Us Army Field Artillery School Annual History

U.S. ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL ANNUAL HISTORY (RCS CHIS-6 [R4])

1 JANUARY 2013 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 2013

FIELD ARTILLERY BRANCH HISTORIAN’S OFFICE

FORT SILL, OKLAHOMA

COMMANDANT’S INTRODUCTION

The 2013 Annual History captures key training and leader development initiatives and combat development accomplishments of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School. During the year, the Field Artillery School continued to meet future requirements by playing a key role in futures development and integration. Emerging weapons systems, such as the Paladin Integrated Management, and Field Artillery munitions, such as the Precision Guidance Kit (PGK), Guided MLRS and the Excalibur, assured unparalleled precision lethal fires, while the School’s ground work on Army Doctrine 2015 prepared the School and the Field Artillery to move into the future. The Field Artillery School’s core mission remained training Soldiers and leaders for Field Artillery units of the operational forces. During the year, the Field Artillery School provided Field Artillery Soldiers and leaders with world-class training and instruction. The School furnished assignment-oriented training to prepare leaders and Soldiers for their next or first assignment and worked to introduce Army Learning Model 2015 and to modernize Field Artillery Fires. The School also engaged the Army through Warfighter Forums, and developed an engagement strategy to encourage West Point and Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets to select the Field Artillery as their branch of choice and to tell the School’s and the Field Artillery’s story. As part of the Fires Center of Excellence, the Field Artillery School participated in growing the next generation Fires force. From equipment modernization to training, the Field Artillery School is providing a force capable of winning in Unified Land Operations. Around the world, Redleg Soldiers are the pride of the Nation’s forces. The Field Artillery School is achieving great things, and we truly are on the glide path to modernizing the Field Artillery. Artillery Strong!

(Original Signed) CHRISTOPHER F. BENTLEY Brigadier General, U.S. Army Commandant, United States Army Field Artillery School

iii

PREFACE

The 2013 Annual History for the U.S. Army Field Artillery School follows the decision-making process as closely as possible. Through interviews, email, messages, staff reports, fact sheets, correspondence, briefings, and other documentation, the Field Artillery School Historian’s Office has recreated as closely as possible how the Field Artillery School made key decisions concerning joint issues, training, leader development, doctrine, force design, and equipment requirements. Because the Field Artillery School was involved in many diverse activities during the year, the Historian’s Office under the direction of the School Commandant selected only those activities deemed to be the most historically significant to include in the History. Preserving historical documents forms a vital part of the historian’s work. After they are collected from the various organizations during the process of researching, they are filed in the historical records and documents collection in the Historian’s Office. All documents are available for use by School staff, other U.S. governmental agencies, and private individuals upon request. Because new documents are often found after research and writing has been completed, this contemporary history is subject to revision. As new documents are discovered, interpretations and conclusions will change. Comments and suggested changes should be directed to the Historian’s Office. In the process of researching and writing the History, the historian becomes indebted to many people for their advice and assistance. The Field Artillery School Historian’s Office would like to thank the people who provided their technical expertise. Without their help writing the history would have been far more difficult.

(Original Signed) BOYD L. DASTRUP, Ph.D. Field Artillery Branch Historian U.S. Army Field Artillery School

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE i COMMANDANT’S INTRODUCTION ii PREFACE iii TABLE OF CONTENTS iv

CHAPTER ONE: MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND PERSONNEL Introduction 1 Field Artillery School Mission Statement 1 Organization 1 Commandant 1 Maneuver Center of Excellence Fires Cell 2 Field Artillery Proponency Office 3 Strategic Communications Office 7 Women in the Army and the Field Artillery 7 Warfighter Forums 9 Fires Center of Excellence and Field Artillery School Accreditation 10 Sequestration 12

CHAPTER TWO: LEADER DEVELOPMENT: TRAINING AND EDUCATION Introduction 15 Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming Training Strategy 15 Army Learning Model 2015 16 Modernizing Field Artillery Fires 19 Gaming 23 Leader Decision Exercise, Virtual Battlespace Simulation Two, and Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course 24 Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations 25 Distance Learning 27 Army National Guard Regional Training Institutes 27 Noncommissioned Officer Academy and Noncommissioned Officer Education System 28 428th Field Artillery Brigade Accreditation 32 Functional Courses 32 Advanced Individual Training 34 Warrant Officer Education System 35 Officer Education System 35 Joint and Combined Integration Directorate 42 Joint Integration Division 43 Precision Fires Program 43 Target Mensuration Only and Collateral Damage Estimation and Weaponeering Courses 47 Joint Fires Observer Course 47

Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course 48 Joint Fires Observer Team 49 Non-lethal Training 50 Electronic Warfare Courses 50 Special Technical Operations Course 53

CHAPTER THREE: COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS: FORCE DESIGN, DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS Introduction 55 Force Design and Doctrine 55 Field Artillery Modernization Strategy: Field Artillery Force of 2020 55 Grade Plate Review 56 Army 2020 Redesign 57 Fires Command: DIVARTY and Corps Field Artillery Brigade 58 Army Doctrine 60 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 62 M777 and M119 Composite Battalion and Precision Fires 65 Precision Munitions, Target Location Error, Quick Reaction Capability and Handheld Devices 66 Electric Fires 69 TRADOC Capabilities Manager Brigade Combat Team-Fires 71 Excalibur Extended-Range Guided Projectile 71 Precision Guidance Kit 78 Future Cannon Munitions Suite 82 M777 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer 83 M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer 87 Paladin Integrated Management 91 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System-G 95 TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell 96 Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble 96 Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 98 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle 99 Knight Vehicle 101 Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 103 Joint Effects Targeting System 105 Fire Support Sensor System 107 Profiler 107 Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications Systems 109 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 109 Handheld Command and Control Systems 112 TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Brigade 113 Fires Radar Strategy 113

Enhanced AN/TPQ-36/53 Radar 113 AN/TPQ-37 Radar 115 AN/TPQ-50 Radar 116 Multiple Launcher Rocket System 117 Munitions 117 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead 122 Launchers 125 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 127 Army Tactical Missile System 131

CHAPTER FOUR: FIRES BATTLE LABORATORY 132

Glossary 165 Appendix One: Student Production for Fiscal Year 2013 171 Appendix Two: Key FCoE and USAFAS Personnel 172 Appendix Three: Field Artillery School Commandants 173 Appendix Four: Chiefs of Field Artillery 175 Appendix Five: Assistant Commandants 177 Appendix Six: Command Sergeant Majors of USAFAS since 1991 179 Appendix Seven: Command Sergeant Majors of NCOA 180 Appendix Eight: USAFCOEFS Organization Chart as of 8 April 2013 181 Appendix Nine: Field Artillery Commandant’s Office Chart as of 27 March 2014 182 Appendix Ten: List of Documents 183 Index of Names 184

CHAPTER ONE MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND PERSONNEL

INTRODUCTION

Influenced by the new Field Artillery technology introduced after the Spanish- American War of 1898, the development of indirect fire, and the lack of adequately trained Field Artillerymen, the War Department opened the School of Fire for Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, on 15 September 1911. While War Department, General Orders No. 72 of 3 June 1911 tasked the school to furnish practical and theoretical field artillery training to lieutenants, captains, field grade officers, militia officers, and noncommissioned officers, War Department, General Orders No. 73 of 5 June 1911 integrated the school into a sequential and progressive educational system for officers. In 2013 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School (USAADAS), the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), and the 434th Field Artillery Brigade composed the training mission of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE), Fort Sill, Oklahoma. During the year, the Field Artillery School trained the Field Artillery forces of the United States Army and United States Marine Corps, provided joint training, developed Field Artillery leaders and Soldiers, helped design and develop fire support tactics and doctrine, participated in equipment and weapons development and force design updates, and supported unit training and readiness.1

FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL MISSION STATEMENT

The U.S. Army Field Artillery School trains, educates, and develops agile, adaptive, and decisive Soldiers and leaders; engages, collaborates and partners with other branches, warfighting function proponents, and sister-Services; and serves as the lead agent for the development and dissemination of Field Artillery doctrine, concepts, and knowledge necessary in Decisive Action.2

ORGANIZATION

Commandant In June 2013 Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley became Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. He graduated from the University of Texas at Austin and was commissioned as a second lieutenant of Field Artillery through the Reserve Officer Training Corps. He earned a masters degree from ______12002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 7; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 11 Apr 11, Doc I-1, 2011 USAFAS AH. 2Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 9 May 13, Doc I-1; Email, subj: USAFAS Mission Statement, 28 Jan 14, Doc I-2. 2

Louisiana State University. His military education included the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College. General Bentley has commanded Field Artillery units at the battery, battalion, and brigade levels. His service as a staff officer included tours as an operations officer at the battalion level and on the Joint Staff, aide-de-camp to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, executive assistant to the Vice Director of the Joint Staff, Chief of Staff, 82nd Airborne Division, and executive officer to the Under Secretary of the Army and Forces Command commander. General Bentley has had many unique professional experiences and opportunities to include tours in the Federal Republic of Germany, the 25th Infantry Division, the 10th Mountain Division, and the 82nd Airborne Division. His awards and decorations included the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit (3 OLC), Bronze Star Medal (2 OLC), Meritorious Service Medal (3 OLC), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal (3 OLC), and Combat Action Badge. He was authorized the Ranger Tab, Master Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, and the Australian Parachutist Badge.3 Maneuver Center of Excellence Fires Cell Established in 2010, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Fires Cell served as a link in coordinating activities to support current priorities and emerging initiatives between the MCoE at Fort Benning, Georgia, and the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. During 2013, the MCoE Fires Cell worked several command directed and internal initiatives to improve Fires integration at the MCoE. Such initiatives included maneuver pre-command course support, joint fires familiarization courses, and maneuver training support. MCoE Fires personnel in conjunction with the Field Artillery School commandant supported Maneuver and Aviation Pre-Command Course training by participating in command briefs, former battalion commander panels, equipment and capabilities demonstrations, and air-ground operations discussions. These sessions, whether Maneuver or Aviation Pre-Command Course, informed leadership of Field Artillery force design updates, fires/joint fires combat training centers’ activities, operational best practices, and air-ground operations. With the support of the Director, Joint and Combined Arms Integration (JACI), at the FCoE, the MCoE Fires Cell began integrating best practices from the FCoE Joint Fires Observer (JFO) Program into MCoE officer education programs. The JFO familiarization program was intended to establish Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC), Aviation BOLC, and Maneuver Captain’s Career Course requirements that would enable company grade maneuver leaders to understand, plan, synchronize, and integrate joint fires in support of combined arms maneuver. The course was currently being piloted in Infantry BOLC and would transition to courses across MCoE in 2014. From a training support perspective, the MCoE Fires cell made great strides in ______3Official Biography, BG Christopher F. Bentley, Doc I-3; “Artillery School Gets New Leader,” Lawton Constitution, 28 Jun 13, Doc I-4; Email, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 6 Jun 13, Doc I-5.

improving Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) capabilities as well as integrating CFFT into various MCoE programs of instruction (POIs). Based on the initiative of this group, MCoE CFFT was capable of effectively training precision fires, close combat attack (CCA)/close air support (CAS), Field Artillery digital fire support training, and mortar digital training in a distributed manner. The ability to link multiple CFFTs on a network, running a common scenario with common terrain and a common operational picture, enhanced the ability to replicate tactical scenarios in CFFT. Latest efforts in conjunction with the Mortar Leader Course developed a realistic, digital network on which to train mortar leaders to ensure that mortar crews and leaders understood the entire digital fire support chain and the requirements to provide effective fires. This was a significant departure from the current mortar program of instruction (POI) that taught the Mortar Ballistic Computer and Lightweight Handheld Mortar Computer in a stand-alone environment. Finally, the Fires Cell continued to work with JACI to gain necessary imagery permissions to offer Target Mensuration Only (TMO)/Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) familiarization and re-certification training for qualified units on Fort Benning. In closing, the above narrative provided a snap shot of only a few areas supported by the MCoE Fires Cell in 2013. The Fires Cell continued to provide access, planning, coordination, continuity, and the resources necessary to ensure the maximum collaboration to develop future combined arms leaders that would be capable of integrating all joint capabilities in support of unified land operations.4 Field Artillery Proponency Office In 2013 the Field Artillery Proponent Office (FAPO) oversaw the maintenance of a balanced and sustainable branch of officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers to facilitate the execution of the Field Artillery’s mission. Throughout the year FAPO also served as the action office for the Field Artillery School commandant and the Command Sergeant Major of the Field Artillery.5 Merger of Military Occupation Specialties 13D and 13P to Form 13J. During 2013, FAPO worked the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13D and 13P merger. Historically, the Field Artillery had two MOSs for fire control – one for cannon and one for rockets. Because of automation and precision munitions and tools, the Field Artillery and the Field Artillery School did not see the requirement for two separate MOSs for fire control. This led to the initiative to merge MOS 13D (Field Artillery Tactical Data Specialist for Cannon) and MOS 13P (Multiple Launch Rocket System Operations/Fire Direction Specialist) into one MOS 13J (Fire Control Specialist). This would build a better model for professional development, eliminate course redundancy, build a sustainable MOS for the future, and develop a more diverse Field Artillery noncommissioned officer.6 MOS 13F Redesign. During 2013, FAPO participated in the Military ______4Email with atch, subj: MCOE Fires Cell Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History, 31 Jan 14, Doc I-6. 5Briefing, subj: FAPO Pre-Command Course Briefing, 3 Feb 14, Doc I-7. 6Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc I-8.

Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F redesign to facilitate integrated, sequential, and progressive life-long learning for soldiers from advanced individual training to senior level training using the Army Learning Model and leader development strategy. These initiatives would culminate under Modernizing Field Artillery Fires for 2020 within the enlisted ranks.7 Joint Terminal Attack Controller Additional Skill Identifier. Joint Publication (JP) 309.3 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for Close Air Support (CAS) codified joint requirements for a position to direct the actions of combat aircraft engaged in CAS and other air operations. This position, called a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC), was created to standardize the certification and qualification process for terminal attack controllers to ensure a common capability across the services. The Army needed to develop Soldiers who, from a forward position, could deliver field artillery fire, attack helicopter fire, and fixed-wing aircraft CAS, and direct the actions of joint combat aircraft engaged in operations in close proximity to friendly forces.8 In 2013 FAPO played a key role in establishing a JTAC additional skill identifier (ASI) that would be primarily associated with Ranger and Special Forces formations. Creating the ASI provided the opportunity to define position-based training requirements and furnished the Army with a tool to track and manage JTAC qualified personnel who would be integral to the Army’s new modular organizations.9 Cadet Engagement Strategy. In 2013 the Field Artillery extended a seven-year trend of exceptional recruiting of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and U.S. Military Academy (USMA) cadets by visiting college campuses and service academies to encourage junior cadets to select the Field Artillery as their branch. In the class of 2013, ROTC branched 187 male cadets and 29 female cadets into the Field Artillery. An additional 124 male ROTC cadets and 37 female ROTC cadets were branch detailed into the Field Artillery. This gave the Field Artillery 311 ROTC male cadets and 66 female cadets. The U.S. Military Academy branched 140 male cadets and 18 female cadets into the Field Artillery. The sustained excellence in recruiting provided remarkable encouragement for the future health of the branch.10 Warrant Officer Accessions. During the 2013, FAPO launched a focused warrant officer accession strategy to get the best Field Artillery noncommissioned officers to fill the warrant officer ranks. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 the Field Artillery branch accessioned 24 warrant officers out of 33 noncommissioned officers who applied. However, the total number of fully qualified noncommissioned officers that applied was minimal. The new strategy focused on increasing the number of “best qualified” to apply for warrant officer positions by actively recruiting quality applicants rather than waiting for potential applicants to approach senior 131A Field Artillery warrant officers for ______7“From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” RedLeg Update (Extract), Jan 14, pp. 1-2, Doc I-9. 8Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc I-10. 9Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14. 10Email, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 5 Dec 13, Doc I-11; Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc I-12.

information. After identifying quality applicants, leaders had to ensure that they met the basic requirements outlined by Army Regulation 135-100 by interviewing them with assistance from a senior 131A warrant officer before sending in the warrant officer packet.11 Armywide Physical Demands. The Army and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) initiated future-based physical demands based upon Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 611-21, Military Occupational Classification and Structure. First, FAPO conducted a physical demands review. Beginning in August 2012 and extending through the rest of the year, the Army and FAPO examined all critical tasks, identified related physical demands to execute the critical tasks in each military occupational specialty (MOS) and officer and warrant officer cohort, and worked closely with TRADOC to edit Pamphlet 611-21. This involved rewriting specifications for each MOS to update the physical demands tables and the supporting physical demands worksheets (DA Form 5643-R). Early in 2013, FAPO completed its initial review and rewrite of DA Pamphlet 611-21, staffed its proposals with the Fires Center of Excellence’s Directorate of Training and Doctrine and Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, and then sent its rewrite proposals to TRADOC for further staffing. Ultimately, the review defined physical demands requirements in each Field Artillery MOS to create gender-neutral physical standards.12 Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3. Army G-1 directed all branch proponents in January 2012 to update their respective branch chapters of DA Pam 600-3, The Army Personnel Development System that outlined commissioned officer professional development. Specifically, a chapter in the pamphlet outlined education and assignments to develop and sustain Field Artillery and Fire Support core competencies and to develop the knowledge and skills to operate in joint assignments.13 Given the objectives of the pamphlet and recognizing lessons learned during the past 10 years of combat operations, the update included a number of significant changes to the Field Artillery chapter. The changes placed a strong emphasis on developing Field Artillery officers who were experts across the breadth of the branch and increased emphasis on joint training and assignments. For example, captains would be assigned to a different weapon system than where they had served as a lieutenant. Where it was possible, education and assignments outside of typical field artillery or fire support duties would contribute to the development and broadening of the officer’s core skills. The changes also pointed out that battery command was the only key development position for captains, that battalion fire support officer was not a key development position even though captains should seek to serve in that position, that lieutenants in brigade combat ______11“Focused WO Accessions Strategy: 131A – Field Artillery Targeting Warrant Officer,” RedLeg Update (Extract), 5-13 May 13, pp. 2-3, Doc I-13. 12Email with atch, subj: FAPO Annual History, 18 Mar 13, Doc I-12, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc I-14; Amy L. Robinson, “TRADOC Leads Review of MOS Standards, Gender Integration,” www.army.mil/article/106746, 2 Jul 13, Doc I-15. 13Briefing, subj: FAPO Pre-Command Course, 3 Feb 14, Doc I-7.

teams should serve in company fire support assignments and have at least one firing battery assignment, and that lieutenants in fires brigades should serve in more than one duty assignment to ensure professional development. The changes also addressed female assignments in the Field Artillery, pointed out the roles and functions of targeting warrant officers that included technical and tactical expertise in target mensuration only and collateral damage estimate. Warrant officers would be given an opportunity to certify in both Target Mensuration Only and Collateral Damage Estimate while attending the Warrant Officer Basic Course and the Warrant Officer Advance Course.14 Although the Army endorsed the above recommended changes to the pamphlet, FAPO provided two additional updates to the final draft pamphlet late in 2013. They included integrating Joint Fires Observer certification into the Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course beginning in July 2014 and the most recent Soldier 2020 initiatives and policy changes pertaining to the assignment of female Field Artillery officers. FAPO anticipated release of the pamphlet to come in January 2014.15 Knox, Hamilton, and Gruber Awards and Honorary Colonels and Command Sergeant Majors and Distinguished Members of the Field Artillery. The Field Artillery Proponency Office (FAPO) stood at the forefront of outreach and engagement on behalf of the Chief of Field Artillery and the Command Sergeant Major of the Field Artillery. Notable programs included the Knox, Hamilton, and Gruber Awards and Honorary Colonels, Command Sergeant Majors, and Distinguished Members of the Field Artillery. Named after the father of American artillery, Henry A. Knox who served as the Chief of Artillery in the Continental Army in the American Revolution, the Knox Award recognized the outstanding Active Army Field Artillery battery of the year. The Alexander Hamilton Award was named in honor of Alexander Hamilton, an artilleryman who gallantly fought in the Continental Army during the American Revolution, and acknowledged the outstanding Army National Guard Field Artillery battery of the year, and Gruber Award honored the memory of Edmund L. Gruber who wrote “The Caisson Song” while he was stationed in the Philippines at the beginning of the 20th Century by recognizing an outstanding Field Artillery professional for superior performance during the year. The Henry A. Knox Award for 2013 was presented to A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York. For 2013, B Battery, 1st Battalion, 121st Field Artillery Regiment of the Wisconsin Army National Guard received the Hamilton Award as the best Army National Guard battery. Because of a tie, the 2013 Gruber Award was presented to SFC Christopher R. Schwerin, 3rd Squadron, 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment who served as a fires advisor to the 3rd Brigade, 205th Corps Security Force Assistance Team and 1LT Nathaniel Holcomb, B Battery 1-41st Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, Fort Stewart, Georgia.16 ______14Briefing, subj: FAPO Pre-Command Course, 3 Feb 14. 15Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 28 Mar 13, Doc I-16; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 21 Nov 13, Doc I-17. 16USAFAS Facebook, 11 Feb 14, Doc I-18; Briefing, subj: FAPO Pre-Command Course, 3 Feb 14; Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc I-19.

During the year, the Field Artillery named four honorary colonels of the Field Artillery, three honorary command sergeant majors of the Field Artillery, and 39 distinguished members of the Field Artillery.17 Strategic Communications Office In recent years the Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) Office in the U.S. Army Field Artillery School assumed greater importance. During 2013, STRATCOM drafted themes, messages, and talking points for dissemination throughout the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery. These messages were distributed via an optimal venue or medium to each leader or Soldier. Measures of performance were determined to prove the effectiveness of the message and the response of the audience that included Soldiers, both active duty and National Guard, and foreign military allies. Specifically, STRATCOM informed Field Artillery Soldiers and leaders about the School’s focus on training, modernization, organization, and readiness of the Field Artillery, reported about the available assets to the Warfighter, and shared lessons learned. To get the message out, STRATCOM employed the School’s and Field Artillery’s news and social media, such as Facebook that increased from 3,754 followers in 2012 to 4,351 followers in 2013, the Fort Sill Cannoneer, the Fires Bulletin, and RedLeg Update, Army-wide news and social media, and direct contact through speeches and presentations with leaders and Soldiers.18 During the year, STRATCOM highlighted many key initiatives. These emphasized the Field Artillery School commandant’s priority of modernizing Field Artillery Fires that included the sub-categories of Modernizing Gunnery, revision of Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F (Fire Support Specialist) training, the merger of MOS 13D (Field Artillery Automated Tactical Data Systems Specialist) with MOS 13P (Multiple Launch Rocket System Operations/Fire Direction Specialist), and the modernization of survey. STRATCOM also stressed the Field Artillery’s priority of supporting TRADOC’s Soldier 2020 that included recruiting the best and brightest Soldiers regardless of gender. Additionally, TRADOC’s initiatives of Sexual Harassment and Rape Prevention Program (SHARP), Strategic Land power, Designing the Future Army, and Doctrine 2015 were supported as well.19

WOMEN IN THE ARMY AND THE FIELD ARTILLERY

During 2011, the Field Artillery Proponent Office (FAPO) worked two separate but related issues concerning women in the Army. Tasked by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond T. Odierno, FAPO refined its officer career path for female Field Artillery officers already on active duty during the latter months of the year.

______17Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14. 18Email with atch, subj: STRATCOM Update to 2013 Annual History, 30 Jan 14, Doc I-20. 19Email with atch, subj: STRATCOM Update to 2013 Annual History, 30 Jan 14.

Concurrently, FAPO provided recommendations for future accession strategies for female officers.20 Meanwhile, the Department of the Army issued a short suspense to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in November 2011 to review women in the Army (WITA). Specifically, General Odierno directed an analysis of modifying the Direct Ground Combat Assignment Rule restriction that was adopted on 1 October 1994 because it did not adequately reflect the current operational environment in Iraq and Afghanistan where non-linear warfare persisted. As outlined in 1994, the rule explained that service members were eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they were qualified. Women would be excluded from assignments to units below the brigade level whose primary mission would be engaging in direct combat on the ground.21 After careful analysis the Department of the Army announced a significant policy change in 2012 concerning women in the Army. Army Directive 2012-16 opened three Field Artillery Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) to women (13M, Multiple Launch Rocket System Crewmember; 13P, Multiple Launch Rocket System Fire Direction Specialist; and 13R, Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator). Until then, only MOS 13T (Field Artillery Surveyor/Meteorological Crewmember) was open to women. Effective 14 May 2012, females could serve in units or positions that were doctrinally required to collocate physically with ground combat units. For females, the change in policy permitted them to serve in all duties in Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) battalions. This change allowed the Field Artillery to grow female officers into senior leaders with a firm understanding of gunnery and delivery. In 2012-2013 greater than 90 percent of the female officer population in the Field Artillery was second or first lieutenant. Female officers were serving as platoon leaders in a MLRS or HIMARS unit. Soon, women would be serving as firing battery commanders, battalion executive officers, and battalion operation officers, would have the opportunity to compete for tactical battalion and brigade command in the Field Artillery, and would serve as mentors for those females that followed them.22 ______20Email, subj: SITREP 11-17 Nov 11, Doc I-14, 2011 USAFAS AH. 21Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, et al, subj: Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, 13 Jan 94, Doc I-15, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP 18-23 Nov 11, Doc I-16, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Women in the Army Assignment Policy, Jul 11, Doc I-17, 2011 USAFAS AH; Congressional Research Service, Women in Combat: Issues for Congress, 8 Nov 11, p. 5, Doc I-18, 2011 USAFAS AH; 1998 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 83-86. 22Fires Forward, Jul 2012, Doc I-13, 2012 USAFAS AH; RedLeg Update, Jul 2012, Doc I-14 2012 USAFAS AH; Talking Points for St. Barbara Celebrations, Nov 12, Doc I-15, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Army Directive 2012-16, 27 Jun 12, Doc I-16, 2012 USAFAS AH; Fires Forward, Oct 2012, Doc I-17, 2012 USAFAS AH; Redleg Update, 3-13 Mar 13, Doc I-21; Memorandum for Record (FOUO), subj: Executive Summary for the Fires Brigade Warfighter Forum, 3 Dec 12,

In 2013 the Field Artillery School passed significant milestones. On 15 March 2013 the first females for the newly opened MOSs 13M and P arrived for advanced individual training (AIT). In May 2013 the first AIT classes of 13M and 13P with female soldiers graduated. All active duty females were assigned to the 18th Fires Brigade. In June 2013 another 13P class with females graduated with the active duty females being assigned to the 214th Fires Brigade. On 11 June 2013 the first class of 13Rs with females graduated. Sergeant Pamela Steinman became the first MOS 13M noncommissioned officer upon graduating from advanced individual training. On 13 November 2013 the Army opened all Field Artillery officer (MOS 13A) positions to female officers. Officially, all 13A positions would be changed to gender non-specific positions. Also, the Army permitted the assignment of female Field Artillery officers to brigade combat teams where they could serve as fire support officers at all levels and announced in December 2013 that female officers could serve within a direct support field artillery battalion in a brigade combat team and a cannon battalion in a fires brigade as a fire direction officer, as a cannon platoon leader, and as an executive officer. Fire support positions at the company and battalion level were still closed until the Infantry and Armored MOSs accepted females.23

WARFIGHTER FORUMS

Advanced information technology led to the inception of the Army’s Warfighters’ Forums. Started late in 2005 at Fort Lewis, Washington, the first Warfighters’ Forum, originally called Stryker University, was developed to communicate and share information on the new Stryker units being organized. Late in 2006, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), General Charles C. Campbell, and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General William S. Wallace, witnessed a demonstration of the Stryker University. Because of the success of the Stryker University concept, they decided that it would be invaluable to the Army and encouraged adopting it. Following brainstorming sessions at Fort Lewis, the Army subsequently launched a web-based initiative on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) site known as the Warfighters’ Forum to enhance ______Doc I-22, material used is not FOUO. 23Marie Berberea, “Women Cross More Combat Lines,” 19 Dec 13, www.army.mil/article/117287, Doc I-23; C. Todd Lopez, “Army to Open 33,000 Positions to Female Soldiers in April,” 27 Jan 14, www.army.mil/article/118930, Doc I- 24; Briefing, subj: Integration of Females into MOS 13M, P, R, 22 May 13, Doc I-25; Marie Berberea, “Female NCO Makes History,” 9 May 13, http://sill- www.army.mil/USAFAS/nco_history.html, Doc I-; Caitlin Kenney, “Army Opens More Jobs to Women,” 19 Jul 12, www.army.mil/article/83951, Doc I-27; Marie Berberea, “Field Artillery Training Integrates Women into Combat Specialties,” www.army.mil/article/101378, Doc I-28; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 13 Mar 14, Doc I-29; C. Todd Lopez, “Army Describes Plans for Integrating Women into Combat,” www.army.mil/article/105814, 18 Jun 13, Doc I-30.

training, readiness, and leader development through collaboration and information sharing among the brigade combat teams and functional and multi-functional brigades.24 Although the concept was away ahead of the technology in 2007, the Army adopted and employed it to streamline interaction and staff processes between the operating and generating forces. The initiative recognized the imperative of providing a proactive means to promote collaboration, to share ideas, and to find solutions to common problems across the Army and to learn, innovate, decide, and act faster than the nation’s adversaries.25 The War fighters’ Forum entered its seventh year in 2013. During the year, the Field Artillery School commandant hosted the Armored Brigade Combat Team, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team, and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Field Artillery breakout Warfighting Forum sessions and hosted the Fires Brigade and the Combat Training Center Warfighting Forums. The School also participated in the Armored Brigade Combat Team, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team, and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Warfighter Forums. All forums facilitated exchanging information across the Army and shared situational awareness of the current operating environment between the operating and generating forces. Topics included: doctrine updates, lessons from fires battalion and brigade exercises, precision fires, Army 2020 transformation, Joint Fires Observer sustainment, and others. Other fire support related forums in 2013 included the Division and Corps Fire Support Warfighters’ Forum, the Armor Brigade Combat Team Field Artillery Battalion Warfighters’ Forum, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team Field Artillery Battalion Warfighters’ Forum, and the Stryker’s Brigade Combat Team Field Artillery Battalion Warfighters’ Forum.26

FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL ACCREDITATION

Every three years, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted accreditation visits to its service schools. The command did this to assure that quality education and training was taking place across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains and to promote improvements as required.27 ______24Email with atch, subj: Warfighter Forums 2012, 17 Dec 12, Doc I-22, 2012 USAFAS AH. 25Email with atch, subj: Warfighter Forums 2012, 17 Dec 12. 26Email with atch, subj: Warfighter Forums 2012, 17 Dec 12; Memorandum for Record, subj: Deputy Assistant Commandant’s Comments on 2012 Annual History, 29 May 2013, Doc I-22a; 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj; Updating Warfighters’ Forum for 2013 Annual History, 17 Dec 13, Doc I-31; Executive Summary, Fires Brigade War Fighting Forum, 9 Oct 13, Doc I-32; Executive Summary, Infantry Brigade Combat Team Field Artillery Battalion War Fighting Forum, 16 Oct 13, Doc I-33. 27Fires Center of Excellence Accreditation Booklet, TRADOC Accreditation Team Visit, 21 October -1 November 2013, Doc I-34.

In keeping with the three-year cycle with the previous accreditation being conducted in 2010, TRADOC carried out an accreditation visit to Fort Sill’s Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) on 22-31 October 2013. To prepare FCoE developed a comprehensive plan of action late in 2012 involving all organizations and staff elements with the Quality Assurance Office serving as the oversight agency as directed by the Commanding General of the FCoE, Major General James M. McDonald. Charged by the plan that had an aggressive timeline to ensure that critical actions had taken place and that established in-progress review dates and briefings to the Commanding General of the FCoE, each organization and staff element appointed an action officer to monitor and assist the preparation process to ensure the accurate assessment of accreditation standards during the self-assessment process. In addition, the plan tasked each organization or unit to produce written self-assessments and to develop detailed briefings that outlined each unit’s current status and measures taken to improve so that quality standards were in place and so that the Army Learning Model 2015 was being implemented. Addressing accreditation, General McDonald stressed that it was an opportunity to assess the state of instruction within the FCoE.28 In the midst of preparing for the accreditation visit, Army standards changed. In December 2012 a General Officer Steering Committee chaired by the TRADOC Commanding General revised Army Enterprise Accreditation Standards by deleting those standards and criteria that were more suited for a command inspection program and by refining those that focused on training and education, the competency of the instructional staff, and the incorporation of Army Learning Model 2015 strategies and techniques. This reduced the number of standards from 48 to 28 and permitted the TRADOC Quality and Assurance Office to concentrate on key functions, programs, and activities of Army schools. The new standards went into effect on 1 April 2013, forcing the FCoE to adjust its accreditation plans and timelines.29 The federal government shutdown with attending civilian workforce furloughs caused by the inability to Congress to pass a budget caused additional adjustments. The shutdown forced the FCoE and TRADOC to move accreditation events around even more and even caused both to project pushing the accreditation visit into November 2013 or December 2013 or even into 2014. To minimize the disruption, both agreed to hold the accreditation visit as scheduled in October 2013.30 The accreditation team inspected virtually every aspect of the Field Artillery ______28Briefing, subj: FCoE 2013 Accreditation Timeline, 18 Dec 12, Doc I-20, 2012 USAFAS AH; FCoE Accreditation Booklet, TRADOC Accreditation Team Visit, 21 October-1 November 2013; Memorandum, subj: FCoE Field Artillery School Self- Assessment Executive Summary, 20 Aug 13, Doc I-35; Briefing, subj: FCoE Accreditation Plan/Timeline, 14 Dec 12, updated 22 Aug 13, Doc I-36. 29FCoE Accreditation Booklet, TRADOC Accreditation Team Visit, 21 October-l November 2013; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Revised Army Enterprise Accreditation Standards, 12 Mar 13, Doc I-37. 30Briefing, subj: FCoE Accreditation Plan/Timeline, 14 Dec 12, updated 22 Aug 13.

School, Air Defense Artillery School, and the FCoE. Thirteen evaluators examined everything from programs of instruction to student barracks to range conditions to mentoring to determine adherence to Army Enterprise Accreditation Standards. They evaluated every standard and rated it as met, not met, or met with comment. If a standard was not met or met with comment, the FCoE had to provide a “get well” plan with a timeline. The evaluators found that the Field Artillery School excelled at implementing the learner-centric Army Learning Model 2015, used instructional technology whenever possible, and minimized the “sage-on-the-stage” instructional model. In fact, the team chief noted that the FCoE and the Field Artillery School were head-and-shoulders above other TRADOC centers and schools in these areas.31 In January 2014 the Commanding General of TRADOC, General Robert W. Cone, announced the accreditation team’s findings. He wrote, “HQ TRADOC congratulates your institution [the Field Artillery School] on receiving the designation of ‘Institution of Excellence,’ the highest accreditation level possible.”32 Continuing, General Cone commended the School for its dedication and hard work to achieve this level of distinction.33

SEQUESTRATION

In view of a rising budget that seemed to be out of control by many Americans, including many in Congress, the President of the United States, Barack Obama, signed the Budget Control Act of 2011, commonly called sequestration, in August 2011 to bring an end to the debt ceiling crisis of Fiscal Year (FY) 2011. The act established caps on the amount of money that could be spent through the annual appropriations process for the next 10 years to reduce the deficit and created a joint select committee, sometimes called the super committee, on deficit reduction that was instructed to develop a bill by 15 January 2012 to reduce spending by least another $1.5 trillion over the 10-year period ending with FY 2021. Basically, the Budget Control Act would create across-the-board cuts to defense and nondefense spending to drive Democrats and Republicans to reach a budget compromise. If the committee failed to create budget reduction legislation or its legislation failed to generate the cuts, mandatory cuts would follow with every defense and nondefense program being cut by a certain percentage beginning on 1 January 2013 (FY 2013). The President and Congress never envisioned implementing the act because it was a blunt and indiscriminate way to reduce the deficit over 10 years. Under

______31Information Paper, subj: FCoE Goes through TRADOC Accreditation, 8 Nov 13, Doc I-37a. 32Memorandum with Encls thru: MG James M. McDonald, Cdr, FCoE, for BG Christopher F. Bentley, Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: Notification of Accreditation Status for USAFAS, 10 Jan 14, Doc I-38. 33Memorandum with Encls thru: MG James M. McDonald, Cdr, FCoE, for BG Christopher F. Bentley, Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: Notification of Accreditation Status for USAFAS, 10 Jan 14.

sequestration the Department of Defense’s (DoD) budget for example would drop by $472 million in FY 2013 to FY 2007 levels after adjusting for inflation.34 With sequestration looming in the near future, DoD took steps in 2013 to mitigate consequences. DoD exempted all military personnel funding from sequestration reductions, fully protected funding for wartime operations, fully protected the Wounded Warrior program, and reduced civilian workforce costs by releasing temporary and term employees. DoD also imposed a hiring freeze, authorized voluntary separation incentives and voluntary early retirements, and considered furloughing civilian employees for 22 to 30 noncontiguous days as a last resort.35 Over the next several months, the Department of the Army (DA) directed Fort Sill to take additional actions to reduce its budget. Besides terminating term and temporary employees consistent with mission requirements and implementing a hiring civilian hiring freeze, Fort Sill decreased its base operating funding by 30 percent, curtailed temporary duties and professional training that were not mission essential, cut back professional conferences that were not related to Operation Enduring Freedom, Korea deployments, Homeland Defense, and Division Ready Brigade, reviewed contracts for possible savings, and limited administrative expenses and supply purchases, among other measures. One of these other measures involved furloughing civilian employees in FY 2013 to meet the federal budget target which was reduced significantly from FY 2012.36 On 23 January 2013 the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE), Major General James M. McDonald, explained the severity of the cuts. The budget reductions would decrease funding for critical combat development efforts to create delays, would force cancelling 15 Field Artillery advanced individual training classes, would reduce the number of practical exercises in Basic Officer Leader Courses, Warrant Officer Basic Courses, and Noncommissioned Officer Education System courses to erode skill proficiency, and would reduce equipment readiness below the Army readiness goal of 90 percent, among other critical implications. Also, the civilian hiring

______34Fact Sheet, subj: Budget Control Act, 1 Aug 11, Doc I-39; Fact Sheet, subj: The Budget Control Act and Sequestration, Aug 12, Doc I-40; OMB Report Pursuant to the Sequestration Transparency Act of 2012 (Extract), p. 1, Doc I-41; Congressional Research Service, The Budget Control Act of 2011 (Extract), pp. 1-4, Doc I-42. 35Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj: Handling Budgetary Uncertainty in Fiscal Year 2013, 10 Jan 13, Doc I-43. Note that Congress pushed the January 2013 deadline back to 1 March 2013. This further hurt the budget process for federal agencies because they had less time to implement reductions if Congress failed to pass a budget for FY 2013. 36Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Risk Mitigation in the Face of Fiscal Uncertainty, 16 Jan 13, Doc I-44; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Fiscal Planning Guidance for Budgetary Uncertainty, 16 Jan 13, Doc I-45; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Department of Army Hiring Freeze and Release of Terms and Temporary Civilian Personnel, 22 Jan 13, Doc I-46.

freeze and releasing temporary and term employees would further inhibit meeting mission requirements.37 Even though DoD and Fort Sill took actions to reduce their budgets and to avoid civilian furloughs, they had to implement civilian furloughs in the end. On 20 February 2013 the Secretary of Defense announced executing civilian furloughs. Initially, the DoD envisioned 14 to 22 days that would be spread out over the last three months of the FY 2013 and would influence approximately 700,000 DoD employees. Most of Fort Sill’s 2,800 civilians were furloughed for two days each pay period. This amounted to a pay cut of 20 percent. The furloughs began in July 2013 with 11 scheduled days for the remaining months of FY 2013. As DoD found additional money, it reduced the furlough days from 11 to six.38

______37Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, G8, subj: FY13 Planning for Fiscal Uncertainty, 23 Jan 13, Doc I-47; Memorandum for LTG John F. Campbell, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S. Army, subj: Follow-Up to the Sequestration ROC Drill, 26 Feb 13, 27 Feb 13, Doc I-48. 38Email, subj: Sequestration Message from the Secretary of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Sergeant Major of the Army, 4 Mar 13, Doc I-49; Memorandum for Department of Defense Civilian Employees, 20 Feb 13, Doc I-50; Ltr, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense to Mr. William R. Dougan, President, National Federation of Federal Employees, 20 Feb 13, Doc I-51; Fact Sheet, subj: DoD Announces 11 Days of Furlough, beginning in July, 15 May 13, Doc I-52; PAO, “Fort Sill Prepares for Civilian Furloughs,” 16 May 13, Doc I-53; Fact Sheet, subj: DoD Furlough Timeline, undated, Doc I-54; “Civilian Furloughs to Start 8 Jul,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 3 Jul 13, Doc I-55; Email, subj: Furlough Reduction, 8 Aug 13, Doc I-56.

CHAPTER TWO LEADER DEVELOPMENT: TRAINING AND EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

During 2013, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School trained Army and Marine Field Artillerymen to meet the needs of the nation’s operational forces. The School focused on developing Field Artillery core competencies and a closer synchronization with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) in the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) in the FCoE. To train Soldiers and leaders, the School employed institutional training and distance learning and leveraged training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations and computer applications to enhance training and developed a live, virtual, constructive, and gaming strategy for operational, institutional, and self-development training and education. The Army National Guard, meanwhile, conducted Field Artillery training using Regional Training Institutes located across the United States as a part of The Army School System.

