about the efficiency of sound ranging in 1919. They commented, “Up to the end of the fighting, no way had been discovered to conceal the location of a gun from sound-ranging instruments suitably placed and properly operated.”97 Teaming with aerial photography, sound ranging and flash ranging provided the primary ways to mass unobserved indirect counterbattery fires from two or more batteries on hostile batteries during the war, while all observed counterbattery fires were fired by only one battery. The requirement for the observer to see the battery, the aiming point, and the target for observed indirect fire made massing fires from two or more batteries on any type of target extremely difficult because the observer computed the fire direction data from the angle

94Kevles, “Sound and Flash in the AEF,” p. 382; Office of the Chief of Artillery, AEF, Report of A Board of Officers Appointed to Make A Study of the Experience Gained by the Artillery of the American Expeditionary Forces and to Submit Recommendations Based Upon Such Study (Hero Board), 1918, 1: 16; Hercz, Development of Field Artillery Observation (Target Acquisition) Battalion, p. 13. 95Kevles, “Sound and Flash in the AEF,” p. 382; Hero Board, 1: 16; Hercz, Development of Field Artillery Observation (Target Acquisition) Battalion, p. 13; Cpt George A. Monagon and James Bruce, “The Artillery Information Service,” Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1919, pp. 438-47. 96Arthur, “Counter Battery,” pp. 100-18. 97Crowell, America’s Munitions, p. 385.

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created by the battery, the aiming point, and the target and generally could not see a neighboring battery’s aiming point to make calculating fire direction data to mass fires impossible.98 As developments during the Great War indicated, target acquisition for indirect fire demanded more than ground and aerial observation to engage deeply defiladed batteries. While ground observation precluded detecting targets beyond the visible horizon, aerial observation ironically not only permitted seeing far behind enemy lines but also caused the combatants to camouflage their positions to make locating them problematic with aerial observation which was limited during adverse weather. Batteries disguised to hide them from aerial observation led to the development of sound ranging and flash ranging. Rather than replacing ground and aerial observation, sound ranging and flash ranging augmented them and made detecting active camouflaged batteries possible. At the end of the war, American field artillery target acquisition that consisted of sound and flash ranging, ground observation, and aerial observation formed an early system where each individual target acquisition system together formed part of a larger system.

98U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Close Support Study Group Final Report, 21 Nov 1975, p. A-1-4, MSTL; Hercz, Development of the Field Artillery Observation (Target Acquisition) Battalion, p. 13.

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CHAPTER TWO

CONSOLIDATING AND PROVING

Although sound and flash ranging, aerial observation, and ground observation effectively located enemy targets for indirect fire during World War One, placing them under different commands presented critical command and control problems for the Field Artillery. Only ground observation sited in static positions belonged to the branch and could be controlled by field artillery commanders; other branches of the Army directed sound and flash ranging and aerial observation. Visualizing a more mobile battlefield in the future with motor vehicles replacing horses as prime movers, field artillery officers projected making ground observation as mobile as the supported maneuver forces. They also understood the need for more responsive counterbattery (field artillery fires designed to neutralize or destroy enemy field artillery) fires to defeat enemy indirect fire systems by making sound and flash ranging and aerial observation organic to field artillery units so that it would be controlled by field artillery officers. While World War Two validated organic aerial observation, it simultaneously revealed limitations with organic sound ranging and flash ranging that led to the adoption of radars for target acquisition.

IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM

Even before World War One had ended, field artillery commanders acted to improve target acquisition. As they envisioned the problem, they recognized that command and control of target acquisition assets laid at the heart of improving the Field Artillery’s ability to provide effective fire support. Field Artillery commanders immediately confronted aviators over the quality of aerial observation.1 Insisting that the Air Service was more concerned about making aces than furnishing responsive aerial observation, Chief of Artillery for the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), Major General Ernest Hinds wanted aviators to reorder their priorities to make aerial observation more important.2 The Chief of Air Service, AEF, Major General Mason F. Patrick, countered Hinds’ argument by insisting that the aerial observers caused the problems with air observation and not the Air Service’s priorities. According to Patrick, the Field Artillery sent its least competent junior officers to the Air Service for training as air

1Edgar F. Raines, Jr., Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2000), p. 13; Office of the Chief of Artillery, AEF, Report of A Board of Officers Appointed to Make A Study of the Experience Gained by the Artillery of the American Expeditionary Forces and to Submit Recommendations Based Upon Such Study (Hero Board), 1918, 1: 66-67, Morris Swett Technical Library (MSTL). 2Hero Board, 1: 66-67.

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observers.3 In fact, the Chief of the Training Section, Office of the Chief of Air Service, AEF, Lieutenant Colonel W.G. Kilner, indicted the Field Artillery when he wrote in July 1918, “It has become evident that the personnel furnished to the Air Service for training as observers is so deficient both in respect to number and quality as to seriously threaten the efficiency of the Artillery. . . .”4 With a better quality of officers, aerial observation would be immeasurably improved. As the debate suggested, neither branch wanted to accept responsibility for ineffective aerial observation that was in its infancy and struggling and denounced the other as the source of the problem.5 Although Harold E. Porter was a major in the Air Service in World War One, his postwar explanation probably represented the reality of aerial observation more closely than either branch of the Army did. “As a matter of fact, the personnel was inferior . . . but the courses could be passed by anyone who had brains enough to pass a college entrance examination,” Porter wrote in 1921.6 He explained further, “It is not intended to imply that the schools were poorly managed or that the instructors were incompetent. Quite the contrary. The courses were simply too short, [and] the flying periods were too short.”7 From Porter’s perspective, a combination of poor students and insufficient training caused by the intense pressure to get as many aerial observers to front as possible led to mediocre aerial observation. Therefore, neither branch deserved the blame because the circumstances were beyond their control. The war produced the demand for aerial observers; and both services responded by pushing as many aerial observers through training as fast as possible to meet the numerical requirements of operational units.8 Regardless of the source of the problem, the overall dissatisfaction with aerial observation led the AEF G-3 (Operations), the AEF G-5 (Training), Hinds, and Patrick to agree in July 1918 to overhaul aerial observation training procedures. To eliminate the deficiencies, the Office of the Chief of Artillery of the AEF took the lead by conducting a study of aerial observation in the AEF. Reflecting a strong field artillery perspective, the study pointed out that the Field Artillery provided officers to the Air Service to be trained as aerial observers. After becoming part of the Air Service, the observers lost contact with the Field Artillery, became more closely associated with the interests of the aviators, and gradually forgot their understanding of the Field Artillery’s requirements. Also, the study

3Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, subj: Aerial Observers, 4 Jul 1918, Hero Board, 2: 823-25; Memorandum for Chief of Air Service, subj: Detail of Observers from Artillery, 19 Jul 1918; Memorandum for Chief of Artillery, subj: Artillery Aerial Observers, 21 Jul 1918, Hero Board, 2: 833. See Harold Porter Aerial Observation: The Airplane Observer, the Balloon Observer, and the Army Corps Pilot (New York: Harper and Brother Publishers, 1921) for a good discussion of the quality of aerial observers. Pages 306- 36 are particularly instructive. 4Memorandum for Chief of Air Service, subj: Detail of Observers from Artillery, 19 Jul 1918, Hero Board, 2: 828. 5Ibid. 6Porter, Aerial Observation, p. 321 7Ibid. 8Ibid., pp. 321, 329; Report of Chief of Field Artillery, 1919, pp. 77, 188.

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candidly acknowledged the existence of confusion between the two branches. Neither clearly discerned its obligation to the other; and this often hampered the quality of aerial observation. Moreover, the Air Service overlooked field artillery missions of observation and adjustment of fires in favor of strategic bombardment and pursuit missions.9 According to the study, the Air Service’s major mission and reason for being revolved around providing observation for the ground forces; and it ignored this.10 After discussing the basic process of developing aerial observers, its perception of the source of the deficiencies, the conflicting priorities, and the desired priorities, the study then recommended commissioning aerial observers in the Air Service, placing them on equal footing with other Air Service officers, creating special schools to train them for field artillery missions, and holding the Air Service accountable for supplying satisfactory aerial observation. In keeping with Hinds’ conclusion, the study wanted to give the fledgling Air Service the mission of correcting the glaring weaknesses with aerial observation. Although he disagreed with the study’s basic conclusions and recommendations, Patrick desired to resolve organizational conflicts over the quality of aerial observation and reluctantly requested the AEF to approve the study’s recommendations. From Patrick’s vantage point, the recommendations would clarify the relationship between the branches, would provide appropriate training, and most importantly would give aviators command and control of aerial observation, thus preserving the status quo. The Director of Military Aeronautics in the War Department, Major General William L. Kenly who was also a field artillery officer by training concurred with the recommendations and made them War Department policy, even though the Chief of Field Artillery, Major General William J. Snow, had obtained a ruling from the Judge Advocate General in the War Department decreeing that air observation officers should retain their original commission and be detailed to the Signal Corps which owned the Air Service. At the direction of the War Department, the Commander in Chief of the AEF, General John J. Pershing, announced the implementation of the study’s recommendations in August 1918. However, the war ended before they could be fully realized. As a result, aerial observation continued functioning as it had done prior to August 1918 with no branch maintaining control over quality; and confusion over roles persisted.11 The inability to rectify the problem led to reforms after the war. As a part of a larger War Department effort to examine recent military operations and to glean the lessons learned, Hinds assembled a board of officers in December 1918 to study the experience gained by field artillery units during the war.12 Under the direction of Brigadier General

9Hero Board, 1: 66-67; Maj H.W. Blakeley, “We Must See With Our Own Eyes,” Field Artillery Journal, May 1939, p. 215. 10Hero Board, 1: 67; Blakeley, “We Must See With Our Own Eyes,” p. 215. 11Blakeley, “We Must See with Our Own Eyes,” p. 215; Hero Board, 1: 15-16, 30, 66-67 and 2: 667-71, 823-40; Laurence B. Epstein, “Army Organic Light Aviation: The Founding Fathers,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Jun 1977, pp. 2-17; Raines, Eyes of Artillery, pp. 12-13. 12Boyd L. Dastrup, King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army’s Field Artillery (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and

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Andrew Hero, Jr., the Hero Board met from December 1918 through March 1919. It traveled throughout France and interviewed American field artillery officers with command experience about their views on training, organization, motorization, weapons, tactics, and equipment.13 Although its most incisive comments addressed training, the board provided critical insights about target acquisition.14 According to the board, aerial observation offered extensive capabilities for locating deeply defiladed targets and adjusting fire on them. However, it failed to fulfill the needs of the Field Artillery.15 Aircraft assigned to furnish field artillery observation missions flew from airfields in the rear up to the front where they contacted division artillery by radio. Upon the completion of a mission, partially trained observers and pilots flew back to their airfields to await another assignment. Given this system of aerial observation which provided positive results in isolated cases, field artillerymen never met and knew the observers and pilots and lacked any control over them because they belonged to the Air Service. Also, shortages of aircraft, competition from other pressing missions, and the diversion of aircraft to higher priority missions prevented field artillery units from getting timely air observation. From the board’s perspective, aerial observation also would have satisfied field artillery observation requirements if the aviators would not have been so concerned about engaging the enemy in aerial combat. Simply put, field artillery missions ranked low in comparison to others and needed to be raised in importance while coordination between the field artillery and aviators was virtually non- existent. The Hero Board’s findings on aerial observation reaffirmed Snow’s and Hinds’ wartime conclusions about the deficiencies of aerial observation and presented no new and startling information for consideration or debate.16 In view of the problems with aerial observation that persisted throughout the war and in agreement with the AEF’s Superior Board and the Infantry Board that were meeting at the same time, the Hero Board outlined a solution that contrasted remarkably with the remedy proposed by Hinds.17 The board advised: That an observation squadron be permanently assigned as a part of each combat division and that the aerial artillery observers . . . be officers of artillery trained as observers and members of the unit for which they are adjusting. . . . For observation and adjustment of artillery fire, the necessary aeroplanes should be under the direct orders of the artillery brigade

______Doctrine Command, 1992), pp. 180-84. 13Hero Board, 1: 15; Dastrup, King of Battle, pp. 180-84. 14Hero Board, 1: 15; Dastrup, King of Battle, p. 180 15Hero Board, 1: 15. 16Hero Board, 1: 15 and 2: pp. 661-67, 670; Lt Col C.C. Benedict, “Aviation, Especially with Reference to Artillery in Open Warfare,” Lecture, AEF Army Center of Artillery Studies, 26 May 1919, p. 2, MSTL; Lt Col Ralph Royce, “Aviation especially with Reference to Artillery and Infantry in Open Warfare,” Lecture, AEF Army Center of Artillery Studies, 16 Apr 1919, p. 3, MSTL; Epstein, “Army Organic Light Aviation,” pp. 2-17; Raines, Jr., Eyes of Artillery, pp. 15-16. 17Raines, Eyes of Artillery, pp. 15-16

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commander and should be trained with the brigade.18 In comparison to Hinds’ proposal of 1918 with its focus on making the Air Service more responsible by giving aviators command and control of aerial observation, the Hero Board urged making aerial observation organic to the division. This arrangement would give the division commander the ability to allocate critical and often limited aerial observation resources as he saw fit for target acquisition, adjustment of field artillery fire, reconnaissance, and liaison and remove command and control from the aviators who often had a conflicting agenda with the ground forces and certainly did not understand the Field Artillery’s nor the Infantry’s requirements. Equally important, the division commander could place some aerial observation assets under the direct control of the division’s field artillery commander, if necessary, to make them even more responsive the arm.19 At the same time the Hero Board identified critical organizational deficiencies with sound ranging and flash ranging that required correcting. During the war, sound ranging and flash ranging sections were assigned to monitor a particular part of the front and were not responsible to any field artillery unit. The board found sound and flash ranging to be satisfactory but still believed that they should be organic to the Field Artillery because their main mission involved furnishing information to that arm about the location of enemy batteries and adjusting and registering friendly fire. Equally important, sound and flash ranging personnel should be field artillerymen and not engineers as the practice had been during the war because they would better understand the needs of the Field Artillery than engineers would.20 In light of its findings, the Hero Board made dramatic proposals for reforming aerial observation, sound ranging, and flash ranging. Dissatisfied with the wartime target acquisition organization with its confusing chains of command between the field artillery and other branches of the Army, the Hero Board wanted aerial observation to be organic to the ground force commander to ensure that it would be linked closely to the combined arms team of infantry, cavalry, and field artillery to meet their observation requirements and also desired sound ranging and flash ranging to be organic to the Field Artillery. If these steps were not taken, target acquisition would remain unresponsive to the Field Artillery because it would belong to another branch of the service, leaving field artillery commanders without command and control of a vital aspect of indirect fire – the ability to acquire targets. As a direct consequent, the Field Artillery would have to continue coordinating with other services for target acquisition and have difficulties providing close support (field artillery fires designed to neutralize or destroy enemy forces that prevented friendly infantry from advancing) and counterbattery fires on an increasingly more mobile battlefield where motor vehicles were replacing horses for transportation and permitting armies to move much more rapidly. Providing responsive fire support on such as a battlefield required an organization that minimized coordination between branches by making target acquisition assets a part of the

18Hero Board, 1: 16 19Ibid. 20Ibid., 1: 16 and 2: 663; Col R.G. Alexander, Lecture on Sound and Flash Ranging, 7 Mar 1919, Army Center of Artillery Studies, MSTL; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1948, pp. 252-57.

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ground forces, in particular, the Field Artillery.21 Completed late in 1919, “An Artillery Study Made in the AEF” also addressed target acquisition and reached similar conclusions as the Hero Board had done. More specifically, the study advised creating a flash ranging and sound ranging battalion of two sound ranging companies and two flash ranging companies in the corps artillery brigade rather than preserving the existing organization where the sections belonged to a certain part of the front and not a particular unit. Making them organic to corps artillery would centralize command and control of two critical target acquisition resources under the corps artillery commander who had counterbattery responsibilities. Equally important, the AEF study suggested staffing the companies with field artillery personnel and not engineers as had been the practice during the war.22 As the Hero Board and AEF studies indicated, command and control lay at the heart of controversy over target acquisition assets during the immediate postwar years. Unless sound ranging, flash ranging, and aerial observation were under the Field Artillery commander or the ground force commander to complement organic ground observation provided by the battery observation post, field artillery officers would lack the ability to furnish effective counterbattery work. As the existing target acquisition organization had displayed so convincingly during the recent war, field artillery units would be at the mercy of other branches of the Army with their own agendas and priorities.23 Although the AEF Artillery Study and the Hero Board found sound ranging, flash ranging, and aerial observation to be effective means of detecting targets that ground observers could not see, severe structural problems impeded more effective operations. To satisfy urgent needs during the war, the AEF improvised by adding new target acquisition systems without clearly understanding the need to coordinate their activities with the Field Artillery even though the Artillery Intelligence Service (AIS) at the various levels of command had the mission of supervising the collection and dissemination of target information to the G-2 and field artillery units. After all, indirect fire with its target acquisition demands was new and being tested in the crucible of combat for the first time; and no one had a clear understanding of the requirement to centralize command and control under the Field Artillery.24 Concurrently, the AEF artillery study and the Hero Board recognized the versatility of aviation and the need to prioritize aviation missions to minimize conflict among the branches

21“The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” pp. 252-57. 22Ibid., Jan-Feb 1920, p. 58 and Mar-Apr 1920, pp. 96, 105-06; Baker Board Report, Historical Division, Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War, 1917- 1918 (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1948), 1: 127; Lt Thomas North, “An Instance of Post-War Training,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1923, p. 516. 23Hero Board, 1: 15-16 and 2: 661-67; Blakeley, “We Must See With Our Own Eyes,” p. 217; “An Artillery Study Made in the AEF,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1920, pp. 50-63 and Mar-Apr 1920, pp. 93-108. 24Maj Howard W. Hodgkins, “Flash and Sound Ranging,” Journal of the U.S. Artillery, Jan 1920, p. 41; Daniel J. Kevles, “Flash and Sound in the AEF,” Military Affairs, 33(1969): 376.

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over aviation. Given this, the Field Artillery wanted to ensure having aerial observation when and where it was needed.25 Ultimately, this involved making observation aviation organic to the corps, division, or field artillery units. Of the three aviation alternatives, only organic field artillery air observation would give field artillerymen dedicated aviation support because division and corps commanders could divert aircraft from field artillery missions to other missions if they controlled aviation.26 Individual field artillery officers concurrently expressed their opinions about the urgency of organic field artillery target acquisition. Late in 1918, an anonymous contributor to the Hero Board wrote, “All aerial observers and the entire F.R.S. [Flash Ranging Service] and S.R.S [Sound Ranging Service] must be composed of artillery personnel and must be absolutely under the control of the artillery. We shall never get successful results by the methods that have been pursued in this war.”27 Another contributor to the study, Brigadier General Adrian S. Fleming of the 158th Field Artillery Brigade who was also commandant of the School of Fire for Field Artillery in 1917-1918, advised, “The only solution I see is to assign certain aeroplanes and balloons to the artillery for the purpose of observing and permit them to do no other work.”28 Like the anonymous contributor, Fleming championed organic field artillery air observation. It would ensure responsive and aggressive target acquisition beyond the sight of ground observers because the aircraft and aerial observers would be under the command of field artillery officers and could not be diverted to other missions without permission.29 Interestingly, the French provided a precedent for organic aerial observation. In October 1914 the French commander, General Joseph Joffre, directed pairing pilots with batteries to overcome their communication difficulties. At the same time he minimized the number of reconnaissance missions so that the greatest number of aircraft could be assigned to work with French field artillery. Ideally, Joffre wanted each field artillery regiment to have its own observation aircraft. For the most part, Joffre’s organic field artillery air observation reduced communication difficulties between airmen and field artillerymen and improved French counterbattery work simultaneously.30 In contrast to Joffre’s and Fleming’s endorsement of organic field artillery air observation, other Army officers offered other target acquisition reform proposals. In 1918 the Commanding General, V Corps, and a field artilleryman, Major General Charles P. Summerall, wrote the Hero Board, “Not only should observers be taken from the Artillery, but all air units for artillery observation and reconnaissance must be absolutely under the Division and Corps as a part of the organic strength.”31 Lecturing senior officers at the Army Center of Artillery Studies in France on 16 April 1919, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Royce of

25Hero Board, 1: 15-16 and 2: 661-71; HQ 8th Training Regiment, Field Artillery Replacement Training Center, Ft. Sill, Instructional Memorandum, 1943, p. 5. 26Ibid. 27Hero Board, 2: 667 28Ibid., 2:664 29Ibid. 30Ibid.; Kennett, The First Air War: 1914-1918, pp. 33-35. 31Hero Board, 2: 667; Blakeley, “We Must See with Our Own Eyes,” p. 215.

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the Air Service acknowledged the quality of the air observers to be a critical problem and simultaneously pointed out the desirability of having the same aviation and field artillery officers working together at all times.32 Royce concurred with the consensus of opinion that was beginning to form in the War Department that “an observation squadron [must] be assigned to each division as an organic part of that unit, to accompany it wherever it goes. By this means it is hoped that better results will be obtained.”33 The following month, Lieutenant Colonel C.C. Benedict of the Air Service made the same argument. On 26 May 1919 in a lecture at the Army Center of Artillery Studies, he explained: There has never been such a thing as divisional air service. At present it is recommended that air observation squadrons be made a part of the division the same as the divisional artillery. This would be ideal from the standpoint of liaison; the observers would become acquainted with the artillery officers and methods of working and vice-versa.34 Summerall, Benedict, and Royce strongly endorsed organic aviation for the division to meet its pressing requirements for observation, reconnaissance, liaison, and adjustment of artillery fire and did not want to limit it to field artillery missions. By taking this position they had a broader perspective for the aircraft’s use, based upon their wartime experiences, than those who wanted to restrict organic aviation to the Field Artillery and desired to take advantage of aviation’s multifaceted capabilities. Although they opposed organic field artillery air observation, proponents of organic aviation for the division provided a preferable solution of resolving aerial observation deficiencies than those who promoted using field artillerymen as observers and employing aircraft and pilots furnished by the Air Service.35 By essentially preserving the status quo, the latter option offered no significant improvement to aerial observation since the Air Service would still control the aircraft and determine their employment; and this was unacceptable to the Field Artillery.36 As the various recommendations indicated, three basic choices for reforming aerial observation emerged shortly after the war. The first alternative centered on making aerial observation organic to the division or corps or to both. The second focused on creating organic field artillery air observation. The third preserved the wartime organization but employed field artillerymen as observers and not aviators. Of the three, the second offered the Field Artillery the most support because the branch would have observation aviation assets under its control and could determine their employment. However, the second option had the potential of hindering the exploitation of the airplane’s capabilities by restricting it to field artillery missions. With few exceptions most field artillery officers sought to ensure the availability of aerial observation when and where they wanted it and were not left to the

32Royce, Lecture, “Aviation, Especially with Reference to Artillery and Infantry in Open Warfare,” pp. 1-3, MSTL. 33Ibid., p. 7. 34Benedict, Lecture, p. 3. 35Royce, Lecture, p. 7; Hero Board, 1: 16 and 2: 661-67, 670. 36Ibid., 2: 661-67, 670.

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mercy of other branches.37 As far as the Field Artillery was concerned, the problem of command and control of invaluable target acquisition assets therefore required a favorable resolution. During World War One, the improvised target acquisition organization left the Field Artillery without command and control of sound ranging, flash ranging, and aerial observation for timely counterbattery work. The Field Artillery needed organic target acquisition. As the war suggested, the absence of control over vital target acquisition systems forced the Field Artillery to accept another branches’ priorities. If indirect fire were to supply responsive and effective counterbattery fires and close support on a battlefield which was growing more mobile with the advent of motor vehicles, field artillery officers had to eliminate existing organizational and technological deficiencies by introducing organic aerial observation and sound and flash ranging.

THE REFORMS

With the solution clearly identified, the Field Artillery worked to make sound and flash ranging and aerial observation organic to field artillery organizations during the 1920s and 1930s to streamline command and control and to minimize the branch’s reliance upon other branches of the Army for target acquisition. The Field Artillery simultaneously addressed technological deficiencies. Terrestrial observation, although organic, remained fairly static during the 1920s and 1930s. On the eve of World War Two, each field battery had a reconnaissance officer who established an immobile battery observation post near to the guns as the practice had been in 1917-1918. This post was manned by either the reconnaissance officer or the battery commander; and all observed fires were conducted from the observation post by one or the other of these two officers. Generally, the battery fired observed fires in support of the maneuver forces, while the battalion fired unobserved fires on targets located by sound ranging or flash ranging or in planned schedules and programs of fire in support of various maneuver operations. According to doctrine, the observer located the target and relayed the information via telephone back to the fire direction center that had been created in the 1930s through the efforts of two successive directors of the Gunnery Department in the Field Artillery School, Major Carlos Brewer and Major Orlando Ward, and their staffs and refined by another director of the Gunnery Department, Lieutenant Colonel H.L.C. Jones, and his staff. Upon receiving the target location, fire direction center personnel computed the technical gunnery problem and directed the guns to fire on the target.38 Field artillery officers understood the inherent weaknesses of wire communications that connected the guns to the observation post and the imperative of adopting the radio that

37Hero Board, 1: 15-16, and 2: 661-71; HQ 8th Training Regiment, Field Artillery Replacement Training Center, Fort Sill, Instructional Memorandum, 1943, p. 5. 38Maj Gen David E. Ott, “History of the Forward Observer,” in Close Support Study Group Study I, 21 Nov 1975, MSTL; Lt Col Frank G. Ratliff, “The Field Artillery Battalion Fire Direction Center – Its Past, Present, and Future,” Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1950, pp. 116-19, 127; Riley Sunderland, “Massed Fire and the FDC,” Army, May 1958, pp. 56-59.

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was in its infancy. Establishing and maintaining uninterrupted telephonic communications between observer and the guns was critical; and often shelling cut the telephone wires. While the War Department was expressing interest in radio communications by directing the Signal Corps to test various models, the Field Artillery School pressed to introduce radios to permit effective communications between the combat arms and the observer and the guns and even tested the SCR-77-B radio in 1927-1928 that was carried around in a wagon and could be broken down into a series of loads and manhandled from place to place. Later in 1933, the school converted ambulances to radio wagons for use by liaison officers with the Infantry and tested them in field artillery exercises, finding them to be still large, heavy, and cumbersome. Writing in the summer of 1935, First Lieutenant G. E. Wrockloff, Jr., for example, acknowledged the tremendous advances made with radio equipment and believed it to be the future means of communication. Until a lightweight, portable radio could be developed and fielded, however, the telephone with its wire lines would remain the primary means of communicating even though wartime experience had demonstrated that wire lines in forward battle areas were difficult to install, were practically impossible to maintain, and prevented the observers from freely following the infantry.39 Four years later in 1939, Captain Conrad L. Boyle, a field artillery officer, reaffirmed the requirement for dependable communications between the observer and the guns and projected the radio as the means. In fact, he wrote, “It is our only hope in solving the communication phase of the close-support problem.”40 The radio would permit unprecedented flexibility. Envisioning the availability of a portable radio in the near future, he advocated moving observers out of the static observation post and attaching them to the Infantry to maneuver with it. When a portable radio was introduced in 1940, Boyle’s concept became a reality. The forward observer equipped with a portable radio could maneuver with infantry units and still communicate with the fire direction center.41 Coupled with the graphic firing table, a specialized slide rule that was introduced in 1940 to compute firing data, the portable radio gave the battery forward observer unparalleled mobility and

391lt Frank Camm, “The Radio for Adjusting Fire form Forward Observation Posts,” The Field Artillery School, 15 May 1924, draft article; Annual Report of the Chief of Field Artillery for 1926-1927, Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1928, p. 13; 1lt G.E. Wrockloff, Jr., “The Best Radio Wavelength for the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1935, pp. 373-85; Riley Sunderland, History of the Field Artillery School, 1911-1941 (Fort Sill, OK: Field Artillery School, 1941), pp. 101, 132; 1lt George F. Wooley, “Radio Progress in the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal, May-June 1931, pp. 286-301; 1lt Georg F. Wooley, “Mobile Radio for Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1931, pp. 524- 34. 40Cpt Conrad L. Boyle, “Has the Close-support Problem Been Solved?” Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1939, p. 387. 41Ibid., pp. 385-401; Lt Col R.W. Barker, “A Method of Conducting the March of a Battalion of Light Artillery as part of an Advanced Guard When Contact in Imminent,” Field Artillery Journal, May-June 1936, p. 222; Maj Gen Harry G. Bishop, “Trend of Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal, Apr-May 1931, p. 127.

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flexibility by unleashing the observer from the tether of wire communications.42 Meanwhile, the Corps of Engineers passed sound ranging and flash ranging to the Coast Artillery and the Field Artillery respectively. Interestingly, the War Department encountered no opposition from Major August Trowbridge of the Corps of Engineers who had formed the first sound ranging units during the war for the AEF. Although the Coast Artillery started developing techniques and equipment for sound ranging after the war to support its mission, the Field Artillery also organized the 1st Observation Flash Battery in August 1922 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to satisfy its needs. For the next three years, the War Department debated proper command and control of sound ranging and flash ranging. Doctrine assigned heavy artillery with its counterbattery mission to the Coast Artillery along with the sound ranging mission although the Field Artillery wanted sound ranging and flash ranging under its control to simplify command and control. In 1925 the Coast Artillery abandoned work on sound ranging to detect enemy batteries in favor of developing sound ranging to locate ships which were not visible because of fog, haze, or smoke. Finally, the War Department assigned sound ranging and flash ranging for the mobile army to the Field Artillery in 1927 because it was the primary beneficiary of those services and should have control over them. Subsequently, the 1st Observation Flash Battery was designated the Sound and Flash Battery. In 1930 the War Department renamed the unit the 1st Observation Battalion and tasked it to locate enemy field artillery, to adjust and register friendly field artillery fire, to collect information, to conduct and coordinate corps artillery survey operations, to calibrate friendly field artillery, and to provide ballistic meteorological data for friendly field artillery.43 By creating the observation battalion, the reforms fashioned a rational organization. Doctrine made the observation battalion with sound and flash batteries organic to the corps field artillery brigade, allocated an unspecified number of observation battalions in the general headquarters reserve artillery for allotment as required, and provided a sound ranging platoon and a flash ranging platoon in each observation battery. When corps artillery operated as a unit, the observation battalion maintained centralized control of its sound and flash batteries. Complete, self-contained batteries were detached to support the division when

42 Maj Gen David E. Ott, “History of the Forward Observer,” in Close Support Study Group Study I, 21 Nov 1975, MSTL; Ratliff, “The Field Artillery Battalion Fire Direction Center, pp. 116-19, 127; Sunderland, “Massed Fire and the FDC,” pp. 56-59. 43Annual Report of the Chief of Coast Artillery for 1925, Coast Artillery Journal, Jan 1926, pp. 47-54; War Department (WD), General Order No. 22, 31 Dec 1927; Annual Report of Chief of Field Artillery, 1928, Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1928, p. 588; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” pp. 252-57; Kevles, “Flash and Sound in the AEF,” p. 376; Monagon and Bruce, “The Artillery Information Service,” p. 443; “Flash and Sound Ranging Activities of the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1930, 339-41; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion” was written by the Observation Department, The Artillery School, and was divided into two parts. The first part ran in the Nov-Dec 1948 edition of the Field Artillery Journal, and the second part ran in the Jan-Feb 1949 edition of the Field Artillery Journal.

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it operated independently of the corps as required.44 Although sound ranging and flash ranging provided invaluable information about enemy batteries, complemented each other, and furnished other critical services, field artillerymen of the 1920s and 1930s found the latter to be more useful. A flash ranging battery could be set up more quickly than a sound ranging battery and could keep up with rapidly moving ground forces more readily. In fact, Major H. Crampton Jones, a field artillery officer, wrote in the Field Artillery Journal in 1929, “Generally, we may say that in its present state of development sound ranging is not of use in moving situations.”45 Although Jones reached this conclusion based upon 1920s technology and the advent of motor vehicles as prime movers, he optimistically viewed the future of sound ranging and did not predict its demise in the near future.46 In the summer of 1929, he recorded: Sound ranging is very valuable. It may prove of even more value in the future. . . . With an increase in the use of long range guns and in the use of more howitzers, the sound ranging batteries will become more and more indispensable to the field artillery. These weapons will be able to take perfect flash defilade and take better advantage of concealment than can the present weapons, so sound ranging will be the only way to find them.47 Several years later in 1935, Bishop expressed similar thoughts about sound ranging. Recent developments with flashless powder threatened to make flash ranging obsolete. Because of the difficulty of detecting flashes from the guns, sound ranging would be the only reliable ranging system in the future. However, unlike aerial observation which had the ability to detect inactive and active hostile batteries, sound ranging and flash ranging could only locate active ones. In view of this critical deficiency, friendly positions could be under fire and destroyed before sound ranging and flash ranging platoons could locate hostile field artillery. The Field Artillery required a more responsive means of locating enemy batteries for

44Arthur R. Hercz, History and Development of Field Artillery (Target Acquisition) Observation Battalion (Fort Sill, OK: Field Artillery School, 1972), pp. 15-16; Cpt Archer F. Freund, “We Cover the Corps Front,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1937, p. 279; Field Artillery School, Organization of the Field Artillery (Ft. Sill, OK: Field Artillery School, 1931), p. 9; Field Artillery School, Organization of the Field Artillery (Ft. Sill, OK: Field Artillery School, 1935), pp. 13-14; Close Support Study Group, Final Report, 21 Nov 1975, p. A-1-4, MSTL; Tentative Training Regulations No. 430-130, Field Artillery: The Sound and Flash Battalion, 10 Sep 1932, pp. 1-5; Field Manual 6-120, 1939, pp. 1-5; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1948, pp. 252-57; “Voice of Experience,” Field Artillery Journal, Apr 1948, pp. 219-22; “Aspects of Artillery Tactics,” Field Artillery Journal, Aug 1943, pp. 606-10. See Maj H. Crampton Jones “Tactical Employment of the Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1929, pp. 359-69, for a good discussion on the organization and employment of the observation battalion. 45Jones, “Tactical Employment of the Observation Battalion,” pp. 359-69. 46Ibid., p. 364 47Ibid., pp. 364, 367

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counterbattery fire.48 Although the reorganizations with target acquisition of the 1920s and 1930s eliminated the command and control issues with sound ranging and flash ranging, some field artillery officers found modernization efforts to be insufficient. In 1925 First Lieutenant Vergil D. Reed, a field artillery officer, explained in the Field Artillery Journal, “The artillery information service must also have control over balloons and airplanes if the service is to fulfill its missions in a satisfactory manner.”49 The postwar reforms so far had made sound ranging and flash ranging organic to the Field Artillery and aviation organic to the division and corps to take advantage of aviation’s versatility. While the corps had two observation squadrons of 13 aircraft each and one balloon group of four balloons, the division had one squadron of 13 aircraft and one balloon squadron in the mid-1920s.50 Although progress was being made, the reforms failed to satisfy Reed because the Field Artillery was still without organic air observation and was dependent upon aviators and higher command echelons for air observation.51 A student at the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, First Lieutenant Lloyd M. Hanna, likewise recorded his concerns in a student thesis about the lingering deficiency of aerial observation. In 1925 he emphasized, “Under our present system with our lack of artillerymen trained to work in the air and our lack of fliers properly trained in artillery[,] we are deliberately giving up one of our eyes to another branch of the service [Air Service].”52 Besides complaining about inadequate aviation support during the war and the policy that gave aerial observation to the aviators, Hanna urged training field artillerymen as aviators and aviators as field artillerymen.53 He continued, “. . . the airplane observer must be an

48Harry G. Bishop, Elements of Modern Field Artillery (Menasha, WI: George Banta Publishing Company, 1935), pp. 33-35; Minutes, Sound Ranging Conference, Washington DC, 12 Dec 1938, p. 2, MSTL 49Reed, “The Corps Artillery Information Service,” p. 556 50Air Service, Manual of Aerial Observation, 1925, pp. 11-12; Air Service Advanced Flying School, Manual of Aerial Observation, 1925, pp. 11-13; The Air Corps Advanced Flying School, Observation, 1928, pp. 8-9; John F. Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931-1935 (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1983), p. 17; John B. Wilson, “Mobility Versus Firepower: The Post-World War I Infantry Division,” Parameters, Sep 1983, p. 51; Edgar Raines, Jr., Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II (Washington, DC: Army Center of Military History, 2000), p. 17. 51Royce, “Aviation especially with Reference to Artillery and Infantry in Open Warfare,” p. 7; 1lt Robert Q. Brown, “Should Observation Aviation be an Organic Part of the Division,” thesis, Field Artillery School, 1937, p. 3, MSTL; Epstein, “Army Organic Light Aviation,” p. 2; The Air Corps Advanced Flying School, Observation, 1928, p. 8. See Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (Montgomery, AL; U.S. Air Force Historical Division, 1955) for a solid discussion of the evolution of airpower doctrine between the wars. 521lt Lloyd M. Hanna, Student Thesis, Field Artillery School, 1925, p. 3, MSTL. 53Ibid., p. 2

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artilleryman.”54 Hanna then added, “One such plane [should] be furnished to every battalion of field artillery with a pilot from the air service until such time as the Field Artillery is able to handle them with its own personnel.”55 As such, Hanna envisioned depending upon the aviators, the corps, and the division for aerial observation until the Field Artillery could provide its own pilots and aircraft.56 However, making aerial observation organic to ground units, especially field artillery, encountered stiff resistance from aviators who were suspicious of any effort to place aircraft under ground force commanders and jealously guarded their perceived prerogatives.57 From the Air Service’s perspective aviation had two basic missions – ground support and strategic bombardment. Of the two, the Air Service preferred strategic bombardment of the enemy’s factories, commerce, and cities to terrorize the civilian population, to break its will, to produce victory before armies and navies could be decisive, and to avoid . Simultaneously, the Air Service sought an independent air force during the early 1920s. Such an arrangement would permit the unrestrained pursuit of strategic bombardment and would preclude placing aviation units, regardless of their mission, under the ground forces. Independence would also place aviation on an equal footing with the Army’s traditional combat branches to give it a stronger voice in the fight for funding during peacetime and would prevent reducing it to its prewar size to free funds for the Infantry, Field Artillery, and Cavalry. In contrast, the ground forces aggressively opposed granting aviation independence because they desired aviators to supply reconnaissance, observation, target acquisition, adjustment of field artillery fire missions, and upon demand. Independence meant losing control of a useful auxiliary force.58 After Congress passed the Air Corps Act in 1926 that left Army aviation under the General Staff but increased its strength, prestige, and influence within the War Department, the divergence in priorities between the ground forces and air forces became more pronounced. Although the Air Corps furnished the aircraft and pilots for observing field artillery fire, it pushed its interests more vigorously during the remaining years of the 1920s than earlier and opposed organic aviation for the ground forces more stridently. Meanwhile, ground force commanders pressed aviators to support their concerns and advocated organic aviation for ground units, including field artillery.59

54Ibid., p. 3 55Ibid. 56Ibid., pp. 3-8. 57Epstein, “Army Organic Light Aviation,” p. 3. 58Ibid.; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 411-12; USAF Historical Division, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941 (Montgomery, AL: Air University, 1955), pp. 26, 29; Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, pp. 11, 12, 22, 23, 31; Brig Gen William W. Ford, “Grasshoppers,” US Army Aviation Digest, Jun 1982, p. 4. 59Ford, “Grasshoppers,” p. 4; Weigley, History of the United States Army, pp. 411-12; USAF Historical Division, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917- 1941 (Montgomery, AL: Air University, 1955), pp. 26, 29; Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, pp. 11, 12, 22, 23, 31.

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New field artillery technology that was appearing in the 1920s made organic field artillery air observation even more critical for effective target acquisition and adjustment of artillery fire.60 First Lieutenant William B. Leitch, a student at the Field Artillery School, wrote in 1925: With constant improvements it our ordnance and munitions, the Field Artillery is able to reach out further and further into enemy territory. Because of this increase in the range of our weapons and of our natural desire to see the other side of the hill, the need for more and better observation becomes apparent. Few [ground] observation posts approach the ideal. Good ones are very often hard to find. Frequently the best available are useless for the full accomplishment of the mission of field artillery. It is such a situation as this last that has caused us to turn to the airplane as an auxiliary means of observation. . . . The Field Artillery has simply acquired another eye.61 Close coordination between field artillery units and observation aviation would permit, exploiting the increased ranges of the new field guns by the Field Artillery the capability of seeing over the hill to complement terrestrial observation that could see only to the visible horizon.62 Besides comprehending the importance of aerial observation, Leitch advocated using field artillerymen as observers because they understood field artillery requirements. Although the division had organic aviation since 1920 when the War Department made all aviation squadrons integral parts of the Army’s divisions and corps, he was still disenchanted with the arrangement because Air Service personnel were employed as observers and did not know enough about field artillery needs to be effective. Leitch advocated a modest but controversial reform of aerial observation by wanting observers to be field artillerymen. However, he did not go as far as to suggest making observation aviation organic to the Field Artillery as some of his predecessors had done after the war. From the lieutenant’s perspective organic division aviation was sufficient as long as the observers were field artillerymen.63 The ranges of field guns of the early 1930s forced the enemy to locate its positions farther away and to camouflage them more extensively for protection and prompted field artillerymen to intensify their efforts to obtain organic aerial observation.64 To find and hit

60Air Service Advanced Flying School, Manual of Aerial Observation, 1925, p. 107; The Air Corps Advanced Flying School, Kelly Field, Observation, 1928, p. 175, MSTL. 611lt William B. Leitch, “The Airplane as an Auxiliary to Field Artillery,” thesis, 1925, p. 1, Field Artillery School, MSTL 62Ibid., pp. 4-9. 63Ibid.; Shiner, Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, p. 12; The Air Corps Advanced Flying School, Observation, 1928, pp. 8-9, MSTL; Cpt William E. Farthing, “Cooperation Between Artillery and the Air Service,” thesis, Field Artillery School, 1927, MSTL, p. 1. See 1lt Ivan D. Yeaton, “Aerial Observation and Conduct of Fire,” thesis, Field Artillery School, 1928, p. 3, MSTL, for additional discussion on organic aviation. 64Maj Robert Arthur, “Counter Battery,” Journal of the United States Artillery, Feb 1925, p. 110; Maj Gen Harry G. Bishop, “Relationship between the Field Artillery and the

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such deeply defiladed targets required aviators and field artillerymen to cooperate more than they had previously done.65 In the fall of 1931, a former Chief of Staff of the Army and a field artilleryman, General Charles P. Summerall (1926-1930), composed an article entitled “Organization, Armament and Employment of Field Artillery” in the Field Artillery Journal. In the article he explained the requirement for organic aviation for the division but never advocated organic aerial observation for the Field Artillery. In doing so, he was consistent with his position of 1919 when he promoted organic aviation for the division.66 Four years later, Bishop condemned the policy that prohibited field artillery officers from “taking to the air and commanding their fire units directly.”67 Such a practice of aerial observation would not stand the test of war, according to Bishop, and it should be replaced with organic field artillery aerial observation and field artillerymen as aerial observers.68 Although Bishop’s concept enjoyed some support, many field artillerymen rejected it. In 1936 when he was a student at the Field Artillery School, First Lieutenant Robert Q. Brown championed organic aviation for the division to give it greater striking power and to take advantage of the versatility of airplanes. Brown explained that an observation squadron was made organic to the infantry division in the 1920s. Controlled by the respective commanders, organic aviation missions included liaison, observation, reconnaissance, target acquisition, and adjustment of field artillery fire. Because of its versatility, organic aviation was being tasked to provide numerous services for the division commander.69 Although organic aviation in the division fostered better liaison between aviators and field artillerymen, budget cuts forced the War Department to eliminate it in 1928. In its place the War Department gave the division one aviation officer and a small detachment of Army Air Corps enlisted personnel. The aviation officer functioned as a division staff officer to advise the division commander on aviation matters and concurrently exercised tactical and technical control over the air units assigned or attached to the division by the corps observation aviation group. Doctrine specified attaching observation aircraft to the corps and allotting them to subordinate units on a mission-by-mission basis as the situation warranted.70

______Air Corps,” draft article, 1931, pp. 1, 6, MSTL; Air Service, Manual of Aerial Observation, 1925, p. 107, MSTL; Chief of the Air Corps, Observation Aviation, Heavier than Air Manual, 1937, pp. 30-31, MSTL; Chief of the Air Corps, Observation Aviation Manual, 1938, p. 95, MSTL. 65Bishop, “Relationship between the Field Artillery and the Air Corps,” p. 5; Chief of the Air Corps, Observation Aviation Manual, 1938, p. 95; Air Service Advanced Flying School, Manual of Aerial Observation, 1925, p. 107. 66Gen Charles P. Summerall, “Organization, Armament and Employment of Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1931, p. 516. 67Bishop, Elements of Modern Field Artillery, p. 132. 68Ibid., p. 133. 69Brown, “Should Observation Aviation be An Organic Part of the Division,” pp. 3-5; War Department, Training Regulation 430-105, Field Artillery: Tactical Employment of Field Artillery, 5 Sep 1924, p. 78. 70Air Corps Tactical School, Observation Aviation Manual, Mar 1930, p. 14, MSTL;

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Appropriations for the military climbed during the mid-1930s; but the War Department did not restore organic aviation to the division for several reasons. First, it provided the corps with organic aviation which in turn furnished aircraft to the division as needed. Second, the creation of the General Headquarters, Air Force, in March 1935 complicated an already difficult situation with aerial observation. Granted more autonomy than ever before but not independence, aviators concentrated their energies on developing heavy bombers for strategic bombing and pursuit aircraft, resisted providing ground support more strongly than before, and allowed observation doctrine to stagnate because the very existence of observation aviation presumed the continued importance of ground forces in future wars.71 In fact, aviators’ desire to avoid supporting the ground forces influenced the General Headquarters, Air Force to pass the Field Artillery observation mission to National Guard observation squadrons. By 1938 the National Guard had 19 such squadrons, one for each existing infantry division in the Army National Guard. Like the Regular Army of the time, its observation squadrons were skeletonized. Only after 1939 did mobilization allow them to expand towards full strength.72 In the meantime, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Malin Craig (1935-1939), expressed his dissatisfaction with existing aerial observation practices and the small number of observation aircraft to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General Stanley D. Embick (1936- 1938), in his effort to ensure the availability of aerial observation to support the ground forces.73 In a letter to Embick in June 1938, he complained: I suppose there is no doubt about the value of controlling fire from the air. This requires rapid and accurate transmission of information from the Artillery Observer to the firing unit so that changes can be made instantly. . . .