LIVE, VIRTUAL, CONSTRUCTIVE, AND GAMING TRAINING STRATEGY

In 2013 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School announced a Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming Training Strategy to offset limited funding, time, resources, expanding urbanization, and increased competition for training areas. The strategy established a blueprint that focused Field Artillery training and education where simulations might be leveraged. As Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, Commandant of the Field Artillery School, explained, computer simulations or virtual reality provided opportunities to conduct training where live training might be too expensive or dangerous as the 210th Field Artillery Brigade demonstrated when it employed gaming, virtual, and constructive training in 2013. Such training offered the brigade realistic training opportunities, reduced the unit’s training support burden, and helped improve unit readiness. General McKiernan added that virtual training could be leveraged to train gunnery skills; reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position; and leadership and decision making. However, virtual training would never replace live training.1 For the institutional domain, General McKiernan noted the need to leverage virtual technology and simulations, such as the Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) and the Virtual Battlespace2 Fires (VBS2 Fires), to furnish cost-effective training to improve Soldier proficiency. For example, the recent joint training conducted by the Maneuver Center of Excellence, the Aviation Center of Excellence, and the Fires Center of Excellence took advantage of virtual technology. Student officers from the three centers employed immersive technologies and emergent technology to conduct virtual combined ______1McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive and Gaming Training Strategy,” pp. 8- 11, Doc II-1; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “From the Commandant’s Desk,” Redleg Update, 4-13 Apr 13, pp. 1, 5, Doc II-2. 16

arms training without leaving their respective centers. Specifically, Field Artillery second lieutenants provided fire support to maneuver arms captains in a realistic environment without the expense associated with live training by employing the CFFT and VBS2 Fires. Another aspect of the exploiting virtual training in the institutional domain revolved around the School’s modernizing Field Artillery fires strategy that focused on gaming technologies to augment institutional gunnery and ballistic theory training. Through mid-2013, the School employed 52 animations to support gunnery instruction and was building scenarios that would graphically display the principles of ballistics and provide situations requiring the application of advanced ballistics theory and troubleshooting.2 In the self-development domain computer simulations, the Fires Knowledge Network, and compact disks offered the individual soldier opportunities for sustainment and self-development training and provided the opportunity for life-long learning.3

ARMY LEARNING MODEL 2015

In October 2010 the Army launched the Army Learning Concept (ALC) 2015. The concept sought to leverage technology without sacrificing standards so that the Army could provide credible, rigorous, and relevant training and education by tailoring training and by stressing a career-long continuum of learning that was not location dependent. Essentially, ALC 2015 found the existing Army learning model that revolved around the three domains of institutional, operational, and self-development training to be inadequate and pointed out the requirement to take immediate action to develop the capacity for accelerated learning that extended from the organization to the individual Soldier whose knowledge, skills, and abilities would be tested in the most unforgiving environment. As a representative of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) in the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) explained, ALC 2015 centered on ensuring good training and education for all of the Army’s soldiers. Brigadier General Richard C. Longo, formerly the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School and currently the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Brigadier General Paul E. Funk II, Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center-Training, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, added in March 2011 that ALC was learner-centric, engaging, adaptive, rigorous and relevant, and leveraged technologies, such as on-line gaming and the virtual environment, to provide learning experiences that were not bound by “brick and mortar” so that Soldiers could learn any place and anytime.4 ______2McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive and Gaming Training Strategy,” pp. 8- 11. 3Ibid. 4“U.S. Army Launches Army Learning Concept 2015,” Army News, 21 Oct 10, Doc II-10, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Annual Historical Review, 4 Apr 11, Doc II-7, 2010 USAFAS AH; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Version 1.0), The United States Army Learning Concept for 2015, 1 Nov 10, pp. 1-4, Doc II-11, 2010 USAFAS

For the Field Artillery School in 2011, the Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015, described in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 of January 2011, meant shifting training from an instructor-centric to a learner-centric paradigm in a few short years in its initial military training, professional military courses, and functional courses. This meant reducing instructor-led PowerPoint lectures, incorporating virtual and constructive simulations, gaming technology, and other technology-delivered instruction, and converting most classroom experiences into collaborative problem-solving events led by facilitators who would engage learners to think and understand the relevance and context of what they had learned. ALM 2015 also would entail more hands-on instruction.5 In 2012 the Field Artillery School made significant progress transitioning to ALM 2015. The School employed the Jared Monti Hall simulation center that provided robust, scenario-based simulations. Meanwhile, the FCoE leveraged educational technology to support enlisted and officer education by employing virtual task trainers for the M119A2, M109A6, and M777A2 weapons systems.6 The Field Artillery School also collaborated closely with FCoE agencies, such as Quality Assurance Office (QAO), to improve the instructor certification process through better in-house and private-sector education for instructors and training developers and better methodologies for the assessment of training effectiveness. The School supported QAO’s implementation of new ALM 2015-focused training assessment and trending tools to evaluate ALM 2015 venues and to provide trends back to instructors, training developers, and chains of command.7 In addition, the Field Artillery School teamed with FCoE agencies and TRADOC to develop new resourcing models to ensure that the capabilities required for ALM 2015 implementation would be supported with programmed resources.8 ______AH; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Extract), The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015, 20 Jan 11, Foreword, Doc II-18, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, DOTD, 20 Jan 12, Doc II-11, 2011 USAFAS AH; BG Richard C. Longo and BG Paul E. Funk II, “Concept: Developing Adaptable Soldiers, Leaders and Units to Meet the Challenge of Persistent Conflict,” Army, Mar 11, pp. 45-50, Doc II-3. 5“U.S. Army Launches Army Learning Concept 2015,” Army News, 21 Oct 10, Doc II-10, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Annual Historical Review, 4 Apr 11, Doc II-7, 2010 USAFAS AH; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Version 1.0), The United States Army Learning Concept for 2015, 1 Nov 10, pp. 1-4, Doc II-11, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, DOTD, 20 Jan 12, Doc II-19, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Commanding Officer, 428th FAB, 23 Jan 12, Doc II-20, 2011 USAFAS AH. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Extract), The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015, 20 Jan 11, Foreword, pp. 5-9, Doc II-4; Tatjana Christian, “Army Learning Model to Begin Fiscal Year 2015,” 8 Jun 12, www.army.mil/article, Doc II-5. 6Email with atch, subj: Strategies and Integration Division Input, FA School History 2012, 5 Feb 13, Doc II-19, 2012 USAFAS AH. 7Ibid. 8Email with atch, subj: Strategies and Integration Division Input, FA School

Simultaneously, the School leveraged technology to provide credible, rigorous, and relevant training and education for Soldiers and leaders. As explained by Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, Commandant of the Field Artillery School, the School in cooperation with the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Georgia, and Aviation Center of Excellence, Fort Rucker, Alabama, developed a Leader Development Exercise and piloted it in late 2011 and early 2012. Captains attending the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC) at Fort Benning and the Aviation Captain’s Career Course (AVC3) at Fort Rucker and second lieutenants attending the Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course (FA BOLC) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, employed the Virtual Battlespace 2 (VBS2) as a gaming platform that had realistic graphics comparable to state-of-the-art video games and that required the player to see the action through the eyes of his/her avatar and integrated the Call-for-Fire Trainer Plus. This initiative developed a live, virtual, constructive, and gaming instructional methodology to learn maneuver, aviation, and fire support planning and airspace control. Based upon the successful pilot, the School implemented the exercise in 2012 and maintained it as a critical part of FA BOLC in 2013.9 Implementing ALM 2015 continued into 2013. During the year, the School employed simulations, training devices, and gaming technology as effective means to reduce training costs and to improve institutional, self-development, and reach-back training and training-on demand and started developing mobile devices for institutional and self-development training. As the Assistant Commandant for the School, Colonel Martin C. Clausen, explained in April 2013, the School used over 25 systems and non- system training aids, devices, simulations, simulators to enhance training. At the same time the School examined ways to automate Field Artillery fires instruction (gunnery) in ______History 2012, 5 Feb 13, Doc II-20, 2012 USAFAS AH. 9COL Mike Cabrey, “Distinguished the Unique Profession of Field Artillerymen,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 8-9, Doc II-27, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot Program, 18 Jan 12, Doc II-28, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP 9-15 Dec, 15 Dec 11, Doc II-29, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot, 28 Oct 11, Doc II-29a, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot, undated, Doc II-16, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery Commandant’s Huddle, 24 Jan 13, Doc II-17, 2012 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 12, pp. 14-16, Doc II-18, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FA CMDT SITREP, 1 Aug 13, Doc II-6; Email with atch, subj: Cmdt SITREP, 15 Aug 13, Doc II-7; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Looking Back over 2012: The Legacy of the ‘King of Battle’ Continues,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 13, pp. 6-9, Doc II-8; “U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot,” 2012, sill-www.army.mil/USAFAS, Doc II-9; Christian, “Army Learning Model to Begin Fiscal Year 2015.”

the school house with the goal of abandoning analog or manual methods of teaching gunnery and developed a live, and virtual, gaming, and constructive strategy for operational, institutional, and self-development training and education.10 In keeping with the need to make BOLC B learner-centric and to ensure incompliance with the ALM 2015, the School meanwhile started planning and conducting a resource analysis in mid-2013 to adopt small group instruction (SGI). Even though SGI was being implemented for mentorship and professional development only during 2013 and received solid reviews from students and instructors alike, large group instruction of approximately 60 students per group still dominated the BOLC-B curriculum at the end of 2013.11

MODERNIZING FIELD ARTILLERY FIRES

In 2013 the Field Artillery School launched critical initiatives to modernize Field Artillery fires. They included modernizing computational tools; developing the Precision Fires Warrior ensemble; modernizing gunnery instruction in the School with automated tools; redesigning Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F, Fire Support Specialist; merging MOSs 13D, Field Artillery Tactical Data Specialist, and 13P Multiple Launch Rocket System Fire Direction Specialist, to form 13J; and integrating Joint Fires Observer (JFO) certification training in the Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course (FA BOLC-B).12 Precision Fires Warrior and Modernizing Computational Tools As of 2013, the Field Artillery depended upon analog and voice communication tools to locate a target and send the information to the fire direction center. During the first years of the 21st Century, the advent of Global Positioning System (GPS) aided munitions, such as the 155-mm. Excalibur, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary, and the 120-mm. Precision Guided Mortar outpaced the dismounted forward observer’s organic ability to locate targets in a timely and accurate manner. Weight, power, consumption rates, cabling difficulties, and the lack of simultaneous voice and digital transmission means prevented the dismounted forward observer at company and below from exploiting precision munitions. Although Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF) could refine grid coordinates for precision strikes, it generally resided at levels above the dismounted forward observer. As a result, the dismounted forward observer did not have the ability to employ precision munitions ______10Speaking Notes, Training the Field Artillery Force for 2020, 26 Apr 13, Doc II- 10. 11Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 1 Aug 13, Doc II-11; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 12 Sep 13, Doc II-12; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 15 Aug 13, Doc II-13; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 26 Sep 13, Doc II-14; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade PCC Overview, 13 Sep 13; Interview, Dastrup with Dooley, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-15; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, Exec Officer, 428th FAB, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-16. 12Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 13, Doc II-16a.

because he could not provide a precise target location.13 To eliminate this capability gap, the Training and Doctrine Command (TCM) Fires Cell at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and the Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, launched an initiative to revolutionize the dismounted forward observer’s capabilities with the Precision Fires Warrior (PFW) ensemble. Conceived in June 2012, the ensemble included a collection of technology that would be worn by the forward observer on the Integrated Outer Tactical Vest. The heart of the ensemble was the Forward Observer Software (FOS) application located on a ruggedized commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) smart phone called an End User Device (EUD). While running the FOS software, the EUD would be able to display a digital map depicting the selected situational awareness and fire support measures on its five-inch screen. To locate targets precisely, the dismounted warrior/forward observer would employ the hand-held Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS) that would be capable of night observation, target location, and designation and that was under development with fielding scheduled for 2016. Until then, the discounted forward observer would utilize the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 2H (LLDR-2H).14 The precision fires warrior ensemble would give the dismounted forward observer who would also be JFO certified the capability of employing all of the available precision munitions and ability to locate a target for precision munitions without mensuration.15 Modernizing computational tools paralleled the Precision Fires Warrior ensemble. In June 2011 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the AFATDS Increment 2 Capability Development Document. AFATDS Increment II would migrate all field artillery command and control systems under it around 2018-2025. This would include the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED), Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System (Centaur), Forward Observer System, and Joint Automated Deeps Operations Coordination System (JADOCS).16 ______13Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-45, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-116, 2012 USAFAS AH; MAJ Alex Mora and Scott McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Dec 13, pp. 40-41, Doc II-16b. 14Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; “Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-46, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation,” pp. 40-41; Scott McClellan, “Get a Grid: Excellence in Precision Targeting,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 26-28, Doc II-16c; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc II-16d. 15Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; “Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation,” pp. 40- 41; McClellan, “Get a Grid: Excellence in Precision Targeting,” pp. 26-28; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernizaton, 1 May 13. 16“AFATDS Version for U.S. Army,” www.army-technology.com, 25 Jul 12, Doc

Modernizing Gunnery Instruction in the School While technical fire direction was conducted in the Fire Direction Center and on weapon systems using automated systems as both a primary means and as a secondary independent check, the Field Artillery School continued to employ manual or analog methods in 2013 to teach gunnery but pushed to abandon them in favor of automated methods. To satisfy Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015’s key imperative of leveraging technology for training purposes, the School urged operational units to train employing its digital devices and to avoid training in a degraded manual mode. Only rarely should a unit train in a fully degraded manual mode. The School also considered manual gunnery instruction in the schoolhouse to be degraded operations and recognized the imperative of modernizing institutional gunnery training by leveraging existing and emerging technology. The School wanted the bulk of gunnery training to center around simulations, digital devices, immersive technologies, Field Artillery training aids, devices, simulations, and simulators (TADSS), and emerging technologies. This would reduce training time on theory and permit more hands-on instruction that was a key ALM 2015 objective. Essentially, the School had to abandon the graphic firing table, the graphic site table, the chart board, and tabular firing tables to teach gunnery because operational units did not employ them and because automated technology could teach gunnery theory faster and better.17 To this end the Directorate of Training and Doctrine’s (DOTD) Education Technology Branch launched an effort in 2013 to develop automated tools as a means of modernizing gunnery training. This involved collaborating with the Training Brain Operations Center (TBOC) at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop scenarios that would demonstrate targeting procedures conducted by forward observers and would require TBOC to create a Virtual Battle Space 2 (VBS2) model of the new Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR 2H) to be used by virtual forward observers in VBS2. Meanwhile, the Education Technology Branch would create automated storyboards to reinforce the five requirements for accurate fires and to provide students with opportunities to hone their troubleshooting skills any time and any place by developing computer applications.18 ______III-62, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 13, II- 16a; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-78; BG Christopher F. Bentley, “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update, 12-13 Dec 13, pp. 1-3-5, Doc III-82; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-77a. 17Briefing, subj: FA BOLC-B Modernization COA Brief, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-17; “Update on Modernizing Gunnery,” RedLeg Update, Apr 13, p. 2, Doc II-18; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “The Field Artillery Force of 2020,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Aug 13, pp. 6-9, Doc II-19; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14. 18“Update on Modernizing Gunnery,” RedLeg Update, Apr 13, p. 2; Training the Field Artillery Force for 2020 Speaker Notes, undated, Doc II-20; Speaker Notes for Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc II-21; McKiernan, “The Field

By the end of 2013, DOTD’s initiative led to the development of a computer- based troubleshooting application to teach second lieutenants to find and eliminate errors in technical fire direction and to the development of other computer applications. Other computer applications included a Paladin Crew Drill Trainer that provided step-by-step visuals using video and single frame scroll to illustrate each crew members’ required functions for operational units and an Engagement Options and Precision Fires Considerations application for assessing engagement options using a quick reaction force, mortars, air support, traditional field artillery, joint operations attack, or precision munitions. Additional applications included a Ballistics Concepts Trainer, Manual Fire Mission Simulator, and a Fires Integration/Application Capabilities.19 Redesigning MOS 13F During 2013, the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery Proponency Office participated in the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F redesign to facilitate integrated, sequential, and progressive life-long learning for soldiers from advanced individual training to senior level training using the Army Learning Model 2015 and leader development strategy. This initiative would culminate under Modernizing Field Artillery Fires for 2020 within the enlisted ranks.20 Merging MOSs 13D and 13P to form MOS 13J During 2013, the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery Proponency Officer continued working the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13D and 13P merger. Historically, the Field Artillery had two MOSs for fire control – one for cannon and one for rockets. Because of automation and precision munitions and tools, the Field Artillery and the Field Artillery School did not see the requirement for two separate MOSs for fire control. This led to the initiative to merge MOS 13D (Field Artillery Tactical Data Specialist for Cannon) and MOS 13P (Multiple Launch Rocket System Operations/Fire Direction Specialist) into one MOS 13J (Fire Control Specialist). This would build a better model for professional development, eliminate course redundancy, build a sustainable MOS for the future, and develop a more diverse Field Artillery noncommissioned officer.21 Integrating JFO Certification Training into FA BOLC B In 2013 the Field Artillery School and the Joint and Combined Integration (JACI) Directorate in the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) initiated integrating Joint Fires Observer (JFO) certification training in the Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course B (BOLC B) Program of Instruction (POI) as directed by the Field Artillery School ______Artillery Force of 2020,” Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14. 19Information Paper, subj: FCoE DOTD Learning and Innovations Division Product Demonstration Items, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-22; Information Paper, subj: Multimedia Production Branch, Learning Innovations Division, DOTD, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-23. 20“From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” RedLeg Update (Extract), Jan 14, pp. 1-2, Doc II-23a; Field Artillery Commandant’s Huddle, 24 Apr 14, Doc II-23b. 21“From the Command Sergeant Major’s Desk,” RedLeg Update (Extract), Jan 14, pp. 1-2; Email with atch, subj: FAPO, 14 Mar 14, Doc II-23c.

Commandant, Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley, who wanted to train and certify all U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps BOLC-B graduates as JFOs and to provide the operational force and fleet with required JFO officer allocations. Ultimately, this initiative upon would increase the annual JFO production and would meet General Bentley’s objective of certifying every second lieutenant as a JFO before graduating from the Field Artillery BOLC-B course. The training was scheduled to begin with Field Artillery BOLC-B class 6-14 (July 2014).22

GAMING

In 2012-2013 the Directorate of Training and Doctrine’s (DOTD) gaming initiative played a key role in training and education in the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) and the Field Artillery School by bringing live, virtual, and constructive training and education to the Fires professionals in and beyond the school. Gaming permitted students to immerse themselves in true-to-life scenarios to broaden their experience base and intuitive decision making abilities. DOTD played a role by creating training aids and desktop simulations and applications that could be used as part of the total training aids, devices, simulations and simulators (TADSS) training package. The initiative led to the development of a computer-based troubleshooting application to teach second lieutenants to find and eliminate errors in technical fire direction. Other computer applications included a Paladin Crew Drill Trainer that provided step-by-step visuals using video and single frame scroll to illustrate each crew members’ required functions, a Collateral Damage Awareness and Tactical Decision Tool to raise collateral damage awareness, and Engagement Options and Precision Fires Considerations for assessing engagement options using a quick reaction force, mortars, air support, traditional field artillery, joint operations attack, or precision munitions. Additional applications covered internal/external ballistics samplings to visualize ballistics, a Ballistics Concepts Trainer and Manual Fire Mission Simulator.23 Given the competition for training areas and resources, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, reinforced in the summer of 2013 the need to exploit gaming to train the force. From his perspective this involved employing the Virtual Battlespace Simulation Two, the Call-for-Fire Trainer, the Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer, and other virtual, immersive training systems, and those applications being developing through the DOTD gaming initiative.24 ______22Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II-23d; Briefing, subj: FA BOLC-B Redesign, 8 Oct 13, Doc II-23e. 23Information Paper, subj: FCoE DOTD Learning and Innovations Division Product Demonstration Items, 31 Jan 14; Information Paper, subj: Multimedia Production Branch, Learning Innovations Division, DOTD, 31 Jan 14; Email with atch, subj: Input to Gaming 2013 Document, 28 Feb 14, Doc II-24. 24Interview, Dastrup with Dean Keveles, Operations Officer, DOTD, 23 Jan 12, Doc II-10, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, DOTD, 20 Jan 12, Doc II-11, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Dave Henderson, Dep Dir,

LEADER DECISION EXERCISE, VIRTUAL BATTLESPACE SIMULATION TWO, AND FIELD ARTILLERY BASIC OFFICER LEADER COURSE

To foster a realistic training environment between future maneuver commanders and fire support officers and to leverage information technology for instructional purposes as directed by the Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, tasked his subordinates early in 2011 to develop a suitable exercise for Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course (FA BOLC) second lieutenants. General Vandal wanted to give them a perspective on integrating fires in a maneuver operation and to establish realism by working with a maneuver officer attending the Maneuver Captain Career Course (MCCC) at Fort Benning, Georgia. This led to developing a Leadership Development Exercise using the Virtual Battlespace Simulation Two (VBS2) as a gaming platform that had been employed by the U.S. Marine Corps since 2008 and the Field Artillery School for a couple of years and to integrate it with the Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) II Plus which was the institutional version of the CFFT and was a gaming and virtual training system to produce immersive training. While the CFFT was a lightweight, rapidly deployable, observed training system that provided multiple simulated battlefield environments for fire support training purposes, the VBS2 offered realistic battlefield simulations and the ability to operate land, sea, and air vehicles and could be used to teach doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures during squad and platoon offensive, defensive, and patrolling operations. Also, it was suitable for training small teams in urban tactics and entire combat teams in combined arms operations or even non-military usage such as emergency response procedures in lethal and non-lethal environments or terrain visualization. Together, CFFT and VSB2 provided virtual and immersive training for maneuver officers and Field Artillery officers.25 During the latter months of 2011, the Field Artillery School conducted its first Leadership Development Exercise with the MCCC and the Aviation Center employing VBS2 and CFFT II Plus. The exercise teamed captains from the MCCC and Aviation Captain Career Course (ACCC) with FA BOLC second lieutenants. The MCCC students ______DOTD, 17 Jan 12, Doc II-12a, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Mission, 6 Feb 13, Doc II-14, 2012 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “The Field Artillery Force of 2020,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Aug 13, pp. 6-9, Doc II-25. 25Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery, 11 May 11, Doc II-21, 2011 USAFAS AH; White Paper, subj: Virtual Battlespace Simulation Two, 20 Sep 10, p. 5, Doc II-22, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP, 30 Jun 11, Doc II-23, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP, 7 Jul 11, Doc II-24, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP, 23 Jun 11, Doc II-25, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Capabilities (Gaming Tools), 21 Mar 12, Doc II-26, 2011 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive and Gaming Training Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 13, pp. 8-11, Doc II-26; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Looking Back over 2012: The Legacy of the King of Battle Continues,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 6-9, Doc II-8, 2012 USAFAS AH.

assumed the role of company commander, while ACCC captains flew rotary wing aircraft during the simulation. FA BOLC students meanwhile performed company fire support officer duties. This collective virtual exercise exposed maneuver captains and Field Artillery officers to the dynamics of the maneuver commander and fire support officer relationship in planning and executing an operation. The Field Artillery School implemented the exercise in the FA BOLC program of instruction in January 2012. In fact, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, noted that the exercise was successful. As a result, the Leadership Development Exercise remained a critical part of FA BOLC in 2013 and served as an invaluable training exercise that relied upon virtual and immersive training.26

TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATORS, AND SIMULATIONS

In the world of constrained budgets and ever-increasing demands on the Soldiers’ duty time in 2013, the Field Artillery School invested in effective and efficient means to sustain core competencies. To do this, the School leveraged the virtual environment where soldiers felt that they were actually in the field by aggressively pursuing simulations/gaming capabilities to enhance the training and educational experience of individuals and units. 27 Charting a path forward in the virtual world of training, the Field Artillery Commandant’s Office published a live, virtual, constructive, and gaming training strategy in 2013. The strategy furnished a vision and guidance and the ends, ways, and means for training and educating Field Artillery Soldiers and leaders to support operational readiness and individual and collective adaptability and to sustain unit readiness. Equally ______26COL Mike Cabrey, “Distinguished the Unique Profession of Field Artillerymen,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 8-9, Doc II-27, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot Program, 18 Jan 12, Doc II-28, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP 9-15 Dec, 15 Dec 11, Doc II-29, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot, 28 Oct 11, Doc II-29a, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot, undated, Doc II-16, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery Commandant’s Huddle, 24 Jan 13, Doc II-17, 2012 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 12, pp. 14-16, Doc II- 18, 2012 USAFAS AH; FA Cmdt SITREP, 7-18 Jan 13, Doc II-27; Email with atch, subj: FA CMDT SITREP, 1 Aug 13, Doc II-28; Email with atch, subj: Cmdt SITREP, 15 Aug 13, Doc II-29; Email with atch, subj: Cmdt SITREP, 29 Aug 13, Doc II-30. 27Email with atch, subj: Strategies and Integration Division Input, FA School History 2012, 5 Feb 13, Doc II-22, 2012 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive and Gaming Training Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 13, pp. 8- 11, Doc II-31.

important, the strategy advocated employing training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS), such as the Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (FSCATT), the Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (CATT), CATT II and CATT II Plus, and Virtual Battlespace Simulation 2 (VBS2) Fires, to facilitate training.28 Call for Fire Trainer I, Call for Fire Trainer II, Call for Fire Trainer II Plus, and Call for Fire Trainer III With the growing importance of the Joint Fires Observer (JFO) and fully trained fire support specialists, the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) recognized the importance of immersive virtual simulation furnished by the Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT). Using the base CFFT and augmenting software, the FCoE provided an immersive institutional and exportable training capability to brigade combat teams and their fire support personnel/JFOs. During 2012, the CFFT contract underwent a “re-compete” with a new vendor being awarded. In order to differentiate those systems built by the new vendor, the nomenclature CFFT III was established. Major functions/operations would remain unchanged from the CFFT I as the initial CFFT was designated. The CFFT I was a lightweight, rapidly deployable, observed training system that provided simulated battlefield training for fire support specialists at the institutional and unit levels. It had the ability to train all artillery, Type II and III close air support, naval gun fire, and mortar missions. CFFT II represented an improvement over CFFT I with its ability to link with other simulations, command and control systems, or operational platforms. The CFFT II Plus, formerly known as the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System (JETS) that was developed as an experimental prototype, had special mission modules to include the JFO variant and the Joint Close Air Support Modification kit and provided an immersive environment for Army and JFO training that accurately replicated the contemporary operating environment. In the near future, CFFT III would be fielded that would use high fidelity generation technology to create virtual battlefields.29 Virtual Battlespace2 Fires Virtual Battlespace2 (VBS2) Fires was a professional call-for-fire virtual training system that furnished sophisticated training in 2013. VBS2 Fires allowed the user to construct a call-for-fire that the trainee could directly enter into a call-for-fire command and had realistic graphics, comparable to those in video games. Also, the system simulated exterior and terminal ballistics to high levels of detail, supported a wide array ______28Briefing, subj: Training the Field Artillery Force for 2020, 1 May 13, Doc II- 32; “From the Commandant’s Desk,” Redleg Update, 4-13 Apr 13, pp. 1, 5, Doc II-33; McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming Training Strategy,” pp. 8-11; Notes, Training the Field Artillery Force for 2020, 29 May 13, Doc II-34. 29Information Paper, subj: Nova Technologies Chooses Havok Simulation for PEO STRI CFFT Program, 4 Dec 13, Doc II-35; Information Paper, subj: CFFT, 12 Nov 12, Doc II-36; Information Paper, subj: CFFT, 17 Dec 13, Doc II-37; Information Paper, subj; CFFT, 17 Dec 13, Doc II-38; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming Training Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 13, pp. 8-11, Doc II-26; Memorandum for TRADOC Capabilities Manager-Virtual, subj: CFFT Increment II Capabilities Update, 10 Nov 11, Doc II-39.

of munitions, fuse types, and firing platforms, and could run in several configurations (stand-alone mode, training mode, and instructor mode).30

DISTANCE LEARNING

In 2013 the Field Artillery School leveraged information technology to train all Army components effectively and efficiently to a single Total Army standard. For Army National Guard officers and Soldiers, distance learning permitted them to stay at home and train to save costs. Basically, the School’s distance learning program leveraged computers and other information technologies to furnish military occupation specialty qualification courses, additional skill identifier and skill qualification courses, reclassification courses, officer functional area and branch qualification courses, professional military education courses and functional/educational courses.31

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD REGIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTES

Established in the 1990s by Task Force Future Army Schools 21 (FAST-21), the Total Army School System (TASS), a school system comprised of Active Component, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard institutional training systems and renamed The Army School System (TASS) early in the 2000s, played a key role in training the Field Artillery in 2013. During the transition to TASS, Army National Guard State Military Academies converted to Regional Training Institutes (RTI). RTIs furnished standardized resident training using The Army Training System Courseware (TATS-C). The TATS-C course structure and media ensured standardization training for all Soldiers, regardless of component, on course critical tasks to performance standard. This courseware was developed by the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS).32 Originally, seven regions conducted training in support of units within the specified region. This concept changed to training being conducted at designated RTIs where subject matter experts taught only specific courses. In 2013 there were 13 RTIs consisting of five battalions and their eight academically aligned training batteries that offered 39 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) courses and graduated 1,582 students in 171 classes. RTIs implemented single and multi- phase courses to include MOS Training for MOS reclassification and the Advanced Leader Course and the Senior Leader Course for noncommissioned officers, provided mobile training teams, and furnished unit training to help the Field Artillery reset mission as requested. The RTIs did not teach Initial Entry Training (IET). Fort Sill handled all ______30McKiernan, “Live, Virtual, Constructive, and Gaming Training Strategy,” pp. 8-11; SimCentric Technologies, VBS2Fires User Documentation (Extract), Nov 10, Doc II-40. 31Information Paper, subj: G3/7 Scheduling Branch, 17 Dec 12, Doc II-41. 32Email with atch, subj: ARNG Input to 2012 USAFAS AH, 13 Feb 13, Doc II-8, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: ARNG Input to 2013 USAFAS AH, 13 Jan 14, Doc II-42.

IET for MOS 13 soldiers. All RTIs were accredited by the Quality Assurance Office at Fort Sill and were collectively prepared to instruct enlisted courses in all Field Artillery training lanes.33

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Background On 5 February 1959 Fort Sill established the Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer Academy. The first pilot course began in April 1959 with the first 22 students graduating in May 1959. The first expansion of the program of instruction came in 1963 with the development of the two-week Leadership Preparation Course. By 1971 the Academy had responsibility for the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, the Leadership Preparation School, the Instructor Training Course, and the Drill Sergeant School. Because of its diverse missions, the Academy underwent a name change to the Fort Sill Institute. In March 1973 Command Sergeant Major Clifford L. Lewis became the first enlisted commandant of the Institute. In October 1975 the Institute started the Primary Noncommissioned Officer Course for Combat Arms. In May 1977 the Institute only taught noncommissioned officer courses, and the Institute’s name changed to the Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer Career Development Center.34 Overview for 2013 In 2013 the Fires Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) continued improving and refining its efforts to produce tactically and technically proficient noncommissioned officers. Efforts centered on implementing Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015 as outlined in TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, the U.S. Army Learning Concept 2015 (ALC 2015), of 6 June 2011. ALM 2015 met the Army’s need to develop adaptive, thinking Soldiers and leaders who were capable of meeting the challenges encountered in an era of persistent conflict. ALM 2015 also described a learning continuum that meshed together self-development, institutional instruction, and operational experience.35 To this end, NCOA and the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) collaborated to develop five achievable objectives in 2012 to meet the intended outcomes of the various Army concepts and retained them in 2013. The NCOA derived all objectives from mutually supporting documents: The Army ______33Email with atch, subj: ARNG Input to 2013 USAFAS AH, 13 Jan 14; Briefing, subj: ARNG Update to Commandant, Jun 13, Doc II-43; Briefing, subj: ARNG Information Brief to FA CCC-RC, 15 Jun 13, Doc II-44. 34“Sill Begins Leadership Program,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 6 Dec 63, p. 6, Doc II- 27, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: History of Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer Academy, 25 Jan 10, Doc II-28, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, sub: NCOA Input to 2011 Annual History, 14 Feb 12, Doc II-45, 2011 USAFAS AH. 35Email with etch, sub: NCOA Input to 2013 Annual History, 9 Jan 13, Doc II- 27, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: NCOA and NCOES Update to 2013 Annual History, 14 Jan 14, Doc II-45.

Training Concept 2016-2020, The Army Learning Concept 2015, and The Army Functional Concept for Fires 2016-2028.36 Objective one involved producing leaders who were subject matter experts in their core and functional competencies, were critical thinkers and effective communicators who embraced leadership attributes outlined in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army Leadership, the Army Leadership Requirements Model, and were confident operators in decisive actions.37 Objective two integrated operational environment variables into all Advance Leader Course (ALC) and Senior Leader Course (SLC) programs of instruction. Students had to consider all operational variables, political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time variables. Students also had to understand how culture and foreign language application in the region of operation would influence their and the force’s presence to the local noncombatants.38 Objective three focused on developing rigorous “closed book tests that measured levels of learning” for all ALC, SLC, and Electronic Warfare (EW) courses. In keeping with the ALM 2015, Noncommissioned Officer Academy instructors facilitated learning by using software that was built upon outcomes-based training and education. In cooperation with the FCoE Quality Assurance Office and DOTD, the Academy transformed how it presented Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery Professional Military Education and how it assessed student’s knowledge. The Quality Assurance Office and DOTD developed tests measuring levels of knowledge rather than merely knowing where to access the information could.39 Objective four centered on Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) Professional Military Education (PME). In the face of advancing technologies across the Fires force, re-developing, maintaining, and retaining hands-on, lock-step traditional field artillery and air defense artillery skills were more relevant and critical to know. Knowing when and what button to push was irrelevant when global positioning systems and power supplies to systems failed. The Academy’s NCOs had to transition between technologically advancing processes and proven old school doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures equally, expertly, effortlessly and comfortably.40 Objective five directed the NCOA to embrace and support the FCoE. Key to the FCoE was providing a fires curriculum that was the right content and that provided instruction and training at the right time and the right place to the Army, joint partners, interagency partners, and international partners. Foundational to the concept was excellence in training and education and support of life-long learning.41 TRADOC Accreditation Inspection

______36Email with atch, subj: NCOA and NCOES Update to 2013 Annual History, 14 Jan 14. 37Ibid. 38Ibid. 39Ibid. 40Ibid. 41Ibid.

From 21-31 October 2013, the NCOA along with the 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 30th Air Defense Artillery Brigade, and Fires Center of Excellence underwent its tri-annual accreditation. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) looked at 11 of 17 Army Enterprise Area Standards (AESA). TRADOC’s Rating of Record for the NCOA was 100 percent, awarding the Academy its second consecutive, highest possible “Institution of Excellence” rating. Noncommissioned Officer Education System During 2013, the NCOES provided noncommissioned officers with progressive and sequential leader and technical and tactical training relevant to the duties, responsibilities, and missions that they would perform in operational units after graduation. The training and education process began with an initial, branch-immaterial, leadership development course that was followed by a basic branch-specific course, an advanced branch-specific course, and a branch-immaterial senior course.42 Supporting lifelong learning, the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy oversaw the Structured Self Development Program (SSD). SSD linked the operational, self-development, and institutional training domains. SSD participation was mandatory for all Soldiers. Upon graduation from Advanced Individual Training (AIT), Soldiers were automatically enrolled in SSD-I and had to complete four modules comprising 34 lessons that focused on team-level leadership to become eligible for the Warrior Leader Course (WLC). Upon graduation from WLC, Soldiers were automatically enrolled in SSD-II referred to as Advanced Leader Course-Common Core (ALC-CC) and had to complete five modules comprising 28 lessons that focused on squad-level leadership and had to complete ALC-CC to be eligible for selection to attend ALC. ALC graduates were automatically enrolled in SSD-III and had to complete it to attend the Senior Leader Course (SLC). SLC graduates were automatically enrolled in SSD-IV and had to complete it to attend the Sergeants Major Course (SMC). Sergeants Major and Command Sergeants Major were automatically enrolled in SMC and had to complete SSD-V upon completing the SMC.43 Warrior Leader Course The Warrior Leader Course (WLC) of 175 hours served as the first of four courses in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). It helped specialists, sergeants, and staff sergeants develop basic leadership skills, knowledge, and behaviors required to become agile and adaptive leaders. WLC was a branch-immaterial 22-day course that provided basic training in leadership, training, and war fighting. WLC also furnished Soldiers with the opportunity to acquire the leader skills, knowledge, and experience necessary to lead team-level (three to five soldiers) units. The scope of tasks and competencies that WLC addressed furnished both the team and squad-level perspective, where appropriate, and built upon experience gained in previous training and operational assignments. Each WLC student had to complete successfully a land navigation course and was assessed on small unit leadership during a culminating ______42Ibid. 43Ibid., CSM Sam K. Young, “NCOES: Addressing Our Educational Requirements,” Redleg Update, 2-13 Feb 13, pp. 2-3, Doc II-46.

situational training exercise. WLC focused on establishing self-discipline and instilling professional ethics and taught leading, disciplining, and developing Soldiers; planning, executing, and evaluating individual and team training; planning and executing missions and tasks assigned to team-size units; and caring for Soldiers and their families.44 Advanced Leader Course The Advanced Leader Course (ALC) of varying lengths depending upon the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) served as the second of four courses in NCOES. It developed promotable sergeants and staff sergeants to train and lead Soldiers at the section and platoon levels. ALC curriculum had two essay papers – one essay on branch history and one essay on cultural awareness. These essays filled the requirements for military history research and developed a better understanding of culture and foreign language. Further supporting the Army Culture and Foreign Language Program, ALC included cultural discussions in the classroom using talking points from the Army 360 Cultural Training Program. ALC fully integrated resiliency training into each of the eight Fires ALC courses to help Soldiers overcome adversity and furnished demanding, realistic, and relevant leader and military occupational specialty specific training that instilled section, squad, and platoon sergeant level leadership competencies so that section and platoon sergeants could perform their missions. Increasing demands for accurate targeting and use of tactical precision munitions in Iraq and Afghanistan led to 40 hours of precision fires training in the 13F30 Fire Support Sergeant Course. To ease the strain on limited availability of open storage/open discussion classrooms, the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) funded remodeling one classroom into an open discussion room, soon to be open storage classroom capable of accommodating up to 40 students. Live fire exercises were the culminating requirement for 13B Cannon Section Chief, 13D Field Artillery Tactical Data System Specialist, 13M Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Section Chief, and 13P MLRS Operations/Fire Direction Specialist courses. To fulfill live-fire requirements the NCOA possessed two M270A1s (Multiple Launch Rocket System launchers), two M142A1s (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers), two M777 towed 155mm. howitzers, two M109A6 self- propelled 155-mm. howitzers, and two M119A3 towed 105-mm. howitzers, and support vehicles.45 Senior Leader Course The Senior Leader Course (SLC) served as the third of four courses in NCOES. It developed promotable staff sergeants and sergeants first class to serve as a senior noncommissioned officer in a platoon or battery level leadership team. SLC curriculum included two essay papers – one essay on battle analysis methodology and one essay on cultural awareness. Increasing demands for accurate targeting and the use of tactical precision munitions in Iraq and Afghanistan led to 120 hours of precision fires training in the 13F40 Fire Support Senior Sergeant Course. Supporting various simulations ______44Email with atch, subj: NCOA and NCOES Update to 2013 Annual History, 14 Jan 14; Briefing, subj: FCoE NCOA Briefing, 16 Sep 13, Doc II-47. 45Email with atch, subj: NCOA and NCOES Update to 2013 Annual History, 14 Jan 14; Briefing, subj: FCoE NCOA Briefing, 16 Sep 13.

strategies, the Noncommissioned Officer Academy funded Command Posts of the Future (CPOF) incorporating the Fires Integrated Application (FIA) and Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) to introduce rigor to the 13B and 13M Live Fire Exercises in ALC’s 13D, 13F, 13P, 13T and 13R courses. The CPOF would integrate the future Army Common Operating Scenarios into its capability tactical capability.46

428TH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE ACCREDITATION

From 22 October 2013 to 1 November 2013, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) evaluated the 428th Field Artillery Brigade (FAB) as a part of its tri-annual accreditation process. TRADOC evaluated the 428th FAB on 15 Army Enterprise Accreditation Standards (AEAS). The unit met 14 of the 15 with an “exceeded” or “met with comment” rating which earned the brigade a 97.3 percent on overall compliance and the title of “institution of excellence.” During the accreditation, the Field Artillery School identified three resourcing challenges that impacted the ability of school organizations to implement Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015. First, TRADOC and the School had to develop realistic and appropriate resourcing models for instructors, cadre, training developers, and support personnel that would provide the ability to implement ALM goals and objectives. Second, funding for facility upgrades was required to ensure quality educational environments in key Field Artillery School buildings (Burleson Hall, Jared Monti Hall, Snow Hall, and Summerall Hall). Third, TRADOC had to support military personnel manning as close to 100 percent tables of authorization levels as possible.47 The Field Artillery School and 428th FAB agreed that the accreditation process and effort to include the internal self-assessment process was an extremely valuable evaluation tool and proved very worthwhile which improved the efficiency of their organizations and the effectiveness of their instruction. The Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) and TRADOC accreditation efforts played key roles in assisting with the implementation of the ALM 2015 across the FCoE.48

FUNCTIONAL COURSES

Master Gunner Course During 2013, the Field Artillery School conducted a Master Gunners Course that was an additional skill identifier A7 producing course consisting of three modules that were progressively sequenced and interdependent with each other. The course centered ______46Email with atch, subj: NCOE and NCOES Update to 2013 Annual History, 14 Jan 14; Briefing, subj: FCoE NCOA Briefing, 16 Sep 13. 47Email with atchs, subj: 428 FAB Input to 2013 Annual History, 3 Apr 14, Doc II-48; Memorandum for Dir, Quality Assurance Office, TRADOC, subj: USAFAS Acceptance Memorandum after Review of FY 14 USAFAS Accreditation Evaluation Report, 18 Dec 13, Doc II-49. 48Email with atchs, subj: 428 FAB Input to 2013 Annual History, 3 Apr 14.

on an overview of current and future field artillery weapon systems, training management, artillery tables (TC 3-09.8), maintenance management, Army Battle Command Systems training and assessing, and developing unit certification programs. The course consisted of 80 hours/10 days of resident training and was taught to Military Occupational Specialties 13B (Cannon Crewmember), 13D (Field Artillery Tactical Data), 13M (Multiple Launch Rocket System Crewmember), and 13P (Multiple Launch Rocket System Operations/Fire Direction Specialist).49 Field Artillery Weapons Maintenance Course This course was an additional skill identifier U6 producing course. It covered shop safety, maintenance publications, the Army maintenance management system, maintenance of firing components, fire control equipment, and subsystems of the M119A2 and M777A1 howitzers. The course consisted of 120 hours/15 days of resident and mobile training team instruction.50 Paladin Assignment Oriented Training Course The Field Artillery School conducted the Paladin Assignment Oriented Training Course for second lieutenants who had assignments to mechanized units as a platoon leader, a fire direction officer, and a fire support officer following graduation from the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC B). The course provided students with a familiarization of the Paladin M109A6 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer and the Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle. The course provided specialized technical and tactical training required to maintain, operate, and deploy the Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle and the Paladin at section, platoon, and battery levels, to perform crew level maintenance, and to supervise the maintenance and operation of the Automatic Fire Control System and associated equipment with the Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle. Funding cuts forced the School to cancel the course in 2013 and to integrate the training into BOLC B.51 Multiple Launch Rocket System Assignment Oriented Training Course This course trained Field Artillery second lieutenants assigned to a Multiple Launch Rocket System or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System unit after graduating from the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC B). It taught the doctrine and tactics of employing the Multiple Launch Rocket System and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket ______49Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-11, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Documents from Mtg with Chris Atkinson, 10 Feb 14, Doc II-50. 50Email with atch, subj: Functional Courses, 27 Jan 12, Doc II-65, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13; Email, subj: Documents from Mtg with Chris Atkinson, 10 Feb 14. 51Email, subj: Paladin AOT, 31 Jan 12, Doc II-68, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-11, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commanding Officer, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-51; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-52.

System. Instruction included missions and intents; delivery of fires; reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position; combat service support, safety; use of the safety data calculator; operation orders; pre-combat checks and inspections; and digital communications checks. Constrained funding forced the Field Artillery School to cancel the course in 2013 and to integrate it into the BOLC B for second Lieutenants.52 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle Operator Course The course trained soldiers on the operation, employment, and maintenance of the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle and the vehicle’s various weapons systems. The course also provided instruction on safety, tactics, and basic tasks. The Field Artillery School conducted this course five times during Fiscal Year 2012 and cancelled it in 2013 when it integrated the training into the Basic Officer Leader Course B for second lieutenants.53

ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

During 2013, the Field Artillery School conducted nine advanced individual training (AIT) courses as a part of its initial military training mission to train soldiers to be skill level one qualified in Field Artillery core competencies and to provide the operational Army with combat ready Field Artillery Soldiers. The courses included Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) 13B (Cannon Crewmember), 13D (Fire Control Systems Specialist), 13F (Fire Support Specialist), 13M (Multiple Launch Rocket System [MLRS] Crewmember), 13P (MLRS Automated Tactical Data System Specialist), 13R (Firefinder Radar Operator), and 13T (Field Artillery Meteorological/Survey Crewmember). Courses varied in length from the five-week 13B course to the seven- week 13P course. The School included hands-on and field training and battle drills to give the graduates the capability of contributing to their new unit of assignment, while the 13F AIT student received training on precision devices so that they could provide accurate targeting.54

______52Email, subj: MLRS and HIMARS AOT, 31 Jan 12, Doc II-69, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS AOT, 3 Feb 12, Doc II-70, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commander, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-53; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-54. 53ATRRS Course Catalog, Information for Course 250-ASID3, Bradley Fire Support Vehicle Operator, 30 May 13, Doc II-11a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commanding Officer, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-53. 54428 FAB Information Paper, subj: AIT, 15 Jan 13, Doc II-24, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 11 Dec 12, Doc II-25, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 27 Apr 12, Doc II- 26, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: AIT, 19 Dec 13, Doc II-; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade PCC, 13 Sep 13, Doc II-56.

WARRANT OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Warrant Officer Basic Course During 2013, the Field Artillery School conducted three 30-week Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) classes for 131A Field Artillery Warrant Officers that trained the best noncommissioned officers from Military Occupational Specialty 13 (Field Artillery) and 11C (Indirect Fire Infantryman) and that focused at brigade and below operations but discussed levels up to the joint task force headquarters. In three phases (common core, target acquisition and targeting, and precision fires) and a military-decision-making- process capstone exercise, WOBC training included survey techniques, targeting methodology, target acquisition systems employment, and principles and application of fire support to include 120 hours of precision targeting. Designed around a small-group environment, the course allowed the students to interact during the learning process and to be certified in target mensuration and collateral damage estimation. Changes to the course supported Field Artillery fires modernization and the need for targeting warrant officers to possess the ability to employ precision munitions.55 Warrant Officer Advance Course During 2013, three 12-week Warrant Officer Advance Course (WOAC) classes prepared 131A Field Artillery Warrant Officers with the advanced concepts of Army and joint doctrine, familiarized them with the duties of a senior staff officer at division, corps, echelons above corps, made them proficient with the Army targeting process, and included a module on precision fires for target mensuration, collateral damage estimation, and weaponeering, among other things, so that the graduates would know how to request and employ precision guided air-to-surface and surface-to-surface ballistic munitions during combat. Beginning in October 2013, the Field Artillery School required all WOAC graduates to be certified in collateral damage estimate and target mensuration only because of the growth of precision capabilities in the Field Artillery and the modernization of Field Artillery fires.56

OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Basic Officer Leader Courses ______55Information Paper, subj: FA WOBC, 6 Jan 14, Doc II-57; Speaker Notes for Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 29 Apr 13, Doc II-58; “Focused WO Accessions Strategy,” Redleg Update, 5-13 May 13, pp. 2-3, Doc II-59; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 24 Oct 13, Doc II-60; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade PCC Overview, 13 Sep 13, Doc II-61; “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update, Dec 13, pp. 1, 3-5, Doc II-62. 56Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-29, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 27 Apr 12, Doc II-30, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 24 Oct 13, Doc II-60; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade PCC Overview, 13 Sep 13, Doc II-61; “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update, Dec 13, pp. 1, 3-5, Doc II-62.

In 2013 Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC A) and BOLC B formed a two-tier training process for newly commissioned second lieutenants. BOLC A involved pre- commissioning training at the United States Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in American colleges and universities, the Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Army National Guard Officer Candidate Schools. BOLC A was the fundamental building block for all officers within the Army Officer Education System. Following graduation from BOLC A, newly commissioned second lieutenants attended BOLC B to train them in a particular branch.57 Basic Officer Leader Course B Through the BOLC B program of instruction, the Field Artillery School produced Field Artillery second lieutenants who were trained in warrior tasks and warrior battle drills. They were also competent, confident, and adaptable officers who were grounded in the military occupational specialties, were able to conduct full-spectrum operations, were capable of contributing immediately to their new units of assignment, and were able to execute lethal and non-lethal fires.58 During Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, the School conducted eight BOLC B classes of 18 weeks and 4 days each. Presented in three blocks of instruction (platoon leader, fire support, and gunnery) plus common core, BOLC B developed and refined basic skills needed by second lieutenants with training focused on towed-artillery systems (M777A2 and M119A3) to qualify them as a field artillery platoon leader, a company fire support officer, and a fire direction officer and included three weeks of common core tasks, such as basic rifle marksmanship, land navigation, small unit operations, leading a tactical convoy, and resiliency training, among others. Resiliency training centered on preventing suicide, thriving in adversity, and other topics, while training on precision devices prepared Field Artillery second lieutenants to furnish accurate targeting for precision munitions at their first unit of assignment. The four-day Red Leg War served as the capstone training event and gave second lieutenants the opportunity to serve on a gun line and in a fire direction center as well as a fire support officer and platoon leader.59 Because of lessons learned from Afghanistan and the requirement for more joint fires observer qualified officers who were trained to request, control, and adjust surface fires, such as artillery, mortars, and naval gunfire; to provide close air support information to a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) or Forward Airborne ______57ATRRS Course Catalog, Fiscal Year 2013, 6 Jan 14, Doc II-63; Information Paper, subj: FA BOLC B, 6 Jan 14, Doc II-63a. 58Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-29, 2012 USAFAS AH. 59Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 27 Apr 12; Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 11 Dec 12, Doc II-33, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13; Army Training Requirements and Resources System Course Catalog, Fiscal Year 2013, 6 Jan 14, II-63; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commanding Officer, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-64; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade PCC Overview, 13 Sep 13, Doc II-65.