______Brown, “Should Observation Aviation Be An Organic Part of the Division,” pp. 3-5; William W. Ford, Wagon Soldier (North Adams, MA: Excelsior Printing Company, 1980), p. 117; Raines, Eyes of Artillery, p. 16; William A. Ford, “Grasshoppers,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Jun 1982, pp. 2-10.” 71Brown, “Should Observation Aviation be An Organic Part of the Division,” pp. 3-5; Ford, Wagon Soldier, p. 117; The Air Corps Advanced Flying School, Observation, 1928, pp. 8-9, MSTL; Air Corps Tactical School, Observation Aviation, Mar 1930, p. 14, MSTL; The Field Artillery School, Associated Arms (Fort Sill, OK: The Field Artillery School, 1934), pp. 8, 349, 358; The Field Artillery School, Tactics and Technique of the Associated Arms (Fort Sill, OK: The Field Artillery School, 1931), p. 10; Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941, p. 44; Raines, Eyes of Artillery, p. 16. 72Ken Wakefield, The Fighting Grasshoppers: US Liaison Aircraft Operations in Europe, 1942-1945 (Leicester, UK: Midland Counties Publications, 1990), p. 11; Raines, Eyes for the Artillery, pp. 26-27. 73Raines, Eyes of Artillery, p. 17; The Chief of the Air Corps, Observation Aviation, Heavier than Air Manual, 1938, p. 31, MSTL. In 1938 the Army Air Corps openly taught in its aviation school that a small number of aircraft were available for observation for field artillery, that there would rarely be more than two aircraft for an artillery brigade at any one time, and that terrestrial observation should be used whenever practical. Essentially, this meant that field artillery missions were a low priority for the Army Air Corps.

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The planes in use are not suited for the modern work either in type or not being sufficiently up to date to keep abreast of the times.74 With this in mind, Craig directed Embick to ensure that the Chief of the Air Corps, Major General Oscar Westover (1935-1938), provided the appropriate aircraft for field artillery aerial observation.75 When Westover failed to accomplish the directed assignment, the Chief of Field Artillery, Major General Robert M. Danford (1938-1942), increased his pressure to improve field artillery aerial observation. In January 1939 he made a formal proposal to the Chief of the Air Corps, Major General Henry H. Arnold, but the general demurred. Although Arnold had little interest in giving such support to the ground forces, he also did not want to give up control of any air function; and organic field artillery aerial observation could mean losing a mission. Arnold and other airpowers advocates were concerned about strategic bombardment, showed no interest in observing for field artillery fire, and did not believe that light aircraft could survive on the modern battlefield.76 Dropping the long-standing policy that prohibited printing articles questioning existing aviation and air observation policies in the Field Artillery Journal printed by his office, Danford, who knew his way around the politics of the War Department, published Colonel H.W. Blakeley’s “We Must See with Our Own Eyes” in the May-June 1939 issue. In the article Blakeley strongly supported organic field artillery aerial observation but failed to change Arnold’s and the War Department’s position on aerial observation.77 Pressure for adopting organic field artillery observation aviation continued unabated as the Field Artillery agitated for better air observation and as the debate intensified over the proper use of airpower. The Air-Ground-Procedure Board, convened by the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Augustine McIntyre (1936-l 940) at Danford’s direction of 26 September 1939, met to determine the best aircraft for air observation. After several months of investigating and experimenting, the board concluded in May 1940 that the Field Artillery should have its own observation aircraft with pilots and mechanics who were field artillerymen. Equally important, the board urged creating organic field artillery observation aviation and organizing a school for air observers at Fort Sill. The board escalated the pressure to institute organic field artillery observation aviation, but the War Department resisted any changes in policy that would give the Field Artillery aircraft.78 Maintaining the pressure for organic field artillery aerial observation, the Executive to the Chief of Field Artillery, Colonel Fred C. Wallace, meanwhile wrote the Adjutant General

74Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff, subj: Fire Control for Field Artillery from Air, 18 Jun 1938, in Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, Air Observation for Field Artillery, Tab A, MSTL. 75Ibid. 76Edward M. Coffman, The Regulars: The American Army, 1898-1941 (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 398. 77Raines, Eyes of Artillery, p. 33. 78Memorandum, subj: Final Report of the Air-Ground-Procedure Board, 19 Aug 1941, in Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, Air Observation for Field Artillery, Tab F, MSTL; Raines, Eyes of Artillery, pp. 36-37, 38, 50, 53.

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of the Army, Major General Emory S. Adams (1938-1942), in July 1940 at the direction of Danford about the Field Artillery’s interest in an airplane for use in observation. Aerial observation was crucial because ground observers could be pushed forward with infantry or cavalry, but they could not see beyond the visible horizon. In the defiladed areas in the rear of the hostile lines, targets, such as troop concentrations, field artillery batteries, and headquarters, would present a threat to front line troops. However, ground observers could not see them to conduct fire onto them. “If the Field Artillery is to perform its mission effectively, an elevated observation post which will allow surveillance of defiladed areas within hostile front line . . . is absolutely necessary,” Wallace explained in July 1940.79 Continuing along the same line, the colonel noted the requirement for each field artillery battalion to have at least one aircraft ready for use or immediately available at all times. “One flight of not less than seven aircraft with pilots and maintenance crews should be an organic part of the equipment and personnel of each artillery brigade headquarters (square division and corps artillery) or regimental headquarters (triangular or armored division),” Wallace outlined.80 Unlike other field artillery officers who supported organic artillery aerial observation, Wallace went further than advocating it. Tasked by Danford, he outlined specific aircraft requirements.81 The optimal aircraft “should be able to land and take off from small unprepared landing fields in the vicinity of the artillery command posts along its route of march. Low cruising speed to permit . . . continued spotting of artillery fire is desirable but the primary consideration is low landing and takeoff speeds.”82 Given the technological developments with aircraft since the war, Wallace expressed a genuine concern about the desired characteristics of observation aircraft. During the 1920s and 1930s, as aircraft became capable of flying higher, faster, and farther, they simultaneously became less suited for field artillery observation needs. Observation aircraft were becoming so heavy with the designers’ emphasis upon weight-carrying capability and durability that the aircraft were limited to flying from permanent airfields. Tied to such runways, observation aircraft were growing less mobile just as field armies were becoming more mobile with the advent of motor vehicles as prime movers. In short, observation aircraft could not follow the division easily because they had to fly from permanent airfields far to the rear. Such a characteristic made them less responsive to field artillery requirements, divorced them from their natural constituent, and threatened to preserve World War One relationships that had proven to be so disastrous.83 Along with the rest of the General Staff, Adams, however, resisted proposals for organic field artillery air observation during the rest of 1940 and into early 1941 even though the Germans were having success with it and even though the British were seriously

79Ltr to Adjutant General, subj: Air Observation for Field Artillery, 15 Jul 1940, Tab B, Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, Air Observation for Field Artillery, MSTL. 80Ibid. 81Ibid. 82Ibid. 83Epstein, “Army Organic Light Aviation,” p. 3; Ford, “Grasshoppers,” p. 4; Raines, Eyes of Artillery, pp. 18-19.

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considering implementing it.84 In response to Danford’s repeated requests for organic field artillery observation aviation, Adams explained in February 1941 that maintaining specialized arms and organizing them into units was the most economical on personnel, material, and operating facilities. He articulated: Unless it can be shown conclusively that the present organization of observation aviation, which contemplates the use of some airplanes especially designed for artillery and infantry missions and ground arms personnel as observers, can not (sic) be made to meet satisfactorily the needs of the Field Artillery and other components of the ground forces [,] the existing policy will be adhered to.85 Before any changes would be made, the Field Artillery had the burden of proving the current organization to be unsatisfactory and unable to provide adequate support. Unless that could be done, Adams refused to consider organic field artillery observation aviation. With such a posture he did not think that such aviation was sound and disapproved Danford’s request. In the meantime, the Air Corps opposed organic field artillery observation aviation out of principle because it feared losing a mission, much as the ground forces had balked against allowing the Air Corps to become an independent arm earlier in the 1930s, fought against giving the Field Artillery control over any aircraft and air observation, and opposed any effort to decentralize airpower as organic field artillery air observation would do by removing it from the control of aviators.86 Shortly afterwards, the Field Artillery School convened a committee under Colonel P.M. Hanson in May 1941 to consider the rationale for organic observation aviation once again. The committee called organic observation aviation as the best means of meeting the Field Artillery’s aerial observation requirements. To the committee the increased mobility of the combat forces in recent years demanded organic field artillery air observation. Such observation would give the Field Artillery the ability to track a mobile enemy more easily over a greater distance and detect more targets for massed indirect fire than ground observation, sound ranging, or flash ranging could. As of 1941 the field artillery envisioned organic observation aviation serving two primary functions. First, it would detect mobile and stationary targets that were an immediate threat to the other combat arms. Second, it would locate inactive batteries hidden from the view of ground observers for counterbattery work.87 Supporters of organic air observation for field artillery, such as Hanson’s group, and their opponents agreed on one major issue but disagreed on another. To accomplish its

84Ibid.; Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, Field Artillery Intelligence Digest, 19 Apr 1941, MSTL; Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, Field Artillery Intelligence Digest, 20 Sep 1941, MSTL; Coffman, The Regulars, pp. 398-99. 85Ltr to Chief of Field Artillery, subj: Air Observation for Field Artillery, 7 Feb 1941, Tab C, Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, Air Observation for Field Artillery. 86Ibid.; US Army Air Corps, Observation Aviation, 1938, p. 4; War Department, Observation Aviation, Heavier-than-Air, 1937, p. 1; Ford, Wagon Soldiers, p. 120; Ford, “Grasshoppers,” p. 6; Raines, Eyes of Artillery, 17. 87Field Artillery School, Committee Study, subj: The Observation Aviation Required for Artillery Missions, 14 May 1941, MSTL.

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mission with effectiveness and speed under conditions of modern warfare, field artillery units required aerial observation to take advantage of long-range weapons. No one really challenged that. The debate, however, raged over ownership. The opponents of organic aviation for field artillery advocated organic air observation for the division and corps to take advantage of the versatility of aircraft and felt comfortable that field artillery missions would be satisfactorily met because those commanders would allocate their air resources effectively and properly.88 The Field Artillery strongly disagreed and wanted ownership because it feared a repetition of its World War One experience where field artillery units had inadequate air observation support from the Air Service; and this concern was justified. As recent as 1937, the Chief of the Air Corps taught in Air Corps schools, “On account of the small number of airplanes available for this work, fire will be adjusted whenever practicable by the artillery’s ground observation. . . and the airplane will be assigned only those missions which are beyond the capabilities of both terrestrial and balloon observation.”89 From the Field Artillery’s perspective, this reinforced the existing anxiety of being dependent upon another arm for aerial observation. Air observation for field artillery missions could easily be superseded by others given the limited number of aircraft available; and the Air Corps’ preoccupation with strategic bombardment and pursuit aircraft certainly buttressed the concern.90 Prompted by the dissatisfaction expressed by the Field Artillery School, the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, and Major William A. Ford, a battery commander during the Louisiana maneuvers of 1940, Aeronca, Piper, and Taylor aircraft manufacturers offered their light aircraft complete with pilots to senior commanders participating in the Louisiana army maneuvers of 1941 for testing in field artillery observation and liaison roles. Arnold approved using the light aircraft and assigned them to squadrons of O-49 aircraft for employment in the maneuvers. The Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Bliss, Texas, Major General Ennis P. Swift, dubbed the light aircraft “Grasshoppers” because they hopped down the makeshift runways like grasshoppers. During the maneuvers, the aircraft flew over 400,000 miles, completed more than 3,000 missions without losing one plane, and demonstrated the ability to conduct air observation, courier, and reconnaissance missions.91 Although the light aircraft proved their worth, field artillery officers who participated in the Louisiana maneuvers of 1941 still expressed their dissatisfaction with existing air observation practices and organization. Because air observation belonged to the aviators, they never knew when it would be available. Aviators disrupted observation by diverting aircraft to other missions at the last minute or by ignoring field artillery requirements. Moreover, there were never enough airplanes for field artillery missions. These problems which sounded reminiscent of those of World War One hampered responsive air observation

88War Department, Field Manual 1-20, Tactics and Techniques of Air Reconnaissance and Observation, 1941, pp. 50-51; War Department, Field Manual 1-20, Tactics and Techniques of Air Reconnaissance and Observation, 1942, p. 50. 89Army Extension Course, Observation Aviation, Heavier-Than-Air, 1937, p. 31. 90Ibid. 91Epstein, “Army Organic Light Aviation,” pp. 11-17; Ford, “Grasshoppers,” pp. 3-4.

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during the maneuvers, prevented field artillery units from locating targets rapidly and effectively beyond the sight of ground observers, underlined the experience of the First Army’s maneuvers at Plattsburg, New York, in August 1939, where senior field artillery officers believed that the Air Corps had failed to provide effective observation support. This Louisiana and Plattsburg maneuvers kept the drive for organic air observation alive.92 Basing his reasoning upon his own experience with aerial observation as a battery commander in the division, corps, and army exercises of 1940, Ford, a battery commander during the Louisiana maneuvers of 1940, and a qualified pilot, joined the debate by urging the organization of organic field artillery observation aviation. In “Wings for Santa Barbara” in the Field Artillery Journal in April 1941, he insisted giving each field artillery battalion its own light aircraft that operated from a nearby field or road, its own field artillery pilot, and its own field artillery aerial observer who would be instantly available for field artillery missions and keep in constant contact with the battalion fire direction center that had been created in the 1930s to facilitate massing fires and shifting them effectively around the battlefield. By having organic aerial observation aviation the branch would have responsive observation to meet its needs to complement the observation post, sound ranging, and flash ranging.93 Late in the summer of 1941 after visiting the artillery school in England that was teaching the use of light aircraft for organic air observation, Danford came away impressed. Influenced by this visit, his observation of the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941 where Army Air Corps air observation was erratic, and the fire direction center that cried for organic field artillery air observation to exploit it, Danford returned to Washington D.C. where he energized his effort for organic field artillery aerial observation by requesting official recognition for it from the War Department. A discouraging reply came back. Along with Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall’s Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair who was in charge of all field training, the War Department G-3 (Operations), Brigadier General Harry L. Twaddle (1941-1942), rejected Danford’s request. The two generals wanted to give the five air support commands that had been organized in June 1941 and were composed of 21 federalized National Guard and 11 Air Corps observation squadrons a fair trial to demonstrate their ability to furnish aerial observation to field artillery units. The commands, however, failed to furnish adequate aviation support during the summer maneuvers of 1941, causing Danford to request organic field artillery aviation once again.94 On 8 October 1941 which was eighteen months after his first official request of July 1940 that had met with intransigence by the War Department and Arnold who had opposed

92Summary of Reports of FA Commanders on Air Observation for Field Artillery during Maneuvers Summer and Fall 1941, Tab D, US Army Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, Air Observation for Field Artillery, 1941, MSTL; Hero Board Report, 1: 15-16, MSTL; Raines, Eyes of Artillery, p. 33. 93Ford, Wagon Soldier, p. 118; Ford, “Wings for Santa Barbara,”pp. 232-34; Ford, “Grasshoppers,” pp. 3-5; Coffman, The Regulars, p. 399. 94Epstein, “Army Organic Light Aviation,” pp. 15-16; Raines, Eyes of Artillery, pp. 56-67.

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decentralizing aviation and strongly championed strategic bombardment at the expense of other missions, Danford renewed his bid for organic field artillery observation aviation.95 In a critical indictment of aerial observation practices to date, he wrote Marshall, “The present organization of observation aviation does not meet the needs of the Field Artillery. It does not provide an adequate number of observation airplanes, timely observation, and that cooperation so essential between the observer, pilot, and firing unit commander.”96 Danford persisted, “The Field Artillery of our Army has never had satisfactory air observation.”97 Because of this, he noted, “There is a widespread and growing demand by field artillerymen for War Department recognition of the need for organic field artillery air-observation units and the ability of the Field Artillery to operate its own planes.”98 In that pointed correspondence of 8 October 1941, Danford outlined his solution. In harmony with guidance given to Wallace over a year earlier, he wanted at least seven airplanes with pilots and maintenance crews to be authorized as an organic part of each field artillery unit in each infantry, motorized, armored, and cavalry division and corps artillery brigade. Equally important, he desired to organize organic field artillery aviation immediately to test the concept.99 Once again, McNair responding on behalf of Marshall rejected Danford’s proposal. On 21 October 1941 McNair said that there was a grave question in his mind whether it was feasible or even desirable for a ground arm to operate aviation, even though he believed that the ground arms should learn to cooperate with aviation. At the same time McNair based his decision upon the unresolved dilemma over the centralization versus the decentralization of aviation assets. Aviators still wanted centralized air power to shift around the battlefield, concentrate, and employ as required, while the Field Artillery proposed parceling out aircraft to field artillery units.100 With strong support from the Field Artillery School and field artillerymen as a whole, and from Secretary of War, Henry Stimson who had been a field artillery regimental commander in World War One and the Assistant Secretary of War, John J. McCloy, Danford continued lobbying intensely for organic field artillery aviation. On 5 December 1941 he made another formal proposal to the War Department to test such aviation. Influenced by the strong support within field artillery circles and the urgency for organic field artillery aviation created by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Arnold grudgingly consented to let the Field Artillery test its organic air observation concept. On 10 December 1941 Adams authorized Danford to test two field artillery observation units, one as a part of a corps field artillery brigade and one as a part of division artillery. Thirteen days later, the pilots had undergone six weeks of training early in 1942 under the Director of the

95Ibid., p. 16; Raines, Eyes of Artillery, pp. 31-33 96Memorandum to The Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington D.C., subj: Air Observation, 8 Oct 1941, in Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, Air Observation for the Field Artillery. 97Ibid. 98Ibid. 99Ibid.; Raines, Eyes of Artillery, pp. 56-67. 100Epstein, “Army Organic Light Aviation,” p. 16; Ford, “Grasshoppers,” p. 4.

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Department of Air Training at the Field Artillery School, Lieutenant Colonel William W. Ford. Field trials of organic field artillery observation followed as debates over the merits continued in the War Department. Conducted during March and April 1942 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and Camp Blanding, Florida, during actual field maneuvers, the trials produced positive results. A board of officers convened to pass judgment found organic field artillery aerial observation to be essential for effective field artillery operations. In light of its findings in April 1942, the board urged adopting organic field artillery observation aviation without reservations and without delay. Brigadier General Mark Clark who was chief of staff to the commander of Army Ground Forces, McNair, and had witnessed organic field artillery aviation at work during the 1942 test, approved the board’s reports and sent them to the War Department, recommending the adoption of organic field artillery air observation.101 Subsequently, on 6 June 1942, a War Department directive established organic field artillery observation aviation to supplement but not replace the Army Air Force’s responsibility for aerial adjustment of field artillery fire from high-performance aircraft in its observation squadrons. The department directed making a team of two liaison airplanes with two pilots and a mechanic organic to each light and medium field artillery battalion and two teams in each field artillery brigade headquarters and headquarters battery and division artillery headquarters and headquarters battery to satisfy Danford’s organizational demands. Such an arrangement also meant ten airplanes for each infantry division and six, later eight, for each armored division. The number of aircraft for each field artillery brigade varied, depending upon the number of assigned battalions. The War Department tasked the Army Air Force that had been created in March 1942 to purchase the aircraft for the Field Artillery, to furnish spare parts, to repair materials and auxiliary flying equipment, and to provide basic flight training for the pilots. Ultimately, organic air observation provided the Field Artillery with a lightweight, unarmed, and unarmored aircraft with a slow cruising speed that was capable of operating off small, unprepared fields and on roads in the vicinity of field artillery command posts and firing batteries and completed the rationalization of target acquisition that had begun following World War One.102

101Report of Board of Officers Appointed to Test Organic Short-Range Air Observation for the Field Artillery, 18 Apr 1942, p. 2, MSTL; Memorandum, Field Artillery School, 2 Jan 1942, in Report, subj: Test of Organic Air Observation for Field Artillery, Training Phase, 15 Jan-28 Feb 1942, MSTL; Ford, Wagon Soldier, p. 126; Ford, “Grasshoppers,” p. 10; Lt Col Lowell M. Riley and Cpt Angus Rutledge, “Organic Air Observation for Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul 1942, pp. 498-501; Raines, Eyes of Artillery, pp. 67-78. 102Epstein, “Army Organic Light Aviation,” p. 17; The General Board, U.S. Forces, European Theater, Report on Study of Organic Field Artillery Air Observation, Study Number 66, undated, p. 1, MSTL; Field Artillery School, Instruction Memorandum, Organic Field Artillery Air Observation, Nov 1942, p. 1, MSTL; Ford, “Grasshoppers,” p. 651; Field Artillery School, Instruction Memorandum, Organization of Field Artillery of the Infantry Division and Employment of the Field Artillery Battalion in Reconnaissance, Selection, and Occupation of Position, Nov 1942, revised Sep 1943, pp. 3-6; John W. Kitchens, “Organic Army Aviation in World War II,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, May-Jun 1992, p. 11; Lt Col

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The organization of organic aerial observation gave the Field Artillery well-rounded, organic target acquisition capabilities of sound ranging, flash ranging, aerial observation, and terrestrial observation that promised to eliminate the problems of 1917-1918. With these capabilities the Field Artillery had the potential to provide unprecedented fire support through more efficient command and control.

INTO THE FIRE

World War Two soon tested the Army’s target acquisition reforms of the past two decades. While organic aerial observation’s performance exceeded expectations, sound ranging and flash ranging exhibited critical deficiencies that encouraged adopting radars for target acquisition. In Europe, for example, each field artillery battalion, field artillery group, field artillery brigade, division artillery, and corps artillery had an organic air observation section of two aircraft, support personnel, equipment, and pilots as part of its headquarters and headquarters battery. Also, each field artillery headquarters above the battalion level contained an additional pilot who functioned as the field artillery air officer and an additional airplane and engine mechanic who functioned as a technical supply sergeant and maintenance inspector. The pilots were field artillery officers with basic flight training and additional training at the Liaison Pilot’s Course at the Field Artillery School in field procedures, low altitude maneuvers, and other instruction that was peculiar to field artillery aerial observation.103 While the field artillery group had from 4 to 12 aircraft depending upon the number of attached battalions, infantry and airborne division had ten aircraft each. In comparison, armored divisions had eight aircraft. Each corps contained approximately 60 to 75 field artillery aircraft, and a field army had approximately 200 to 300 aircraft.104 Whenever it was possible, field artillery units built a landing strip in the vicinity of its command post to facilitate communications. Often, battalions constructed a landing strip in a nearby pasture after clearing obstacles. If necessary, aviators even employed a road or highway as a landing strip. Notwithstanding the importance of the proximity of the landing strip to the battalion command post to facilitate communications, protecting aircraft from enemy activity was more critical. If a potential battalion landing strip would be too exposed to the enemy, the aircraft flew from an airfield farther to the rear.105 ______Lowell M. Riley and Cpt Angus Rutledge, “Organic Air Observation for Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul 1942, pp. 498-501. See Leighton Collins’ “Grasshopper Haven,” 1 Jun 1943, MSTL, for an insightful look into aerial observation training at Fort Sill in the early 1940s. 103USFET Report, subj: Organic Field Artillery Air Observation, undated, p. 1, MSTL. 104Ibid.; USFET Report, subj: Liaison Aircraft with Ground Forces, undated, p. 1, MSTL. 105USFET Report, subj: Organic Field Artillery Air Observation, undated, pp. 4, 13, 14, MSTL.

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When the terrain was difficult and limited sites were available for landing strips, divisions organized a common or base airfield to the rear. This was especially true in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and the Pacific islands. At times in Sicily, the difficult terrain compelled several divisions to share a common airfield. With few exceptions field artillery battalion commanders in infantry divisions who were forced to employ a common airfield turned tactical control of their aircraft over to the division artillery commander to centralize command and control. Even battalions attached to an infantry division pooled their aircraft at the division’s base airfield to centralize command and control.106 In comparison, armored divisions generally did not use a common airfield. For the most part, they permitted their aircraft to function with their respective combat commands because of the dispersed nature of their operations.107 As might be expected, corps artillery worked differently from division artillery because it lacked organic field artillery battalions. Although the corps’ air observation aircraft and aircraft from attached battalions often flew from a corps base airfield, commanders of the attached battalions in all theaters of operations retained tactical control of their organic air observation except when scheduled corps patrol flights operated. In the Italian campaign in 1944-1945, for example, VI U.S. Corps authorized field artillery battalions to use their own air observation for any specific mission but requested them to employ corps patrol planes when possible and to refrain from utilizing their own planes because of the scarcity of air strips.108 In Europe field artillery commanders found the common airfield to be advantageous. On 23 May 1944 the XIX U.S. Corps reported that the common airfield facilitated the economical use of aircraft and personnel, encouraged the proper maintenance of aircraft, and was sufficiently flexible to provide liaison aircraft for missions required by the battalions.109 Besides listing the advantages identified by the XIX U.S. Corps, the common airfield standardized operational procedures so that they did not differ from battalion to battalion, and this enhanced efficiency.110 In the fall of 1944, the field artillery air officer of the 183rd Field Artillery Group reported to the Third Army about the practicality of common airfields. Such airfields yielded more productive observation coverage. Because pilots flew fewer hours and adhered to a definitive schedule, the corps could program maintenance and repair

106Ibid., p. 2; Maj Edward A. Raymond, “Air Ops,” Field Artillery Journal, May 1944, pp. 274-78; Cpt John W. Oswalt, “The Air Op is Here to Stay,” Field Artillery Journal, Aug 1944, pp. 568-72; Field Artillery School, Artillery In Combat in the Pacific Areas, Jul 1945, pp. 56, 131, MSTL; HQ United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, Artillery Bulletin No. 2, 1 Sep 1944, MSTL; Maj Gen John A. Crane, “Field Artillery Groups,” Field Artillery Journal, Oct 1945, p. 581. 107USFET Report, subj: Organic Field Artillery Air Observation, undated, p. 3, MSTL. 108Field Artillery School, Artillery in Combat, Jan 1945, p. 20, MSTL. 109USFET Report, subj: Organic Field Artillery Air Observation, undated, pp. 2-4, 35, MSTL. 110Report, subj: Operations of II Corps during March-Jun 1944, p. 4, MSTL.

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work more easily.111 Moreover, according to the Third Army, centralized command and control expedited supply, communications, and massing aircraft for missions to permit the maximum efficient use of aircraft and pilots.112 As a U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET) report of late 1945 summarized, a common airfield increased the efficiency and the economy of operations.113 In the Pacific Theater of Operations, organic aircraft often lacked landing strips unlike their European cousins. Because the war in the Pacific was based upon island-to- island amphibious operations, the aircraft frequently went ashore in crates after the beach or landing strip had been secured and had to be unpacked and assembled. However, the tactical situation often prevented unloading the aircraft for several days after the landing. With this in mind, some liaison aircraft flew off jerry-rigged flight decks on converted Navy landing ships (LSTs). The use of such ships eventually led to the introduction of the Brodie device to recover the aircraft flown off these vessels. Named after its inventor, Navy Lieutenant James Brodie, the Brodie device consisted of four masts extended over the water from the deck of an LST and was supported by a strong horizontal steel cable. A trolley with an attached sling underneath ran along the cable and caught a hook attached to the moving liaison aircraft. If properly arrested by the sling, the plane would stop immediately in mid-air and could be lifted onto the deck of the tank landing ship.114 From individual landing strips, common airfields, or LSTs, organic field artillery air observation furnished invaluable services in Europe and the Pacific. Grounded only when weather conditions restricted visibility or when enemy aircraft were active, organic aircraft flew continuously during daylight hours. During patrols of one to one and one half hours in length, aerial observers had sufficient time to study the terrain for enemy activities and to locate targets, especially field artillery, for neutralization or destruction.115 In November 1944 a Field Artillery School pamphlet, compiled from after action reports from the various theaters of operation and used for instructional purposes, summed up the contributions of the air patrols and organic air observation in general. The school pointed out succinctly, “The Air OP has become the primary means of observation for the artillery, and a constant and reliable source of combat intelligence for the higher staffs.”116 The air patrols provoked an unanticipated but beneficial response by the enemy. An observer in the North African Theater for the Field Artillery School, Colonel T.B. Hedekin, related in July 1943 that “hostile artillery fire ceased” whenever American field artillery

111USFET Report, subj: Organic Field Artillery Air Observation, undated, p. 4, MSTL. 112“Air Op Operations in the Third U.S. Army,” Field Artillery Journal, Oct 1946, p. 588-89. 113Crane, “Field Artillery Groups,” p. 581 114Herbert P. LePore, “Eyes in the Sky: A History of Liaison Aircraft and Their Use in World War II,” Army History, Winter 1990/1991, p. 37. 115Ibid., p. 5; Cpt George W. James, “Air Ops in the South Pacific,” Field Artillery Journal, Feb 1945, pp. 98-99. 116Field Artillery School, Battlefield Reports on Corps Artillery Organization, Intelligence, and Operations, 22 Nov 1944, p. 31, MSTL.

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observation aircraft were aloft over their positions.117 Later, the 282nd Field Artillery Battalion recounted a similar experience in Europe in a report to the Third Army in the fall of 1944. When American observation aircraft were in the air, the Germans did not fire their field artillery, fearing that they would give away their positions. Discovery by organic air patrols inevitably meant massed American field artillery fires. Rather than face them, the Germans kept their guns silent to avoid detection and possible destruction; and this allowed American and allied ground forces to maneuver without facing serious amounts of enemy field artillery fire, especially during daylight.118 Writing in the Field Artillery Journal in May 1944 about combat conditions in Italy, Major Edward A. Raymond told about the enemy’s fear of the “rain of steel that always follows discovery” by American air observers.119 To avoid this, German field artillery in Italy was often the most active at dawn and dusk when air observers were less active. In response, American organic artillery observation aircraft had to get airborne as early as possible in the morning and to stay aloft as late as feasible in the evening to identify German batteries that might be active.120 In the Pacific Theater of Operations, field artillerymen described comparable incidents. During the Munda Campaign in the New Georgia Islands in the summer of 1943, organic air observation from the 152nd Field Artillery Battalion, the 169th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 192nd Field Artillery Battalion flew over 300 missions. Whenever they were in the air over Japanese lines, the enemy stopped firing its field artillery to prevent being spotted and receiving highly destructive American counterbattery work.121 Organic field artillery observation aircraft supplied a variety of other missions. Besides being the only organic aircraft with ground units and flying field artillery missions, the aircraft in the European and Pacific Theaters furnished courier services and transported key personnel. The aircraft also provided liaison service between widely separated units, photographic services, intelligence information on the location of friendly units, column control, emergency resupply, evacuation, camouflage checks, reconnaissance and terrain studies, and command and staff reconnaissance.122 In October 1945 the division artillery executive officer of the 33rd Infantry Division, Colonel Ralph MacDonald, recounted, “Everyone knows of the Field Artillery Liaison Pilots, how they adjust artillery fire, and their value in general to the Field Artillery, but not enough has been told about the many other

117Report of Observer to North African Theater, 5 Jul 1943, Appendix C, p. 3, MSTL; Field Artillery School, Review of Confidential Information, 10 Aug 1943, p. 18, MSTL. 118USFET Report, subj: Organic Field Artillery Air Observation, undated, p. 5, MSTL. 119Raymond, “Air Ops,” p. 276. 120USFET Report, subj: Organic Field Artillery Observation, undated, p. 5, MSTL. 121New Georgia Occupation Force, Artillery Operations Report for Munda Campaign, undated, pp. 16, 82, MSTL; Lt Col Charles W. Stratton, “Air Ops in New Guinea,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov 1944, p. 767. 122USFET Report, subj: Liaison Aircraft with Ground Force Units, undated, pp. 2, 3, 4, 8, MSTL; Field Artillery School, Artillery in Combat in the Pacific Areas, Jul 1945, p. 56.

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services they render.”123 For example, they were indispensable in Northern Luzon in Philippines in 1945 by carrying emergency air drops to small, isolated forces and helped patrols in difficult and treacherous terrain to locate themselves on the ground or map.124 Everyone, regardless of the theater of operations, praised organic field artillery air observation.125 For example, Hedekin, writing about organic air observation in North Africa, noted in July 1943, “Field Artillery planes have not flown as many fire missions as might be expected because the terrain over which operations took place generally afforded excellent terrestrial observation; however, those missions which have been flown were entirely successful.”126 Supporting this commentary, II U.S. Corps related on 1 September 1943 that organic field artillery air observation furnished “exemplary service to their units” during the fighting in Sicily.127 The successful performance of reconnaissance missions and the conduct of fire missions were major contributing factors to the rapid advance of the 45th Infantry Division (Oklahoma National Guard) and later the 3rd Infantry Division along the northern part of Sicily in 1943.128 Discussing air observation in Normandy in the summer of 1944, Captain Delbert L. Bristol, a field artillery air officer with the First Army and an unabashed organic field artillery air observation advocate, wrote in October 1946, “The Air Ops . . . were the only effective means available to the artillery for locating targets and adjusting fire in the ‘hedge-row’ country.”129 On 23 June 1944 II U.S. Corps wrote, “Records show that they [field artillery aerial observers] conducted 53% of all corps artillery observed fire missions during the period [25 March-5 June 1944]” in Italy.130 The corps concluded, “Air OP’s [observation posts] for artillery observation are indispensable, and especially so in a pursuit.”131 Along these lines, an unidentified First Army field artillery officer wrote in July 1944: Field Artillery Air OP’s have been in operations continuously since D+1 [6 June 1944 when the Allies invaded Normandy]. In view of the poor terrestrial observation available, Air Op’s have handled the major portion of observed fire missions. The results have been universally excellent.132

123Col Ralph MacDonald, “Artillery Cubs in Mountain Operations: 33rd Infantry Division in Northern Luzon,” Field Artillery Journal, Oct 1945, p. 614. 124Ibid., p. 616 125USFET Report, subj: Liaison Aircraft with Ground Force Units, undated, p. 8, MSTL; Field Artillery School, Artillery in Combat, Aug 1944, p. 10, MSTL. 126Report of Observer to North African Theater, 5 July 1943, Appendix C, p. 5, MSTL. 127Report, subj: Operation of II Corps in the Sicilian Campaign, 1 Sep 1943, Appendix E, MSTL. 128Ibid. 129Maj Delbert L. Bristol, “Air Op is Here to Stay,” Field Artillery Journal, Oct 1946, p. 586. 130Report, subj: Operations of II Corps during March-4 June, 1944, p. 4, MSTL. 131Ibid., p. 14 132First US Army, Artillery Information Service Memorandum, Jul 1944, p. 35, MSTL. See Wakefield’s Fighting Grasshoppers for interesting insights into organic air

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In an USFET General Board report, compiled after the war, one anonymous commander exclaimed, “The present employment and organization of aircraft in the field artillery has been eminently successful.”133 In the Pacific Theater organic artillery observation earned comparable accolades. In jungle operations field artillery units depended almost entirely upon their organic aviation, operating from common airfields, because dense vegetation restricted fields of vision for ground observers. In many cases, useable terrestrial observation posts were virtually nonexistent on Pacific islands.134 After the initial landings on Guam, for example, organic air observation and forward observers furnished “all the observation during the remainder of the campaign” on the island in the summer of 1944.135 During the battle for the island of Leyte in the Philippine Islands, organic field artillery air observation furnished the only observation behind the enemy’s front lines.136 With few exceptions organic field artillery aviation proved to be invaluable in the Pacific Theater.137 In an undated after action report, XIV U.S. Corps field artillery after participating in the Munda Campaign in the New Georgia islands in mid-1943 recorded, “The air observers and planes should be credited with much of the success obtained.”138 In harmony with this report, the 37th Infantry Division field artillery pointed out after the Munda Campaign, “Air observation was excellent. Artillery officers flew low over the target area, drew fire, and then adjusted on it.”139 Addressing air observation during the battle of New Georgia in the summer of 1943, Lieutenant Colonel Howard F. Haines of the 37th Infantry Division commented, “Air observation was excellent.”140 In an operations report Brigadier General Harold R. Barker who served as the field artillery officer of the New Georgia Occupation Force concluded late in 1943, “The importance of air observation [in the New Georgia Campaign of July 1943] cannot be over-emphasized.”141 Despite their invaluable services during combat, organic observation aircraft displayed key inherent weaknesses. Writing in September 1943, Colonel William W. Ford, a leader in the fight for organic field artillery air observation and Director of Air Training at the Field Artillery School, commented:

______observation in Europe during World War II. 133USFET Report, subj: Liaison Aircraft with Ground Force Units, undated, p. 6, MSTL. 134Field Artillery School, Artillery in Combat in the Pacific Areas, Jul 1945, pp. 56, 131. 135Ibid., p. 95. 136Ibid., pp. 117-18. 137Ibid., p. 131 138New Georgia Occupation Force, Artillery Operations Report for Munda Campaign, undated, p. 82, MSTL. 139Ibid., p. 46. 140Lt Col Howard F. Haines, “Division Artillery in the Battle of New Georgia,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov 1943, pp. 846-49. 141Report, subj: Artillery Operations Report Covering the New Georgia Campaign, British Solomon Islands, undated, p. 15, MSTL

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The plane is not only unarmed and unarmored, but also painfully slow. It is exceedingly vulnerable to small arms fire from the ground and to the fire of hostile aircraft. To live in action it must be carefully concealed while on the ground. It must take to the air for short periods only, and only when hostile aircraft are not around. It must fly at low altitudes in order to minimize the chance of its being seen and to facilitate a prompt landing if an enemy appears.142 Although these restrictions reaffirmed Arnold’s fears and concerns prior to the war about the vulnerability of light observation aircraft, they did not detract from the value of the aircraft. Ford explained, “Artillery fire increases in effectiveness and efficiency directly in proportion to the observation available. In many types of terrain the only practicable observation is air observation.”143 Its contributions to combat operations during the war compensated for any deficiencies, met prewar expectations of most field artillerymen, and far surpassed the contributions of the Army Air Forces observation squadrons and liaison flights. Both basically failed to furnish reliable support to the Field Artillery.144 Less glamorous than organic air observation, sound ranging and flash ranging grew rapidly to meet the needs of the Field Artillery during World War Two.145 Of the 26 battalions that were created during the war, 23 saw combat action.146 Organic to corps artillery, each observation battalion consisted of a headquarters and headquarters battery and two observation batteries. Basically, the battalion located enemy artillery, registered and adjusted friendly artillery fire, collected information, coordinated survey, and furnished the meteorological message about the weather conditions because they influenced the accuracy of long-range field artillery fires.147 Throughout the war sound ranging and flash ranging units complemented organic air observation. During the Tunisian Campaign early in 1943, the 1st and 9th Divisions reported about flash ranging and sound ranging units furnishing accurate data for counterbattery fire. As a result, counterbattery fire was “very successful” throughout the fighting.148 According to II U.S. Corps, the 1st Observation Battalion located enemy batteries quickly in North Africa to permit friendly field artillery to neutralize them “in short

142Ford, “Grasshoppers,” p. 651 143Ibid. 144Kitchens, “Organic Army Aviation in World War II, Part I,” pp. 14, 16; Kitchens, “Organic Army Aviation in World War II, Part II,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Jul-Aug 1992, p. 17. 145Hercz, History and Development of Field Artillery Target Acquisition, p. 18. 146Bursell, “American Sound Ranging in Four Wars,” p. 54; Hercz, History and Development of Field Artillery Target Acquisition, p. 18. 147USFET Report, subj: The Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, p. 1, MSTL. The meteorological message contained information on wind speed and direction, humidity, and air pressure because they influenced the range and accuracy of artillery trajectories. 148Field Artillery School, Review of Confidential Information, 10 Aug 1943, p. 18, MSTL.

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order” and forced German field artillery to displace frequently to avoid punishing American counterbattery fire.149 In Okinawa in 1944, an observation battalion identified about 500 Japanese gun positions, allowing friendly field artillery to silence them over a period of two weeks through heavy shelling. For example, flash ranging units fixed the position of Yontan Pete, a 150-mm. Japanese piece that had been harassing an American airfield over a period time from an impregnable cave on Okinawa. Watching for the gun’s muzzle flash, observers reported instantly when the gun fired and identified its location. Before the gun could return to the safety of its cave, American 155-mm. field guns demolished Yontan Pete with devastating fire.150 Notwithstanding their invaluable services, sound ranging and flash ranging still exhibited critical weaknesses that often restricted their utility. During the rapid pursuit across France and later Germany, observation battalions were of little value as many field artillery officers had anticipated during the 1920s and 1930s. The mobile operations prevented the battalions from setting up their equipment even though they were physically able to keep abreast of the rapid movement. When operations stabilized along the Siegfried Line, the battalions became more useful for locating German batteries and adjusting friendly field artillery fire on them. However, heavy fog, rain, and snow hampered flash ranging on occasions. Also, in the initial island-to-island warfare in the Pacific where difficult terrain was encountered, the Americans found flash ranging to be impractical and seldom used it.151 With a few exceptions corps artillery maintained centralized command and control of its observation battalion’s batteries. This permitted evaluating enemy battery locations and intelligence for the entire corps at one headquarters and gave observation battery commanders freedom to supervise their often widely separated units rather than being concerned with evaluating the information. Circumstances, however, frequently forced corps artillery to decentralize operations. In cases where communications presented problems on extended corps fronts in Europe that were frequently 40,000 yards across and irregular, corps artillery often attached one or more batteries to subordinate field artillery groups. Decentralization of sound ranging and flash ranging assets, especially, below division level dissipated “specialized and irreplaceable personnel and equipment on tasks that forward observers . . . can do,” and field artillery commanders tried to avoid this. However, they sometimes had no other choice.152 In the Pacific during the initial island-to-island operations, for example, the Americans faced difficult terrain covered with dense vegetation and created special sound ranging platoons by adding more maintenance personnel and equipment to the normal tables of organization and equipment of the organic observation battalions. Flash ranging platoons were impractical there because they could not detect the flashes of expertly camouflaged

149Report of Observer to North African Theater, 5 Jul 1943, Annex C, p. 24, MSTL. 150Frank E. Comparato, Age of Great Guns: Cannon Kings and Cannoneers Who Forged the Firepower of Artillery (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1965), p. 271. 151USFET Report, subj: The Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, pp. 2-3, MSTL. 152First US Army, Artillery Intelligence Service Memorandum, Apr 1944, p. 24, MSTL.

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Japanese field artillery.153 During a rapid advance in Europe, corps artillery also placed observation batteries under division control as necessary. This kept the batteries forward where they could detect enemy field artillery more easily than if they were under corps artillery. Such action, however, often led to disaster. At Faid Pass, Tunisia, early in 1943, for example, the Germans overran and captured a skeletonized observation battery. Later in December 1944, the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion lost most of one battery in the infamous Malmedy Massacre during the Battle of the Bulge.154 Of the two forms of ranging, sound ranging proved to be more reliable. It located field artillery pieces hidden to visual observation and played a vital role on every front.155 Under static conditions sound ranging stations identified an average of 750 enemy batteries per month in the Europe from mid-1944 through mid-1945. From a study of the confirmations of sound ranging plots by photo intelligence, air observation, flash ranging, shelling reports, and prisoner of war reports, sound ranging was also more accurate than flash ranging.156 In Italy American sound ranging successfully located the Anzio Express, a German railroad gun that shelled the Anzio beachhead from 40 to 50 kilometers away. Also, a counterbattery intelligence statistical report from VII U.S. Corps Artillery of July 1944 to April 1945 indicated that over 75 percent of all enemy gun locations in the corps area were made by sound ranging and that 51percent of all corps artillery counterbattery fire was based on sound ranging.157 Although flash ranging demonstrated its worth, it still failed to meet prewar expectations. During operations in North Africa and Europe, flash ranging “was only about one tenth as successful as sound ranging in locating German artillery.”158 Throughout the campaigns in Europe difficult terrain and adverse weather hampered operations and limited flash ranging’s effectiveness.159 German activities also restricted the usefulness of flash ranging. In the spring of 1943, the Germans started employing a “practically flashless” propellant. This development made locating batteries by their flashes more difficult than previously. The German practice of utilizing their guns near their maximum ranges to make finding them more challenging than if they were closer to the front lines also hampered flash ranging ability to detect enemy batteries.160 Although sound ranging and flash ranging played a vital role in counterbattery work,

153“The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1948, p. 253. 154USFET Report, subj: The Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, pp. 2-3, MSTL; Hercz, Development of the Field Artillery Observation Battalions, p. 19. 155“The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” p. 255. 156USFET Report, subj: The Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, pp. 3-4, MSTL. 157Bursell, “American Sound Ranging in Four Wars,” p. 54. 158USFET Report, subj: The Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, p. 8, MSTL. 159Ibid. 160Ibid.

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they had limited success locating enemy mortar batteries.161 Mortars were extremely deadly and difficult to find. After firing a few shots the enemy moved their mortars to avoid incoming field artillery fire. Hilly or mountainous terrain, adverse weather conditions, widely extended fronts, and deeply defiladed mortar batteries further reduced sound ranging’s and flash ranging’s ability to locate mortars. Equally important, the small amount of flash and noise produced by mortars made detection impractical, while the high trajectory of mortar fire permitted lobbing shells over hills and other obstructions that precluded easy discovery. Given such barriers, the Germans and Japanese employed the weapon extensively and resourcefully to inflict a tremendous number of American casualties.162 To reduce the impact of the mortar, the Americans turned to organic field artillery air observation. The 80th Infantry Division artillery executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E. Shaw, pointed out in the fall of 1944: Locating enemy mortars is a problem, but we have achieved quite a bit of success locating them with our Air OP’s [observation post]. Mortars can be seen only when you are looking right down the muzzle [because of the lack of smoke and flash]. . . . Knowing the maximum range of mortars we strike an arc of 3,000 yards or so from a place where mortar fire is received. This gives our pilots a definite area where to look and saves a lot of wasted searching.163 The 80th Infantry Division artillery found a way to neutralize enemy mortars, employing air observers, but it was time consuming and insufficient. Air observers could only spot mortars when they were firing. Even then, flashless propellants and the small amount of smoke produced by firing made observation difficult. To pinpoint mortars aerial observers had to be in the air when they were firing and had to know beforehand the areas in which they were likely to be located.164 In view of the serious handicaps with existing target acquisition systems, the Army searched for a more efficient method of finding hostile mortars.165 When casualties from mortar and field artillery fire reached 73 percent in some American units at Anzio, Italy, in 1943, the urgency to neutralize mortars escalated. The situation in Italy, the American work prior to the war with antiaircraft radar to track 12-inch seacoast artillery trajectories, and the

161Special Report of Observer in European Theater of Operations, 8 Sep-22 Dec 1944, pp. 71, 72, 74, MSTL. 162Lt Col Leonard M. Orman, “Counter-Mortar Radar,” Coast Artillery Journal, Jan- Feb 1947, p. 26; Lincoln R. Thiesmeyer and John E. Burchard, Combat Scientists (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947), pp. 244-45. 163Special Report of Observer in European Theater of Operations, 8 Sep-22 Dec 1944, p. 25, MSTL. 164Ibid., pp. 25, 73; First U.S. Army, Artillery Intelligence Service Memorandum, Jul 1944, p. 35, MSTL. 165Report, Field Radar Operations Section, 15th Army Group, Oct 1944-May 1945, p. 1, MSTL; Orman, “Counter-Mortar Radar,” p. 26; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1949, pp. 14-20; Report, subj: Preliminary Information on Radar Set AN/TPQ-2, Jun 1945, pp. 1-2, MSTL.