Controller (FAC); and to talk directly to the pilot if authorized by the JTAC, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, introduced an initiative in mid-2011 to add Joint Fires Observer (JFO) familiarization training in the school. This included developing an online JFO course of 20 hours for all second lieutenants and integrating an overview of JFO training to BOLC B during fire support training. Later, Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan added a JFO assignment- oriented training course following graduation from BOLC B for second lieutenants assigned to brigade combat teams. Assignment-orient training began in January 2012 with BOLC B class 7-11. Constrained by limited resources, only a total of 48 second lieutenants received JFO assignment-oriented training in 2012 and 2013.60 Influenced by the value of the JFO as a combat multiplier and the need to bolster fire support capabilities for joint and maneuver commanders, the Field Artillery School wanted to ensure that all second lieutenants graduating from BOLC B were certified JFOs. To this end, Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley subsequent to his arrival in June 2013 to serve as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School took steps to integrate JFO certification training into the BOLC B curriculum by July 2014 so that every BOLC B graduate beginning with BOLC B class 6-14 would be JFO qualified. When the JFO assignment-oriented training ended with BOLC B class 5-14, certified JFO training in BOLC B would be the sole means of producing JFOs and would greatly increase their number in the Field Artillery force.61 ______60Email, subj: Joint Fires Observer Course and Joint Fires Observer Team, 2 Mar 12, Doc II-82, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JFO in 2011, 16 Feb 12, Doc- 78, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: FA BOLC B Course POI Review, 2011, Doc II- 83, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: BOLC/JFO Integration, 2011, Doc II-84, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-46, 2012 USAFAS AH; Sharon McBride, “Joint Fires Observer: Shouldn’t be ‘on the job’ Training,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Oct 11, pp. 20-23, Doc II-57, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: BOLC Brief to CG, 21 Apr 11, Doc II-58, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP, 7 Jul 11, Doc II-58, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL Gary Hisle, Dir, Joint and Combined Integration Directorate, 12 Jan 12, Doc II-59, 2011 USAFAS AH; MAJ Elijah M. Ward, CPT Fred A. Janoe, CAPT Thomas F. Hicks, and CAPT Richard W. Heaser, “Modern Men of Mars: The Evolution of Junior Fire Supporters,” Fires Bulletin, Jan- Feb 12, pp. 36-41, Doc II-60, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-32, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Fort Sill Educators Look at Air Force Pilot Training Practices,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 10 Oct 13, Doc II-66; JACI Opord, 1 Oct 12, Doc II-67; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade PCC Overview, 13 Sep 13; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1- 30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-68. 61BG Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 12, pp. 14-16, Doc II-69; Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery Commandant’s Huddle, 14 Nov 13, Doc II-70; “Fort Sill Educators Look at Air Force Pilot Training Practices,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 10 Oct 13; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 1 Aug 13, Doc II-71; Email with atch, subj: Cmdt SITREP, 29 Aug 13, Doc II-72; Email with atch,

In keeping with the need to make BOLC B learner-centric and in compliance with the Army Learning Model 2015 and the desire to mentor young second lieutenants, the School meanwhile started planning and conducting a resource analysis in mid-2013 to adopt small group instruction (SGI) of 12-16 students per class in the near future. Even though the resource impact of small group instruction had not been completed, the School implemented it in one-hour mentorship sessions held twice a week that received solid reviews from students and instructors alike. Large group instruction of approximately 60 students per class still dominated the curriculum at the end of 2013.62 For several years, the Field Artillery School conducted assignment-oriented follow-on courses – the Paladin Assignment Oriented Training Course and the Multiple Launch Rocket System/High Mobility Artillery Rocket System for second lieutenants that had graduated from BOLC B. The Paladin Assignment Oriented Training Course familiarized second lieutenants assigned to mechanized units as a platoon leader, a fire direction officer, and a fire support officer. The course provided the officer with specialized technical and tactical knowledge required to maintain, operate, and deploy the Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle and the Paladin M109A6 self-propelled howitzer at section, platoon, and battery levels; to perform crew level maintenance; and to supervise the maintenance and operation of the Automatic Fire Control System and associated equipment with the Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle. In 2013 funding cuts forced the School to cancel the course and to integrate the training into BOLC B, but the course was retained in the Army Training Requirements and Resources System.63 Concurrently, the Multiple Launch Rocket System/High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Assignment Oriented Course trained second lieutenants assigned to those systems after graduating from the BOLC B. The course taught the doctrine and tactics of ______subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 21 Nov 13, Doc II-73; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 19 Dec 13, Doc II-74; Briefing, subj: FA BOLC B Redesign COA Decision Brief to FA Cmdt, 29 Oct 13, Doc II-75; “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update, Dec 13, pp. 1, 3-5, Doc II-76; Interview, Dastrup with Dooley, 24 Jan 14; Interview, Dastrup with Atkinson, 31 Jan 14. 62Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History, 22 Feb 14, Doc II-77; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 1 Aug 13, Doc II-77a; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 12 Sep 13, Doc II-77b; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 15 Aug 13, Doc II-77c; Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 26 Sep 13, Doc II-77d; “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update, Dec 13, pp. 1, 3-5; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade PCC Overview, 13 Sep 13; Interview, Dastrup with Dooley, 24 Jan 14; Interview, Dastrup with Atkinson, 31 Jan 14; Briefing, subj: FA BOLC B Redesign COA Decision Brief to FA Cmdt, 29 Oct 13. 63Email, subj: Paladin AOT, 31 Jan 12, Doc II-68, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-11, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commanding Officer, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-64; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-68.

employing the Multiple Launch Rocket System and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. Instruction included missions and intents; delivery of fires; reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position; combat service support; safety; use of the safety data calculator; operation orders; pre-combat checks and inspections; and digital communications checks. Influenced by funding reductions, the School stopped teaching the course in 2013 and integrated the training into BOLC B; but the course remained in the Army Training Requirements and Resource System.64 Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course In Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) conducted six two-phased Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course (FACCC) classes conducted in a small group format of 12-16 students. During the 24-week course, small group leaders (SGL) from the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, or an allied officer from Australia or Canada conducted all instruction. Captains and senior first lieutenants went through a rigorous FACCC that afforded them the last branch-specific training in their career and staff training. The officers received U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) common core instruction and tactical and staff instruction, including training on the military decision making process from the maneuver battalion perspective. FACCC instruction also provided situational-based practical exercises on field artillery core competencies and other learning methodologies to develop agile and adaptive leaders for the full-spectrum battlefield who were technically proficient to serve as a battery commander, a battalion/brigade fire support officer, a field artillery battalion fire direction officer, and a battalion/brigade/brigade combat team staff officer. FACCC also trained students to coordinate lethal and non-lethal fires and effects at the battalion level with an emphasis on lethal effects and included employing precision munitions and fire support coordinator tasks and responsibilities.65 Tasked by Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015 initiated in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015, dated 20 January 2011, the School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics (SALT) at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, meanwhile, developed the Mid-Grade Learning Continuum (MLC) for the Captain’s Career Course in 2011 to meet the requirements of an expeditionary force. MLC 2015 revolved around a tailored, student-centered, life-long learning continuum that established a system of resident and self-development opportunities, designated a common core of skills, and outlined establishing a culture of life-long learning among officers. As a critical part of MLC 2015, the Captain’s Career ______64Email, subj: MLRS and HIMARS AOT, 31 Jan 12, Doc II-69, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS AOT, 3 Feb 12, Doc II-70, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commanding General, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-64; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-68. 65Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History, 22 Feb 14, Doc II-77; Information Paper, subj: FACCC, 23 Jan 14, Doc II-78; Information Paper, subj: FACCC, 23 Jan 14, Doc II-79.

Course (CCC) had a common core curriculum of eight weeks that was designed by SALT and was a multi-branch, small group seminar format designed to facilitate peer-to- peer learning and to foster critical thinking and competencies required for company/battery command and battalion or brigade staff positions. The common core also had a multi-branch battalion-level with brigade-level staff exercise of five to seven days that required students to collaborate, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate their activities to accomplish the mission.66 Between 6 November 2012 and 25 January 2013, the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence conducted a multi-branch common core seminar pilot with Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery CCC officers.67 While the existing common core portion of the career course focused on getting the students to a knowledge comprehension level of learning, the pilot centered on learning information and then applying it in scenarios and emphasized developing critical thinking skills rather than rote memorization. Based upon the successful pilot, the Field Artillery School implemented the new common core instruction in 2013 for CCC using Air Defense Artillery and Field Artillery officers as small group instructors and established the goal of adding Infantry and Armor officers as small group instructors in the near future for new common core. However, the multi- branch common core staff exercise, although piloted in 2013, required more work before implementation.68 Pre-Command Course In 2013 the Field Artillery School conducted a two-week Pre-Command Course for Army colonels, lieutenant colonels, promotable majors, and command sergeant majors. In two blocks of instruction (technical competency and leadership competency) the course prepared officers for battalion and higher command responsibilities.69 Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Reserve Component During the first decade of the 21st Century, the Field Artillery Captain’s Career ______66Trip Report, subj: Multi-Branch CCC STAFFEX Initial Planning Conference, 23-25 Oct 12, Doc II-80; Briefing, subj: CCC Multi-Branch STAFFEX Way Ahead, 30 Oct 12, Doc II-81; Briefing, subj: SALT, 26 Mar 13, Doc II-82; COL William A. Raymond, LTC (Ret) Keith R. Beurskens, and LTC (Ret) Steven M. Carmichael, “The Criticality of Captains’ Education: Now and in the Future,” Military Review, Nov-Dec 10, pp. 51-57, Doc II-83; “Captains Career Course Pilot Underway,” Redleg Update, 1- 13 Jan 13, p. 6, Doc II-84; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade Overview, 13 Sep 13, Doc II-85. 67“Captains Career Course Pilot Underway,” Redleg Update, Jan 13. 68“Captains Career Course Pilot Underway,” Redleg Update, Jan 13; Briefing, subj: CCC Multi-Branch STAFFEX Way Ahead, 30 Oct 12; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Deputy Commanding Officer, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 24 Jan 14, Doc II-86; Interview, Dastrup with Christopher Atkinson, 1-30th Field Artillery Regiment XO, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 31 Jan 14, Doc II-86a. 69Information Paper, subj: USAFAS PCC, 23 Jan 14, Doc II-87; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 13 Sep 13, Doc II-88; Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB Input to 2013 Annual History, 3 Apr 14, Doc II-89.

Course for the Reserve Component (FACCC-RC) went through significant changes. Prior to 2001, it consisted of a series of Army Correspondence Course Program sub- courses followed by a two-week resident phase. The Field Artillery School offered the resident phase approximately three times a year, usually in the summer months, and conducted it in the standard platform instruction format of two weeks of PowerPoint presentations and a final examination. In 2001 the School adopted an internet-based distance learning format for the non-resident phase of FACCC-RC. Twelve computer- based learning modules replaced the existing correspondence program texts. At the same time the two-week resident phase was converted to the small group instruction format. While there had been many updates to the resident portion of the course over the past eight years, the original computer modules for phase one were still used in 2008.70 Meanwhile, the Army and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) expressed concern that the Officer Education System for captains, including Reserve Component captains, did not meet the demands of an Army at war and that Active and Reserve Components’ training had be standardized so that both received the same training. This prompted the Commanding General of TRADOC to publish Operations Order 04-176A in May 2004 that called for the Reserve Component to redesign, develop, pilot, and implement a non-resident version of the Captain’s Career Course no later than 1 October 2006. This order required an FACCC-RC of two, two- week active duty training periods of 120 hours each with two inactive duty training periods between the active duty training periods.71 Upon obtaining the necessary resourcing, the Deputy Assistant Commandant for the Army National Guard at the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery School redesigned FACCC-RC in 2008 based upon the 2004 directions and implemented it in 2009. Since 2009 two options for training Reserve Component captains existed. The captain could attend the resident Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course. In most cases, reserve captains could not take off six months from their civilian employment to attend the course, while states also lacked funds to send them to the resident course. This basically left the second option of taking the four-phase FACCC-RC.72 ______70Memorandum for MG Peter M. Vangjel, subj: Overview of FACCC-RC, 24 Oct 08, Doc II-66, 2008 USAFACFS ACH. 71Memorandum for MG Peter M. Vangjel, subj: Overview of FACCC-RC, 24 Oct 08; Annex A to Operations Order 04-176A, Doc II-67, 2008 USAFACFS ACH. 722008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 45-46; Memorandum for Record, subj: Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Reserve Component, 5 Mar 10, Doc II-68, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); COL Robert W. Roshell and LTC Lawrence M. Terranova, “Education for ARNG FA Officers and NCOs,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 09, pp. 30-34, Doc II-69, 2009 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Assistant Commandant, USAFAS, subj: USAFAS Course Redesign Initiative: Field Artillery Captain-Level Critical Task List, 3 Apr 07, Doc II-70, 2009 USAFAS AH; CPT Bronson M. Sapp, Battery Executive Officer, FACCC, “The Reserve Component Captain’s Career Course,” unpublished paper, undated, Doc II-71, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FACCC-RC Input to 2010 Annual History, 11 Feb 11, Doc II-56,

In 2013 FACCC-RC consisted of four phases for Field Artillery officers in the U.S. Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserves who were unable to attend the resident course. The Field Artillery School built the FACCC-RC around the 13-month model. Once the student started the course, the individual should complete it in 13 months. Phase one (online, self-paced with instructor access) was asynchronous. Students had five or more months to finish the online modules. Completion was a prerequisite for moving into phase two. Phase two was a two-week resident session at Fort Sill that served as a prerequisite to taking phase three. Phase three then followed. This asynchronous phase was Field Artillery specific. Successful completion of this five or more month online phase permitted students to move into phase four that was the second two-week session at Fort Sill.73 Command and General Staff Course: Support of Combined Arms Maneuver/Wide Area Security In 2013 the Field Artillery School conducted two Fires in Support of Combined Arms Maneuver/Wide Area Security (CAM/WAS) preparation courses at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) for Field Artillery majors attending USACGSC. This five-day course prepared fire support officers to be the subject matter expert (SME) in their staff sections by reviewing the basics of fire support for CAM/WAS environment and ensured that the officers were prepared for the school, no matter what positions that they had served in prior to attending. Senior Field Artillery mentors provided information on recent trends, tactics, techniques, and procedures; and precision fires; furnished updates and overviews on doctrine; and gave the students the opportunity to complete a fire support practical exercise. This course was seminar-based in 2013 with groups of 13 to 15 officers per instructor.74

JOINT AND COMBINED INTEGRATION DIRECTORATE

During 2013, the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) continued to deliver and develop its two-fold role of providing the joint and combined focus for the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) and individual training. In the former role it routinely interacted with the Joint Staff, Component Commands, Formation Headquarters, Department of the Army, Forces Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine ______2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Field Artillery Captains Career Course, 15 Jan 14, Doc II-90. 73Information Paper, subj: FACCC-RC, 2013, Doc II-37, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Field Artillery Captains Career Course, 15 Jan 14. 74Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 30 Jan 14, Doc II-91; Trip Report, subj: Combined Army Maneuver/Wide Area Security, 21-26 Jul 13, Doc II-92; Trip Report, subj: Summary Report, 22-25 Jul 13, Doc II-93; Briefing, subj: ILE Fires ISO CAM/WAS, 14-18 Jan 13, Doc II-94; Trip Report, subj: Combined Arms Maneuver/Wide Area Support, 21-24 Jan 14, Doc II-95; Email, subj: CGSC Fires Seminar and ILE, 10 Feb 14, Doc II-96; Email with atch, subj: ILE Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History, 24 Feb 14, Doc II-97.

Command (TRADOC). JACI remained the staff proponent for the Battlefield Coordination Detachments (BCDs). In the latter role it continued to deliver Joint Fires Observer (JFO), electronic warfare (EW) and Targeting/Precision Fires individual training courses, but rising costs caused the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC) to be discontinued in 2013. Additionally, the responsibility for the Foreign Liaison Officers was transferred to the Air Defense and Field Artillery Schools.75 Joint Integration Division The Joint Integration Division represented JACI, FCoE, and the Army at working groups and forums that collaborated with other services, combat commands (COCOMs), and partner nations. The division was the Army’s representative to the Joint Fires Support and Joint Close Air Support Action Officer Working Groups and supported the JACI Director as the O-6 representative and the Commanding General of FCoE as the Army Principal to the Joint Fires Executive Steering Committee. In 2013 the Executive Steering Committee began work to verify and modify as required the Joint Terminal Attack Controller qualification and certification requirements, completed a Digitally Aided Close Air Support Tactics Techniques and Procedures paper, and completed the compilation of airspace and fires coordination measures table and coordination table matrix of definitions and planning considerations. The division was the lead for the Army for the introduction and development of the Joint Air Ground Integration Center (JAGIC), a staff organization that arranged current staff from the Division Fires Cell and the Air Force Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) to more rapidly clear airspace for fires. The Joint Integration Division also coordinated the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) and Ground Liaison Detachment issues for the Field Artillery commandant. During the year, the Joint Integration Division in conjunction with the Air Combat Command (ACC) continued preparing each Active Component (AC) Army division for the alignment of one Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). The 1st Calvary Division and the 1st Infantry Division completed their alignment in Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 with the 9th Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS) and 10th ASOS respectively. The 40th Infantry Division, California Army National Guard also completed a Warfighter Exercise in June 2013 with support from the 168th ASOS (Army National Guard) and executed the first divisional JAGIC concept in support of a Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) warfighter exercise.76 Precision Fires Program In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in 2003, the Army acknowledged that it lacked the ability to mensurate coordinates for the employment of coordinate seeking munitions. At the time the Army relied upon the Air Force to derive mensurated coordinates. Generally, it took up to 24 hours from the time that the target information reached the Air Force until it came back to the Army for engaging. Pushing to reduce the turn around- time, the 75th Field Artillery Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division developed a process in ______75Email with atch, JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II- 98. 76Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14.

2005-2006 to mensurate coordinates using Rainstorm, a National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency validated tool. This reduced turnaround time to minutes. In the meantime, Special Operations Forces employed Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Force’s (PSS-SOF) tool for mensuration. This tool was not validated by the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency until 2009. The 1st Cavalry Division was the first Army unit to apply the mensuration process in combat without the assistance of outside agencies.77 Precision fires represented a critical requirement in the operating environment of the 21st Century. With the strategic risk associated with unnecessary or unwarranted injury and death of non-combatants, precision fires had to be employed effectively. The accurate employment of ballistic and precision munitions would reduce the risk of collateral damage, making coordinate mensuration critical.78 However, a capability gap existed. The Army lacked institutional training for target coordinate mensuration (TCM), weaponeering (the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or non-lethal weapon required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target), and collateral damage estimation (CDE). Such training would reduce target location error for conventional munitions and would be required for the employment of organic coordinate seeking munitions. With this in mind, the Joint and Combined Integration (JACI) Directorate in the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill assumed the lead for developing a precision fires program that would encompass training for TCM, weaponeering, and CDE in 2008.79 After creating a working group in June 2009 that developed a mission essential task list, among other things, and developing a concept plan and a capability needs statement over the next several months, the JACI implemented a precision fires program in September 2010. This program trained fire supporters to conduct TCM, weaponeering, and CDE through three venues. The first venue provided the training in primary military education courses for Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F fire support specialists, MOS 131A targeting warrant officers, and 13A fire support officers to enable operational units to employ indirect fires accurately and effectively while achieving first-round target effects and mitigating collateral damage. The second venue, a functional course, trained MOS 13F forward observers and MOS 131A warrant officers who had not received this training in their primary military education, while mobile training teams, the third venue, furnished unit training in 2010-2011.80 ______77Interview, Dastrup with CW3 Thomas Taccia, JACI, 23 Feb 11, Doc II-63, 2010 USAFAS Annual History (AH); Email with atch, subj: Precision Fires Course Input to 2010 Annual History, 4 Mar 11, Doc II-64, 2010 USAFAS AH. 78Information Paper, subj: The Maneuver Commander’s most versatile and lethal weapon system, “The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” undated, Doc II-73, 2011 USAFAS AH. 79Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2010, Doc II-65, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Program, Oct 10, Doc II-66, 2010 USAFAS AH. 80Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Course 2010, Doc II-74, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: The Maneuver Commander’s Most Versatile and

The Targeting Division in JACI meanwhile received formal recognition of its expertise in targeting. First, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency accredited the Target Coordinate Mensuration Certification Program. Second, the Joint Targeting School accredited the Collateral Damage Estimation Program. With these two accreditations in place, the Army had the ability to certify its Soldiers to use Army and joint precision weapons and to conduct CDE.81 The Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) subsequently recognized the need to expand further its efforts in CDE, Target Mensuration Only (TMO), and Weaponeering and to mainstream precision fires into Professional Military Education (PME). Late in 2011, MG David D. Halverson, FCoE CG, decided to add precision fires to several PME courses. As a result, the FCoE introduced precision fires courses in the Warrant Officer Instruction Branch (WOIB) and the Noncommissioned Officers Academy (NCOA). The WOIB added TMO and Weaponeering to the Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) and TMO to the Warrant Officer Advance Course (WOAC). Both courses provided CDE instruction. Meantime, the NCOA integrated TMO into the MOS 13F Advance Leader Course (ALC) and MOS 13F Senior Leader Course (SLC) and added Weaponeering and CDE to MOS 13F Senior Leader Course. For Soldiers who did not have the opportunity to receive precision fires training or certification through their professional military education, resident and mobile training teams (MTT) trained them.82 In 2013 Precision Fires Resident and Mobile Training Teams (MTT) continued to bridge the gap for soldiers who did not have the opportunity to receive training or certification through their PME. Precision Fires Course (PFC) instructors conducted 66 resident and 72 MTT courses and supported 29 NCOA classes for a total of 177 weeks of precision fires instruction in the United States, Germany, Italy, and Korea. Overall, the PFC instructors trained/certified over 1,900 in TMO, trained over 700 in Weaponeering, and certified over 900 soldiers in CDE.83 As the requests for precision fires training continued to grow, the JACI Targeting Division developed a course of action to increase the number of trained personnel while ______Lethal Weapon System, The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” 2011; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2010, Doc II-65, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Program, Oct 10, Doc II-66, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Taccia, 23 Feb 11, Doc II-63, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Courses, 10 Feb 12, Doc II-75, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Precision Fires Courses Input to 2011 Annual History, 28 Feb 12, Doc II-76, 2011 USAFAS AH; CW4 Thomas Taccia, “The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” Infantry Bulletin, Jun-Aug 11, pp. 9-11, Doc III-98a; Briefing (Extract), subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2 Jul 12, Doc III- 98b. 81Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-40, 2012 USAFAS AH. 82Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13; Personal account: CW5 Robert Tisdale, Precision Fires Division, FCoE, Feb, 13, in Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13. 83Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II-99; Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Courses, 28 Oct 13, Doc III-99a.

still maintaining the ability to support resident training and MTT. After a series of meetings, Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, Field Artillery School Commandant, decided to give TMO and weaponeering instruction responsibility to WOIB and NCOA. This would allow precision fires course instructors to maintain the instruction for the resident and MTT courses.84 JACI Precision Fires course instructors trained and certified instructors in WOIB and NCOA, allowing them to certify students in TMO and to train students in weaponeering. Additionally, the Targeting Division sought assistance from the Field Artillery Commandant’s Office to market the Unit Precision Fires Program where certain soldiers would have the opportunity to become certified TMO instructors. This initiative provided operational units with the ability to certify soldiers in TMO while also providing a certified analyst with a means for maintaining currency. Several units, including the National Training Center, were developing unit precision fires programs in 2012.85 On 1 February 2013 the 101st Air Assault Division developed the first Unit Precision Fires Program with the capability to create analysts outside of JACI Precision Fires courses. This capability allowed the unit and the Army to save training dollars because it did not require MTTs to train TMO analysts. With the success of the 101st Air Assault Division’s program, 1st Armored Division, 10th Mountain Division, 82nd Airborne Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 1st Cavalry Division followed suit by establishing their own certified analysts to ensure that the capability to grow and sustain TMO analysts was maintained.86 With the increase in demand to train Army personnel in these disciplines and the need to have the capability to track as well as place the correct soldiers in the right positions, JACI meanwhile identified the requirement to create Additional Skill Identifiers (ASIs) for TMO and CDE. In August 2013 JACI briefed the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley, about the requirement. With his approval the Precision Fires team started working with the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) and the Field Artillery Proponency Office (FAPO) to ensure ASI approval by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.87 During 2013, JACI continued providing this certified training through three venues. The first was Professional Military Education for MOS 13F ALC and MOS 13 F SLC, MOS 131A WOBC, and MOS 131A WOAC. The second was resident functional courses that were open to all MOS 13Fs and MOS 131As who had not received the training in their professional military education courses. The third was MTT for Army Force Generation support, unit-level training program development, and combatant command training activities when requested. All three venues led to certification in ______84Ibid. 85Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13; “TMO: Maintaining Certification is a Must for Precision Munitions,” RedLeg Update, Dec 12, Doc II-42, 2012 USAFAS AH. 86Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II-100. 87Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14.

TMO, CDE or both.88 Target Mensuration Only and Collateral Damage Estimation and Weaponeering Courses In an environment where collateral damage might have operational or strategic implications, the Army required fires delivery with pinpoint accuracy. The development of precision munitions allowed commanders at all levels to achieve the desired effects on a target with the minimal number of munitions and minimal collateral damage. As the precision requirement grew, the necessity for Soldiers with the skills to employ precision munitions also grew.89 In 2013 the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) served as functional manager for the Target Mensuration Only (TMO) course and Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) and Weaponeering course. Fort Sill conducted resident and mobile training TMO courses to train and certify personnel assigned to fire support and targeting cells to conduct target mensuration through a National Geospatial Intelligence Agency accredited training certification program. Those attending the course included staff personnel who provided support to the targeting process as well as personnel who delivered coordinate seeking munitions, such as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System munition and the Excalibur 155-mm. munition. The program consisted of target coordinate mensuration certification and program accreditation using Digital Precision Strike Suite, Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Forces, and Precision Fires Image software.90 In resident and mobile training team formats, the CDE and Weaponeering Course trained and certified personnel assigned to fire support and targeting cells to conduct collateral damage estimation and to support the effective employment of joint and organic fire support assets.91 Joint Fires Observer Course Prompted by the 4th Infantry Division’s inability to access joint fires because of the shortage of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) and Army modularization that exacerbated the shortage, the Air Force and Army created the Joint Fires Observer (JFO). Although the Air Force planned to increase the number of JTACs in sufficient numbers to have one at the maneuver company by 2012 by training more at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), the Army envisioned using the JFO at the maneuver platoon level as the eyes of the JTAC. Recognizing that the JFO course conducted by the 57th Operations Group at Nellis AFB could not produce sufficient numbers of JFOs to satisfy its requirements, the ______88COL John T. Smith, “Training for Joint Operations,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 18-22, Doc II-101. 89Fact Sheet, subj: TMO: Maintaining Certification is a Must for Precision Munitions, 30 May 13, Doc II-43, 2012 USAFAS AH. 90Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Target Mensuration Only Course, 30 May 13, Doc II-44, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: TMO: Maintaining Certification is a Must for Precision Munitions, 12 Feb 14, Doc II-102. 91Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Collateral Damage Estimation Course, 30 May 13, Doc II-45, 2012 USAFAS AH.

Army decided to train its own. As agreed upon by the Air Force and Army, Fort Sill developed a JFO course. Following a successful pilot course conducted by the Joint and Combined Integration (JACI) Directorate at Fort Sill in September 2005 using resources from the 138th Fighter Wing of the Oklahoma Army National Guard, the Army and Air Force signed a memorandum of agreement on 14 November 2005 to support the Fort Sill course. Thus, two JFO schools existed – one at Nellis AFB and one at Fort Sill – in 2005. Two years later in 2007, Nellis AFB stopped its JFO course. This prompted Fort Sill to increase its capacity to train JFOs employing resident and mobile training and to become the sole source of JFO training.92 In 2013 instructors from the Army, Air Force Detachment 1, 6th Combat Training Squadron (CTS) from Nellis AFB, Army and Air Force guest instructors, and contract instructors from FSCX company who were former JTACS and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F (Fire Support Specialist) taught JFO resident and mobile training team courses. The courses provided training to integrate joint fires for JFOs who were key members of the joint fire support team, were the eyes of the JTAC, and resided at the brigade combat team level.93 Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course The Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC) was designed and delivered in a fiscally unconstrained environment and proved to be a successful and popular course. In 2013, however, significant financial constraint imposed through ______92FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 19, Doc II-67, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Governor’s Report 2010, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-68, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Air Force 2010, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-69, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with LtCol Rustan S. Schwichtenberg, Cdr, 138th Combat Training Flight, JACI, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-70, 2010 USAFAS AH; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 48; Information Paper, subj: JFO Course Information, 1 Dec 05, Doc II-100, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email, subj: JFOs, 10 Jan 06, Doc II-101, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, and the U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, and the United States Special Operations Command, Director, Operations Support Group for Joint Fires Observer, 14 Nov 05, Doc II-102, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations and Training, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, 13 Oct 05, Doc II-103, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email, subj: JFO Information, 10 Jan 06, Doc II-103a, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email, subj: Number of JTACs required, 10 Jan 06, Doc II-104, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Commander’s Statement - FY06 TRADOC Budget Guidance, undated, Doc II-105, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email with atch, subj: JFO and 138th Flight Input to 2010 Annual History, 28 Feb 11, Doc II-71, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atch, Dastrup with LTC Michael A. Todd, JACI, 10 Feb 12, Doc II-77, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JFO in 2011, 16 Feb 12, Doc II-78, 2011 USAFAS AH. 93COL John T. Smith, “Training for Joint Operations,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 18-22, Doc II-103; “The JFO – New JOF MOA Sustainment Guidance,” Redleg Update, Nov 13, pp. 3-4, Doc II-104.

sequestration led to a detailed review of expenditures across all training programs. This clearly showed that Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) could no longer resource expensive JOFEC training to the same level that had been possible in 2012. Because constrained costs meant cutting some training and because the Field Artillery Commandant ranked JOFEC below the Joint Fires Observer course and precision fires courses, the FCoE cancelled the course. The last iteration of JOFEC was delivered at Fort Sill in June 2013.94 Joint Fires Observer Team The Joint Fires Observer Team found 2013 to be another productive and exciting year. During the year, instructors from the Army, Air National Guard, Detachment 1, 6th Combat Training Squadron (CTS), JTAC guest instructors, and contract instructors from FSCX taught 13 Joint Fires Observer (JFO) resident and 15 Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) assignment-oriented (AOT) courses at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and 20 JFO mobile training team (MTT) courses at select Forces Command (FORSCOM) installations. These courses produced 957 certified JFOs and greatly enhanced the brigade combat teams’ ability to train with and interoperate with Division Air Support Operations Center (ASOSs) and their Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs). Of note were two MTTs that trained in locations where training had not been conducted prior to 2013. A MTT provided JFO training for 2nd Infantry Division in Korea; and a MTT trained JFOs at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin.95 Throughout 2013, the JFO team represented the FCoE and JACI in other significant ways. Members of the JFO team provided assistance for two Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee (JFS-ECS) support accreditation team visits to the U.S. Marine Corps JFO School at Fort Sill, and the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group-Atlantic (EWTGLANT) at the U.S. Marine Corps JFO School. In both instances, the team reviewed lesson plans, courseware, testing and reference materials, practical exercises, and simulation devices and recommended the Joint Staff to accredit both courses. The JFO team also participated in numerous joint fires training exercises that helped hone their JFO and joint fires skills. These training events took place at Smokey Hill Bombing Range in Salina, Kansas; Dyess Air Force Base, Texas; Gila Bend Bombing Range, Arizona; and Navy Special Operations, Virginia. During all joint fires training exercises, JFO and JTAC skill sets were being performed as well as joint tactics, techniques and procedures. The exercises also built joint partnerships. The JFO team provided JFO briefs and demonstrations to senior representatives from FCoE, Hungary, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Germany, Japan, Korea, and the United Kingdom.96 ______94Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II-105; Email with atch, subj: JOFEC Cancellation Background Info, 17 Mar 14, Doc II-106. 95Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II-107; Email with atch, subj: JAC History 2013, 27 Feb 14, Doc II-108. 96Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14; Memorandum for Chairman, Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee, subj: Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Atlantic Joint fires Observer Course Biennial

The JFO noncommissioned officer in charge additionally participated in the Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) Symposium in May 2013 in which the revision began for the JFO Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and briefed the Army’s JFO course curriculum as a best practice for other JFO programs to emulate. In 2013 the JFO team made numerous improvements to its curriculum that incorporated Army Learning Model 2015 principles. These improvements included more simulation rehearsal time, additional small-group instruction, and a field training exercise. The JFO team also initiated the integration of JFO certification within the Field Artillery BOLC B Program of Instruction (POI) as directed by the Field Artillery School Commandant, Brigadier General Christopher F. Bentley, who wanted to train and certify all U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps BOLC B graduates as JFOs and to provide the operational force and fleet with required JFO officer allocations. Ultimately, this initiative upon would increase the annual JFO production from an average of 1,100 to an average of 1,500 (enlisted and officer) and would meet General Bentley’s objective of certifying every second lieutenant as a JFO before graduating from the Field Artillery BOLC B course. The training was scheduled to begin with Field Artillery BOLC B class 6-14 (July 2014).97 Another initiative that would carry over from 2013 into 2014 involved working with the Maneuver Center of Excellence to integrate JFO familiarization classes into the Infantry and Armor Basic Officer Leader Course POIs. This concept would begin in March 2014 with JFO familiarization classes being taught at the Infantry school and later at the Armor school.98 As JFO team transitioned from 2013 to 2014, it had the goal of continuing to conduct world-class training in the JFO course, while simultaneously assisting with multiple FCoE-directed initiatives that would in the long-run benefit the entire Army in its knowledge and access to Joint Fires.99

NON-LETHAL TRAINING

Electronic Warfare Courses Early in the 21st Century, the Army renewed its interest in electronic warfare as a part of information-age warfare. On 30 October 2003 the Department of Defense ______Accreditation Review, 4 Mar 13, Doc II-109; Memorandum for Chairman, Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee, subj: Marine Corps Artillery Detachment Joint Fires Observer Course Initial Accreditation Review, 11 Feb 13, Doc II-110. 97Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14; Briefing, subj: FA BOLC-B Redesign, 8 Oct 13, Doc II-111. 98Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14; Email, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 26 Sep 13, Doc II-; Email, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 10 Oct 13, Doc II-113; Email, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 24 Oct 13, Doc II-114; Email, subj: FA Cmdt SITREP, 21 Nov 13, Doc II-115. 99Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II-107.

concluded that electronic warfare capabilities had to be improved to meet advances in the application and the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to deny adversarial situational awareness, to disrupt command and control, and to develop targeting solutions to defeat weapons while protecting the United States’ electronic capabilities from being successfully attacked. Initially, the Army’s Military Intelligence branch oversaw electronic warfare as part of its intelligence collection activities. However, improvised electronic devices (IED) employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to attack U.S ground forces prompted the Army to shift electronic warfare from Military Intelligence to the Field Artillery and to stress its operational capability to jam radio signals that detonated the IED rather than its collection responsibilities.100 This transfer soon generated action. On 15 May 2004 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) designated the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the specified proponent for electronic warfare in the Army and tasked CAC to identify requirements. Later on 23 November 2004, the CAC commander, Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, directed the Commander of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), renamed U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) late in 2005, to take the lead for the Army’s electronic warfare attack for brigade, division, and corps and for doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements. Working with CAC, USAFACFS developed a plan early in 2005 to revitalize electronic warfare within the Army, to establish roles and responsibilities for electronic warfare functions, to update electronic warfare DOTMLPF, and to design, develop, and execute a course of instruction for electronic warfare that eventually led to development of the Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course in 2007.101 Subsequently in May 2006, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter W. Chiarelli, strengthened the Army’s operational electronic warfare capabilities. That month he directed the Army G-3 to establish electronic warfare as an enduring core warfighting competency within the Army and specifically tasked the G-3 to develop an electronic warfare force structure and operational concepts to strengthen the Army’s strategic vision and support the ground force component commander. This would ______100Email with atch, subj: FA Vision and Transformation, 4 Apr 06, Doc III-12, 2005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), Annual Command History (ACH); Briefing, subj: Electronic Attack Mission Analysis Brief, 23 Feb 05, Doc III-13, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Field Manual 34-45, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Electronic Attack (Extract), Jun 2000, Chapter One, Doc III-14, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006, Doc II- 77, 2010 USAFAS AH. 101Briefing, subj: Electronic Attack Mission Analysis Brief, 23 Feb 05, Doc II-64, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Field Manual 34-45, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Electronic Attack (Extract), Jun 2000, Chapter One; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006, Doc II-77, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC James J. Looney, EW-JACI, 19 Jan 12, Doc II-85, 2011 USAFAS AH.

enhance the Army’s ability to counter electronic threats proactively, to permit integrating kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities across the Army, and to mitigate the threat of electromagnetic spectrum being employed by America’s enemies, such as IEDs that had been so deadly in the War of Terrorism.102 To meet the immediate requirement for Army electronic warfare personnel and guidance by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and the Fires Center of Excellence developed two electronic warfare courses under the direction of CAC. The Intelligence School developed a Tactical Electronic Warfare Practioneers Course that awarded an additional skill identifier (ASI) 1K and that focused on countering radio-controlled improvised explosive devices. Meanwhile, the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill conducted a pilot Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course (AOEWC) in October 2006 and January 2007 to train electronic warfare officers to plan, integrate, synchronize, and execute electronic warfare according to the commander’s scheme of maneuver. This six-week course awarded an ASI 1J and served as a foundation course for electronic warfare.103 AOEWC also served as a bridging strategy until an electronic warfare force structure could be stood up and until Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 29 could be established. In August 2008 CAC directed the FCoE to develop an electronic warfare officer functional course, an electronic warfare warrant officer integrator course, and an electronic warfare enlisted personnel integrator course. This would permit the Army to field its own electronic warfare personnel to replace those provided by the Air Force and

______102Fact Sheet, subj: Electronic Warfare Career Field, 14 Jan 10, Doc II-78, 2010 USAFAS AH; “Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability,” Army News Service, 7 Dec 06, Doc II-79, 2010 USAFAS AH; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006, Doc II-77, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC James J. Looney, EW-DOTD, 14 Feb 11, Doc II-80, 2010 USAFAS AH; “New Career Field: Electronic Warfare,” Army News Service, 6 Feb 09, Doc II-81, 2010 USAFAS AH; Shirley Dismuke, “Electronic Warfare: The Newest Military Career Field Choice,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 64-66, Doc II-86, 2011 USAFAS AH. 103Email, subj: EW MOS for Enlisted Soldiers and EW Functional Area for Officers, 23 Feb 07, Doc II-67, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Briefing, subj: Army Electronic Warfare, 4 Jan 07, Doc II-68, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Interview, Dastrup with Alvin W. Peterson, Jr., Northrup Grumman, EW Course Developer, 23 Feb 07, Doc II-66, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Fact Sheet, subj: Electronic Warfare Career Field, 14 Jan 10, Doc II- 78, 2010 USAFAS AH; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006, Doc II-77, 2010 USAFAS AH; “Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability,” Army News Service, 7 Dec 06, Doc II-79, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Electronic Operational Warfare Course, 10 Mar 09, Doc II-117, 2009 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH; Briefing, subj: Fort Sill EW Courses, 2011, Doc II-87, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Electronic Warfare Input to 2011 Annual History, 1 Mar 12, Doc II-88, 2011 USAFAS AH.

Navy.104 On 1 March 2009 the MOSs for Noncommissioned Officers and Warrant Officers were approved awarding MOS 29E (Electronic Warfare Specialist) to graduates of the Electronic Warfare Specialist Course and MOS 290A (Electronic Warfare Targeting Technician) to graduates of the Electronic Warfare Targeting Technician Basic Course (Warrant Officer). Later, FCoE added Functional Area 29 for officers.105 In 2013 the U.S. Army Electronic Warfare School taught two electronic warfare courses to satisfy training requirements for Functional Area 29 for officers, two courses to satisfy MOS 290A for warrant officers, five courses to satisfy MOS 29E for enlisted soldiers, and five courses to satisfy AOEWC requirements. The U.S. Army Electronic Warfare School also developed and validated two Advanced Professional Military Education (PME) Courses for Enlisted and Warrant Officer EW personnel. The Electronic Warfare School conducted two 29E Pilot Senior Leader Courses (SLC) and two 290A Pilot Warrant Officer Advanced Courses that resulted in the validation of both PME courses.106 Special Technical Operations Course Based on lessons learned from past and current operations, the Army acknowledged a need for an enduring capability for Special Technical Operations (STO) training to train Army personnel how to use special access programs (SAP) that controlled access to the most sensitive Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities, information, technologies, and operations so that combatant commanders could use SAP in their planning processes and mission execution. The Army developed the U.S. Army Special Technical Operations Course (USASTOPC) in 2005 to fill a critical training gap. Since its inception in 2006, the USASTOPC continued to see increased attendance. The Army assessed that the force required additional information to fully leverage STO capabilities.107 ______104Interview, Dastrup with Looney, 14 Feb 11, Doc II-80, 2010 USAFAS AH; CAC OPORD 08-231a Electronic Warfare Roles and Responsibilities, 18 Aug 08, Doc II-82, 2010 USAFAS AH. 105MILPER Message 09-088, Title: FY10 Warrant Officer Military Occupational Classification and Structure (MOCS) Personnel Reclassification Actions, 22 Apr 09, Doc II-50, 2012 USAFAS AH; MILPER Message 09-089, Title: FY 10 Enlisted Military Occupational Classification and Structure (MOCS) Personnel Reclassification Actions, 22 Apr 09, Doc II-51, 2012 USAFAS AH. 106Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II-107; Information Paper, subj: Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course, 7 Jan 14, Doc II-116; Information Paper, subj: Electronic Warfare Officers Course, 7 Jan 14, Doc II-117; Information Paper, subj: Army Operational Electronic Warfare Specialist course, 7 Jan 14, Doc II-118; Information Paper, subj: Electronic Warfare Technical Warrant Officer Basic Course, 7 Jan 14, Doc II-119; COL John T. Smith, “Training for Joint Operations,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 18-22, Doc II-120; Email with atch, subj: JACI Input for USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II-107. 107Email with atch, subj: Source Documents for Special Technical Operations, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-55, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Special Technical Operations, 24

On 27 July 2010 the Army tasked the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to institutionalize STO in order to establish it as an enduring capability within the Army. In turn, TRADOC directed the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill to provide the facilities and training oversight. The Army further stipulated that a STO facility would be established at the FCoE. FCoE submitted a concept plan that received Army approval in April 2012. The concept plan received Army validation for four Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) requirements for the FCoE. Key to this effort was effective leader development, TRADOC’s number one priority. TRADOC would further develop key aspects of training, education, and experience by establishing a more integrated and functioning STO presence at key institutions.108 Given that the Joint and Combined Directorate (JACI) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, trained Army, Joint, and Coalition commanders and staff on the coordination, integration and synchronization of lethal and non-lethal fires and effects, it was only natural for TRADOC to charge JACI with the STO mission. The Army provided funding to the FCoE to build a STO facility in which the resident STO planner’s course would be conducted.109 In 2013 JACI was authorized to form a Special Activities Division with a STO facility accredited to conduct operations at the top secret level. A Lieutenant Colonel from the FA40 (Space Operations Officer) community was appointed in August 2013; and the program gained traction and has since made significant progress. Authorization was received to hire three civilian contractors; and work on the facility neared completion. The Special Activities Division now had its first “certified” instructor and certifier. On assuming responsibility for training, JACI worked with the Asymmetric Warfare Group that had the instructor pool to deliver courses. Five mobile training teams provided the opportunity for 52 personnel to complete the US Army Special Technical Operations Course in 2013.110

______Mar 14, Doc II-121; DoD Directive (Extract), Number 5205.07, 1 Jul 10, Doc II-122. 108Email with atch, subj: Source Documents for Special Technical Operations, 7 Mar 13; Memorandum for Cdr, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, subj: Special Technical Operations Concept Plan, 26 Apr 12, Doc II-56, 2012 USAFAS AH. Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-40, 2012 USAFAS AH. 109Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13. 110Email with atch, subj: JACI Input to USAFAS Annual History, 13 Feb 14, Doc II-107.

CHAPTER THREE COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS: FORCE DESIGN, DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS

INTRODUCTION

During the 2013, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School worked in cooperation with the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate to make the Field Artillery more lethal, deployable, mobile, and responsive to meet the current and future operational environment and to be a vital part of the joint forces team. This involved participating in force design and doctrine updates, introducing new fire support systems, testing new concepts, and modernizing Field Artillery equipment.