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British wartime experiments with radar to locate mortars inspired the Americans to use antiaircraft radars operated by antiaircraft artillery officers to detect ground targets, especially mortars, and to make them available to observation units, such as the 3rd Field Artillery Observation Battalion. Rather than taking the time to develop a totally new radar, the Americans modified the SCR-584 antiaircraft radar to track a mortar shell back to its firing point. When the Americans first experimented with the radar in Italy in 1944-1945, they had success even though the mountainous terrain hampered finding mortar sites. Even so, the first battery of radars located 226 mortar sites in its first three weeks of operation. In the meantime, the U.S. Army modified the British long-range air warning radar AN/TPS-3 for employment in the Pacific theater, called it the AN/TPQ-3, and started developing a mobile countermortar radar with the capability of seeing deep into enemy territory.166 In the fall of 1944, a special observer to the European Theater of Operations, Major Lee O. Rostenberg, commented on the use of SCR-584 radar by XV U.S. Corps. He reported, “Countermortar radar development has had high priority because of large [number of] casualties from mortars. Radar is . . . a successful solution to enemy mortar problems, according to both British and U.S. operational experience with AA [antiaircraft] radar.”167 Because of the requirement to place the radar in an exposed position to obtain a direct line of sight into the target area and because daylight operations were too dangerous, American forces employed radar at night to avoid enemy detection. Given the success of radar through the fall of 1944, many field artillerymen in Europe insisted on developing it for pinpointing enemy field batteries and positions, thus, expanding its role.168 The XV U.S. Corps artillery commander in 1943-1945, Brigadier General Edward S. Ott, recounted his experience with the SCR-584 radar. Rather than focusing on solely countermortar missions as American forces had done in Anzio, Ott’s corps employed the radar for general field artillery use between October 1944 and April 1945 in France and Germany to provide battlefield intelligence, to locate moving and fixed ground targets for

166Report, Field Radar Operations Section, 15th Army Group, Oct 1944-May 1945, p. 1, MSTL; Memorandum, HQ Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, subj: Summary of counter-mortar Radar Developments in European Theater of Operations, 11 Jun 1945, MSTL; Orman, “Counter-Mortar Radar,” p. 27; Comparato, Age of Great Guns, p. 357; Thiesmeyer and Burchard, Combat Scientists, pp. 244-45, 252; Field Artillery School, Employment of Tracking-Type Radar with Field Artillery, Dec 1950, p. 2, MSTL; Report, subj: Preliminary Information on Radar Set AN/TPQ-2, Jun 1945, pp. 1-6, MSTL; Report, subj: A Comparison of Tracking and Intercept Methods of Radar Mortar Location, Oct 1952, unpaginated, MSTL; Field Radar Operations Section, Allied Armies, Italy, Field Radar Operations Reports, 11 Nov-3 Dec 1944, 4 Dec-16 Dec 1944, 14 Jan-27 Jan 1945, MSTL; USAFAS, “Development of the Field Artillery Observation (Target Acquisition) Battalions,” pp. 19-20, Oct 1972, MSTL. 167Special Report of Observer in European Theater of Operations, 8 Sep-22 Dec 1944, p. 74, MSTL. 168Ibid.; Report No. 103, HQ European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 11 Apr 1945, p. 1, MSTL.

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corps artillery to attack, and to adjust friendly artillery fire.169 During mobile operations in Europe in December 1944, however, XV U.S. Corps seldom utilized the SCR-584. The radar’s large, cumbersome size prevented it from keeping up with mobile ground forces.170 When the front stabilized in January 1945, the corps was able to use the radar more extensively for locating targets out to 28,500 yards. Ott wrote, “. . . in certain critical areas we used the radar to give us some effective results in hampering the enemy in his supply of his troops.”171 In fact, the radar contributed to more successful fire missions in February 1945 than air observation did because of bad weather.172 Ott concluded, “The emergence of radar in the ground role from a ‘screwball experimental dream’ to an accepted, dependable, and much desired intelligence agency was amazingly rapid and widespread in the divisions of the XV Corps.”173 Other Army officers also commented favorably on radar. “With development and experience in operation with infantry and field artillery it is believed radar can become a valuable aid in obtaining information and in assisting fire control,” a combat observer with the XV U.S. Corps, Colonel H.A. Tribolet, concluded on 2 February 1945.174 Later in the month on 27 February 1945, the commander of the 23rd Antiaircraft Artillery Group that supplied the XV U.S. Corps with radar service remarked, “It may be said that the present method of operation of the radars in this role [countermortar] is considered very successful.”175 Many field artillerymen favored employing the SCR-584, saw the need to design countermortar and counterbattery radar systems, and recognized that employing radars to locate mortars and field artillery was in its infancy. Equally important, they acknowledged the requirement for lighter and more mobile countermortar and counterbattery radars than the

169Brig Gen Edward S. Ott, “Employment of Radar by XV Corps Artillery,” undated draft article, pp. 1-2, MSTL. The SCR-584 radar was the most widely used radar during the war by the U.S. Army ground forces. It was designed as a mobile, medium range, search and fire control radar for antiaircraft artillery; but the Army found many other uses for it, such as locating enemy mortar and artillery batteries. See Orman, “Radar: A Survey,” pp. 1-7, for a discussion on the various radars employed by the U.S. Army during World War Two. 170Ott, “Employment of Radar by XV Corps Artillery,” p. 4; Thiesmeyer and Burchard, Combat Scientists, p. 245; Ltr, Cdr, 23rd AAA Group, to CG, ETOUSA, ATTN: Theater Antiaircraft Officer, subj: Report and Recommendations on Detection of Group Targets by Use of SCR-584, 23 Jan 1945, MSTL; Ltr, Cdr, 23AAA Group to CG, ETOUSA, subj: [Blurred word] Report on Detection of Ground Taggers by SCR-584, 27 Feb 1945, MSTL; Ltr, HQ ETOUSA to Chief Signal Office, War Department, subj: Counter-Mortar Developments in the European Theater of Operations, 15 Jun 1945, MSTL. 171Ott, “Employment of Radar by XV Corps Artillery,” p. 4, MSTL. 172Ott, “Employment of Radar by XV Corps Artillery,” pp. 462-67, MSTL. This article is the same as the draft article referenced in footnote 152. 173Ibid., p. 467. 174Report Number 42, HQ European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 2 Feb 1945, p. 5, MSTL. 175Ltr, Col J.B. Fraser, Commander, 23rd AAA Group, to CG, Seventh Army, subj: [Blurred] Report on Detection of Ground Targets by SCR-584, 27 Feb 45, MSTL.

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SCR-584 to stay abreast of fast-moving maneuver and field artillery units.176 As critical as organic air observation, sound ranging, flash ranging, and radar were, the ever-present ground forward observer still performed invaluable services. During the war, the Field Artillery perfected the concept of attaching an observer to a maneuver company in an effort to provide more responsive fire support, especially close support, on a battlefield that was more mobile than the one of World War One. As a minimum, each firing battery had one observer to support three maneuver companies. To accomplish this, the battery reconnaissance officer was used as an additional observer. In many cases, the observers moved from one maneuver company to another as the company passed in reserve or was committed to combat so that a direct relationship between the observer and the company was not possible. The Field Artillery also employed assistant executive officers from the firing battery, usually scrounged from the wire section, to provide an additional observer. Although the system was difficult to work, the Field Artillery had a forward observer with every maneuver company in contact with the enemy.177 Field artillery operations during World War Two validated reformers’ cries of the 1920s and 1930s for organic target acquisition for counterbattery work and more mobile terrestrial observation for close support. Backed with organic sound and flash ranging, organic aerial observation, and forward observers, field artillerymen had target acquisition when and where they needed it during World War Two and did not have to request assistance from other branches of the Army to locate enemy batteries as their predecessors of World War One had done. Organic field artillery target acquisition proved to be a major breakthrough by streamlining command and control. However, the question remained about the utility of making radars organic to the Field Artillery since it was an antiaircraft artillery asset during the war that had success in locating mortars.

176Memorandum, HQ Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, subj: Operational Use of Radar for the Detection of Ground Targets, 17 Mar 1945, MSTL; Ltr, Cdr, 23rd AAA Group, to CG, ETOUSA, subj; Report and Recommendations of Detection of Ground Targets by Use of the SCR-584, 23 Jan 1945; USFET Report on Study of the Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, pp. 13-14, MSTL; Thiesmeyer and Burchard, Combat Scientists, p. 245. 177U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Close Support Study Group Final Report, 21 Nov 1975, p. A-1-4, MSTL.

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SCR 584 Radar, Field Artillery Journal, August 1946

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Sound Plotting Board, Field Artillery Journal, November-December 1948

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GR-8 Sound Recording Set on left and sound plotting board in center, Field Artillery Journal, November-December 1948

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SD-1 Drone, Artillery Trends, March 1961

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AN/TPQ-4 in static defense, Artillery Trends, January 1967

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Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle and Launcher, Field Artillery Journal, January 1976

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Q-37, Task Force Hawk, Albania, 1999, Field Artillery Magazine

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Q-36 in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Field Artillery Magazine, September-October 2002

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CHAPTER THREE

FALLING BEHIND

During the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the Field Artillery focused its attention on procuring new cannons, rockets, and for a battlefield that was growing increasingly more mobile and lethal with the introduction of atomic and later nuclear weapons. Over a period of three decades beginning in the mid-1940s, this emphasis prompted the branch to modernize weapon systems to keep up with Soviet developments. Equally important, it caused modernizing target acquisition systems to lag behind. By the 1960s field artillery weapons systems could shoot further the branch could hear and see.

THE DOWNHILL SLOPE

Although target acquisition systems might have demonstrated their capabilities during World War Two, the rush to modernize weapon systems to keep up with the Soviet arms developments during the Cold War dominated thinking in the Field Artillery. By the late 1950s, field artillery target acquisition systems lacked the capability of locating targets for long-range rockets and missiles to engage. Before World War Two was over in the Pacific Theater, the General Board, United States Forces, Europe (USFET) met over a period of several months beginning in the summer of 1945 and wrote studies on the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by United States military forces in the European Theater of Operations to serve as the basis for recommendations to improve the Army’s ground forces.1 Prepared by Brigadier General Jesmond D. Balmer who was the commandant of the Field Artillery School from July 1942 to January 1944, Colonel L.J. Compton, and Lieutenant Colonel J.G. Harding and based upon interviews with field artillerymen and after action reports, the study on the field artillery observation battalion furnished valuable insights into wartime target acquisition organization, systems, and operations. It concluded that organic sound ranging and organic flash ranging in the corps artillery observation battalion provided unsurpassed responsive support in Europe, especially under stabilized conditions. Although long irregular front lines restricted complete coverage of the battlefield at times and although they encountered difficulties furnishing support in mobile circumstances, sound ranging and flash ranging batteries permitted field artillery units to adjust and register friendly fire and to fix enemy field batteries rapidly and effectively for devastating counterbattery (field artillery fires designed to neutralize or destroy enemy field artillery) fires. This forced the enemy to move its field guns frequently to prevent destruction, hindering their ability to engage American ground forces.2 As a result, the Field Artillery should expand the number of sound and flash

1Report, USFET, subj: The Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, p. 1, Morris Swett Technical Library (MSTL), U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Ok.. 2U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Field Artillery Agency, The History of

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ranging batteries in the observation battalion from two to three and concurrently place a radar platoon in an observation battalion on an experimental basis.3 Although the radar had demonstrated its usefulness in combat during the latter two years of the war by locating elusive mortar batteries more effectively than other target acquisition systems had done, Balmer, Compton, and Harding questioned the reliability of the infant technology. Reflecting their skepticism about it, they advocated more testing to be conducted before endorsing the radar wholeheartedly and integrating it permanently into the observation battalion.4 In contrast, Balmer, Compton, and Lieutenant Colonel P.W. Thornton enthusiastically supported organic air observation in their study of organic field artillery air observation for the General Board. Organic air observation supplied continuous daylight target acquisition and over-the-hill observation capabilities during flyable weather and located passive batteries and other critical non-firing targets unlike sound ranging, flash ranging, and radar which only had the ability to pick up active firing batteries. Yet, they candidly acknowledged deficiencies with organic field artillery aerial observation and advised acquiring improved aircraft, adopting cameras with the capability of taking sharp, clear photographs from an aircraft, and adding more aerial observers for additional coverage.5 Before anything could be done with the recommendations from the General Board’s studies, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers who oversaw combat developments and was also a field artilleryman, directed a conference to be convened at the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in March 1946 to review the Field Artillery’s combat performance with the objective of providing recommendations to improve tactics, doctrine, organization, and equipment.6 Assembling at ______Target Acquisition, 1964, p. B3, MSTL; Report, General Board, USFET, subj: The Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, pp. 2, 15, MSTL. Brig Gen J.D. Balmer served as Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 1 July 1942 to 11 January 1944. 3Report, The General Board, USFET, subj: Study of the Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, p. 17; 1997 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 181. 4Report, The General Board, USFET, subj: Study of the Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, pp. 13-18, MSTL. 5Report, The General Board, USFET, subj: Study of Organic Field Artillery Air Observation, undated, pp. 35-36, MSTL. 6On 1 November 1946 the U.S. Army Ground Forces reorganized the Army school system. It established The Artillery Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The Center was composed of The Artillery School, formerly called the Field Artillery School, and all ground force units at Fort Sill. See History of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Volume III, p. 18, for more details. Also, on 9 March 1942, the Department of War created the Army Air Force, Services of Supply (later renamed Army Services of Supply), and Army Ground Forces and abolished the Chief of Arms for Infantry, Field Artillery, Cavalry, and Engineers. The Army Ground Forces assumed the mission of training the army, establishing equipment

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the prescribed date and place, conference participants came from the War Department General Staff, Army Air Force, Marine Corps, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, and ground commanders from the various theaters of operation and represented a broader base of experience than the authors of the General Board studies provided. After extensive discussions on diverse field artillery subjects, including target acquisition, the conferees advised adding a radar platoon to the corps artillery observation battalion to help cover the corps front more effectively and to assist sound ranging, flash ranging, and air observation in locating enemy positions, especially mortars that had been so devastating during the war. Unlike the more conservative officers involved with General Board studies with their reluctance to adopt the radar and their focus on the system’s weaknesses, Fort Sill conference participants acknowledged the system’s deficiencies, embraced the radar as the wave of the future, and ranked a obtaining a countermortar radar as the Field Artillery’s second most important acquisition priority. Only developing an improved variable time fuse that had proven so effective during the Battle of the Bulge and subsequent battles in Europe rated higher.7 Acquiring a countermortar radar and placing a radar platoon in the corps artillery observation battalion rested on a solid foundation as the participants at the Fort Sill conference pointed out convincingly in their discussions over field artillery equipment. Although sound ranging, flash ranging, aerial observation, and terrestrial observation located enemy field batteries and other critical targets for neutralization, suppression, or destruction, they experienced difficulties detecting hostile mortar batteries. Well-trained radar crews could locate mortars at a range of 7,000 yards with an accuracy of 100 yards and could identify vehicular traffic at 2,800 yards.8 ______requirements for the combat arms, and overseeing the combat arms. See Kent R. Greenfield and Robert R. Palmer, Origins of the Army Ground Forces General Headquarters, United States Army, 1940-1942 (Washington D.C.: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946); and Kent R. Greenfield, Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops (Washington D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1947). 7Maj Gen Louis E. Hibbs, “Report on the Field Artillery Conference,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul 1946, pp. 407-13; U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Artillery Agency, The History of Target Acquisition, 1964, p. B8, MSTL; Report, Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, War Department Observers Board, subj: AGF Report No. 1106, Employment of FA Observation Battalions, 20 Jul 1945, Employment of FA Observation Battalions, U.S. Army Ground Forces Board File, MSTL. General Hibbs served as Commandant of the Field Artillery School from August 1945 to June 1946. Also see Report, Field Artillery School, subj: Field Artillery Conference, 18-29 Mar 1946, MSTL, for an in- depth discussion of the issues and challenges facing the Field Artillery following World War Two. 8“The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1948, pp. 252-57; Maj Sydney Combs, “Radar,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan 1946, pp. 6-7; Maj H.P. Rand, “Radar Helps the Artillery Help the Doughboy,” Combat Forces Journal, Jan 1951, p. 30; Report, subj: A Comparison of Tracking and Intercept Methods of Radar

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Given the success with countermortar work during the war, the requirement for improved target acquisition capabilities on a more mobile battlefield, the General Board’s reports on field artillery tactics, doctrine, organization, operations, and equipment, and the Fort Sill conference of 1946, the Army enlarged the field artillery observation battalion. In November 1948 the Army added a third sound and flashing ranging battery to the battalion and provided a radar platoon in each battery to make radar organic to corps artillery and to ensure command and control over that critical target acquisition asset. Just because the radar was in its infancy and required additional work, it could not be ignored.9 In view of this development, the Army initiated an aggressive effort in 1946 to develop critically needed countermortar and counterartillery radars. During the war, field artillery units used the SCR-584 antiaircraft artillery radar that had been modified to locate mortars and other terrestrial targets. Besides being able to detect large targets up to 32,000 yards, the radar weighed 14 tons, was not designed to be moved around the battlefield, and was therefore unsatisfactory for mobile warfare. The Army subsequently replaced it with the SCR-784. Electronically, the SCR-784 was the same as the SCR-584, but it weighed only seven tons and was as mobile as the towed 155-mm. . Although both radars satisfied the range and accuracy requirements, their sizes and weights made them cumbersome and impractical for employment in mobile warfare as envisioned in the future.10 Prompted by the glaring lack of mobility with its radars, the Army searched for a more suitable countermortar radar. The Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories modified the long-range, air warning AN/TPS-3 radar to locate ground targets after obtaining it from the Royal Air Force, renamed it the AN/TPQ-3, and supplied it to the field forces in limited quantities during the latter months of World War Two. Although the Q-3 weighed only 250 pounds, had a range of 10,000 yards, was mobile, and was promising for divisional countermortar work, especially in fast-moving situations, tests conducted at Fort Sill in 1945- 1947 indicated that it was less effective than the SCR-584 and SCR-784. While the larger radars could locate enemy weapons of various calibers at relatively long ranges, adjust field artillery fire, and detect terrestrial movement of troops and vehicles, the Q-3 could only ______Mortar Location, ca 1952, unpaginated, MSTL; The General Board, U.S. Forces, European Theater, Report, subj: Study of the Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, pp. 13-15, MSTL. 9“The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1948, pp. 253-54; Report, War Department Observers Board, subj: AGF Report No. 1106 - Employment of FA Observation Battalions, p. 2, MSTL. 10Report, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, subj: A Comparison of Tracking and Intercept Methods of Radar Mortar Location, Oct 1952, unpaginated, MSTL; Report, The General Board, U.S. Forces, European Theater, subj: Study of the Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, pp. 13-14, MSTL; Report, Army Ground Forces Board Number One, subj: Test of Radar Adjustment of Field Artillery Fire, 10 Feb 1947, unpaginated, MSTL; George R. Thompson, et al, The Signal Corps: The Test (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957), pp. 268-74; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1949, pp. 14-20.

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pinpoint mortar fire and adjust friendly mortar fire. Its restricted range prevented locating long-range field artillery weapons, limited its usefulness, and made it less desirable than the other two more versatile radars. Even with their drawbacks, all three radars performed countermortar roles adequately during the war and helped reduce infantry casualties by facilitating effective countermortar fire from friendly field and mortar batteries.11 The radars’ deficiencies, however, encouraged looking for a better radar even before the war was over.12 In March 1945 the Chief Signal Officer, European Theater of Operations, Brigadier General William S. Rumbough, advised the Chief Signal Officer, War Department, Major General Harry C. Ingles, of the requirement for a new radar. Rumbough advocated obtaining a radar with sufficient range to look deep into the enemy’s territory to support the ground forces. Anticipating a more mobile battlefield in the future, Rumbough added in June 1945 that lightweight radars were critical to stay abreast of rapid moving ground forces and to provide target acquisition in mobile situations, something that sound ranging and flash ranging had trouble accomplishing.13 Other field artillerymen shared Rumbough’s perception and proposed improving

11Ltr, Office of the Chief Signal Office, HQ Communications Zone, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, to War Department, subj: Mortar Location, 14 Jan 45, MSTL; Ltr, Col J.B. Fraser, Cdr, 23 AAA Group, to CG, Seventh Army, subj: [Blurred word] Report on Detection of Ground Targets by SCR-584, 27 Feb 1945, MSTL; Ltr, HQ European Theater of Operations, to Chief Signal Office, War Department, subj: Counter-Mortar Developments in the European Theater of Operations, 15 Jun 1945, MSTL; Report, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, subj: A Comparison of Tracking and Intercept Methods of Radar Mortar Location, Oct 1952, unpaginated, MSTL; Report, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, subj: Preliminary Information on Radar Set AN/TPQ-2, Jun 1945, pp. 1-2, MSTL; Field Artillery School, Employment of Tracking-type Radar with Field Artillery, Dec 1950, p. 2, MSTL; Report, The Artillery School, subj: Report of Signal Corps Conference, 10 Jul 1950, unpaginated, MSTL; Report, Army Ground Forces Board Number One, subj: Test of Radar Adjustment of Field Artillery Fire, 10 Feb 1947, unpaginated, MSTL; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1949, pp. 14-20. 12Ltr, HQ European Theater of Operations to Chief Signal Officer, War Department, subj; Counter-Mortar Developments in the European Theater of Operations, 15 Jun 1945, MSTL. 13Ltr, Chief Signal Officer, European Theater of Operations, to Office of the Chief Signal Officer, War Department, subj: Operational Use of Radar for the Detection of Ground Targets, 17 Mar 1945, MSTL; Ltr, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, European Theater of Operations, to Chief Signal Office, War Department, subj: Counter-Mortar Developments in the European Theater of Operations, 14 Jun 1945, MSTL; Report, subj: A Comparison of Tracking and Intercept Methods of Radar Mortar Location, Oct 1952, unpaginated, MSTL; Rebecca R. Raines, Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996), pp. 298, 314, 416; George R. Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, The Signal Corps: The Outcome (Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), p. 613.

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radar target acquisition. On 20 July 1945 Colonel F. H. Boucher, a field artillery officer with War Department Observers Board, submitted an invaluable report to Devers about the views of field artillery observation battalion commanders in the European Theater of Operations. Commanders familiar with countermortar radars unanimously agreed that they were “a very promising development” and simultaneously encouraged making every “effort . . . to decrease weight, increase reliability, ease of operation, and maintenance.”14 In view of their combat experiences and the ground forces’ vulnerability to mortars, these commanders saw the merits of countermortar radars and favored improving them.15 Until better radars could be developed and fielded which would take time, the Army had to employ World War Two equipment during the late 1940s. With the SCR-584 being used primarily in an antiaircraft role, the SCR-784 served as the corps countermortar and counterartillery radar in the observation battalion. The Q-3, in the meantime, was assigned to division artillery for countermortar work. To locate a mortar battery position, the SCR-784 and the SCR-584 which were tracking radars followed a projectile during a portion of its flight by moving their antennas automatically to keep the radar beam on the projectile. An intercept radar, the Q-3 used a two-point trajectory-intercept method to locate mortars. The radar ranged the projectile twice during its trajectory, once when it was ascending and once when it was descending. By timing the interval between the two intercept points and using certain assumptions on mortar trajectories and the angle of elevation, field artillerymen could calculate the mortar’s position based upon information supplied by the radar. Like the other radars, the Q-3 had difficulties locating field artillery batteries and was a line-of-sight instrument like all radars because transmitted and echoed radar waves traveled in straight lines. This characteristic forced field artillerymen to place the radars on top of a hill or high terrain to give them a clear line of sight in all directions and made them vulnerable to hostile field artillery fire once located. For protection from enemy field artillery, radar crews generally positioned their radars in defilade behind a hill or ridge, called a screening crest, which still permitted a direct line of sight to enemy positions. However, such a position also limited the length of time that the radar could follow the projectile’s trajectory and made determining the location more challenging.16 With the understanding that the SCR-784, SCR-584, and Q-3 had critical limitations that hampered countermortar and counterartillery work in support of the maneuver arms, the

14Report, Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, War Department Observers Board, subj: AGF Report No. 1106 - Employment of FA Observation Battalions, 20 Jul 1945, p. 6, MSTL. 15Ibid.; Ltr, HQ Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, to Office of the Chief Signal Officer, War Department, subj: Operational Use of Radar for the Detection of Ground Targets, 17 Mar 1945, MSTL; Report, subj: Signal Corps Conference Held at The Artillery School, 17-21 Apr 1950, 10 Jul 1950, p. 2, MSTL 16Ibid.; Maj Paul E. Pigue, “Operation Countermortar,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov- Dec 1949, pp. 250-52; Field Manual, Radar Set AN/MPQ-4A, May 1961, pp. 8-9; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1949, pp. 14-20.

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Field Artillery pressed vigorously for new radars. During the latter years of the 1940s, the Army introduced the countermortar AN/TPQ-2 radar. Developed to replace the Q-3, the Q-2 radar had a range of 5,000 yards, weighed 3,000 pounds, and used the intercept technique for locating hostile mortars. Unlike the Q-3’s intercept method, the Q-2 employed two beams, a high beam and a low one. Each detected the projectile as it ascended. The low beam picked up the projectile first, and the high beam detected it next. The arc of the projectile between the two beams permitted computations to determine the projectile’s origin. Unfortunately, field testing proved the Q-2 to be unsatisfactory because it lacked the desired range and accuracy. As such, the first attempt to develop a true countermortar radar failed, forcing continued reliance on World War Two radars as the 1940s drew to a close. Although new countermortar radars were in various stages of development, the Army did not anticipate fielding them for several years and projected employing the obsolete SCR-784 that was in limited supply if war broke out early in the 1950s.17 As the Army pursued developing radars for countermortar and counterartillery employment, it did little to modernize sound ranging and flash ranging equipment. Although the GR-3-C sound ranging set of World War Two and its successor, the GR-8 sound ranging set that was introduced in 1945 and consisted of a recorder, a power supply, microphones, connecting cables and wires, and associated equipment proved to be a productive field artillery locating system during the war, inherent weaknesses circumscribed their effectiveness. Strong winds, mountainous terrain that disrupted the travel of sound waves, heavy enemy field artillery fire that cluttered sound recordings, and long ranges to the source of the sound weakened the sound and distorted it and stimulated developing more sensitive microphones. In the meantime, poor visibility, flat terrain, and dense vegetation, such as jungles, rendered flash ranging ineffective. The use of flashless powder in World War Two and deeply defiladed batteries also made the flash more difficult to detect and therefore hampered flash ranging’s usefulness. Moreover, the enemy could fool sound ranging and flash ranging systems by detonating charges to replicate active batteries.18 Given the handicaps of sound ranging and flash ranging and the intriguing potential

17Report, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, subj: A Comparison of Tracking and Intercept Methods of Radar Mortar Location, Oct 1952, unpaginated, MSTL; Report, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, subj: Test of Radar Adjustment of Field Artillery Fire, 10 Feb 1947, unpaginated, MSTL; Report, subj: Artillery Conference, 6-10 Dec 48, 20 Jan 1949, Enclosure 5, MSTL; Report, subj: Signal Corps Conference Held at The Artillery School, 17-21 Apr 1950, 10 Jul 1950, Enclosure 3, MSTL. 18War Department, Training Manual 11-2568, Sound Ranging Set GR-8, 28 Sep 1945, p. 1, MSTL; Report, subj: Signal Corps Conference Held at The Artillery School, 17- 21 Apr 1950, 10 Jul 1950, Annex B, MSTL; Rand, “Meet the FA Observation Battalion,” p. 25; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1949, p. 16; Fact Sheet, subj: Counterbattery Effort in South Vietnam, undated, Artillery Locating Radars, Miscellaneous File, MSTL; Maj Glen Coffman, “Sound Ranging – Dead or Alive,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1974, pp. 21-23; Maj Glen Coffman, “The Gap in Target Acquisition,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul 1973, p. 17.

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of radar, conferees at the Signal Corps Conference at The Artillery School, formerly the Field Artillery School, in April 1950 envisioned radars as the predominant form of terrestrial target acquisition in the future with sound ranging and flash ranging growing obsolete and eventually being eliminated. In fact, some field artillerymen insisted early in 1950 that sound ranging had already reached its optimal performance with the GR-8 and had no viable future. In view of this conclusion that was shared by many field artillerymen and the attraction of the more glamorous radar, the Field Artillery’s interest in sound ranging and flash ranging began waning late in the 1940s and early in 1950s. The favorable perception about radar coupled with deficiencies of sound ranging and flashing ranging caused developing new sound ranging and flash ranging equipment to rank low on the Army’s list of priorities before the .19 As for organic field artillery air observation, most field artillerymen found it to be highly productive during World War Two, especially when the Americans had command of the air.20 Although organic field artillery aerial observation demonstrated difficulties finding camouflaged or naturally concealed targets and detecting targets in darkness or through smoke and dust, Major Delbert L. Bristol, a vocal advocate, wrote a positive critique in the Field Artillery Journal in October 1946. He pointed out, “No one can challenge the success of the Air OP [Observation Post] during the recent conflict. It established itself as a ‘must’ and it’s here to stay.”21 Addressing aerial observation technology, Bristol added, “From the outset of the organic aviation program in 1942 to the present [1946] . . . , the principal aircraft . . . has been the . . . Piper Cub [L-4].”22 The Field Artillery employed this aircraft until late in the war when the L-5 Stinson Sentinel was introduced. During the latter months of the war, both aircraft played critical roles in locating targets, adjusting fire, and providing many other crucial services as organic elements of division and corps artilleries. Along with other field artillery officers, Bristol acknowledged the compelling requirement for adopting an aircraft with better range and speed than the L-4 and L-5. Just prior to the end of the war, the War Department directed the Army Air Force which was clamoring for independence to pursue its strategic bombing

19War Department, Training Manual 11-2568, Sound Ranging Set GR-8, 28 Sep 1945, p. 1, MSTL; Report, subj: Signal Corps Conference Held at The Artillery School, 17- 21 Apr 1950, 10 Jul 1950, Annex B, MSTL; Rand, “Meet the FA Observation Battalion,” p. 25; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1949, p. 16; Fact Sheet, subj: Counterbattery Effort in South Vietnam, undated, Artillery Locating Radars, Miscellaneous File, MSTL; Coffman, “Sound Ranging – Dead or Alive,” pp. 21-23; Coffman, “The Gap in Target Acquisition,” p. 17. 20Report, subj: Artillery Conference, 6-10 Dec 1948, 20 Jan 1949, Enclosures 1 and 8, MSTL. 21Maj Delbert L. Bristol, “Air OP is Here to Stay,” Field Artillery Journal, Oct 1946, p. 587. See Report, subj: Target Detection, Identification, and Discrimination Utilizing Army Observation Aircraft, Oct 1961, pp. 2, 28, 29, MSTL, for a discussion on the weaknesses of aerial observation 22Bristol, “Air OP is Here to Stay,” p. 587.

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interests to develop one. However, the Army Air Force gained its independence in 1947 as the Air Force when Congress reorganized the country’s military services by creating the Department of Defense with three subordinate military services – the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force – and never developed an observation aircraft because it focused on strategic bombing. The Field Artillery did not get a new observation aircraft until the 1950s when the L-19 Bird Dog was adopted.23 To supplement and extend aerial observation beyond the ranges of existing organic light aircraft in corps and division artillery that lacked the range to find deeply defiladed targets, the Army, in the meantime, experimented with , often called high performance aircraft, in light of wartime experiences with Army Air Forces observation squadrons and liaison flights.24 The one of first uses of fighter aircraft for field artillery observation occurred in September 1943 in Italy when the Fifth Army used the P-51 Mustang to adjust fire for 155-mm. guns of the 36th Field Artillery Battalion on targets that were beyond the operating range of its organic L-4 aircraft. Two fighter aircraft directed counterbattery fire on an enemy battery at a range of 24,000 yards. During the spring of 1944, corps artilleries in the Fifth Army employed fighter aircraft again to adjust fire for counterbattery missions at ranges of 20,000 to 25,000 yards which would have been impossible for the L-4 aircraft to find with its limited range and successfully neutralized enemy field artillery. Later in 1945, the First Army reported using fighter aircraft to augment L-4 aircraft. Between June 1944 and April 1945, the 32nd Field Artillery Brigade in the First Army completed 295 successful missions employing fighter aircraft to observe and adjust fire on long-range targets in France and Germany. Although high-performance aircraft demonstrated the ability to furnish observation, Army Air Force observation squadrons and liaison flights generally provided unreliable and inconsistent service because other missions had higher priority. With these successful wartime precedents with high-performance aircraft, the undependable support furnished by Army Air Force observation squadrons, and the pressing requirement for long-range observation to locate targets deep behind enemy lines and to take advantage of long-range field artillery calculated to be introduced in the near future, the Field Artillery explored using fighter aircraft after the war. The branch wanted such aircraft to observe and adjust field artillery fire with the possibility of making them organic supplements to existing organic light aircraft. In 1948 The Artillery School even developed a course of instruction for tactical reconnaissance pilots and navigators to teach

23U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Artillery Agency, The History of Target Acquisition, 1964, p. B-9, MSTL; Lt Col George L. Morelock, “Army Aviation,” Military Review, Jan 1956, p. 53; Richard P. Weinert, A History of Army Aviation: 1950- 1962, edited by Susan Canedy,(Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991), pp. 48-49, 227; John B. Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1998), p. 227 24Report, The General Board, USFET, subj: Study of Field Artillery Gunnery, undated, p. 5, MSTL; John W. Kitchens, “Organic Army Aviation in World War II, Part I,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, May-Jun 1992, p. 16.

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them field artillery adjustment procedures. However, the Army and the Field Artillery failed to reach any firm conclusions about employing fighter aircraft in observation roles as the 1950s began.25 Meanwhile, the Army also investigated using rotary-wing aircraft, better known as helicopters, in its search for critical over-the-hill observation capabilities. In 1949 the Army finished a study that outlined the requirement for helicopters with the ability of carrying personnel, cargo, and equipment but did not make any firm recommendations about employing helicopters in a field artillery role on the eve of the Korean War.26 Commenting on the state of target acquisition, especially that furnished by the observation battalion, the Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Field Artillery of February 1949 prepared a critical report. It pointed out: Present equipment, including flash ranging, sound ranging, and radar devices for the location of enemy weapons and other targets, and the adjustment of our own fire, and contemplated developments in the close foreseeable future do not approach the effectiveness desired as to accuracy, speed, and ability to function in all weather and over variable terrain. This [meaning target acquisition] is considered to be the most important development requirements of the field artillery projects.27 For the Field Artillery, the panel’s report decried the inadequate state of target acquisition, the deficiencies of observation battalion, and the stagnant modernization effort as of 1949 with the exception of forward observation that had been enhanced with more observers in each battery. Target acquisition capabilities were falling behind weapon capabilities, meaning the guns could shoot farther than field artillery eyes could see and ears could hear. More important, the panel clearly understood the relationship between indirect fire and target acquisition. For indirect fire to be effective for counterbattery work and close support (field artillery fires designed to neutralize or destroy enemy forces that prevented friendly infantry from advancing) to the other combat arms, target acquisition systems had to locate targets quickly and accurately to permit adjusting field artillery fire on them. From the perspective of the panel, modernizing target acquisition should be a higher priority than it was.28 In fact, the panel recorded, “[The] Highest possible priority [should] be placed on research and development of all means for locating weapons and other targets and adjusting our own

25Maj Paul F. Wilson, “Artillery Missions by High-Performance Aircraft Observers,” Antiaircraft Journal, May-Jun 1950, pp. 21-23; First U.S. Army, Artillery Information Service, Feb 1944, pp. 13, 14, MSTL; First U.S. Army, Artillery Information Service, Jul 1944, p. 8, MSTL; First U.S. Army, Artillery Information Service, Dec 1945, pp. 24-25, MSTL; Kitchens, “Organic Army Aviation in World War II, Part I,” p. 16; Kitchens, “Organic Army Aviation in World War II, Part II,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Jul-Aug 1992, p. 17. 26Morelock, “Army Aviation,” pp. 53-63. 27Report (Extract), Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Field Artillery, 18 Feb 1949, p. A-G-7, MSTL. 28Ibid.

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fire.”29 Otherwise, effective and responsive countermortar and counterbattery work and close support for the maneuver arms would be compromised.30 Although tremendous attempts had been exerted, the target acquisition modernization effort initiated after the war did not produce any concrete results by 1950 besides making radar organic to the corps artillery observation battalion. Because time was required to develop and introduce new systems and because peacetime funding restraints restricted developmental work, field artillery units still relied upon wartime antiaircraft radars, aircraft, and sound and flash ranging equipment to complement terrestrial forward observation. Following the war, the Army increased the number of forward observers in the direct support battery from one to three and added another assistant executive officer. This reform gave the direct support battery three dedicated forward observers, a battery commander, an executive officer, a reconnaissance officer, and two assistant executive officers to serve as forward observers as required.31 As the Field Artillery entered the 1950s, it stood at a crossroad. As the Advisory Panel on Field Artillery report revealed, the Army and the Field Artillery clearly understood the inadequate state of target acquisition with the exception of the forward observer. The branch could continue making the modernization of target acquisition systems a low priority; or it could elevate their importance. Failing to modernize would be disastrous and leave the Field Artillery with ineffective and obsolete target acquisition systems for engaging the enemy with indirect fires.32 Before modernization could begin in earnest, the Korean War that escalated tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States broke out to validate thinking about the state of field artillery target acquisition. During the war, the Army deployed two field artillery observation battalions to Korea. Shortly after the North Korean invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950, the 1st Observation Battalion arrived in theater in July 1950 and later saw its first action on the Pusan perimeter in September 1950. There, the battalion’s sound and flash ranging batteries served well in locating enemy field artillery and mortars for counterbattery and countermortar work. Pressed to meet urgent requirements on the front for more firing batteries after the People’s Republic of China had entered the war in November 1950, the Eighth Army shipped the battalion’s target acquisition equipment to Pusan for storage and equipped the unit with 105-mm. howitzers. The battalion served as a firing unit until it was relieved by the New Zealand Artillery Regiment early in 1951. The battalion then went back into the line with its normal target acquisition equipment. The 235th Observation Battalion did not arrive until November 1952, just months prior to the signing of the armistice that ended active hostilities in July 1953, and saw little action.33

29Ibid., p. 15. 30Ibid. 31U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Close Support Study Group Final Report, 21 Nov 1975, p. A-1-4, MSTL. 32Ibid. 33Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, “Artillery Target Acquisition in Korea, 1953,” p. 7, MSTL; Ronald K. Kyle, “Killer of Communists, Saver of

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Throughout the Korean War American target acquisition resources in the observation battalion faced severe complications. The mountainous terrain, the extended fronts, the unfavorable weather, and the enemy’s practice of positioning its mortars and field artillery in deeply defiladed positions restricted the effectiveness of terrestrial field artillery observation.34 Of the observation battalion’s three forms of target acquisition, sound ranging found the most enemy mortar and field artillery batteries even though it had to share its status as the favorite target locator with radar at the beginning of the war. This was particularly true during the static phase of the war when sound ranging units could find good sites and had time to set up. Combined with photo interpretation, sound ranging proved to be extremely valuable in Korea as it had been during World War Two. In comparison, flash ranging did not fare as well and could not supply 24-hour coverage. During daylight, it had difficulties detecting gun flashes and generally could not see them. At night, however, muzzle flashes from field pieces lit up the night sky to disclose their positions.35 Radar, in comparison, experienced mixed success, even though it was viewed as the target acquisition system of the future and the eventual replacement for sound ranging and flash ranging by many field artillery officers. After approximately seven years of development, the Army adopted the countermortar AN/TPQ-10 radar in 1951 to replace the SCR-584, SCR-784, and Q-3 and rushed it into action.36 Initially intending to use the Q-10 for antiaircraft missions, the Army modified it to meet field artillery requirements. A tracking radar, the Q-10 weighed 3,000 pounds, offered mobility, had a range of 5,000 yards, and promised to be “an efficient field radar.”37 During the war, the Field Artillery employed it in a counterbattery role as well as countermortar role because a field artillery locating radar had not been introduced at the time. Even though the Q-10 had difficulties detecting field artillery projectiles with their low trajectories and small profiles, it furnished a viable means ______Soldiers: U.S. Army Field Artillery in the Korean War, 1950-1953,” unpublished masters thesis, Ohio State University, 1995, pp. 57-58, 65, MSTL; Arthur R. Hercz, Development of Field Artillery Observation (Target Acquisition) Battalions, (Fort Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 1972), p. 23. 34Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkin University, “Artillery Target Acquisition in Korea, 1953,” p. 29. 35After Action Report, 1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, pp. 4, 6, 11, 25, 26, MSTL; Coffman, “Dead or Alive: Sound Ranging,” p. 22. 36Field Artillery School, Employment of Tracking-type Radar with Field Artillery, Dec 1950, p. 5, MSTL; “Exercise Your Radar,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1959, pp. 58-59; “Eyes for Countermortar Teams,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, pp. 3-5; Ltr, subj: Mortar Locating Radar, AN/TPQ-36, 13 Sep 1976, in Target Acquisition File, Historical Research and Document Collection (HRDC), Historian’s Office, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Ok. 37Field Artillery School, Employment of Tracking-type Radar with Field Artillery, Dec 1950, pp. 5-6, MSTL; Report, subj: A Comparison of Tracking and Intercept Methods of Radar Mortar Location, Oct 1952, unpaginated, MSTL; “New Eyes for the Countermortar Teams,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, p. 3.

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of adjusting friendly fire onto mortars. For the most part, the radar functioned well in darkness, fog, and light rain, but snow, sleet, and heavy rain reduced its effectiveness.38 Korea’s mountainous terrain also restricted the length of time and the distance that a projectile could be tracked during its trajectory and made accurately locating mortars and field artillery problematic.39 Regardless of the limitations imposed upon sound ranging, flash ranging, or radar by geography, weather, or the state of technology, corps artillery still found them to be indispensable and employed them extensively to find enemy targets.40 Organic field artillery air observation supplemented terrestrial observation but had its own inherent limitations. Although the Field Artillery utilized the L-19 effectively to locate targets and to perform other missions, the aircraft demonstrated critical weaknesses. Its combat performance indicated the requirement for a higher rate of climb, a greater endurance at higher cruising speeds, and the ability to carry a heavier load. The L-19 was a new aircraft, but it had serious deficiencies and needed to be replaced.41 The Korean War highlighted the weaknesses of World War Two vintage target acquisition systems still being employed. Terrain, weather, and the enemy’s resourceful use of its field artillery and mortars hampered the effective employment of the Army’s target acquisition assets and reaffirmed their growing obsolescence, including the practice of modifying antiaircraft radars for countermortar work.

FALLING FURTHER BEHIND

Cognizant of the deficiencies of its target acquisition assets, the Field Artillery pursued developing new ones following the Korean War. The branch experimented with jet aircraft in observation roles, new radars, and sound and flashing ranging equipment. However, it concentrated on fielding rockets and missiles to counter Soviet field artillery developments; and new target acquisition systems ranked low on the priority list. Prompted by the deficiencies with the L-19 and other army aircraft and the inability to acquire long-range targets for field artillery rockets and guided missiles being developed, the Army Equipment Development Guide for 1954 outlined the requirement for a high-

381lt Allen W. Brown, “Adjustment of Artillery Fire by Radar,” Artillery Trends, Feb 1960, p. 3; Rand, “Meet the FA Observation Battalion,” pp. 24-26; U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Artillery Agency, History of Target Acquisition, 1964, p. B-18, MSTL; Memorandum, subj: U.S. Position for Second Meeting of the Quadripartite Working Group on Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Night Observation, Nov 1971, Artillery Locating Radars (Miscellaneous) File, MSTL; DF, subj: Trip Report, 1 Jul 1971, Artillery Locating Radar (Miscellaneous) File, MSTL. 39After Action Report, 1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, pp. 4, 6, 11, 25, 26, MSTL; Coffman, “Dead or Alive: Sound Ranging,” p. 22; Brown, “Adjustment of Artillery Fire by Radar,” p. 3; Rand, “Meet the FA Observation Battalion,” pp. 24-26. 40US Army Combat Developments Command Artillery Agency, The History of Target Acquisition, 1964, pp. B-17 - B-19, MSTL. 41Weinert, A History of Army Aviation, pp. 48-49; Morelock, “Army Aviation,” p. 53.

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performance aircraft for observation, long-range field artillery adjustment, and command, reconnaissance, and utility use. In light of this, the Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces which had assumed the combat development mission in 1952 to add to its training mission requested in June 1954 that the Army procure ten T-37 jet aircraft trainers from the Air Force for testing in observation and reconnaissance roles. Although the Army considered the request to be reasonable, the Air Force strongly resisted because it had the reconnaissance mission, because it opposed any encroachments on that mission, and because it looked unfavorably at giving high-performance aircraft to the Army for any reason. After lengthy negotiations in 1954-1955 that clarified the rationale for the testing and abolished the reconnaissance role, the Air Force acquiesced and loaned the T-37 aircraft to the Army for test purposes.42 Upon receiving the aircraft, the Army initiated Project Long Arm to determine if jet aircraft would be suitable for observation, liaison, field artillery, and other ground force missions and activated a T-37 unit at Fort Rucker, Alabama, in the fall of 1956.43 After the test detachment had been organized and the pilots and maintenance personnel had been trained, the Army developed operational procedures, doctrine, organization, and training for the Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery employment at Fort Knox, Tennessee, , Georgia, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in 1957. The tests demonstrated that jet aircraft’s speed of 275 knots per hour did not prevent gathering accurate data. This prompted the Army to find jet aircraft to be acceptable as observation vehicles for the combat arms. However, such aircraft required a hard runway of 3,000 to 4,000 feet which would force the aircraft to fly from an airfield in the rear and raised the specter of coordination problems between aviators and ground force commanders along the lines of World War One that had driven the introduction of organic field artillery air observation early in the 1940s. Believing that the positive results of Project Long Arm outweighed the command and control concerns and pressing for long-range target acquisition capabilities to exploit the rockets and guided missiles being introduced, the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, formerly The Artillery School, recommended in December 1957 using jet aircraft in observation roles to complement existing organic fixed-wing and organic rotary-wing observation aircraft in corps and division artilleries and field artillery battalions.44

42Weinert, A History of Army Aviation, pp. 209-11; Anne W. Chapman, et al, Prepare the Army for War: A Historical Overview of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1973-1998 (Fort Monroe, VA: Military History Office, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1998), p. 6; Lt Col John W. Oswalt, “The Case for Organic Aerial Observation,” Army, Feb 1959, pp. 42-43. 43Weinert, A History of Army Aviation, pp. 209-11; James E. Hewes, Jr., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963 (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), p. 217; Oswalt, “The Case for Organic Aerial Observation,” p. 43. 44Report, subj: Evaluation of Report of Test of HPACA (Project Long Arm T-37), 13 Dec 1957, pp. 1-15, MSTL; Oswalt, “The Case for Organic Aerial Observation,” pp. 43-45. Over the years, the School of Fire for Field Artillery has undergone several names changes:

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The Commandant of the U.S. Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker, Brigadier General (later Major General) Ernest F. Easterbrook, concurred with the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School’s position of late 1957 and in March 1959 and urged adopting jet aircraft for field artillery target acquisition. As the general explained, jet aircraft would permit locating targets beyond the range of existing organic air observation aircraft and would allow the Army to take advantage of long-range rockets and guided missiles.45 Although the Army agreed with the findings and recommendations of Project Long Arm, the development of the AO-1 Mohawk fixed-wing, radar-equipped aircraft late in the 1950s that met most of the observation requirements being studied and the possibility of employing helicopters in such missions caused the Army to lose interest in using high-performance jet aircraft for ground force missions by the end of the 1950s.46 Simultaneous, the Army invested time and money in ground-based systems to ensure balanced target acquisition capabilities. Along with the Signal Corps, the Field Artillery clearly understood in 1952 that the practice of modifying antiaircraft radars for countermortar work was an expediency that could go on forever. The practice, however, would “only lead to [a] further waste of effort” and seriously restrict radar’s abilities of finding ground targets, especially hostile mortars and field artillery batteries.47 That year, the Signal Corps and the Field Artillery reaffirmed the need for radars specially designed for countermortar and counterbattery work to be fielded as soon as possible. Because the techniques of tracking and intercepting were so different, developing a radar with both capabilities to save money would be impossible. Although either type of radar would satisfy field artillery requirements, the variety of tactical situations and the distinct advantages offered by each dictated developing both kinds of radars.48 Recognizing that the AN/MPQ-10 which was fielded in 1951 never satisfactorily met the Field Artillery’s requirements as demonstrated by the Korean War, the Army replaced it ______Field Artillery School (1919-1946), The Artillery School (1946-1955), The Artillery and Guided Missile School (1955-1957), the U.S. Army Artillery and Guided Missile School (1957), the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School (1957-1969), and U.S. Army Field Artillery School (1969-present). 45Final Report, subj: Project Long Arm, 24 Mar 1959, Appendix 4 to Annex A, MSTL; Report, subj: Phase II Evaluation Report, Higher Performance Army Observation Aircraft, 14 May 1958, pp. 3, 11, MSTL; Weinert, A History of Army Aviation, 1950-1962, pp. 210-11; Field Artillery School, Organizational Charts for Field Artillery, 1957, pp. 18, 62, 68, 97, 105; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Army Aviation- Orientation, 1955, pp. 1-2, MSTL. Since World War II, the Field Artillery had organic aviation in division artillery and its field artillery battalions. 46Weinert, A History of Army Aviation, pp. 210-14; Oswalt, “The Case for Organic Aerial Observation,” p. 45. 47Report, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, subj: A Comparison of Tracking and Intercept Methods of Radar Mortar Location, Oct 1952, unpaginated, MSTL 48Ibid.; Report, subj: Artillery Conference, 6-10 Dec 1948, 20 Jan 1949, Enclosure 5, MSTL.

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with the AN/MPQ-4 countermortar radar in 1958 but retained the older Q-10 in the observation battalion to support the atomic-capable 280-mm. gun. The Q-4 was a mobile, dual-beam, intercept radar. When a projectile passed through the beams, two separate echoes appeared on a scope. The range and direction to each intercept point provided the radar’s computer with information to figure the coordinates of the firing mortar or the impact of the round, depending upon which leg (ascending or descending) of the trajectory that the radar observed. The Q-4 had a range of 15 kilometers, weighed over 6,000 pounds, had a narrow search sector, performed poorly in rain and fog, and lacked sufficient accuracy. Moreover, the Q-4 required constant operator alertness and had limited multiple target handling capability. When it was employed in conjunction with another target acquisition system, the Q-4, however, could locate targets with sufficient accuracy for fighter aircraft and bomber strikes but not for field artillery missions.49 Although target acquisition developments, such as radars, were making moderate progress, other assets in the observation battalion lagged behind the introduction of new field artillery weapons. Out of all of the target acquisition capabilities available to the Field Artillery at the end of the 1950s, sound ranging and flash ranging were falling behind the most. While radar and rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft were glamorous, exciting, and desirable with aircraft providing the ability of finding passive and active targets and furnishing much needed over-the-hill capabilities, sound ranging and flash ranging represented old methods of detecting targets, attracted little attention, could only find active firing batteries, and encouraged finding alternative means. During the 1950s, therefore, the Army generally ignored its flash ranging system, allowed it to grow obsolete, and experienced spare parts shortages with it even though flash ranging provided the greatest source of target information during World War Two. Meanwhile, the Army replaced the GR-3 sound ranging system with the heavy and cumbersome GR-8 that had more sensitive microphones to detect sounds at greater ranges (15,000 to 18,000 yards) but really offered no distinct advantages over its predecessor. Despite this apparent progress with sound ranging, the Army and the Field Artillery focused its attention on radars and helicopters as the wave of the future to the exclusion of the others. This modernization effort gave the corps

49Cpt Joe F. Stewart, “Genealogy of Target Acquisition,” Artillery Trends, Oct 1964, pp. 9-10; Maj John C. Marschhausen, “New Eyes for the Countermortar Teams,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, pp. 3-5; Cpt W. Thomas Reeder, “Exercise Your Radar,” Artillery Trends, Jul 1959, pp. 58-59; Fact Sheet, subj: Material Need Document for an Artillery Locating Radar, 27 Oct 1970, in Artillery Locating Radars File, MSTL; Fact Sheet, subj: Counterbattery Effort in South Vietnam, undated, in Artillery Locating Radars File, MSTL; DA, Field Manual 6-171, Field Artillery Radar Systems, 1986, p. 1-1, MSTL; Report, subj: Signal Corps Conference Held at The Artillery School, 17-21 Apr 1950, 10 Jul 1950, p. 2, MSTL; Ltr, Lt Col Sylvanus J. Williams III, PM MALOR, to Secretary, USAFAS, 13 Sep 1976, Radar File No. 30, MSTL; Briefing, subj: Target Acquisition, 24-25 Sep 1969, in Tab C, After Action Report, Field Artillery Systems Review, 24-25 Sep 1969, MSTL; Program Manager, Communications and Electronics Command “Eyes for the King of Battle,” unpaginated, HRDC.

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observation battalion a mixture of old and new systems with neither being satisfactory.50 Given the deteriorating state of ground-based systems in the observation battalion with the exception of the radar, the Army realized late in the 1950s that it had to modernize field artillery target acquisition as a whole to stay abreast of changes in the size of the battlefield and the ranges of new field artillery weapon systems being introduced. Otherwise, the effectiveness of counterbattery fires and close support to the other combat arms would be limited.51 In January 1957 the Artillery and Missile School explained, “Present field artillery target acquisition capabilities are limited to a range of under 20,000 meters. Acquisition of targets for long-range missiles is beyond the capability of most present techniques, excepting aircraft capable of penetrating into enemy held territory,” and sending them far behind enemy lines was extremely dangerous with the presence of antiaircraft artillery sites.52 Radars and sound and flash ranging equipment had to be positioned 3,000 or more yards behind friendly lines to protect them from hostile field artillery fire; and this reduced how far they could see into enemy territory. According to the Artillery and Missile School, a solution existed. Looking to the future, it pointed out, “The artillery expects to . . . improve its [target acquisition] capabilities through optical, infrared, photographic, acoustic, radar and other developments being pursued.”53 Individual officers also commented on the state of target acquisition. Reflecting upon this grave deficiency, Lieutenant Colonel John W. Oswalt of the U.S. Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, aptly noted in February 1959, “Today’s artillery has not the organic means of acquiring targets at the distances that can be traversed by Honest John, the 280mm gun, the Corporal, Sergeant, Redstone, and eventually the Pershing.”54 Along this line, Major James F. Holcomb of the Department of Target Acquisition in the Artillery and Missile School wrote an insightful article in Artillery Trends, an in-house publication of the school, in March 1959. He noted, “The increased range . . . of today’s field artillery weapons created a new problem. The problem is acquiring targets for these weapons. Present means of target acquisition are limited and need improvement to make full use of the nuclear capability and increased ranges of the weapons.”55 American and foreign field artillery weapons, especially those with nuclear capability, could shoot a projectile, rocket, or missile farther than the Army’s target acquisition systems in the observation battalion could see. Given the existence of sophisticated antiaircraft artillery, employing aircraft was not a viable option. This meant that adjusting friendly fire or locating hostile field artillery for counterbattery work would be extremely difficult, that

50Maj Alex J. Johnson and Maxwell R. Conerly, “A Neglected Giant: New Look for Sound Ranging,” The Field Artilleryman, Apr 1970, pp. 55-60; “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” pp. 252-57. 51Briefing, subj: Target Acquisition, 1957, Target Acquisition File, HRDC. 52“Target Acquisition,” The Artillery Quarterly, Jan 1957, p. 2 53Ibid. 54Oswalt, “The Case for Organic Aerial Observation,” pp. 42-43. 55Maj James F. Holcomb, “Target Acquisition vs. Combat Surveillance,” Artillery Trends, Mar 1959, pp. 34-35.

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long-range enemy field artillery, rockets, and guided missiles could attack friendly forces with impunity, and that the long ranges of the new American weapon systems could not be used effectively.56 Basically, the observation battalion’s target acquisition capabilities had advanced “only slightly beyond its World War II status” as the 1950s were drawing to a close, while the ranges of field artillery weapon systems, especially rockets and missiles, had increased dramatically. Without improved target acquisition capabilities, exploiting long-range field artillery weapons would be precluded.57 Personnel reductions, in the meantime, adversely influenced terrestrial forward observation. Following the Korean War, the firing battery lost one assistant executive officer and the reconnaissance officer. This left the battery with three forward observers and one assistant executive officer to serve as forward observers. A little later in the 1950s, the Army formalized the battery fire direction center with the assistant executive officer becoming the battery fire direction officer. This action further hampered flexibility by decreasing the number of officers who were available for duty as forward observers. In addition, the Field Artillery lost forward observers from the battalions with general support missions.58 Although the Army hampered terrestrial forward observation by reducing the number of observers to satisfy other pressing needs and candidly acknowledged the need for field artillery target acquisition systems in the observation battalion with greater ranges late in the 1950s, it did little during the early 1960s to eliminate the deficiencies but concentrated its energies on developing new weapon systems to counter Soviet field artillery systems.59 In a forthright comment about target acquisition in October 1964, Captain Joe F. Stewart of the Target Acquisition Department in the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School in wrote: With the advent of the current family of missiles, it is increasingly important that longer range target acquisition devices be available to the artillery commander. Presently, long range patrols, army aircraft, and the U.S. Air Force must provide locations of targets which are further than 15 to 20 kilometers beyond FEBA [forward edge of battle area].60 As Captain Stewart indicated, the Field Artillery was growing dependent upon other branches of the Army and the Air Force to satisfy its target acquisition requirements for its long-range missiles and rockets. This was unsatisfactory because field artillery target acquisition requirements could be subordinated to others’ priorities as history suggested and

56Ibid. 57Briefing, subj: Target Acquisition, 1957, Target Acquisition File, HRDC 58U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Close Support Study Group Final Report, 21 Nov 1975, p. A-1-4, MSTL. 59Conerly, “Effective Target Acquisition Coverage,” pp. 28-29; Ltc James E. Dick, “Target Acquisition Organization,” Artillery Trends, Oct 1964, pp. 6-8; Stewart, “Genealogy of Target Acquisition,” pp. 9-11; “Target Acquisition,” Artillery Trends, Jul 1966, pp. 27-29; Report, subj: AN/MPQ-4A Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 14 Feb 1966, MSTL. 60Stewart, “Genealogy of Target Acquisition,” p. 11.

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could prevent responsive and effective counterbattery and close support fires.61 Three years after Stewart’s assessment, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Harold K. Johnson (1964-1968), provided his perception of the situation with target acquisition capabilities. Johnson related in 1967, “If our firepower is to be effective, we must have a fully responsive target acquisition system. Our system is neither responsive enough nor adequately comprehensive to serve the purposes that we would like.”62 Field artillery target acquisition capabilities in the observation battalion had not changed appreciably changed since 1957. They still lagged behind other field artillery systems and required serious modernization through the introduction of state-of-the-art target acquisition systems.63 The following year, a Field Artillery Survey and Target Acquisition Conference, held at Fort Sill, reached the same conclusion. The conference report noted in the latter months of 1968, “Artillerymen pride themselves on their ability to deliver fires accurately. A great deal of money and effort have gone into the development of weapons with greater range, greater accuracy, more destructive ammunition, and greater mobility to assist the artillerymen in accomplishing their mission.”64 The report then lamented, “If this increased ability to deliver fires is not to be wasted, suitable targets must be provided. This requirement emphasizes the importance of target location and the need for constantly improving present target acquisition equipment and techniques.”65 Reflecting on the serious situation, Major Joe Mah of the U.S. Army Combat Development Command Field Artillery Agency reinforced the need to modernize target acquisition. In a briefing at the Field Artillery Survey and Target Acquisition Conference in the fall of 1968, he pointed out, “When the ranges of our current target acquisition equipment are compared to our current weapons, it becomes painfully clear that our target acquisition capability cannot support our weapons in range.”66 If the current target acquisition systems in the observation battalion were positioned within two kilometers of the forward edge of the battlefield, they would be “able to detect and locate very little of the Soviet [indirect fire] systems.”67 Mah continued, “Our current flash means [M-65 Battery Commander scope of World War Two] would probably not be able to pick up very much in the way of medium range cannons and probably no free flight rockets. Our current sound system would be of marginal utility. The current counterbattery system AN/MPQ-10 would be of doubtful value.”68

61Ibid. 62“Improvement of Artillery Target Acquisition Effectiveness,” Artillery Trends, Jan 1967, p. 44. 63“Improvement of Artillery Target Acquisition Effectiveness,” pp. 44-49. 64Report, subj: Field Artillery Survey and Target Acquisition Conference, 30 Oct-1 Nov 1968, p. 8-2, MSTL. 65Ibid. 66Ibid. 67Ibid. 68Ibid.

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Subsequently, the Field Artillery School, formerly the Army Artillery and Missile School, reached the same conclusion. The school noted in 1969 that the conflict in Southeast Asia stressed the urgent need for more responsive and efficient systems to fill the modern Army’s target acquisition, meteorology, and survey requirements. During 1969, the Target Acquisition Department, directed by Colonel H.R. Jackson, also emphasized the growing requirement to improve target acquisition.69 In September 1969 a briefing given at the Field Artillery Systems Review noted, “With the exception of some radar, our capabilities in target acquisition, survey and meteorology are essentially no better than those of World War II.”70 Even the radars represented obsolete technology. The standard counterbattery radar, the Q-10, was originally a countermortar radar and later modified to locate field artillery.71 In 1970 the school added, “No radar within the inventory today gives the field artillery a satisfactory counterbattery capability.”72 Such a deplorable situation in the field artillery observation battalion was the result of “decades of neglect.”73 Over a period of 30 years, the Army and the Field Artillery consciously allowed target acquisition capabilities to deteriorate by focusing their attention on improved cannons, rockets, and missiles and ignoring target acquisition systems.74 At the end of the 1960s, sound ranging, flash ranging, and radars provided “only limited capability. Such systems are limited in range, in sector coverage, in accuracy, and dependability.”75 Given the impact of field artillery and mortars in World War Two and Korea and the requirement for effective counterbattery fires and close support to the maneuver arms on the modern battlefield, the deficiencies were unacceptable and would lead to high friendly casualties in the future if World War Two and the Korean War were preludes to the future. In both wars field artillery produced the most casualties on the battlefield. Modernizing target acquisition systems, including forward observation, was warranted and definitely needed for effective close support and especially destructive counterbattery fires on enemy indirect fire systems.76 During 1965-1969, combat action in Vietnam substantiated the grave concerns about the inadequacies of target acquisition and forced the Army to come to grips with the inadequacies in the observation battalion, renamed the target acquisition battalion in 1961.

69U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Annual Historical Summary, 1 Jan 1969-31 Dec 1969, p. 14. 70Briefing, subj: Target Acquisition, 24-25 Sep 1969, in Tab C, After Action Report, subj: Field Artillery Systems Review, 1969, MSTL. 71Ibid. 72Fact Sheet, subj: Material Need Document for an Artillery Locating Radar, 27 Oct 1970, Artillery Locating Radar File-Miscellaneous, MSTL. 73Fact Sheet, subj: Counterbattery Effect in South Vietnam, undated, Artillery Locating Radar File-Miscellaneous, MSTL. 74Fact Sheet, subj: Counterbattery Effect in South Vietnam, undated, Artillery Locating Radar File-Miscellaneous, MSTL. 75Hughes Aircraft Company, Firefinder: The Q-36 Weapon Locating Radar, MSTL 76Ibid.

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As in past wars in the 20th Century, forward observers and aerial observers furnished most of the target acquisition services in Vietnam. Although they were vulnerable to sophisticated enemy air defense artillery and even small arms fire if they came within range, observers aloft in helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft that were organic to the corps and division artilleries and the field artillery battalion were more flexible and more responsive than radar, sound ranging, and flash ranging provided by the three target acquisition batteries deployed to Vietnam. While Battery F, 2nd Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Field Artillery, supplied sound ranging and flash ranging services, Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battalion, 26th Field Artillery and Headquarters Battery, 8th Target Acquisition Battery, 25th Field Artillery employed the AN/MPQ-4 radar and the AN/TPS-25 ground surveillance radar. Most field artillery units believed that the AN/TPS-25 did a good job and was a valuable piece of equipment. The Q-4, in contrast, suffered from two major shortcomings. It had a small scan sector of 445 mils (approximately seven degrees) and could not locate low-trajectory weapons, specifically rockets which were particularly troublesome and threatening. Although the first weakness could be alleviated by using several Q-4s to furnish mutual and overlapping coverage, the second deficiency could not be eliminated because the system was designed to detect high-trajectory weapon systems.77 In 1969 a study conducted by the Field Artillery confirmed the already existing reflections about the limits of the Q-4’s effectiveness in Vietnam. Over a period of six months in 1969, the radar verified the location of 342 mortar and rocket attacks out of a possible of 1,759 attacks for a success rate of 19 percent. The study identified the limited scan capabilities as the foremost disadvantage because many attacks came outside of the scan capabilities. Aware of the radar’s characteristics, the enemy initiated mortar and rocket attacks from positions beyond the scan of the radar by first noting the orientation of the radar

77U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Field Artillery Reference Data, 1963, pp. 4-5; U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Field Artillery Reference Data, 1965, p. 4; U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Field Artillery Reference Data, 1966, p. 4; U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Field Artillery Reference Data, 1967, p. 4; U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Organization Infantry, Mechanized, Armored, and Airborne Divisions, 1962, pp. 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 54, 55, 56, 64, 65, 66, and 67; U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Organization Infantry, Mechanized, Armored, and Airborne Divisions, 1963, pp. 33, 34, 37, 42, and 47; U.S. Army Aviation School, Army Aviation in the Field Army, 1963, p. 33; Maj Gen David E. Ott, Field Artillery: 1954-1973 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1975), pp. 179-80; U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Organization and Employment of Army Aviation, Apr 1969, pp. 3-4, HRDC. To be more accurate field artillerymen divided a circle into 6400 mils. Therefore, 445 mils is about 7 degrees of coverage. Early in the 1960s, the Army centralized organic field artillery aviation in the division artillery aviation section and removed aircraft from the field artillery battalion to enhance command and control. In doing this, the Army broke with the organizational arrangement that dated back to World War II. As a result, direct support field artillery battalions in Vietnam did not have organic air observation. They depended upon the division or corps artillery to furnish air observation.

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(the direction that it pointed) and then selecting an appropriate avenue of attack.78 Projects of the late 1960s that were in varying stages of development held out the possibility of eliminating the gap between target acquisition and weapon systems capabilities by introducing state-of-the-art equipment.79 Because the Q-10 and Q-4 were ineffective and were growing obsolete, the Army approved a requirement in 1967 for a field artillery locating radar and a countermortar radar. Meanwhile, the Army confirmed a requirement for a new sound ranging set in 1966 to replace the GR-8. The lack of funding and the hindered progress; and work on the AN/TNS-10 sound ranging system, a transistorized model of the GR-8, did not begin until the early 1970s. As long as funding was available to permit serious work, these developmental projects would represent a substantial improvement in target acquisition capabilities but could not be introduced until late in the 1970s or early in the 1980s at the soonest.80 Yet, the decision to develop new field artillery target acquisition systems late in the 1960s failed to produce the desired results. As late as 1972, funding for new radars, sound ranging, and flash ranging equipment for the target acquisition battalion did not exist because many senior officers did not see the need for them, exhibiting attitudes that dated back to World War Two. They simply failed to understand the critical relationship between indirect fire and target acquisition and held to the mistaken belief that organic air observation would make up for deficiencies in the target acquisition battalion. Such thinking left the Field Artillery with World War Two vintage sound ranging and flash ranging.81 Addressing this dire situation, a student handout of 1972 in the Field Artillery School noted, “There are no combat ready sound ranging sets in the Army inventory, and very few adequately trained sound rangers or flash rangers remain on active duty.”82 The North Vietnamese offensive of 1972, however, changed this deteriorating situation with target acquisition. During the offensive, large amounts of enemy mortar and field artillery fire hit American fire bases with devastating effect and impunity because the Americans could not locate the enemy’s mortars, field artillery, and rockets. Together, the North Vietnamese offensive and the Field Artillery Systems Review of 1973 compelled the

78Ott, Field Artillery, pp. 180, 232 79Report, subj: Field Artillery Survey and Target Acquisition Conference, 30 Oct-1 Nov 1968, p. 9-2, MSTL; Hercz, Development of the Field Artillery Observation (Target Acquisition) Battalions, p. 23. 80Fact Sheet, subj: Radar Artillery Locating, 2 Nov 1970, Artillery Locating Radars File-Miscellaneous, MSTL; Fact Sheet, subj: Mortar Locating and Artillery Locating Radars, undated, Artillery Locating Radars File-Miscellaneous, MSTL; Report, subj: Field Artillery Survey and Target Acquisition Conference, 30 Oct-1 Nov 1968, pp. 9-5 - 9-11, 10-3 - 10-14, MSTL; Coffman, “Dead of Alive,” p. 23. 81Coffman, “The ‘Gap’ in Target Acquisition,” p. 18; Hughes Aircraft Company, Firefinder: The Q-36 Weapon Locating Radar, p. iii, MSTL; Department of the Army, U.S. Army TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity, Mar 1977, p. 1, AN/TPQ File, MSTL; Hercz, Development of Field Artillery Observation (Target Acquisition) Battalion, p. 23. 82Ibid.

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Army to allocate funds for new radars and sound and flash ranging systems with greater ranges and accuracy than their predecessors.83 Although persisting funding problems still threatened to stall acquisition, the Army made developing new radars a high priority in the mid-1970s and started work on the AN/TPQ-37 radar for locating long-range, low-angle trajectory weapons up to 30 kilometers and the AN/TPQ-36 radar for locating enemy mortars, field artillery, and rockets up to 24 kilometers.84 Collectively called Firefinder radars, the Q-37 and Q-36 would have the ability to detect and track multiple projectiles from an indirect fire weapon system, would cover a full circle in ninety degree-sectors, would have greater ranges, and would be more mobile than their predecessors. The radars would scan the horizon, sweeping back and forth several times a second in their search for projectiles as they emerged above the mask. After a projectile had been detected and a subsequent radar beam had verified detection, track beams would follow the path of the projectile until sufficient data had been collected for accurate location of the weapon.85 Because atmospheric conditions limited the distance that sound could be heard and that the flash could be seen, the Army envisioned sound ranging and flash ranging as backups to radar in case the latter were jammed by enemy electronic equipment. Notwithstanding this valid concern, the Army decided early in 1973 to focus its energies on improving counterbattery and countermortar radars and devoting less time on new sound ranging and flash ranging systems.86 Moreover, only radar could to provide precise locations “beyond the

83Coffman, “The ‘Gap’ in Target Acquisition,” p. 18; Hughes Aircraft Company, Firefinder: The Q-36 Weapon Locating Radar, p. iii, MSTL; Department of the Army, U.S. Army TRADOC Systems Analysis Activity, Mar 1977, p. 1; Hercz, Development of Field Artillery Observation (Target Acquisition) Battalion, p. 23. 84Msg, Cdr, USAFACFS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: AN/TPQ-37 Radar, 102372Z Mar 75, Radar File, MSTL; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cdr, USAFACFS, subj: AN/TPQ-37 Radar, 121780Z Mar 75, Radar File, MSTL; DF, subj: Trip Report, 12 May 75, Radar File, MSTL; Ltr, Lt Col Sylvanus J. William III, PM MALOR Field Office, to Secretary, USAFAS, 13 Sep 1976, Radar File No. 30, MSTL. 85Hughes Aircraft Company, Firefinder: The AN/TPQ-36 Weapon Locating Radar, Oct 1981, pp. 2-3, MSTL; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cdr, FAS, subj: AN/TPQ-37 Radar, 121700Z Mar 75, Radar File, MSTL; Trip Report, Cpt Frank L. Meier, 12 May 75, Radar Rile, MSTL; Memorandum, subj: Firefinder COEA Funds, 25 Feb 1975, Radar File, MSTL; HQ DA, Field Artillery Radar Systems, 17 Mar 1986, p. 1-1; U.S. Army Field Artillery School; Field Manual 6-161, Field Artillery Radar System, Mar 1986, pp. 6-1, 6-2, 6-8; Coffman, “Sound Ranging: Dead or Alive,” pp. 19-24; Coffman, “The ‘Gap’ in Target Acquisition,” pp. 16-19. Maj Coffman was assigned to the Review and Analysis Division of the Target Acquisition Department. 86Report, Army Scientific Advisory Panel, subj: Hostile Artillery Locating Systems, Apr 1973, pp. 1, 7, 12, 23, 31, 47, MSTL; Hughes Aircraft Company, Firefinder: The Q-36 Weapon Locating Radar, p. iii.

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optical horizon.”87 Radar could track incoming projectiles, determine their trajectories, and extrapolate their origins with greater accuracy than sound and flash ranging could. In fact, the Army Scientific Advisory Panel Ad Hoc Group, chartered by the Army in 1973 to recommend target acquisition solutions, noted that none of the non-radar techniques for target acquisition would remedy the hostile field artillery locating problem at this time.88 Meanwhile, air observation fared better. Pressed by the urgent requirement for new observation aircraft, the Army created the Army Aircraft Development Plan in 1959-1960. Besides acknowledging the findings of previous aviation studies, the plan declared that the L- 19 Bird Dog aircraft and the H-13 Sioux and H-23 Raven observation helicopters should be replaced by modern aircraft with greater ranges and mobility as part of a modernization plan for the 1960s. The plan also outlined an orderly aviation development program through the 1960s.89 On 15 January 1960 the Army Chief of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer (1959- 1960), directed the establishment of the Army Aircraft Requirements Review Board to follow up on the work initiated by the Army Aviation Development Plan. Chaired by Lieutenant General Gordon B. Rogers, the Deputy Commanding General for the Continental Army Command, the board examined the requirements for light observation aircraft and established a prioritized developmental plan for 1960-1970. Following an intensive study of Army aviation in general, the board recommended holding a design competition by 1964 to develop light observation aircraft, concurrently proposed phasing out the L-19, H-13, and H- 23 and replacing them with new aircraft, and developed a procurement schedule for the 1960s.90 Although Lemnitzer approved the Roger Board’s recommendations, his successor, General George H. Decker (1960-1962), convened the Light Observation Helicopter Design Selection Board in April 1961 to review helicopter procurement, to make changes as needed, and to conduct a helicopter design competition. Chaired by Rogers, the Light Observation Helicopter Design Selection Board, better known as the Second Rogers Board, accepted three helicopter designs – OH-4 of Bell Helicopter Company, OH-5 of Hiller Aircraft Corporation, and OH-6 of The Aircraft Division of Hughes Tool Company – to compete for the Army’s light observation helicopter contract. After fierce competition between 1961 and 1964 among the potential contractors, a Second Light Observation Helicopter Design Selection Board awarded Hughes the contract in August 1964, based on the lowest cost. Several years later, Hughes introduced the OH-6 Cayuse to replace the L-19, H-13, and H-23 in observation roles and eventually sold 1,434 helicopters to the Army over a period of several years. The OH-6 quickly established a solid reputation during the Vietnam War for its

87Report, Army Scientific Advisory Panel, subj: Hostile Artillery Locating Systems, Apr 1973, p. 47, MSTL. 88Report, Army Scientific Advisory Panel, subj: Hostile Artillery Locating Systems, Apr 1973, pp. 47, 66, MSTL. 89Weinert, A History of Army Aviation, p. 203 90Ibid., pp. 115-17

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maneuverability, speed, and ability to sustain battle damage and to return to base.91 In the midst of the light observation helicopter competition, a controversy arose over the decision to abandon fixed-wing aircraft in favor of rotary-wing aircraft for field artillery observation missions. In May 1962 the Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board under the direction of Major General Hamilton Howze gathered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Besides reaffirming the recommendations of the Second Rogers Board, the Howze Board specifically advocated employing rotary-wing aircraft for observation missions because they could fly the nap of the earth to make them more difficult to detect and could hover. At the same time the Howze Board endorsed the growth of Army fixed-wing and rotary-wing aviation in general for other missions. A Department of Defense review of Army aviation in 1962, however, challenged using only helicopters for observation missions and endorsed employing fixed-wing aircraft in that role because they had a lower initial cost and were more economical to operate. In response, the Army directed the Combat Developments Command to conduct a study in 1963 comparing rotary-wing aircraft and fixed-wing aircraft in liaison, reconnaissance, observation, field artillery fire adjustment, and target acquisition missions and to advise a course of action. Completed in June 1963, the study found rotary- wing aircraft and fixed-wing aircraft to be equally suitable for most army missions. In view of the study’s conclusion, the Army continued developing rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft for organic aviation in division artillery and other purposes.92 Subsequently, the Army required more scout helicopters for combat in Vietnam. Because Hughes Tool Corporation Aircraft Division raised the purchase price of the OH-6 by three times the original cost, Congress refused to renew the contract for the helicopter and directed the Army to hold a light observation helicopter competition in 1968. This time the Army selected Bell’s OH-4 and bought 2,200 OH-4s between 1969 and 1973. Named the OH-58 Kiowa in honor of Kiowa Indian scouts with the frontier Army in the 19th Century, the Bell helicopter gave the Army a light observation helicopter to supplement the OH-6. The two helicopters also complemented the fixed-wing OV-1 Mohawk that had been manufactured by the Grumman Aircraft Corporation and had replaced the L-19. Together, the OH-58, the OH-6, and the OV-1 saw extensive duty in the Vietnam War as observation aircraft with the helicopters playing the dominant role in field artillery missions because they

91W.E. Butterworth, Flying Army: The Modern Air Arm of the U.S. Army (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 154-57; Bill Gunston, An Illustrated Guide to Military Helicopters (New York: Arco Publishing, 1981), pp. 34-36, 60-62; Porter, The McDonnell Douglas OH-6A Helicopter, pp. 1-6; Frank J. Delear, Helicopters and Airplanes of the U.S. Army (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1977), pp. 63-65; Report, subj: Army Aviation in the Field Army, Fiscal Year 1963, pp. 75-76, MSTL; “Weapons Systems: 1970,” Artillery Trends, May 1962, p. 11; “OH-6A Versus OH-58A,” Army, Feb 1990, p. 4. 92Report, subj: Light Observation Helicopter versus Fixed-Wing Aircraft Experiment, 25 Jun 1963, pp. iii, ix, 7, 21, 22, 28, 125-31, MSTL; Butterworth, Flying Army, pp. 95-96; U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Organization and Employment of Army Aviation, Apr 1969, pp. 3-4, HRDC.

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could hover and fly the nap of the land to void radar and visual detection better than fixed- wing aircraft could.93 The drive for over-the-hill observation capabilities and the growing sophistication of air defense systems that made manned observation aircraft vulnerable to antiaircraft fire simultaneously propelled the development of unmanned drone aircraft for target acquisition. A drone aircraft employed an onboard programmer for flight direction, was programmed to follow a certain flight pattern, and lacked remote guidance capabilities. Given these limitations, a drone’s flight path could not be altered after the aircraft had been launched and was relatively inflexible in its employment. Nonetheless, the Army made its first serious attempt to introduce a drone in 1954 when the Signal Corps began to investigate the use of small, sensor-equipped ones. After the feasibility of such vehicles had been successfully demonstrated, the Army procured ten drones built by Northrop-Ventura and fielded them as the AN/USD-1 in the United States, Europe, and Korea in 1959-1960 for test purposes. The USD-1, renamed the AN/MQM-57A in 1964, was radio-controlled and carried a camera to provide photographs of target locations. Tests conducted by the Artillery and Missile School demonstrated the drone’s ability to acquire passive and active targets with sufficient accuracy to permit effective indirect fire to be brought upon deeply defiladed targets. Although the USD-1/MQM-57A’s range of 65 kilometers could not cover the entire depth of the corps sector of hundred kilometers, the Army concluded that it was a significant field artillery target acquisition system and should be part of the field artillery target acquisition battalion to complement radar, sound ranging, and flash ranging. Based upon this decision, the USD- 1/MQM-57A went into limited production early in the 1960s along with other models of drone aircraft. Even so, after spending millions dollars over a period of a decade on various models of drone aircraft, the Army had not developed an operational one by the early 1960s. Pressed by the demanding requirements of the Vietnam War and the apparent lack of a technological base for further development, the Army lost interest in drone aircraft by 1966 and terminated its drone programs, leaving the Field Artillery with only fixed- and rotary- wing aircraft for aerial target acquisition.94 Early in the 1970s, field artillery target acquisition occupied an untenable position.

93Gunston, An Illustrated Guide to Military Helicopters, pp. 34-37, 60-63; Mary McClure, “New Helicopter Honors Kiowas,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 28 Mar 1969, p. 3; Delear, Helicopters and Airplanes of the U.S. Army, pp. 60-68; “OH-58A,” Army, Feb 1990, p. 4. 94Report, subj: Test of AN/USD-1 Drone as a Target Acquisition System, undated, pp. 1-6, MSTL; “Drones in the Future,” Artillery Trends, Mar 1959, p. 61; “Target Acquisition,” Artillery Trends, Jul 1963, p. 33; Cpt Gary L. Nilson, “What's New in the Drone System,” Artillery Trends, Oct 1964, pp. 22-24; Report, subj: Outline for an Army RPV System Analysis, Apr 1975, p. 3-1, MSTL; llt Francis San Pietro, “Artillery’s Candid Camera: The SD-1 Drone,” Artillery Trends, Mar 1961, pp. 3-9; Report, subj: Target Detection, Identification, and Discrimination Utilizing Army Observation Aircraft, Oct 1961, pp. 28-29, MSTL; Col Sherwin Arculis, U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, AZ, “Remotely Piloted Vehicles,” draft article, Nov 1975, pp. 1-3, RPV Historical File, MSTL.

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With the exception of organic aerial observation that had been modernized during the 1960s with the introduction of new rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft that were vulnerable to sophisticated enemy air defense artillery systems as demonstrated by the Vietnam War, target acquisition systems in the corps target acquisition battalion and forward observers from the firing batteries could not see deep behind enemy lines to exploit long-range friendly field artillery weapons. Clearly for target acquisition to provide critical service on the battlefield, it had to be modernized. Otherwise, friendly ground forces would be unprotected from undetected hostile indirect fire systems that were out of range of friendly target acquisition systems. As the war in Vietnam reaffirmed, the Field Artillery paid dearly for making acquiring new target acquisition systems a low priority since 1945.

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CHAPTER FOUR

HALTING THE SLIDE

The Vietnam War, the Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat in Europe, the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, and the post-Cold War world persuaded the Army to embark upon an energetic, intensive target acquisition modernization effort. Over a period of several years, the Army adopted new target acquisition systems to counter the Soviet-Warsaw Pact’s lethal indirect fire systems. Although the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat unexpectedly collapsed early in the 1990s to end the Cold War, modernizing the Field Artillery’s eyes and ears continued undiminished to eliminate the deficiencies highlighted by Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm of 1990-1991 and to support power projection of military forces from the continental United States to regional hotspots throughout the world.

WHAT TO DO NOW

The Field Artillery School fully acknowledged the deficiencies in target acquisition. Eliminating them required rewriting doctrine and reorganizing. Given the tensions of the Cold War, the school felt a sense of urgency to overcome years of neglecting target acquisition in favor of weapon systems modernization and understood the correlation between effective, responsive fire support and target acquisition. In a training pamphlet of the early 1970s, the Field Artillery School reaffirmed the importance of target acquisition. The school noted: On the modern battlefield the field artillery will be called on to deliver immediate and planned suppressive fires on direct and indirect fire weapons in order to provide close, continuous, and timely fire support to the combined arms team. In order to provide these responsive fires, an aggressive, integrated, and coordinated target acquisition effort is imperative.1 Although the school did not openly criticize the quality of existing target acquisition assets, the pamphlet’s message clearly made its point. To furnish timely and effective close support (field artillery fires designed to neutralize or destroy enemy forces that prevented friendly infantry from advancing) and counterbattery (field artillery fires designed to neutralize or destroy enemy field artillery) work on a high-intensity battlefield against the Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat, the Field Artillery required sophisticated target acquisition capabilities to locate enemy targets for destruction to permit the maneuver arms to advance with a minimal amount of hostile direct and indirect fires. The Arab-Israeli War of October 1973 where two military forces equipped with modern weapons that were representative of those employed by the Soviet-Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) clashed

1USAFAS, Target Acquisition: What Can Be Done Now, undated, Forward, Target Acquisition File No 43, Morris Swett Technical Library (MSTL).

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reinforced the requirement for improved field artillery target acquisition.2 With this in mind, key Army leaders reflected upon the state of target acquisition at the beginning of the 1970s, expressing their concerns about its inadequacies against modern weapons. Upon becoming the Commandant of the Field Artillery School in June 1973, Major General David E. Ott (1973-1976) brought with him a sense of urgency. The difficulties of locating indirect fire weapons and the vulnerability of friendly troops to elusive enemy mortars and rockets in Vietnam already convinced him about the imperative of responsive target acquisition systems. A possible confrontation with the imposing Soviet- Warsaw Pact military forces with their emphasis on massive field artillery barrages to pave the way for the maneuver arms attack further intensified Ott’s drive to introduce new target acquisition systems more aggressively than the Army had done in the recent past. To survive on the European battlefield, the Army and other NATO military forces had to negate Soviet- Warsaw Pact direct and indirect fire systems through effective target acquisition. Otherwise, sure destruction would follow.3 Other Army officers, especially ones in Europe, shared Ott’s apprehensions about the state of target acquisition and concerns about the military situation in Europe. Writing the Commander of VII Corps in Germany in August 1974, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), Major General William R. Kraft, Jr., explained, “The ‘USAREUR Priority Equipment Needs’ listing indicates both high level interest and the urgent requirement for improved target acquisition means in Europe.”4 The Commanding General of VII Corps Artillery, Brigadier General Charles C. Rogers, subsequently wrote a letter to the Field Artillery School in October 1974 where he supported Kraft’s position by soundly criticizing the poor quality of target acquisition in his command and by actively seeking help to improve it.5 In a November 1974 letter to Rogers and other senior field artillery commanders, the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Vernon B. Lewis, Jr., responded to the biting critique about the condition of target acquisition in the mid-1970s and reaffirmed the school’s commitment to improve target acquisition. Reflecting on his branch,

2Ibid.; U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), Philosophy and Direction, 1977, pp. 5-13, U21 U59 1977, MSTL. 3Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Update, 18 Apr 1979, p. 3, Historical Research and Document Collection (HRDC), Command Historian’s Office, U.S. Army Field Artillery School; Patrick F. Rogers, “The New Artillery,” Army, Jul 1980, p. 31; Col William J. Harrison, “MALOR,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1975, pp. 30-32; Memorandum for Record, subj: The Mortar Locating Radar Development History and Status, ca. 1973, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Col Stanley Cass with Maj Gen David E. Ott, Dec 1979, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, pp. 29, 30, 66, 79; USAFAS, Philosophy and Direction, Oct 1977, pp. 7-8, 13; USAFAS, A Philosophy for the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 1976, pp. 28-29, MSTL. 4Ltr, HQ USAREUR, to Cdr, VII Corps, subj: Proposal for Sound Ranging System Field Tests, 14 Aug 1974, Target Acquisition File No. 34, MSTL. 5Ltr, Ott to Rogers, 21 Oct 1974, Target Acquisition File No. 34, MSTL

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Lewis candidly wrote in the letter, “The location of targets is a top priority in the Field Artillery of today. . . . We acknowledge that today’s equipment is old, hard to maintain, and in short supply.”6 Ott later reiterated Lewis’ concern. In a perceptive article in the Field Artillery Journal in the March-April 1975 edition, he wrote, “Our guns can mass fires on targets further to the enemy rear than we can acquire them.”7 The limited ranges of existing target acquisition systems prevented finding deeply defiladed enemy indirect fire systems even though American field artillery weapons had the ability to destroy them and other deep targets.8 About the same time the Director of the Target Acquisition Department in the Field Artillery School, Colonel Donald M. Rhea, composed a thoughtful article in the Field Artillery Journal, buttressing Ott’s and Lewis’ conclusions. Commenting, Rhea remarked, “Target acquisition is widely recognized as one of the more serious deficiencies in the Field Artillery.”9 Years of neglect had finally caught up to the arm.10 Although a general consensus within the Field Artillery about the inadequate state of target acquisition existed, upgrading involved more than introducing new systems with greater ranges and better tracking abilities. Doctrine and organization also had to be refined to meet the challenge of modern warfare. Early in 1975, target acquisition doctrine called for employing the corps target acquisition battalion to furnish observation, meteorological services, adjustment and registration of friendly fires, and survey and for detaching the corps batteries to lower echelons as required by tactical considerations. Decentralization often occurred when an exceptionally wide corps front existed, when rapidly changing tactical situations required timely displacements, or when the attachment of additional firing units to division artillery generated a requirement for target acquisition that exceeded division artillery’s capability. At the same time doctrine gave radars to the division for countermortar work and ground surveillance but not for counterbattery work, although the division could provide the service if necessary.11

6Ltr, AC, USAFAS, to Field Artillery Cdrs, subj: What We Can Do Now in Targeting, Nov 1974, Target Acquisition File No. 34, MSTL. 7Maj Gen David E. Ott, “Forward Observations,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1975, p. 22. 8Ibid. 9Col Donald M. Rhea, “Target Acquisition Today. . .Tomorrow,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1975, p. 7. 10Ibid. 11Talking Paper, subj: Target Acquisition Battery, 14 Mar 1975, Target Acquisition File No. 34, MSTL; Ltr with Encl, Lt Col Francis P. Curran, to AC, USAFAS, subj: Reorganization of the Field Artillery Target Acquisition Battalion, 19 Dec 1974, Target Acquisition File No. 34, MSTL; Ott, “Forward Observations,” p. 22; Rhea, “Target Acquisition Today . . . Tomorrow,” pp. 7-11; Brig Gen Vernon B. Lewis, Jr., “Evolving Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1975, pp. 44-48; Field Manual 6-120, Field Artillery Target Acquisition, Oct 1967, pp. 12-13; Field Manual 6-121,

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In a talking paper of 14 March 1975, Rhea reminded everyone about the origins of target acquisition organization and doctrine of the 1970s and their limitations. He explained, “These procedures are based upon WWII doctrine and frontages, where weapons took a long time to emplace and the situation was less fluid than today.”12 He went on, “The corps frontages on the future battlefield will be so great that centralized control of the TA [target acquisition] resources will be very difficult. With the new TA devices and the integration of all-source intelligence, the number of targets presented at corps artillery would be unmanageable.”13 In an article in the Field Artillery Journal in March 1975, Rhea explained his misgivings about target acquisition doctrine and organization. He pointed out that the expanded frontages projected for corps and divisions on the modern battlefield demanded moving target acquisition responsibility to the division because the corps target acquisition battalion would be unable to support the entire corps.14 Reflecting work completed earlier by Lieutenant Colonel F.P. Curran when he was at the Armed Forces Staff College, the Field Artillery School’s Target Acquisition Department’s analysis of the situation during 1974-1975 reached a similar conclusion. The new target acquisition devices, the integration of all-source intelligence, and the increase in size of corps frontages made centralized control of target acquisition resources at corps artillery unresponsive. To solve the problem the Army should create a target acquisition battery in the division and replace the corps target acquisition battalion with a target acquisition battery. The division target acquisition battery should have sound ranging, flash ranging, field artillery locating radars, moving target locating radars, aerial observers, a remotely piloted vehicle, and a processing section to serve as the nerve center. Such an organization would permit the direct support field artillery battalion to attack enemy field artillery, heavy mortars, vehicles, personnel, command posts, resupply points, choke points, and air defense artillery sites effectively and rapidly. In comparison, the corps target acquisition battery would provide deep target acquisition capabilities and support the division’s target acquisition battery as necessary.15 Although these recommendations received support from the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General William E. DePuy, the ______Field Artillery Target Acquisition, Oct 1962, pp. 10, 22, 23; Boyd L. Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle: 1973-1991 (Fort Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School, 1994), pp. 6-7. 12Talking Paper, subj: Target Acquisition Battery, 14 Mar 1975, Target Acquisition File No. 34, MSTL. 13Ibid. 14Rhea, “Target Acquisition Today . . . Tomorrow,” p. 8. 15Talking Paper, subj: Target Acquisition Battery, 14 Mar 1975, Target Acquisition File No. 34, MSTL; Ltr with Encl, Lt Col F.P. Curran to AC, USAFAS, subj: Reorganization of the Field Artillery Target Acquisition Battalion, 19 Dec 1974, Target Acquisition File No. 34, MSTL; Rhea, “Target Acquisition Today . . . Tomorrow,” p. 9; Lewis, “Evolving Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques,” pp. 46-48.