FORCE DESIGN AND DOCTRINE

Field Artillery Modernization Strategy: Field Artillery Force of 2020 Early in 2013, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School and Chief of Field Artillery, Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, introduced the Field Artillery Modernization Strategy. After briefly discussing the continuing need to assess capabilities of potential adversaries, General Mckiernan explained that the Field Artillery Modernization Strategy was part of the Fires Force Modernization Strategy and provided a roadmap to deliver required operational capabilities for the Army of 2020. The strategy revolved around improving target acquisition capabilities, modernizing delivery systems, fielding precision munitions, and enhancing mission command.1 Addressing target acquisition systems, General McKiernan noted the movement from eight different aging and high maintenance 90-degree sensor systems to two, 360- degree systems with state-of-the-art electronics as being critical. In the near future the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) mounted AN/TPQ-50 Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar (LCMR) and the truck-mounted AN/TPQ-53 Quick Reaction Capability Radar would become the Field Artillery’s primary target acquisition radars. The AN/TPQ-53 would reduce operational and support costs, would provide 90- to 360-degree capability to detect and classify targets, would track incoming mortar, artillery, and rocket projectiles, and would have a minimum range of 500 meters and a maximum range of 60 kilometers. In comparison, the Q-50 that was scheduled for fielding in Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 would be a short-range radar and complement the Q-53 that was scheduled for fielding in FY 2014. Other targeting devices included the Laser Designator Rangefinder-Handheld (LLDR-2H) that was fielded in 2013 and the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS) under development. Until the JETS could be fielded in 2016, the Field Artillery would employ the Quick Reaction Capability hand-held precision targeting device that would give the dismounted forward observer the ability to ______1BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-1. 56

acquire targets accurately.2 Enhancing delivery systems and munitions played an important role in moving to the Army of 2020. The Paladin Integrated Management would address obsolescence and sustainment issues of the current M109A6 Paladin and the M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Supply Vehicle (FAASV), while digitized the M119A3 105-mm. towed howitzer would leverage software from the M777A2 155-mm. towed howitzer to maximize commonality in operations and training and to minimize cost. In the meantime, precision munitions, such as the Excalibur and the Precision Guidance Kit, and area fire munitions remained a critical aspect of modernization. The M1130 105- mm. high explosive (HE) pre-formed fragmentation projectile was fielded during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and provided greater lethality than the M1 HE, M760 HE, M913 HE, and M927 HE projectiles. The M483 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions re-use program utilized de-militarized Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) projectile bodies and other parts for use in the M1122 training projectile, XM1123 extended-range infrared illumination projectile, and XM1124 extended-range visible illumination projectile.3 For the past 20 years, the Field Artillery employed the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) as its primary mission command system. With the Army’s shift to all mission command software into a single common operating environment, the Fires Center of Excellence initiated action to converge all fire support system software/applications into the AFATDS Increment II software system. Eventually, the Effects Management Tool (EMT), Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (JADOCS), Forward Observer System (FOS), Pocket-size Forward Entry Device (PFED), Precision Fires Manager (PFM), Profiler, and CENTAUR would be migrated to AFATDS Increment II. By FY 2018 the Field Artillery School and Fires Center of Excellence planned to have AFATDS Increment II fielded. This action would streamline training, ease training requirements, and save resources. The Joint Air Ground Integration Cell (JAGIC), meanwhile, would enhance ground and air integration of airspace at the division.4 Grade Plate Review During the first decade of the 21st Century, combat and force structure adjustments to support combat operations and the disapportionate growth in the number of majors driven in part by modularity and the excessive promotion rates to major encouraged the Army to conduct a grade plate review. To this end the Army directed each career military field (CMF) to review and nominate positions to be reduced in grade and provided the Field Artillery with a significant target to achieve. These targets included most senior grade positions for officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members of the branch. For officers, grade plate reductions meant reducing colonel positions to lieutenant colonel positions, lieutenant colonel positions to major positions, and major positions to captain positions. For enlisted personnel, this involved reducing master ______2Ibid. 3Ibid. 4Ibid.

sergeant positions to sergeant first class positions and sergeant first class positions to staff sergeant positions.5 In 2012-2013 the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) Force Design team at Fort Sill and the Field Artillery School’s Field Artillery Proponency Office (FAPO) identified field grade officers (O4-O6), senior chief warrant officers (W3-W4), and senior noncommissioned officers (E6-E9) positions within Standard Requirements Code (SRC) 06 (Field Artillery Organizations) that could be rolled down (reduced to a lower position) to enable the Army to achieve a viable, sustainable, and acceptable grade plate pyramid while maintaining operational force capabilities within an acceptable level of risk.6 Army 2020 Redesign Late in 2011, the Army initiated Army 2020 Redesign and directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to design Army 2020 with the capabilities required to support the Joint Force and to posture the Army to succeed in an era of constrained resources. The design effort reduced Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) from 73 to 60 and added a third maneuver battalion to the Armored BCT and the Infantry BCT. This prompted changes to the Field Artillery force structure by creating a 3x6 composite fires battalion for the Infantry BCT (two M119A3 batteries and one M777A2 battery), a third field artillery battalion for the Armored BCT, a firing platoon fire direction cell to support distributed operations for two-gun pairs in Infantry BCT, and an executive officer position at the firing battery in all BCTs. The changes also added one 13D40 Field Artillery Tactical Data fires control noncommissioned officer and one 13D10 Field Artillery Tactical Data fires control specialist to the battery fire direction cell, a fifth crew member for all BCT Q-53 Radars, a Chief Warrant Officer Three as a targeting warrant officer to the Stryker BCT fires cell (eliminated during 2008 BCT holistic review), and a Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) capability in the all BCT reconnaissance ______5Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-1, 2012 USAFAS AH; “ARCIC FDD Leads Recent Officer Grade Plate Review,” www.army.mil, 5 Apr 11, Doc III-2, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FAPO Annual History, 18 Mar 13, Doc I-12, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2012-2013, Army 2020 Redesign and Fires Command Force Design Update, History GPR, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-3, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Cmdt SITREP, 29 Aug 13, Doc III-2; FA Cmdt SITREP, 6-17 Aug 13, Doc III-3. 6Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-1, 2012 USAFAS AH; “ARCIC FDD Leads Recent Officer Grade Plate Review,” www.army.mil, 5 Apr 11, Doc III-2, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FAPO Annual History, 18 Mar 13, Doc I-12, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2012-2013, Army 2020 Redesign and Fires Command Force Design Update, History GPR, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-3, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Cmdt SITREP, 29 Aug 13; FA Cmdt SITREP, 6-17 Aug 13; Riccio, “ARCIC FDD Leads Recent Officer Grade Plate Review;” Email, subj: Grade Plate Review, 2 Apr 14, Doc III-5.

squadrons. Also, the Infantry BCT reconnaissance squadron platoon forward observer would be equipped with M1200 COLT equipment package. The platoon forward observer could be re-missioned to perform COLT functions when required. In addition, the dual mission company Fire Support Team (FIST) in Heavy BCT and Stryker BCT could perform COLT functions when required.7 The redesign also standardized BCTs target acquisition platoons with two Q-53 radar systems and four Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar (Q-50) sections, reorganized BCTs fire support personnel into the fires battalion, and retained the current Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM) cell capability in all formations.8 As a part of the Army 2020 effort, a new Sustainment Concept of Support was developed to address known capability gaps based on Army 2020 initiatives to better support the BCT, maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB), fires brigade (FiB), and other functional/multi-functional units operating in the Division Area of Operation and not simply focusing on a resourcing solution. As a result, the Fires Brigade’s Brigade Support Battalion was reduced from 248 to 136 positions thereby placing a greater reliance on habitually aligned Division Combat Service Support Battalions (CSSBs) to provide support to the Fires Brigade and Echelons above Brigade (EAB) battalions. All Army 2020 decisions were approved and would be implemented in Total Army Analysis (TAA) 15-19. Unit conversions would begin in 2014 and would be completed by 2016.9 Fires Command: DIVARTY and Corps Field Artillery Brigade At the beginning of the 21st Century, the Army introduced the modular brigade combat team (BCT) and functional brigade concept to provide the capability to deliver responsive fires to maneuver commanders by placing fires battalions within the BCT and furnishing fires brigades to support BCTs, divisions, corps, or joint task forces. This eliminated senior Field Artillery command headquarters at the division and corps levels for the integration of fires and training and readiness oversight and left the force with an inadequate number of force Field Artillery headquarters to support divisions and corps. Specifically, six (going to seven) active component Fires Brigades supported 14 divisions and corps headquarters as well as the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea. The modular organization assumed that BCTs could provide sufficient training, readiness, and administrative oversight to their organic fires battalions and that a small number of fires brigades could function as a Force Field Artillery headquarters for divisions, corps, or joint task forces. Operational experience demonstrated the assumptions to be invalid.10 ______7Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-3, 2012 USAFAS AH. 8Ibid. 9Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13; Email with atch, subj: Grade Plate Review, Army 2020 Design, and Army Doctrine, 1 Apr 14, Doc III-6. 10LTC Sean Bateman and MAJ Steven Hady, “King of Battle Once Again: An Organizational Design to Effectively Integrate Fires in Support of Tactical, Operational and Strategic Force,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 23-25, Doc III-7; Shirley Dismuke, “The 2013 State of Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Aug 13, pp. 14-15, Doc III-8; Email with

As the Army projected returning to combined arms operations and executing regionally aligned force missions, the modular design created several capability gaps. The echelon above brigade mission command Field Artillery force structure and organizational design did not sufficiently meet the combatant commander requirements as part of the Joint Force; and it lacked the ability to integrate and synchronize fires effectively at the division and the corps in support of unified land operations. The organization also lacked the ability to provide training and readiness oversight of Fires battalions in the brigade combat teams and could not provide consistent fire support certifications and leader development. Soon after becoming the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE), Major General James M. McDonald, submitted a force design update in December 2012 to the Army to re-establish Field Artillery command headquarters in echelons above brigade at division and corps levels.11 The proposal established a division artillery (DIVARTY) without organic firing units for each active component division. The DIVARTY would be assigned to each active component division, would be stationed with the division, and would coordinate, integrate, and synchronize fires to achieve the division commander’s objectives, while the DIVARTY commander would serve as the Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) for the division. Moreover, the DIVARTY could be tailored with a variety of fires battalions (rocket and cannon), unmanned aerial systems, and counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (CRAM)/indirect fire protection capability units, could integrate and deliver fires, and would furnish mission command for training management and certification of BCT fires battalions and fires cell.12 Also, the proposal provided for a Field Artillery brigade to be assigned to each active component corps and one with the U.S. Eighth Army in Korea. While the Field Artillery brigade would coordinate, integrate, and synchronize fires, would provide long- range precision fires to the corps, and would give the corps/U.S. Eighth Army commander a headquarters that would plan, prepare, execute, and assess fires in support of operations, and would provide the capability for counterstrike throughout the corps area of operations, the Field Artillery brigade commander would serve as the FSCOORD for the corps. In addition, the corps Field Artillery brigade would train and certify its ______atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14, Doc III-9; Email with atch, subj: Dr. Dastrup History, 28 Mar 14, Doc III-10; Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14, Doc III-11. 11Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14; Bateman and Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” pp. 23-25; Dismuke, “The 2013 State of Fires,” pp. 14-15; Email with atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: Dr. Dastrup’s History, 28 Mar 14; Interview, Dastrup with James McClary, Concepts Development Division, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, 18 Mar 14, Doc III-12. 12Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14; Bateman and Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” pp. 23-25; Dismuke, “The 2013 State of Fires,” pp. 14-15; Email with atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: Dr. Dastrup’s History, 28 Mar 14.

subordinate Field Artillery battalions and allocate them to the division as required to provide reinforcing fires.13 In October 2013 the Army approved the echelon above brigade force design update. It created 10 DIVARTYS that would be assigned to the 10 active component divisions and retained four active component fires brigades that would be assigned to each corps and the Eighth Army. Later, the Army authorized redesignating fires battalions in the BCT and echelons above BCTs as field artillery battalions. To standardize naming convention within Field Artillery units, General McDonald also changed the Fires Brigade to the Field Artillery Brigade.14 FCoE’s force design update modified the existing Field Artillery brigade in the Army National Guard with the same organizational design as the Active Component. The existing Army National Guard Field Artillery brigades would provide flexibility to the Total Army and would perform the same functions as the active component Field Artillery brigades. However, they would be aligned with Army National Guard divisions for training affiliation, would be capable of serving as a DIVARTY to support Army National Guard divisions during deployment, or would provide reinforcing and counterfire capability to active component corps and joint task forces.15 Army Doctrine On 23 August 2011 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Robert W. Cone, issued Doctrine 2015 guidance. Once completed, Doctrine 2015 would give the Army well-defined enduring principles, tactics, and standard procedures. The transition to Doctrine 2015 required all doctrine publications to be reviewed and separated into new categories. Even though resources would be constrained, General Cone added, TRADOC had to produce quality doctrine by its best and brightest. He concluded, “In summary, we need to make the development and implementation of Doctrine 2015 a priority. We must seize the initiative we now enjoy as we reflect on this decade of war our Army has fought. We have too many hard earned lessons, and we must capitalize on the talent we have across our force to ensure the next fight we find our Army in we can win upon arrival.”16 In his guidance General Cone established key priorities. First, he wanted Army Doctrine Publications (ADP)/Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP) to be completed by August 2012. Second, he directed field manuals to be finished by ______13Bateman and Hady, “King of Battle Once Again,” pp. 23-25; Email with atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14. 14Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14; Memorandum for CG, TRADOC, subj: Renaming all Fires Battalions and Fires Brigades, 3 Jan 14, Doc III-13; Email with atchs, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14, Doc III-13a; Army Staffing Form, 19 Sep 13, Doc III- 14; Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 2 Apr 14, Doc III-15. 15Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 1 Apr 14; Email with atch, subj: Another DIVARTY Paper, 18 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: DIVARTY, 2 Apr 14. 16Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Doctrine 2015 Guidance, 23 Aug 11, Doc III-6, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Army Doctrine 2015, 7 Mar 12, Doc III-7, 2011 USAFAS AH.

December 2013. Third, he wanted technique publications to be written by December 2015. To accomplish these goals, service schools, such as the Field Artillery School, could increase their manning levels commensurate with the workload and fill the positions with the best qualified personnel who would be competitive for battalion command and beyond and had recent operational experience, subject matter expertise, and a fundamental understanding of Army concepts.17 Besides increasing the number of people required to write the publications, the Field Artillery School started writing its ADP, ADRP, Field Manuals, and Army Techniques Publications during 2011. On 6 January 2012 the School submitted the initial draft of ADP 3-09 that explained the fundamental principles of fire support and the initial draft of ADRP 3-09 that provided detailed information on fire support fundamentals to the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth and meanwhile initiated work on Field Manual (FM) 3-09, Field Artillery Operations that would focus on fire support tactics and procedures.18 In August 2012 the Army published and distributed ADP 3-09 and ADRP 3-09, both written by a team from Forces Command (FORCSOM), the Air Defense, and the Field Artillery. A Department of Army publication, an ADP contained the fundamental principles that guided military forces’ actions and expressed them so that Army forces could seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. ADP 3-09 incorporated air and missile defense and electronic attack in the Army fires warfighting function, included fires from other services, and provided fires doctrine that would enable the development of interoperable, networked, and integrated systems that were capable of executing multiple missions throughout unified action. ADRP 3-09, meanwhile, served as a doctrinal manual for commanders, leaders, and staffs of the fires warfighting function and furnished a detailed explanation of all doctrinal principles in support of offensive and defensive tasks.19 Subsequently late in 2013, a writing team distributed drafts of FM 3-09, Field Artillery Operations, and FM 3-01, Air and Missile Defense, for staffing and eventual publication. With an intended audience of maneuver commanders and their staffs, this revised version of the 2011 FM 3-09, released in December 2013, consisted of four ______17Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Doctrine 2015 Guidance, 23 Aug 11; Interview, Dastrup with Bo Bielinski, FA Supervisor, Doc Div, DOTD, 15 Feb 12, Doc III-8, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Army Doctrine 2015, 7 Mar 12. 18Interview, Dastrup with Bielinski, 15 Feb 12; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Doctrine Update, 20 Jan 12, Doc III-9, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Army Doctrine 2015, 7 Mar 12. 19“Update on Doctrine,” Redleg Update, Aug 12, p. 2, Doc III-4, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Doctrine 2015 Information Briefing, undated, Doc II-5, 2012 USAFAS AH; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 12, pp. 14-16, Doc III-6, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Revised FM 3-09 is in the Works,” Redleg Update, 2-13 Feb 13, Doc III-7, 2012 USAFAS AH; ADRP 3-09 (Extract), Fires, Aug 12, Preface, Doc III-16; ADP 3-09 (Extract), Fires, Introduction, Doc III-17.

chapters that covered Field Artillery operations, fire support, fire support and the operations process, and fire support coordination and other control measures. Essentially, the 2013 FM 3-09 gave the maneuver arms a single field manual on how the Field Artillery supported the maneuver missions during unified land operations.20 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies Late in 2008, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) directed the Sustainment Center of Excellence at Fort Lee, Virginia, and Centers of Excellence to conduct an analysis to support the Department of the Army’s development of a tactical wheeled vehicle strategy and implementation plan. As the lead, the Sustainment Center of Excellence/Combined Arms Support Center set out to examine the operational impact and risk of reducing the brigade’s objective table of organization and equipment (TOE) tactical wheeled vehicles by 10, 20, and 40 percent respectively within each phase of the Army Force Regeneration cycle. Essentially, the study, later called Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) Study I, aimed to determine if the Army had too many trucks, to develop approaches to optimize the number of tactical wheeled vehicles across the Army, and to analyze the risk of reducing tactical wheeled vehicles.21 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study I examined the operational impact and risk of reducing the number of brigade tactical wheeled vehicles. Started in 2008 and completed in 2009, the study reduced the size of the Army’s tactical wheeled vehicle fleet in the eight brigade types (infantry brigade combat team, heavy brigade combat team, Stryker brigade combat team, battlefield surveillance brigade, fires brigade, combat aviation brigade, maneuver enhancement brigade, and sustainment brigade) and replaced smaller capacity vehicles with larger capacity vehicles.22 Prompted by budget considerations to reduce the number of wheeled vehicles even more, the Army initiated the Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Studies II and III. Study II looked at echelons above brigade for more reductions. Influenced by budget considerations, the Army launched Tactical Wheeled Study III to refine the number of tactical wheeled vehicles further. At a conference on 9-10 September 2010, the Study III team reviewed several courses of action and selected its objective course of action. It ______20 “Revised FM 3-09 is in the Works;” Sharon McBride, “FM 3-09 Field Artillery Operations and the Fire Support is the ‘Go To’ Document for Maneuver and Fires Commanders,” Redleg Update, Nov 13, p. 6, Doc III-18; BG Christopher F. Bentley, “2013 Year in Review,” Redleg Update, Dec 13, pp. 1-5, Doc III-19. 212008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 65; Interview, Dastrup with Gary Wilds, CDID, 5 Apr 11, Doc III-8, 2010 USAFAS, AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Army 2020 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy Kick-Off IPT, 24 Feb 12, Doc III-20, 2011 USAFAS AH. 22Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7, 3rd Quarter 2009, p. 7, Doc III-23, 2009 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Wilds, 5 Apr 11; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 11, Doc III-9, 2010 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Reduction Study III, 15 Sep 10, Doc III-10, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Jun 10, p. 12, Doc III-11, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: WV Studies and MRAP 2010, 8 Apr 11, Doc III-12, 2010 USAFAS AH.

could (1) reduce Army Force Generation tactical wheeled vehicle equipping, (2) create two-level TOEs across all phases of Army Force Generation with units in the available phase having their full TOE requirements, (3) further reduce TOE requirements and keep constant tactical wheeled vehicle fill levels through all phases of Army Force Generation, (4) create installation-based pooling where units in the available phase could fill their TOE requirements from pooled assets, or (5) make further reductions to TOE requirements. Of the five courses of action, the team selected options two, three, and five for further analysis. Even before the options could be evaluated, funding constraints required an additional cut in the number of tactical wheeled vehicles. This led to reducing the number of vehicles in the tables of distribution and allowances (TDA) Army in 2011 as a part of the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study III. Together, the three studies of 2008-2011 reduced the tactical wheeled fleet by 20,000 vehicles.23 Meanwhile, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) asked what does a 170,000- vehicle Army look like, prompting the Army to take more aggressive action to reduce its tactical wheeled vehicle fleet even more. Although Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study IV that was developed to examine further tactical wheeled vehicle reductions to meet the 170,000 goal and the Army 2020 Study that was designed to scrutinize future force structure had been initiated as separate studies, the Army merged them in 2011 because it could not discuss the number of tactical wheeled vehicles required without knowing the future force structure that would be created by Army 2020.24 Early 2012, the Army therefore directed TRADOC to identify the impact and risk of reducing the TWV fleet from 233,000 to 170,000 vehicles as part of the TWV Study IV. Led by Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), the Army’s initial plan reduced TWV fleet in three parts. First, the plan had to identify minimum quantity and vehicle types for offensive and defensive operations, assessment and re-baseline. This would become the new requirement. Second, it had to identify vehicles for pooling and divestment, while retaining the minimum essential equipment required for training. Third, it had to identify vehicles (mainly MRAPs) required to augment units for stability operations. These reductions were based on the Army 2020 TWV strategy that the Army did not use 100 percent of its vehicles, 100 percent of the time. ARCIC asked the Centers of Excellence (CoE) to begin by assessing the impact of a target 20 percent reduction to each Standard Requirement Code (SRC). Upon completion of the 20 percent reduction, analysis planners realized that TWV reductions created a significant impact and ______23FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 28, Doc III-13, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Gary Wilds, CDID, 28 Feb 12, Doc III-21, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Army 2020 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy Kick-Off IPT, 24 Feb 12; Email with atch, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2011, 13 Mar 12, Doc III-22, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Reductions and Pooling Recommendations, undated, Doc III-8, 2012 USAFAS AH. 24Interview, Dastrup with Wilds, 28 Feb 12; Briefing (Extract), subj: Army 2020 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy Kick-Off IPT, 24 Feb 12; Email with atch, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2011, 13 Mar 12; Briefing, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Reduction and Pooling Recommendations, undated.

unacceptable risk to combined arms maneuver (CAM). All CoE recommended reductions had to be based on acceptable levels of risk. The acceptable levels of risk across proponents turned out to be an average reduction of eight percent. Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery averaged between 8-10 percent across all formations for a loss of over 600 vehicles in their formations.25 To identify the effect that these reductions would have on mobility and the unit’s ability to perform it mission, the Army directed the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Requirements Management Office (TWVRMO) and Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) to conduct a mobility study utilizing the proponents’ recommended TWV reductions to analyze the unit’s ability to transport personnel and equipment in one lift. This analysis provided the SRC with the actual mobility rating and identified the residual amount of personnel and equipment which could not be transported in one lift. The SRCs that exceeded their doctrine mobility requirement would be required to take additional reductions.26 In February 2013 the Chief of Staff of the Army approved all TWV IV 13,363 reductions for documentation and directed TWV Study V to identify additional reductions. Basically, the Chief of Staff voiced concern that the TWV Study IV reduction was not enough and did not view the availability of TWVs as more crucial than keeping BCT force structure intact. TWV V identified three lines of effort (LOE). Line of effort one centered on further TWV requirement reductions. Line of effort two called for substituting non-tactical vehicles for tactical wheeled vehicles, and line of effort three revolved around vehicle pooling at regional or installation level. ARCIC did not support line of effort three because HQ DA G-8 was pursuing a similar effort. Of the three lines of effort, only line of effort one – TWV requirement reductions – was completely analyzed and studied.27 In support of the TWV Study V effort the Army officially tasked TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) at Fort Lee, Virginia, in August 2013 with support from the Centers of Excellence to conduct modeling of a division taskforce using SRC with reduced TWVs as a risk and operational assessment, leading to five courses of action in line of one effort. TRAC selected three for further analysis. Course of action one ______25Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-9, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Army 2020 TWV Mobility Study, 1-2 Star In-Progress Review, 23 Jan 13, Doc III-10, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: TWV Study V, Jan 14, Doc III-20. 26Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13; Briefing, subj: Army 2020 TWV Mobility Study, 1-2 Star In-Progress Review, 23 Jan 13; Email with atchs, subj: Addition TWV Documents, 31 Mar 14, Doc III-20a. 27Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13; Briefing, subj: Army 2020 TWV Mobility Study, 1-2 Star In-Progress Review, 23 Jan 13; Briefing (Extract), subj: TWV Study V, Jan 14; Email with atchs, subj: Additional TWV Documents, 31 Mar 14, Doc III-21; Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13; Briefing, subj: Army 2020 TWV Mobility Study, 1-2 Star In-Progress Review, 23 Jan 13; Briefing (Extract), subj: TWV Study V, Jan 14.

(some/balanced mobility) balanced mobility reduction in requirements that would reduce excess mobility within those SRCs having a mobility rating that exceeded at least 10 percent of their documented mobility requirement. Course of action three (more) represented a proponent identified level of reduction in TWV requirements (without the use of non-tactical vehicle substitution) and an acceptable level of reductions in TWV. Course of action five (most) represented at least a 20 percent reduction from the course of action one and did not make use of non-tactical vehicle substitution. Upon the completion of the risk and operational assessment, ARCIC selected course of action one and sent it to the Chief of Staff of the Army for a decision.28 In February 2014 the Chief of Staff of the Army reluctantly approved course of action one with additional 575 reductions for documentation, but he was not pleased with the overall reduction effort. The Commanding General of TRADOC emphasized that a great amount of work and risk analysis had been done from the SRC view/bottom-up approach, but it was now necessary to look at it from a strategic view using the Army 2025 study. The CSA agreed with the recommendation.29 M777 and M119 Composite Battalion and Precision Fires U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commissioned a Precision Effects Analysis (PEA) to determine a solution to mitigate the Infantry Brigade Combat Team’s (IBCT) capability gap in indirect fire precision effects. As of 2010- 2011, the IBCT employed the M119A2 towed 105-mm. howitzer that did not have digital capabilities. The PEA determined that fielding the digitized M777A2 155-mm. towed howitzer system as an organic weapon system to the IBCT was a viable solution to give it precision capabilities. A subsequent PEA, known as PEA II, examined what the force structure and proper mix of cannons for the IBCT should look like, such as a composite battalion of M119A2s and M777A2s. This led to a TRADOC decision in 2011 to organize a composite battalion of one or two batteries of M119A2s and a battery M777A2s to give the IBCT precision capabilities, greater flexibility, mobility, range, and lethality. As of the end of 2011, the Army Capabilities Integration Directorate (ARCIC) had approved the composite battalion, and the Field Artillery awaited the Army’s decision on its force structure. In 2012 the Army settled on two M119A2 batteries and one M777A2 battery in the battalion because this mix was less expensive than two M777A2 batteries and one M119A2 battery. One year later in 2013, the composite battalion was a mix of the two digitized M119A3 towed 105-mm. howitzer batteries and one digitized M777A2 battery. The Army had not yet decided on the exact mix because of ongoing budget constraints. It could be two M119A3 batteries and one M777A2 battery for a three maneuver battalion IBCT or one M119A3 battery and one M777A2 battery for a two maneuver battalion IBCT. In 2013 the Army chose the two M119A3 batteries and one M777A2 battery composite battalion force structure and started fielding the battalion to the three-battalion IBCT.30 ______28Email with atchs, subj: Additional TWV Documents, 31 Mar 14. 29Ibid. 30Interview with atch, Dastrup with Veach, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-21, 2010 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and

Precision Munitions, Target Location Error, Quick Reaction Capability, and Handheld Devices In recent years the Field Artillery experienced a revolution in precision. Through most of its history, the Field Artillery was a weapon of mass destruction and area fire, especially beginning in the Napoleonic Wars of the early 1800s and continuing through Operation Desert Storm of 1991. It relied upon massed fires to destroy and neutralize enemy formations. This started changing in the 1970s with the fielding of the Copperhead 155-mm. projectile in the Army. A precision munition that used a laser designator to guide it to the target, Copperhead introduced the American Field Artillery to precision. Over the next couple of decades, the Army adopted other precision munitions – the cannon-launched Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munitions (SADARM) that employed infrared seekers to locate the target, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Unitary, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Unitary, and the Excalibur Unitary, a 155-mm. cannon projectile. Guided to the target using sophisticated inertial navigation systems and/or global positioning system (GPS) capabilities, GMLRS Unitary, ATACMS Unitary, and Excalibur Unitary offered unparalleled precision, minimized collateral damage, and were therefore especially valuable for employment in complex, built-up, urban terrain. For precision munitions to be successful, however, the Field Artillery had to locate the targets precisely by using a common reference point and datum to locate precisely a point on the earth in three dimensions – latitude, longitude, and altitude.31 For precision munitions to be effective, the Field Artillery therefore required precise target location – one of the five requirements (accurate delivery system location, ______Technology), subj: M777A2 Authorized Acquisition Objective Increase, 25 May 10, Doc III-22, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), subj: M777A2 Army Acquisition Objective Increase, 22 Dec 10, Doc III-23, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: PEA, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-24, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 Annual History; Email, subj: M777, 1 Mar 12, Doc III-45, 2011 USAFAS AH; COL Gene Meredith and COL Richard M. Cabrey, “Meeting the Fire Support Challenge,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 20-23, Doc III-46, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Thomas L. Hills, CDID, 2 Apr 12, Doc III-47, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: IBCT PEA Portion of the 2011 Annual History, 3 Apr 12, Doc III-48, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2012-2013, Army 2020 Redesign and Fires Command Force Design Update, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-11, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-22; Briefing, subj: Fires Battalion Composite 3x6 IBCT Fielding Schedule, 22 Jan 14, Doc III-23; Speaker Notes for Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-24. 31Interview with atch, Dastrup with COL Anthony Daskevich, Dir, TCM RAMS, 23 Feb 10, Doc III-28, 2009 USAFAS AH; Message to Observer, Jul 2009, Doc III-29, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Precision Munitions, 21 Mar 10, Doc III-30, 2009 USAFAS AH.

timely and accurate meteorological data, accurate computational procedures, accurate weapon and ammunition information, and accurate target location and size) for accurate, predicted fires. As the Global War on Terror demonstrated, the Field Artillery delivered responsive, effective fires with GMLRS Unitary employing deliberate targeting methods, while the Air Force employed Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) effectively for deliberate targeting. Essentially, deliberate targeting involved attacking targets that were detected, identified, and developed in sufficient time to schedule actions in a tasking cycle. In contrast, dynamic targeting at the Army battalion and below proved to be challenging because it concerned attacking time-sensitive, fleeting targets that required a quick response. Often, forward observers could not provide the precise location of the targets; and this minimized the effectiveness of Excalibur Unitary that was employed frequently in deliberate and dynamic targeting missions. Some dismounted forward observers even preferred maps, binoculars, and compasses as opposed to automated targeting systems; and this further restricted obtaining a precise location.32 The Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative (APMI) introduced in 2010-2011 further highlighted the need for precise target location as would the Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) for field artillery rounds upon being fielded in the near future. As a representative from the Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, explained, APMI was a GPS- guided mortar with a 10 meter circular error probable that gave the infantry commander precision-strike capabilities. APMI provided first-round, fire-for-effect capability and could be employed in restricted urban areas where collateral damage was a consideration. It also reduced the logistical burden of ammunition resupply. Until the introduction of this mortar, the infantry commander relied upon mortar volleys against an area target because the mortar was inherently inaccurate. This minimized employing mortars in urban areas. As such, the inability to provide a precise target location for precision munitions created a critical capabilities gap, especially at the platoon, company, and battalion levels, for dynamic targeting. In fact, dismounted observers lacked the ability to locate ground targets rapidly with sufficient accuracy to use precision munitions.33 To eliminate this target location error gap that the Field Artillery School considered to be the number one gap in the Field Artillery, the Army took action. The Project Manager, Soldier Precision Targeting Devices (PM SPTD) developed the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder-2H (LLDR-2H) for dismounted soldiers that ______32Interview with atchs, Dastrup with COL Craig M. Newman, Doug Brown, and Gordon Wehri, CDID, 1 Mar 12, Doc III-25, 2011 USAFAS AH. 33Email with atch, subj: Precision Munitions, TLE, and QRC, 29 Mar 12, Doc III-26, 2011 USAFAS AH; Audra Calloway, “Picatinny Fields First Precision-Guided Mortars to Troops in Afghanistan,” Public Affairs Picatinny Arsenal, 29 Mar 11, Doc III- 27, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Handheld Devices and Target Location Error, 22 Mar 12, Doc III-28, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Newman, Brown, and Wehri, 1 Mar 12; Information Paper, subj: LLDR, undated, Doc III-29, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: TRADOC Overview Concept Requirements to Capabilities for Procuring Affordable Tactical Missiles, 4 May 10, Doc III-30, 2011 USAFAS AH.

was fielded beginning in 2013. After changes were made to the target location module (TLM), the LLDR-2H could provide precision targeting capability by integrating a celestial navigation system with a digital magnetic compass in the target locator module to furnish highly accurate target coordinates. The target locator module could be used as a stand-alone device or in conjunction with the laser designator module (LDM). During daytime operations, the LLDR-2H could detect a target at more than 10 kilometers, could recognize it at seven kilometers, and could designate a stationary target at five kilometers and a moving target at three kilometers. At night the LLDR-2H could detect a target at three kilometers, could recognize it at two kilometers, and designate it at almost two kilometers. Because the LLDR-2H represented a significant improvement over earlier versions of the LLDR, the Army started retrofitting them as LLDR-2Hs in 201334 The Army and the Field Artillery also envisioned the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS) as a means to minimize target location error. The handheld JETS would provide the dismounted observer and joint terminal attack controller with the ability to acquire, locate, mark, and designate for precision GPS-guided and laser-guided munitions without target mensuration but would not be fielded until Fiscal Year (FY) 2016. 35 Given this and the pressing requirement to eliminate target location error, the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence, Major General David D. Halverson, directed the Capabilities Development Integration Directorate (CDID) to hold a handheld precision optical targeting demonstration and assessment at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to develop a quick reaction capability that would be fielded before JETS could be introduced. Held in December 2011, the demonstration provided industry with the opportunity to demonstrate its target location systems. Based on this demonstration and the state of technology, CDID submitted the desired capabilities for a future target location system to the Rapid Equipping Force for the development of a limited number of handheld and tripod-held systems for experimentation with the goal of fielding an objective system at the same time that the PGK was fielded and before JETS could be fielded.36 ______34Email with atch, subj: Precision Munitions, TLE, and QRC, 29 Mar 12; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Newman, Brown, and Wehri, 1 Mar 12; Information Paper, subj: LLDR, undated; Briefing, subj: TRADOC Overview Concept Requirements to Capabilities for Procuring Affordable Tactical Missiles, 4 May 10; Email, subj: CDID Input to 2011 Annual History, 21 Mar 12, Doc III-31, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: LLDR, 23 Sep 13, Doc III-25; Scott McClellan, “Get A Grid: Excellence in Precision Targeting,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 26-28, Doc III-26; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6- 9, Doc III-27. 35Email with atch, subj: Handheld Devices and Target Location Error, 22 Mar 12; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Newman, Brown, Gordon Wehri, CDID, 1 Mar 12; Information Paper, subj: LLDR, undated; Briefing, subj: TRADOC Overview Concept Requirements to Capabilities for Procuring Affordable Tactical Missiles, 4 May 10; Information Paper, PEO Soldier, 27 Feb 13, Doc III-12, 2012 USAFAS AH. 36Interview, Dastrup with Josh A. Dexter and John H. Deel, CDID, 27 Mar 12,

The Army started fielding the Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) hand-held targeting device in 2013. It would provide the dismounted forward observer with the ability to locate targets accurately in a timely manner and within the standards required to employ precision munitions. Basically, the QRC hand-held targeting device would bridge the gap between the existing target location capability found in units today and the objective capability of JETS.37 Electric Fires In August 2010 the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE), Major General David D. Halverson, hosted a panel of senior leaders and retired general officers at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to discuss the Army’s vulnerability to electric fires (high power microwaves, directed energy, electromagnetic kinetic weapons, plasma, and electronic attack weapons). The panel concurred that the Army had some vulnerabilities to electric fires and recommended that the Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) provide an initial assessment to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter N. Chiarelli, along with its own findings.38 On 16 June 2011 SMDC briefed General Chiarelli about the panel’s initial findings and its own assessment of the status of electric fires efforts in the Army. General Chiarelli then tasked the Commanding General of SMDC/Army Strategic Command (ARSTRAT) to conduct a comprehensive electric fires assessment to identify current and emerging threat capabilities and to make recommendations on filling the gaps in electric fires capabilities. General Chiarelli also tasked FCoE to support the effort as a user representative. Subsequently, FCOE assigned the Fires Battle Laboratory in its Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) to lead its effort.39 Over the following months, multiple general officer steering committee meetings and briefings that included the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army discussed electric fires. On 17 January 2012 the SMDC and the FCoE provided General Chiarelli with a final assessment briefing on their electric fires work. Based upon the briefing that pointed out the imperative for additional work, General Chiarelli tasked the SMDC and the FCoE to assess the U.S. Navy’s electric fires program, to include the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in the process, and to provide the incoming Vice Chief of ______Doc III-32, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Handheld Devices and Target Location Error, 22 Mar 12. 37Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-13, 2012 USAFAS AH; McClellan, “Get A Grid,” pp. 26-28; McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” pp. 6-9. 38Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Susan Walker, Dep Dir, Fires Battle Laboratory, 28 Mar 12, Doc III-12 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FBL History 2011, 6 Mar 12, Doc III-13, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Electric Fires Portion of the 2011 Annual History, 2 Apr 12, Doc III-14, 2011 USAFAS AH; Electric Fires Request for Information, 27 Jun 12, Doc III-28. 39Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Susan Walker, Dep Dir, Fires Battle Laboratory, 28 Mar 12; Email with atch, subj: FBL History 2011, 6 Mar 12; Email with atch, subj: Electric Fires Portion of the 2011 Annual History, 2 Apr 12.

Staff of the Army, General Lloyd J. Austin III, with an overview of the electric fires threat as it existed.40 Based upon the adversaries’ development of directed energy and electromagnetic powered weapons and systems that posed a threat to the Army and General Chiarelli’s guidance, the FCoE briefed General Austin on 22 August 2012 about electric fires and its recommendation for creating an Electric Fires Office under the Fires Battle Laboratory. General Austin concurred with SMDC/FCoE forming an Electric Fires Working Group under the Fires Integrated Capabilities Development Team Charter, dated 22 April 2010, and creating an Electric Fires Office. In view of this, the FCoE subsequently chartered the Electric Fires Office in November 2012 to work with the Fires Battle Laboratory and the SMDC to lead the Electric Fires Working Group, to provide subject matter expertise, and to coordinate and conduct electric fires efforts across the Army. As a team, SMDC and the Electric Fires Office would lay the groundwork for long-term efforts for offensive and defensive electric fires capabilities based upon emerging concepts, capability gaps, and the operational environment and would initiate a series of vulnerability assessments and facility assessments. Without this effort the potential operational and technical risk to the Army would increase while the Army’s capabilities to address the threats would remain unknown and untested. Equally as important, the nation had to invest in “game-changing technologies” to counter enemy threats.41 To carry out its mission as a coordinator, the Electric Fires Office conducted the Army’s first Electric Fires Seminar, an Army-wide gathering to identify and discuss the potential impact of electric fires on doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P), on 28 February 2013. Besides providing an open forum to discuss electric fires capabilities, planning, and coordination measures, the seminar supplied a greater understanding of how electric fires could be integrated into future planning, synchronization, and execution of missions; identified mission command and targeting and intelligence requirements; and coordinated input into the Electric Fires white paper that was being written as a roadmap to the future.42 Work on electric fires continued through the rest of 2013. In June 2013 the Vice Chief of the Army, General John F. Campbell who replaced General Austin in March 2013, tasked the Army G3/5/7 to conduct a review of threat-related testing and evaluation programs to identify gaps related to directed energy and electrodynamics kinetic energy weapons, to prioritize testing requirements, and to identify funding requirements. Out of this emerged a five-phase effort. By late 2013 the Electric Fires Office and the Fires ______40Email with atch, subj: Electric Fires Portion of the 2011 Annual History, 2 Apr 12; Email with atchs, subj: Electric Fires, 12 Mar 14, Doc III-29; J.D. Leipold, “Campbell Takes Oath as Army’s Vice Chief of Staff,” 11 Mar 13, www.army.mil/article/98124, Doc III-30. 41Memorandum for Record, subj: Establishment of the FCoE Electric Fires Office, 21 Nov 12, Doc III-31; Email with atchs, subj: Electric Fires, 12 Mar 14. 42Fires Battle Laboratory History 2013, Doc III-31a; Email with atchs, subj: Electric Fires, 12 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: Electric Fires Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-31b.

Battle Laboratory had completed the first phase by identifying the threat, had established agreements between the Army and industry, called cooperative research and development agreements (CRADA), to establish the roles and responsibilities for sharing technologies and resources, and moved into phase two where equipment and facility gaps would be identified.43 Meanwhile on 26 August 2013, the Commanding General of FCoE, Major General James M. McDonald, directed the center to establish a directed energy range on Fort Sill that would facilitate developing electric fires and electronic attack. Several months later on 6 November 2013, the Fires Battle Laboratory briefed Fort Sill’s Directorate of Public Works (DPW) on the modifications required for creating a directed energy range out of an existing range. These modifications would enhance the range not only for electric fires purposes but also for any other organizations that would use it. Critical work included access road improvement, buried electric cable, and gravel, among other things. Later on 13 November 2013, the Fires Battle Laboratory conducted a kickoff meeting with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at Fort Sill and their contract representatives to explain the requirements for the directed energy range and to initiate work. On 3 March 2014, the United States Corps of Engineers started the environmental assessment necessary to allow non-program of record demonstrations on Fort Sill. Once completed, the range would allow government, industry, and academia to demonstrate electric fires capabilities and emerging technologies to combat developers, concept developers, requirement developers, and training developers, would be completed by the summer of 2015, and would furnish a convenient facility for observing electric fires capabilities and technologies. As of 2013, non-program of record systems, such as electric fires, had to be tested at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, or Dugway Proving Ground, Utah.44

TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM-FIRES

Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile Determined to increase the range of its cannon artillery without sacrificing accuracy, the U.S. Army explored adopting the XM982 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile. As initially planned in 1995 and outlined in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) of 22 February 1996, Excalibur would be a fire-and- forget projectile with a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and inertial measurement unit guidance package that would allow the projectile to fly extended ranges (50 kilometers) to shape the close battle and to improve survivability and would be able it to detonate within six meters of the target. The projectile’s modular design would permit carrying the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) for ______43Email with atchs, subj: Electric Fires, 12 Mar 14; Fires Battle Laboratory History 2013. 44Fires Battle Laboratory History 2013; Email with atchs, subj: Electric Fires, 12 Mar 14; Email with atch, subj: Electric Fires Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History, 13 Mar 14.

area targets, the Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM) for counterfire against self-propelled artillery or armor, or the Unitary munition for precision targets – soft or hard. Upon fielding, Excalibur would furnish the Field Artillery with improved fire support; would be compatible with all digitized 155-mm. howitzers, such as the M109A6 (Paladin) Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer, the Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer (XM777) under development, and the Crusader Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer under development; would reduce fratricide; and would be fielded with DPICM in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006, with SADARM in FY 2007, and Unitary in FY 2010.45 Several years into development, critical issues altered the direction of the Excalibur program. Insufficient funding and the termination of the SADARM program early in 2000 prompted the Army to limit Excalibur’s initial development to DPICM. However, the fear of duds and collateral damage, the need for precision, and the Transformation of the Army process that was underway, especially the creation of the Initial Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), caused another shift in priorities. In December 2000 the Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Major General Toney Stricklin, signed a school decision paper recommending switching Excalibur’s initial development to the Unitary munition. Concurring with General Stricklin, the Program Manager for Excalibur subsequently deferred work on the DPICM warhead in January 2001 because it caused collateral damage by scattering sometimes unexploded bomblets upon base ejection. The Program Manager made the Unitary the primary warhead because it produced low collateral damage. This caused the Unitary warhead to become more important after being a low priority for years.46 In the meantime, another development influenced the Excalibur program. In 1999 Congress started pulling money from the Excalibur program to fund the Trajectory Correctable Munition (TCM), a howitzer-launched 155-mm. artillery projectile being developed by Bofors Defense of Sweden. Using GPS and an inertial measurement unit, Bofors TCM would carry three different warheads, including Unitary, would provide a significant increase in accuracy with first-round hit capabilities, and would extend the Field Artillery’s digitized cannon range from 27 to 35 kilometers with the XM777 and the Paladin and 50 plus kilometers with the Crusader. Equally important, TCM would significantly improve warfighting capability and give the Army and the Field Artillery a second long-range, precision-guided munition.47 Raytheon’s technical problems with the Excalibur airframe or projectile and the inability to afford both TCM and Excalibur soon forced the Army to explore various developmental options. First, the Army could drop the TCM program and fund Excalibur, but this was a high-risk solution because Excalibur’s airframe was untested whereas TCM’s had been tested and had already demonstrated reliability. Second, the Army could drop Excalibur and fund TCM. This alternative involved abandoning a contract with an American company and would be politically troublesome. Third, the ______452004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 74-75. 462000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79. 472001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79.

Army could merge the programs and take the best from each. After serious consideration the Army Acquisition Executive decided in November 2001 to merge the two developmental programs that essentially paralleled each other. A merger would deliver a low-risk program that would take advantage of the complementary strengths of each. While Bofors would be the subcontractor and had years of experience with projectile design, Raytheon would be the prime contractor. Raytheon also possessed extensive experience with guidance electronics and software development.48 The merger, however, was not free. Before the merger, Excalibur had unfunded requirements. The merger added more unfunded requirements. In view of the importance of developing the projectile, the United States and Sweden signed a memorandum of agreement on 11 December 2002 for the cooperative development of Excalibur with the Sweden providing $57 million.49 Meanwhile, Excalibur passed key milestones. On 26 February 2002 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, approved a new block approach to field Excalibur Block I to the Crusader in FY 2008 and Blocks II and III which would build on Block I to the Paladin and the Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer later. When the Office of the Secretary of Defense terminated the Crusader on 8 May 2002, the Army restructured the program to focus developing Excalibur for the Future Combat System (FCS) Cannon of the Objective Force with fielding in FY 2008.50 Prompted by the requirement to get Excalibur to the field as quickly as possible in view of the Global War on Terrorism, the Office of the Secretary of Defense subsequently tasked the Program Manager for Excalibur to develop a plan to accelerate fielding by employing “spiral development.”51 Basically, this approach would deliver sequential, increasing capability over time until the Operational Requirements Document threshold and objective requirements were met. On 28 August 2002 the Army Acquisition Executive attended a review that detailed the program to deliver the Unitary Excalibur in three versions, called spirals, and subsequently approved it. The first version (Block/Increment I) would be the least capable and would be fielded to the Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer in FY 2006. Block/Increment II with more capabilities would be fielded to the FCS Cannon in FY 2008. Block/Increment III would meet the original Operational Requirements Document requirements and would be fielded in FY 2010 or 2011. The revised ORD signed by the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, Major General Michael D. Maples, on 20 August 2002 and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Developments, Major General Alan W. Thrasher, on 12 February 2003 and verbally approved by the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army on 23 April 2003 reflected the changes brought by spiral development. Over a year later on 16 September 2004, the Vice Chief ______482001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 79-80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 57. 492001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 57-58. 502002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS ) ACH, p. 49. 51Email with atch, subj: Excalibur History, 12 Feb 03, Doc III-37, 2002 USAFACFS ACH.

of Staff of the Army signed the ORD because its key performance parameters were essential for the contemporary operational environment with its urgent requirement for precision fires.52 Meanwhile, development moved forward. On 23 July 2003 BAE Systems completed the first firing trials of its M777E1 (formerly XM777) with the Excalibur at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. The trials evaluated seven XM982 instrumented ballistic test projectiles fired at three different temperatures using the Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS) to characterize the ballistic environment and to assess the projectile’s physical compatibility with the M777E1. A few weeks later in August 2003, the U.S. government awarded United Defense Industries subsidiary, Bofors Defense, the contract for the system development and demonstration phase of the Excalibur program. Later in October 2003, the Army and Sweden officially opened the Excalibur Joint Program Office at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, to improve developmental efficiency. One year later in September 2004, the Guided Series 3b Tests validated the airframe and guidance system design.53 Studies conducted in 2002 and 2003, in the meantime, validated Excalibur development. As a precision munition for the current and future force, Excalibur facilitated the destruction of point targets and selected high-value area targets at extended ranges in complex terrain and urban environments from dispersed locations and would fill an existing deficiency – the inability to destroy point targets and the requirement to minimize collateral damage. In view of the current operational environment in Afghanistan and Iraq and the need to minimize collateral damage, such capabilities would be crucial for the success of U.S. joint military forces.54 As the studies indicated, Excalibur offered other distinct advantages. The Achieving Transformation in Fire Support Study of June 2002 determined that the firepower of existing Army field artillery systems would be improved much more with the proper precision munitions, such as Excalibur and the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System munition, than by investing in Crusader. Also, the Alternative Indirect Fire Study of July 2002 concluded that Excalibur was more effective against a wider variety of targets and at a greater range than current munitions even with utilizing current target acquisition capabilities. Excalibur would allow current platforms to complement the improved accuracy of future target acquisition systems and would be less expensive to use because it could be used in smaller numbers than non-precision munitions. Subsequently, the Non-Line of Sight Mix Study of March 2003 noted that Excalibur Unitary greatly enhanced the lethality of the current cannon force and demonstrated the need for the munition. Ultimately, according to these studies and others, Excalibur and other precision munitions would provide more capability at equal or less cost than the Crusader to reaffirm the requirement for accelerating the fielding of the precision

______522002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 62. 532003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 62-63. 542003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78.

munition.55 Along with the studies, the urgent needs statement for the Excalibur endorsed by the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in August 2004 created the requirement to accelerate fielding the munition. In response to the urgent need statement, the Field Artillery School presented its case for a formal acceleration of the munition’s development to the Army Resource and Requirements Board which would vet the requirement and decide the fate of accelerating development. Although the product of the accelerated program would not be the objective round identified in the officially approved ORD of September 2004, it would meet the urgent needs statement and create a parallel development program for Excalibur. Essentially, the urgent needs statement required splitting Block/Increment I into two parts. While Increment Ia-1 would provide the theater forces with an immediate need capability and have less capability, Increment Ia-2 would be the objective program outlined in the 2004 ORD. Increment Ia-2 would continue development, would have improved reliability, and improved countermeasures, and would be fielded to M777A2 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer and Paladin units.56 In March 2005 the Army Resource and Requirements Board validated the urgent needs statement of August 2004 from Central Command’s Combined Forces Land Component Command for a precision guided cannon artillery munition and designated Excalibur as the materiel solution. To accelerate the fielding of Excalibur to get it to Iraq by the second quarter of FY 2006, the Army condensed the testing schedule, allowing little room for program slippage or delays, and reduced the capabilities. Updated Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) software would accompany Excalibur.57 Subsequently, the contractor held test firings at the Yuma Proving Ground. On 1 September 2005 the contractor fired two urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 projectiles from a Paladin using MACS. Both rounds deployed their canards, acquired the GPS signal, and completed their pre-programmed navigational maneuvers. Subsequently on 15 September 2005, the urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 demonstrated its accuracy by hitting within seven meters of the target to bring the program a step closer to filling the urgent requirement to put the projectile in the hands of 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 1st Armor Division.58 More testing took place in 2006 and early 2007. Tests conducted in March-July 2006 fired 22 rounds while the Limited User Test of February 2007 demonstrated the munition’s reliability and lethality when 23 out of 25 rounds hit within an average six meters of the target. In fact, the Limited User Test indicated that the munition actually ______552003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78. 562004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 63-64; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 52-53; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 50-51; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 69; COL (Ret) Donald C. DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manger Brigade Combat Team Fires: The One-Stop-Shop for All Things Cannon,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 35-39, Doc III- 32. 572005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51. 582005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56.

surpassed the requirements outlined by the ORD and had better effects than anticipated to permit fielding the urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 to U.S. ground forces in Iraq in May-July 2007. The Limited User Test results also satisfied the urgent release requirement and permitted moving the munition into low-rate initial production. Subsequently, in the Customer Test conducted by I Battery, 11th Marine Regiment at Yuma Proving Ground with the M777A2, the urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 successfully demonstrated its accuracy when four out of four rounds had an average miss distance of 10 meters, allowing material release to the M777A2. Meanwhile, the Army approved the Capability Production Document for the Excalibur Ia-2 and testing beginning in 2008.59 Excalibur quickly demonstrated its value in combat. Following new equipment training on 5 May 2007, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted the first operational firing of the munition at a well-known insurgent safe house in Bagdad. Elements from the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment teamed with the 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment to destroy the safe house with one Excalibur round. At the end of 2007, American operational units had fired the urgent requirement Excalibur Ia-1 in Operation Iraqi Freedom, while Canadian forces had fired the munition in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. In February 2008 American forces also began firing Excalibur Ia-1 in OEF as units equipped with the M777A2 deployed to Afghanistan. Through late 2010, Army and Marine field artillery units had fired 370 urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 projectiles in OIF and OEF.60 Concurrently in 2008-2009, the Field Artillery School educated commanders of deploying units using New Equipment Training Teams (NETT). The NETTs explained that the munition had to be fired at a high angle to achieve the maximum range and optimal flight path to perform the terminal maneuver to achieve a near vertical angle of attack. As it neared the target, the projectile oriented itself to a near-perpendicular angle of fall to optimize the lethal effects on the intended target. This characteristic made the urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 an ideal solution for engagements in complex and urban settings because it created a minimal amount of collateral damage. Also, the munition had roughly the same explosive power as an M107 high-explosive projectile. Because of its near-perpendicular angle of descent, it furnished more lethality and more uniform detonation pattern. The urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 had the ability to penetrate four inches of reinforced concrete which was the thickness of the typical load-bearing roof and could penetrate and detonate with devastating lethality.61 Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School participated in developing Excalibur Ia-2 and Ib. Representing the baseline program outlined in the ORD of 2004, Excalibur Ia-2 ______592006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72. 602007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 70; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-33, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires, 22 Feb 13, material is not FOUO, Doc III-33; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13, Doc III-34. 612008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 72-73; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 70-71.

would have increased range, improved reliability, improved countermeasures (anti-jam capabilities), and went through an initial operational test in January 2010. At that time Excalibur Ia-2 demonstrated high reliability with charges three and four but was less reliable at charge five. It received full material release in April 2011 with fielding beginning in August 2011 and continuing into 2012 to complement the urgent need Excalibur Ia-1 that completed its fielding and production run in 2012. The Army concluded fielding Excalibur Ia-2 in 2012 and awarded Raytheon the contract to produce Ib and scheduled testing for 2012 and fielding in FY 2014.62 However, technical difficulties set back the demonstration of the Raytheon and Alliant Tech Systems designs of Excalibur Ib from March 2010 until August 2010; Raytheon won the shoot off the contract for Excalibur Ib. The munition achieved ORD requirements during testing and provided more range, increased reliability, and lower cost than the Excalibur Ia-2. A critical design review in April 2011 revealed that the fins were being destroyed upon firing the projectile. As a result, the Army decided in February 2012 to use the Ia-2’s base assembly as opposed to the Ib’s base assembly. This approach would lower the developmental risk and use a base that had demonstrated reliability. Subsequently, testing in October 2012 validated the Excalibur Ib and led to a milestone c decision in December 2012 that permitted moving it into low-rate initial production. Excalibur Ib successfully passed the initial operational test and evaluation in February 2014 at the Yuma Proving Ground with a majority of the rounds landing within two meters of the target. Although funding constraints reduced the number to be produced, the munition was on schedule to receive full material release by June 2014.63 ______622009 USAFAS AH, p. 71; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM BCT- Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-41, 2009 USAFAS AH; TCM Newsletter, Sep 09, Doc III-42, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Project Manager, Combat Ammunitions systems, 28 Oct 09, Doc III-39, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-35, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, Excalibur XM 982 Precision Engagement Projectiles, undated, Doc III-14a; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 Dec 10, Doc III-15; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 Feb 13, Doc III-16, 2012 USAFAS AH; DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires,” pp., 35-39; Briefing, subj: Precision Strike Association Excalibur Overview, 2012, Doc III-35; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), subj: TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires, 22 Feb 13, material used is not FOUO); Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13; Interview, Dastrup with Mark Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 25 Feb 14, Doc III-36. 632009 USAFAS AH, p. 71; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM BCT- Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-41, 2009 USAFAS AH; TCM Newsletter, Sep 09, Doc III-42, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Project Manager, Combat Ammunitions Systems, 28 Oct 09, Doc III-39, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM

Meanwhile, the Excalibur Ib passed other significant milestones. In June 2012 the Army fired two Excalibur Ib rounds at Fort Bliss, Texas. This marked a significant development. For the first time, an Army unit fired the Excalibur Ib in the continental United States outside of Twenty-Nine Palms, California; the National Training Center, California; Yuma Proving Ground; or White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico; all of which were testing facilities where units trained before deploying. The Fort Bliss firings presaged the Army’s authorization to fire the munition at other installations because units wanted to fire it even if they were not deploying. The following year of 2013, the 212th Field Artillery Brigade and the 1st Armored Division fired Excalibur Ib at home station at Fort Bliss. This demonstrated that home-stationing training of the Excalibur was not only achievable but also valuable because the units gained experience that could be applied to combat operations while the maneuver commander acquired information about the munition’s unique capabilities.64 Precision Guidance Kit Although the U.S. Army had been working to introduce precision munitions since the early 1990s, the effort led to a limited number and types, such as the Sense-and- ______Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-35, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for TCM Cannon, COL Michael Hartig, 6 Feb 12, Doc III-35, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 12 Feb 13; Raytheon Information Paper, subj: Raytheon’s Excalibur Ib Demonstrates Accuracy during Flight Tests, 24 Oct 12, Doc III-17, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Cdr, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Capabilities Integration Center, subj: Approval of the Precision Engagement Projectile, Excalibur Ib Capability Production Document, 18 Dec 12, Doc III-18, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Ammunition, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for Low Rate Initial Production of Increment Ib Excalibur M982E1, 13 Dec 12, Doc III-19, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Excalibur, PGK, and Future Cannon Munition Suite 2012, 26 Feb 13, Doc III-20, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: US Army Awards Raytheon $54 million for Excalibur Ib, 10 Sep 13, Doc III-37; “Raytheon Completes Excalibur IB Projectile’s Qualification Flight Testing,” www.army-technology.com, 21 Oct 13, Doc III-38; Email with atch, subj: Excalibur and Munitions Input to 2013 USAFAS Annual History, 28 Feb 14, Doc III-39; Interview, Dastrup with Belcher, 25 Feb 14. 64Interview, Dastrup with Pack and Belcher, 11 Feb 13. See COL Gene Meredith, MAJ David Moser, CPT Andrew Zikowitz, and Daniel Hallagin, “A Current Assessment of Excalibur Employment in Afghanistan,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 12, pp. 27-32, Doc III-21, 2012 USAFAS AH; MG (Ret) Toney Stricklin, “Employment of the M982in Afghanistan: US Army and Marine Corps Differences,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 16-19, Doc III-22, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Excalibur, PGK, and Future Cannon Munitions Suite 2012, 26 Feb 13, LTC Gary C. Leroux, MAJ Aaron Van Alstine, and SFC Clifton Blowe, “Excalibur Home-Station Live Fire Training,” RedLeg Update, Sep-Oct 13, pp. 3-6, Doc III-40.

Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM). Interestingly, combat operations during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) highlighted the need for precision munitions to mitigate collateral damage and improve accuracy. Prompted by the Americans’ restrictive rules of engagement for attacking targets to minimize collateral damage, American adversaries modified their tactics. By dispersing their forces and often occupying positions in or near populated areas, enemy forces limited the Americans’ ability to engage targets. This tactic caused the Army to increase its dependence upon precision munitions.65 The Army initiated a search for a less expensive precision munition than SADARM. On 20 November 2003 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) tasked the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) to head a working group of representatives from the military and industry to conduct the Precision Effects Study, to determine the current or near-current precision engagement solutions, and to select those that would yield the best payoff for field artillery and mortar assets within 24 to 36 months.66 Various proposals emerged. Among many including the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3), the Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition developed by GD/Denel of South Africa, and the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR), the course-correcting fuse (CCF), renamed Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) in 2005, offered much promise. Based upon analysis of the proposed solutions during the first part of 2004, USAFACFS concluded that PGK would vastly improve the accuracy of 105-mm. and 155-mm. projectiles and drive down the logistical tail by reducing the number of rounds required for each engagement and ammunition resupply requirements. Through spiral development PGK could be fielded by Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 with the first increment and by FY 2010 with the second increment that would be the full-performance fuse.67 In 2005 USAFACFS explained that PGK, a low-cost, fuse-size module, intended to replace a standard fuse on current and future non-guided 105-mm. and 155-mm. projectiles, would significantly improve accuracy by using the Global Position System (GPS) to provide location during flight and to make trajectory corrections and would reduce the amount of ammunition required for a mission. Basically, the PGK would transform a “dumb projectile” into a “smart projectile.” Late in the year, USAFACFS completed the capabilities development document which noted that the PGK would leverage U.S. Navy Guidance Integrated Fuse Technology Demonstration Program work, forwarded the document through the chain of command for staffing and approval which came on 22 January 2007, and announced that fielding was projected for 2009.68 ______652004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 58; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH. 66Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH. 672004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 58-59. 682005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 52.

As of late 2006, the Army planned to field PGK in three increments. Increment I would consist of a fuse-like kit that would contain GPS guidance, power supply, control surfaces, electronic circuitry, and the fuse function modes of point-detonating and proximity, would give the projectile a circular error probable of 50 meters or less, and would address the urgent needs of current operations in the Global War on Terrorism with fielding in FY 2010. Increment II would minimize GPS interference and jamming, would improve delivery accuracy to 30 meters, would add delay and GPS time-fuse functions, would address the entire 155-mm. family of platforms, munitions, and propellants, and would be fielded in FY 2013. Increment III would add the 105-mm. family of platforms, munitions, and propellants and would be fielded in FY 2014.69 In the meantime, developmental efforts moved forward. On 20 December 2005 the Program Executive Officer, Ammunition approved PGK Increment I. Subsequently, the Army Requirements Oversight Council approved the PGK requirement and sent it to joint staffing with the Department of the Army approving the Capability Development Document in January 2007 which established the requirement for PGK. Charged with developing the kit, the Project Manager, Combat Ammunition Systems meanwhile solicited industry for possible Increment I designs that could provide a near-term solution, awarded two six-month technology contracts, one to BAE Systems and one to Alliant Techsystems, for PGK development, and scheduled a shoot off at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, in March-April 2007. The winner would receive the contract for development of Increment I with an accuracy of 50 meters circular error probable. Alliant Techsystems won the shoot off by meeting the accuracy requirements of less than or equal to 50 meter circular error probable. Eighteen of their rounds impacted within 30 meters of the target. Based on this, the Program Executive Officer, Ammo approved and signed the Milestone B Acquisition Decision Memorandum on 4 May 2007 to permit PGK to enter the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of acquisition. Subsequently, Project Manager, Combat Ammunition Systems awarded Alliant Techsystems an 18-month System Development and Demonstration contract on 18 May 2007 to develop PGK Increment I for 155-mm. high-explosive shell and to test it in 2009. However, technical difficulties pushed testing PGK Increment I back into 2010 and developing PGK Increment II.70 In August 2010 testing to move PGK Increment I into the next phase of development did not go well. In response, the Program Manager for Combat Ammunitions Systems put together a team to review the test and to determine the causes ______692006 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 57-58; Briefing, subj: TCM Cannon, 2 Nov 09, Doc III-38, 2009 USAFAS AH; Capability Development Document for the PGK (Extract), 11 Jul 12, Executive Summary, Doc III-23, 2012 USAFAS AH. 702006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 58; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-44, 2009 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: IBCT Organic Cannon Precision Strike Capability, 12 Jan 2011, Doc III-18, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: PGK, undated, Doc III-37, 2011 USAFAS AH.

of the failures. A few months later, the team’s findings indicated that design problems had led to the failures and recommended terminating the program or letting it slip so that fielding would be later than initially planned. In December 2010 the Army Systems Acquisition Review Board approved a plan by the Program Manager for Combat Ammunition Systems to restructure the engineering and manufacturing development program to allow the program to slip 25 months in order to make minor design changes and to field PGK Increment I in 2014 rather than 2011. Subsequently on 21 January 2011, the Army Acquisition Executive authorized moving forward with the restructured plan for PGK Increment I and directed the Program Manager for Combat Ammunitions System to provide PGK Increment I acquisition program baseline for approval within 120 days. The Army Acquisition Executive approved the acquisition program baseline restructure on 16 July 2011.71 Almost two years later on 18 March 2013, the program of record release program passed its milestone c decision with approval to move into Low- Rate Initial Production and continued development.72 Meanwhile, the Department of the Army G-3 directed an urgent material release on 17 May 2011 for PGK. This would accelerate fielding of PGK Increment I with reduced reliability to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan based upon successful testing in August 2011. Subsequently, the contractor conducted a PGK Increment I guided flight test in August-September 2011 where it collected sufficient data for entrance into the next engineering, manufacturing, and development phase as well as considering the accelerated fielding to OEF. In March 2012 the Army approved accelerated fielding of PGK to OEF in 2013. This gave PGK two tracks – the program of record PGK and the urgent material release program. Fielding the urgent material release PGK began in March 2013 and concluded at the end of June 2013.73 ______71Interview, Dastrup with Don DuRant TCM BCT-Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Steve Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-34, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer for Ammunition, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for the XM1156 Precision Guidance Kit Increment I, 21 Jan 11, Doc III-38, 2011 USAFAS AH. 72“Update on the Precision Guidance Kit,” Redleg Update, 6-13 May 13, p. 4, Doc III-41; Audra Calloway, “PGK Arrives in Afghanistan Ahead of Fighting Season,” Redleg Update, 6-13 May 13, p. 4, Doc III-41. 73Interview with atch, Dastrup with Worth, 22 Feb 11; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army, subj: Acceleration and Urgent Materiel Release for XM 1156 Precision Guidance Kit, 17 May 11, Doc III-39, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 Feb 13, Doc III-; DOTE Information Paper, subj: PGK, 2012, Doc III-24, 2012 USAFAS AH; Audra Calloway, Picatinny Arsenal, “Fort Bliss soldiers First to Fire Army’s New Near- precision Artillery Rounds,” www.army.mil, Doc III-25, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center, subj: Approval of Capability Development Document in lieu of Capabilities Production Document for the Precision Guidance Kit, 11 Jul 12, Doc III-26, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), subj: TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires, 22 Feb 13, material used is not FOUO.

Future Cannon Munitions Suite To upgrade existing 105/155-mm. munitions to meet the Army’s transformation objectives and to modernize the U.S. Army’s stockpile of cannon munitions, the Army continued developmental efforts with the Future Cannon Munitions Suite (FCMS), formerly called the Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition Program (ACAAP), which would be a common carrier for 105-mm. and 155-mm. families of projectiles, would be capable of carrying future developmental projectiles, such as non-lethal, multi-spectral smoke under development, would be less toxic and incendiary, and would include infrared illumination. Late in 2005, the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), renamed the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS), developed a capabilities production development document for a 105- mm. IM High-Explosive Preformed Fragmentation (Pff) round (M1130) for staffing. The Department of the Army approved the document on 18 July 2007. A top priority for the Commanding General of Fort Sill in 2013, the M1130 Pff round would be an insensitive munition, meaning that it would not detonate unexpectedly by a spark or rough handling, would be embedded with 9,300 3-mm. tungsten balls, and would be used against soft and light-skinned targets. Following successful testing in 2010, the Army granted full materiel release in 2012 for the M1130 with some rounds being accepted for prepositioning in theater (Afghanistan).74 Concurrently, the Army developed other initiatives to modernize Field Artillery munitions. In 2011 it developed a plan to re-use the M483 Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) by demilitarizing it to save money. The Army planned to demilitarize the M483 and to use it as a replacement for aging or less capable munitions. The first munition using this re-use concept was the M1122 training round. The M1122 (155-mm.) replaced the M804 Low-cost Indirect Fire Training Round (LITR) and eventually the M107 for training purposes. Full material release for the munition came on 22 June 2012, meaning that it was reliable, operationally sustainable, and effective. As of 2013, the Army planned to produce approximately 280,000 M1122 training rounds through 2018. Other munitions using the demilitarized M483 included the XM1123 Infrared Illuminating Projectile and XM1124 Visible Light Illuminating Projectile for use by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps. Both were undergoing ______742005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 54; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 54; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 58-59; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 75; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Don DuRant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-44, 2009 USAFAS AH; Fires Center of Excellence CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 10, p. 7, Doc III-45, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12; Briefing (Extract), subj: PM Update, 24 Feb 12; General Dynamics Information Paper, subj: 105-mm. M1130 HE-Pff, undated, Doc III-40, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History, 6 Apr 12, Doc III-41, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), subj: Smart Book, 22 Feb 13, material used is not FOUO, Doc III-42.

testing in 2013 with full material release scheduled for 2014. A third re-use round included the M110A3 White Phosphorous Smoke Projectile.75 M777 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer When the United States shifted its national defense priorities from forward- deployed forces in Europe to force projection from the continental United States (CONUS) at the end of the Cold War early in the 1990s, lightweight weapons attracted the Army’s interest more than before. Lightweight weapons offered greater strategic and tactical deployability than heavier weapons. In view of the emergence of a new world order and the need for strategically deployable equipment, the Army completed an Operational and Organizational Plan in January 1991 for a lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer to replace the aging M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer. Prompted by the urgent need to replace the M101 towed 105-mm. howitzer and the M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer, the Marine Corps concurrently planned to field a lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer as a replacement. With the recognition that they required a new towed lightweight 155-mm. howitzer, the Army and the Marine Corps wrote a Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) in 1995 to develop a joint lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer (LW155) and later formed the Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office in 1998 to direct the developmental program. Although Joint Program Management Office at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, managed the overall program, the Marine Corps had the lead in the acquisition of the LW155, also called the XM777. Pressed to obtain the LW155 as soon as feasible, the Marine Corps opted to field one without digital enhancements and to add them later, while the Army chose introducing a digitized LW155 that would take longer to field.76 After several years of developmental work, the contractor delivered the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) prototype XM777s in 2000 and 2001. Unveiled at Picatinny Arsenal in June 2000, the first EMD prototype XM777 held ______75Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-41a, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Steve Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-41b, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 7 Feb 12, Doc III-42, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History, 6 Apr 12; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 Feb 13, Doc III-27, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, Picatinny Arsenal, subj: Recycling Produces Cheaper, Safer, Realistic Artillery Rounds, 5 Oct 12, Doc III-28, 2012 USAFAS AH; “TCM BCT Fires Update,” RedLeg Update, Jul 12, Doc III-29, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-30, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Picatinny Recycles Artillery Shells to Create Cheaper, Safer, more Reliable Training Rounds,” Army Material Command, 8 Jan 13, Doc III-43; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), subj: Smart Book, 22 Feb 13, material uses is not FOUO, Doc III-44; Interview, Dastrup with Mark Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 25 Feb 14. 762003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 82; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 105-08; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 64.

out great promise. The howitzer’s reduced size and weight permitted towing by the same prime mover used to tow the M198 and allowed two howitzers to fit into a C-130 aircraft for strategic deployability. Additionally, the howitzer could be emplaced in three minutes or less, could fire faster than the M198, could be displaced in two minutes or less, and had a range of 30 kilometers. By the end of 2001, the Marines had a total of six XM777 EMD howitzers undergoing tests.77 Unfortunately, none of the six EMD howitzers met the “production representative” requirements for an operational test to be conducted in 2002 by the Army and Marine Corps.78 This caused the Marine Corps to restructure the program by adding an operational assessment test or a limited user’s test in 2002. If the EMD howitzers passed the test, the contractor could start low-rate initial production with the goal of performing an operational test in 2004 to determine if full production would be permitted.79 In 2002 the XM777 underwent testing as scheduled. Following extreme cold weather testing in Alaska in January 2002 where the howitzer demonstrated its ability to function in extremely cold weather conditions, the Army and the Marine Corps conducted an operational assessment test from 13 May 2002 to 15 June 2002 at Twenty- Nine Palms, California; Camp Pendleton, California; and the Coronado Naval Amphibious Base, California; to determine if it met the specific requirements outlined in the JORD of 1995. The test included live fire of approximately 4,000 rounds, towing, and embarkation. Although the howitzer failed to meet the displacement time, reliability, and maximum rate of fire requirements and minor equipment problems, it achieved its key operational requirements and later passed the accuracy requirement in a separate accuracy test in August 2002 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Along with the successful air load test at the Miramar Marine Corps Air Station, California, in June 2002, the operational assessment and the accuracy test indicated that the XM777 program was making satisfactory progress.80 Based upon the accuracy test and especially the operational assessment test of May-June 2002, the Navy held a milestone c decision meeting on 8 November 2002. Although the key performance parameters of displacement, maximum rate of fire, and reliability were not met and would be addressed in full-rate production exit criteria, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition approved moving the XM777 into the low-rate initial production of 94 howitzers to be delivered in 2004-2005 for testing. This decision granted the Marine Corps permission to move forward with development.81 More than anything else, the Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD) package that was scheduled to be added to the Army’s LW155 distinguished the Army’s howitzer from the M198. As the Army explained, TAD would give the howitzer onboard ______772002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 64-65. 782002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 792000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 802002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 812002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 65-66; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 83-84.

advanced capabilities like those associated with self-propelled howitzers, such as the Paladin M109A6 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer and the futuristic Crusader 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer under development, and would eliminate the need for external survey, aiming circles, aiming posts, and collimators. Capabilities, such as self-locating and orienting, onboard firing data computation, easy-to-read electronic sights, digital communications, and improved direct fire sight, would also make the Army version of the LW155 superior to the M198. Additionally, TAD would be compatible with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System (AFATDS). In light of this, the Army released a request for proposal to industry on 10 February 2000 for TAD. After analyzing six proposals, the Army awarded a contract to General Dynamics Armament Systems of Burlington, Vermont, on 15 September 2000 to engineer, manufacture, and develop TAD for operational testing by 2003. To distinguish the Army’s LW155 with TAD from the basic LW155 for the Marine Corps, the Joint Program Office designated the Army’s LW155 as the XM777E1 and made the Army the lead agency. With the emergence of the XM777E1, two LW155 programs existed – the XM777 (M777) with onboard conventional optical fire control capabilities for the Marine Corps and the XM777E1 (M777E1) with digital capabilities for the Army.82 Fielding the M777 with conventional optical fire control began in the Marine Corps. On 19 January 2005 at Fort Sill, the Marine Corps conducted their first M777 live fire and received 55 of the planned 94 M777s. These howitzers were fielded to the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines at Twenty-Nine Palms and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines at Camp Pendleton. On 19 December 2005 Colonel John M. Sullivan, Jr., the Commander of the 11th Marine Regiment, certified that the Marine Corps had achieved their initial operational capability with the M777.83 Work on the software for the TAD and hardware meanwhile progressed. In September-October 2006, the Army carried out a successful first article testing of the Digital Flight Control System (DFCS)-equipped M777A1 howitzer (TAD equipped) at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Together, the successful software testing and the successful first article testing led to full material release of the M777A1 with TAD capabilities on 12 January 2007 by Major General William M. Lenaer, Commanding General, U.S. Army Tank Command Life Cycle Management Command.84 Shortly afterwards, the Army initiated testing and fielding the M777A2 that would have software upgrades to fire the Excalibur precision munition and other upgrades. In June 2007 I Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment successfully fired the first Excalibur from the M777A2 (TAD equipped and Excalibur capable). This led to full material release for the M777A2 system by the Army on 3 July 2007 and by the U.S. Marine Corps on 7 September 2007 and fielding that began in July 2007 and continued ______822000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 112; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 66-67; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72. 832005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 64-65; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 67. 842006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 66.

into 2010. At same time the Army upgraded the M777 to a M777A2 and upgraded all M777A1s to M777A2s.85 Other crucial developments concurrently occurred. C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment fired the first Excalibur precision munition in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan from the M777A2 on 13 January 2008; and later the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment fired the first Excalibur from the howitzer in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) on 26 April 2008.86 Subsequently to these operational firings, emerging force structure issues influenced M777A2 fielding decisions. In August 2009 the Army decided to convert the 1st Brigade, 1st Armor Division, a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to Stryker Combat Brigade Teams (SBCT) in 2011 and 2012 respectively to shift focus towards the middle of the spectrum of conflict. This action would require equipping the SBCTs with M777A2s and associated equipment and furnishing new equipment training. Additionally, the Army forced a 10 percent manpower reduction across all branches and proponencies; and the Field Artillery community decided to take this hit in all field artillery organizations except for brigade combat teams. The biggest “hit” on structure from force design studies required the echelons above brigade cannon battalions to convert from a 3x6 to a 3x4 force structure. In 2010 the Army decided to phase the conversion over a period of five years.87 Upgrade actions also influenced the M777A2 during 2010-2011. In August 2010 a limited user assessment held at Fort Bragg demonstrated the Hydraulic Power Assist Kit (HyPAK). It used hydraulic power to lift the weapon off the ground to minimize crew fatigue because the crew would no longer have to pump the wheels down manually. The HyPAK would also free up one soldier to do other tasks. This successful demonstration led to fielding HyPAK in FY 2012. Also, the Di-pulse Laser Ignition System (LIS) live-fire demonstration at Fort Sill on 1 December 2010 illustrated the ability to replace the primer as a propellant ignition source, offering the potential of eliminating the difficulties that arose in 2009 with M232A1 zone 5 charge. As long as a restriction for use of this charge continued, the weapon would be unable to reach maximum range, losing about 6,000 meters of range. The LIS was still in development at the close of the 2011, but all indicators were positive.88 ______852007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 68-69; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 87-88; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to 2010 Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); M777 155-mm. Ultralightweight Field Howitzer, United Kingdom, www.army-technology.com, 30 Jan 14, Doc III-45. 862008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 87; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 USAFAS AH. 872009 USAFAS AH, p. 89; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Scott Veach, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-21, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 USAFAS AH. 88Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11; Briefing, subj: M777A2 Future Initiatives Demo, 8 Feb 12, Doc III-43, 2011 USAFAS AH;

As a result, the Army directed that engineering and development efforts continue in 2012-2013, hoping to start fielding a LIS by FY 2014. Other upgrade actions in 2012 included the muzzle velocity sensor system, the electronic thermal warning device to warn of excessively high temperatures in the tube, an improved power conditioning and control module, improved batteries to the automated equipment can run longer before recharging, among other initiatives. Early in 2013, the Army announced its plans to field the objective M777 with on-board ballistic computation capabilities, integrated muzzle velocimeter, and other upgrades in the near future.89 M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer Largely through the efforts of personnel at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 82nd Airborne Division obtained funding in 1998 for the Light Artillery System Improvement Program (LASIP) to provide some needed changes to the M119 towed 105-mm. howitzer to make it more maintainable and more operationally suitable. The Army initiated the LASIP program in 1998 with Block I improvements that included a cold weather recuperator, trail lifting handles, off-the-shelf brakes, and other enhancements. First applied in 2002, Block II upgrades consisted of a redesigned elevation gearbox, a new rammer/extractor tool, an improved buffer, an improved buffer/recuperator connection, a roll bar, and a new fire control system that used LEDs as a light source and not radioactive tritium. Because of the aggregate differences produced by LASIP Block I and II modifications from the original M119A1 that was typed classified in 1985 and was towed by a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), the Army designated modifications as the M119A2 with type classification coming on 15 February 2005.90 With the creation of the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) with their organic fires battalion beginning in 2002, the Army required more towed 105-mm. howitzers than in the inventory. This led to a decision by a general officer steering committee (GOSC) in June 2004 to rebuild and refit old M102 towed 105-mm. ______Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Rafael Acevedo, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-44, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History, 6 Apr 12, Doc III-41, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Historical M119A2, 12 Feb 13, Doc III-31, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-32, 2012 USAFAS AH. 89Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11; Briefing, subj: M777A2 Future Initiatives Demo, 8 Feb 12; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Rafael Acevedo, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History, 6 Apr 12, Doc III-41, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Historical M119A2, 12 Feb 13; Interview, Dastrup with Brown, 5 Feb 13; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), subj: TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires, 22 Feb 13, material used is unclassified. 902000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 115-16; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 66.

howitzers. Pressured by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the GOSC reevaluated the decision in August 2004 and ordered production of new M119A2 howitzers to fill the shortages. Shortly after, the Army National Guard decided to replace their M102 howitzers with the M119A2 to have a pure M119A2 fleet.91 Based upon successful testing, the Army granted new production full materiel release for the M119A2 on 10 June 2008 and fielding began. Because of modularity conversions and aging M102 howitzer fleets, the Army National Guard agreed to accept initial half-battalion fieldings for 2008 and 2009, allowing Army National Guard battalions to field their new equipment sooner.92 Fielding M119A2 howitzers continued into 2011. By the end of 2010, 20 active component IBCTs and 18 of the 20 Army National Guard IBCTs had been fully fielded with M119A2s. One year later, the Army completed fielding the M119A2s. Twenty active component brigade combat teams and 20 Army National Guard brigade combat teams had M119A2s.93 Force structure changes meanwhile altered the number of M119A2s to be fielded. On 6 April 2009 the Secretary of Defense Bill Gates directed the Army to stop the growth of active component brigade combat teams at 45 rather than the 48 initially planned. Along with fewer howitzers required in preposition stocks, this action reduced the buy of M119A2s from 893 Army Acquisition Objective to 823 Army Program Objective. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Army Peter Geren halted the Army’s plan to organize the last three active component brigade combat teams at Fort Bliss, Texas, Fort Carson, Colorado, and Fort Stewart, Georgia, and authorized an end strength in the Army of 547,000 to ensure better-manned units, to end the routine use of stop loss for deployment manning, and to reduce the risk of hollowing the force.94 Meanwhile, another critical issue arose with the M119A2 in 2006. With the fielding of the digitized M777A1 towed 155-mm. howitzer and the phasing out of the M102 towed 105-mm. howitzer, the M109A5 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer, and the M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer, the M119A2 would be the only howitzer in the Army’s inventory without digital capabilities; and this would exacerbate the capability gap between the IBCTs and Heavy Stryker Brigade Combat Team because the latter would ______912005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 66; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 66-67; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 69. 922008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 89-90; 2099 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 90-91. 93Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie L. Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-49, 2011 USAFAS AH; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 91; Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie L. Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-25, 2009 USAFAS AH; SIGACTS, LW155 and M119, 19 Dec 09, Doc III-26, 2009 USAFAS AH; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 11 Dec 10, Doc III-27, 2009 USAFAS AH. 94Execution Order (FOUO), undated, material used is unclassified, Doc III-71, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: M119A2 Howitzer AAO Reduction, 9 Nov 09, Doc III- 72, 2010 USAFAS AH.

have digitized howitzers. The lack of digital capabilities with the M119A2 would also prevent the howitzer from using near-precision munitions and the Precision Guidance Kit that would convert dumb munitions into near-precision munitions. The lack of precision in turn would lead to less accuracy, would make dispersed operations more difficult to perform, and would decrease the survivability of the IBCT. Influenced by these reasons, the Field Artillery School, TRADOC, and the Army G-8 (Programming and Materiel Integration) developed the requirement for digitizing the M119A2 along the lines of the M777A1. Based upon the Material Change Package (MCP) signed on 15 June 2007, the Field Artillery School and the Army developed a strategy for digitizing the M119A2. One year later in January 2008, the Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill approved digitizing the M119A2 to give it the same capabilities of self-locating, self- orienting, and digital communications as the M777A1 and M109A6 (Paladin) self- propelled 155-mm. howitzer. Upon completion of the digital modifications, the M119A2 would become the M119A3.95 Over the next two years, digitizing the M119A2 moved forward. Major General Peter M. Vangjel, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS), Kevin M. Fahey, the Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems, and the Army G-8 met on 24 January 2008 with the Program Manager for LW155. They agreed on the requirements, directed work to begin digitizing the M119A2 through a series of block upgrades, and recommended maximizing the use of digitization components common to the IBCT where they would be fielded. At a subsequent meeting on 2 October 2008, they defined functionality for the blocks – Block One (aiming, pointing, and basic digital communications to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System), Block Two (ammunition management and deployment commands), and Block Three (on-board ballistic computation and integrated muzzle velocity management) and noted that the lack of off-the-shelf hardware had caused the initial operational capability date to slip from FY 2011 to FY 2012.96 Meanwhile, the Army conducted a preliminary design review on 10 June 2008 and another one in December 2008, while the 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment participated in Early User Assessments of the M119A2 digitization design concept in September 2008 and November 2008. The exchange between soldiers and engineers brought increased attention to digitizing the weapon and understanding of operational considerations to the engineers. Subsequently, on 30 June 2009, the program manager for the M119A2 ______952006 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 67-68; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 70; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 90; Information Paper, subj: M119A2, 27 Oct 10, Doc III-50, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Digitized M119A2 Information Paper/Airdrop Certification, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-51, 2011 USAFAS AH; Joseph Lipinski, “Commonality of Towed Artillery Digital Fire Control Systems,” Army AL&T, Jul-Sep 10, pp. 21-24, Doc III-32a, 2012 USAFAS AH. 962008 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 90-91; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 92-93; SIGACTS LW 155 and M119, 20 Nov 10, Doc III-28, 2010 USAFAS AH.

released a request for proposal to industry for an inertial navigation device for the M119A2. Bid sample testing began in August 2009 and ended with a Global Positioning System (GPS) inertial navigation unit contract awarded to Honeywell Inc., Clearwater, Florida, in March 2010. Testing ended in December 2010 with digitizing remaining on track to retrofit 200 of 603 M119A2s starting in FY 2013 as M119A3s and to type classify the digitized howitzer as the M119A3. This would be followed by a Modification Work Order starting in FY 2014 for the remaining 403 howitzers to be digitized. By FY 2017 at the conclusion of the fielding, the Army would have a total of 823 M119 howitzers (603 M119A3s and 220 M119A2s). Meanwhile, the M119A2 was being upgraded with a titanium firing base plate to reduce weight and base plate crack, an improved muzzle velocity sensor system, an updated wheel assembly (valve stem protection), and a suspension lockout system to absorb the shock when the weapon was fired at top zone.97 Work on the M119A2 moved forward in 2012-2013. In March 2012 a new howitzer production line was completed. The production line was originally scheduled to be completed in August 2011, but delays and contractor issues caused the program to miss the original date and to be finished in March 2012. Between July 2012 and September 2012, the Program Office conducted a Follow-on Test and Evaluation on the digitized M119A2 (M119A3) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, using soldiers from B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Sill. Taking place over a nine-week period, testing included the Fires Directorate (FTD), Program Manager-Towed Artillery Systems (PM-TAS), and TRADOC Capabilities Manager-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (TCM- IBCT) and consisted of three 96-hour vignettes in which B Battery fired over 12,000 rounds. Testing went well. At the end of December 2012, the Program Executive Officer Brigadier General John McGuiness signed the milestone c type classification standard for the M119A2 as the digitized M119A3. Fielding began in 2013 when the 3rd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 1st Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 1st Battalion, 78th Field Artillery Regiment, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, received their howitzers as part of a six-year fielding plan. Meanwhile, the Army conducted sling load testing to develop procedures for sling loading the M119A3 under a helicopter.98 ______972008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 90-91; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 92-93; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 19 Dec 09; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 20 Nov 10; Email with atch, subj: M119 Input to 2010 Annual History, 7 Mar 11, Doc III-29, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie L. Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12; Audra Calloway, “M119A2 Howitzer Upgrade Gives Quicker Firepower,” Army News Service, undated, Doc III-52, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atchs, subj: Digitized M119A2 Information Paper, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-53, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: M119 Tow 105 2011, 9 Mar 12, Doc III-54, 2011 USAFAS AH; Lipinski, “Commonality of Towed Artillery Digital Fire Control Systems,” pp. 21-24. 98Email with atch, subj: Historical M119A2, 12 Feb 13, Doc III-33, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-34, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Historical M119A2, 14 Feb 13, Doc III-

Paladin Integrated Management In the fall of 2007, the U.S. Army and BAE Systems signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a public-private partnership to develop and sustain the Army’s M109 Family of Vehicles (FOV) – the M109A6 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzer (Paladin), the M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Resupply Vehicle (FAASV), and the Paladin Operations Center Vehicle (POCV) – through the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) and later in May 2008 signed a contract to design and develop the PIM M109 system of vehicles. The Army separately approved the capabilities production document for the POCV, started the process of incorporating it into the M109 FOV capabilities production document to rebaseline the FOV with all three platforms, and initiated testing in 2008.99 The Army intended PIM to improve readiness, avoid component obsolescence, and increase sustainability of the M109 platforms to mitigate size, weight and power gaps required to support heavy brigade combat teams through 2037. Operationally, PIM upgrades would make the howitzer faster, more maneuverable, more sustainable, and more lethal and would reduce the logistics footprint and operation and support costs. To achieve these objectives, PIM would leverage commonality with Future Combat System’s Non-Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) and the heavy brigade combat team’s (HBCT) Bradley fighting vehicle. For example the PIM would use the Bradley’s engine and transmission and new track/suspension and incorporate select technologies from the NLOS-C including but not limited to the automated projectile rammer and modern electric-gun drive systems to replace the current hydraulic operations (elevation and azimuth drives) that were designed in the early 1960s. Once delivered to the field, the PIM M109 FOV would give the HBCT upgraded capabilities including more maneuverability, a higher rate of speed, increased crew survivability, and delivery of accurate and timely fires.100 The M109 FOV successfully completed the Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews, among other milestones, in 2008. Upon successful completion of these ______34a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Audra Calloway, “M119A2 Howitzer Upgrade Provides Quicker Firepower,” www.army.mil, Doc III-35, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Update on the Digitized M119A3 Program,” RedLeg Update, Mar 13, Doc III-36, 2012 USAFAS AH; COL (Ret) Donald C. DuRant, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires: The One-Stop-Shop for All Things Cannon,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 35-39, Doc III-46; “Fort Bragg First to Receive upgraded M119 Howitzers,” Army Material Command, 6 May 13, Doc III-47; Interview, Dastrup with Cpt Dusty Gray, TCM BCT-Fires, 27 Feb 14, Doc III-48. 992007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 70-71; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 91. 100Kris Osborn, “Army Developing New Self-Propelled Howitzer,” www.army.mil/article, 6 Sep 11, Doc III-55, 2012 USAFAS AH; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 70-71; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 91-92; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 93-94.

reviews, the M109 was postured to begin prototype testing in the fourth quarter of FY 2009. Successful completion of prototype testing would positively impact the milestone c decision scheduled for the third quarter of FY 2010. Upon completion of the milestone c decision, the program would move forward into low-rate initial production (LRIP) to produce a limited number of the vehicles.101 In 2009 key developments took place. In January 2009 the program manager approached the U.S. Army Armament Research and Development and Engineering Center about approving the capabilities documents, but the center did not approve it. However, the cancellation of the NLOS-C in April 2009 by the Secretary of Defense caused PIM to become the Army’s number one modernization effort and led to the approval of the capabilities production document on 9 August 2009 that scheduled a milestone c decision in 2011. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) stripped the POCV from PIM and tied it to a command and control vehicle to replace the M113, the M577, and the M1068 vehicles. In August 2009 the Army awarded BAE the contract to produce seven PIM vehicles – five self-propelled howitzers and two carrier ammunition tracked (CAT) vehicles. Five months later on 20 January 2010, the company unveiled its first M109 PIM prototype.102 Later in 2010, Lieutenant General Michael M. Vane, the Director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, TRADOC, made a significant change to the PIM. He increased force protection and survivability, but the changes were not added to the capabilities production document. This created confusion with the program since some government agencies and some contractors did not have the changes and consequently increased the cost of PIM.103 PIM costs generated concern. In March 2010 the Secretary of the Army and the Vice Chief of the Staff of the Army received a PIM cost briefing that was based upon contractor estimates so that they could determine how many PIMs could be purchased. The briefing also indicated an aggressive acquisition schedule, causing them to request acquisition changes, because they believed that the schedule was too aggressive and created a high-risk program. Subsequently, the Army Acquisition Executive adopted the low-risk schedule rather than the moderate-risk schedule or the low- to moderate-risk schedule alternatives. The low-risk schedule slowed down the program, included all test events, slipped the milestone c decision where the Army had to decide about going into LRIP or not from 2011 to 2013, and established full-rate production in 2017.104 Using the contractor estimates that had been briefed in March 2010, the Army G- 3 subsequently determined in April 2010 how many PIM sets (howitzers and ammunition ______1012008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 92; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 94. 1022009 USAFAS AH, pp. 94-95; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with MAJ Jeffrey R. White, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-30, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12, Doc III-56, 2011 USAFAS AH 103Interview with atchs, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12. 104Interview with atchs, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12.

and resupply vehicles) that the Army could purchase. At that time the G-3 opted to buy 440 sets that was a reduction from the previous number of 718. This would modernize about one half of the M109 fleet in the active and reserve components. Shortly after in May 2010, the Army realized that the cost of the 440 sets was based upon contractor estimates and not the actual cost of the PIM set. Purchasing the PIM would cost considerably more, forcing the Army and the Field Artillery to rejustify PIM program continually.105 In October 2010 rising costs influenced the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army to question if the program was justifiable and why the costs had changed so frequently during the year. To answer the questions the Army held a cost briefing on 17 November 2010 because the costs had risen from $3.6 million per set to $5.4 million to $9.4 million. The last cost turned PIM into an acquisition category one. This meant that the Office of the Secretary of Defense would now make the decision about PIM’s future and all major program decisions and not the Army. Because the $9.4 million was considered too expensive, the Office of the Secretary of Defense chose to replace all M109 Paladins with PIM. This would reduce the cost to $7.2 million per set. Subsequently in May 2011, the Army decided to field 580 PIMs to have a pure PIM fleet.106 Meanwhile, the Army conducted a two-part de-scoping effort using the Army Oversight Council (AROC) in January-February 2011 to review the status and requirements of the program in the face of rising costs and funding shortfalls. The AROC approved the capability production document with revisions and a classified annex E. The AROC reduced the reliability requirement to permit flexibility with the testing schedule and acceptance of the PIM and added Office of the Secretary of Defense directed force protection and survivability requirements with add-on armor kits for operational flexibility that would permit the commander to choose the right configuration for the mission.107 Several months after the AROC in June 2011, the Army began developmental testing at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, for firing and at the Aberdeen Test Center, Maryland, for automotive performance. Test events were designed to achieve system ______105Interview with atchs, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12. 106Briefing, subj: Update for Secretary of Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, 14 Mar 12, Doc III-57, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: PIM AROC Update, 4 Feb 11, Doc III-58, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jeff White, TCM BCT Fires, 13 Mar 12, Doc III-59, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, subj: M109 Family of Vehicles Army Acquisition Objective, 24 May 11, Doc III-60, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Information Paper, subj: How the PIM Supports Army Concepts, 19 Nov 10, Doc III-31, 2010 USAFAS AH. 107Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12; Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jeff White, TCM BCT-Fires, 13 Mar 12; Email, subj: PIM AROC Update, 3 Feb 11, Doc III-62, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Paladin PIM AROC, 21 Jan 11, Doc III-63, 2011 USAFAS AH.

requirements. Successful test results permitted development and testing to continue that laid the groundwork for a milestone c decision in June 2013 and award of a low-rate initial production contract.108 The Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel (JROC) approved the requirements listed in the M109 FOV capability production document on 16 December 2011 as an acquisition category ID program. Concerns continued about the increasing costs and government risk generated by a poor contract structure choice. Following the JROC, a Defense Acquisition Board in December 2011 approved a modification to the contract from a cost plus fixed-fee type to a cost plus incentive-fee type. This would reduce overall costs and incentivize the contractor with additional money to deliver a quality product on time. The new contract modification also extended the period of performance for developmental testing through 2015.109 Subsequently, the Army conducted several key events in 2012. From May to November 2012, it conducted a logistics demonstration. During the demonstration, soldiers performed field level operations and maintenance to demonstrate the PIM’s suitability for maintenance in the field and the requirement to update procedures in the draft technical manuals. Running from October to November 2012, the limited users test gave soldiers the first opportunity to employ the PIM in an operational environment. Following individual and collective training, soldiers from the 4-27th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas, ran two 72-hour scenarios with the PIM and CAT, firing 1,255 rounds and driving 882 miles. The soldiers demonstrated the PIM’s ability to deliver accurate and timely fires in an operational environment. Essentially, the limited user test helped prove how soldiers would be able to operate the system and provided additional data showing that the system could continue development testing and move into low-rate initial production in 2013.110 More good news followed in 2013. A site coordination meeting with BAE, the ______108Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12; Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 13 Mar 12; Kris Osborn, “U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center Information Paper, subj: Army Developing New Self- Propelled Howitzer,” live.usaac.info, 27 Oct 11, Doc III-64, 2011 USAFAS AH; Kris Osborn, “Army Developing New Self-Propelled Howitzer,” www.army.mil/article, 1 Sep 11, Doc III-65, 2011 USAFAS AH. 109Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 13 Mar 12; Email, subj: EXSUM CCM, 9 Jan 12, Doc III-66, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: DRM EXSUM, 5 Dec 11, Doc III-67, 2011 USAFAS AH; CPD, 21 Dec 11, Doc III-68, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12. 110Interview, Dastrup with Cpt Dusty Gray, TCM BCT Fires, 8 Feb 13, Doc III- 37, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract) Log Demo EAD Review, 15 Jan 13, Doc III- 38, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Update on the Paladin Integrated Management Program,” RedLeg Update, 2-13 Feb 13, Doc III-39, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: PIM Input to 2012 USAFAS Annual History, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-39a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Dr. Dastrup Article, 9 Apr 13, Doc III-39b, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-49.