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proposed action encountered mild opposition from a retired field artillery colonel with an extensive target acquisition background.16 In a provocative article in the Field Artillery Journal in the fall of 1975, Colonel Arthur R. Hercz, a former director of the Field Artillery School’s Observation Section, drew upon the Field Artillery’s experience in World War Two to clarify his disagreement with the school about the planned target acquisition reforms. During the war in North Africa in 1943, the colonel explained, the Army moved target acquisition resources from corps artillery to division artillery and even the direct support field artillery battalion. The experiment failed because commanders lost control. Rather than placing a target acquisition battery in the division and giving corps artillery a target acquisition battery as proposed by the Field Artillery School for locating deep targets and supporting the division battery, Hercz urged increasing the number of target acquisition battalions. Each corps should have at least one organic target acquisition battalion; and each division should also have a target acquisition battalion. This would permit covering the anticipated vast fronts and would not degrade target acquisition as the school’s proposal would. Basically, Hercz opposed decentralization but did not contest giving division artillery target acquisition assets. He just wanted more than the school proposed and advocated retaining command and control in corps artillery, fearing that decentralization would lead to disaster.17 Although Hercz presented a well-formulated argument, the Field Artillery School continued pushing its plan for reorganizing target acquisition. Late in 1975 in a brief letter, Ott thanked Hercz for his insightful thoughts on target acquisition doctrine and organization. After explaining that future war would involve large frontages of 40 kilometers for the division and 100 kilometers for the corps, Ott pointed out: The expected intensity of the battle will require the ability to respond immediately to changing situations. This, in turn necessitates one manager close to the battle to control the allocation of fires between close support and counterfire [counterbattery]. There will not be time to request or coordinate changes at corps level. The one manager must be at the division.18 In this response to Hercz, Ott supplied another crucial reason for placing target acquisition assets and command and control in the division. This organization would furnish responsive target acquisition by giving it to the unit that was the closest to the fight and would permit covering the entire front more easily and effectively. Only such an organization would permit target acquisition to “keep up with the fight.”19 Although Ott conceded that one battery per division would be marginal and agreed with Hercz about the need for more target acquisition resources, constraints on force levels supported only a battery.20

16Disposition Form (DF), subj: Installation of Target Acquisition Battery at Division Level, 26 Feb 1975, Target Acquisition File No. 34, MSTL. 17Col Arthur R. Hercz, “On Target Acquisition . . . Again,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1975, pp. 36-37. 18Ltr, Ott to Hercz, undated, Target Acquisition File No. 34, MSTL. 19Ibid. 20Ibid.; USAFAS, Field Artillery Reference Data, Jan 1980, pp. 2-1, 3-1.

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Years later in February 1993, Ott reflected upon his reasoning about revamping target acquisition and counterbattery organization and doctrine. The expected intensity of modern warfare as demonstrated by the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, the expectation of fighting a numerically superior force with highly mobile and powerful armored formations, the high density of targets, the extended communications requirements, and the inability of field artillery weapons to cover entire corps front demanded placing target acquisition assets in the division. Also, existing doctrine did not clearly designate responsibility in any single agency for target acquisition and counterbattery but based it upon the premise that the most appropriate means available would be employed. Corps artillery and division artillery were considered the only echelons with the capability of providing effective counterbattery with the corps having the overall responsibility for the supervision and coordination of the fire. However, the direct support field artillery battalion could also furnish counterbattery if necessary. This practice of scattering counterbattery work and target acquisition command and control throughout the field artillery force structure created confusion during the heat of battle and led many field artillery officers to question corps artillery’s role in combat. To end this distraction and make counterbattery work and fire support in general more effective on the modern battlefield, Ott and other high-ranking field artillery officers wanted to move target acquisition to the division and make the division artillery commander solely responsible for counterbattery work. This would enable the division artillery commander to coordinate corps artillery and division artillery better and would prevent corps artillery from fighting too independently of division artillery.21 As compelling as these reasons were, the “real selling point” for restructuring counterbattery fire and target acquisition hinged upon fighting outnumbered, according to Ott. In a badly outnumbered situation, there would be times when counterbattery had to be the top priority, and other times, such as a threatened rupture of the defense, when close support would be the top priority.22 In each situation Ott recalled in 1993: We would need all the cannons involved in the highest priority battle. To achieve this we needed a single manager of all cannon fire and it needed to be someone close to the situation at hand. We [at the Field Artillery School] suggested the division commander as the individual best able to identify priorities and the division artillery commander as the person to execute his directive.23 As Ott indicated, placing command and control of counterbattery work, renamed counterfire to indicate field artillery fires designed to neutralize or destroy enemy indirect fires systems (field artillery and mortars), in the division meant that giving the division target acquisition capabilities would permit the Field Artillery to manage its resources more effectively and help overcome the numerical superiority of the threat.24

21Dastrup, Modernizing the King of Battle, pp. 4-5; USAFAS, A Philosophy for the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 1976, p. 11; USAFAS, Philosophy and Direction, 1977, p. 26. 22Ibid. 23Ltr, Ott to Dastrup, 12 Feb 1993, HRDC 24Ibid.

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After months of study and with input from field artillery commanders and officers from all echelons of command, the Field Artillery School and TRADOC formally recommended moving target acquisition and counterbattery fire responsibility from corps artillery to division artillery. Lewis explained early in 1975, “USAFAS [the U.S. Army Field Artillery School] is firmly convinced that both the countermortar and counterbattery functions, which we refer to as counterfire, belong down in the division.”25 The general then added, “Experience and wargaming tell us that corps artillery is too far removed from the problem, by both time and distance, to effectively run a counterfire program.”26 Essentially, the concept involved replacing the existing field artillery group (corps artillery) with a headquarters and headquarters battery and a variable number of attached firing battalions with a field artillery brigade with organic firing units to bring corps artillery in line with the division’s infantry brigades and placing it in a reinforcing role. This would give the division the first priority in the use of corps artillery fire and the authority to position corps artillery units where it felt that they could best contribute to the battle and organic target acquisition assets.27 Desiring the most efficient employment of field artillery, most division and corps commanders favored making counterfire a division responsibility by giving it command and control of target acquisition means. Given the positive reaction by the commanders most immediately affected by the change, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Fred C. Weyand (1974-1976) approved the new counterfire doctrine on 30 April 1976. In doing so, he acknowledged that moving counterfire and target acquisition from the corps to the division would optimize indirect fires for counterfire, the suppression of enemy air defenses, and maneuver support missions by centralizing command and control and broke with field artillery tradition and practices that dated back to World War One and distributed counterbattery fires and target acquisition among the different echelons. The move gave the division a target acquisition battery with the appropriate resources, eliminated the corps target acquisition battalion, and provided a corps target acquisition battery with the responsibility of identifying deep targets, such as enemy rockets, and meshing its assets with the intelligence community and the joint or unified command targeting system.28

25Lewis, “Evolving Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques,” p. 47. 26Ibid. 27Ltr, Ott to Dastrup, 12 Feb 1993, HRDC; Ltr, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Recommended Changes to TOE 6-401H, Artillery Group, 3 May 1977, HRDC; Col Edward R. Coleman, “Field Artillery Brigade,” Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1977, pp, 40, 51; Field Manual 6-22, Division Artillery, Field Artillery Brigade, and Field Artillery Assigned to Corps (Draft), Extract, May 1977, pp. 4-1, 4-2, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Cass with Ott, Dec 1979, pp. 62-65; USAFAS, Philosophy and Direction, 1977, pp. 20-21. 28Msg, DA to Cdr, TRADOC, 072049Z May 1976, Counterfire Doctrine File, MSTL; Ltr, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr TRADOC, subj: Recommended Changes to TOE 6-401H, Artillery Group, 3 May 1977; Ltr, Ott to Hercz, undated, Target Acquisition File No. 34, MSTL; FM 6-121, Field Artillery Target Acquisition, 1 May 1987, pp. 9-1 - 9-3; FM 6-121, Field Artillery Target Acquisition, 13 Dec 1984, p. 2-1; USAFAS, Philosophy and Direction,

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Ott and other senior field artillery officers found improving target acquisition went beyond placing it in the division and introducing counterfire. During the 1950s repeated personnel reductions decreased the number of forward observers available to the maneuver forces, hindering the Field Artillery’s ability to furnish responsive close support fires. From Lewis’ perspective the decrease in the number of forward observers weakened the link between the guns and the maneuver arms and needed correction. As of 1975, every direct support field artillery battalion had nine forward observer teams (three per battery) composed of a second lieutenant, a sergeant, and a private first class who operated the radio and drove the forward observer vehicle, to support the nine maneuver battalions in a division. Given the expanded fronts, the forward observer team could not furnish observed fire throughout the supported company’s sector. Simultaneously, the forward observer team worked loosely with 81-mm. and 4.2-inch mortar observer teams that were operating in the company area. This organization furnished fragmented and uncoordinated forward observation, insufficient forward observer parties for each maneuver company, and inadequate forward observation resources for 24-hour operations.29 Given the forward observer’s serious limitations, the requirement to coordinate massed fires from mortars, field artillery, attack helicopters, and tactical aircraft to stop numerically superior Soviet-Warsaw Pact military forces, and the improved technology to be fielded in the near future, Ott advocated far-reaching forward observer reforms in 1975. In a letter to DePuy on 21 June 1975, he stressed the need for the synchronized use of mortars, close air support, and field artillery and reorganized forward observation teams. Responding to Ott’s persuasive argument, DePuy convened the Close Support Study Group to examine ways of improving forward observation. In its final report of 21 November 1975, the group recommended creating the fire support team (FIST) led by a fire support officer (fire support coordinator). The team would transfer responsibility for fire support coordination at the company level from the overworked maneuver commander to the fire support chief. Called the FIST chief, the fire support officer (FSO) would handle all fire support tasks for the company and would command, train, and supervise all observers on the team, including 81- mm. and 4.2-inch mortar observers. The study group also urged making the FIST chief and battalion and brigade fire support coordinators (FSCOORD) organic to the supported maneuver unit to coordinate tactical air strikes, naval gun fire, mortar fire, and field artillery fire and to advise maneuver commanders of all fire support capabilities, limitations, and employment of fire support assets. Endorsed by the Chief of Staff of the Army in mid-1976, the FIST at the company level and FSCOORDs at the battalion and brigade became a reality. Fire support officers (fire support coordinators) would ensure the availability of fire support experts to train with the maneuver unit and provide experienced fire support personnel at all

______1977, pp. 26-27; Lewis, “Evolving Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques,” pp. 44-48; Maj Gen Donald R. Keith, “Forward Observations,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1977, pp. 3- 4. 29CSSG, Nov 1975, pp. A-1-4 - A-1-5, D-1-2 - D-1-3, MSTL; Lewis. “Evolving Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques,” pp. 44-48.

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times throughout the chain of command.30 In the fall of 1976, the division artillery commander for the 82nd Airborne Division, Colonel Carl E. Vuono, who later became the Chief of Staff of the Army late in the 1980s, explained the importance of the FIST chief and the FSCOORD being organic to the maneuver arm. He wrote in the Field Artillery Journal in the fall of 1976, “Planning and coordinating training is now a joint effort between each of the infantry brigades and its DS [direct support field artillery] battalion. . . . Planning and coordinating this caliber of training fosters a close personal relationship between the infantry and field artillery commanders . . . at all levels.”31 The organizational and doctrinal reforms with target acquisition of the mid-1970s reshaped the relationship between the Field Artillery and the maneuver arms. They gave the division command and control of counterfire that had been previously divided ambiguously as counterbattery work between corps artillery and division artillery and even the direct support field artillery battalion and the requisite resources. At the same time the creation of the fire support coordinators made field artillery officers organic to the maneuver arms to foster a dynamic partnership on the battlefield. These reforms had to potential of unleashing improved fire support in future wars.

NEW GROUND-BASED TECHNOLOGY

As crucial as developing new doctrine and organizations were, introducing new ground-based target acquisitions systems played an equally significant part in modernization. Over a period of years, the Field Artillery adopted the Bradley fighting vehicle for the fire support team (FIST), the Striker, later known as the Knight vehicle, for the Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT), Firefinder radars, and target location sensors for precision munitions. Late in the 1970s, TRADOC convened the Close Support Study Group II to optimize observed fire support for the maneuver forces. Among other things, the group’s report of January 1980 recommended fielding a mobile vehicle to provide reliable, secure communications for the FIST. The study group contemplated two alternatives to the M113 armored personnel carrier that had been the fire support vehicle since the 1960s. Ideally, the Field Artillery wanted the XM2 infantry fighting vehicle or the XM3 cavalry fighting vehicle.32 As the former Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Donald R. Keith (1976-1977), explained, either vehicle offered greater mobility and survivability

30Brig Gen Paul F. Pearson, “FIST,” Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1976, pp. 7-12; Legal Mix V, Executive Summary, 30 Dec 1977, pp. vii, 4-10, HRDC; Ltr, Ott to DePuy, 25 Jun 1975, CSSG, 21 Nov 1975, MSTL. 31Col Carl E. Vuono, “FIST at Bragg,” Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1976, pp. 4- 5. 32USAFAS, Philosophy and Direction, 1977, p. 25. Both the XM2 and XM3 became known as the M2 and M3 Bradley fighting vehicles upon fielding in the 1980s. The M2 was an infantry fighting vehicle, and the M3 was a cavalry fighting vehicle.

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than the M113 and the M981 that was scheduled for fielding in the near future as the fire support vehicle. Mobility and survivability were especially critical because doctrine required field artillery units to have same mobility and survivability as the supported forces. Early in the 1980s, the Army would be fielding the XM1 (Abrams) tank to the armored forces and the XM2/XM3 (Bradley) infantry fighting vehicle to infantry and cavalry forces; and both would provide significant mobility and survivability over the M113 and M981. Without the XM2 or XM3 the newly created FIST would have difficulties keeping up with the maneuver forces and furnishing effective close support because it would employ slower vehicles.33 However, the Infantry and Cavalry had first priority and would get their XM2/XM3 vehicles first; and the Field Artillery would have to wait its turn. In view of this situation, the study group advised fielding the M981 as the fire support vehicle as planned, retaining the obsolete M113, and using both as interim solutions until the XM2/XM3 modified for fire support missions could be adopted as the long-term solution.34 Interestingly, Operation Desert Storm of 1991 highlighted the known deficiencies of the M981 and prodded the Field Artillery to push harder for the XM2/XM3. During the war, the M981 had problems staying abreast of the Abrams tank and Bradley fighting vehicle, lacked self-protection against armored threats, and presented a unique signature that set it apart from other Army armored vehicles to make it an inviting target for enemy weapon systems. In addition, infantry and armor units did not stock sufficient spare parts for the M981 because it was a low-density Army vehicle; and this complicated repair.35 After funding became available early in the 1990s and after the maneuver arms got their Bradley fighting vehicles, equipping the Field Artillery with the Bradley became a reality to make field artillery units as mobile as the supported maneuver forces. The vehicle promised to solve the problems created by the M981 and validated by Operation Desert Storm. Besides having the requisite mobility, the Bradley FIST vehicle would use common repair parts and present a common signature with the supported armored force. Equally important, the Bradley FIST (BFIST) vehicle would be fielded in two versions. The M7, commonly called the M7 BFIST, integrated a fire support mission package, including the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator (G/VLLD) that lased targets for laser-guided

33Ltr, Keith to Dastrup, 19 Jul 1993, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, subj: The BFIST, 13 May 1994, HRDC; CSSG II Study (Extract), 25 Jan 80, pp. 9-7, 9-8, and 9-11, HRDC. 34Ibid., Executive Summary, 1-1, 1-2, 9-6, 9-10, and 9-11; CSSG III Study (Extract), Dec 1984, p. 25, HRDC; Keith to Dastrup, 19 Jul 1993, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Cpt Don W. Veirs, TRADOC System Manager (TSM) Target Acquisition, DCD, 21 Feb 1996, HRDC. 35Memorandum for Record, subj: The BFIST, 13 May 1994; Maj John K. Stephens and Cpt David Landecker, “The Bradley Fire Support Vehicle,” Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 1994, p. 19; 1lt Aaron L. Geduldig, 1lt Mark S. Kremer, 1lt James A. Skelton, and 1lt Willie R. Witherspoon, “How to Cure the FIST-V Blues,” Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 1991, pp. 64-65; Lt Col Robert M. Hill, “Future Watch: Target Acquisition and Precision Attack Systems,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 1996, pp. 18-19.

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munitions, on the M2A2 Bradley Operation Desert Storm chassis, was introduced late in the 1990s, and performed, according to some field artillery officers, brilliantly in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. While the M7 Bradley was able to stay abreast of the maneuver arms, the M7’s fire support package allowed the FIST to search, locate, and identify targets, day or night, with a circular error probable of less than 50 meters at a range of five kilometers and a circular error probable of less than 80 meters at a range of ten kilometers and designate targets. The other variant, the M7A1 BFIST, would be more advanced than the M7 and be fielded early in the 21st Century.36 After several years of work, the Army modified the acquisition strategy for the M7A1 in 1999 by deciding to develop it into the M3A3 BFIST vehicle and halted work on the system. Based on a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis, the M3A3 BFIST vehicle incorporated the M7 fire support mission package. Thus, early in the 21st Century, the M7 Bradley and the A3 Bradley existed. While fielding the A3 Bradley started in 2005, both, the M7 and A3, were retrofitted with the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) that would provide increased range to detect, recognize, identify, and designate targets for precision munitions and would replace the G/VLLD. Given the importance of accurate target location, the Army’s Precision Fires Study conducted by Major General David P. Valcourt, Commandant of the Field Artillery School (2003-2005), declared the FS3 to be a number one developmental priority because of its ability to locate, mark, and designate targets. Without this sensor precision munitions would be less effective.37

36Lt Col James E. Lackey, Cpt Dean J. Case III, and 1lt George L. Woods, “BFIST: A Sight for Sore Eyes,” Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 2001, pp. 16-21; Memorandum for Record, subj: BFIST, 13 May 1994; Stephens and Landecker, “The Bradley Fire Support Vehicle,” p. 19; Briefing, subj: BFIST, 1995, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: BFIST Overview, Oct 1996, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Maj Neil J. Hamill, BFIST Manager, Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD), 30 Jan 1997, HRDC; Hill, “Future Watch,” p. 18; Col Thomas G. Torrance and Lt Col Noel T. Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq: The 3rd Div Arty in OIF,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 2003, pp. 30-35; 1lt Richard R. Aaron, Jr., “3d ID BFIST in OIF: Simultaneous Direct and Indirect Fire at the Tip of the Spear,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 2004, pp. 20-21. 372001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 107; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 94-95; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 94- 95; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 97-98; Department of the Army, Procurement Programs, FY 2008, Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army (Extract), Feb 2007, p. 1, BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: M2 Bradley - M7 BFIST, 11 Jun 08, BFIST File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Bradley Vehicle Improvements Reflect War Lessons, Oct 2004, BFIST File, HRDC; Brig Gen William F. Engel, Col R. Mark Blum, and Major Rafael Torres, Jr., “Report to the Field: Tactical/Operational Fire Support Conference,” Field Artillery Magazine, May-Jun 2000, pp. 31-35; Army’s Precision Fires Study, 2003-2004, p. 23, HRDC; Maj Gen David C. Ralston, “Field Artillery Azimuth: 2005-2015,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Dec 2005, pp. 1-4. In 2006 the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill was

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Meanwhile, the COLT that was a new name for the observation lasing team, that designated targets for laser-designated munitions, such as the Copperhead munition, in the heavy and light forces, and that complemented the FIST employed the M981 fire support vehicle. Besides lacking mobility and stealth which was amply demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm of 1991, the M981 had been designed for armored units and presented a unique signature in the light forces that used the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). In 1997 the Field Artillery School responded to this dilemma. It recommended employing the Bradley for the heavy forces’ COLTs. Simultaneously, it proposed integrating the fire support mission equipment package onto a HMMWV chassis, initially known as the Striker, which included, among other equipment, the G/VLLD and later the man-portable lightweight laser designator rangefinder (LLDR) to lase targets for the light forces. Eventually, the Army decided that a HMMWV-based COLT vehicle would be fielded to all heavy and light forces, would provide unprecedented mobility, flexibility, and stealth, would be less noticeable with HMMWV forces because it would present a common signature, would save Bradley assets for fire support teams, and would lower operating costs for the COLTs that also served as a traditional target acquisition asset as required. Based upon its performance in the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment of March 1997, the Striker vehicle was approved as a Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program by the Chief of Staff of the Army on 14 May 1997 for rapid development that led to fielding the vehicle beginning in 2001. Subsequently in 2002, the Army renamed the vehicle the Knight to avoid confusion with the Stryker brigade combat teams being formed.38 The BFIST vehicle and the Knight provided unprecedented target acquisition capabilities for close support. With the growing importance of precision munitions at the beginning of the 21st Century, such as the precision Excalibur 155-mm. projectile, the BFIST vehicle and Knight with their respective fire support equipment furnished accurate target location data to permit the Excalibur to hit within thirty meters of the target.39 To balance its target acquisition capabilities, the Army had to modernize its counterfire target acquisition capabilities. In 1973 the Field Artillery Systems Review brought sound ranging back to life by placing it at the top of the list of requirements for the ______renamed the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill. 382000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 144-45; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; Engels, Blurm, and Torres, “Report to the Field,” pp. 31-35; Lt Col Henry T. Stratman, “Field HIGH MOBILITY MULTIPURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLE-Based Colts Now,” Field Artillery Magazine, Apr 1992, pp. 37-38; Lt Col Theodore J. Janosko, “Fire Support Observations,” Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 1996, pp. 32-33; Maj Neil J. Hamill, “BFIST Is On The Way,” Field Artillery Magazine, May-Jun 1997, p. 45; “Maneuver Shooters: Eyes for the Battlefield,” Field Artillery Magazine, Feb 1995, pp. 3-4; Maj (Ret) Edward J. Stiles, “Close Support Study Group IV,” Field Artillery Magazine, Dec 1989, pp. 7-10. 39Maj Danny J. Sprengle and Col Donald C. DuRant, “Extended Range Precision for the Army,” Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 2003, pp. 13-16; MG David C. Ralston, “Field Artillery 2005: Azimuth 2015,” Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 2005, pp. 1-4.

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Field Artillery and outlined replacing the GR-8 sound ranging set with the AN/TNS-10 sound ranging set because of limited spare parts and a diminishing number of technically qualified maintenance personnel for the older system. Transistorized, the AN/TNS-10 would eliminate most of the maintenance problems associated with the vacuum tube-based GR-8 and would be tied to the Field Artillery Digital Automated Computer (FADAC) to reduce the time required to analyze sound data.40 Yet, the Field Artillery School only saw the system as an interim effort. As commandant of the school, Keith expressed his conditional acceptance of the AN/TNS-10 in March 1977. As work was being done with the system, he wrote the Commanding General of TRADOC, “The new sound ranging recorder, AN/TNS-10, which replaces the WWII GR8, represents a great improvement in the system. The radio data link, AN/GRA-114 will provide the increased responsiveness and flexibility long needed by sound ranging.”41 The general then added, “Sound ranging is not the ultimate target acquisition system; nor is any other single system.”42 The Field Artillery required sound ranging, flash ranging, and radars. From the general’s perspective in March 1977, the automation of sound ranging was the next logical step; and that was being accomplished by the AN/TNS-10’s replacement, Field Artillery Acoustic Locating System.43 As a message of January 1977 suggested, Keith had valid reasons for his pessimistic assessment of sound ranging. Recently completed tests of the AN/TNS-10 and AN/GRA-114 revealed significant technical deficiencies with both and raised questions about their reliability. In view of this substandard showing, TRADOC and the Field Artillery School insisted on reevaluating the “sound ranging concept.”44 The commander of the 3rd Armor Division’s field artillery, Colonel Edward A. Dinges, who later became the Commandant of the Field Artillery School (1980-1982), also questioned the utility of sound and flash ranging. In a fact sheet in May 1976, Dinges noted: Flash and sound ranging assets soon to be organic to Division Artillery with the activation of the Div Arty Target Acquisition Battery have questionable value. Based on the anticipated threat - masses of artillery and a fluid rapid moving battlefield environment - flash and sound base systems may well be overloaded, overextended within a matter of hours.45 Because Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground forces would overwhelm sound and flash ranging with masses of indirect fire and because sound and flash ranging were obsolete, lacked

40DF, subj: Sound Ranging, 15 Mar 1977, Target Acquisition File No. 1, MSTL; Maj Glen Coffman, “Dead or Alive,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1974, pp. 19-24. 41Msg, Cdr, USAFACFS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Sound Ranging, 21 Mar 1977, Target Acquisition File No. 1, MSTL. 42Ibid. 43Ibid. 44Msg, HQ TRADOC, to Cdr, USAFACFS, subj: AN/GRA-114, 312312Z Jan 1977, Target Acquisition File No. 1, MSTL. 45Fact Sheet, subj: Interface Between the OH-58A and the MPQ-4A Countermortar Radar, 21 May 1976, Radar File No. 30, MSTL, and Target Acquisition File, HRDC.

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sufficient mobility to keep up with the maneuver arms, and therefore would not furnish responsive service as the battlefield became more mobile and larger, Dinges envisioned radar as their logical replacement.46 In the meantime, work on the Field Artillery Acoustic Locating System moved forward.47 Although the system showed some promise during the tests and would automate sound ranging, the Army’s Research and Development Committee stopped funding it in 1979 and ignored the Field Artillery School’s urgent pleas for continuing work on it as a complementary system to the new radars under development. The committee basically thought that investing time and money in a totally new sound ranging system was unwise with the introduction of new radars at hand.48 Difficulties keeping FADAC operational, funding constraints that prevented procuring the Hewlett-Packard 9825 calculator as a replacement for FADAC, and enemy weapon systems with ranges that exceeded the AN/TNS-10’s range capability combined to raise doubts about the viability of sound ranging. This caused the Army to delete the requirement for new sound ranging equipment in January 1984 and to abolish sound and flash ranging in the target acquisition battery shortly thereafter, even though the Field Artillery Materiel Development Plan of 1977 cautioned that sound ranging would be required because the enemy’s electronic countermeasures could jam radar.49 Although electronic countermeasures would minimally influence sound and flash ranging, radar attracted the Army’s attention as the ground-based target acquisition system of the future to locate enemy indirect fire systems. During the 1970s, the Army developed the family of Firefinder radars to replace the Q-4, Q-10, and Q-25 that were based upon 1950s technology. While the Army designed the AN/TPQ-36 for locating high-angle trajectory

46Ibid. 47Coffman, “Dead or Alive,” pp. 23-24 48Msg, Maj Gen Keith, Cdr, USAFAC, to Maj Gen Vinson, TRADOC, subj: Field Artillery Acoustic Locating System, 202000Z Apr 1977, Target Acquisition File No. 1, MSTL; Msg, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Army Acquisition Objective for the Sound Ranging System AN/TNS-10-AN/GRA-114, 20 Sep 1977, Target Acquisition File No. 1, MSTL; DF, subj: Army Acquisition Objective for the Sound Ranging System, AN/TNS-10-AN/GRA-114, 27 Sep 1977, Target Acquisition File No. 1, MSTL; Msg, subj: Field Artillery Acoustic Locating System, undated, Target Acquisition File No. 1, MSTL. 49DF, subj: Hewlett-Packard 9825 Calculator for Sound/Flash Platoon, 1 Feb 1980, 1985 USAFACFS AHR; Ltr, Cdr, USAFACFS, to Cdr, USARCERCOM, 28 Jul. 1980, HRDC; Determinations and Findings for Sole Source Approval, undated, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, 200th TAMMC, to Cdr, V Corps, subj: USAREUR Fielding of OL-274/TNS-10 Sound Ranging Data Processing Groups, 010838Z May 1976, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cdr, CECOM, subj: AN/TNS-10 PIPS 281320Z Apr 1984, 1985 USAFACFS AHR; Msg, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, ERADCOM, subj: Unfinanced Requirement for the Radio Link, AN/GRA-114, 241945Z Feb 1984, HRDC; Memorandum for Inspector General, subj: Reclassification of Soldiers with PMOS 17C, 29 May 1985, HRDC; Field Artillery Materiel Development Plan, Aug 1977, p. B-1-2, in Target Acquisition File, HRDC.

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weapons, such as mortars, and gave it some capacity to find low-angle systems, such as field artillery and rockets, it designed the AN/TPQ-37 radar for detecting low-angle trajectory weapons and provided it with some ability to locate high-angle trajectory weapons.50 Although training had begun and units were beginning to receive their radars early in the 1980s, the Army proposed a major Firefinder program change in 1984. With the advent of AirLand Battle doctrine in 1982 with its emphasis on mobility and the deep battle, the emergence of light forces to fight low-intensity conflicts, and the drive to automate fire support functions, the Army found the Firefinder radars to be too large and heavy for the emerging battlefield. Basically, the Q-36 and Q-37 were 1970s vintage technology and obsolete. Based upon this, the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army, General Maxwell R. Thurman, told TRADOC and the Field Artillery School to create a Firefinder improvement program that would integrate the two radars into a single follow-on system based on the Q-36 and could be employed on the future battlefield.51 In 1985-1986 TRADOC and the school outlined reducing the size of the Q-36 and its equipment to fit on a five-ton truck and adding electronic improvements. With the enhancements to the radar, the crew could occupy a position rapidly, detect a target up to 36 kilometers, and then quickly move to avoid enemy artillery fire.52 The Army modified the program within a few years to satisfy the requirements of the heavy and light forces simultaneously. In 1987 the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Raphael J. Hallada (1987-1991), reaffirmed the decision to reduce the size of the Q-36 to fit on a five-ton truck for rapid emplacement and displacement and to furnish target acquisition for the heavy divisions. Given the emergence of light forces, Hallada concurrently urged proceeding earlier than initially planned with the development of the Q-36 variant for towing in a trailer behind a HMMWV which meant reducing the size of the radar and its equipment even more. Initially, the Army and school had charted fielding the radar designed for a five-ton truck first and then the radar for the HMMWV, but the new

50Memorandum for Record, subj: Termination of 17C MOS, 12 Apr 1984, HRDC; Ltr, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition to See Distribution, subj: Guidance Ltr, AN/TPQ-37, undated, HRDC; Harrison, “MALOR,” pp. 50-53; Field Artillery Materiel Development Plan, Aug 1977, p. B-1-2, MTSL. 51Ltr, Dir, DCD, subj: FAM-T Pitch to VCSA, 13 Mar 1984, FF Downsize and Follow-on Pitch to VCSA, 13 Mar 1984 File, MSTL; Briefing, subj: Firefinder Block II and III AMC MARB, 10 Jul 1986, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Firefinder Improvement Program, undated, HRDC; Mark Conrad, “Firefinder: Improvements for the 21st Century,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 1997, pp. 40-41. 52Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder II Radars, 12 Nov 1987, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Radars, 31 Dec 1987, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Product Improvement Program, 4 Aug 1988, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Maj David F. MacFerren, TSM Target Acquisition, DCD, 7 Feb 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Improvement Program, 13 Sep 1989, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, DCD, 22 Feb 1990, HRDC; “Firefinder,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1986, p. 57.

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plan dictated pursuing two Q-36 programs simultaneously.53 With the growing emphasis on deployability to support the light forces, the Army subsequently approved eliminating the five-ton truck version in 1990. The HMMWV variant would be introduced and later improved with electronic enhancements to meet the requirements of the objective Q-36 radar. The electronic upgrades would provide faster access to data, process targets faster, and expand memory and digital map storage.54 Although Operation Desert Storm of 1991 that occurred as a result of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 came before the Q-36 and Q-37 could be modernized, it verified the Field Artillery’s efforts of the past two decades to modernize target acquisition. Despite mobility problems, the Q-36 and Q-37 radars performed satisfactorily by detecting any type of object moving in a ballistic trajectory through the air. If the targeting process verified the existence of an actual target, field artillery units then fired on it. This gave American field artillery a decided advantage over longer range Iraqi field artillery which had lost its target acquisition capabilities during the air war and could not locate American field artillery. Notwithstanding this, the radars’ lack of mobility in Operation Desert Storm validated the need for continued modernization with the radars.55 During the middle years of the 1990s, work on the Q-36 produced its first fruits when fielding began in 1993. The modernization downsized the Q-36 (Version 7) radar for towing on a trailer behind a HMMWV. It could be driven off and on a C-130 aircraft and larger aircraft and had a modular azimuth and positioning system for self-survey. Subsequently, the Army began fielding the Q-36 with electronics upgrade in 2001. Using a processor the size of the shoe box, the electronics upgrade Q-36 (Version 8) had increased memory, faster

53Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Block IIB Materiel Change, 20 Nov 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Block IIB Configuration Decision, 25 Oct 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Improvement Program, 13 Sep 1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Impact of FY90 Budget Cuts on Firefinder Block II, 21 Sep 1989, HRDC. 54“Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Update,” Field Artillery Magazine, Dec 1990, p. 53; Input to the Commanding General’s Monthly Update to TRADOC, 15 Feb 1991, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, DCD, 7 Mar 1991, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Q-36 Improvement Program (Block II), 20 Aug 1991, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Q-36 Improvement Program (Block II), 14 Jan 1992, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, Target Acquisition Division, DCD, 5 Feb 1992, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, DCD, 6 Mar 1995, HRDC; USAFAS, DCD, Program and Project Summary Sheets, 1 Nov 1994, p. 18-1 - 18-2; HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Radar Product Improvement Programs, 25 Jan 1994, HRDC. 55Oral History Interview, Dastrup with Col David A. Rolston, former division artillery commander, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 25 Aug 1992, pp. 4-5, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and L. Martin Kaplan with Col Stanley E. Griffith, Director, Target Acquisition Department, USAFAS, 24 Jul 1991, pp, 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 13-16, HRDC; Col Vollney B. Corn, Jr., and Cpt Richard A. Lacquemont, “Silver Bullets,” Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 1991, p. 13.

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access to data, and the ability to process up to twenty targets a minute.56 Meanwhile, the school introduced another change to its Q-37 counterfire radar modernization effort in 1990. Because the radar did not have the range, survivability, mobility, target processing capability, or target identification capability for future requirements, the school decided to replace it with the Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System (ATACS). The new system would take advantage of leap-ahead technology to detect more targets, would have greater range, and would reduce the equipment and personnel requirements significantly. In addition, it would be capable of being driven on and off a C-130 aircraft and larger aircraft and air insertion by a CH-47D helicopter.57 In 1991 three alternatives offered hope of satisfying the requirement. The Army could start a development program for the ATACS radar. It could introduce material changes to the current Q-37 that would be less expensive than a new start. Last, the Army could negotiate a memorandum of understanding with France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom to join the European counterbattery radar (COBRA) program. Of the three possibilities, the last was the least expensive and most promising. In view of this, the Army opened negotiations with the Europeans in August 1991 but ended them within a year because of limited funding.58 In the meantime, the Army started low-cost, low-risk upgrades to the existing Q-37. Enhancements included improved transportability and mobility and the incorporation of the modular azimuth and positioning system. Reliability, availability, and maintainability were achieved through hardware and software upgrades. Once testing was completed in 1994, fielding began in 1996.59 As it fielded the Q-37 Block I that was an upgrade to the Q-37 as an interim measure,

56Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Radar Product Improvement Program, 23 Jun 1995, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, DCD, 11 Mar 1996, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: FF Q-36 Block II, 17 Mar 1997, HRDC; 1995 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 140-41; Lt Col Robert M. Hill, “Future Watch: Target Acquisition and Precision Attack Systems,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 1996, pp. 18-21; 2001 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill Annual Command History, pp. 102-04. 57Fact Sheet, subj: ATACS, 31 Jan 1991, HRDC; “Field Artillery Equipment and Munitions Update,” Field Artillery Magazine, Dec 1990, p. 55; Draft Operational and Organization Plan for ATACS, 30 Oct 1990, HRDC. 58Issue Papers for Gen Frederick M. Franks, Jr., CG, TRADOC, 13-14 Dec 1991, p. 17, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, DCD, 5 Feb 1992, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: ATACS/COBRA Program, 3 Sep 1991, HRDC. 59Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, 9 Feb 1994, HRDC; USAFAS, Program and Project Summary Sheets, 1 Nov 1993, pp. 43-1 - 43-2, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, TSM Target Acquisition, 6 Mar 1995, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Radar Product Improvement Programs, 25 Jan 1995, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Ron Anderson, 17 Mar 1997, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: AN/TPQ-37 Improvement Program, 1 Aug 1994, HRDC; Hill, “Future Watch: Target Acquisition and Precision Attack Systems,” pp. 18-21.

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the Army initiated developmental work on the ATACS radar late in the 1990s.60 The system would take advantage of leap-ahead technology to give the Army a passive system or, at a minimum, passive or active cuing, would reduce the equipment and manpower needs significantly, and would furnish support to the corps area of influence in AirLand Operations. In addition, it would be capable of driving on and off a C-130 and larger aircraft and air insertion by CH-47D helicopter and would reduce crew size from 12 to 6 to cut personnel costs.61 Besides utilizing advanced technology to furnish dramatically improved capabilities over the Q-37, the ATACS radar would replace all Q-37s, including the upgraded Q-37 Block I, on a one-for-one basis and would meet the needs of the objective force.62 Challenges soon altered the program. In 1999 the Army redesignated the program as the AN/TPQ-47. Technological problems and schedule delays necessitated the modifying the Q-47 program several times. In 2002, the Army redesignated the radar program as the Phoenix battlefield sensor system. Hardware reliability issues and software interface developmental delays forced the Army to terminate the developmental contract with Raytheon in September 2004. The cost overruns and schedule delays was compounded by the Army’s transition to the modular force and the redefinition of the contemporary operational environment. The Phoenix system, while providing increased capability in range and accuracy, was a 90-degree sensing system when it was becoming increasingly apparent that a 360-degree sensing capability was necessary as indicated in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan during the first decade of the 21st Century.63 Because of the demise of the Phoenix, the Army deferred approved long-range counterfire target acquisition capability requirements. However, the medium range threat set (cannon and rockets) and the 360-degree medium range coverage defined a capability gap with no fielded solution that neither the modernized Q-36 nor Q-37 addressed. The Field Artillery School then began to define a change to the Q-36 radar that with a relatively short developmental cycle could incorporate new technology into an existing radar to close that gap. The Enhanced Q-36 (EQ-36) radar would reduce crew size and footprint, would increase range and accuracy against cannon and rockets in a 90-degree mode, and would spiral from an initial increment 360-degree capability against mortars to a 360-degree capability for mortars, cannon, and rockets. In January 2007 the Army awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin to produce a prototype in 30 months.64

60USAFAS, Program and Project Summary Sheets, 5 Oct 1992, pp. 26-1 - 26-2, HRDC; USAFAS, Program and Project Summary Sheets, 1 Nov 1994, pp. 19-1 - 20-2, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Radar Product Improvement Programs, 25 Jan 1994, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: FF Q-37 Block II, 17 Mar 1997, HRDC. 611995 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 141-42. 622000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 135-37; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84. 632005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86; Email with atch, subj: TPO Sensors History, 27 Mar 07, HRDC. 64Ibid.

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The school then turned its attention to the Special Operations Command program to develop the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR) that would provide 360-degree coverage against a short-range mortar threat in OIF and OEF. The Army formally designated the radar as the AN/TPQ-48 and awarded a contract to Syracuse Research to develop and produce the radar with the first unit being equipped in 2009.65 Through the efforts of the Field Artillery School, the Army revolutionized ground- based field artillery target acquisition. New technology, organizations, and doctrine made terrestrial target acquisition more responsive to the requirements of modern warfare with a new Q-48 countermortar radar being developed to support warfare and the light forces. While Q-36 and Q-37 radars provided the capability of locating enemy indirect fire systems for responsive counterfire, field artillery soldiers in M7 or A3 BFIST and Knight vehicles had the capability of employing laser rangefinder designators for pinpoint target location for precision munitions, such as the Excalibur, to attack.

EYES IN THE SKIES

Confronted by sophisticated Soviet and Warsaw Pact air defenses late in the 1960s and early in the 1970s with the capability of shooting down manned observation aircraft trying to cross the line of contact, the Army had to find a reliable means of locating targets deep behind enemy lines that could not be detected by friendly terrestrial target acquisition systems. To do this, it explored adopting a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) and focused on adopting an improved scout helicopter. The Tactical Reconnaissance and Surveillance 75 Study, completed in 1967 by the U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, advocated using an RPV that could be controlled from the ground and could fly virtually undetected into enemy territory. Six years later, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, finished the Commander’s Surveillance and Target Acquisition Information Needs Study of 1973. It pointed out the requirement for aerial observation systems to overcome ground target acquisition systems’ line-of-sight constraints that prevented them from locating targets beyond the horizon and hampered effective indirect fire on deep targets. Together, these studies and other comparable ones underlined serious shortcomings with terrestrial field artillery target acquisition systems and the requirement for an elusive aerial system.66 Viewing the situation, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Lockhard of the Target Acquisition Department in the Field Artillery School in the meantime outlined unambiguously the school’s thinking. On 30 August 1972 he wrote, “The field artillery is in desperate need for precise, real time, three-dimensional target information which lies beyond the capability of its ground sensors.”67

65Ibid. 66Col Sherwin Arculis, U.S. Army Intelligence School, “Remotely Piloted Vehicles,” draft article, Nov 1975, pp. 1-7, RPV Historical Report File, MSTL; RPV Historical Supplement, pp. 1-2, HRDC. 67DF, subj: Remotely Piloted (Aerial) Vehicle, 30 Aug 1972, Remotely Controlled

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Although the requirement for a RPV was clearly apparent, the Army lacked a systematic effort for developing such a system. The disjointed development endeavor of the 1960s and early 1970s spawned numerous unproductive programs and forced continued reliance upon manned aircraft and ground target acquisition systems.68 Based upon the pressing requirement for obtaining over-the-hill targets as noted by the Field Artillery School and other Department of Defense agencies and disjointed RPV effort, the Army restructured its RPV program to give greater cohesion and direction and to eliminate the duplication of effort that had characterized development so far.69 Early in 1974, the Army Scientific Advisory Panel, Ad Hoc Committee on RPVs published a pivotal report. It advocated centralizing the management of RPV development and furnished guidance on the type of desired system. The panel recommended acquiring vehicles with real-time capabilities for field artillery target acquisition, producing equipment that could accomplish the mission more cheaply than present equipment could, and using present and proven technology rather than relying on future state-of-the-art technology. Fielding a RPV rapidly was imperative in view of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact air defense systems; and employing existing technology would facilitate meeting that objective and reduce costs.70 Under the direction of the Army, TRADOC and the U.S. Army Materiel Command signed an agreement in September 1974 to investigate the feasibility and desirability of developing an RPV to assist the ground commander in performing reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. TRADOC stopped work on all other RPV projects except for the interim airborne target acquisition system AN/USD-501 that the Field Artillery School wanted and designed a two-phased demonstrator program in 1974, called Project Seeker. In phase one the Intelligence School would investigate the ability of RPVs to fulfill reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition requirements for the Army and use contractor personnel to conduct RPV flights.71 In phase two the Field Artillery School would ______(Aerial) Vehicle and FA Center Team Position on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle File, MSTL 68US Army Field Artillery School and Board, Detailed Plan for Project Seeker, Jul 1975, p. 1, RPV Documents File, HRDC; Arculis, “Remotely Piloted Vehicles,” pp. 9-11; RPV Historical Supplement, p. 3, MSTL; Msg, HQ DA to Cdr, US Army Material Command, et al, subj: RPV Program, 292001Z Jan 1974, RPV Review File, MSTL; Trip Report, 4 Feb 74, RPV General Officer Review File, MSTL; Briefing, subj: RPV NATO Panel VI Briefing, 1978, RPV Documents Miscellaneous File, MSTL; Msg, Cdr, AMC, to Cdr, MICOM, et al, subj: Mini-RPVs, 111954Z Jan 1974, RPV Misc Documents File, MSTL; Evaluation Plan for the Force Development Test and Experimentation of the RPV, 27 Aug 1987, 1988 AHR. 69Arculis, “Remotely Piloted Vehicles,” pp. 11-12; Report, Army Scientific Advisory Panel Ad Hoc Group, subj: RPVs, 30 Sep 1977, pp. 3-4, Army Scientific Advisory Panel Ad Hoc Group File, MSTL. 70Arculis, “Remotely Piloted Vehicles,” pp. 7, 9, 12, 13; Memorandum, subj: RPV Monograph, undated, RPV Odds and Ends File, HRDC. 71Arculis, “Remotely Piloted Vehicles,” pp. 7, 9, 12, 13; Memorandum, subj: RPV Monograph, undated, RPV Odds and Ends File, HRDC.