Product Manager, Self-propelled Howitzer System, and Fort Sill concerning the Elgin PIM production facility reaffirmed the significant of PIM and the suitability of the facility. In October 2013 Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems announced that PIM passed a major hurdle when it received milestone c approval from the Defense Acquisition Executive. This allowed PIM to move into low-rate initial production of 19 howitzers and 19 carrier ammunition tracked vehicles. The Army scheduled low-rate initial production to begin in 2014 with the first vehicles coming of the production during the first quarter of FY 2015 and full-rate production in 2017 with first unit equipped in FY 2017.111 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System-G The Army introduced the self-contained Position and Azimuth Determining System (PADS) early in the 1980s to determine position, azimuth, and elevation rapidly and accurately in either ground or airborne survey operations. The Army wrote the original requirements documents in February 1974 and equipped the first unit with PADS in 1981.112 Because of age and escalating maintenance costs with PADS, the Army acted. In June 1995 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School approved a continuing need for non-global positioning inertial survey systems. Seven years later on 12 August 2002, Army approved an operational requirements document (ORD) for a replacement system to PADS, called the Improved Positioning and Azimuth Determining System (IPADS). Developmental testing began in 2003 at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma; and the Army decided in June 2004 to field the system and awarded a contract to L3 Communications of New Jersey in September 2004 to produce the system. Fielding began in August 2005 under a conditional material release until 2007 and was completed in mid-2009.113 In 2006 and early 2007 Fort Sill began working to incorporate a SAASM Global Positioning System (GPS) Card into IPADS which would almost eliminate zero velocity updates (ZUPs) and extend its area of coverage. The GPS-augmented IPADS would be

______111PEO Ground Combat Systems Information Paper, subj: Army’s Paladin Integrated Management Program Reaches Successful Milestone C Decision, 24 Oct 13, Doc III-50; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13; “Paladin Hybridizes for Future Fleet,” Army News, 18 Nov 13, Doc III-51; Fires Forward, Nov 13, Doc III-52; Email with atch, subj: M109 FOV Historical Record EXUM Compilation, 6 Mar 14, Doc III-53. 1122002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 85. 1132002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 85-86; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 106; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 96-97; L-3 Information Paper, subj: L-3 Communications Space and Navigation Awarded Major Indirect Fire Support Contract in Support of U.S. Army TACOM, 13 Sep 04, Doc III-40, 2012 USAFAS AH.

called IPADS-G.114 In February 2008 an IPADS-G prototype was successfully tested over a distance of 230 kilometers for 60 minutes without stopping for a ZUP. This capability increased artillery timeliness, availability of fires, lethality, survivability, and force protection on extended convoys or artillery missions. The contractor began developmental work on IPADS-G in 2010.115 Fielding for IPAD-G began in September 2012 and was later put on hold because of a manufacture error with the GPS card. In January 2013 fielding started again beginning with the 5-25th Fires Battalion of the 4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Combat Team, Fort Polk, Louisiana. Currently, the Army planned to field eight IPAD-G units per month until all Field Artillery brigades and battalions had the system. Each brigade combat team would have two IPAD-Gs, while each fires brigade would have three IPAD- Gs.116

TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGER FIRES CELL

Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble During the first years of the 21st Century, the advent of Global Positioning System (GPS) aided munitions, such as the 155-mm. Excalibur, the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Unitary, and the 120-mm. Precision Guided Mortar outpaced the dismounted forward observer’s organic ability to locate targets in a timely and accurate manner. Weight, power, consumption rates, cabling difficulties, and the lack of simultaneous voice and digital transmission means prevented the dismounted forward observer at company and below from exploiting precision munitions. Although Precision Strike Suite for Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF) could refine grid coordinates for precision strikes, it generally resided at levels above the dismounted forward observer. As a result, the dismounted forward observer did not have the ability to employ precision munitions because he could not provide precise target location. As one Field ______1142003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 106; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 96-97. 1152008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 124-25; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School Annual History, pp. 129-30; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2001 USAFAS AH; L-3 Communications Information Paper, subj: L-3 Awarded Contract to Add GPS Capabilities to U.S. Army’s IPADS Equipment, 16 Sep 10, Doc III-41, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-42, 2012 USAFAS AH; Picatinny Arsenal Information Paper, subj: Products and Services, 21 Jan 14, Doc III-54. 116Email with atch, subj: IPADS Input to 2012 USAFAS Annual History, 8 Feb 13, Doc III-43, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System-GPS Aided ECP, New Material Introduction, undated, Doc III-44, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract, FOUO), subj; TCM Brigade Combat Team Fires, 22 Feb 13, material used is not FOUO, Doc III-55.

Artilleryman indicated, the munitions would fly precisely to the assigned coordinates, but those coordinate would be incorrect.117 With this in mind, the Training and Doctrine Command (TCM) Fires Cell at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and the Program Executive Office (PEO) Soldier at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, launched an initiative to revolutionize the dismounted forward observer’s capabilities with the Precision Fires Warrior (PFW) ensemble that addressed the Fires Center of Excellence’s number one capability gap – the inability of the dismounted forward observer to locate ground targets rapidly with better than 10-meter accuracy in all conditions without target mensuration to prevent engagement with precision indirect fire systems.118 Conceived in June 2012, the ensemble included a collection of technology that would be worn by the Soldier on the Integrated Outer Tactical Vest. The heart of the ensemble was the Forward Observer Software (FOS) application located on a ruggedized commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) smart phone called an End User Device (EUD). While running the FOS software, the EUD would be able to display a digital map depicting the selected situational awareness and fire support measures on its five-inch screen. To locate targets precisely, the dismounted precise warrior would employ the hand-held Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS) that would be capable of night observation, target location, and designation and that was under development with fielding scheduled for 2016. Until then, the discounted forward observer would utilize the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 2H (LLDR-2H).119 The precision fires warrior ensemble would give the dismounted forward observer the capability of employing all of the available precision munitions and ability to locate a target for precision munitions without mensuration. As planned in 2012-2013, the Army would field the ensemble initially to the Fire Supporters in the Infantry Brigade Combat Team followed by the Armored Brigade Combat Team and the Stryker brigade combat team.120 ______117Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-45, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-46, 2012 USAFAS AH; MAJ Alex Mora and Scott McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Dec 13, pp. 40-41, Doc III-56. 118Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation: Precision Fires Warrior,” pp. 40-41. 119Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; “Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-46, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation,” pp. 40-41; Scott McClellan, “Get a Grid: Excellence in Precision Targeting,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 26-28, Doc III-57; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-58. 120Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; “Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-46, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Mora and McClellan, “PEO Soldier Supports the Next Forward Observer Generation,” pp. 40-41; McClellan, “Get a Grid: Excellence in

Warfighter Information Network-Tactical In 2013 the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) leveraged the networked battlefield more than ever with the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) that was a multi-year program to improve communications. In 1982 the Army acquired the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) system to fill the communications requirements from division down to battalion. Adopted before the widespread availability of satellite communications technology, the MSE required installation and maintenance of relay towers, was designed primarily for voice communications, and had limited beyond-line- of-sight capabilities. Military operations during Operation Desert Storm (OIF) in Iraq of 1991, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan in 2001, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) of 2003 revealed the inability of MSE systems to keep with highly mobile and dispersed forces in a digital environment and the need for beyond-the-line-of-sight communication capabilities.121 To meet an urgent requirement to satisfy this need and to communicate on the move, the Army conceived the Joint Network Node (JNN) in 2002. Work began that year on JNN with fielding coming in 2004. However, the formal program of record for the JNN was designated as WIN-T Increment 1 (completed fielding in 2012) in June 2007 to bridge the gap between MSE and full WIN-T on-the-move capabilities. WIN-T Increment I provided beyond-line-of-sight communications and enabled units to operate autonomously. It also provided the battalion and above with the ability to connect to the Army’s digitized voice, data, and video systems via satellite Internet connection at the quick-halt. Subsequently, the Army upgraded WIN-T Increment I to Increment Ia to give access to the Ka-band defense Wideband Global Satellite and to reduce reliance upon commercial-off-the-shelf equipment, while Increment 1b added the Net Centric Waveform that optimized bandwidth and satellite utilization and improved information input and colorless core technology that satisfied Global Information Assurance security compliance requirements.122 As the Army fielded WIN-T Increment 1a and 1b, it conducted developmental tests with WIN-T Increment 2 in May 2012, started limited fielding in September 2012, conducted additional successful tests in May 2013 to reassess its ability to satisfy Army ______Precision Targeting,” pp. 26-28; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14. 121Email with atch, subj; Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-47, 2012 USAFAS AH; Maryann Lawlor, “WIN-T Marches Forward,” Signal Online, www.afcea.org, Jul 12, Doc III-48, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: AUSA Aberdeen Chapter Luncheon, 15 Oct 13, Doc III-59. 122Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Lawlor, “WIN-T Marches Forward;” PEO Command, Control, and Communications, subj: WIN-T Increment I, 18 Dec 13, Doc III-60; WIN-T Commander’s Handbook (Extract), undated, Doc III-61; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Report (Extract), Feb 12, Doc III-; Executive Summary, Selected Acquisition Report, Defense Acquisition Management, 31 Dec 11, Doc III-62; Information Paper, Lockheed Martin, subj: WIN-T, undated, Doc III-63; Briefing, subj: AUSA Aberdeen Chapter Luncheon, 15 Oct 13.

reliability and maintainability standards and to validate continued fielding, and initiated full-rate production in 2013. Increment 2 provided a single integrated tactical network program by leveraging proven commercial and government technology and furnished on- the-move capability and a mobile infrastructure. It also enabled network mobility by employing military and commercial satellite connectivity and line-of-sight terrestrial radios operating on the Joint Tactical Radio System and antennas to achieve end-to-end connectivity and dynamic networking operations. Equally important, Increment 2 extended the network to company/battery level within the brigade combat team.123 In 2012-2013 the Army scheduled two more increments for fielding in the near future. Undergoing engineering, manufacturing, and development in 2013 to deliver full networking on the move, WIN-T Increment 3 would provide fully mobile, flexibly dynamic tactical networking capability needed to support highly dispersed forces over isolated areas with fielding coming in 2019-2024, while Increment 4, the Transformational Satellite Communications System would furnish the Department of Defense with a high data rate Military Satellite Communications and Internet-like services.124 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle In 2013 the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle (BFIST) fielded as a replacement to the M981 Fire Support Vehicle (FISTV) served as the Field Artillery’s fire support vehicle for the heavy forces, such as the heavy brigade combat team. Late in the 1970s, a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) working group, Close Support Study Group (CSSG) II, met to optimize observed fire support for the maneuver forces. Besides reaffirming the necessity of the Fire Support Team (FIST) that had been created in the mid-1970s to integrate fire support with the maneuver arms at the company level, the group recommended fielding a mobile fire support vehicle for reliable, secure communications.125 ______123Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Lawlor, “WIN-T Marches Forward;” Information Papers, PEO Command, Control, Communications-Tactical, subj: WIN-T, undated, Doc III-49, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, PEO Command, Control, and Communications, subj: WIN-T Increment 2, 18 Dec 13, Doc III-64; Director of Test and Evaluations Report (DOTE) (Extract), subj: WIN-T, 2012, pp. 123- 25, Doc III-65; WIN-T Commander’s Handbook (Extract), undated; Press Release, 16 Sep 13, Doc III-66; “Army Approved to Continue Fielding WIN-T Increment 2,” Army News Service, 8 Oct 13, Doc III-67; Briefing, subj: AUSA Aberdeen Chapter Luncheon, 15 Oct 13. 124“Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Lawlor, “WIN-T Marches Forward;” Information Paper, PEO, Command, Control, Communications-Tactical, subj: WIN-T, 18 Dec 13, Doc III-; DOTE Report (Extract), 2012, pp. 123-25; Information Paper, subj: WIN-T Increment 3, 18 Dec 13, Doc III-68; Office of the Unfer Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System (Extract), Feb 12, Doc III-69. 1252000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 138-39.

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After funding had become available early in the 1990s and after the maneuver arms had received their Bradley fighting vehicles, equipping the Field Artillery with the BFIST became a reality. As of 1995-1996, combat and materiel developers envisioned two models of BFIST (the M7 and M7A1) with each being a type-classified system. The M7 BFIST would integrate a fire support mission package onto a modified Bradley A2 ODS chassis. The M7A1 would be more advanced and use a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis with the fire support mission package.126 After several years of developmental work, the project manager modified the acquisition strategy for the M7A1 in 1999 by initiating an engineering change proposal to the M7 BFIST to develop it into the M3A3 BFIST and halted work on the M7A1. This meant that there would not be a M7A1 as initially planned. The M3A3 BFIST (A3 BFIST) would be based on a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis, would incorporate the M7 fire support mission package, and would be fielded beginning in 2004 to counterattack units, such as the digitized 4th Infantry Division. Thus, the M7 BFIST and the A3 BFIST existed as official Army programs to adapt the Bradley fighting vehicle to fire support missions as of 2003-2004.127 In Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 the Program Manager acquired funds to retrofit A3 BFISTs with the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) as the main target location system for underarmor targeting and designation. The FS3 Sensor would provide the A3 BFIST with the most accurate and greatest range sensor available. The FS3 would allow the fire support team to detect, identify, and designate targets for precision munitions at greater ranges while remaining buttoned up (protected by the vehicle’s armor) and would give the A3 BFIST the same capability as the Stryker fire support platform and the M1200 Armored Knight. The critical design was approved on 18 June 2008; and an integrated development test with soldiers was completed in February 2010. The 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia, was the first unit equipped; and this came in June 2011.128 Meanwhile, the Army awarded BAE a contract in 2010 to upgrade Bradley M2A2, M2A3, and M7 to the Operation Desert Storm Situational Awareness (SA) configuration. This program would bring these vehicles, approximately 353 for select Army National Guard units, close to those of the A3 by integrating the latest digitized ______1262000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 140-43; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94. 1272001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 107; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 94-95. 1282004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 126-27; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 131; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 26, Doc III-32, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-33, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 11, p. 30, Doc III-69; FCOS CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27, Doc III-70, 2011 USAFAS AH; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338, Doc III-71, 2011 USAFAS AH.

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electronics to provide optimal situational awareness, network connectivity, and enhanced communications hardware with the 81st Brigade Combat Team of the Washington Army National Guard receiving their modernization Bradley Operation Deseret Storm SA vehicles in October 2010. As the Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems explained in 2013, the modernization effort would fully digitize the entire force when the last Bradley Operation Desert Storm SA vehicles were fielded during FY 2015.129 Knight Vehicle The Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) employed the M981 fire support vehicle. Besides lacking mobility and stealth, the M981 had been designed for armored and mechanized forces and presented a unique signature in forces that used the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) as their scout vehicles. In response to this discrepancy, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) approved a change to the Fire Support Vehicle Operational Requirements Document of April 1997, written by the Field Artillery School, to leverage fire support vehicle technology for heavy and light forces. In the revised Operational Requirements Document the Field Artillery School retained the BFIST for the heavy forces and recommended developing a vehicle with BFIST mission capabilities for the COLT by integrating the fire support mission equipment package onto a HMMWV chassis, known as the Striker. This would provide the COLT with unprecedented mobility, flexibility, and stealth. Also, the Striker would be less noticeable because it would present a common signature with other HMMWV vehicles, would save Bradley assets for fire support teams, and would lower operating costs for the COLT. Based upon its performance in the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment of March 1997, the Striker vehicle, as well as the Striker concept that furnished six Striker vehicles to each heavy maneuver brigade, was adopted by the U.S. Army and was approved as a Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) by the Chief of Staff of the Army on 14 May 1997 for rapid development.130 Over the next several years, several critical developments with Striker occurred. Early in 1999, the Army type classified the system as the M707 Striker (mounted on the M1025 HMMWV) and conducted a successful air-drop test to demonstrate its ability to be dropped from an aircraft. Also, the contractor built three prototypes that went through successful developmental and operational testing in 2000 by the 4th Infantry Division that would be the first unit equipped. The following year, the Army fielded Striker to the ______1292009 USAFAS AH, pp. 131-32; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Brown, 17 Feb 11; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 10; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 11, p. 30; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338; BAE Information Paper, 13 Aug 12, Doc III-50, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Col Scott Patton, Dir, TCM Fires Cell, and Gordon Wehri, TCM Fires Cell, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-51, 2012 USAFAS AH; PEO Ground Combat Systems Information Paper, subj: Bradley Fighting Vehicle, undated, Doc III- 70; Army, Oct 13, pp. 322-24, Doc III-71. 1302000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 144.

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3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Field Artillery School, and Army National Guard units in South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. In addition, the Army fielded the Striker to the 82nd Airborne Division in 2002 and to additional active component units and Army National Guard units in 2003-2004. To avoid confusion with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, meanwhile, the Army renamed the Striker the Knight in 2002.131 In December 2005 the Program Manager Office determined that the M1025 version of the HMMWV and the planned replacement the M1114 would no longer be able to support the Knight program. Due to armor increases, either vehicle with the Mission Equipment Package (MEP) would no longer be safe to operate because increased vehicle weight would create excessive operating restrictions. In January 2006 Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) at Fort Sill submitted a letter to the Program Manager agreeing with him about the weight and urged finding a suitable replacement. Subsequently on 17 April 2006, Headquarters Department of the Army G-3/5/7 validated Third Army’s operational needs statement to provide the 10th Mountain Division with five Knight systems on a more survivable platform than the existing one. These two concerns prompted the Product Manager Fire Support Systems to initiate an effort to change the platform of the M707 Knight system from the M1114 HMMWV based system to a M1117 Armored Security Vehicle based system.132 Subsequently, the Army purchased eight M1117 Armored Security Vehicles and designated them as the M1200 Armored Knight for employment by the COLT. Production began late in 2007 with a Limited User Test completed in September 2007. In October 2007 the 10th Mountain Division received five M1200 Armored Knights. The 101st Division received its first four M1200 vehicles in November 2007 with regular fielding beginning in February 2008 and continuing into 2013 with production ending in the first quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2013. Through the end of FY 2013, the Army had fielded 465 M1200 Armored Knights to COLTS in armored brigade combat teams, infantry brigade combat teams, Stryker brigade combat teams, and battlefield surveillance brigades, and Fire Support Teams in infantry brigade combat teams.133

______1312000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 145; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96. 1322005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 128. 1332008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 128; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, pp. 338-40, Doc III-72, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, subj: M1200 Armored Knight, 11 Mar 13, Doc III-52, 2012 USAFAS AH; Army, Oct 13, p. 324, Doc III-72; Information Paper, subj: Armored Knight, undated, Doc III-73.

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In October 2013, meanwhile, the Armored Knight M1200 entered sustainment. Force structuring designated the elimination of the COLT requirement at the company level and replaced it with the Reconnaissance Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadron requirement and moved the Armored Knight into this role. This reduced the number of Knights required by 153.134 Subsequently, the Army began working Armored Knight M1200 obsolescence issues in January 2014. Recognizing the obsolescence of the Knight’s targeting station control panel and mission processing unit, the Army decided to replace them with the Mounted Family of Computer Systems over the next several years to improve planning, monitoring, and executing missions. In addition, efforts by the Maneuver Center of Excellence drove the need for netted sensor capability to facilitate the RSTA role to provide target handoff capability for joint munitions precision targeting. Communications improvements, in the meantime, envisioned upgrading beyond-line-of sight capability with the replacement of SINCGARS communications suite with the maneuver network vehicular radio communications suite, while platform discussions recognized the Knight platform had met its essential useful life cycle and proposed replacing it with the joint light tactical vehicle.135 Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder Early in the 1990s, fire supporters employed the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator (GVLLD) to lase targets for location and precision munitions. The system weighed 107 pounds, reduced the mobility of light fire support team, did not meet its needs, and was not man-portable. In response to this situation and the lack of a man- portable system to designate targets, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School wrote an Operational Requirements Document for the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR). Approved by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in February 1994, the LLDR would replace the GVLLD. Although the LLDR remained unfunded for several years, the School still pursued acquisition. Combining technological advances in position/navigation (Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System), thermal sights, and laser development, the LLDR would be a lightweight, compact, man-portable system designed for dismounted or mounted operations. Besides determining range, azimuth, and vertical angle, the LLDR would permit light forces to perform fire support functions quickly and accurately on a fast-paced, less dense, and more lethal battlefield and would offer the best alternative to the GVLLD. Because of its modular design, it could be readily tailored to the mission. In its target location configuration the LLDR weighed about 20 pounds and had the ability of locating targets accurately out to 10 kilometers and seeing the battlefield with a near, all-weather capability at shorter ranges. An integrated thermal night-sight would provide continuous day/night operations and the ability to see through obscurants, such as fog and smoke. If needed, the LLDR could be configured with a separate laser designator module to ______134Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-74. 135Nancy Jones-Bonbrest, “Army Advances Standardized Tactical Computer,” www.army.mil/article/109748, 27 Aug 14, Doc III-75; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14.

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designate moving and stationary targets for precision munitions. This configuration would increase the system’s weight to 35 pounds. Equally important, the LLDR could be used in training environments because of its eye-safe rangefinder.136 Although LLDR passed the initial operational test and evaluation in 2001, testing revealed some deficiencies. As a result, the Army developed a corrective action plan; and LLDR program proceeded to Milestone III where the Army decided to move into it low-rate initial production (LRIP). The 82nd Airborne Division was scheduled to receive the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) and LRIP production models; but the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon caused the Army to shift fielding priorities. Instead, the Special Operations Command was fielded with the EMD models, while the 82nd Airborne Division and the Interim Brigade Combat Team, later renamed the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, shared 66 LRIP models. In 2002 the Army fielded 15 test LLDRs to the 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan, started developing plans to reduce the system’s weight even more, and anticipated a full-rate production decision in 2003 and fielding in 2004.137 In December 2003 the Army made the LLDR full-rate production decision with contract negotiations continuing into 2004 and shifted fielding priorities at the same time. LRIP fielding priority shifted from the 82nd Airborne Division to the 25th Infantry Division. Just as the 25th Infantry Division was deploying to Iraq in January 2004, it received 21 LLDRs. Subsequently in September 2004, the 3rd Infantry Division’s combat observation lasing teams (COLTs) received 20 LLDRs in conjunction with M707 Knight fieldings. Later in October, the Army fielded two LLDRs to the Field Artillery School for enlisted and officer instruction and decided to field the LLDR to units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and to the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment), making it the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to receive the system.138 In November 2005 the Army Requirements and Review Board approved accelerating LLDR production and increased funding in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008-2113 Program Objective Memorandum. The production rates would go from three LLDRs per month, doubling every six months until a full-rate production of 40 per month would be achieved. This funding stream would complete LLDR fielding by FY 2013 to the total force. In fact, the Army completed fielding LLDR, also called LLDR-1, in 2011.139 Meanwhile in October 2006, the Program Manager for LLDR initiated a two-year performance improvement and weight reduction effort and designated the effort as the LLDR-2. Product improvements included improved day-and-night imaging performance, ______1362000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 145-46. 1372001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 109; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 110. 1382004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99. 1392005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED- 1, 2012, Doc III-74, 2011 USAFAS AH.

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solid-state laser designator module that would provide higher reliability, and a five-pound overall weight reduction to the system. The improvements would be available in FY 2010 without an increase in unit cost. Fielding began in FY 2011 to units supporting OEF.140 Meanwhile on 21 September 2010, the Army G-3 acknowledged the LLDR’s need for better accuracy to support current and future precision munitions. As a result, it began development on the LLDR-2H, initiated testing in 2010, and awarded a contract to retrofit the LLDR-1 and the LLDR-2 as the high-accuracy LLDR-2H. Fielded in 2012- 2013, the new system incorporated the High Accuracy Azimuth Device that would not be subject to the magnet interference issues that had plagued existing target locator systems. The device had three cameras, one day and two nights, that could map the location of the sun and stars and could compare them to its GPS location to determine very accurate direction and angular deviation to permit the soldier to call for fire with precision- munitions. A limited number of hardened prototype LLDR-2Hs had been produced as of 2012. In February 2014, 2nd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division was the first unit to be fielded the new precision targeting device. Current funding supported the fielding of four brigade combat teams per year.141 Joint Effects Targeting System In June 2004 the Army/Marine Corps Board (AMCB) directed the services to develop a common laser-targeting device requirement. In response, Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Southern Command representatives began developing the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS). JETS would consist of a Target Location Designation System (TLDS) and a Target Effects Coordination System (TECS). Combined, they would enable the dismounted observer (forward observer, joint target attack controller, special operations forces, and others) to acquire and engage targets and control all available effects providers (field artillery, close air support, attack aviation, and naval gunfire) and to designate stationary targets out to five kilometers and moving targets out to three kilometers. A forward observer equipped with JETS with TLDS capabilities would be capable of target recognition out to ranges of 3,000 meters during the day and 1,300 meters during the night with sufficient accuracy for the employment of precision munitions without mensuration. TECS would provide Blue Force Situational Awareness (BFSA) and communications interface with effects providers. On 19 September 2005 the ______1402008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS), ACH, p. 131; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III- 99, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012, 2012 USAFAS AH. 141Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-35, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-53, 2012 USAFAS AH; PEO Soldier Information Paper, subj: LLDR, 12 Dec 12, Doc III-76; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-77; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-77a.

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Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the initial capabilities documents (ICD).142 In October 2006 the Department of Defense designated the Army as the lead component for JETS. The Army made Program Executive Office Soldier the material developer to assist the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in the development of the capabilities documents and supporting analysis documentation. Work on the capabilities development document began with an analysis of alternatives being conducted in 2007-2008. The Capabilities Development Document for TLDS was released for worldwide staffing in January 2009, while the Army worked to produce the TECS capability development document.143 In July 2010 a meeting held at the Pentagon with milestone decision authority led to a successful milestone a decision for the JETS TLDS. This moved JETS from the material solution analysis phase into the technology development phase where technology demonstrator prototypes would be developed and where the draft Capabilities Development Document would be completed for final staffing. Two years later in 2012, the Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, awarded the contract to design, develop, fabricate, test, and deliver prototypes for engineering and manufacturing development of the system with fielding scheduled for 2016.144 Until JETS could be fielded, the Army planned to field the Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) hand-held targeting device in 2013. It would provide the dismounted forward observer with the ability to locate targets accurately in a timely manner and within the standards required to employ precision munitions. Basically, the QRC would bridge the gap between the existing target location capability found in units today and the objective JETS. The QRC capability was awarded to two industry partners to create celestial-based precision targeting devices under a Rapid Equipping Force (REF) initiative. Both vendors had technical challenges with the integration of the celestial cameras to determine direction, causing the Army to consider a limited fielding of the QRC to Special Forces approximately one year late. Fielding of this capability was originally April 2013. The QRC effort has been invaluable in informing JETS ______1422004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 97; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-78. 1432008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 130; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 26; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III-99, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH). 144Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-35, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Joint Effects Targeting System, 12 Jun 12, Doc III-54, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, subj: Joint Effects Targeting System Target Location Designation System, undated, Doc III-55, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-56, 2012 USAFAS AH.

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requirements and mitigating the technical challenges associated with celestial cameras.145 Fire Support Sensor System The Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) was an engineer change proposal to the Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3). The engineer change proposal integrated the laser designation module from the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR) onto the LRAS3 that in turn could be mounted on the Knight and Striker fire support vehicle and potentially BFIST in the future. The FS3 would be complemented by the platform’s mission equipment package, providing very accurate self-location and accurate target location. The FS3 would be the most capable observation, target location, and designation sensor on the battlefield.146 Fielding the FS3 began in 2006. The 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) at Fort Lewis, Washington, was retrofitted with the FS3 in February-April 2006. The 4th SBCT received its FS3s in July-September 2006 while the 3rd SBCT, currently deployed, was retrofitted upon returning from its overseas deployment. Integrating the FS3 onto the M3A3 BFIST began in 2007 and continued into 2011. In 2013 the FS3 gave the Field Artillery a capable target location and designation sensor.147 Profiler In 1995 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School started work on replacing the existing Meteorological Measuring Set (MMS) with the MMS-Profiler. The MMS produced meteorological (MET) messages by obtaining data from radiosonde instrumentation carried aloft by balloons and sent back to a ground-based receiver. Given the current state of operational numerical weather prediction systems, the single local balloon-borne radiosonde technology used by MMS was antiquated and limited in capability. The MMS MET messages provided only limited range and carried high operational and support costs. To address these shortcomings, an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Target Area Meteorological Measuring System (TAMMS) was generated and signed on 15 October 1996 by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This ORD, later renamed MMS-Profiler, required a system to provide a modernized, real-time meteorological capability over an extended battle space out to 500 kilometers. The system would provide vital target area meteorological information from a mesoscale model and associated software that acquired information from weather satellites and other MET sensors for use in the ______145Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” pp. 6-9; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-79. 1462004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 96. 1472005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 129; Email with atch, subj: TPSO History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III-99, 2010 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), Annual History (AH); “Ground Combat System,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338, Doc III-75, 2011 USAFAS AH; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 09, p. 355, Doc III-76, 2011 USAFAS AH; Raytheon Information Paper, subj: FS3, 2011, Doc III-77, 2011 USAFAS AH.

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employment of smart weapons to ensure proper munitions selection and optimal aiming. The Profiler would also furnish field artillery forces with current or expected weather conditions along the projectile trajectory and within the target area. In 2000 the Army issued a contract for Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) of the Profiler system. The initial program schedule called for operational testing in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 and low-rate initial production (LRIP) of nine systems to begin in the third quarter of FY 2003. Production of 83 systems was originally scheduled to begin in the first quarter of FY 2005, and the first unit equipment would be equipped in the second quarter of FY 2005.148 Progress with the program moved forward but with modifications. The Army changed the acquisition strategy to incorporate a system functional demonstration during the second quarter of FY 2003. In 2004 the program received a Milestone C decision after the completion of a successful developmental test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and went through an operational test at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Following these tests, LRIP began. Subsequently, the Army granted an urgent material release and fielded Profiler to the 3rd Infantry Division in December 2004. The Profiler program began full-rate production (FRP) in April 2006 after the Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare granted approval. In 2007 Program Manager (PM) Target Identification and Meteorological Systems (TIMS) accepted an initial five FRP Profiler systems. The first of these systems was fielded in March 2007 under an urgent material release until the full material release could be attained. In December of 2007 the Army approved full material release and fielded the MMS-Profiler, also known as MMS- Profiler I, from 2008 through 2010.149 Meanwhile, Fort Sill began developmental work on the Block II Profiler system (AN/TMQ-42B). Block II would reduce the system’s footprint, leverage technology and software advancements to achieve improved accuracy, and eliminate the balloon and radiosonde subsystem. In August 2008 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, approved eliminating the use of the balloon and the radiosonde. Basically, obtaining meteorological data was no longer dependent upon a balloon borne radiosonde and was no longer based upon the modeling of the atmosphere. With the elimination of the balloon and radiosonde came some logistical savings. The Army was able to reduce the ______1482005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 86-87; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 92; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-53, 2013 USAFAS AH 1492007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 95; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 10, Doc III-102, 2010 USAFCOEFS ACH; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 105; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p.p. 92-93; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 123-24; Information Paper, subj: MMS-Profiler I, 28 Jan 09, Doc III-36, 2010 USAFAS AH.

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size of the Profiler crew from six to two and the number of vehicles from three to one. Equally important, the Army achieved all Block II requirements (eliminating the balloon and radiosonde) in Block I that completed fielding in November 2011.150 The next step in the evolution of the Profiler system involved moving to the Block III configuration that the Army authorized in September 2010. Block III Profiler (Computer Meteorological Data-Profiler) would further reduce the footprint by limiting the equipment to a laptop computer, would reduce the number of soldiers from two to zero, and would be embedded in the tactical operations center via a local area network and eventual integration within the Fire Support Command and Control software. Block III would provide meteorological data to target acquisition radars, cannons, rockets, missiles, and mortars to improve first round hits, to conserve ammunition, to achieve surprise, and to reduce the chances of fratricide. The Army completed developmental testing in 2011-2012 and approved development of the system in 2012 with fielding starting in 2013 and continuing into 2014.151 Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications Systems Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. For the past 20 years, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) served as the Field Artillery’s primary fire support and mission command system. In 2013 AFATDS processed, analyzed, and exchanged combat information and furnished fully automated support for planning, coordinating, controlling, and executing fires and effects. It supported mortars, field artillery cannons, rockets, and missiles, close air support, attack aviation, and navel

______1502001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 105; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 92-93; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 95; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 127-29; Information Paper, subj: MMS-PI, 28 Jan 09; Information Paper, subj: MMS-Profiler, 2010, Doc III-37, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 10, Doc III-38, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: MMS-P I, 28 Jan 09, Doc III-39, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-40, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27, Doc III-78, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Field Artillery, 21 Sep 11, Doc III- 79, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-56, 2012 USAFAS AH. 151Interview with atch, Dastrup with Brown, 17 Feb 11; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27; RDT&E Project Justification (Extract), Feb 11, Doc III-80, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, MMS-P/Computer Meteorological Data- Profiler, undated, Doc III-57, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, PEO IEW&S, 18 May 10, Doc III-58, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-59, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: MMS-P/Computer Meteorological Data-Profiler, undated, Doc III-80; Information Paper, subj; ARL Scientists Assist the Army and Marine to Retain Artillery MET Capability, 18 Apr 13, Doc III-80a.

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surface fire support systems.152 Fielding began in 1996 with the original AFATDS version 96 (also version one) with planned updates to improve the software over a period of years. To accommodate growing fire support requirements the Army revamped AFATDS software fielding schedule in 1996. The Army fielded three variations of AFATDS version two software as AFATDS 97, AFATDS 98, and AFATDS 99 (also called A99) and AFATDS software version three in 2000 as AFATDS 00 (renamed AFATDS Version 7 in 2000 to match Army Battlefield Command System numbering). Fielded in 1998, AFATDS 97 furnished corps and echelons-above-corps functionality, modified MLRS/Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) command and control processes, and enabled the Field Artillery to plan and execute deep battle operations faster and safer than ever before. Later in 2000, the Army fielded AFATDS 98 which was the first AFATDS software version to address specific U.S. Marine Corps requirements.153 Fielded to active and reserve component units beginning in April 2002, AFATDS 99 (A99), renamed Version 6 in 2002 to match Army Battlefield Command System (ABCS) numbering convention and officially released in November 2002, enhanced AFATDS ability to compute tactical and technical fire direction. It reorganized and simplified menus and windows, streamlined plain text message access, enhanced alerts, created shortcuts, and incorporated technical fire direction. Equally important, the new capabilities of Version 6.3 eliminated the Battery Computer System (BCS) for cannon field artillery and Fire Direction System (FDS) for the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Also, Version 6 had improved interoperability with other ABCS computers, underwent successful initial interoperability testing in 2002 with several allied systems, including the French Automation des tires et liaison de l-Artillery sol-so (ATLAS), the German Artillerie Daten, Lage und Einsatz-Rechnerverbund (ADLER), the Italian Sistema Informatico di Reggimento (SIR), and the United Kingdom Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System (BATES), and was a part of the Artillery Systems Cooperative Activity (ASCA). ASCA was created to provide guidance for establishing interface among the five nations’ automated field artillery systems.154 As the fielding of AFATDS 6.3.1 that replaced Version 6.3 in 2003 moved forward, meanwhile, the Army proceeded with the development of AFATDS 6.4 which was formerly AFATDS Version 7 (AFATDS version 3/AFATDS 00). Pushing to automate all Army units, the Chief of Staff of the Army made ABCS 6.4 the minimum standard and directed that Version 7 would not be developed. To ensure full integration with ABCS 6.4, the Field Artillery School started working the training development for ______152Information Paper, Program Executive Office Command, Control, and Communications, subj: FSC2, 16 Apr 14, Doc III-81. 1532000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 148-55; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90. 1542000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 155; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 102-03; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 104; Artillery Systems Cooperation Activities Operator’s Notebook (Extract), 11 Oct 06, pp. 1-3, Doc III-101, 2009 USAFAS AH.

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ABCS/AFATDS 6.4 in 2003-2004. The ABCS Operational Test for AFATDS 6.4 was conducted at Fort Hood, Texas, involving the 4th Infantry Division and elements of the III Corps Artillery, from March 2004 to April 2004. Early in 2005, a general officer steering committee approved universal fielding and training on ABCS/AFATDS 6.4. Individual military occupational specialty (MOS) training was initiated in the Field Artillery School in October 2005; and the Army began fielding ABCS/AFATDS 6.4 to the Total Force. In addition to this, AFATDS Version 6.4.0.1, supporting Excalibur, was fielded in 2007, while AFATDS Version 6.4.0.2 was released in September 2008. Priority fielding went to units deploying or deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; and AFATDS Version 6.5 (Windows version) was granted full materiel release in December 2008, while AFATDS Version 6.5.0.1 (Windows version) was achieved in June 2010.155 Meanwhile, the Army initiated work on AFATDS Version 6.6 (Windows version), started fielding it in 2010, and completed it in 2012. This version modernized fire planning and scheduling by permitting drag and drop and time scheduling, among other improvements. For this version, the entire human interface moved to Java, the Fire Planning/Target Scheduling Worksheet was completely redesigned; and a web portal was created to access AFATDS data through a web browser using the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET)/Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) network. Air support features were improved to include a digital link to the U.S. Marine Corps’s TLDHS (strikelink); and digital threads were now able to be processed from initial request through aircraft control and mission complete.156 Released in early 2011, AFATDS Version 6.7.0 replaced AFATDS Version 6.6. Capabilities included multiple precision aim point missions, expanded AFATDS interface to Centaur, and a digital link to U.S. Air Force’s Terminal Air Control Party (TACP) for close air support (CAS) management. Basically, Version 6.7 automated fire support planning and coordination for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and automated planning, coordinating, and controlling of all fire support assets in the joint battlespace (field artillery, mortars, close air support, naval gunfire, attack helicopters, and offensive electronic warfare). Because of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the contractor added precision fires capabilities and other capabilities, such as automatic conduct of unit fratricide avoidance checks and collateral damage avoidance.157 ______1552005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 105; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 134-35; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 140; Information Paper, subj: PM Battle Command, undated, Doc III-57, 2010 USAFAS AH; RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11, Doc III-60, 2012 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2013 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-79. 156Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells Update, 7 Apr 11, Doc III-59, 2010 USAFAS AH; RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14. 157Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells Update, 7 Apr 11; RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11; RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11;

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Needing improved capabilities, the Army signed a contract with Raytheon for the development of AFATDS 6.8x (Bridging Effort) to replace AFATDS Version 6.7.0.2 around 2015. This version would focus on improving and simplifying the user interface while enhancing speed and capabilities. It would introduce more robust airspace control measures (ACM) processing as well as a new and revised airspace request conforming to the Department of Defense Form 1970, Motor Equipment Utilization Record. In June 2011 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the AFATDS Increment II Capability Development Document. AFATDS Increment II would migrate all field artillery command and control systems under it around 2018-2025. This would include the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED), Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System (Centaur), Forward Observer System, and Joint Automated Deeps Operations Coordination System (JADOCS).158 Handheld Command and Control Systems. To improve mobility for the Field Artillery, the Army adopted hand-held devices to augment AFATDS and to ensure that the entire force had common command and control systems that would improve the capabilities of early-entry forces. Beginning in 2002, they began investigating the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED) to transmit and receive fire support messages and the Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System (Centaur) to provide technical fire support capability as a backup for AFATDS for fielding.159 A lightweight, portable, low-power Rugged Personal Digital Assistant designed for the dismounted forward observer, the PFED with an integrated Global Positioning System capability utilized a laser ranger finder and a precision fire imagery application to generate a grid coordinate and sent the grid coordinate to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). Basically, the PFED was a handheld tactical device. The forward observer used it to compose, edit, transmit, receive, store, and display messages, process data, and monitor status employed in the conduct, planning, and execution of fire support missions. With the Precision Fire Imagery software PFED gave the dismounted observer the capability to mensurate the target and provide a precision grid in his call for fire.160 During 2013, Field Artillerymen also used the Centaur. It was a rugged personal ______USMC Systems Command Information Paper, subj: AFATDS I and II, undated, Doc III- 61. 158USMC Systems Information Paper, subj: AFATDS I and II, undated; “AFATDS Version for U.S. Army,” www.army-technology.com, 25 Jul 12, Doc III-62, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 13; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “Field Artillery Modernization Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 6-9, Doc III-78; Briefing, subj: Fire Support Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13; BG Christopher F. Bentley, “Year in Review,” RedLeg Update, 12-13 Dec 13, pp. 1-3-5, Doc III-82; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cell 2014 History, 24 Mar 14, Doc III-77a. 1592002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 113; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 103; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 105. 160Kathryn Bailey, “Handheld Fires App Lightens the Load for Forward Observers,” 20 Dec 13, www.army.mil/article/117413, Doc III-83.