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continue to research the feasibility and desirability of developing such a system. Ultimately, the Field Artillery School had the responsibility of conducting experiments to develop user expertise, to demonstrate the feasibility of RPVs for target acquisition, to develop new concepts, to refine organizational and operational concepts, and to define future requirements.72 To support Project Seeker the RPV system manager for the U.S. Army Material Command in the meantime searched for a candidate system. Through a competitive bidding process the system manager chose the Lockheed Missile and Spacecraft Company in December 1974 to fabricate an RPV for experimentation and demonstration.73 The system technology demonstrator, called the Aquila (Latin word for eagle) RPV, would be composed of off-the-shelf components to reduce development time and costs. The Aquila would provide real-time combat intelligence and target acquisition, conduct field artillery fire adjustment, and designate tank-size targets for laser-guided munitions under development.74 Although technical problems with hardware slowed down progress and even threatened to halt development altogether between 1974 and 1978, the Aquila eventually demonstrated its ability to perform the required tasks at ranges and under conditions in which manned aircraft or ground observers could not operate without excessive losses.75

72Arculis, “Remotely Piloted Vehicles,” pp. 12-15; Msg, HQ TRADOC, to MG Keith, USAFAC, subj: RPV Joint Working Group, 191540Z Apr 1977, RPV/Drone File, MSTL; Briefing, subj: RPV NATO Panel IV Briefing, 1978, RPV Documents File, HRDC; Report, Army Scientific Advisory Panel Ad Hoc Group, subj: RPVs, 30 Sep 1977, pp. 3-4, Army Scientific Advisory Panel Ad Hoc Group File, MSTL; US Army Field Artillery School and Field Artillery Board, Detailed Experiment Plan for Project Seeker, Jul 1975, pp. 1-2, 4, RPV Misc Documents Misc File, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: RPV, undated, RPV Fact Sheet File, MSTL; Briefing, subj: RPV, Oct 1975, Target Acquisition File Number One, MSTL. 73Briefing, subj: RPV NATO Panel VI, 1978, RPV Documents Miscellaneous File, HRDC. 74Report, U.S. Army Audit Agency, subj: RPV Program, Oct 1985, pp. 3, 8-9, US Army Audit Agency File, MSTL; Report, Army Scientific Advisory Panel Ad Hoc Group, subj: RPVs, 30 Sep 1977, pp. 8, 11, MSTL; Maj George H. Finger, “Mini-RPVs,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1974, p. 7; Briefing, subj: Remotely Piloted Vehicle NATO Panel VII, 1978, RPV Documents Miscellaneous File, HRDC. In June 1975 Project Seeker adopted the Aquila as the model designator for the XMQM-105 series of remotely piloted vehicles. The term referred to the entire project and the RPV itself. See Memorandum subj: RPV Historical Monograph, undated, RPV Odds and Ends File, HRDC, and 1975 Annual Historical Supplement, USAFAS, p. 18. 75White Paper, subj: A Case for Acquiring Aquila and a Family of Payloads as a Combined Arms RPV, Mar 1988, p. 12, White Paper File, HRDC; Terrence D. Gossett, U.S. Army Research and Technology Laboratory, “U.S. Army Remotely Piloted Vehicle Supporting Technology Programs,” Jan 1981, HRDC; DF, subj: Trip Report-National Association for RPV Symposium, 7 May 1976, RPV/Drone File, MSTL; Memorandum, subj: RPV Program Update, 5 Nov 1976, RPV/Drone File, MSTL; Memorandum for

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Despite the limited success with Aquila, the growing interest in RPVs throughout the military services prompted the Army to decide in October 1979 to introduce the Aquila RPV. It would be heavily oriented towards field artillery operations with some intelligence gathering capabilities.76 Although the Aquila acquisition program suffered many technical problems, schedule delays, unforeseen costs, and other challenges, it achieved a solid test record between 1979 and 1982 and offered much promise according to test participants.77 In the midst of the developmental effort, the Army reaffirmed the Aquila’s mission. In September 1976 the project manager for the Field Artillery School, Colonel Sherwin Arculis, wrote, “The present US Army battlefield requirement dictates a survivable RPV capable of operating under day/night and adverse weather conditions out to 50 KM [kilometers] from the FEBA [Forward Edge of the Battle Area] providing real-time imaging sensor returns of tank sized targets with sufficient resolution for detection, recognition and identification.”78 The Aquila’s primary role would be target detection, acquisition, and identification for field artillery fires. At the same time the system would lase targets for a family of laser-guided munitions – the Copperhead cannon-launched projectile and the Hellfire and the Maverick air-launched missiles. Considering another benefit of the Aquila, Colonel George F. Christensen, the RPV program manager for the U.S. Army Aviation and Research and Development Command, said in 1982 that the aerial vehicle would enable the Army to take advantage of the range of conventional field artillery and assess field artillery fire damage quickly.79 A few years later, the Field Artillery School’s, Operational and Organizational Plan, Target Acquisition/Designation and Aerial Reconnaissance System of February 1985 ______Assistant Secretary of the Army, 4 Nov 1976, RPV/Drone File, MSTL; Disposition Form, subj: Trip Report, 4 Nov 1976, RPV/Drone File, MSTL; DF, subj: Trip Report, 8 Aug 1976, RPV/Drone File, MSTL; Memorandum, subj: USAFAS Historical Supplement 1976, 17 Jan 1977, RPV Odds and Ends File, HRDC. 76White Paper, subj: A Case for Acquiring Aquila and a Family of Payloads as a Combined Arms RPV, Mar 1988, p. 12, HRDC; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army RPV Target Acquisition/Designation and Aerial Reconnaissance System, 5 Mar 1980, RPV Miscellaneous Docs File, HRDC; DF, subj: Trip Report-National Association for RPV Symposium, 7 May 1976, RPV/Drone File; Fact Sheet, subj: Untitled, 22 Dec 1981, RPV Miscellaneous Documents File, HRDC. 77White Paper, subj: A Case for Acquiring Aquila and A Family of Payloads as a Combined Arms RPV, Mar 1988, pp. 12-13; F. David Schnebly, “The Development of the XMQM-105 Aquila Mini-RPV System,” pp. 24-29, Development of the XMQM-105 Aquila Mini-RPV File, MSTL; Aquila Historical Update, undated, 1985 AHR, HRDC; Report, GAO, subj: Aquila RPV: Its Potential Battlefield Contribution Still in Doubt, Oct 1987, p. 16. 78Msg, Cdr, USAFACFS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Epervier Battlefield Surveillance and Target Acquisition System, 8 Sep 1976, RPV/Drone File, MSTL. 79Benjamin M. Elson, “U.S. Army Considers Aquila RPV Ready,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 29 Nov 1982, p.

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validated Christensen’s conclusion. Quoting a previously written Fire Support Mission Analysis, the plan reported that the Army had inadequate target acquisition and target attack assessment capabilities as the 1980s opened and that overcoming these problems was a high priority. Because of limited range, restricted line-of-sight abilities, adverse weather, and timeliness, existing ground-based systems in the target acquisition battalion failed to meet the maneuver commander’s requirements for responsiveness, while sophisticated air defenses made manned aircraft highly vulnerable to destruction. To win on future battlefields the Army required accurate target intelligence to reduce the presentation rate of the enemy’s echeloned forces and engage high-payoff targets. As part of the division’s target acquisition battery, the Aquila would increase the Army’s ability to locate and identify threat targets before they were committed to the main battle and track passive and active targets beyond the line-of-sight of existing ground target acquisition systems in keeping with AirLand Battle doctrine. Just as important, an RPV would reduce or eliminate the risk of losing pilots or expensive aircraft to hostile air defenses and would be more economical.80 Subsequently in May 1985, the Aquila program manager at the Field Artillery School, Colonel John S. Nettles, briefed the Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Maxwell R. Thurman, on the system’s status. Even though the testing and writing of doctrine had begun, hardware shortages, technical deficiencies detected during qualification training, and other problems frustrated serious progress. Given the grave situation with the Aquila in the summer of 1985 and the pending congressional budget cuts for Fiscal Year 1986, the Aquila faced possible termination.81 In view of the time and money already invested in the Aquila, Army did not abandon the system. Testing in the fall of 1985 demonstrated that target detection, recognition, and identification and other technical deficiencies prevented the required performance standards from being met, that the hardware was unsatisfactory, and that logistical support and training failed to satisfy the requirements.82 Despite the bleak outlook, efforts to field the Aquila carried on in 1986. During contractor flights early in the year to demonstrate that the deficiencies of 1985 had been fixed, the Aquila exhibited its ability to lase stationary and moving targets, among other things. Although substantial work was still required before the system could be fielded, Lockheed had eliminated the most glaring failings. Because of this, the Army approved

80Operational and Organizational Plan, Target Acquisition/Designation and Aerial Reconnaissance System, Feb 1985, pp. 1-1 - 1-2, HRDC; Field Artillery School, Field Artillery Reference Data, 1983, p. B-1, HRDC. 81Briefing, subj: Aquila RPV Quarterly In-Process Review, 21 May 1985, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Aquila RPV Restructured Program, 23 Oct 1985, HRDC; Briefing to CSA, subj: Army Aquila RPV Program, 24 Jun-2 Jul 1985, HRDC; USAFAS, White Paper: A Maturing of Aquila RPV Tactical Employment Doctrine, Training and Organization based on Lessons Learned from Operational Test II, 23 Oct 1987, HRDC. 82Staff Report, Maj Michael Blose, 25 Mar 1986, HRDC; Briefing, subj: RPV Red Team Background, 16 Sep 1985, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Aquila RPV Restructured Program 23 Oct 1985, HRDC.

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continuing work on the Aquila.83 In May 1986 bad news surfaced. Based upon test flights of the Aquila in the spring of 1986, participants in the RPV program found the existence of too many hardware and software problems. Specifically, hardware failures caused one RPV to crash during testing, while various technical problems forced twenty-eight launches to be aborted. In a memorandum for the Army Vice Chief of Staff on 19 May 1986, Major General James E. Drummond, Commander of the U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency that was testing the Aquila, expressed his concern about the viability of the system. In his estimation the reliability of the Aquila had decreased seriously since 1985 as revealed by the increased frequency of aborted launches in 1986 over 1985.84 Two days later, Lieutenant General Louis C. Wagner, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition for the Army, wrote that the Aquila was not ready for additional testing because crucial deficiencies still had to be resolved.85 Although many pressing issues were settled in 1986 to permit developmental work to continue, a critical one remained. As late as November 1986, many civilian and military personnel associated with the Aquila program questioned the system’s ability to conduct successful flights in an operational environment and to furnish indirect fire support for conventional field artillery systems in view of the persisting technical problems.86 Operational testing of the Aquila in 1986-1987 that produced ambiguous performance results seemed to justify the officials’ concerns. Although the system could function in an operational environment and perform indirect fire missions, it could not be launched within one hour as required because of software problems and had difficulties acquiring targets. On the positive side the Aquila furnished over-the-horizon observation and timely intelligence. Additional work by the contractor in 1987 took giant strides towards eliminating the difficulty of acquiring targets and being launched in one hour, but the chronic software and hardware problems, the escalating developmental costs, and the growing length of time to field the system encouraged Congress to react.87

83TRADOC System Manager RPV Quarterly Report, 2nd Quarter FY 86, 31 Mar 1986, HRDC; RPV History, Executive Summary, p. 9, HRDC. 84Memo for Vice Chief of Staff, Army subj: Preliminary Assessment of the RPV, 19 May 1986, HRDC. 85Memo through Vice Chief of Staff, Army, for Under Secretary of the Army, subj: Read-Ahead – Aquila RPV DT IIA Review, 21 May 1986, HRDC. 86Memo, subj: Conditions and Standards for RPV OT II, 12 Dec 1986, HRDC. 87Fact Sheet, subj: Aquila 1987, 20 Jan 1988, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Aquila RPV Program Status, 3 Feb 1988, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program Status, 29 Jan 1988, HRDC; 1987 USAFACFS AHR, p. 65; Michael A. Dornheim, “Delay in Appointment Hampers Consolidation of RPV Programs,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 7 Mar 1989, pp. 17-18; Brendan M. Greeley, Jr., “Defense Department Master Plan Allocates $1.55 Billion for Unmanned Air Vehicles,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 1 Aug 1988, p. 83; Michael A. Dornheim, “Defense Department Briefs Industry on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Plan,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 Jun 1988, pp.

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Based upon the General Accounting Office’s negative report on the Aquila in October 1987, Congress restructured the military services’ RPV programs in December 1987. To eliminate redundancy and reduce costs Congress directed consolidating the military services’ RPV programs and deleting their separate research, development, test, and evaluation accounts. This action halted funding for the Aquila. Meanwhile, Congress instructed the Secretary of Defense to designate one of the military services to take the lead. The Office of the Secretary of Defense assumed authority over all RPV activities, established a joint unmanned aerial vehicle program office, and designated the Navy as executive manager. The office’s joint service master plan outlined acquiring affordable RPVs by incorporating the best off-the-shelf components and subsystems, by maximizing commonality, and by delivering systems that could be improved as required to keep them technologically current.88 Shortly after the decision to consolidate all RPV efforts, the Army revamped its RPV and unmanned aerial vehicle programs to follow guidance established by the Department of Defense. In December 1987 the Army merged the program management offices for the Aquila and its unmanned aerial vehicle project at the Intelligence Center that had been underway for several years together as the Army Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). Even though the Field Artillery School pushed to have the Aquila serve as the Army unmanned aerial vehicle, most TRADOC service school commandants rigorously opposed this. From their perspective the Aquila was not sufficiently responsive in timeliness and had problems locating targets. Moreover, production costs prohibited fielding the system in the numbers required to meet the needs of division and brigade commanders.89 TRADOC Commanding General, General Maxwell R. Thurman, still advocated using the Aquila as the Army UAV but eventually modified his stance. In a lengthy message to the Army Chief of Staff, General Carl E. Vuono, on 5 January 1988 in defense of the Aquila, Thurman cautioned, “The Army has developed a system which meets its RPV/UAV requirements for close combat operations. We should not step back from the table and start

______30-31; George Leopold, “Army to Merge Aerial Drone Programs,” Army Times, 11 Jan 1989, p. 29; Report, GAO, subj: Aquila RPV: Its Potential Battlefield Contribution Still in Doubt, Oct 1987, pp. 1, 2, 3, 8, 16. 88White Paper, subj: A Case for Acquiring Aquila and A Family of Payloads as a Combined Arms RPV, Mar 1988, pp. 12-13; F. David Schnebly, “The Development of the XMQM-105 Aquila Mini-RPV System,” pp. 24-29, Development of the XMQM-105 Aquila Mini-RPV File, MSTL; Aquila Historical Update, undated, 1985 AHR, HRDC; Report, GAO, subj: Aquila RPV: Its Potential Battlefield Contribution Still in Doubt, Oct 1987, p. 16; Dornheim, “Delay in Appointment Hampers Consolidation of RPV Programs,” pp. 17- 18; Bill Sweetman, “Unmanned Air Vehicles: US Services Plan Jointly at Last,” Interavia, Aug 1988, pp. 775-77. 89DF, subj: Proposed Army UAV/RPV Program Effort by MICOM, 16 Dec 1987, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Army UAV Programs, Feb 1989, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, Combined Arms Development Center, to Cdr, US Army Intelligence Center, et al, subj: Non-lethal UAV Requirements, 231501Z Dec 1987, HRDC.

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over.”90 According to Thurman, prudent thinking dictated using the Aquila as the unmanned aerial vehicle rather than deserting it and developing another one. Although it acknowledged the resolution of a number of the technical and training problems with the Aquila in 1987, the Army told Thurman on 5 February 1988, “The cost of producing the system coupled with fiscal realities [the Fiscal Year 1989 budget reductions] made the decision [to stop all work on the Aquila] unavoidable.”91 The Army simply could not afford to move the Aquila into production even though the aircraft would satisfy the need for over-the-horizon observation. It had to find a less expensive RPV. With this Thurman altered his position and announced his support of the unmanned aerial vehicle effort.92 In the place of the Aquila, the Army endorsed a family of two UAVs as a part of the Department of Defense program. One would meet the close battle needs of the brigade commander, would have a range of 50 kilometers to support the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and tube artillery, and would be inexpensive. The other would satisfy the deep battle needs of corps and division commanders, would have a range of 200 kilometers, and would support the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile under development and MLRS. Equally as important, the Intelligence School would be the proponent for UAVs as it had been for the Aquila since June 1985 because of the intelligence and electronic warfare potential of the system. The decision to give the Intelligence School supervision of the UAV effort, to make the system a division G-2 asset to take advantage of its versatility, and to stop work on the Aquila meant that the Field Artillery would not have a RPV/UAV dedicated primarily to its missions and would have to share the aircraft with others.93

90Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to HQ DA, subj: DOD Consolidation of RPV/UAV Systems Management, 051635Z Jan 1988, RPV Miscellaneous Documents File, HRDC. 91Msg, HQ DA to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: RPV/UAV Status, 051615Z Feb 1988, RPV Miscellaneous Documents File, HRDC. 92Ibid. 93Briefing, subj: Army UAV Programs, Feb 1989, HRDC; Dornheim, “Delay in Appointment Hampers Consolidation of RPV Programs,” pp. 17-18, HRDC; Ltr, Cdr, USAICS, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Memorandum of Agreement and Transition Plan, UAV Proponency, 10 Feb 1986, HRDC; DF, subj: Proposed Army UAV/RPV Program Effort by MICOM, 16 Dec 1987, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Army UAV Programs, Feb 1989, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, Combined Arms Combat Development Center, to Cdr, US Army Intelligence Center, et al, subj: Non-lethal UAV Requirements, 231501Z Dec 1987, HRDC; Dan Beyers, “Pentagon Writes New Master Plan for RPVs,” Defense News, 7 Mar 1988, p. 1; George Leopold, “Army To Merge Aerial Drone Programs,” Army Times, 11 Jan 1988, p. 29; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cdr, USAFASCH, et al, subj: RPV Proponency, 061907Z Jun 1985, RPV Miscellaneous Documents File, HRDC; Talking Paper, subj: RPV Operational and Organizational Concept, 23 Apr 1976, RPV/Drone File No. 3, MSTL; Ltr, MG Morris Brady, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, to Maj Gen David E. Ott, 26 Feb 1976, RPV/Drone File No. 3, MSTL; Ltr, Maj Gen David E. Ott, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Maj Gen Wilbur H. Vinson, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments, TRADOC, subj: RPV Operational and Organizational concepts, Apr 1976, RPV/Drone File No. 3, MSTL. The

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Even though the Field Artillery School would not have much input in the Army’s UAV program, it, nevertheless, realized the significance of the aircraft on the battlefield. As a part of military operations, the aircraft upon fielding would “mark a new era in warfare.”94 UAV functions included munitions delivery, directed energy application, communications relay, deception applications, meteorological information, target acquisition, and psychological operations support. Reflecting upon the various missions, the Directorate of Combat Developments in the Field Artillery School envisioned that UAVs in the division G- 2 would furnish the ground commander with the flexibility to support joint and combined operations regardless of the weather, the terrain, the visibility, the adversary, and the intensity of the conflict.95 As the Field Artillery School worked unsuccessfully to acquire the Aquila RPV, the mounting pressure for over-the-horizon target acquisition, reconnaissance, and surveillance simultaneously drove the acquisition of a new scout helicopter as part of a family of new light helicopters. In 1972 Army outlined a requirement for an advanced attack helicopter with a laser to designate targets for laser-guided, anti-tank missiles fired from helicopters. That same year, the Army developed the concept of teaming the advanced attack helicopter with an advanced scout helicopter to form a deadly hunter-killer combination.96 Budgetary considerations stalled progress; and several years passed before any serious work actually began.97 In October 1979 the Advanced Scout Helicopter Study Group revisited the need for a new scout helicopter. Along with the Fire Support and Command Mission Element Needs Statement of the mid-1970s, the study group acknowledged the ground commander’s requirement for a real-time combat information, reconnaissance, security, aerial observation, target acquisition, and target designation system and concluded that the Advanced Scout Helicopter (ASH) would satisfy those needs. On 30 November 1979 the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council for the ASH concurred with the study group about the necessity of a new aeroscout helicopter. Recognizing that the helicopter was unaffordable, the Army chose a less costly option. In 1980 it adopted the Army Helicopter Improvement Program (AHIP) as a near-term solution “to provide more effective eyes, both day and night, for the force.”98 The program called for modifying an existing helicopter to serve in a scout role until research and development could deliver a family of light helicopters as a long-term ______RPV/Drone File No. 3 has a several letters discussing where the RPV should be assigned and follows the debate between the Intelligence School and the Field Artillery School. 94Concept Statement for US Army UAV Systems, undated, p. 2, HRDC. 95Ibid. 96Lt Col R.A. Neuien, Jr., “How Your Got It and What You Got,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Mar 1982, pp. 6-10; “OH-58D Kiowa Scout Helicopter,” Army, Aug 1990, pp. 54-56; GAO, Report, subj: Issues Concerning the Army’s Light Helicopter Family Program, 22 May 1986, p. 4,MSTL. 97Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to DA, subj: ASH, 091229Z Nov 1976, ASH File, MSTL. 98DF, subj: Army Helicopter Improvement Program/Near-Term Scout Helicopter, 19 Jan 1982, HRDC.

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solution. In September 1981 the Army conducted a flyoff between the Hughes Aircraft OH-6 Cayuse and the Bell Helicopter OH-58 Kiowa before awarding Bell Helicopter the contract for the AHIP.99 As the contractor was modifying the OH-58 during the early 1980s by adding new avionics and electronic packages, emerging doctrine outlined three major functions for the helicopter. Designated the OH-58D, the AHIP helicopter would support attack helicopter, air cavalry, and field artillery units. In the field artillery role the helicopter would serve as a platform for aerial observers to acquire targets and adjust fire as traditional aerial observers had been doing for years and also to lase targets for the laser-guided Copperhead field artillery projectile. Although the OH-58D could perform field artillery missions, supporting attack helicopters and air cavalry had the top priority and was the reason for acquiring the scout helicopter. Initially, the Army wanted to purchase 720 OH-58Ds, but budgetary restraints reduced the number to 578 in 1983. Of this number, the Field Artillery would get thirty helicopters for observation after attack helicopter and air cavalry units had received their share.100 The Army intended to integrate the helicopters dedicated to the field artillery mission and the other missions into a relatively new division and corps aviation force structure. In an effort to improve command and control of aviation assets and to maximize their availability to the combat commanders, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Bernard W. Rogers, implemented the recommendations of the Aviation Requirements for the Combat Structure of the Army III study of 1976, conducted by the U.S. Army Aviation Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama, at the direction of TRADOC. The Army created a division aviation battalion of

99Neuwien, “How You Got It and What You Got It: AHIP,” pp. 6-10; MG Ellis Parker, “The Vision of the LHX,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Dec 1986, p. 5; Briefing, subj: To Provide Information on the AHIP as It Pertains to Field Artillery, ca. 1987, HRDC; Trip Report, 7 Sep 1982, HRDC; Advanced Helicopter Improvement Program Briefing, Oct 1981, HRDC; DF, subj: Army Helicopter Improvement Program/Near-Term Scout Helicopter, 19 Jan 1982, HRDC. 100Maj Laurie Pope, “AHIP: Aeroscout of the Next War,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Mar 1982, pp. 11-13; “OH-58D Kiowa Scout Helicopter,” Army, Aug 1990, pp. 54-56; “OH- 58 Kiowa,” Army Aviation, 30 Jun 1990, p. 59; 2lt Adam Oaks, 2lt Kenneth Seiffert, Jr., 1lt B. Shawn Vishneski, “OH58D: The New Eye on the Battlefield,” Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 1988, p. 41; Memorandum for Command Historian, subj: Review of CED Historical Input for FY 91, HRDC; Trip Report, 7 Sep 1982, HRDC; DF, subj: Draft Training Device Need Statement for AHIP Simulator, 4 Feb 1982, HRDC; DF, subj: AHIP Briefing, undated, HRDC; DF, subj: Trip Report, 13 Jan 1984, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, USAFAS, and Cdr, US Army Aviation Center and Fort Sill, subj: OH-58D in the Field Artillery Role, 18 May 1987, HRDC; Field Artillery School, Field Artillery Reference Data, 1980, p. 1-3; Field Artillery School, Reference Data, 1983, pp. 1-1 - 1-6; Richard K. Tierney, “Forty Years of Army Aviation: Part 5, Policies and Organizations,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Oct 1982, p. 34; Col James F. McCarthy, Sr., and Maj Jim S. Hutchinson, “FIST Takes to the Air,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1978, p. 26.

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five companies with different missions and functions. One of these companies was the division aviation company with a division artillery support platoon to furnish field artillery air observation. Formed in 1979-1980, the division aviation battalion consolidated all aviation assets dispersed throughout the division under one command and eliminated organic field artillery air observation that had been implemented in 1942. While helicopters dedicated to the field artillery mission were assigned to the division artillery support platoon under the command of an aviator, the aerial observers would come from division artillery. The reforms also created a corps aviation company to concentrate all aviation assets at that level and abolished organic field artillery air observation in corps artillery.101 Although the Field Artillery School never seriously questioned the demise of organic field artillery air observation in 1979-1980 with the creation of the new division and corps aviation organizations, it challenged fielding priorities of the OH-58D. The Chief of Program Management and New Systems Division in the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Major Mark Ison, who was a field artilleryman and also an aviator, recognized the helicopter’s potential for field artillery use and enrolled the support of the school’s Assistant Commandant, Brigadier General Thomas J.P. Jones (1983-1984), in 1983-1984 in an effort to boost the field artillery mission to a higher position on the list of priorities. From the Field Artillery School’s perspective, fielding the aircraft primarily in a field artillery role made more sense than employing it to support air cavalry or attack helicopters because it could obtain a maximum effect against an enemy with an economy of force. Rather than using a team of costly AH-64s and OH-58Ds to locate and destroy enemy armor with laser-guided munitions, one OH-58D in a field artillery role could coordinate enough indirect fire on the same target with the same effectiveness at far less expense by tying up fewer men and less equipment. In addition, using a single OH-58D in a field artillery role afforded a better chance of exploiting the element of surprise against an enemy than a team of aeroscouts and attack helicopters would.102 Tests of the OH-58D in 1984-1985 and not a compelling argument from the Field Artillery School, however, prompted the Army to restructure fielding priorities. Operator problems, test evaluation methods, range instrumentation, and uncertain techniques and procedures prevented the helicopter from convincingly demonstrating its ability to support attack helicopter and air cavalry missions effectively. Ironically, the tests showed that the helicopter was satisfactory in its field artillery role. In view of this, the Army revamped its priorities for the helicopter. It elevated the field artillery mission to the top priority and planned to give the OH-58D to field artillery units before attack helicopter and air cavalry

101Maj George R. Hall, Maj Russell H. Smith, Maj Lewis D. Ray, and Cpt Lloyd D. McCammon, “ARCSA III,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Jul 1977, pp. 2-3, 17-19; McCarthy and Hutchinson, “FIST Takes to the Air,” p. 25-27; Field Artillery School, Field Artillery Reference Data, 1980, p. 1-3; Field Artillery School, Field Artillery Reference Data, 1983, pp. 1-1 - 1-6; Tierney, “Forty Years of Army Aviation: Part 5, Policies and Organizations,”p. 34. 102Memorandum for Command Historian, subj: Review of CED Historical Input for FY 91, 10 Apr 1991, HRDC.

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units received their aircraft.103 Regardless of fielding priorities, the Field Artillery School and a subordinate organization of TRADOC, the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, clearly understood the OH-58D’s potential. In a white paper of 1986, the school wrote that the combination of the aerial fire support observer and the OH-58D would enhance fire support significantly and magnify the total force’s ability to execute AirLand Battle doctrine.104 As the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center explained in May 1987, the combination of the aerial observer and the OH-58D “has the potential to significantly enhance fire support for the tactical commander.”105 The helicopter in its field artillery role would provide fire support, lase targets for Copperhead, Hellfire, and Air Force/Navy laser- guided munitions, and furnish target acquisition through its mast-mounted sight with television and thermal imaging. Ultimately, the OH-58D would render timely and accurate observed fire for conventional and semi-smart munitions for the deep, main, and rear areas of combat operations, would provide real-time information for targeting and intelligence to the division commander, would supply fire support coordination for attack helicopter battalions, and would furnish fire support coordination across the spectrum of conflict.106 Over the next several years, further testing, operations, budget cuts, and the decision to arm all OH-58Ds and reconfigure some as multi-purpose light helicopters prompted the Army to rearrange the helicopter’s mission priorities. Testing conducted from January to May 1987 validated the OH-58D’s capabilities in an aeroscout role. From July 1987 through January 1988, 15 OH-58Ds from the XVIII Airborne Corps deployed to the Persian Gulf to help provide aerial cover for merchant convoys in Operation Prime Chance where they further reinforced the OH-58D’s capabilities in an aeroscout role. With a planned procurement of 578 helicopters, the existing distribution plan and priority list appeared to be safe. With this number the Field Artillery would get its fair share of the helicopters and remain the top priority although testing and operations validated its utility in aeroscout roles. In 1988 budget cuts forced the Army to reduce its purchase of OH-58Ds to 477. Even though fielding priorities did not change with the decrease in funding and the number to be purchased, the U.S. Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker confidently revealed its position on priorities for the aircraft. In view of recent testing and the urgent need for scout helicopters, the Aviation School insisted, the aircraft should go to attack helicopter and air

103Fact Sheet, subj: History of the Aerial Fire Support Division, 18 Feb 1988, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: OH-58D/AFSO Field Status, 19 Dec 1988, HRDC; Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, subj: AHIP, undated, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: History of AFSC/Proponency for Aerial Fire Support Coordinator Training, 23 Dec 1986, HRDC; Memorandum with Atch for Cdr, USAFAS, and Cdr, USAAVNC, subj: OH-58D in the Field Artillery Role, 18 May 1987, HRDC. 104White Paper, subj: Employment of the AHIP OH-58D as a Station for the AFSC, 24 Oct 1986, HRDC. 105Memorandum with Atch for Cdr, USAFAS, and Cdr, USAAVNC, subj: OH-58D in Field Artillery Role, 18 May 1987, HRDC. 106Ibid.; Fact Sheet, subj: OH-58D in the Field Artillery Role, 10 Nov 1987, HRDC.

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cavalry missions and then field artillery missions. Despite taking this position in May 1987, the Aviation School still professed support for the field artillery mission. When budget cuts in January 1989 reduced the procurement to 207 aircraft, the need to review fielding priorities definitely arose.107 In the face of fewer aircraft, the Army reexamined its distribution plan. In June 1989 the Army directed TRADOC to develop an aircraft distribution plan and to consider the OH- 58Ds slotted for field artillery missions for redistribution. Threatened with loss of helicopters dedicated to field artillery missions, the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Fred F. Marty (1987-1989), fought to retain the aircraft. In a July 1989 message to the Aviation School, he solicited support to keep the field artillery mission and retain a field artilleryman as the observer if the field artillery mission could not be salvaged. The Aviation School accepted Marty’s proposal and agreed to work with the Field Artillery School to satisfy their respective but conflicting needs.108 In mid-September 1989, just a month before the Field Artillery completed fielding its allotted OH-58Ds, the Army’s revised fielding and employment plan drastically undercut the Field Artillery School’s position. The plan removed field artillery OH-58Ds from all but one division artillery support platoon. Faced with losing 75 of 81 aircraft, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Raphael J. Hallada (1987-1991), argued strenuously against such action. In a message to TRADOC on 15 September 1989, he cautioned that the action “would seriously degrade the Division commander’s ability to acquire and engage the enemy with indirect fires and maintain a current intelligence picture of the enemy situation.”109 A compromise appeared to have been reached when the Aviation School subsequently announced on 22 September 1989 that the aircraft distribution plan would allocate 51 of the 207 OH-58Ds to the artillery mission, 131 to the cavalry/attack/reconnaissance mission, and 25 to the training base/maintenance float. In the case of the field artillery aerial observer, it would be a field artillery noncommissioned

107Interview, Dr. L. Martin Kaplan with Maj George W. Chappell, Chief, Aerial Fire Support Division, Fire Support and Combined Arms Department, subj: AFSO Training, 5 Feb 1990, HRDC; Memorandum for Assistant Commandant, USAFAS, subj: OH-58Ds in the Aerial Observer Role, undated, HRDC; Interview, Kaplan with Chappell, subj: AFSO Training, 15 Jan 1991, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, USAAVNC, to AC, USAFAS, subj: Observer for OH-58D, 111730Z May 1988, OH-58D Odds and Ends File, HRDC; Robert R. Ropelewski, “Threat and Budget Changes Imperil Army Aviation Plan,” Armed Forces Journal, Apr 1990, pp. 50-51. 108Msg, DA to Cdr, TRADOC, et al, subj: After Action Report VCSA HA-64 Program Review, 211135Z Jun 1989, HRDC; Msg, Cmdt, FASCH, to Cdr, USAAVNC, subj: OH58D Employment, 241300Z Jul 1989, HRDC; Position Paper, subj: OH58D/AFSO Employment, undated, HRDC; Memorandum for Record, subj: AFSO Employment, undated, HRDC. 109Msg, DA to CINC, FORSCOM, et al, subj: OH-58D Near Term Fielding, FY90- 91, 281824Z Aug 1989, HRDC; Msg, Cmdt, FASCH, to Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Revised OH58D Fielding and Employment Plan, 151815Z Sep 1989, HRDC.

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officer, while the other missions would be filled by an aeroscout observer.110 The new Army Aviation Modernization Plan plainly identified the air cavalry mission as the number one priority, reversing a previous decision. Given the Army’s requirement to use its available assets wisely, a consensus of senior field commanders agreed with the Aviation School’s position that “the systemic aviation battlefield deficiency continuing to cause the greatest concern is our inability to see the battlefield particularly at night.”111 With the future distribution of the OH-58D program still remaining uncertain, the Aviation School pointed out, however, that the role of the divisional aerial fire support mission continued to be a major factor in fielding priorities.112 In early October 1989 a revised fielding and employment plan outlined distributing all of the Field Artillery’s OH-58Ds to the air cavalry mission. Although Hallada vigorously protested this decision, TRADOC responded that arming the OH-58D, using it as a multi- purpose light helicopter, and purchasing only a limited number forced a reexamination of fielding priorities and chose not to support him. In addition, the Army was also thinking of optimizing the use of its scarce OH-58D assets by scrutinizing the possibility of expanding the OH-58D’s combat role to include scout and armed reconnaissance.113 The revised OH-58D fielding and employment plan recognized increased competing demands for the aircraft and effectively canceled the field artillery mission. Top priority now went to fielding armed OH-58Ds to air cavalry units for armed reconnaissance, to the XVIII Airborne Corps and 82nd Airborne Division for critical multi-purpose light helicopter needs, and to corps target acquisition reconnaissance companies and training units. In light of the new priorities, the Army opted to redistribute all field artillery OH-58Ds to satisfy the other pressing concerns and decided to assign OH-58A/Cs to the division aviation brigade for the field artillery mission. Created by the Aviation Requirements of the Combat Structure of the Army III of 1983 to centralize aviation assets in the division in the face of the numerically superior Soviet-Warsaw Pact, the division aviation brigade consisted of attack helicopter battalions, an air cavalry squadron, and additional aviation assets. Although the Field Artillery still had access to aerial observation in the division aviation brigade, it lacked the capability of lasing over-the-hill targets for precision munitions with the allotted OH- 58A/C.114

110Msg, Cdr, USAAVNC, to Cdr, U.S. Army Armor School and Center, et al, subj: OH-58D Deployment, 222300Z Sep 1989, HRDC. 111Msg, Cdr, USAAVNC, to Cmdt, FASCH, et al, subj: Revised OH58D Fielding and Employment Plan, 272245Z Sep 1989, HRDC. 112Ibid. 113Msg, Cmdt, USAFAS, to Cdr, TRADOC, et al, subj: OH58D Retrofit and Redistribution, 031250Z Oct 1989, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cmdt, USAFAS, et al, subj: Revised OH58D Fielding and Employment Plan, 041558Z Oct 1989, HRDC. 114Ibid.; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cdr, XVIII Airborne Corps, et al, subj: MPLH for 1st Squadron, 17 Cavalry Requirements, 041410Z Oct 1989, HRDC; Briefing, subj: AHIP, 9 Nov 1989, HRDC; Msg, Cdr, TRADOC, to Cdr, USAAVNC, et al, subj: OH58D Deployment, 061742Z Oct 1989, HRDC; Briefing, subj: subj: Armed OH58D, 20 Dec

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The OH-58D program continued to receive congressional support for additional thirty-six aircraft for 1990 to make a total of 243 to be purchased. On 6 December 1989 Secretary of the Army, Michael P.W. Stone, reviewed the armed and multi-purpose light helicopter OH-58D programs. A month later, he approved a retrofit program to arm all 243 aircraft, reaffirmed the previous decision to transfer OH-58Ds from the division field artillery role to the air cavalry role, to configure 81 OH-58Ds as multi-purpose light helicopters for contingency forces, and to name the OH-58D the Kiowa Warrior.115 Interestingly, Operation Desert Storm of 1991 validated the requirement for over-the- hill target acquisition capabilities. Although Firefinder AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars performed well in the counterfire battle, the Field Artillery still required the ability to acquire enemy field artillery before it fired. According to many field artillery officers, an RPV would have satisfied this deficiency. Writing in the Field Artillery Magazine in October 1991, the Commander of the 1st Armored Division Artillery, Colonel Vollney B. Corn, Jr., explained, “One of the most effective target acquisition means used in the theater was the British RPV.”116 The system furnished real-time intelligence for field artillery targeting – capabilities that the American army, especially the Field Artillery, lacked since the demise of the Aquila program late in the 1980s. “If I still had the Aquila . . . , it would have been in Southwest Asia, and the Army would be buying it right now,” proclaimed the Director of the Target Acquisition Department, Colonel Stanley E. Griffith, in July 1991.117 From the vantage point of these colonels, Operation Desert Storm substantiated the requirement for an RPV. “If we [the Army] had been able to send it [the Aquila] over there [Southwest Asia], that would have been the hero of the war not GPS [GPS],” Griffith asserted as he assessed the possible impact of the Aquila in war.118 Based upon the success of the British RPV and the requirement for real-time intelligence and targeting information, these officers and the Fire Support and Combined Arms Operations Department in the Field Artillery School argued for acquiring the family of unmanned aerial vehicles for fire support

______1989, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: OH-58D Fielding Status, 16 Apr 1990, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: OH-58D Distribution, 16 Apr 1990, HRDC; Interview, Dr. Larry M. Kaplan with Maj George W. Chappell, Chief, Aerial Fire Support Division, Fire Support and Combined Arms Department, USAFAS, 30 Jan 1990, HRDC; Field Artillery School, Field Artillery Reference Data, 1983, p. 1-1 - 1-6; Field Manual, Fire Support Operations, 1983, p. B-3; Maj David Law, “United States Army Aviation Organizational Changes,” unpublished masters thesis, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2012, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Ks, pp. 36-37. 115Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Aviation, subj: OH-58D (Armed) and MPLH, 8 Jan 1990, HRDC; Msg, DA to Cdr, TRADOC, et al, subj: OH58D Armed Distribution Plan, 231505Z Jan 1990, HRDC. 116Ibid. 117Ibid.; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Griffith, 16 Jul 1991, p. 20, HRDC. 118Ibid.

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missions as soon as possible.119 Another system, the OH-58D helicopter that the Field Artillery lost during the latter years of the 1980s because of budget reductions also performed well in Operation Desert Storm. Two senior field artillery officers from Fort Sill who had served in the Gulf unanimously agreed about the system’s importance for field artillery target acquisition.120 Looking back upon his unit’s experience with the OH-58D in the Persian Gulf, the Commander of the 75th Field Artillery Brigade, Colonel (later Brigadier General) Jerry Laws, said, “It was superb, exceptional.”121 Unfortunately, the Army employed the OH-58D almost exclusively as a division aviation asset. With few exceptions the helicopter operated in tandem with AH-64 Apache helicopters to designate targets for Hellfire laser-guided munitions.122 This situation limited the Field Artillery’s opportunity to use them in a target acquisition role and simultaneously restricted the aircraft’s versatility by limiting it to a few select missions. Yet, the restricted but successful employment of the OH-58D in a fire support function confirmed the requirement for making the helicopter readily available to division artillery to acquire targets and lase targets for Copperhead munitions.123 As Operation Desert Storm disclosed, the very target acquisition systems that the Field Artillery School worked so hard to acquire during the 1980s for over-the-horizon observation but lost proved to be critical. Unfortunately for the Field Artillery, someone else controlled the Army’s OH-58D and RPV assets and determined their employment. As the Field Artillery approached the 21st Century, its ability to engage passive and active targets beyond the horizon and to exploit the long ranges of its weapons remained problematic. Even with the loss of the Aquila RPV and the OH-58D in the 1980s and the creation of the division aviation brigade in the 1980s, the Field Artillery still had access to aerial observation. Yet, the Field Artillery had come a full circle with aerial observation. As in World War One, it now had to rely upon other branches of the Army for aerial observation. Notwithstanding this limitation, field artillery target acquisition occupied more solid

119Ibid.; Memorandum for Dir, CALL, subj: Operation Desert Storm Emerging Observations, 10 Jul 1991, p. 3, HRDC; Memorandum with Encls for Dir, FSCAOD, subj: USAFAS Historical Document, 2 Jul 1991, HRDC. 120Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Col Jerry Laws, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, 19 Jun 1991, p. 10, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Col Floyd T. Banks, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, 19 Jun 1991, p. 13, HRDC. 121Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Laws, p. 10, HRDC. 122“Modernization Program Systems Prove Themselves in the Desert,” Army, May 1991, p. 16. 123Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Banks, 19 Jun 1991, p. 13, HRDC; Oral History Interview, Dastrup and Kaplan with Griffith, 16 Jul 1991, p. 20, HRDC; Col Freddy E. McFarren, et al, “Operations and Desert Shield and Storm: A Unique Challenge for the 18th FA Brigade (Airborne),” Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 1991, p. 46; Maj Kenneth P. Graves, “Steel Rain: XVIII Corps Artillery in Desert Storm,” Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 1991, p. 52.

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ground than any time in the last 45 years. Early in the 21st Century, the Q-36 and Q-37 Firefinder radars, the BFIST vehicle for the FIST and the Knight vehicle for the COLT, and the creation of fire support coordinators in the maneuver units provided responsive target acquisition capabilities. While the radars eliminated the requirement for sound and flash ranging and allowed the Field Artillery to see as far as it could shoot for counterfire, BFIST and Knight vehicles provided effective target acquisition for close support fires to the maneuver arms. Target sensors meanwhile furnished precise target location for precision munitions to attack.

Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle, photo by SFC Gerald Mitchell, 1st Battalion, 41st Field Artillery, Fort Stewart, Georgia

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE PRECISION REVOLUTION AND TARGET ACQUISITON

INTRODUCTION

Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center twin towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. in September 2001, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and later Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003. OEF aimed to defeat the supporters of the attacks, while OIF intended to drive Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to prevent him from employing his weapons of mass destruction against neighboring countries. Working in concert, those wars prompted the Field Artillery to accelerate modernizing its target acquisition radars and target location sensors to support precision munitions and to complement the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle (BFIST) and Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) vehicle being modernized.

PRECISION MUNITIONS

Moving into the 21st Century, the Field Artillery School encountered the growing importance of precision munitions. Although they had been around since the 1970s, precision munitions assumed greater significance during OEF and OIF. During OEF and OIF, insurgents hid among civilians to counter American fire support. This elevated the need for precision munitions to minimize collateral damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure. As the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, Major General Michael D. Maples (2001-2003) wrote in the September-October 2003 edition of the Field Artillery Magazine, the Field Artillery played a key role in defeating Iraqi ground forces during major combat operations in OIF in March-April 2003 whereas it did not contribute heavily to combat operations in OEF in 2001-2003. Army field artillery units deployed to Iraq included one corps artillery, two division artilleries, three field artillery brigade headquarters, and 11 field artillery battalions; and the Marine Corps supplied five field artillery battalions and multiple separate batteries. The Army’s 60 155-mm. howitzers shot over 14,500 rounds, while its towed 105-mm. howitzers fired 4,107 rounds. Seventy- three Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) M270 launchers shot 857 rockets and 414 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles. Meanwhile, Marine field artillery delivered 19,883 rounds. As maneuver commanders attested, field artillery units provided devastating counterfire (field artillery fires designed to neutralize or destroy enemy indirect fire systems) and close support fires (field artillery fires designed to neutralize or destroy enemy forces that prevented friendly maneuver forces from advancing). As effective as fire support was, large-scale combat operations in OIF and counterinsurgency operations in OIF and OEF accelerated the acquisition of precision munitions and improved target acquisition

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radars and target location sensors.1 Precision munitions dramatically changed the Field Artillery. According to the Army Precision Effects Study of 2003-2004, precision fires offered the opportunity to disrupt or destroy enemy targets at extended ranges with precision. This required the ability to locate and attack targets accurately. As the study concluded, precision munitions, target acquisition radars, and target location sensors complemented each other. While precision munitions provided pinpoint accuracy to curtail collateral damage, radars and sensors accurately located targets.2 Unquestionably, the Excalibur Unitary, a single, high-explosive warhead projectile, played a critical role in OIF and OEF. Determined to increase the range of its cannon artillery without sacrificing accuracy and to satisfy its requirement for precise, all-weather, day/night, fire-and-forget lethal fires up to and beyond the current range of conventional 155- mm. field artillery, the Army adopted the Excalibur extended range guided projectile. As initially planned in 1995, Excalibur would be a fire-and-forget projectile with a global positioning system (GPS) receiver and inertial measurement unit guidance package that would allow the projectile to fly extended ranges (50 kilometers) to shape the close battle and to improve survivability of the firing unit and that would permit the munition to detonate within six meters of the target. The projectile’s modular design would permit carrying the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) composed of lethal bomblets for area targets, the Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM) for destroying self- propelled artillery or armor, or the Unitary munition, a single high-explosive warhead, for soft or hard precision targets. Upon fielding, Excalibur would furnish improved fire support; would be compatible with all digitized 155-mm. howitzers, such as the M109A6 (Paladin) self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer, the XM777 towed 155-mm. howitzer under development, and the Crusader self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer also under development; and would reduce fratricide. Excalibur would be fielded with DPICM in 2006, SADARM in 2007, and Unitary in 2010. Concerned about the soaring costs of SADARM, the Army stopped work on it, while DPICM left dangerous unexploded bomblets on the ground. This encouraged the Army to focus its attention on Excalibur Unitary.3 Prompted by the requirement to get Excalibur Unitary to the field as quickly as possible in view of the Global War on Terrorism that included OIF and OEF, the Office of the Secretary of Defense tasked the Program Manager for Excalibur in mid-2002 to accelerate fielding the munition through “spiral development.”4 This approach would deliver sequential, increasing capability over time until the objective requirements were met. The munition would be fielded in increments. Increment I would be the least capable; Increment

1Maj Gen Michael D. Maples, “FA Priorities after OIF,” Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 2003, p. 1; Briefing, subj: Quick Look, 26 Aug 2003, HRDC. 2Army’s Precision Fires Study, 2003-2004, p. 3, HRDC. 32000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 74-75; Briefing, subj: Excalibur Increment 1b Full Rate Production ASARC Brief, 25 Jun 2014, HRDC; Army’s Precision Fires Study, 2003-2004, p. 8, HRDC. 4Email with atch, subj: Excalibur History, 12 Feb 2003, HRDC.

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II would be more capable; and Increment III would be the objective munition.5 Subsequently, an urgent needs statement for Excalibur Unitary endorsed by the Coalition Forces Land Component Command that oversaw the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 created a requirement in August 2004 to field the munition even more rapidly. In response, the Field Artillery School presented its case for a formal acceleration to the Army Resource and Requirements Board. It vetted the requirement and supported accelerated development. Although the product of the accelerated program would not be the objective round, it would meet the urgent needs statement. The urgent needs statement required splitting Increment I into Increment Ia-1, Increment Ia-2, and Increment Ib. Ia-1 would provide the theater forces with an immediate need capability, have less capability than Ia-2 and Ib, and have a range of 24 kilometers; Increment Ia-2 would continue development, would have improved reliability, would have improved countermeasures, would be fielded to M777A2 towed 155-mm. howitzer and Paladin units, and would have a range greater than 35 kilometers; Increment Ib would be even more capable than the other increments and would have a range greater than 35 kilometers.6 Upon fielding, Excalibur Ia-1 quickly demonstrated its value in combat. Following new equipment training in May 2007, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted the first operational firing of the munition at a well-known insurgent safe house in Baghdad, Iraq. Elements from the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment teamed with the 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment to destroy a safe house with one Excalibur Unitary round. At the end of 2007, American operational units had fired Excalibur Ia-1 in OIF, while Canadian forces had fired the munition in OEF. In February 2008 American forces also began firing Excalibur Ia-1 in OEF as units equipped with the Excalibur-capable M777A2 deployed to Afghanistan. Through late 2010, Army and Marine field artillery units had fired 370 Excalibur Ia-1 projectiles in OIF and OEF where the projectiles provided timely engagement of targets in complex urban environments with minimal collateral damage. 7 Subsequently, the Army fielded Excalibur Ia-2 and Ib and projected fielding Excalibur II and III. Fielding Excalibur Ia-2 began in August 2011 to complement Excalibur Ia-1; and fielding the more capable Excalibur Ib began in 2014. As of 2014, the Army

52002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 62; Email msg with atch, subj: Excalibur History, 30 Apr 2004, HRDC. 62004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 63-64; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 52-53; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 50-51; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 69; Col (Ret) Donald C. DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires: The One-Stop-Shop for All Things Cannon,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 2013, pp. 35-39; DOTE, FY 2014 Report, pp. 107-08, www.dote.osd.mil. 72007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 70; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 2011, p. 26, HRDC; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires, 22 Feb 2013, material used is not FOUO, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 2013, HRDC; Selection Acquisition Report (Extract), 21 May 2013, p. 4, HRDC; Directorate of Test and Evaluation FY 2014 Report, pp. 107-08, www.dote.osd.mil.

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projected fielding Excalibur II and III sometime in the future. Excalibur II would be a smart projectile with capability of engaging a moving target; and Excalibur III would be a discriminating projectile with the capability of searching, detecting, and selectively engaging individual targets by distinguishing specific target characteristics.8 Just as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan drove the fast-track fielding of Excalibur Unitary, they also highlighted the need for other precision munitions to mitigate collateral damage and improve accuracy in urban environments. Prompted by the Americans’ restrictive rules of engagement to minimize collateral damage, American adversaries dispersed their forces and often occupied positions in or near populated areas to curb the Americans’ ability to attack targets. This tactic caused the Army to increase its dependence upon precision munitions.9 In view of this, the Army searched for a less expensive precision munition than SADARM that was employed effectively during the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 to complement the Excalibur Unitary under development. On 20 November 2003 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) tasked the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill to head a working group of representatives from the military and industry to conduct the Army Precision Fires Study. Among other things, the study determined that the Field Artillery had to locate and attack targets rapidly and accurately with precision to be relevant and ready in OIF and OEF. Also, the branch had to meet the rules of engagement restrictions in view of the Global War on Terrorism, to determine current or near-current precision engagement solutions, and to select those that

82009 USAFAS AH, p. 71; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM BCT-Fires, 3 Mar 201, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 2010, HRDC; TCM Newsletter, Sep 2009, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Project Manager, Combat Ammunitions systems, 28 Oct 2009, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 2010, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Lt Col Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 2012, HRDC; DOTE Information Paper, Excalibur XM 982 Precision Engagement Projectiles, undated, HRDC; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 Dec 2010, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Lt Col Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 Feb 2013, HRDC; DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” pp. 35-39; Briefing, subj: Precision Strike Association Excalibur Overview, 2012, HRDC; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), subj: TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires, 22 Feb 2013, (material used is not FOUO), HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 2013, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Mark Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 25 Feb 2014, HRDC; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract) 21 May 2013, p. 4, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Precision Strike Association Excalibur Overview, undated, HRDC; Picatinny Arsenal Information Paper, subj: Army Completes Excalibur 1a-2 Production, Transitions to 1b, 14 Apr 2014, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Mark W. Belcher and Steven W. Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, 18 Feb 2015, HRDC; DOTE Report (Extract), subj: Excalibur Increment 1b M982E1, FY 2014, HRDC; DOTE FY 2012 Report, pp. 93-94, www.dote.osd.mil. 92004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 2010, HRDC.

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would yield the best payoff for field artillery and mortar assets within the next 24 to 36 months.10 Various proposals emerged from this recommendation. Among many, the course- correcting fuse, renamed Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) in 2005, offered much promise. Based upon analysis of the proposed solutions during the first part of 2004, the Field Artillery Center and Field Artillery School concluded that PGK, a low-cost, fuse-size module, would replace a standard fuse on current and future unguided 105-mm. and 155- mm. projectiles and would vastly improve the accuracy of those projectiles. PGK would also drive down the logistical tail by reducing the number of rounds required for each engagement and ammunition resupply requirements and would reduce collateral damage. In addition, PGK would significantly improve accuracy by using GPS during flight to make trajectory corrections and would transform a “dumb projectile” into a “smart projectile.”11 Through spiral development, PGK could be fielded by 2009 with the first increment and by 2010 with the second increment that would be the full-performance fuse. Technical difficulties pushed PGK Increment I testing back into 2010 and delayed Increment II development.12 On 17 May 2011 the Department of the Army G-3 directed an urgent material release for the fuse. This would step up the pace of fielding Increment I with reduced reliability to support OEF. In March 2012 the Army approved accelerated fielding of the fuse. The Army sent these accelerated development fuses to deployed M777 and M109 units in Afghanistan in 2013 where operational units reported achieving near-precision target effects when PGKs were mated to conventional 155-mm. projectiles.13 As combat attested, PGK and Excalibur opened a new era for the Field Artillery. Through much of the 20th Century, the five requirements for predicted fire provided the foundation of field artillery gunnery. Prior to World War One, the Field Artillery relied upon

10Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 2010, HRDC; Army’s Precision Fires Study, ca. 2003-2004, pp. 3, 16, HRDC. 112005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 52; Army’s Precision Fires Study, undated, HRDC. 122006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 58; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 2010, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: IBCT Organic Cannon Precision Strike Capability, 12 Jan 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: PGK, undated, HRDC; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 58-59. 13Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army, subj: Acceleration and Urgent Materiel Release for XM1156 Precision Guidance Kit, 17 May 2011, HRDC; DOTE Information Paper, subj: PGK, 2012, HRDC; Audra Calloway, Picatinny Arsenal, “Fort Bliss Soldiers First to Fire Army’s New Near-precision Artillery Rounds,” www.army.mil, HRDC; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center, subj: Approval of Capability Development Document in lieu of Capabilities Production Document for the Precision Guidance Kit, 11 Jul 2012, HRDC; DOTE Information Paper, subj: PGK, 2013, HRDC; Cpt Cal A. Thomas and Sfc Jonathan S. Delong, “Regaining our Luster: How Fort Sill Institutional Training is Improving to meet Requirements for the 21st Century Field Artillery NCO,” Redleg Update, Aug 2014, pp. 5-9, HRDC.

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observed indirect fire to engage a target. The battery commander identified the target and brought his battery’s fire to bear on the target. However, this method precluded massing fires for echelons above the battery. Recognizing this deficiency, the Colonel Georg Bruchmüller and Captain Erich Pulkowski of the German army perfected predicted fire techniques during World War One. Unlike observed indirect fire, the observer did not have to see the fall of the shot from his guns to adjust fire. Predicted fire made possible surprise attacks without extensive adjustment or registration of fire before the infantry attacked. Predicted fire was based upon five requirements (accurate target location, accurate firing unit location, accurate weapon and ammunition information, accurate meteorological information, and accurate computational procedures). By employing these five requirements field artillery units up to army echelon had the capability of providing massed, surprise predicted fires without adjustment to give a distinct tactical advantage. Recognizing the importance of massed predicted fires, the Americans borrowed the German method of predicted fires following the war and employed it with modifications through the remaining years of the 20th Century and into the 21st Century.14 During the second decade of the 21st Century, the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, formerly the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, and the Field Artillery School questioned the validity of the five requirements for accurate predicted fire in light of GPS, digitized field artillery systems, and near-precision and precision munitions. Technology allowed the Field Artillery to be precise in all aspects of the five requirements for accurate predicted fires. As the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley (2013-2014) pointed out on 6 May 2014, automated systems and near-precision and precision munitions permitted modifying the term of the five requirements for accurate predicted fire to the five requirements for accurate fire. Technology allowed the Field Artillery to be precise. The branch did not have to project where a near-precision or a precision munition would hit whereas for the previous one hundred years the branch had to predict the impact points of unguided ballistic munitions. In May 2015 the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General William A. Turner (2014-2016), reemphasized the need for accurate target location as one of the five requirements for accurate fire. General Bentley and he believed that it was the most difficult of the five requirements to achieve and added that the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery expected fire supporters to provide a category one (six meter target location error) target location every time.15

14Brig Gen Christopher F. Bentley, “From the Commandant’s Desk,” Redleg Update, Feb 2014, p. 1, HRDC; Cpt Brock Lennon, “Fire Requirements of Accurate Fire for the 21st Century,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 2014, pp. 51, 58; Michael D. Grice, On Gunnery: The Art and Science of Field Artillery from the American Civil War to the Dawn of the 21st Century (North Charleston, NC: Booksurge Publishers, 2009), pp. 107-09. 15Lennon, “Fire Requirements for Accurate Fire for the 21st Century,” pp. 51, 58; Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery: 2025 and Beyond, 6 May 2014, HRDC; Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery, May 2015, HRDC; Brig Gen William A. Turner, “2014 State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 2015, www.army.mil/firesbulletin, HRDC.

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Raising target location standards accompanied the five requirements for accurate fire. As the Field Artillery School explained in the fall of 2014, precision targeting was “non- negotiable.”16 With this vision the school under Bentley created a ratio of 80:10:10. Taking advantage of the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3), the Forward Observer System (FOS), the Pocket-size Forward Entry Device (PFED), the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR), and target sensor systems scheduled for fielding in the near future, the school determined that forward observers had to acquire an accurate grid 80 percent of the time. This meant achieving a category one (six meter target location error) and a category two (15 meter target location error) or a precision grid 80 percent of the time, achieving a category four (50 meter target location error) ten percent of the time, and achieving a category five/six (200 meter target location error) ten percent of the time. The school explained, “This 80:10:10 ratio defines for us as professional Artillerymen the term accurate in the first requirement for accurate Fires. It also defines for us, as a profession of arms, how we train, certify and deliver accurate target locations in support of strategic, operational and tactical Fires.” 17 As Generals Bentley and Turner explained, precision munitions revolutionized fire support. They gave the Field Artillery the capability of engaging a single target with one munition to reduce logistical requirements, to minimize collateral damage, and to complement massed fires. For the first time its history, the Field Artillery could accurately determine a projectile’s impact point. Prior to the emergence of precision munitions, the branch had to predict the impact point; and the Field Artillery intended to take advantage of the new capability. However, precision munitions relied upon accurate target location that was the Field Artillery’s greatest deficiency, according the Generals Bentley and Turner.

TARGET SENSORS

The 80:10:10 ratio and precision munitions reinforced the need for accurate target location and improved target acquisition and target sensors for dismounted and mounted forces. In the 1990s fire supporters employed the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator (G/VLLD) to lase targets for precision munitions. The system weighed 107 pounds, reduced the mobility of the light fire support team, did not meet its needs, and was not portable. In response to this situation, the Field Artillery School wrote an operational requirements document for the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR). Approved for fielding by TRADOC in February 1994, the LLDR would replace the G/VLLD. Although the LLDR remained unfunded for several years, the school still pursued acquisition. Combining technological advances in position/navigation, thermal sights, and laser development, the LLDR would be a lightweight, compact, portable system designed for dismounted or mounted operations. Besides determining range, azimuth, and vertical angle, the LLDR would permit the light forces or dismounted forces to perform fire support

16 “DIVARTY: A Force Multiplier for the BCT and Division,” Fires Bulletin online edition, Nov-Dec 2014, HRDC. 17Ibid; Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery 2025 and Beyond, 6 May 2014, HRDC.

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functions quickly and accurately on a fast-paced, less dense, and lethal battlefield and would offer the best alternative to the G/VLLD; while its modular design would permit tailoring to meet the mission. In its target location configuration the LLDR weighed about 20 pounds and had the ability of locating targets accurately out to ten kilometers and seeing the battlefield with a near, all-weather capability at shorter ranges. An integrated thermal night- sight provided continuous day/night operations and the ability to see through obscurants, such as fog and smoke. If needed, the rangefinder could be configured with a separate laser designator module to designate moving and stationary targets for precision munitions. This configuration increased the system’s weight to 35 pounds.18 Although LLDR passed its initial operational test and evaluation in 2001, it still had some deficiencies. This caused the Army to develop an action plan to correct the deficiencies and to field the engineering, manufacturing, and development LLDR that was being designed and developed before going into production and low-rate initial production LLDR to the 82nd Airborne Division to get the system to the field quickly; but the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. prompted the Army to adjust fielding priorities. Instead, the Army fielded the engineering, manufacturing, and development LLDRs to the Special Operations Command that was deploying units to OEF in Afghanistan; while the 82nd Airborne Division and the interim brigade combat team, later designated as the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, subsequently received 66 low-rate initial production models.19 A little over one year later, the Army moved the LLDR into full-rate production and shifted fielding low-rate initial production LLDRs from the 82nd Airborne Division to the 25th Infantry Division just as it was deploying to Iraq in January 2004. It received 21 low- rate initial production LLDRs. Subsequently in September 2004, the 3rd Infantry Division’s Combat Observation Lasing Teams (COLTS) received 20 full-rate production LLDRs. Later in October 2004, the Army fielded full-rate production LLDRs to the Field Artillery School for training, to units deploying to OIF and OEF, and to the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment), making it the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to receive the full-rate production system.20 In November 2005 the Army Requirements and Review Board approved accelerating LLDR production and increased funding. The production rates went from three per month and doubled every six months until a full-rate production of 40 per month was achieved with fielding completed in 2013.21 Meanwhile in October 2006, the Program Manager for the LLDR initiated a two-year performance improvement and weight reduction effort and designated it as the LLDR2.

182000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 145-46; Army Precision Effects Study, 2003-2004, p. 18, HRDC. 192001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 109; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 110. 202004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99. 212005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012, HRDC.

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Enhancements included improved day-and-night imaging performance, solid-state laser designator module to provide higher reliability, and a five-pound weight reduction to the system. Fielding the LLDR2 began in 2011 at the company level to units supporting OEF.22 Meanwhile on 21 September 2010, the Army G-3 acknowledged the system’s need for even better accuracy to support current and future precision munitions. As a result, the Army began development on the LLDR2H, initiated testing in 2010, and awarded a contract to retrofit the original LLDR, renamed as the LLDR1, and the LLDR2 that used the digital magnetic compass and laser to determine target location as the LLDR2H. The LLDR2H incorporated the high accuracy azimuth device that would not be subject to the magnetic interference that had plagued existing target locator designator systems. The device had three cameras (one day camera and two night cameras) that could map the location of the sun and stars and compare them to its GPS location to determine very accurate direction and angular deviation to permit the soldier to call for fire with precision munitions. Initial fielding of the LLDR2H began in 2014, but software problems halted fielding after only two units had received their systems. Once the software problems had been resolved, fielding resumed in 2015 with 250 systems fielded by the end of the year.23 The LLDR2H performed well as a precision target designator but did not meet the complete requirement for precision targeting. This persuaded the Army to develop a requirement in 2016 for the LLDR3 with fielding scheduled for 2021.24 In June 2004 the Army/Marine Corps Board meanwhile directed the services to develop a common laser-targeting device requirement. In response, the Army began developing the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS). The system would consist of a target location designation system and a target effects coordination system. Combined, they would enable the dismounted observer (forward observer, joint target attack controller, special operations forces, and others) to acquire and engage targets, to designate stationary targets out to five kilometers and moving targets out to three kilometers, and to control all available

222008 USAFCOEFS, ACH, p. 131; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History for 2010, 22 Feb 2010, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012, HRDC. 23Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 2011, HRDC; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc., Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 2013, HRDC; PEO Soldier Information Paper, subj: LLDR, 12 Dec 2012, HRDC; Brig Gen Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 2013, pp. 6-9; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 2014, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 2015, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: LLDR3, 30 Sep 2016, HRDC. 24Email with atch, subj: TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell Update, 11 Mar 2016, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: Lightweight Laser Designator and Rangefinder, 30 Sep 2016, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 2017, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CDID-Requirement Development Division, 6 Mar 2018, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2017 USAFAS History Submission v2, 20 Mar 2018, HRDC.

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effects providers (field artillery, close air support, attack aviation, and naval gunfire).25 In October 2006 the Department of Defense selected the Army as the lead agency for the system. The Army then made Program Executive Office Soldier the material developer to assist TRADOC in the development of the capabilities documents and supporting analysis documentation. Work on the capabilities development document began with an analysis of alternatives being conducted in 2007-2008. The capabilities development document for the target location designation system was released for worldwide staffing in January 2009, while the Army worked to produce the target effects coordination system development document.26 In 2010 the Army moved JETS from the material solution analysis phase into the technology development phase where technology demonstrator prototypes would be developed. Two years later in 2012, the Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, awarded a contract to design, develop, fabricate, test, and deliver prototypes for engineering and manufacturing the system with fielding scheduled for 2016. In 2012 the Army approved the PFED Increment II software as a replacement for the JETS target effects coordination system.27 In February 2013 the JETS entered engineering, manufacturing, and development. The Army selected two vendors and awarded contracts in March 2013. Technical and budgetary challenges, however, caused the initial operational test and evaluation to be rescheduled from 2016 to the last of 2017.28 As planned, the Army conducted developmental testing of the vendors’ systems at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, in 2016. The Army used the information from the tests along with other data to evaluate and select a single vendor for the JETS production contract. On 22 September 2016 the Army awarded the contract to DRS Network and Imaging Systems, Melbourne, Florida, to produce the JETS with a limited user test scheduled for April 2017 and moved the initial operational test and evaluation from 2017 to February

252004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 97; McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” pp. 6-9; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 2015, HRDC; Capabilities Development Document for Joint Effects Targeting System (Extract), Executive Summary, 17 Jan 2013, HRDC. 262008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 130; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 2010, p. 26; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History for 2010, 22 Feb 2010, HRDC. 27Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 2011, HRDC; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc., Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: Joint Effects Targeting System, 12 Jun 2012, HRDC; Information Paper, U.S. Army, subj: Joint Effects Targeting System Target Location Designation System, undated, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 2013, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 2015, HRDC. 28Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 2015, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: FA DOTMLPF, 27 May 2015, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: FA DOTMLPF, Dec 2015, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: Joint Effects Targeting System Production, 31 Oct 2016, HRDC.

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2018; it set an initial operational capability for 2018. Fielding would begin late in 2018 with the Special Operations Command and global response units. After these received their JETS, the brigade combat teams would receive theirs.29 In November 2017 ten field artillery soldiers tested JETS at the Cold Regions Test Center in Alaska. The handheld system provided 24/7 all-weather precision targeting and target acquisition to support dismounted forces and was a modular system of three components – the target location module, the precision azimuth and vertical angle module, and the laser marker module. Each test day consisted of ten hours of testing with an average of 40 targets per observation team. Under realistic conditions, the teams detected, recognized, and identified targets using their five-pound JETS.30 To fight on the precision munition battlefield, the M7 Bradley Fire Support Team (BFIST) vehicle and the Knight vehicle for the Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) also required modernization. Colonel Thomas G. Torrance, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) artillery, and Lieutenant Colonel Noel T. Nicolle, the deputy fire support coordinator for the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), wrote that OIF of March- April 2003 was the M7 Bradley’s first combat action. The vehicle had the speed, survivability, and capability as a communications platform; gave the fire support officer the ability to remain well forward in maneuver formations without compromising safety; and allowed the Fire Support Team (FIST) to remain in the fight. With this capability FISTs mounted in M7 Bradleys initiated 407 of the 657 direct support fire missions for the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized).31 However, the M7 Bradley lacked a mounted laser designator for precision capabilities. This forced the FIST to rely upon the G/VLLD that was carried on the vehicle. Employing G/VLLD required the M7 crew to dismount and take time to set up the system; and this exposed it to enemy fire. Basically, the G/VLLD was obsolete and cumbersome. This reinforced the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Michael D. General Maples’ (2001-2003), conclusion about the Field Artillery’s requirement for

29Email with atch, subj: TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell Update, 11 Mar 2016, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: Targeting, undated, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 2017, HRDC; Douglas Graham, “Army Awards Contract for JETS Handheld Targeting System,” www.army.mil, 28 Sep 2016, HRDC; Program Executive Office Information Paper, subj: Rugged Alaska Terrain Sees Field Artillery Soldiers Test New Laser Targeting System, 3 Nov 2017, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2017 USAFAS History Submission v2, 20 Mar 2018, HRDC. 30Program Executive Office Information Paper, subj: Rugged Alaska Terrain Sees Field Artillery Soldiers Test New Laser Targeting System, 3 Nov 2017, HRDC; Kyle Olson, “Soldiers Test Newest Precision Targeting Device,” Program Executive Office Soldier, 24 Oct 2017, HRDC. 31Col Thomas G. Torrance and Lt Col Noel T. Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq: The 3d Div Art in OIF,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 2003, pp. 30-35; Maples, “FA Priorities after OIF,” p. 1.

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improved sensors to locate targets accurately for precision munitions.32 The Army Precision Fires Study of 2003-2004 conducted by the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General David P. Valcourt (2003-2005) subsequently corroborated Maples’ concerns by evaluating the Field Artillery’s near-term precision effects capability. Among other things, such as accelerating the adoption of precision munitions and the PGK fuse that would make a dumb munition a smart one, the study recommended improving target acquisition radars, specifically adopting the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR), and improved target sensor systems for accurate target location.33 Influenced by this study, the Program Manager for the Bradley finally acquired funds in 2006 to retrofit the digitized A3 BFIST vehicle that was more sophisticated than the M7 BFIST vehicle with the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) as the main target location sensor for target designation.34 The FS3 integrated the laser designation module from the LLDR onto the Long-Range Advance Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3). Fielded beginning in 2006, the FS3 complemented the A3’s fire support mission equipment package; provided the A3 with the most accurate range sensor available; and allowed the FIST to detect, identify, and designate targets for precision munitions at greater ranges while remaining protected by the vehicle’s armor. Subsequent to fitting the FS3 on Stryker fire support vehicles in the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and the 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team in 2006, the Army installed the FS3 on A3 Bradley vehicles beginning in 2007 with the last A3 BFIST receiving the sensor in 2011.35

32Torrance and Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq: The 3d Div Art in OIF,” pp. 30- 35; Maples, “FA Priorities after OIF,” p. 1. 33Army’s Precision Fires Study, 2003-2004, pp. 26, 28, 29, and 38, HRDC. 342004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 126-27; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 131; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 2010, p. 26, HRDC; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc., Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 2011, HRDC; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, HRDC; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 11, p. 30, HRDC; FCOE Newsletter (Extract), Oct 2011, p. 27, HRDC; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338;. Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc., Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 2011, HRDC; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Brown, 17 Feb 2011; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 2010, p. 10, HRDC; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 2011, p. 30, HRDC; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 2011, p. 27, HRDC; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338; BAE Information Paper, 13 Aug 12, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Col Scott Patton, Dir, TCM Fires Cell, and Gordon Wehri, TCM Fires Cell, 7 Feb 2013, HRDC; PEO Ground Combat Systems Information Paper, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle, undated, HRDC; Army, Oct 2013, pp. 322-24; PEO Ground Combat Systems Information Paper, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle, undated, HRDC; BAE Information paper, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle A3 System Upgrade, 2015, HRDC; BAE Systems Information Paper, subj: Bradley A2 ODS-SA, 2015, HRDC. 352004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 96; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2008 U.S. Army Fires

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As the A3 Bradley was being retrofitted with the FS3, the Army awarded BAE a contract in 2010 to upgrade Bradley M2, M3, and M7 vehicles to the M2A2 Operation Desert Storm-Situational Awareness (ODS-SA) configuration. This program would bring the M7 Bradley capabilities close to those of the A3 Bradley by integrating the latest digitized electronics to provide optimal situational awareness, network connectivity, and enhanced communications hardware and the FS3. This would give the M7 the ability to observe and lase for precision munitions and to match the detection, recognition, and identification ranges of the A3 BFIST. As the Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems explained in 2013, the modernization effort would fully digitize the entire Bradley force when the last Bradley ODS-SA vehicle was fielded during the second decade of the 21st Century. As of 2015, the Army was fielding the Bradley ODS-SA to the active Army and the Army National Guard.36 The Army modernized the Knight vehicle as it was enhancing the M7. Besides upgrading the Knight vehicle employed by the COLTs with the first-generation and later second-generation FS3, the Army meanwhile determined in December 2005 that the M1025 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and its planned replacement, the M1114 HMMWV would no longer be able to support the Knight program. Because of increased armor to counter improvised explosive devices that increase weight, either vehicle with the mission equipment package would no longer be safe to operate. In January 2006 the ______Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 129; Email with atch, subj: TPSO History for 2010, 22 Feb 2010, HRDC; “Ground Combat System,” Army, Oct 2011, p. 338; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 2009, p. 355; Raytheon Information Paper, subj: FS3, 2011, HRDC; USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 126-27; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 131; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 2010, p. 26, HRDC; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc., Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 2011, HRDC; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 2011, HRDC; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 2011, p. 30, HRDC; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 2011, p. 27, HRDC; Raytheon Information Paper, subj: FS3, 2011, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TPSO (TRADOC Program Sensor Office) History for 2010, 22 Feb 2010, HRDC. 362009 USAFAS AH, pp. 131-32; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc., Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 2011, HRDC; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Brown, 17 Feb 2011, HRDC; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 2010, p. 10, HRDC; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 2011, p. 30, HRDC; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 2011, p. 27, HRDC ; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338; BAE Information Paper, 13 Aug 2012, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Col Scott Patton, Dir, TCM Fires Cell, and Gordon Wehri, TCM Fires Cell, 7 Feb 2013, HRDC; PEO Ground Combat Systems Information Paper, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle, undated, HRDC; Army, Oct 2013, pp. 322-24; PEO Ground Combat Systems Information Paper, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle, undated, HRDC; BAE Information paper, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle A3 System Upgrade, 2015, HRDC; BAE Systems Information Paper, subj: Bradley A2 ODS-SA, 2015, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 2017, HRDC.

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Futures Development and Integration Center at Fort Sill submitted a letter to the Program Manager Fire Support Systems agreeing with him about the weight and accompanying safety problem and urged finding a suitable replacement. Later on 17 April 2006, the Army G-3/5/7 validated Third Army’s operational needs statement to provide the 10th Mountain Division with five Knight systems with a more survivable platform than the existing one. The Futures Development and Integration Center’s and the Army’s actions prompted the Program Manager Fire Support Systems to change the platform conversion from the M707 Knight system to the M1117 armored security vehicle.37 Subsequently, the Army purchased eight M1117s complete with the FS3 and other fire support equipment and designated the M1117 as the M1200 Armored Knight for employment by the COLT. Beginning in October 2007 and continuing in November 2013, the Army fielded M1200 Armored Knights to COLTs in armored brigade combat teams, infantry brigade combat teams, Stryker brigade combat teams, battlefield surveillance brigades, and fire support teams in infantry combat teams.38 Yet, the Army concluded in 2016 that the M1200 Armored Knight had met its useful life cycle and proposed replacing it with the joint light tactical vehicle. This encouraged the TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell at Fort Sill to begin searching for an adequate replacement. The replacement had to provide the requisite force protection for the fire supporter while maintaining the same or better targeting capabilities of the current system. Along the same lines, recent overseas operations caused the Army to determine that the level of armor protection on the M1200 chassis did not adequately support forward operational base operations. In many cases, commanders left their M1200 Armored Knights at home station in the continental United States because they lacked sufficient armor protection. In view of this, the Army G-4 in 2016 considered abandoning the armored security vehicle chassis for the Military Police and Armored Knight and initiated studies to replace it at the earliest date as possible.39 Although the M1200 Armored Knight vehicle might be replaced, modernizing target location sensors certainly overshadowed that imperative. The BFIST vehicle, the M1200 Armored Knight, and the Stryker fire support vehicle equipped with the FS3 gave the mounted forces the capability of locating a target with pinpoint accuracy, while the LLDR and the JETS with the latter still being developed provided the dismounted forces with the

372005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 128. 382008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 128; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 2011, pp. 338-40; Information Paper, U.S. Army, subj: M1200 Armored Knight, 11 Mar 2013, HRDC; Army, Oct 2013, p. 324; Information Paper, subj: Armored Knight, undated, HRDC. 39Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “Army Advances Standardized Tactical Computer,” www.army.mil/article/109748, 27 Aug 2014, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 2014, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells History, 9 Apr 2015, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell Updated, 11 Mar 2016, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2017 USAFAS History Submission v2, 20 Mar 2018, HRDC

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same capability. Employing these target location sensors, the Field Artillery no longer had to approximate target location; it could be precise. While the target location sensors pinpointed targets, precision munitions permitted hitting the targets. For the first time in its history, the Field Artillery could hit a target with a single round and minimize collateral damage. Prior to the combination of precision munitions and target location sensors, the Field Artillery depended upon massed fires to engage a target and wiped out an entire grid square in the process. Precision moved the branch into a new era.

MODERNIZING RADARS

As the Field Artillery introduced new target location sensors to pinpoint targets for precision munitions, it faced the inevitability of modernizing its radars. For counterfire the Field Artillery had employed the Firefinder radars – AN/TPQ-36 for mortars, cannons, rockets, and missiles and AN/TPQ-37 for cannon, rockets, and missiles – since the 1970s. Even though they had been updated since, they lacked sufficient mobility and scan capabilities for the 21st Century battlefield. Following the OIF March-April 2003 offensive that assaulted Baghdad, Iraq, the counterfire officer for the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) Chief Warrant Officer Three Brian L. Borer and the division deputy fire support coordinator, Lieutenant Colonel Noel T. Nicolle, provided a mixed assessment of the Q-36 and Q-37 radars. In a brief article in the Field Artillery Magazine in the fall of 2003, they wrote that the modernized AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 radars were brilliant. They had better cross country capabilities than their predecessors, performed exceptionally well, and had unmatched ability to acquire enemy indirect fire systems. Yet, their unit had difficulties keeping the radars operational even with the availability of spare parts. As a result, Borer and Nicolle recommended that a heavy division required an additional Q-36 and two additional Q-37 radars because operational readiness demanded more radar coverage. An additional Q-36 would also furnish redundant capability for direct support battalions and the division’s cavalry squadron when it was committed.40 Major Dennis W. Yates, the operations officer for the 3rd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, 101st Airborne Division, and Warrant Officer One Scott E. Prochniak, the targeting officer for the 3rd Battalion, 320th Field Artillery, likewise, reflected upon their target acquisition experiences in Afghanistan during OEF. Early in 2002, their battalion provided counterfire for the 3rd Brigade Combat Team in the Shah-e-Kot Valley; and they learned quickly about the Q-36 radar’s limitations. It was too heavy to support rapid movement and had a scan radius of 90 degrees. Trying to supply more than a 90-degree coverage caused undue wear on the azimuth drive motor. Based upon these shortcomings, Yates and Prochniak advised in 2002 supplementing the Q-36 with the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR) being developed by the Army’s Special Operations community. With its 360-degree scan coverage, the LCMR had the ability to fill the gaps created by the Q-36. In

40Chief Warrant Officer Three Brian L. Borer and Lt Col Noel T. Nicolle, “Acquisition: 3d ID Counterfire in OIF,” Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 2003, pp. 42-46.

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the long term, they recognized the requirement for a lighter radar than the Q-36 with omni- directional capabilities.41 Major General Martin E. Dempsey, the Commanding General, 1st Armored Division that was deployed to Iraq in May 2003-August 2004 provided a different critique of the radars. Dempsey’s division fought an insurgency. This forced his division to provide precision fires and not massed fires. Addressing the Q-36 and Q-37 radars’ ability to provide target acquisition in an insurgency, he explained, “Now, we need to improve our Firefinder radars. For example, the Q-37 was designed to counter a rocket attack. It used fairly old technology intended to pick up mass barrages of rocket fires in the old Soviet methodology.”42 Given this orientation on massed Soviet-Warsaw Pact indirect rocket volleys, field artillery doctrine ignored identifying and attacking a lone indirect fire system as Dempsey discussed and drove developing the Q-36 and Q-37 radars; and adapting these radars to counterinsurgency warfare proved to be challenging.43 Even before Dempsey’s perceptive critique, the Army decided in 2002 to field a new radar with the ability to locate medium range indirect fire systems in a 360-degree scan radius in view of the operational environment in OEF and the need to replace the aging Q-36 and Q-37 Firefinder radars with their limited scan capabilities. Based on this, the Futures Development and Integration Center at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, began defining a material change to the Q-36 radar to make it the Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 (EQ-36) radar with the ability of scanning 360-degrees, among other capabilities.44 Shortly afterwards, an urgent material release prompted the Army to develop and field a Quick Response Capability (QRC) EQ-36 to support OIF. In 2008 the Army signed a contract with Lockheed Martin Missile Systems and Sensors to build 38 QRC EQ-36 radars, began fielding them in 2010 when ten were shipped to Iraq and Afghanistan, and completed buying the radar in 2012. The radar was designed to operate with the Air Defense Artillery Counter-Rocket, Artillery, Missile (CRAM) system and future indirect fire systems and provided sufficient accuracy for effective counterfire as demonstrated in tests, evaluations, and operations.45

41Warrant Officer One Scott E. Prochniak and Maj Dennis W. Yates, “Counterfire in Afghanistan,” Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 2002, pp. 15-18. 42Maj Gen Martin E. Dempsey, “Fires and Effects for the 1st Armored Division in Iraq,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 2005, p. 7. 43Ibid. 44Briefing, subj: The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar, undated, HRDC; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, subj: Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar, undated, HRDC; Daryl Youngman, “Fires Radar Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 2013, pp. 45-47; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 2013, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 2016, HRDC. 45Interview, Dastrup with Chief Warrant Officer Four Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13 Apr 2012, HRDC; PM Radars Information Paper, subj: Q-37, undated, HRDC; U.S. Army Information Paper, subj: Enhanced Q-36, undated, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup

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Meanwhile in September 2010, a production capabilities document outlined the requirement for a radar system with capabilities comparable to the QRC EQ-36 radar; and the Army designated the radar as the AN/TPQ-53 in September 2011. Mounted on a five-ton truck, the Q-53 would reduce operational and support costs, would have a minimum range of 500 meters and a maximum range of 60 kilometers, could be emplaced in five minutes, displaced in two minutes, would be equipped with an auto-leveling system, could be operated by a crew of four, would be linked by digital tactical radios to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Digital System (AFATDS) for mission processing, and could be transported by a C- 17 aircraft. Once the Q-53 radar had been fielded, the Army intended to retrofit QRC EQ-36 radars to make them Q-53 radars.46 ______with Col Matt Merrick, Dir, CDID, 25 Jan 2012, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, 2011, HRDC; “First U.S. Army EQ-36 Radar Deploys to Iraq,” Defense News, 9 Sep 2010, HRDC; Briefing, subj: The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar, undated, HRDC; Briefing, subj: The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar, undated, HRDC; DOTE Information Paper, FY 2010, HRDC; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 2011, p. 26, HRDC; DOTE Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, FY 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, Army Technology, 7 Mar 2012, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade, 29 Nov 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, DOTE, subj; EQ-36, undated, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 2011, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Col David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, HRDC; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, Mar 2013, HRDC; Memorandum for Record with atch, subj: Annual History, 10 Apr 2013, HRDC; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 2013, pp. 40-43; Briefing, subj: Fires Modernization Strategy Brief, 26 Apr 2013, HRDC; DOTE Report (Extract), FY 2012, pp. 115-116, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 2016, HRDC; “TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 2016, pp. 15-20; DOTE, FY 2010 Report, p. 77, www.dote.osd.mil, accessed 30 May 2018; DOTE, FY 2011 Report, p. 115, www.dote.osd.mil, accessed 30 May 2018. 46Interview, Dastrup with McDonald, 13 Apr 2012, HRDC; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 2011, p. 26, HRDC; DOTE Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, FY 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, U.S. Army, undated, HRDC; Information Paper, Army Technology, 7 Mar 2012, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 2011, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Brost, 6 Mar 2013, HRDC; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, Mar 2013, HRDC; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-43; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, 3-13 Mar 2013, p. 3, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Fire Modernization Strategy Brief, 26 Apr 13, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade 2012, 13 Mar 2014, HRDC; Kris Osborn, “Army Fields Next-Generation Radar,” 17 Oct 2012, www.army.mil/article, HRDC; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, subj: TPQ-53 Radar System, 10 Dec 2014, HRDC; DOTE Report (Extract), FY 2014, pp. 137-38, HRDC;

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Three years later in April and May 2014, the Army conducted the initial operational test and evaluation of the Q-53 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Emerging results found the Q-53 to be operationally suitable but not operationally effective. Testing established the radar to be operationally suitable because it was available to complete its mission 99 percent of the time; whereas the Army required the radar to be operationally available 95 percent of the time. However, the Q-53 did not meet the Army’s reliability requirement. Ten system aborts occurred during 1,152 hours of testing. This amounted to system abort every 115 hours. The Army required no more than one abort every 185 hours. Also, the radar reported numerous false targets and had difficulties locating volley-fired projectiles in the 90-degree and 360-degree modes. Based upon these deficiencies, the Army developed corrective measures and planned to reevaluate the radar in 2015.47 In January and February 2015 the 82nd Division Artillery and 18th Field Artillery Brigade conducted an exercise at Yuma Proving Ground with the Q-53 in preparation for the reevaluation in May and June 2015. The Directorate of Operational Test and Evaluation assessment report rated the Q-53 as effective, suitable, and survivable but still expressed concern over the radar’s difficulty locating volley-fired mortar munitions that was a common technique employed by a variety of threat nations. Later in October 2015, the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command issued its test report and material release statement. The command supported the full-rate production and conditional material release of the AN/TPQ- 53 Counter Target Acquisition Radar Set and a full-material release when the mean time between system aborts and operational availability had improved, when the development of a mature product support package with digital interactive technical manuals had been completed, and when cold weather testing ensured that the system would remain operational at minus 25 degrees, to name a few conditions. Once these deficiencies had been corrected, the Army started fielding the Q-53 in 2016 to sensor platoons in brigade combat teams and fires brigades.48 A Joint Urgent Needs Statement meanwhile identified a high priority need for developing the Q-53 into a multi-mission sensor. In cooperation with the contractor, ______DOTE Report (Extract), FY 2011, pp. 77-78, HRDC; Directorate of Test and Evaluation, FY 2011 Report, p. 115, www.dote.osd.mil, accessed 30 May 2018; Directorate of Test and Evaluation, FY 2014 Report, p. 137-38, www.dote.osd.mil, accessed 1 Jun 2018. 47DOTE, FY 2014 Report, pp. 137-38, www.dote.osd.mil, accessed 1 June 2018; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 2016, HRDC. 48Email with atch, subj: CDID 2017 USAFAS History Submission v2, 20 Mar 2018, HRDC; TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 2016, pp. 15-20, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 2016, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Q-53 Counterfire Target Acquisition Radar System, Fiscal Year 2015, HRDC; TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 2016, pp. 15-20, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 2016, HRDC; Fact Sheet, subj: Q-53 Counterfire Target Acquisition Radar System, Fiscal Year 2015, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2017 USAFAS History Submission v2, 20 Mar 2018, HRDC.

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Lockheed Martin, Program Manager CRAM launched an effort to give the radar the capability of detecting rockets and missiles, unmanned aerial systems, and aircraft. Given the Russian threat, expanding the radar’s capabilities beyond sensing rockets and missiles to air defense was attractive because it could save money and magnify the radar’s capabilities to make it more versatile. Experts, however, cautioned that turning the radar into a multi- mission system had drawbacks. For example, a low-flying unmanned aerial vehicle presented a different radar profile than a rocket or missile streaking across the sky; and creating a radar to track more than one type of target would be challenging. In 2016 however, the contractor successfully demonstrated the radar’s ability to detect unmanned aerial vehicles at the U.S. Army Maneuvers-Fires Integrated Experiment at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and planned to develop the Q-53 with the capability of tracking unmanned aerial vehicles operational by late 2018.49 Although the Army planned to replace the Q-37 radar that was first fielded in the 1970s as a low-angle indirect fire radar, underwent several modernization programs, and was a Firefinder radar along with the Q-36 that had evolved into the Q-53, the Army acknowledged that the Q-37 would be around for several more years. In view of this, the Army upgraded the Q-37 for the heavy and Stryker brigade combat teams and fires brigades, later renamed field artillery brigades. Thales Raytheon Systems developed reliability and maintainability initiative kits in 2011-2012 for the radar to reduce sustainment costs and increase the life span. Despite this, the Army still planned to retire the Q-37 in 2019.50 As it modernized the Q-36 and Q-37 radars, the Army worked to introduce the LCMR. Originally called the man-portable countermortar radar, the radar emerged from requirements identified late in the 1990s by the Special Operations Forces. Because the Q-36

49Email with atch, subj: CDID 2016 FA History Submission, 21 Mar 2017, HRDC; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, subj: Passed the Test: Q-53 Radar Demonstrates Counter UAS Capability, 27 Jun 2016, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2017 USAFAS History Submission v2, 20 Mar 2018, HRDC; Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Lockheed Pushes Q- 53 for Air Defense against Russia,” Breaking Defense, 17 Apr 2017, www.breakingdefense.com; Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Lockheed Pushes Q-53 Radar for Air Defense vs. Russia,” Breaking Defense, 24 Apr 2017, www.breakingdefense.com; Tim Broderick, “Q-53 Radar Upgrade Counters Drone Strikes,” 18 Nov 2016, www.Defensesystems.com. 50Interview, Dastrup with Chief Warrant Officer Four Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13 Apr 2012, HRDC; Information Paper, ThalesRaytheonSystems, 2010, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade, 29 Nov 2011, HRDC; Briefing, subj: Firefinder Radar AN/TPQ-37(V)8, 2013, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Chief Warrant Officer Four Scott Prochniak, CDID, 8 Mar 2013, HRDC; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-43; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade 2012, 13 Mar 2014, HRDC; “TRADOC Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 2016, pp. 15-20; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 2016, HRDC.

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and Q-37 Firefinder radars lacked the ability to scan 360 degrees and the mobility and agility to accompany light and early entry forces, Special Operations Forces had a critical need for a LCMR with the capability of scanning 360 degrees to detect the location of short-range mortars rapidly and accurately for counterfire. This led to the development of the QRC LCMR (AN/TPQ-48) that was specially designed to support the Special Operations Forces and Ranger units.51 The Army awarded a contract to Syracuse Research Corporation to develop and produce the radar. Syracuse Research Corporation adopted the Special Operations Command’s requirements as a baseline and utilized a spiral development strategy using increments to achieve the full capability needed for fielding. Accuracy and range would increase for each increment while maintaining the mobility and transportability of the original LCMR concept. A man-portable system with a maximum range of 7,000 meters and a minimum range of 1,000 meters, the radar had the ability to search 360 degrees and to detect and track mortar fire. Such capabilities permitted responsive counterfire to destroy or neutralize fleeting improvised shooters including those in urban area.52 The Army fielded the LCMR in three increments. Increment I (Q-48) was fielded in 2004 to Special Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a range of five kilometers and a target location error of 100 plus meters, the radar met the immediate needs of deployed forces of the United States Special Operations Command, while future increments would satisfy the capability gaps identified in the operational and organizational concept of 2004. Fielded in 2005-2006, Increment II (Q-49) provided more rugged hardware and better software and supported CRAM.53 In 2008 the TRADOC Program Sensor Office at Fort Sill wrote and staffed a capabilities document for the program of record LCMR. Syracuse Research Corporation received the contract to produce Increment III (AN/TPQ-50) to serve in conjunction with the Q-53 radar to track field artillery and rockets and friendly fire without having to switch modes. The Q-50 counterfire radar provided continuous 360-degree surveillance and 3D

512004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 99; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 100; Information Paper, SRC Tec, 2010, HRDC; Scott R. Gourley, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar,” Army Magazine, Apr 2002, HRDC; Navy Lt.j.g. Jason Calandruccio, Defense Contract Management Agency, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar, www.dcma.mil, Winter 2002, HRDC. AN/TPQ-48 was the initial designation of the lightweight countermortar radar as noted in Scott R. Gourley, “Soldier Armed,” Army, Feb 2011, pp. 63-66; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 2011, HRDC. 522006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 91-92; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 94; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 122; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 2011, HRDC. 532004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 99; Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 2011, HRDC; Gourley, “Soldier Armed,” pp. 63-66; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, Syracuse Research Corporation, undated, HRDC; Information Paper, Syracuse Research Corporation, undated, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Col David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 2013, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Chief Warrant Officer Four Scott Prochniak, CDID, 8 Mar 2013, HRDC.

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rocket, artillery and mortar location using a non-rotating, electronically steered antenna. When compared to Q-49, it detected targets with flatter trajectories while calculating the point of origin more accurately from a greater distance. Its full azimuth coverage allowed it to detect and track multiple rounds fired simultaneously from separate locations within a 700 square kilometer surveillance area. The radar could also be configured to scan less than 360 degrees to provide focused sector coverage with more frequent update rates and mounted on a tripod as required.54 After a successful initial operational test and evaluation early in February and March 2012 at the Yuma Proving Ground, the Army started fielding the Q-50 late in 2013 with the 101st Airborne Division receiving the first radars. Mounted on a HMMWV to facilitate movement around the battlefield, the Q-50 gave the Army a lightweight and highly mobile radar for early entry operations. Through the end of 2015, the Army had fielded 155 Q-50 systems to the operational Army and ten systems for training purposes to the 428th Field Artillery Brigade in the Field Artillery School, had removed the Q-48 from service, and transferred the Q-49 to United States Marine Corps.55 With fielding the Q-50, the Field Artillery had five target acquisition radars (Q-36, Q- 37, Q-48, Q-49, and Q-53) in its inventory in 2013 and a modernization plan for each. As Daryl Youngman of the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) at Fort Sill explained in 2013, the Field Artillery required a strategy to guide radar acquisition in an era of constrained resources that would reduce the number of radars and provide a way forward to accomplish its core mission of detecting, tracking, classifying, and identifying aerial objects, including manned and unmanned aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, cannon artillery projectiles, and mortar projectiles. In the near term (2015-2019) the Army’s

54Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 2011, HRDC; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 2011, p. 26, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Chief Warrant Officer Four Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13 Apr 2012, HRDC; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 2011, HRDC; SRC Information Paper, subj: AN/TPQ-50 Counterfire Radar, 2018, HRDC. 55FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 2011, p. 26, HRDC; Information Paper, PM Radars, subj: LCMR, undated, HRDC; Information Paper, U.S. Army Equipment, undated, HRDC; Information Paper, PM Radars, 16 Jan 2013, HRDC; Presolicitation Synopsis for LCMR, 15 May 2012, HRDC; DAC for ARNG SITREP, Apr 2012, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 2011, HRDC; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade, 29 Nov 2011, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Col David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 2013, HRDC; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 Mar 2013, HRDC; Jeff Froysland and Chief Warrant Officer Four Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 2013, pp. 40-43; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade 2012, 13 Mar 2014, HRDC; Kris Osborn, “Army Fields Next-Generation Radar,” www.army.mil/article, HRDC; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, subj: TPQ-53 Radar System, 10 Dec 2014, HRDC; Briefing (Extract), subj: FA DPTMLPF, Dec 2015, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 2016, HRDC.