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digital assistant that computed a technical firing solution for cannon units. It was used as a backup to AFATDS, performed a mandatory check for AFATDS firing data, and computed range safety data in an operational environment. Additionally, it provided immediate and early entry automated fire direction capabilities and auxiliary technical fire control for Light/Heavy Fire Direction Centers and the Cannon Firing Platoon Leaders. It computed automated safety, displayed safety-T, checked computed firing solutions against safety-T, and identified violations.161

TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGER FIRES BRIGADE

Fires Radar Strategy As of 2013, the Field Artillery had five target acquisition radars – AN/TPQ-36, AN/TPQ-37, AN/TPQ-48, AN/TPQ-49, and AN/TPQ-53 target acquisition radars – in its inventory and a modernization plan for each. However, the Field Artillery required a strategy to guide radar acquisition in an era of constrained resources that would reduce the number of radars and that would provide a way forward to accomplish the Fires core mission of detecting, tracking, classifying, and identifying aerial objects, including manned and unmanned aircraft, ballistic and cruise missiles, rockets, cannon artillery projectiles, and mortar projectiles. In the near term (Fiscal Years 2015-2019) the Army planned to merge the short-range field artillery radar Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar (AN/TPQ-48 and AN/TPQ-49) that were not programs of record, leaving just the AN/TPQ-50, and to retire the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37, leaving only the AN/TPQ- 53. The Q-53 and Q-50 would provide the Field Artillery force with 360-degree target acquisition capability, improved range, improved mobility, and decreased maintenance requirements over the Q-36 and Q-37.162 Enhanced AN/TPQ-36/53 Radar In view of the operational environment in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and the need to replace the AN/TPQ- 36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars with their limited scan capabilities, the Army decided in 2002 to field a new radar with the ability to locate medium range indirect fire systems in a 360-degree radius. Based on this, the Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, began defining a material change to the Q-36 radar to make it the Enhanced Q-36 (EQ-36) radar that would incorporate new technology into the existing radar, would reduce crew size and footprint, would increase range and accuracy in a 90-degree mode, would spiral from an initial increment 360-degree capability against only mortars to a 360-degree capability for mortars, cannon, and rockets, and would replace the aging Q-36 and Q-37 radars that had originated in the 1970s. Developmental work by Lockheed Martin started in January 2007.163 ______161Information Paper, Program Executive Office Command, Control, and Communications, subj: FSC2, 19 Dec 13, Doc III-83a. 162Daryl Youngman, “Fires Radar Strategy,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 45- 47, Doc III-84; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Modernization, 1 May 13, Doc III-85. 163Briefing, subj: The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition

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Shortly afterwards, an urgent material release prompted the Army to develop and field a Quick Response Capability (QRC) EQ-36 radar to support OIF. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 the Army approved developing 12 QRC EQ-36 radars. Later, the Army authorized procuring 38 QRC EQ-36 radars to meet combat operation requirements. Of these, Lockheed Martin would produce 36 based upon an initial production contract of July 2008 while another company would provide the rest. As of 2013, the Army directed the purchase of 45 QRC radars.164 Meanwhile, a production capabilities document in September 2010 outlined the requirements for a system of record with comparable capabilities as the QRC EQ-36 radar and initiated the program of record QRC EQ-36 as the AN/TPQ-53. In August 2011 the Army released a proposal contract to industry for low-rate initial production with the intention of selecting a contractor in FY 2012 to produce 33 program of record Q-53 radars with increased range over the Q-37, the capability to perform continuous ______Radar, undated, Doc III-90, 2011 USAFAS AH; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, subj: Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar, undated, Doc III-91, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH. 164Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-92, 2011 USAFAS AH; PM Radars Information Paper, subj: Q-37, undated, Doc III-93, 2011 USAFAS AH; U.S. Army Information Paper, subj: Enhanced Q-36, undated, Doc III-94, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL Matt Merrick, Dir, CDID, 25 Jan 12, Doc III-95, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, 2011, Doc III-96, 2011 USAFAS AH; “First U.S. Army EQ-36 Radar Deploys to Iraq,” Defense News, 9 Sep 10, Doc III-97, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar, undated, Doc III-90, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, FY 2010, Doc III-98, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-99, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, FY 2011, Doc III- 96, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, Army Technology, 7 Mar 12, Doc III-73, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade, 29 Nov 11, Doc III-70, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, DOTE, subj; EQ-36, undated, Doc III-74, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with McDonald, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-100, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, FY 2011, Doc III-96, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 11, Doc III-67, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III-68, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” RedLeg Update, Mar 13, Doc III-68a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Record with atch, subj: Annual History, 10 Apr 13, Doc III-68b, 2012 USAFAS AH; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-43, Doc III-86; Briefing, subj: Fires Modernization Strategy Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-87.

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360-degree coverage, and solid state components to reduce maintenance requirements. The Q-53 would also reduce operational and support costs, would have a minimum range of 500 meters and a maximum range of 60 kilometers, could be emplaced in five minutes, displaced in two minutes, would be equipped with an auto-leveling system, could be operated by a crew of four, and would be linked by digital tactical radios to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Digital System (AFATDS) for mission processing. Once these Q-53 radars had been fielded, the Army planned to retrofit the QRC EQ-36 radars to make them Q-53 radars and completed a limited users test for the Q-53 in October 2012. The Army also planned to conduct an initial operational test and evaluation in 2014, to make a full-rate production decision in 2015, and to hold a follow-on test and evaluation in 2015. The Army outlined fielding the Q-53 to the brigade combat teams and fires brigades and intended to replace the Q-36 and Q-37 radars with the Q-53.165 AN/TPQ-37 Radar Although the Army planned to replace the Firefinder AN/TPQ-37 radar which was first fielded in the 1970s and underwent several modernization programs over the next several decades, the Army acknowledged that it would be around for several more years. Based on this, the Army decided to upgrade it for the heavy and Stryker brigade combat teams and the fires brigades. Thales Raytheon Systems developed reliability and maintainability initiative kits in 2011-2012 to incorporate into the Q-37 to reduce sustainment costs and increase the life span of the radar system beyond its scheduled retirement date of Fiscal Year 2019.166 ______165Interview, Dastrup with McDonald, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-100, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, FY 2011, Doc III-96, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, undated, Doc III-75, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, Army Technology, 7 Mar 12, III-73 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 11, Doc III-69, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III- 70, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 Mar 13, III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” RedLeg Update, Mar 13, III-68a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-43; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, 3-13 Mar 13, p. 3, Doc III-88; Briefing, subj: Fire Modernization Strategy Brief, 26 Apr 13; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade 2012, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-89. 166Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-89, 2011 AH; Information Paper, ThalesRaytheonSystems, 2010, Doc III-71, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 11, Doc III-72, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade, 29 Nov 11, Doc III-73, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Firefinder Radar AN/TPQ-37(V)8, 2013, Doc III-74, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, 8 Mar 13 Doc III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manger-Fires

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AN/TPQ-50 Radar Over the past several years, the Army worked to introduce the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR). Originally called the man-portable countermortar radar, the LCMR emerged from requirements identified late in the 1990s by the Special Operations Forces. Because the existing AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars lacked the ability to scan 360 degrees and the mobility and agility to accompany light and early entry forces, Special Operations Forces had a critical need for lightweight countermortar radar with the capability of scanning 360 degrees to detect the location of short-range mortars rapidly and accurately. This led to the development of the Quick Response Capability (QRC) LCMR (AN/TPQ-48) that was specially designed to support the Special Operations Forces and Ranger units. A man-portable system with a maximum range of 7,000 meters and a minimum range of 1,000 meters, the LCMR had the ability to search 360 degrees and to detect and track mortar fire. Such capabilities would permit responsive counterfire to destroy fleeting improvised shooters including those in urban area.167 Subsequently, the Army awarded a contract to Syracuse Research Corporation to develop and produce the radar. Requirements documentation was written and approved. Syracuse Research Corporation adopted the Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) requirements as a baseline and planned to utilize a spiral development strategy using increments/versions to achieve the full capability needed for fielding. An operational needs statement (ONS) further defined the requirements. Accuracy and range would increase while maintaining the mobility and transportability of the original LCMR concept.168 In 2004 the Army started fielding the QRC Q-48 to Special Operations Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. With a range of five kilometers and a target location error of 100 plus meters, the radar met the immediate needs of deployed forces of the United States Special Operations Command, while future spirals would satisfy the capability gaps identified in the operational and organizational concept of 2004. Fielded in 2005-2006, ______Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-43, Doc III-90; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade 2012, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-91. 1672004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 99; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 100; Information Paper, SRC Tec, 2010, Doc III-52, 2010 USAFAS AH; Scott R. Gourley, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar,” Army Magazine, Apr 02, Doc III-53, 2010 USAFAS AH; Navy Lt.j.g. Jason Calandruccio, Defense Contract Management Agency, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar, www.dcma.mil, Winter 02, Doc III-54, 2010 USAFAS AH; AN/TPQ-48 was the initial designation of the LCMR as noted in Scott R. Gourley, “Soldier Armed,” Army, Feb 11, pp. 63-66, Doc III- 102, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH. 1682006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 91-92; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 94; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 122; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH.

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Increment II/Version II (QRC AN/TPQ-49) provided more rugged hardware and better software and supported the counter rocket, artillery and mortar (CRAM) system of systems.169 In 2008 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Program Office Sensors at Fort Sill wrote and staffed a capabilities document for the program of record LCMR. Syracuse Research Corporation received the contract to produce LCMR (AN/TPQ-50) or Increment III/Version III to serve in conjunction with the AN/TPQ-53 radar to track artillery and rockets and friendly fire without having to switch modes.170 After conducting a successful initial operational test and evaluation early in February and March 2012 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, the Army started fielding the Q-50 in the third quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2013. As of 2013, two Q-50 programs existed: the ORC and the program of record. The Army planned to remove the QRC AN/TPQ- 48/48A/49 from service by 31 March 2015.171 Multiple Launch Rocket System Munitions. Improvement efforts with the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in 2013 focused on enhancing the munitions to give them better range and precision. Although MLRS performed well during Operation Desert Storm (ODS) in ______1692004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 99; Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 11, Doc III-55, 2010 USAFAS AH; Gourley, “Soldier Armed,” pp. 63-66; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, Syracuse Research Corporation, undated, Doc III-75, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, Syracuse Research Corporation, undated, Doc III-76, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III- 70, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH. 170Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 11; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-104, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-100, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH. 171FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-104, 2011 USAFAS AH; PM Radars Information Paper, subj: LCMR, undated, Doc III-105, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army Equipment, undated, Doc III-77, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, PM Radars, 16 Jan 13, Doc III-78, 2012 USAFAS AH; Presolicitation Synopsis for LCMR, 15 May 12, Doc III-79, 2012 USAFAS AH; DAC for ARNG SITREP, Apr 12, Doc III-80, 2012 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 11, Doc III-81, 2012 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade, 29 Nov 11, Doc III-73, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III-82, 2012 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-66, 2012 USAFAS AH; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-43, Doc III-92; “Update on AN/TPQ 53, AN/TPQ-50,” Redleg Update, 3-13 Mar 13, p. 3; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade 2012, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-93.

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1991, its rockets and their submunitions raised serious concerns. During the war, many Iraqi field artillery assets out-ranged their coalition counterparts, including the MLRS M26 Dual-Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) rocket. Also, the high dud rate of the M26 rocket, including MLRS submunitions, raised apprehensions about the safety of soldiers passing through impact areas. Together, the proliferation of rocket systems with greater ranges than MLRS and the unacceptable dud rate of the M26 led to the requirement for an extended-range (ER) MLRS rocket (M26A2) with a range of 45 kilometers and a lower submunition dud rate that would serve as an interim measure until a Guided MLRS (GMLRS) rocket could be developed. A 45-kilometer range would increase the commander’s ability to influence the battlefield at depth and to fire across boundaries and simultaneously would improve the survivability of launcher crews. However, the Field Artillery required greater accuracy to accompany the increased range.172 After the Army started production of the ER-MLRS M26A2 rocket in limited quantities to meet the range requirements identified in ODS, it turned its efforts to the GMLRS rocket that was already under development and that could be fired from the M270A1 MLRS Launcher under development and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) also under development. Unlike the accuracy of the traditional free- flight MLRS M26 or M26A2 rocket that degraded as the range to the target increased, the guided rocket’s Global Positioning System (GPS)-aided inertial navigation system would provide consistent, improved accuracy from a minimum range of 15 kilometers to a maximum of 60-70 kilometers, depending upon warhead weight and type of propellant, to attack area and point targets. The GMLRS rocket would also enhance the ability to conduct precision strikes, would reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target, and would give the MLRS an additional 15 plus kilometer range beyond the ER-MLRS. Such a range would permit hitting more targets and make the MLRS launcher more survivable because it could be positioned farther from the target. Given the need for the rocket, the Army awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin Vought Systems in November 1998 for a four-year, five-nation (United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States) engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) effort. Based upon successful testing, low-rate initial production would begin in 2002 with the first unit equipped in 2004. Technical problems, however, arose in 2000, causing the program to slip with the initial operational capability being moved to 2006.173 As planned, engineering developmental testing (EDT) for GMLRS took place. In May 2002 the contractor completed the last of the six EDT tests for 2001-2002. During the last one, a rocket flew more than 70 kilometers to the target area and dispensed its ______1722000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 117; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-44, Doc III-92. 1732000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 117-19; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-93; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 71-72; Memorandum with atch, subj: Annual History, 10 Apr 13, Doc III-63a, 2012 USAFAS AH.

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submunitions. Major test objectives included the successful launch of the rocket from the launcher, nominal motor performance, tail fin deployment and spin rate evaluation, and navigation performance. In all aspects the GMLRS rocket satisfied its EDT objectives to permit moving to the next stage of testing.174 Production qualification test (PQT) at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, followed shortly after EDT. Over a period of six months beginning in June 2002 and ending in November 2002, the contractor conducted five PQT flights that ranged between 15-70 kilometers to demonstrate accuracy and performance maturity. Although some technical problems still existed, the flights verified the rocket’s maturity and accuracy and led to the decision on 7 March 2003 to enter into low-rate initial production (LRIP) for GMLRS with the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions M30 rocket. Later on 3 November 2003, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) at the Joint Staff approved fielding GMLRS. Upon fielding that began in 2003, GMLRS M30 rocket enhanced the Army’s and Marine Corps’s ability to conduct precision strikes, reduced the number of rockets required to defeat a target, and extended the range of MLRS 15 kilometers beyond that of ER-MLRS, but the rocket was not be well suited for target engagements in heavy snow or forested, urban, complex, or restrictive terrain. Debris caused by the warhead skins, nose cone, and rocket motor damage could cause collateral damage.175 Subsequent to the JROC decision, additional testing occurred. During September 2004 and October 2004, the Army and contractor conducted operational testing. They fired more than 24 GMLRS rockets from MLRS M270A1 and HIMARS M142 launchers. Testing demonstrated that the rocket met all requirements; and the GMLRS with DPICM was type classified and went into full-rate production in 2005. Because of restrictions imposed by the Department of Defense Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians implemented in 2008, GMLRS M30, later designated as GMLRS Increment I, the Army stopped procuring the munition.176 Concurrently, the Army explored the possibility of adding another MLRS rocket, later designated as GMLRS Increment II (Unitary). Looking at Kosovo in 1999 and the need to reduce damage to civilian property and the loss of civilian lives during combat operations and to deliver organic fires in all types of terrain and weather, the Army required a more accurate MLRS rocket with a high-explosive unitary warhead and investigated the possibility of acquiring it. Equipped with the Guided DPICM MLRS motor, the Unitary rocket would have a fuse with the capabilities of a proximity fuse, a point-detonating fuse, or a delay fuse capability, depending upon the target area. The proximity fuse would provide a large burst over the target area. The point-detonating ______1742002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 72-73. 1752002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 73; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 88-89; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44. 1762004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 76; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 68; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manger-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40- 44.

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fuse would reduce the size of the burst and collateral damage because of the ground burst, while the time-delay fuse would permit the rocket to penetrate certain types of structures or targets and then detonate the rocket.177 After funding delays in 2000 and 2001, work on the GMLRS Unitary rocket warhead and fuse began in earnest in 2002-2003. On 7 March 2003 GMLRS Unitary passed milestone b in the acquisition cycle to move the rocket into design and demonstration with operational testing and initial operational capability scheduled for 2007. The initial GMLRS Unitary rocket would have only a point detonating and a delay fuse, while the objective rocket would incorporate the third mode (proximity) of the tri- mode fuse, anti-jam antenna, and an insensitive munition motor. The tri-mode fuse capability would permit commanders to tailor the munition’s effects to the mission requirements.178 Even before operational testing could be done on the GMLRS Unitary Increment II, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, the Commander of the Multi-National Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and also Commander of the U.S. Army III Corps, sent the Army an operational needs statement on 28 March 2004 for the rocket. After the Army denied the request on 13 September 2004, General Metz forwarded an urgent needs statement for the rocket to the Army on 12 October 2004. His forces required a precision, all-weather, low-caliber, high-explosive MLRS munition to integrate into joint fires in an urban environment, to attack high pay-off targets, and to provide large area coverage at the same time; and the initial GMLRS Unitary met those requirements.179 On 6 January 2005 the Army validated General Metz’s request and accelerated work on the GMLRS Unitary Increment II to provide it sooner than planned and subdivided GMLRS Unitary Increment II into IIa and IIb. In May 2005 the contractor, Lockheed Martin, delivered 72 Increment IIa rockets with the point detonating and delay dual-mode fuses to the Army. Meanwhile, Congress directed the Army to field 496 GMLRS Increment IIa Unitary rockets with 486 of them going to the field. The rest would be used for further development and testing.180 Combat operations corroborated the GMLRS Unitary Increment IIa development. On 9 and 10 September 2005, B Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment fired a six- rocket mission at an insurgent safe house in a heavy urban environment at 53 kilometers and destroyed it, killing insurgents in the process, and shot another two-round mission in the same area, killing more insurgents in the process. One day later, A Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment shot six rockets at a bridge and destroyed it. In all instances, collateral damage to surrounding buildings was almost non-existent according to ______1772000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 120; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 95-96; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 73-74; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 73; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44. 1782007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 73. 1792004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69. 1802005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 73; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 95.

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participants. By 23 December 2008, field artillery units in Iraq and Afghanistan had fired over 1,000 GMLRS Unitary IIa rockets. The following year of 2009, American and British field artillery units shot approximately, 1,500. Of these, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps engaged the enemy with 830 Increment IIa rockets and employed them in pre-planned missions against precisely located targets in urban or counterinsurgency operations where collateral damage was of concern. The GMLRS Unitary Increment IIa rockets with point detonating and delay fuse capabilities requested by General Metz performed well and generated a paradigm shift that permitted using MLRS rockets in close proximity (200 meters or less) to friendly forces whereas the previous practice had a minimum of 2,000 meters as the safe distance from friendly forces. Even though it went out of production and was the only GMLRS munition, GMLRS Unitary Increment IIa continued to be used in theater in 2012 and 2013.181 Work on the objective GMLRS Unitary rocket with software upgrades, new trajectory shaping modes, and the third (proximity) mode of the tri-mode fuse meanwhile continued as GMLRS Unitary Increment IIb (the objective rocket). Phase two engineering developing testing and production qualification testing of 2007 demonstrated the maturity of the objective GMLRS Unitary IIb rocket. This permitted moving to milestone c decision for low-rate production and operational testing of the objective rocket. Successful completion of the operational testing resulted in full-rate production decision and fielding of the tri-mode fuse (proximity, point detonating, and delay) rocket configuration. Over 2,500 GMLRS Unitary Increment IIbs were employed in OIF and OEF.182 In 2012-2013 the Army also commenced developing the next-generation GMLRS designated as GMLRS Increment IV. To mitigate the eventual loss of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) with its Anti-Personnel/Anti-Material (APAM) cluster ______1812006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 71; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 73-74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 95; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Jeff Froysland, TCM RAMS, 1 Feb 10, Doc III-87, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: MLRS Family of Munitions, Jan 09, Doc III-90, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 History, 29 Mar 12, Doc III-81, 2011 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44. 1822006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 95-96; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Froysland, 1 Feb 10, Doc III-87, 2009 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Fact Sheet, subj: HIMARS Takes the High Ground, 5 Jan 10, Doc III-89, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-64, 2012 USAFAS AH; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 10 Feb 14, Doc III-94; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44.

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munitions that were banned by the cluster munitions convention with a proven missile, the Army wanted the GMLRS Unitary Increment IV, designated as the Long Range Precision Fires Munition in October 2013, to have a 250-300 kilometer range, a warhead with a tri-mode fuse (proximity, point detonating, and delay), and effectiveness to achieve required target effects, among other requirements. The Army completed the updated Increment IV capabilities development document for worldwide staffing in 2013.183 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead. Over the years, cluster munitions generated controversy. Armies first used them in World War II, and at least 21 countries have employed them since. For example, the United States used them in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, the Soviets utilized them in Afghanistan in the 1970s and 1980s, while the British employed them in the Falkland Islands in the 1980s. Subsequently, the United States dropped cluster bombs in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first decade of the 21st Century. Basically, cluster munitions dispensed large numbers of submunitions over an extended area. The submunitions generally lacked self-destruct capability and had the potential of remaining hazardous for decades.184 Frustrated with attempts to prohibit or restrict the use of cluster munitions, a group of nations led by Norway reached an agreement to ban cluster munitions. In December 2008, 94 countries signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions that prohibited their development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling. The United States, Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, and Pakistan, however, did not participate in the talks that led to the agreement or sign the convention. By December 2009 103 states had signed the convention.185 Meanwhile, the United States resisted banning cluster munitions. In May 2008 just prior to the signing of Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Political-Military Affairs, Stephen Mull, said that United States relied upon cluster munitions as an important part of its defense strategy and preferred pursuing technological fixes to ensure that the weapons would not be viable once the conflict was over. Moreover, if cluster munitions were eliminated, more money would be spent on new weapon systems, ammunition, and logistical resources. The United States further stated that most militaries would increase their employment of massed field artillery and rockets barrages which would increase the destruction of key infrastructure if cluster

______183Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-64, 2012 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44; Speaker Notes for Field Artillery Modernization Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-95; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fire Brigade MLRS-Munitions History 2013, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-96. 184Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 22 Dec 09, pp. 1-2, Doc III-31, 2010 USAFAS AH. 185Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” pp. 3-4.

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munitions were banned.186 On 19 June 2008 the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a new policy on cluster munitions although it still recognized them as legitimate weapons with clear military utility and did not support the convention. Acknowledging the unintended harm that unexploded cluster munitions could cause to civilians and civilian infrastructure and worldwide opposition to the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) which was a cluster munition, the DoD replaced its previous policy with a new one. As soon as possible but no later than one year from 9 July 2008, the military and combatant commands would begin removing all cluster munitions that exceeded operational planning requirements or for which there would be no operational planning requirements from the active inventory All excess cluster munitions would be demilitarized as soon as practicable. After 2018 United States military departments and combatant commands could only employ cluster munitions that would not result in more than one percent unexploded ordnance. Until then, the employment of cluster munitions that exceeded the one percent threshold had to be approved by the combatant commander. Prior to 2018, DoD could seek to transfer cluster munitions that did not exceed the one percent threshold to a foreign government if that government agreed not to use them. The old policy required the military to design and procure cluster munitions with a 99 percent reliability rate but did address the use and removal of current munitions.187 Because the dud rate for GMLRS DPICM did not meet DoD and international agreements on the reduction of dud munitions, the Army pressed forward to develop an alternative to engage area and inaccurately located targets, recognizing the need to minimize collateral effects in pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Although the Army acknowledged the need for such munitions and noted that unitary munitions did not provide the same capability and effects, the DoD officially announced a moratorium on the production and use of DPICM on 18 June 2008 that would leave more than one percent duds after arming and subsequently approved an effort on 22 October 2008 to develop a viable alternative to GMLRS DPICM with an initial operational capability in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. Subsequently, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7, Lieutenant General James D. Thurman, announced the Army’s desire to transition to an alternative warhead capability as soon as technologically and programmatically feasible. Later, the Army announced its intention to procure GMLRS Unitary rockets in-lieu of future planned DPICM procurement and to develop a GMLRS Alternative Warhead that was designated as GMLRS Increment III with fielding scheduled for FY 2015.188 ______186Ibid. 187Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians, 19 Jun 08, Doc III-32, 2010 USAFAS AH; DOD News Release, Cluster Munitions Policy Released, 9 Jul 08, Doc III-33, 2010 USAFAS AH; Donna Miles, “New Cluster Bomb Policy Aims to Reduce Collateral Damage,” American Forces Press Service, 9 Jul 08, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH. 1882007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 96; Briefing (Extract), subj: Precision Guided Missiles and Rockets Program Review, 24 Apr 07, Doc

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Work on the alternative warhead moved forward over the next several years. During the 2009, the Army contracted with three vendors to produce a warhead that was equal or greater than DPICM in destructive capabilities. The Army wanted each to produce four prototypes for testing and planned to enter engineering, manufacturing, and developing. In August-October 2010 the three vendors successfully fired their prototypes (warhead designs). Based upon this, the Project Office conducted a three-part system preliminary design review of each alternative warhead in January 2011. Six months later in July 2011, the Army Missile Command Source Selection Authority completed evaluating the three competing alternative warhead designs and selected Alliant Tech Systems to develop the alternative warhead. Subsequently, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the GMLRS Alternative Warhead (GMLRS Increment III) capability development document and validated the key performance parameters for the system on 8 November 2011. Later on 19 November 2012, the Army approved production of the warhead as a replacement for the GMLRS DPICM. In 2013 work continued on GMLRS Alternative Warhead (GMLRS Increment III). During the year, flight testing in May 2013 and engineering and developmental testing conducted between April 2013 and September 2013 paved the way for production qualification testing in October 2013. Production qualification testing confirmed the missile’s compliance with the Army requirements. Four rockets fired from a M270A1 launcher destroyed their respective targets 17 kilometers away.189 ______III-82, 2011 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: MLRS Family of Munitions, Jan 09, Doc III-90, 2009 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-44. 189Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr 12, Doc III-83, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-84, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires, Rockets and Missiles, 21 Apr 11, Doc III-85, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Froysland, 1 Feb 10, Doc III-87, 2009 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, subj: GMLRS Alternative Warhead Analysis of Alternatives, 9 Feb 10, Doc III- 41, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Jeff Froysland, TCM Fires Brigade, 15 Feb 11, Doc III-42, 2010 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G- 3/5/7, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for GMLRS Alternative Warhead to Initiate Analysis of Alternatives, 7 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2010 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: GMLRS-U Fire, undated, Doc III-44, 2010 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: GMLRS-AW Analysis of Alternatives Study Directive, 26 Apr 10, Doc III-45, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-65, 2012 USAFAS AH; Froysland and Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” pp. 40-43; Briefing, subj: Fires Modernization Strategy Brief, 26 Apr 13, Doc III-97; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-Munitions History 2013, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-98; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, subj: Lockheed Martin Conducts Second Successful Production

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Launchers. Based upon after action reports from Operation Desert Storm of 1991, the Army realized that the MLRS M270 launcher that had been introduced in 1983 required a faster response time, global positioning system-aided munitions, and improvements to its fire control system and launcher drive system. To combat the launcher’s growing obsolescence the Army initiated the Improved Fire Control System (IFCS) program in 1992 to replace dated electronic systems and to provide for growth potential for future precision munitions. Subsequently, the Army initiated the Improved Launcher Mechanical System (ILMS) program in 1995 to reduce reaction times by decreasing the time required to aim, displace, and reload the launcher. For several years the Improved Fire Control System and Improved Launcher Mechanical System modifications were two separate programs. As a result of the integrated test program initiative, the Army combined the two programs in 1997. Together, the two modernization efforts produced the M270A1 launcher early in the 21st Century.190 After the fielding began in 2002, the Army upgraded the M270A1 over the next decade. During 2005, 13 launchers from 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, received the Improved Weapon Interface Unit (IWIU). The IWIU was required for firing Guided MLRS munitions, both Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) and Unitary. Meanwhile, the Army completed other significant M270A1 modification projects – machine gun mount and Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) and Environmental Control Unit (ECU) in 2005. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) after action reviews and lessons learned expressed a need for a mount for the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) that was the primary weapon for the M270A1’s launcher chief. Lengthy road marches and traveling down unimproved roads presented a challenge for the launcher chief to maintain control and stability of his SAW while standing in the hatch as the vehicle was moving. By the end of 2007, all M270A1 units were equipped with this machine gun mount.191 Because the current ventilation system in the launcher cab did not meet Manpower Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) requirements for a crew during firing and silent watch operations in all weather and because multiple radios and electronic equipment in the cab generated heat, the Army had to find a way to improve conditions in the cab. It installed the ECU to control adverse climate conditions and to permit the maximum use of radios and computer systems and the APU to reduce maintenance time and cost while providing the capability for silent watch operations. The APU was a diesel generator designed to provide a source of electricity and permitted the launcher to remain powered while in the hide area with the main engine shut off; and the ECU was an 18,000 BTU unit that could reduce the temperature inside the cab when it was subjected to extreme heat environments like those found in Operation Iraqi Freedom.192 ______Qualification Flight Test of GMLRS Alternative Warhead, 3 Feb 14, Doc III-99. 1902000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 120; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 74-76; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 92. 1912005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 77. 1922005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 72-73; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 75; 2007

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With the increasing need for better communications over long distances, the Army, meanwhile, initiated development of the Modular Launcher Communication System (MLCS) for MLRS and HIMARS in 2006 to permit long-range communications between the fire direction center and the launchers. MLCS would integrate long-range radios (high frequency and satellite communication), tactical fire direction software, a display panel, and a data entry device. As of 2006, digital messages to the launcher were transmitted from the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) via a SINCGARS radio. This message flow was sequential from command and control node to command and control node with line-of-sight radio communications limiting the distance between each command and control node. Although there were advantages to this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of time- sensitive targets by taking a long time to process, and increased the quantity of equipment required to complete a fire mission. MLCS would furnish a means to receive and transmit long-range digital messages in a network consisting of multiple subscribers with different communication devices and underwent a successful user test utilizing high frequency radios at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 2007.193 MLCS addressed a communications capability gap in MLRS M270A1 and HIMARS M142 launchers. In the near-term the Army planned to use the Harris 150 High Frequency Radio to satisfy long-range communications requirements. For the long- term (2011-2017) the Army foresaw migrating both launchers to the Joint Tactical Radio System when it became available and integrating limited tactical fire control, among other capability improvements. For the present, the Army outlined using Blue Force Tracker for situational awareness. Additional situational awareness would be met by the acquisition of the Driver’s Vision Enhancement for both launchers that would provide the driver with the capability to drive in reduced visibility with the use of forward looking infrared sensor and display control module. Beyond 2017, the plan identified incorporating tactical fire control functions managed at the battery and/or platoon command and control echelons utilizing an integrated battle space communications and adding the ability to receive and execute valid fire missions digitally from field artillery sensor platforms, among others.194 In 2012-2013 the Army continued the modernization effort above, commonly known as the “Big Three,” and two other modernization efforts. The first modernization effort added Drivers Vision Enhancement, Blue Force Tracker, and Long-Range Communications to each launcher. Because the original M270 launcher was designed to be employed behind front line troops by utilizing the extended reach of the rockets and missiles, the cab had minimal armor to protect the launcher crew. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that the threat had changed, requiring greater protection. The second modernization effort, the Improved Armored Cab, started in 2012 and continued ______USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 77-78. 1932007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 104. 1942007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 101; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 104; Email, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011, 19 Apr 12, Doc III-86, 2011 USAFAS AH.

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into 2013 and would provide increased protection for the crew against mines, improvised explosive devices, fragmentation from enemy artillery, and direct attack from small arms upon completion. The third modernization effort, the Fire Control System Upgrade, would upgrade the obsolete Fire Control System and would provide fire control system software and hardware commonality between the M142 and M270A1 by taking advantage of the latest technology and better processors that would enhance mission processing and make the Fire Control System more user friendly. Fielding was scheduled to begin in 2016. These modernization efforts would make the M270A1 more modern, survivable, and sustainable.195 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System In 2013 the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) M142 launcher provided the Army with a critical precision deep fires capability for light and early entry forces and furnished field artillery medium and long-range rocket and long-range missile fires as part of the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) fleet of launchers. A wheeled, indirect fire, rocket/missile system capable of firing all rockets and missiles in the current and future MLRS family of munitions, HIMARS originated in the 1990s. On 26 October 1990 the operational and organizational plan for HIMARS established an urgent need for a strategically deployable, tactically mobile, indirect fire, long-range, rocket/missile system that could operate semi-autonomously and achieve the range, accuracy, and lethality required to support combat operations effectively. The plan stated that the light divisions and early entry forces did not have the organic assets to perform battle tasks on a worldwide basis effectively. While corps-level assets could furnish supporting fires with 155-mm. howitzers and MLRS M270 launchers, these systems’ lack of strategic deployability could limit or even preclude their introduction into the theater in time to influence the battle. In comparison, a HIMARS unit would require less lift than an equivalent MLRS unit and expand airlift capacity by extending airlift platforms to include C-130 aircraft. Use of C-130 aircraft would also expand tactical mobility once forces arrived in the area of operations. Examination also revealed that doctrinal changes alone would not correct the identified shortfalls of not having a rapidly deployable launcher system to support light forces. Organizational changes of field artillery units also would not address the basic problems associated with worldwide deployment.196 ______195Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-65a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Launchers, 10 Feb 14, Doc III-100; Briefing, subj: PFRMS Launcher and Munitions System Overview, 2012, Doc III-101; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-44, Doc III-102; Briefing, subj: PRRMS Launcher and Munition System Overviews, 2012; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade MLRS- Munitions History 2013, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-103; MAJ Matt Anderson, “Proven Launcher Receives Upgrades for Future,” www.theredstonerocket.com/tech, 17 Jul 13, Doc III-104. 1962002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 77-78; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p.

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Analysis by the Field Artillery School also supported HIMARS development. In December 1991 the school conducted an in-house Legal Mix VII analysis to determine the preferred composition for the Field Artillery to meet worldwide requirements in the future. The analysis concluded that HIMARS would provide a much-needed, lethal punch for the light forces and would be as mobile as the supported force. The wheeled chassis and C-130 deployability would provide unique means for rapid intra-theater employment. The effectiveness comparisons of equal airlift alternatives for M198 155- mm. towed howitzer, the MLRS launcher, and the HIMARS launcher revealed that the HIMARS was approximately 20 percent more effective than the MLRS alternative and approximately 70 percent more effective than the M198 alternative.197 In view of this, the Department of the Army approved the HIMARS operational requirements document (ORD) on 3 December 1992, outlining the requirement for two battalions with three being desired. However, the Army failed to fund development because the payoff of fielding only two battalions was not deemed worth the cost of a new start.198 In 1997 an emerging force structure study at the Field Artillery School called for two field artillery brigades of two HIMARS battalions and one towed cannon battalion each to support one light division. The study confirmed that adding a rocket/missile system to the light corps artillery force structure would increase lethality against high- payoff targets, field artillery, and other special targets. The analysis also highlighted an increase in field artillery survivability when HIMARS was integrated into the light force field artillery structure. In view of this evidence, the Army decided to fund HIMARS.199 Subsequently, the Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI), a joint effort sponsored by the U.S. Army Missile Command and the Dismounted Battle Space Battle Laboratory, conducted an advanced concepts technology demonstration (ACTD) in 1998 using new target acquisition systems, “shooters,” and command and control systems at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that would be C-130 deployable and would be used by the first-to-fight forces. Among the systems to be tested were four HIMARS prototypes. In August 1998 following the ACTD, the RFPI reviewed the contributions of HIMARS as a lightweight MLRS system. RFPI’s assessment cited the advantage of increased firepower for early entry forces, less time spent on the firing point versus the M270 launcher’s time, and the ease of the training transition from the M270 to the HIMARS.200 Over one year later on 19 October 1999, the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments approved an updated HIMARS operational requirements document in light of the RFPI ACTD. The updated document permitted HIMARS to enter into the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) phase of acquisition and also identified the requirement for 16 HIMARS battalions – two in the active force

______102. 1972002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78. 198Ibid. 199Ibid. 2002002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 97.

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and 14 in the Army National Guard.201 After five years of development and testing, the Army fielded HIMARS beginning in 2005 and carried it on for several years.202 Meanwhile, the Department of the Army approved an urgent need statement of 20 October 2005 by the 3-27th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Bragg and XVIII Airborne Corps for increased crew protection for the HIMARS by armoring the launcher cab. Even with the armor, the cab still had to meet C-130 transportability requirements while achieving STANAG level II armor requirements. Developed in 2005-2006 to meet an operational need statement from the XVIII Airborne Corps, the near-term armor solution involved using a modified design of the low signature armored cab (LSAC) developed for use with the family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV) and using “bolt on” or “appliqué” armor which would be applied after the launcher had been transported by C- 130. This modified cab design was designated the low signature armored cab-HIMARS (LSAC-H). The appliqué armor consisted of 43 pieces of armor that could be installed on the cab in less than two hours and removed in less than one hour. A removable machine gun mount was also developed because of after action reviews and lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan).203 To reduce production sustainment costs and to provide even greater crew protection, the Army initiated work on the increased crew protection (ICP) cab late in 2006. During 2007, the ICP Cab went through a series of tests including a live-fire test and evaluation and road shock and vibration testing. The cab would incorporate enhancements suggested in the test phase of the LSAC-H with production beginning in 2010. The ICP Cab would protect the crew from ballistic attack, mine blast, foreign object debris, and fumes from the rocket launch and would be retrofitted to HIMARS M142 launchers without armored cabs and HIMARS M142 launchers with LSAC-H capabilities.204 Testing the ICP Cab continued into 2008. In July 2008 the Army and the contractor completed the final test that consisted of an extended field exercise to evaluate the operational effectiveness and suitability of the ICP Cab configured HIMARS to ensure that the system met performance standards identified in the HIMARS operational requirements document and system specifications prior to production and fielding. Test results indicated that the ICP Cab configured HIMARS met the critical operational criteria and demonstrated that the launcher’s ability to conduct shoot-and-scoot tactics to make it survivable in a hostile threat environment. As a result in 2009, the Army awarded BAE Systems the contract for 64 ICP Cab up-armor kits. Retrofitting all ______2012002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79. 2022005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 84; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 87; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 106-07; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Launchers, 10 Feb 14, Doc III- 105. 2032005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 85; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 110-11. 2042005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 85; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 111.

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HIMARS M142 launchers with the ICP cab was completed in 2012 along with the universal fire control system to mitigate obsolescence of critical fire control components.205 With the increasing need for better communications over long distances, the Army meanwhile initiated acquisition action for development of the modular launcher communication system (MLCS) for HIMARS and MLRS in 2006. MLCS would integrate long-range radios (high frequency and satellite communication), tactical fire direction software, situation awareness, a display panel, and a data entry device. As of 2006, digital messages to the launcher were transmitted from the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) via a SINCGARS radio to the launcher. This message flow was sequential from command and control node to command and control node with line-of-sight radio communications limiting the distance between each command and control node. Although there were advantages to this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of time-sensitive targets by taking a long time to process, and increased the quantity of equipment required to complete a fire mission. MLCS would furnish a means to receive and transmit long-range digital messages in a network consisting of multiple subscribers with different communication devices and underwent a successful user test in 2007 utilizing high frequency radios at Fort Bragg, another test in 2008, and one in 2009.206 Concurrently, TCM Rockets and Missiles (RAMS) which was rechartered as part of TCM Fires Brigade in 2010 that was responsible for the capability development and user requirements for the Fires Brigade sought to improve command and control and address a capability gap with the integration of prototype long-range high frequency and satellite communications kits and outlined plans to improve battle space awareness by integrating blue forces tracking into the HIMARS M142 launcher. In 2011 the Army implemented the Hot Panel capability for the HIMARS. This capability allowed the launcher software to receive positional updates while in flight aboard a C-130 or C-17 aircraft to give the HIMARS a true roll off and fire capability allowing for greater flexibility in projecting the force on the battlefield. Further efforts in implementing long- range communications led to the AN/PRC 150 being fielded to the 5-3rd Field Artillery Regiment and the 3-27th Field Artillery Regiment. This radio gave true beyond-line-of- sight communications capability. Plans were also underway for the installation of the blue force tracker and drivers vision enhancement. In 2012-2013 the Army outlined using blue force tracker for situational awareness. Additional situational awareness would be met by the acquisition of the driver’s vision enhancement that would provide the driver with the capability to drive in reduced visibility with the use of forward looking infrared sensor and display control module.207 ______2052008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 108; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 111; Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Launcher, 10 Feb 14. 2062006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 85-86; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 111-12. 2072007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 101, 109; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 104, 112; Email, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011, 19 Apr

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Army Tactical Missile System In 2013 the Army had three variants of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) – the ATACMS I, ATACMS Ia, and ATACMS Unitary – that possessed long-range, all-weather capabilities and provided the joint task force and corps commander with precision engagement throughout the depths of the battlefield. The ATACMS I (range of 35-165 kilometers) and Ia (range of 70 to 300 kilometers) were semi-ballistic missiles with Anti-Personnel/Anti-Material (APAM) cluster munitions. While they were employed extensively early in the major combat portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom, ATACM I and Ia did not comply with the 2008 Department of Defense Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians that would preclude using them after 2018 and would force employing ATACMS Unitary (M48/M57) that had been used with great effectiveness in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and that had the precision to attack high-payoff targets at extended ranges as well as troops in contact with minimal collateral damage employing the Global Positioning System for accuracy. With a range of 70 to 270 kilometers, ATACMS Unitary delivered single 500-pound high-explosive warhead up to 270 kilometers.208

______12, Doc III-86, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 11, p. 28, Doc III-87, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 25; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011, 19 Apr 12, Doc III-88, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-65a, 2012 USAFAS AH; Jeff Froysland and CW4 Scott Prochniak, “Training and Doctrine Command Capability Manager-Fires Brigade,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 13, pp. 40-44, Doc III-105; Briefing, subj: PRRMS Launcher and Munition System Overviews, 2012, Doc III-101; Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Brigade MLRS-Munitions History 2013, 13 Mar 14, Doc III-106; Anderson, “Proven Launcher Receives Upgrades for Future;” Precision Fires Rockets and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Launcher, 10 Feb 14; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 Dec 11, Doc III-107; Briefing, subj: PFRMS Launcher and Munitions System Overview, 2012. 208Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr 12, Doc III-84, 2011 USAFAS AH; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 118; Interview, Dastrup with Leighton Duitsman, TCM RAMS Dep Dir, 10 Feb 11, Doc III-47, 2010 USAFAS AH. See 2010 USAFAS AH for history of ATACMS from the early 1990s to 2009, pp. 105- 10; Federal Register, Vol 78 Issue 3, 4 Jan 13, Doc III-108; Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Information Paper, subj: Munitions, 10 Feb 14, Doc III-109; Briefing (Extract), subj: FSCOORD Seminars, 29 Aug 13, Doc III-110.

CHAPTER FOUR FIRES BATTLE LABORATORY

In 1992 Fort Sill became an active participant in the Army’s new Battle Lab program. Designed to prepare the Army better for warfighting in the post Cold War era, the Battle Lab program took root in six of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) key service schools to coordinate ideas about technology and warfighting in future battlefield effectiveness. At Fort Sill, the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab (now called the Fires Battle Lab [FBL]) was created to fulfill one of the six major components in the program. The FBL concept represented a significant break with Cold War era threat driven decision making. As General Frederick M. Franks, the former TRADOC commander, explained it, the FBL focused on tailoring post-Cold War Army force projections into the 21st Century. In seeking to increase battlefield effectiveness by optimizing combinations between technology and warfighting, the FBL envisioned giving the Army a technological edge on future battlefields as well as streamlining the technological modernization process. Before any concept or equipment was tested in the field, the Battle labs tested them through computer simulations and virtual prototyping. General Franks established the first of six battle labs in early April 1992 at the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, with the remaining five selected by the end of the month. The six were: (1) Early Entry Battle Lab at TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia, (2) Mounted Battle Space Laboratory, Fort Knox, Kentucky, (3) Dismounted Battle space Battle Laboratory, Fort Benning, Georgia, (4) Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, (5) Battle Command Leavenworth, Kansas, and (6) Combat Service Support, Fort Lee, Virginia. Fort Sill’s Depth and Simultaneous Attack battle lab began operating on August 1992 with a mission to identify depth and simultaneous needs and then initiate action to resolve these needs using analysis, simulation, experimentation, evaluation, and integration of materiel and non-materiel solutions. The FBL was the first to identify a need to develop an interface that translated simulations messages into tactical messages to stimulate Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) for training. This led to the development of the Enhanced Protocol Interface Unit that enabled field artillery staffs to train in a “free play” simulated environment on a large scale. This first step into “doing the impossible” provided immeasurable benefits to the Army and Department of Defense. In 2012, the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) was leading simulations development on many fronts and was on the cutting edge of providing enhanced training capabilities. The FBL continues to provide support to Forces Command (FORSCOM) units, TRADOC schools, Capability Development and Integration Directorate (CDID), and other Battle Labs experiments.1

______1Email with atch, subj: Fires Battle Lab History 2013, 25 Feb 14, Doc IV-1. Everything that follows comes from this email. 133

THE FIRES BATTLE LAB MISSION

The Fires Battle Laboratory mission used live, virtual and/or constructive simulations to gain insights, impacts, and recommended changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF), based on inputs from Soldiers and their leaders, as well as emerging technologies and materiel initiatives to support current and future forces.