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field artillery radar strategy merged the Q-48 and Q-49 to field the Q-50 and retired the Q-36 and Q-37 to leave the Q-53. Some within the Field Artillery community even envisioned developing multi-role, multi-functional, and multi-mission radars sometime in the distant future. As technology improved, multi-functional radars would be capable of performing multiple missions at different times, while multi-mission radars could perform multiple missions concurrently.56 For the time being, the Q-53 and Q-50 provided the field artillery force with 360- degree target acquisition capability, improved range, improved mobility, and decreased maintenance requirements over the Q-36 and Q-37 upon being fielded during the second decade of the 21st Century. Thus, target acquisition radars based upon 1970s technology and fighting in Europe gave way to more sophisticated radars as the Field Artillery moved into the second decade of the 21st Century. As the fielding of the Q-50 and Q-53 indicated, field artillery target acquisition underwent a critical transformation in the 21st Century. The precision munition revolution prodded the Field Artillery to adopt improved target location sensors, while the mobility imperatives of OIF and OEF encouraged developing lighter and more mobile radars with greater scan capabilities. Precision munitions and target acquisition radars and sensors formed a symbiotic relationship. For precision munitions to hit targets, radars and sensors, especially the latter, had to locate targets accurately. Otherwise, the Field Artillery could not employ precision munitions effectively. Sensors and target acquisition radars represented part of a larger picture. Over a period years, the Field Artillery converted from direct fire where the gunner required a direct line of sight to the target to engage it to indirect fire. Beginning with rudimentary observation capabilities late in the 1800s when terrestrial forward observers positioned themselves to get a clear view of the target and relied upon binoculars or telescopes for indirect fire missions, target acquisition grew more sophisticated as years passed. The Field Artillery employed sound and flash ranging and aerial observation to locate deeply defilated batteries to complement ground observers during World War One. By World War Two radars in their infancy contributed their unique capabilities, replaced sound and flash ranging in the 1980s, and supplemented ground observation and organic aerial field artillery observation that disappeared when aviation was centralized in the division in the 1980s. During the first two decades of the 21st Century, the Field Artillery introduced target sensors to complement ground observers and radars and to locate targets precisely for precision munitions. Although target acquisition systems of the 21st Century were more sophisticated than their predecessors, they provided the same mission. They gave the Field Artillery the capability of exploiting its weapon systems and munitions.

56Daryl Youngman, “Fires Radar Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 2013, pp. 45-47; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 2013, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: TCM FAB-D History Document, 9 Mar 2016, HRDC; Email with atch, subj: CDID 2017 USAFAS History Submission v2, Mar 2018, HRDC.

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AN/TPQ-50 being emplaced by 1st Battalion, 101st Field Artillery, courtesy Fires Bulletin, November-December 2016

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SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

The following bibliography contains only the most significant sources used in the monograph. For memoranda, letters, briefings, messages, and emails see the footnotes.

DOCUMENT COLLECTIONS

Morris Swett Technical Library (MSTL), U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK Historical Research and Document Collection (HRDC), Field Artillery School Historian’s Office, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, OK

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND PRINTED MATERIALS

Air Corps Advanced Flying School. Observation, 1928, MSTL. Air Corps Tactical School. Observation Aviation, Mar 1930, MSTL. Air Service. Manual of Aerial Observation, 1925, MSTL. Air Service Advanced Flying School. Manual of Aerial Observation, 1925, MSTL. American Expeditionary Forces, General Headquarters. Flash and Sound Ranging, 1918, MSTL. American Expeditionary Forces, General Headquarters, Army Artillery Instruction Division, MSTL Annual Command Histories, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, HRDC. Annual Command Histories, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill., HRDC. Annual Historical Reviews, HRDC. Annual Historical Reviews, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, HRDC. Annual Historical Summary, 1 Jan 1969-31 Dec 1969, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, HRDC. Annual Reports of the Chief of Artillery, MSTL. Annual Reports of the Chief of Field Artillery, MSTL. Annual Reports of the Secretary of War, Fort Sill Museum. Artillery Information Bulletin, Nov 1917, American Expeditionary Forces, Office of the Chief of Artillery. Report of A Board of Officers Appointed to Make A Study of the Experience Gained by the Artillery of the American Expeditionary Forces and to Submit Recommendations Based Upon Such Study (Hero Board), 1918, MSTL. American Expeditionary Force. Flash Ranging, 1918, MSTL. _____. Procedure Followed by American Sound Ranging Sections, 1918, MSTL. _____. Chief of Artillery, Report, MSTL. Chief of the Air Corps. Observation Aviation, Heavier than Air Manual, 1937, MSTL. _____. Observation Aviation Manual, 1938, MSTL. Coast Artillery School. Flash, Sound, and High Burst Ranging Manual (Provisional), 1920, MSTL. Department of the Army. Field Artillery Radar Systems, 17 Mar 1986, MSTL. 160

_____. Draft Field Manual 6-22, Division Artillery, Field Artillery Brigade, and Field Artillery Assigned to Corps (Extract), May 1977, MSTL. _____. Field Manual 6-120, Field Artillery Target Acquisition, Oct 1967, MSTL. _____. Field Manual 6-121, Field Artillery Target Acquisition, Oct 1962, 13 Dec 1984, 1 May 1987, MSTL. Field Artillery School. Associated Arms, 1934, MSTL _____. Organization of the Field Artillery, 1931, 1935, MSTL. _____. Tactics and Techniques of the Associated Arms, 1931, MSTL. First U.S. Army. Artillery Information Service, Feb 1944, Jul 1944, MSTL. 8th Training Regiment, Field Artillery Replacement Training Center, Ft. Sill. Instructional Memorandum, 1943, MSTL. Office of the Chief of Field Artillery. Field Artillery Intelligence Digest, 19 Apr 1941, 20 Sep 1941, MSTL. U.S. Army. Extension Course, Observation Aviation, Heavier-Than-Air, 1937, MSTL. U.S. Army Air Corps. Observation Aviation, 1938, MSTL. U.S. Army Field Artillery School. Target Acquisition: What Can Be Done Now, undated, MSTL. War Department. Artillery Tactics. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1888. _____. Artillery Tactics. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1889. _____. Drill Regulations, 1905. _____. Drill Regulations, 1907. _____. Drill Regulations, Light Artillery, 1891. _____. Drill Regulations, Light Artillery, 1896. _____. Drill Regulations for Field Artillery (Provisional), 1905, 1907, 1908, 1911. _____. Field Manual 1-20, Tactics and Techniques of Air Reconnaissance and Observation, 1941, 1942. _____. Training Manual 11-2568, Sound Ranging Set GR-8, 28 Sep 1945. _____. General Orders No. 71, 14 May 1903. _____. General Orders No. 22, 31 Dec 1927. _____. Regulations for Field Artillery, 1911. _____. Training Regulation 430-105, Tactical Employment of Field Artillery, 5 Sep 1924.

GOVERNMENT MANUSCRIPTS

Correspondence to the President of the Board for the Preparation of Field Artillery Drill Regulations, 1904, MSTL. Field Artillery School. Committee Study, subj: The Observation Aviation Required for Artillery Missions, 14 May 1941, MSTL. _____. Artillery in Combat, Aug 1944, Jan 1945, MSTL. _____. Artillery in Combat in the Pacific Areas, Jul 1945, MSTL. _____. Battlefield Reports on Corps Artillery Organization, Intelligence, and Operations, 22 Nov 1944, MSTL. _____. Employment of Tracking-Type Radar with Field Artillery, Dec 1950, MSTL. _____. Review of Confidential Information, 10 Aug 1943, MSTL. 161

Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff, subj: Fire Control for Field Artillery from Air, 18 Jun 1938, MSTL. Memorandum, First U.S. Army, subj: Artillery Intelligence Service, Apr 1944, Jul 1944, MSTL. Memorandum, Headquarters Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, subj: Summary of Countermortar Radar Developments in European Theater of Operations, 11 Jun 1945, MSTL. Memorandum, Office of the Chief of Field Artillery, subj: Air Observation for Field Artillery, 1941, MSTL. Minutes, Sound Ranging Conference, Washington DC, 12 Dec 1938, MSTL. U.S. Army Combat Developments Command Artillery Agency. History of Target Acquisition, 1964, MSTL. U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas. Artillery Bulletin No. 2, 1 Sep 1944, MSTL. War Department. Instruction Memorandum, Organic Field Artillery Air Observation, Nov 1942, MSTL. War Department. Reports of Military Observers Attached to the Armies in Manchuria During the Russo-Japanese War. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1906, MSTL.

REPORTS

Report, Army Ground Forces Board Number One, subj: Test of Radar Adjustment of Field Artillery Fire, 10 Feb 1947, MSTL. Report (Extract), Army Field Forces Advisory Panel on Field Artillery, 18 Feb 1949, MSTL. Report, Army Scientific Advisory Panel, subj: Hostile Artillery Locating Systems, Apr 1973, MSTL. Report, Board of Officers Appointed to Test Organic Short-Range Air Observation for the Field Artillery, 18 Apr 1942, MSTL. Report, Cpt Dan T. Moore, School of Field Artillery Fire at Jüterbog, Germany, undated, MSTL. Report, Chief of Field Artillery, 1919, MSTL. Report, Close Support Study Group, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 21 Nov 1975, MSTL. Report, Close Support Study Group II (Extract), 25 Jan 1980, HRDC. Report, Close Support Study Group III (Extract), Dec 1984, HRDC. Report Fiscal Year 2011, Director of Test and Evaluation, www.dote.osd.mil. Report Fiscal Year 2012, Director of Test and Evaluation, www.dote.osd.mil. Report Fiscal Year 2014 (Extract), Director of Test and Evaluation, pp. 137-38, HRDC. Report Fiscal Year 2014 (Extract), Director of Test and Evaluation, subj: Excalibur Increment Ib, M982E1, HRDC. Report, Field Artillery School, subj: Employment of Tracking-type Radar with Field Artillery, 1950, MSTL. Report, Field Artillery School, subj: Field Artillery Conference, 18-29 Mar 1946, MSTL. Report, Field Radar Operations Section, 15th Army Group, Oct 1944-May 1945, MSTL. Report, Field Radar Operations Section, Allied Armies, Italy, Field Radar Operations, 11 162

Nov-3 Dec 1944, MSTL. Report, First Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, MSTL. Report, General Board, U.S. Forces, European Theater Observers Board, subj: AGF Report No. 1106, MSTL. Report, General Board, U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET), subj: Organic Field Artillery Air Observation, undated, MSTL. Report, General Board, USFET, subj: Liaison Aircraft with Ground Forces, undated, MSTL. Report, General Board, USFET, subj: Field Artillery Gunnery, undated, MSTL Report, General Board, USFET, subj: The Field Artillery Observation Battalion, undated, MSTL. Report, Government Accounting Office, subj: Aquila RPV: Its Potential Battlefield Contribution Still in Doubt, Oct 1987, MSTL. Report, Legal Mix V, Executive Summary, 30 Dec 1977, HRDC. Report No. 42, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 2 Feb 1945, MSTL. Report No. 103, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, 11 Apr 1945, MSTL. Report, New Georgia Occupation Force, subj: Organic Field Artillery Observation, No. 66, undated, MSTL. Report, New Georgia Occupation Force, subj: Artillery Operations, Munda Campaign, undated, MSTL. Report, Observer to North African Theater, 5 Jul 1943, MSTL Report, Operations Research Office, The John Hopkins University, Artillery Target Acquisition in Korea, 1953, MSTL. Report, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, subj: A Comparison of Tracking and Intercept Methods of Radar Mortar Location, Oct 1952, MSTL. Report, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, subj: Preliminary Information on Radar Set AN/TPQ-2, Jan 1945, MSTL. Report, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, subj: Test of Radar Adjustment of Field Artillery Fire, 10 Feb 1947, MSTL. Report, Special Observer in European Theater of Operations, 8 Sep-22 Dec 1944, MSTL. Report, The Artillery School, subj: Report of Signal Corps Conference, 10 Jul 1950, MSTL. Report, U.S. Army Audit Agency, subj: RPV Program, Oct 1985, MSTL. Report, subj: A Comparison of Tracking and Intercept Methods of Radar Mortar Location, Oct 1952, MSTL. Report, subj: AN/TPQ-4A Lessons Learned in Vietnam, 14 Feb 1966, MSTL. Report, subj: Annual Army Aviation Instructors’ Conference, 26-28 Jul 1960, MSTL. Report, subj: Army Aviation in the Field Artillery, Fiscal Year 1963, MSTL. Report, subj: Artillery Conference, 6-10 Dec 1948, MSTL. Report, subj: Artillery Detection, Identification, and Discrimination Utilizing Army Observation Aircraft, Oct 1961, MSTL. Report, subj: Artillery Operations Report Covering the New Georgia Campaign, British Solomon Islands, undated, MSTL. Report, subj: Evaluation of Report of Test of HPACA (Project Long Arm T-37), 13 Dec 163

1957, MSTL. Report, subj: Field Artillery Survey and Target Acquisition Conference, 30 Oct-1 Nov 1968, MSTL. Report, subj: Field Artillery Systems Review, 24-25 Sep 1969, MSTL. Report, subj: History of Target Analysis, 1964, MSTL. Report, subj: Light Observation Helicopter versus Fixed-Wing Aircraft Experiment, 25 Jun 1963, MSTL. Report, subj: Operations of II Corps during Mar-4 Jun 1944, MSTL. Report, subj: Operations of II Corps in the Sicilian Campaign, 1 Sep 1943, MSTL. Report, subj: Outline for an Army RPV System Analysis, Apr 1975, MSTL. Report, subj: Phase II Evaluation Report, Higher Performance Army Observation Aircraft, 14 May 1958, MSTL. Report, subj: Preliminary Information on Radar Set AN/TPQ-2, Jun 1945, MSTL. Report, subj: Project Long Arm, 24 Mar 1959, MSTL. Report, subj: Signal Corps Conference Held at The Artillery School, 17-21 Apr 1950, MSTL. Report, subj: Target Detection, Identification, and Discrimination Utilizing Army Observation Aircraft, Oct 1961, MSTL. Report, subj: Test of AN/USD-1 Drone as a Target Acquisition System, undated, MSTL. Report, subj: Test of Organic Air Observation for Field Art, MSTL.

LECTURES

Alexander, Col R.G. “Sound and Flash Ranging,” America Artillery, Training Phase, 15 Jan- 28 Feb 1942, MSTL. Expeditionary Force (AEF) Army Center of Artillery Studies, 7 Mar 1919, MSTL. Bazzoni, Charles B. “Notes on the Accuracy of Sound Ranging Locations,” 1918, MSTL. Benedict, Lt Col C.C. “Aviation, Especially with Reference to Artillery in Open Warfare,” AEF Army Center of Artillery Studies, 26 May 1919, MSTL. Bourgeois, General. Locating Batteries by Sound, trans. by Army War College, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1917. Honeycutt, 1lt F.W. “Cover for Artillery in the Battlefield and Methods of Using Aeroplanes in Reconnaissance of Target and Observation of Fire,” School of Fire, 15 Apr 1916, MSTL. Royce, Lt Col Ralph. “Aviation Especially with Reference to Artillery and Infantry in Open Warfare,” AEF Army Center of Artillery Studies, 16 Apr 1919, MSTL. Smith, 1lt Emery T. “Field Artillery: Its Organization and Employment.” 10 Mar 1916, MSTL.

ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS

Cass, Col Stanley with Maj Gen David E. Ott, Dec 1979, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, MSTL.

164

Dastrup, Dr. Boyd L. with Col David A. Rolston, former division artillery commander, 24th Infantry (Mechanized), 25 Aug 1992, HRDC. _____ . with Col Floyd T. Banks, Commander, 212th Field Artillery Brigade, 19 Jun 1991, HRDC. Dastrup, Dr. Boyd L. and Dr. L. Martin Kaplan with Col Stanley E. Griffith, Director, Target Acquisition Department, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 24 Jul 1991, HRDC. _____. with Col Jerry Laws, Commander, 75th Field Artillery Brigade, 19 Jun 1991, HRDC.

DISSERTATIONS AND THESES

Brown, 1lt Robert Q. “Should Observation Aviation be an Organic Part of the Division,” Field Artillery School, 1937, MSTL. Farthing, Cpt William B. “Cooperation Between Artillery and the Air Service,” Field Artillery School, 1927, MSTL. Hanna, 1lt Lloyd M. untitled, Field Artillery School, 1925, MSTL. Hennessy, Cpt F.B. “Cover for Field Artillery,” Field Artillery School, Spring 1916, MSTL. Kyle, Ronald K. “Killer of Communists, Saver of Soldiers: U.S. Army Field Artillery in the Korean War, 1950-1953,” unpublished master’s thesis, Ohio State University, 1995. Laws, Maj David. “United States Army Aviation Organization Changes, unpublished master’s thesis, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, 2012 Leitch, 1lt William B. “The Airplane as an Auxiliary to Field Artillery,” Field Artillery School, 1925, MSTL. Nesmith, Vardell E., Jr., “The Quiet Paradigm Change: The Evolution of the Field Artillery Doctrine of the United States Army, 1861-1905,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1977. Stebbins, Steven A. “Indirect Fire: The Challenge and Response in the U.S. Army, 1907- 1917,” unpublished master’s thesis, University of North Carolina, 1993. Yeaton, 1lt Ivan D., “Aerial Observation and Conduct of Fire,” Field Artillery School, 1928, MSTL.

ARTICLES

Aaron, 1lt Richard R., Jr. “3ID BFIST in OIF: Simultaneous Direct and Indirect Fire at the Tip of the Spear,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 2004, pp. 20-21. “Air Operations in the Third U.S. Army,” Field Artillery Journal, Oct 1946, pp. 588-89. “An Apparatus for Pointing by Means of an Elevated Line of Metal, Automatically Finding Concealed Position,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 9(1898): 212-27. “An Artillery Study Made in the AEF,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1920, pp. 50-63, and Mar-Apr 1920, pp. 93-108. Arculis, Col Sherwin. “RPVs,” draft article, Nov 1975, MSTL. Arthur, Maj Robert, “Counter Battery,” The Coast Artillery Journal, Feb 1925, pp. 100-18. “Aspects of Artillery Tactics,” Field Artillery Journal, Aug 1943, pp. 606-10. Bentley, Brig Gen Christopher F. “From the Commandant’s Desk,” RedLeg Update, Feb

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2014, p. 1. Beyers, Dan. “Pentagon Writes New Master Plan for RPVs,” Defense News, 7 Mar 1988, p. 1. Birkhimer, 1lt William E. “Has the Adoption of the Rifle-Principle to Fire-Arms Diminished the Relative Importance of Field Artillery,” Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States, 6(1885): 191-237. Bishop, Maj Gen Harry G., “Relationship between the Field Artillery and the Air Corps,” draft article, 1931, MSTL. Blakeley, Maj H.W. “We Must See With Our Own Eyes,” Field Artillery Journal, May 1939, pp. 215-18. Borer, Chief Warrant Officer Three Brian L. and Lt Col Noel T. Nicolle. “Acquisition: 3d ID Counterfire in OIF,” Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 2003, pp. 42-46 Bristol, Maj Delbert L., “Air Op is Here to Stay,” Field Artillery Journal, Oct 1946, pp. 586- 87. Broadrick, Tim. “Q-53 Radar Upgrade Counters Drone Strikes,” Defense Systems, 18 Nov 2018, www.DefenseSystems.com. Brown, 1lt Allen W. “Adjustment of Artillery Fire by Radar,” Artillery Trends, Feb 1960, pp. 3-6. Bursell, William R. “American Sound Ranging in Four Wars,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov- Dec 1981, pp. 53-55. Calandruccio, Jason. “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar,” Winter 2002, www.dcma.mil. Calloway, Audra. “Fort Bliss Soldiers First to Fire Army’s New Near-precision Artillery Rounds,” www.army.mil. Coffman, Maj Glen. “Sound Ranging – Dead or Alive,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1974, pp. 19-24. _____. “The Gap in Target Acquisition,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul 1973, pp. 16-19. Collins, Leighton, “Grasshopper Haven,” 1 Jun 1943, MSTL. Coleman, Col Edward R. “Field Artillery Brigade,” Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1977, pp. 40- 43, 51. Combs, Maj Sydney. “Radar,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan 1946, pp. 6-10. Conerly, Maj Maxwell R. “Effective Target Acquisition Coverage,” Artillery Trends, Oct 1964, pp. 28-29. Conrade, Mark. “Firefinder: Improvements for the 21st Century,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 1997, pp. 40-41. Corn, Col Vollney B., Jr. and Cpt Richard A. Lacquemont. “Silver Bullets,” Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 1991, pp. 10-15 Crane, Maj Gen John A. “Field Artillery Groups,” Field Artillery Journal, Oct 1945, pp. 579-82. Cress, J.B. “Ranging Equipment of the U.S. Army,” The Military Engineer, 8(1920): 275-80. Dempsey, Maj Gen Martin E. “Fires and Effects for the 1st Armored Division in Iraq,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 2005, p. 7. Dick, Lt Col James E. “Target Acquisition Organization,” Artillery Trends, Oct 1964, pp. 5- 14. “DIVARTY: A Force Multiplier for the BCT and Division,” Fires Bulletin, www.army.mil, 166

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“Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 2009, p. 355. “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 2011, pp. 338-40. Haines, Lt Col Howard F. “Division Artillery in the Battle of New Georgia,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov 1943, pp. 846-49 Hall, Maj George R., Maj Russell H. Smith, Maj Lewis D. Ray, and Cpt Lloyd D. Mc Cammon, “ARCSA III,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Jul 1977, pp. 2-3, 17-19. Harrison, Col William J. “MALOR,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1975, pp. 50-53. Hercz, Col Arthur R. “On Target Acquisition. . .Again,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1975, pp. 35-41. Hibbs, Maj Gen Louis B. “Report on the Field Artillery Conference,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul 1946, pp. 407-13. Hill, Lt Col Robert M. “Future Watch: Target Acquisition and Precision Attack Systems,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jan-Feb 1996, pp. 18-21. Hodgkins, Maj Howard W. “Flash and Sound Ranging,” Journal of the United States Artillery, Jan 1920, pp. 41-54. Holcomb, Maj James F. “Target Acquisition vs. Combat Surveillance,” Artillery Trends, Mar 1959, pp. 34-35. Horn, Cpt Tiemann N. “Present Method and Lessons in Regard to Field Artillery Taught by the Russo-Japanese War,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 30(1908): 251-62. “Improvement of Target Acquisition Effectiveness,” Artillery Trends, Jan 1967, pp. 44-49. James, Cpt George W., “Air Ops in the South Pacific,” Field Artillery Journal, Feb 1945, pp. 98-99. Johnson, Maj Alex J. and Maxwell R. Conerly. “A Neglected Giant: New Look for Sound Ranging,” Field Artilleryman, Apr 1970, pp. 55-60. Jones, Maj H. Crampton, “Tactical Employment of the Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul-Aug 1929, pp. 359-69. Jones-Brest, Nancy. “Army Advanced Standardized Tactical Computer,” www.army.mil., 27 Aug 2014. Daniel J. “Flash and Sound in the AEF,” Military Affairs, 33(1969): 374-84. Kitchens, John W. “Organic Army Aviation in World War II: Part 1, 1940-1943,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, May-Jun 1992, pp. 11-17. _____. “Organic Army Aviation in World War II: Part 2, 1944-1946,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Jul-Aug 1992, pp. 15-25. Lassiter, 2lt William. “Range and Positioning Finding,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 4(1895): 238-54. Lennon, Cpt Brock. “Five Requirements of Accurate Fire for the 21st Century,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 2014, p. 51 Leopold, George. “Army to Merge Aerial Drone Programs,” Army Times, 11 Jan 1989, p. 29. LePore, Herbert P. “Eyes in the Sky: A History of Liaison Aircraft and Their Use in World War II,” Army History, Winter 1990-91, pp. 30-39. Lewis, Brig Gen Vernon B., Jr. „“Evolving Field Artillery Tactics and Techniques,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1975, pp. 44-48. Maples, Maj Gen Michael D., “FA Priorities after OIF,” Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 2003, p. 1. 168

Marshhausen, Maj John C. “New Eyes for the Countermortar Teams,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, pp. 2-5. MacDonald, Col Ralph, “Artillery Cubs in Mountain Operations: 33rd Infantry Division in Northern Luzon,” Field Artillery Journal, Oct 1945, pp. 614-16. McCarthy, Col James F., Sr., and Maj Jim S. Hutchinson, “FIST Takes to the Air,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1978, pp. 25-27. McClure, Mary. “New Helicopter Honors Kiowas,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 28 Mar 1969, p. 1. McFarren, Col Freddy E., et al. “Operations and Desert Shield and Storm: A Unique Challenge for the 18th FA Brigade (Airborne),” Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 1991, pp. 42-48. McKiernan, Brig Gen Brian J. “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, May- Apr 2013, pp. 6-9. McMahon, Lt Col John E. “The Field Artillery of the United States: Its Organization and Tactical Use,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Mar 1912, pp. 95-108. McNair, Maj William S. “Concealment and Protection of Artillery from Artillery Fire,” Field Artillery Journal, Jan-Mar 1916, pp. 43-50. “Modernization Program Systems Prove Themselves in the Desert,” Army, May 1991, pp. 14-16. Monagon, Cpt George A. and Cpt James Bruce, “The Artillery Information Service,” Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1919, pp. 438-47 Morelock, Lt Col George L. “Army Aviation,” Military Review, Jan 1956, pp. 53-63. Neuffer, Lt William, “What Lessons in the Employment of Field Artillery Should be Deduced from the Experiences of the Russo-Japanese War?” trans. by Maj G. LeR. Irwin, Field Artillery Journal, Apr-Jun 1911, pp. 197-219. Neuien, Lt Col R.A., Jr. “How You Got It and What You Got: AHIP,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Mar 1982, pp. 6-10. “New Eyes for Countermortar Teams,” Artillery Trends, Jun 1958, pp. 2-5. Nilson, Cpt Gary L. “What’s New in the Drone System,” Artillery Trends, Oct 1964, pp. 22- 25. North, 1lt Thomas. “An Instance of Post-War Training,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1923, pp. 515-20. Osborn, Kris. “Army Fields Next-Generation Radar,” www.army.mil, 17 Oct 2002. “OH-58 Kiowa,” Army Aviation, 30 Jun 1990, p. 59. “OH-58A,” Army, Feb 1990, p. 4. “OH-58D Kiowa Scout Helicopter,” Army, Aug 1990, pp. 54-56. Olson, Kyle. “Soldiers Test Newest Precision Targeting Device,” Program Executive Office Soldier, 24 Oct 2017. Orman, Lt Col Leonard M. “Counter-Mortar Radar,” Coast Artillery Journal, Jan-Feb 1947, pp. 88-91. Oswalt, Cpt John W., “The Air Op is Here to Stay,” Field Artillery Journal, Aug 1944, pp. 568-72. _____. “The Case for Organic Aerial Observation,” Army, Feb 1959, pp. 42-45. Ott, Maj Gen David E. “Forward Observations,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1975, p. 6. Ott, Brig Gen Edward S. “Employment of Radar by XV Corps Artillery,” draft article, 169

undated, MSTL. _____. “Employment of Radar by XV Corps Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal, Aug 1946, pp. 462-67. Parker, Maj Gen Ellis. “The Vision of the LHX,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Dec 1986, pp. 2-5. Parkhurst, 1lt Charles D. “Field-Artillery, Its Organization and Its Role,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 1(1892): 250-77. _____. “The Artillery at Santiago,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 11(1899): 137-92. Pearson, Brig Gen Paul F. “FIST,” Field Artillery Journal, May-Jun 1976, pp. 7-12. Percin, Gen Alexandre. “Masked Fire of the Artillery,” trans. by Lt Benjamin F. Castle, Field Artillery Journal, Jan 1913, pp. 96-106. Pigue, Maj Paul E. “Operation Countermortar,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1949, pp. 250-52. Pope, Maj Laurie. “AHIP: Aeroscout of the Next War,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Mar 1982, pp. 11-13. Prochniak, Warrant Officer One Scott E. and Maj Dennis W. Yates. “Counterfire in Afghanistan,” Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 2002, pp. 15-18 Ralston, Maj Gen David C. “State of the Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 2006, pp. 1-5. _____. “Field Artillery 2005: Azimuth 2015,” Field Artillery Magazine, Nov-Dec 2005, pp. 1-4. Rand, Maj H.P. “Meet the FA Observation Battalion,” Combat Forces Journal, Feb 1953, pp. 24-27. _____. “Radar Helps the Artillery Help the Doughboy,” Combat Forces Journal, Jan 1951, pp. 30- 32. Raymond, Maj Edward A., “Air Ops,” Field Artillery Journal, May 1944, pp. 274-78. Reed, Lt Vergil D. “The Corps Artillery Information Service,” Field Artillery Journal, Sep- Oct 1919, pp. 552-59. Reeder, Cpt W. Thomas. “Exercise Your Radar,” Artillery Trends, Jul 1959, pp. 58-59. Rhea, Col Donald M. “Target Acquisition Today . . . Tomorrow,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1975, pp. 7-11. Riley, Lt Col Lowell M. and Cpt Angus Rutledge, “Organic Air Observation for Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal, Jul 1942, pp. 498-501. Rogers, Patrick. “The New Artillery,” Army, Jul 1980, pp. 27-33. Ropelewski, Robert R. “Threat and Budget Changes Imperil Army Aviation Plan,” Armed Forces Journal, Apr 1990, pp. 50-51. San Pietro, 1lt Francis. “Artillery’s Candid Camera: The SD-1 Drone,” Artillery Trends, Mar 1961, pp. 3-9. Spaulding, Cpt Oliver L. “The Use of Field Artillery,” Journal of the United States Artillery, May-Jun 1912, pp. 321-39. Sprengle, Maj Danny J. and Col Donald C. DuRant, “Excalibur: Extended Range Precision for the Army,” Field Artillery Magazine, Mar-Apr 2003, pp. 13-16. Stephens, Maj John K. and Cpt David Landecker. “The Bradley Fire Support Vehicle,” Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 1994, p. 19. 170

Stewart, Cpt Joe F. “Genealogy of Target Acquisition,” Artillery Trends, Oct 1964, pp. 9-11. Stratton, Lt Col Charles W. “Air Ops in New Guinea,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov 1944, p. 767. Summerall, Gen Charles P. “Organization, Armament and Employment of Field Artillery,” Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1931, pp. 503-16. Sweetman, Bill. “Unmanned Air Vehicles: US Services Plan Jointly at Last,” Interavia, Aug 1988, pp. 775-77. “Target Acquisition,” Artillery Trends, Jul 1963, pp. 33-35. “Target Acquisition,” Artillery Trends, Jul 1966, pp. 27-30. “The Field Artillery Observation Battalion,” Field Artillery Journal, Nov-Dec 1948, pp. 252- 57. Thionville, D. “Artillery in Battle Yesterday and Today,” trans. by Cpt John E. McMahon, Journal of the United States Artillery, 21(1904): 272-81. Thomas, Cpt Cal A. and Sfc Jonathan S. DeLong, “Regaining Our Luster: How Fort Sill Institutional Training is Improving to meet Requirements for the 21st Century Field Artillery NCO, RedLeg Update, Aug 2014, pp. 5-9. Tierney, Richard K. “Forty Years of Army Aviation: Part 2, Building A Training Program,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Jul 1982, pp. 22-36. _____. “Forty Years of Army Aviation: Part 3, Combat” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Aug 1982, pp. 19-32. _____. “Forty Years of Army Aviation: Part 4, Armed Helicopters,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Sep 1982, pp. 31-35. _____. “Forty Years of Army Aviation: Part 5, Policies and Organizations,” U.S. Army Aviation Digest, Oct 1982, pp. 28-35. Torrance, Col Thomas G. and Lt Col Noel T. Nicolle, “Observations from Iraq: The 3d Div Arty in OIF,” Field Artillery Magazine, Jul-Aug 2003, pp. 30-35. Turner, Brig Gen William F. “2014 State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 2015, www.army.mil. Vishneski, 1lt B. Shawn, 2lt Adam P. Oaks, and 2lt Kenneth D. Seiffert. “OH58D: The New Eye on the Battlefield,” Field Artillery Magazine, Oct 1988, pp. 41-42. “Voice of Experience,” Field Artillery Journal, Apr 1948, pp. 219-22. Von Brill, Heinrich. “A New Method of Indirect Laying for Field Artillery,” trans. by Lt. Joseph E. Kuhn, Journal of the United States Artillery, 3(1895): 444-74. von Reichold, Maj Gen Moriz Edler. “Indirect Fire,” trans. by 2lt J.A. Shipton, Journal of the United States Artillery, 8(1897): 170-85. Vuono, Col Carl E. “FIST at Bragg,” Field Artillery Journal, Sep-Oct 1976, pp. 4-5. “Weapons Systems: 1970,” Artillery Trends, May 1962, pp. 11-13. Wilson, Cpt C. Holmes, R.F.A. “The Employment of R.F. Artillery in the Field,” Journal of the United States Artillery, 21(1904): 45-54. Wilson, John B. “Mobility Versus Firepower: The Post-World War I Infantry Division,” Parameters, Sep 1983, pp. 47-52. Wilson, Maj Paul F. “Artillery Missions by High-Performance Aircraft Observers,” Antiaircraft Journal, May-Jun 1950, pp. 21-23.

171

BOOKS

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1981. Haythornwaite, Philip J. The Napoleonic Source Book. New York: Facts on File, 1990. Hercz, Arthur B. History and Development of Field Artillery Target Acquisition. Fort Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 1977. Hewes, James E., Jr. From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1990-1963. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975. Historical Division, Department of the Army. United States Army in the World War, 1917- 1918. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1948. Hughes, B.P. British Smooth-bore Artillery: The Muzzle-Loading Artillery of the 18th and 19th Centuries. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1969. Innes, John R. Flash Spotters and Sound Rangers: How They Lived, Worked and Fought in the Great War. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1935. Jamieson, Perry D. Crossing the Deadly Ground: U.S. Army Tactics, 1865-1899. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1994. Kennett, Lee. The First Air War: 1914-1918. New York: The Free Press, 1991. Mason, Herbert M. The United States Air Force: A Turbulent History. New York: Mason- Charter, 1976. McKenney, Janice E. The Organizational History of Field Artillery, 1775-2003. Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2007. Ott, David E. Field Artillery: 1954-1973. Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1975. Palmer, Robert T. Origins of the Army Ground Forces General Headquarters, United States Army, 1940-1942. Washington DC: Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946. Polmar, Norman and Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr. Military Helicopters of the World: Military Rotary-Wing Aircraft since 1917. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981. Porter, Donald J. The McDonnell Douglas OH-6A Helicopter. Blue Ridge Summitt, PA: Tab Books, 1990. Porter, Harold E. Aerial Observation: The Airplane Observer, the Balloon Observer, and the Army Corps Pilot. New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1921. Raines, Edgar F. Jr. Eyes of Artillery: The Origins of Modern U.S. Army Aviation in World War II. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2000. Raines, Rebecca R. Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal Corps. Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1996. Rohne, Heinrich. The Progress of Modern Field Artillery, trans. by M.M. Macomb Washington DC: Journal of the United States Infantry Association, 1908. Scales, Robert H., Jr. Firepower in Limited War. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995. Shiner, John F. Foulois and the U.S. Army Air Corps, 1931-1935. Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1983. Spaulding, Oliver L. Notes on Field Artillery for Officers of all the Arms. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Cavalry Association, 1908, 1914, 1917. Stephenson, Edward D. Sound Ranging: The Location of Guns by Sound with Special Reference to the Bull-Tucker System. Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1920. Sunderland, Riley. History of the Field Artillery School: 1911-1942. Fort Sill, OK: Field Artillery School, 1942. 173

Thiesmeyer, Lincoln R. and John E. Burchard. Combat Scientists. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1947. Thompson, George R., et al, The Signal Corps: The Test. Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957. Thompson, George R. and Dixie R. Harris. The Signal Corps: The Outcome. Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966. U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Development of Field Artillery Observation (Target Acquisition) Battalions. Fort Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 1972. _____. History of the U.S. Army Artillery and Missile School, Vol 3. Fort Sill, OK: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, undated. Wagner, Arthur L. Organization and Tactics. Kansas City, MO: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Company, 1898. _____. Report of the Santiago Campaign, 1898. Kansas City, MO: Franklin Hudson Publishing Company, 1908. Wakefield, Ken. The Fighting Grasshoppers: US Liaison Aircraft Operations in Europe, 1942-1945. Leicester, UK: Midland Counties Publications, 1990. Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984. Weinert, Richard P., Jr. A History of Army Aviation: 1950-1962, edited by Susan Canedy. Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991.

174

INDEX

A

Adams, Maj Gen Emory S., 48, 49, 52 Aerial observation, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29 Air Corps Act of 1926, 43 Aircraft AO-1 Mohawk, 89 L-4, 82, 83 L-19, 83, 87, 98, 99 OV-1 Mohawk, 99 P-51 Mustang, 83 T-37, 88 Air-Ground Procedure Board, 47 Air Service, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 42, 43, 50 Alexander, Roger G., 26 Aquila Remotely Piloted Vehicle, 72, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 134, and 135 Armored Knight, M1200, 150 Army Air Corps, 45, 51 Armstrong, William, 3 Army Precision Fires Study, 112, 138, 140, 148 Arnold, Gen Henry H., 47, 51, 52, 60 Aultman, Dwight, 14

B

Balmer, Maj Gen Jesmond D., 75, 76 Barker, Harold R., 60 Bazzoni, Charles B., 26, 28 Benedict, C.C., 37 Bentley, Brig Gen Christopher F., 142, 143 Bessemer, Henry, 5, 6 Best, Clermont, 13 Birkhimer, William E., 9, 10 Bishop, Maj Gen Harry G., 21, 41, 45 Blakeley, H.W., 47 Boucher, F.H., 80 Borer, Brian L., 151 Boyle, Conrad L., 39 Bradley fighting vehicle, 110, 111, 112, 113, 136, 137, 147, 148, 149 Bruchmüller, Georg, 142 Brewer, Carlos, 38 Bristol, Delbert L., 58, 82 175

Brodie, James, 56 Brown, Robert Q., 45

C

Cavalli, Gionvanni, 3 Cavalry, 2, 17, 19, 21, 34, 43, 50, 52, 110, 111, 129, 130, 133, 139, 133, 151 Christensen, George F., 123, 124 Civil War, American, 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 13 Clark, Brig Gen Mark, 53 Coast Artillery, 40, 64 Combat Observation Lasing Team, 110, 113, 137, 144, 147, 150 Compton, L.J., 75, 76 Corn, Vollney B., Jr., 134 Corps of Engineers, 26, 40 Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar System, 152, 155, 156 Craig, Gen Malin, 46, 47 Cress, J.B., 28 Crimean War, 4 Curran, F.P., 105

D

Danford, Maj Gen Robert M., 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53 Decker, George H., 98 Dempsey, Maj Gen Martin E., 152 Depuy, Gen William E., 105, 109 Devers, Lt Gen Jacob L., 76, 80 Dillenback, John W., 13, 14 Dinges, Edward A., 114, 115 Drones AN/MQM-57A, 100 AN/USD-1, 100 AN/USD-501, 121 Drummond, Maj Gen James E., 125 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition, 138 DuTeil brothers, 2

E

Easterbrook, Ernest F., 89

F

176

Field Artillery School (U.S. Army Field Artillery School), 38, 39, 42, 44, 45, 47, 49, 50, 52 54, 57, 60, 75, 76, 82, 94, 96, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 126, 130, 131, 132, 135, 137, 141, 142, 143, 144, 147, 148, 157 Fire Support Sensor System, 112, 143, 148, 149, 150 Fire Support Team, 109, 110, 113, 136, 143, 147, 150 Fire support vehicles A3 Bradley fire support vehicle, 112, 120, 148, 149 M2A2 Operation Desert Storm-Situational Awareness vehicle, 149 M7 fire support vehicle, 111, 112, 136, 147, 148, 149, 150 M7A1 fire support vehicle, 112 M113 fire support vehicle, 110, 111 M981 fire support vehicle, 111, 113 First Observation Battalion, 40 First Observation Flash Battery, 40 Flash ranging, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 51, 54, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 105, 114, 115, 136 Flash Ranging Section No. 1, 27 Flemming, Brig Gen Adrian S., 36 Ford, William W., 50, 51, 53, 59, 60 Forward Observer System, 143 Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, 7, 11

G

Global Positioning System, 134, 138, 141, 142, 145 Greener, William W., 3 Gribeauval, Jean Baptiste, 2 Griffith, Stanley E., 134 Grimes, George S., 13 Ground observation, 22, 25, 29, 30, 35, 44, 49, 50, 158 Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator, 111, 112, 113, 143, 144, 147 Guk, Karl G., 7, 8

H

Haines, Howard F., 59 Hallada, Maj Gen Raphael J., 116, 132, 133 Hanna, Lloyd M., 42, 43 Hanson, P.M., 49 Harding, J.G., 75, 76 Hedekin, T.B., 57, 58 Helicopters AH-64, 130, 135 177

H-13 Sioux, 98 H-23, 98 OH-4, 98, 99 OH-5, 98, 99 OH-6, 98, 99, 129 OH-58, 99, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135 Hercz, Arthur R., 104, 106 Hero, Brig Gen Andrew, Jr., 33, 34, 35, 36 Hero Board, 33, 34, 35, 36 Hinds, Maj Gen Ernest, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince Kraft zu, 8, 11 Holcomb, James F., 91 Howze, Maj Gen Hamilton, 99

I

Ingles, Harry C., 78 Ison, Mark, 130

J

Jackson, H.R., 94 Joffre, Joseph, 36 Johnson, Gen Harold K., 93 Joint Effects Targeting System, 145, 146, 147, 150 Jones, H.L.C., 38, 41 Jones, Brig Gen Thomas J.P. 130

K

Keith, Maj Gen Donald R., 110, 114 Kenly, William L., 32 Kilner, W.G., 31 Kraft, William R., Jr., 103 Krupp, Alfred, 6

L

Lassiter, William, 11, 12 Laws, Jerry, 135 Leitch, William B., 44 Lemnitzer, Gen Lyman L., 98 Lewis, Brig Gen Vernon B., 103, 104, 108, 109 Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder, 113, 143, 144, 145, 148, 150 178

Lockhard, William H., 120 Long-Range Advance Scout Surveillance System, 148 Lyman, Theodore, 26, 27

M

MacDonald, Ralph, 58 Mah, Joe, 93 Maples, Maj Gen Michael D., 137, 147, 148 Marshall, Gen George C., 51, 52 Marty, Maj Gen Fred F., 132 McCloy, John J., 52 McGlachlin, Edward Jr., 20 McIntyre, Augustine, 47 McNair, Maj Gen Lesley J., 51, 52, 53 McNair, William S., 23 Miller, E.A., 21 Minié, Claude E., 3 Moore, Dan T., 19, 20 Muller, John, 2

N

Nettles, John S., 124 Neuffer, William, 16, 17 Nicolle, Noel T., 147, 151

O

Operation Enduring Freedom, 119, 120, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144, 145, 152, 158 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 119, 120, 137, 138, 139, 140, 144, 147, 152, 158 Oswalt, John W., 91 Ott, Maj Gen David E., 103, 104, 106, 107, 109 Ott, Brig Gen Edward S., 65

P

Parkhurst, Charles D., 10, 13 Patrick, Mason F., 30, 31, 32 Pershing, Gen John J., 26, 32 Pocket-size Forward Entry Device, 143, 146 Porter, Harold E., 24, 31 Precision Munitions Excalibur, 113, 120, 138, 139, 140 179

Precision Guidance Kit, 141 Prochniak, Scott E., 151 Project Long Arm, 88, 89 Pulkowski, Erich, 142

R

Radars AN/TPQ-2, 81 AN/TPQ-3, 64, 78, 97 AN/TPQ-4, 93, 96, 116 AN/TPQ-10, 86, 89, 93, 96 AN/TPQ-25, 116 AN/TPQ-36, 74, 98, 115, 116, 119, 120 134, 136, 151, 152, 153, 155, 157, 158 AN/TPQ-37, 73, 97, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 134, 136, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158 AN/TPQ-47, 119 AN/TPQ-48, 120, 156, 157, 158 AN/TPQ-49, 156, 157, 158 AN/TPQ-50, 156, 157, 158, 159 AN/TPQ-53, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158 SCR-584, 64, 65, 66, 78, 80, 86 SCR-784, 78, 80, 81, 86 Radio, SCR-77-B, 39 Raymond, Edward A., 57 Reed, Virgil D., 42 Rhea, Donald M., 104, 105 Rogers, Gen Bernard W., 129 Rogers, Charles C., 103 Rogers, Gordon B., 98 Rogers, J.I., 18 Rohne, Gen Heinrich, 17 Roosevelt, Theodore, 19 Royce, Ralph, 36, 37 Rumbough, William S., 79

S

School of Fire for Field Artillery, 20, 36 Scriven, George P., 22, 23 Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition, 138, 140 Shafter, Maj Gen William R., 13 Shaw, Joseph E., 63 Signal Corps, 23, 26, 32, 39, 78, 82, 89, 100 180

Smith, Emery T., 21 Snow, Maj Gen William J., 32, 33 Sound and Flash Battery, 40 Sound ranging, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 51, 54, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 82, 84, 86, 87, 90, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 105, 114, 115 Sound Ranging Section No. 1, 26, 27 Sound Ranging Section No. 2, 27 Sound Ranging Section No. 3, 27 Sound ranging sets AN/GRA-114, 114 AN/TNS-10, 96, 114, 115 GR-3, 81, 90 GR-8, 69, 81, 82, 90, 96, 114 Spaulding, Oliver L., 18, 19, 21, 22, 24 Stewart, Joe F., 92, 93 Stone, Michael P.W., 134 Striker/Knight combat observation lasing team vehicle, 110, 113, 120, 136, 147, 149, 150 Summerall, Maj Gen Charles P., 36, 37, 45 Swift, Ennis P., 50

T

Terrestrial observation, 20, 22, 27, 38, 44, 58, 59, 66 77, 87 Thornton, P.W., 76 Thurman, Gen Maxwell R., 116, 124, 126, 127 Torrance, Thomas G., 147 Tribolet, H.A., 65 Trowbridge, August, 26, 40 Turner, Brig Gen William A., 142, 143 Twaddle, Brig Gen Harry L., 51

U

U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill, 137, 140, 142 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 105, 108, 110, 114, 116, 121, 126, 130, 131, 132, 133, 140, 143, 146, 150, 156

V

Valcourt, Maj Gen David P., 112, 148 Vielle, Paul, 6 Vuono, Carl E., 110, 126

181

W

Wagner, Arthur L., 11 Wagner, Louis C., Jr., 125 Wallace, Fred C., 47, 48, 52 War Department, 9, 10, 12, 18, 19, 20, 26, 32, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 52, 53, 77, 79, 80 Ward, Orlando, 38 Westover, Oscar, 47 Weyand, Gen Fred C., 108 Whitworth, Joseph, 3 Woodward, C., 18 Wrockloff, G.E., Jr., 39

Y

Yates, Dennis W., 151 Yontan Pete, 61 Young, W.D., 28

182