FIRES BATTLE LAB CHARTER

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command chartered the Battle Laboratory to provide the means to develop, refine, and integrate future operational capabilities and architectures in support of Joint and Army concepts and to focus on developing and refining tactical and some operational concepts for the Future Force. The Battle Lab integrated DOTMLPF imperatives to support the task and purpose of mission concepts and employed experimentation/wargaming and analysis, utilizing modeling and simulation to produce the underpinnings for concepts and requirements validation. The Fires Battle Lab has two major contributors to the History of this organization and these are: Modeling and Simulation Branch, Experiment and Wargaming Branch, and Electric Fires

Modeling and Simulation Branch

Name of event: Directed Energy Warfare Event (HPM)

Event Start Date: 23 Sept 2013

Event End Date: 4 Oct 2013

Description of event: There is a gap in counter UAS Class I-II and Command and Control of directed energy systems. The CRADA investigated the Command and Control of directed energy and solutions to defeat Class I and II UAS platforms. The CRADA investigated Raytheon’s capability to detect, identify and destroy class I-II unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). The High Powered Microwave investigated the effects of RF energy on electronics. The event was held at Engineer Lake firing point, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Results: Engaged and prevented the completion of Class 1 and Class 2 UAS missions.

Event POC: Maj Gonzales, 580 442-4645, [email protected]

Name of event: CRADA FY13 Simulation Event Integration and Execution

Event Start Date: 4 MAR 2013

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Event End Date: 15 MAR 2013

Description of event: Integration week occurred 4MAR - 8MAR 2013. These events were to stimulate the ADSI and the FAAD with simulated UAV air tracks within FireSimXXI in order to replicate the actual connections for field event. We would then engage the enemy air track using the FAAD and process the mission using a simulated high powered microwave (HPM) to disable and destroy the UAV.

Results: Integration and tests were successful.

Event POC: Maj Gonzales, 580 442-4645, [email protected]

Name of event: Army Expeditionary Warfighting Experiment (AEWE) Spiral I Simulation Integration Exercise (SIE) #1

Event Start Date: 24 JUN 2013

Event End Date: 28 JUN 2013

Name of event: Army Expeditionary Warfighting Experiment (AEWE) Spiral I Simulation Integration Exercise (SIE) #3

Event Start Date: 15 OCT 2013

Event End Date: 18 OCT 2013

Description of events: Integration activities focused on implementing the Fires architecture to enable Fire Mission threads from the MAFIA device through AFTADS to FireSimXXI. Fire Missions generated from the AFATDS and the MAFIA device were processed from the live environment down through the simulated Fire Units being played in FireSimXXI.

Results: All valid mission test threads were successful. The results of these exercises are for debugging the MAFIA device software. FireSimXXI software behaved as expected.

Event POC: Brian Carney, 580 442-5115, [email protected]

Name of event: Army Expeditionary Warfighting Experiment (AEWE) Spiral I Network Integration Event

Event Start Date: 3 DEC 2013

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Event End Date: 12 DEC 2013

Description of event: With the support of two personnel (Matt McLaughlin and Mike Perdieu), FireSimXXI, ExCIS, and the AFATDS were integrated into the AEWE architecture.

Results: FireSimXXI, ExCIS, and AFATDS were ready to support MAFIA, Fires Warrior testing throughout the integration and exercise in JAN 2014.

Event POC: Brian Carney, 580 442-5115, [email protected]

Name of Event: AEWE Spiral H

Event Start Date: Jan 2014

Event End Date: Feb 2014

Description of Event: The Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment, conducted by the Maneuver Battle Lab. The Fires Battle Lab supports AEWE with Fires capability using FireSim integrating with OneSAF, ExCIS and the AFATDS to support the unit in the experiment.

Results: successful experiment for the development community to get necessary feedback on technologies progress from soldiers in battlefield.

POC: Brian Carney, 580 442-5115, [email protected]

Name of event: Fleet Synthetic Training - Joint (FST-J)

Event Start Date: 12 Feb 13

Event End Date: 28 Feb 13

Description of event:

Fleet Synthetic Training-Joint (FST-J) are constructive Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) events. The primary Navy training audience is one Carrier Strike Group (CSG) in an in-port distributed environment. The synthetic joint/coalition players (AWACS, CRC, JSTARS, UAS, PATRIOT, THAAD, Battlefield Coordination Detachment, USA/USMC Fire Effects Cells, and when available, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command units) will focus training on Joint Interoperability Training Requirements, Battlespace Maneuver and Firepower, Joint Fires & Strike, Integrated Air and Missile Defense, and Time Sensitive Targeting. We participated with RTOS THAAD.

Results:

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The FBL supported the event with a RTOS THAAD model. The event was executed as planned. During this event the FBL worked with the Navy’s Atlantic Command (TTGL) in support of their Aegis Ships BMD Certifications. Some other units that supported the event were the 1-1 ADA BN in Japan. They supported with Patriot participation and the Japanese supported with their BMD ships. During this event we also participated with the 94th AAMDC ADAFCO & UCTE. This was the first event from the 94th AAMDC and the UCTE to create and test new Missile Defense Upper Tier Coordination with THAAD, Patriot and Aegis. This was used to create some of the first TTP’s for Upper Tier Ballistic Missile Defense.

Event POC: Sam Saiz, 580 442-2916, [email protected] LCDR Golding, 619 767-4864,[email protected]

Name of event: Global Defender Exercise (GDEx-04e)

Event Start Date: 8 Jul 13

Event End Date: 13 Jul 13

Description of event: The objective is to provide Joint Leadership with an overview of what level of protection current Joint Air & Missile Defense (AMD) Systems can or can’t provide. It’s needs to be determined if current day TTP’s have prepared our defense appropriately, or if changes needs to be made in order to address new capabilities and a full assessment of the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Integration. We supported with RTOS Patriot.

Results: The Fires Battle Lab (FBL) participated in the Global Defender Exercise 04e (GDEx-04e) event from 8 – 12 Jul 13. The FBL supported the event with four RTOS Patriot Battalions. During this event the FBL worked with the Missile Defense Integration & Operations Center (MDIOC), Navy Aegis Missile Defense Systems, Live Patriot Weapon Systems located in Rhine Ordinance Barracks (ROB), Germany and the Israeli Test Battalion (ITB) using the Arrow System. The event was planned & executed to standard. We were able to see the required level of Air & Missile Defense Systems (AMD) needed to support the required mission for our COCOM. The added benefit of using all available AMD Systems gave us the potential to utilize Deconfliction and use our system to their fullest capabilities without sacrificing the level of protections we were able to provide for our defended assets. The simulation had no issues during the entire week which allowed the FBL the ability to support every scenario throughout the week. We have submitted our AAR Comments to the Exercise Control Team and will participate in the Final AAR on 12 Jul.

Event POC: Sam Saiz, 580 442-2916, [email protected]

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LCDR Steven Jones

Name of event: 2013 Army Modeling and Simulation Award

Event Start Date: 1 Jan 2013

Event End Date: 5 Dec 2013

Description of event: The Army’s Modeling and Simulation award is presented to the top Battle Lab Team and Individuals for outstanding contributions to the Models and Simulations Community.

Results: The Fires Battle Lab (FBL) received both the Team and Individual awards for the top Army wide experimentation team. Their hard work in the design and implementation of cutting edge capabilities into experimentation Army and Joint simulation federations. The fiscal year 2013 Counter Unmanned Aerial System Experiment integrated unique cyber and electronic warfare models generating simulated effects. This cutting edge development supported the attainment of all experiment objectives, while informing the development and review of multiple gaps in the areas of detection, classification, discrimination, identification, tracking and defeat of Unmanned Aerial Systems. The results of the experiment are informing the development of Army 2020 and are leading directly to immediate changes in operational TTP’s for UAS threats.

Event POC: Burt Montague (580) 442-5647, [email protected]

Experiment and Wargaming Branch

Event Name: Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment

Event Start Date: 28 Jan 13

Event End Date: 22 Feb 13

Event Description: The AEWE Campaign is the live component of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) live, virtual and constructive experimentation strategy. AEWE provides a credible and repetitive opportunity to experiment with small unit concepts and capabilities, to examine emerging technologies of promise and to accelerate capabilities development. AEWE is chartered to challenge current thought and constructs, to look outside programs of record and to provide Soldier feedback. This venue allows Soldiers to have input on concepts and technologies early in their development cycle. The spiral development concept creates an opportunity to reduce development time and costs in an environment which is focused on experiment and develop rather than test. AEWE examines emerging concepts and capabilities for the current and future force across all warfighting functions. AEWE provides TRADOC capability developers, the science and technology research community and the defense

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industry a repeatable, credible, rigorous and validated operational experiment. The outcomes sought are operational in nature. "Working together, TRADOC and the Army's science and technology community leverage the AEWE Campaign to get technology into the hands of soldiers earlier and more frequently. AEWE also provides an opportunity to evaluate improved capabilities for fielded systems. AEWE Spiral H will examine network and mission command solutions, enablers for precision fires, new technologies for power and energy generation, immersive training systems, solutions for enhanced lethality and force protection and innovative basing and sustainment systems. The experiment is organized around a live Infantry platoon, two simulated Infantry platoons and a company headquarters equipped with a company intelligence support team and a robotics section. The robotics section includes a section leader, unmanned ground vehicle team, unattended ground sensor team and an unmanned aircraft system team, and a battalion equipped with a live Scout platoon, performing the function of higher headquarters. AEWE experiments are conducted by the Maneuver Battle Lab of the Maneuver Center of Excellence. As an ongoing annual campaign, AEWE has yearly projects with predefined objectives. Spiral H is the eighth annual campaign. Results:

1. UGS need to be integrated into the COP network, whatever that network may be. Independent base stations require additional personnel to monitor them and input their information manually into the COP network. The most common and significant limitation of the various demonstrated sensors was not their individual capabilities to observe the environment, but their inability to plug into a hypothetical system-integrated unit command post sensor control suite and therefore “report” across the tactical network.

2. UAS limitations reduce the ability to detect, identify, or provide targetable imagery of potential enemy under foliage or in urban terrain, day or night.

3. Unmanned systems need equivalent capabilities to reach out and touch the target whether that be through sight (camera), sound (sensor), movement (sensor), or maneuverability.

4. Sensor UGS technology needs to be able to reach out and identify the target with sufficient early warning to effectively engage targets.

5. Retrieval of “lost” small UAS by the infantry company increases risk and exposes friendly forces to unnecessary danger. As a result, small UAS may not be utilized to their full potential.

6. UGSs show promise in increasing force protection around fixed/temporary bases and improve upon early threat warning to the commander, if they can operate in visual dead space and beyond small arms fire while maintaining communication

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with the Company Command Post/Base Defense Operating System (CoCP)/(BDOC). UGS must be self reporting and self sustaining.

Event POC: Mr. Anthony Evans, [email protected] (580)442-3235

Event Name: Army 2020 Sustainment Experiment

Event Start Date: 11 Mar 2013

Event End Date: 6 Jun 2013

Event Description: The Sustainment Center of Excellence (SCoE) conducts an experiment as part of the Army 2020 Experiment. This experiment is focused on identifying, examining, and analyzing, how will the Army sustainment community gain efficiencies with joint and strategic providers by providing effective sustainment operations in the Army of 2020? An additional focus the SCoE is identifying, examining, and analyzing how would the sustainment community support the Army of 2020 in a theater of operations? This effort informs proposed operational techniques for Combat Service Support (CSS) at echelons above division, and Corps to Brigade; as they pertain to sustaining the fighting forces in Major Combat Operations (MCO) or in Stability Operations (SO).

Results:

 The Sustainment community does not understand the aspects of support relationships. Commanders and staffs need to understand the responsibilities of support relationships to avoid confusion and misunderstandings. Renew focus on mission command and support relationships. Define the home station roles of the Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC). Study potential integration of Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB) functions into the ESC. Revise doctrine to articulate Sustainment Area Support (SAS).

 Migrating water production and fuel storage from the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) to Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) Sustainment enhances the flexibility and mobility of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) maneuver commander. Water production and fuel storage at EAB enables the BSB to maneuver with supported units and maintain operational momentum.

 Due to the loss of their BSB, the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) staff lost the capability to plan, coordinate, synchronize supply, conduct mortuary affairs, handle distribution and provide Sustainment Automated Support Management Office (SASMO) support. Rebuilding a more robust MEB S4 section may now be necessary.

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 The Reconnaissance & Surveillance Brigade Combat Team (RSBCT) could be supported by other EAB Sustainment organizations, not exclusively by the division aligned or corps aligned CSSB. Task organized in experimentation, the RSBCT was able to execute its mission and Sustainment will be able to provide required support. The sustainment command must determine how best to support the RSBCT through the Military Decision Making (MDMP) process.

 There is a lack of understanding between SOF and CF logisticians concerning their respective logistics operations and capabilities. Confusion and frustration with regards to support operations. Synergies may occur with improved leader education and training.

Event POC: Wallace McLoyd, Jr., [email protected], 580 442-2935

Name of event: Army Integrating Experiment

Event Start Date: 15 July 2013

Event End Date: 2 August 2013

Description of event: The Phase II/III Wargame continued the efforts from the January MDMP experiment and the December Army 2020 Capability Seminar. Corps, Division, and Brigade staff representatives executed the Ph II (Seize the Initiative) and Ph III (Dominate) wargame to refine the experiment force structure, identify unified action partner (UAP) interdependencies, gain a mutual understanding of the Army's role in Phase II/III operations, and determine the July Simulation Exercise (SIMEX) STARTEX conditions.

The intent behind this Army Integrating Experiment (AIE) is to provide initial insights to refine the A2020 operational and organizational (O&O) plan supporting the MCTP/8th Army War fighter Exercise.

Event Results:

 Finding #1: A2020 FDUs increase the combat power of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The addition of the third maneuver battalion to the BCT and third firing battery to the BCT fires battalion significantly increased the BCT Commander’s (CDRs) ability to generate and apply combat power and array forces. The BCT CDR has greater ability to adapt his forces to required mission requirements (based on METT-TC) and conduct simultaneous operations within a larger area of operations. Insight #1: The third Maneuver BN increased agility and allowed for a significant reserve, which providing the BCT commander with increased lethality, flexibility and ability to exploit success. The addition of the third maneuver battalion gave BCT

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Commanders more flexibility in arraying forces and planning the fight and provided for a significant reserve to exploit success on the attack.

Insight #2: The additional firing battery increased the fires available to BCTs w/ varied munitions and range requirements. The additional Firing Battery and standardized Target Acquisition Platoon provided fires in large non-contiguous areas and increased the combat power of the BCTs. This was clearly seen in the Ph II-III Wargame as the R&S BCT had sufficient fires available in the organic Fires BN to provide Joint enabled integrated fires to each maneuver battalion. The organic FA BN staff was sufficient to plan and execute Joint Fires and perform limited airspace integration while operating in a large area of responsibility (AOR). The A2020 R&S BCT design allows greater flexibility to conduct seamless fires for Reconnaissance and Security operations and provides increased access to deep and shaping fires.

Insight #3: The R&S BCT enhanced the Corps’ ability to detect and identify threats and opportunities in its operating environment. The R&S BCT provided the Corps with a capability to fight for information that the BfSB did not provide. However, to accomplish this mission, the R&S BCT was heavily augmented with an Aviation Task Force (Sqdn), Expeditionary MI Bn (E-MIB), and a Logistics Task Force. The R&S BCT was able to provide timely information back to the Corps G2 through the ACE, to help develop the threat picture in advance of the Corps’ movement to its objectives. This enabled Blue forces to process data and develops situational awareness before being decisively engaged.

Recommendation: As the army continues to update the FDU for the future keep the third Maneuver BN, third firing battery, and the R&S BCT in the force design.  CAC develop doctrine for R&S BCT operations.  MCTP include R&S BCT Ops in all Corps and Division exercises.  Station BCTs and enablers assigned to the R&S BCT mission together to allow them to be habitually and regionally aligned.

Finding #2: A2020 FDUs and legacy systems limit Corps and Division commander’s ability to control operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and limit flexibility of assigning missions to subordinate units. Removal of lift assets from the IBCT significantly limits the mobility of the IBCT and makes it dependent upon the CSSB to rapidly move forces around the battlefield. The limited firepower and protection of the Stryker and the weight limit restrictions of the Rapidly Emplaced Bridge System (REBS) assigned to the SBCT create operational challenges for commanders. SBCTs must be backed up with heavier forces to counter armored adversaries and these heavier armored systems are unable to cross the REBS. Insight #1: IBCTs do not have the organic capability to transport all of their companies in a single movement. This affects operational tempo by reducing the ability to mass or exploit the initiative, reduces the ability to secure main support routes and quickly seize key facilities, and requires additional staff training, integration and synchronization to plan and execute unit movements. The Divisionally aligned CSSB has assets to lift 600

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soldiers in single lift without augmentation. In order to lift an entire A2020 IBCT in a single lift, additional LT truck platoons from within the Sustainment Brigade must augment the CSSB. Insight #2: Stryker platforms lack sufficient lethality and survivability during major combat operations. During the SIMEX, the momentum of the attack was lost when the SBCT (main effort for the Division) encountered enemy armored forces on the objective, requiring the SBCT to conduct a passage of lines so that an ABCT could conduct the attack on the objective. Recommendation: Stryker mission sets and capabilities need to be further analyzed: armament and hull modifications must be weighed against power requirements, suspension/drive train upgrades, overall weight, and tactical air deployment transportability when developing mitigation strategies. Insight #3: The SBCT lacks the gap crossing capability to support attached, OPCON and follow-on ABCT platforms. The Rapidly Emplaced Bridge Systems (REBS) organic in the SBCT will not support follow-on ABCT platforms (M1A1 Tank, M109A6 Paladin). This will delay the advance if bridging assets are not properly coordinated and positioned. Units will need to reposition appropriate bridging assets to accommodate weight differences or find alternate passages for heavier equipment. Both actions could delay the advance and leave units vulnerable to attack. The MDMP process must consider attached, OPCON, and follow-on unit movements when assigning gap-crossing missions. This planning must take into consideration the 100,000 lbs (50 tons) limitation of the REBS. If a command element assigns a gap-crossing task to an SBCT, with the intent of also passing ABCT platforms along the same route, the unit will require gap- crossing augmentation capable of supporting the weight of all follow-on units.

Recommendation: Develop Study and S&T plan to address most critical mobility and survivability issue for A2020  Conduct a study to evaluate the IBCT transportation plant and develop solution to move the IBCT without increasing vehicles in the IBCT.  Develop an S&T plan to increase survivability and lethality for the SBCT.  Develop an S&T plan to increase bridging capacity carried by the SBCT that can support an ABCT.

Finding #3: A2020 FDUs result in critical shortfalls in the number of ISR, MP, AMD (radar and weapons), Intel assets available at Division and below. A2020 FDUs removed some capabilities from BCTs and functional brigades and aggregated these capabilities at Echelons above Division, moved them into the Reserve Components, or simply removed them from the force structure. This result in shortages of these capabilities, requiring commanders prioritize distribution of these assets based on METT- TC. While prioritization of assets is nothing new to Army commanders, during FY13 experiments we found that there simply were not enough of some of these assets to meet unit requirements, resulting in units lacking critical capabilities (Trojan Spirit, AMD radars and systems, and UAVs for ISR). Insight #1: The Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB) requires ISR and MI augmentation to perform its assigned mission. Although not a maneuver brigade, it can

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be assigned an AO and control terrain, and is frequently assigned the mission of providing Mission Command of the Corps and Division Support area. In order to do so, the MEB requires a robust ISR capability (Shadow), radar to detect rocket, artillery and mortar attacks, and intelligence personnel to augment the brigade’s S-2 section, which contains two MI officers and five enlisted Soldiers. Insight #2: The Army of 2020 force structure lacks sufficient military police capabilities during major combat operations. Under modular design, each brigade had an MP platoon organic to the BCT. Under the A2020 FDUs, these MPs have been removed from the BCT and actually removed from the Army force structure. The mission analysis conducted for FY13 experimentation indicated that each BCT and the R&S BCT needed an entire company to conduct detainee operations, handle Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and maintain route control within the BCT’s AO. Failure to provide the necessary MP support will require BCT commanders to re-purpose combat forces to handle these tasks, for which they are not properly trained. Insight #3: The E-MIB design does not have the necessary capacity to support the entire Corps. Using the same task organization as developed in the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) How-to-Fight Seminar, 50% of the E-MIB was task organized to support the R&S BCT advance guard mission. This left one battalion to support three Divisions, the Corps headquarters, and numerous other organizations. This was especially critical with respect to the inability of the E-MIB to provide Trojan Spirit and multi-function team support to the MEBs, the Division Fires Command (now DIVARTY) and the Combat Aviation Brigade. Insight #4: There are insufficient numbers of Gray Eagles and High Altitude platforms to meet both ISR and communications relay missions. Future Aerial Network Layer communications continues to be a critical enabler for beyond line of sight Mission Command on-the-move operations, especially over complex terrain. R&S BCT communications over extended distances in highly compartmentalized terrain required continuous presence of aerial/space based communications relay packages. High Altitude - Heavier than Air (HA-HTA) systems are complementary to the aerial layer as an integrated (terrestrial, aerial & space) solution to persistent and resilient communications. Insight #5: Functional units (MP, EN and CBRN) lack similar communications and network capabilities found in maneuver units they support. Based on the Signal CoE’s force modernization plan, BCTs, Division headquarters and staffs, Corps headquarters and staffs, and Fires units have (or will have) robust, redundant capabilities over multiple waveforms, but the units supporting them will not. For example, EAB enablers lack on- the-move capability and rely solely on line-of-sight FM capability. WIN-T fielding plans are BCT/maneuver centric; they hinder enablers' ability to conduct operations at the DIV, Corps, and Theater echelons in a 2020 environment. Additionally, MP units that are tasked organized to maneuver BDE’s at the PLT level and above lack the current digitized TOE on hand to fully and effectively communicate with their supported maneuver CDRs to include such systems such as CPOF, BFT, JNN/CPN/SNAP systems. Furthermore, BCT fires battalion Fire Direction Center and maneuver battalion Forward Support Elements lack organic on-the-move network capabilities, limiting the ability to integrate fires in offensive maneuver operations.

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Insight #6: The Army lacks sufficient quantities of mobile, survivable air and missile defense assets to adequately protect the force and assets on the critical assets list: bridges, railheads, ATHPs, mobile refueling sites, APODs, and SPODs. During the Phase III SIMEX, Red forces conducted multiple simultaneous attacks using theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and manned/unmanned aerial systems to overwhelm limited defensive capabilities of critical defended assets. The Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC) – Avenger Battalion provides the force with limited counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM), and counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) capabilities. However, the BCTs lack sufficient ADA weapons systems and Avengers to assign to all BCTs and other organizations, and to support operations across the Division.

Recommendation: Relook the current FDU design and adjust the force size of the critical enablers to fit the mission requirement that is expected to be given to a Corp and Division.  Identify position(s) within BCT/BDE HQs to designate a 3Y space additional skill identifier.  Review the BEB organic capacity and adjust to support engineer tasks required during phase IV operations.  Review the organic chemical capability and adjust to support CBRN task required during Phase III.  Review the E-MIB force structure. There are not enough MI assets to fulfill the needs of a Corps, three divisions, subordinate BCTs, and functional BDEs during Phase III or Phase IV. Expand the number of Trojan Spirits in the E-MIB.  Review the MP force structure. During Phase III each BCT required a military police company to support the BCT during decisive operations.  Determine the DivArty, FiB, and Fires BN requirements for on-platform On the Move network capabilities.  Determine the On the Move requirements for MI units to collection, analysis, and communications.  Resource Enables with the similar communications and network capabilities found in maneuver units they support to allow them to effectively communicate.

Finding #4: The vulnerability of Low-Density, High-Value Assets create risk to the mission and the force. Significant warfighting capability depends on low density, high value assets. Many of these assets are thin skinned and highly susceptible to artillery, RPG, and even small arms fires. These systems lack organic protection capability and are frequently pushed forward to support other organizations and are not provided the necessary security to ensure their survivability. Additionally, separation from their parent organizations means they have limited access repair parts at the point of need, resulting in longer down-times when repairs are needed. The lack of operational readiness floats for many of these systems means that when systems are lost or damaged, replacements either do not exist or are not readily available to meet mission requirements, placing the mission and/or the force at risk. Insight #1: The lightly protected vehicles and equipment of the E-MIB and MICO are extremely vulnerable when traveling with BCTs in Phase III operations. The MI Soldier

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casualties and damaged low-density equipment adversely impacted collection and analysis efforts. Several critical components of both the Trojan SPIRIT and Prophet are not stocked as spares and there are no “floats”, thus necessitating shipment from depot or the manufacturer, which would result in nonoperational equipment for several days to weeks. Insight #2: Air and Missile Defense radars and multiple launch rocket system/high mobility artillery rocket system (MLRS/HIMARS) lack organic protection capabilities in a high threat environment. These low density, highly vulnerable vehicles were primary targets for Red rockets, artillery, and unmanned aerial systems during FY13 experiments. Loss of these assets in the forward units resulted in radars being detached from rear echelon units and being pushed forward to replace destroyed assets, placing rear echelon units at higher risk. Insight #3: Communication assets employed in remote locations lack organic force protection capability. In order to expand the range of the network, units can place network retrans capabilities throughout the area of operations. However, in an asymmetric environment, these sites become prime targets for indigenous forces, so use of this method requires significant force protection planning. Recommendation: Provide force protection and armored vehicles capable of protecting crew and equipment from artillery, RPG, and small arms fires for critical low density assets.  Assess operational risk to low-density equipment when performing mission analysis  Procure vehicles with better survivability for tactical MI, communications, and radar systems.  Conduct study to determine what and where critical MI components should be stocked to reduce down time.  Develop procurement plan to increase retrans capabilities from Space, high altitude, and UAV platforms to mitigate ground based retrans vulnerabilities.  The Army should consider using decoys or decoy emitters to protect these low density assets from anti-radiation munitions. Finding #5: Basic skills required for the conduct of Major Combat Operations have atrophied or are non-resident. Over the past 10+ years Army units have focused their unit level training on the environment in which they were expected to operate. Most training has focused on Counter Insurgency and urban operations executed from a Forward Operating Base. Because of this, tasks such as Assembly Area Operations, maneuvering Command Posts, Mission Command of Division/Corps support areas, Forward Passage of Lines, Deliberate Gap Crossings, and sustainment of offensive operations have been neglected. When present, these skills now reside primarily at the senior officer/NCO level and have atrophied; many of these skills are non-resident at the junior officer/NCO level. Insight #1: The Army is untrained in conducting deliberate gap crossings as a combined arms team. The Army will likely be required to execute deliberate gap crossings during Decisive Action. However, the Army has not trained on this complex, multi-discipline task as a combined arms team since before 2004, if not earlier. Future MCO with plug and play units that range from Strykers to heavy tracked vehicles will require in depth

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analysis, planning, and rehearsal to be effective. Insight #2: Based on the size and complexity of Division and Corps Support areas of operation in major operations, there is a lack of understanding of the most effective mission command of the support area. Terrain management, movement, protection, subordinate unit responsibilities, use of the MEB vs. other EAB unit mission command capabilities need additional study to determine the best way to maintain effective sustainment momentum to the fight. As many of the issues raised in this area are directly related to the implementation of A2020 concepts, Doctrine does not exist to address these gaps. Insight #3: Forward Passage of Lines/Battle Handover (FPOL/BHO) collective capabilities have atrophied. A passage of lines is a complex operation integrating many of the WfFs in a constrained area of operations, usually in contact. There are multiple moving parts of the operation that require deep doctrinal understanding, common SOPs and detailed mission command processes. During the wargame, the division conducted a forward passage of lines “rock drill” through the Reconnaissance and Security Brigade Combat Team to educate the experiment participants on this operation because so few of the uniformed personnel had ever conducted one at the CTCs or during current operations. Graphic control measures, mission command requirements and responsibilities of the stationery and moving units were discussed in detail. While doctrine exists to address this need, as evidenced in the experiment, units no longer possess the institutional knowledge to plan and conduct these operations. This skill set will likely require externally supported unit-level training to address these deficiencies. Insight #4: Army is not sufficiently trained to conduct decontamination operations; unit- level collective CBRNE decontamination tasks have atrophied and need more training/emphasis. CBRNE effects could be more prevalent during MCO base don METT-TC and its effect on combat power and enablers must be considered and properly prepared for at the individual soldier, crew, squad and unit level. Insight #5: Sustainment community has lost the art of sustainment in offensive operations (sustainment on the move). Due to ten years of phase IV (FOB centric) operations, logistician skill-sets have atrophied on mobile operational capabilities of the sustainment force. Displacing sustainment operations (jumping and refuel on the move) have not been used in the latter parts of OIE/OEF. In order to operate, sustainment units (CSSB, BSB, BSMC and FSC’s) must be static to issue/receive supplies, conduct maintenance, and provide Role 2 Med Spt. Sustainment units cannot provide support when they are displacing from one location to another because the reduction in tactical wheeled vehicles places increased demand on CSSB transportation assets. Recommendation: Focus future training and evaluation to regain the required skills in the force. Finding #6: Commanders must take into account the additional time, training and integration required by the A2020 force designs. Consolidation of critical enablers at EAB results in units which must be augmented to perform their required missions. While the concept of task organizing units is not new, it does result in a requirement for units to become familiar with the standard operating procedures and the nuances of the organizations/commanders they are supporting. If these units do not get the opportunity to train with each other prior to deployment, it increases the opportunities for

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misunderstanding/miscommunication and increases risk to force and mission accomplishment. Insight #1: Corps and R&S BCT staffs will require significant training to effectively plan and conduct security missions. There are inherent training tasks associated with transitioning an ABCT or SBCT into the R&S BCT. It will take more time for an ABCT or SBCT to become proficient in their organic tasks along with their R&S training tasks. In the PH II-III Wargame, the Corps and R&S BCT staff needed further training in conducting screen, guard and LRS missions. Along with the training required at the BCT level, staffs at EAB need to be trained on deploying and utilizing the R&S BCT. Insight #2: Functional Battalions (MP, CBRN, CM) when task organized into Task Forces lack sufficient training, leader development and staff capability to meet mission requirements. Experimentation displayed the importance of task organizing the MEB’s assigned functional battalions into Task Forces to conduct the complex maneuver support and protection tasks required in a Division’s or Corps’ support area or along movement corridors to secure, clear, and maintain MSRs. However, the staff expertise for the functional battalions is limited to only their respective function (e.g., CBRN battalion only has CBRN expertise). Insight #3: The Expeditionary Military Brigade (E-MIB) is required to augment a variety of units at all echelons from the Corps headquarters (HQ) down to a maneuver company. Because each unit’s mission and organic capabilities are different, the training required to integrate intel units with and support these units’ present unique training challenges for MI unit commanders. The critical task lists (CTLs) for MI Soldiers contains a mix of tasks that are trained at the schoolhouse and at the unit. Unit level tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and standard operating procedure (SOP) requirements with which the augmenting MI unit is unfamiliar will hamper rapid and complete integration of MI assets. The limited number and geographic distribution of the E-MIBs will exacerbate this problem as many supported/supporting units will rarely have the opportunity to train together.

Insight #4: Army forces are not fully trained to operate in a disrupted and degraded space operational environment. The enemy has the ability to degrade and disrupt space-reliant mission command, surveillance, and navigation capabilities. Throughout the FY13 Campaign of Learning the enemy employed an extensive navigational warfare (NavWar) campaign, which introduced new Precision, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) problem sets to the force, and attempted to employ an extensive SATCOM jamming campaign. Space Support Elements (SSE) reactions to these efforts included: coordination of Joint & National assets to locate and target jammers; requested PNT augmentation; GPS II-Flex Power, GPS III-Max Power, and High Altitude augmentation. These efforts were critical to the navigation, communications, and Fires of the Division and R&S BCT. The Corps Cdr emphasized the importance of PNT in synchronizing operations by planning critical events when the GPS constellation was most resistant to disruption.

Recommendation: Review current ARFORGEN cycle and plan to determine if it is still valid with the new force design and AC/RC mix.

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 Conduct study to determine how long it would take to fully mobilize and prepare the Army (AC/RC) for large scale MCO operations.  Align supporting enablers ARFORGEN cycle, to include RC, with their supported units to allow units to habitually train together. Finding # 7: The increase of air-ground interactions (fixed wing, rotary wing, UAV, ADA, rockets, artillery, mortar, missiles, and high altitude aerostats) has created a complex airspace coordination problem. The exponential increase in the number of UAVs and the use of rocket artillery requiring higher trajectories in recent years has created a highly complex airspace deconfliction problem which current doctrine does not sufficiently address. To further exacerbate the problem, no single integrated air ground picture exists and there is no single Mission Command system capable of correlating, validating, or verifying trajectories and tracks of Rocket/Artillery fires, Army Aviation, coalition Air Forces, and the myriad of UAVs on the battlefield. Staffs currently track multiple sources of information (INTEL, Space, Fires, and AMD sensors) to get clear air picture, but large quantities of data gleaned from multiple sources do not equate to a clear operational picture. During FY13 experimentation, many fire missions were not fired due to the inability of units to clear fires. Insight #1: Division Staffs were challenged to integrate high volume of artillery fires, joint fires, and Close Air Support during the high tempo MCO Joint/combined arms operation. The Division staff could not quickly communicate changes to the Coordinating Altitude and Coordinating level required to optimize the use of Close Air Support, joint fires, and artillery fires. Insight #2: The use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and the increase in range/altitude of rocket munitions which has occurred over the past ten years has significantly changed the dynamics of employing and synchronizing Joint and Army fires. Joint Fires can be executed seamlessly with clear direction from commanders and staff coordination to turn kill boxes on and off. This will require significant training and education to allow the joint fires community to work through a complex environment of aerial maneuver and surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and air-to-surface fires. Insight #3: Lack of a single air-ground picture at all operational level limits fires and airspace integration and the use of Joint Fires enablers in a timely and effective manner, due to inability to clear fires. The Joint force requires the capability to dynamically execute air/fire support coordination measures (ACM/FSCM) in order to ensure timely fires and flight safety in extremely congested airspace, in support of unified land operations (ULO) in 2020. Insight #4: The Army and Air Force are working together to address many of these issues and the JAGIC has been effective at integrating joint fires and airspace during experiments over the last several years. The Air Force is pushing their ASOCs from Corps down to Division level to become part of the JAGIC and is creating a new Corps Air Liaison Element (CALE) to replace the ASOC at the Corps. The Army and Air Force are currently staffing their Joint Air Ground Integration Center publications (ATP 3-91.1 and AFTP 3-2.86) and several Joint Pubs are either under final revision or ready to be published. Recommendation: Rewrite Air/Ground doctrine to address the complexity that now requires integration (vice deconfliction).

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 Develop and implement consolidated air-ground picture to facilitate joint fires, joint targeting, deep attack, AMD and counterfire.  Train TTPs for employment of AMD assets to ensure coverage of tactical units.

Finding #8: A2020 FDUs increase command and control challenges and require a greater understanding of battlefield systems. The A2020 FDUs consolidate capabilities at EAB, create the need for significant enabler augmentation to Divisions and BCTs and increase reliance on area support for logistics and medical support. These changes will increase frequency of units encountering span of control issues and will create interoperability challenges between units with different battlefield networks. The increased reliance on digital data and communications creates complex challenges in network planning (bandwidth must now be planned, resourced and managed as a commodity) and communications between units operating with different increments of WIN-T and creates difficulties with units using mission command systems (MI COP and ABCS) which are not compatible. Insight #1: The command and control relationship between the Division, CSSB, and medical units needs to be more clearly defined. The maneuver community does not understand or is not comfortable with all aspects of area support relationships. Throughout the FY13 experiments, there were concerns on how sustainment and medical unit priorities would be synchronized with Corps and Division priorities. Insight #2: Throughout FY13 experiments, LNOs were utilized to provide coordination between augmenting and supported units. Unfortunately, TO&Es and MTO&Es for most tactical units lack LNO positions, which forces staffs to send much needed personnel to liaison with supported/supporting units. Insight #3: Individual warfighting functions have created systems that meet their numerous information requirements but do not integrate well, or at all, with other command and control systems. There are intelligence systems that are not interoperable with the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). Experiment participants gravitated toward the most understood and interoperable elements of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). To produce a common product, staffs and analysts must convert or transcribe products from a stovepipe into a common medium, which introduces lag, inaccuracy, and inefficiency. This process denies the command timely information that facilitates decision making.

Insight #4: Network-enabled Mission Command increases the requirement for multiple means of communications and increases the complexity of network planning. Staffs face challenges in determining commander’s bandwidth requirements, managing bandwidth and planning Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and High Altitude platforms to support critical communication. Slow processing of network database updates result in Mission Command systems which do not provide rapid, accurate depiction of task organized units and prevent immediate network connectivity between supported/supporting units as task organizations change.

Recommendation: Train and equip leaders and staff with the capabilities to Command and Control the A2020.

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 Update leaders POI’s to address the re-designed BCT concept  Update Maneuver and Maneuver Support leader POIs to education leaders that bandwidth is finite capability and must be managed like other commodities.  Create LNO positions within HQ units to mitigate issues from large scale task- organization of units.  Integrate the different C2 systems.  Ensure all enablers communications and network capabilities are similar to those of the supported unit. This will require fielding plan analysis and ARFORGEN management.  Define area support in FM 5.0 in accordance with the definition provided in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 1.02 Nov 2012.

Finding #9: A2020 FDUs require doctrine updates and in some cases require new doctrine to be written. Most of the FDU changes relating to the A2020 create new types of units or significantly change the capabilities of existing units. All of these organizations will require updates to or entirely new doctrine. The draft O & O created for the 8th Army/2ID WFX and the revisions made to that document following the operational assessment will be a good start for these new/revised doctrinal products. Recommendation: Use the Army experimentation produce draft O&O Revision 3 as a baseline to review and update doctrine for all units affected by the A2020 FDU changes.

Finding #10: A2020 increases the capability to integrate, coordinate and synchronize assets at EAB. Centralizing capabilities at EAB gives the commander flexibility to task organize, allows integration of combat power at decisive points on the battlefield, and prioritizes efforts for efficient distribution. Insight #1: Use of an Information Related Capabilities (IRC) coordinator on the Division staff improved the focus, responsiveness, and visibility of IRC efforts, and ensured IRCs were synchronized, de-conflicted, and mutually supported the operation. This approach was more effective than current doctrine for the integration of the IRCs. While establishing a central focal point on the staff for IRC integration was shown to have merit, it is unclear if it is also necessary to create a large IRC Coordination Element within the Staff to support this integration effort.

Insight #2: The JAGIC successfully integrated joint fires and airspace and should be institutionalized in the Army and Air Force and coordinated with USMC. Five years of experimentation have shown that airspace control, risk mitigation, and fires integration have become increasing more complex as a result of the introduction of both hostile and friendly unmanned aerial systems, space and near space based ISR and communications systems, and enhanced indirect fires weapons and munitions. The JAGIC and the ADAM/BAE are the enabling organizations that will facilitate rapid deconfliction of airspace. Insight #3: The Expeditionary MI Brigade (E-MIB) provides mission command for lower level intelligence organizations and assists Corps, Div, and BCT staffs to priorities intelligence efforts. The E-MIB provides an Intel mission command capability

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that is lacking at echelons above the BCT. BCT S2s and MICO commanders are experienced MI officers but lack a higher Intel headquarters to provide training oversight, experience, and mentorship. The E-MIB and subordinate battalions provide the experience necessary to help the Corps and Division G2s and BCT S2s prioritize their intelligence efforts. However, FY13 experimentation identified that the two battalion E- MIBs did not have enough resources (personnel and equipment) to simultaneously provide necessary support to the R&S BCT, the Corps G2, and the associated Divisions.

Recommendation: As the army continues to update the FDU and refine the EAB design keep the Information Related Capabilities (IRC) coordinator on the Division staff, the JAGIC and the ADAM/BAE, and the MI Brigade (E-MIB). Maintain the Expeditionary MI Brigade (E-MIB), but increase to a three Battalions per E-MIB.

Event POCs: Dr. Frank Myers, 580 442-2930, [email protected] Digital File Location: S:\FBL\FY13 Experimentation

Name of event: Black Dart and Joint Counter Low and Slow Unmanned (JCLU) Joint Test

Event Start Date: 29 July 2013

Event End Date: 11 August 2013

Description of event: Black Dart is a Joint Integrated Air Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) sponsors an annual demonstration designed to examine emerging technologies to meet current and near-term counter-UAS requirements. In conjunction with BD13, the Joint Counter Low- Slow-Small UAS (JCLU) team from Nellis AFB conducted Field Test #1 (FT1), to test draft JTTPs for detection, tracking, and identification. JCLU FT1 utilized joint POR and future (by 2016) POR systems, examined current service TTPs, and identified potential changes/revisions for the joint environment. This year’s demonstration at Naval Base Ventura County – Point Mugu. Representatives from DoD, Inter-Agency, Industry, and Academia and National Laboratory Programs of Record (PORs) demonstrated near-term capabilities and technologies to support Warfighter’s counter UAS requirements. Seven of the seventeen FCoE nominated technologies for inclusion into BD13 participated. The seven technologies and outcomes are:

 Lockheed Martin Company – AN/TPQ-53: Successful demonstration of developmental UAS tracking software  Air Vigilance: successful (classified)  GT Aeronautics – Bandito: successful tracking but near miss during engagement  SAAB Sensis Corp – Giraffe: successful integration and information inject into the Multi-Source Correlation Tracker (MSCT)

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 SRC, Inc. – Vigilant Falcon: 3 successful demonstrations  Miltec Corp – Fencepost: successful collection of data and test results  EWA Government Systems – EWA Nemesis: 2 successful demonstrations Of the ten technologies that did not participate seven did not participate due to funding, two completed successful demonstrations at other venues or previous Black Darts and one could not participate due to range safety issues.

Results: Observations from the JCLU FT1:

1. FT1 was a success. They collected a large amount of data and will now switch to the analytics mode to review it.

2. Lack of USAF personnel in the division TOC prevented full functionality of the JAGIC. Future JAGIC integration exercises must ensure full integration of USAF to support complete information flow in the JAGIC. ADAM, ADAFCO and CRC personnel developed work-arounds to replicate missing information from the JAGIC.

3. Need to “shield” UAS as they are taking off to keep ID unknown. The UAS could be seen taking off, and many systems already knew what was to be flying and shared that information.

Event POC: CW2 Travis Craig, (580)442-7624, [email protected]

Event Name: Counter Unmanned Aerial System Simulation Experiment (SIMEX)

Event Start Date: 3 September 2013

Event End Date: 20 September 2013

Event Description: The SIMEX utilized with minor modification the efforts from the April Phase II/III Wargame, the January Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) experiment, and the December Army 2020 Capability Seminar. The SIMEX was distributed using the Battle Laboratory Collaborative Simulation Environment (BLCSE) across key locations to include Fort Benning, Fort Huachuca, Fort Leavenworth, Fort Lee, Fort Eustis, Fort Rucker, Hurlburt Field, and Fort Sill. Friendly and threat forces were stimulated by the M&S Federation and master scenario event list (MSEL) injects to ensure experimental objectives were met.

Event Results:

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1. Decision Point 1 (DP 1): Design of the Future BCT. The objective for DP 1 is to: Maximize the capabilities within the BCTs to achieve a decisive defeat of potential adversaries in Major Combat Operations and across a broad range of foundational activities. Observations and results from the SIMEX were examined from an integrated perspective to determine the FY13 DP 1 implications across warfighting functions and related DOTMLPF considerations. a. Warfighting Function Integration. The following advantages and disadvantages were determined from the analytic insights listed in the annexes.

 Advantages:  The third maneuver battalion increased the combat power and flexibility of the force.  Direct access to Cyber systems in support of CUAS or tasking of full range Cyber capability provides opportunities heretofore unattainable.  The third firing battery increased fires available to BCTs.  The Sentinel Radar at the BCT increases capability to detect threats and to manage airspace.  IFPC missile variant and Directed Energy (laser) provided enhanced CUAS capability and flexibility  The Division Fires Command (DFC) and Corps Fires Brigade provided senior level fires guidance integration through reallocation of assets to support close combat operations with additional fires or counterfire and target acquisition capabilities.

 Disadvantages:  BCT’s or support Brigades do not have capability or skilled personnel to control Cyber equipment or direct their usage thus limiting the full range of possibilities.  There are increased training requirements for the Fires and ADAM/BAE personnel during airspace control and fires integration operations.  BCTs lack air defense capability and there are insufficient quantities of Avengers or IFPCs to assign to all BCTs and other organizations to provide fully integrated security and CUAS operations.  Access to Division’s and Corps' Space Support Element and enabling assets is impaired by lack of or junior trained personal.

b. DOTMLPF Considerations.

 The Division and Brigade CPs/TOC must organized to facilitate the rapid integration of fires and airspace. (O)  With the increased threat of BM/CM/UAS, A2020 needs to revisit the Army’s Air Missile defense organizational structure to counter the threat and protect the force. (O, M)

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 The Army needs to further examine maneuver support, security and protection roles and responsibilities in the 2020 Corps, Division, and BCTs to fix responsibility and requirements for force protection.  Identify position(s) within BCT/BDE HQs to be designated for a 3Y like space additional skill identifier. (O, T, P)

2. Decision Point 3 (DP 3): Design R&S Capabilities. The objective for DP 3 is to ensure the Army of 2020 can meet the Corps and Division Commanders' requirements for reconnaissance and security in current and future conflicts. R&S capabilities were not examined during this event

3. Milestone 9 (MS 9): SOF-CF Interdependencies. The objective for MS 9 is to: Improve SOF-CF interdependence by defining responsibilities and organizing SOF-CF functional capabilities IOT create a clear and synergistic effort to assess, shape and influence foreign security environments, promote trust with allies, and build partner- nation capacity. SOF—CF capabilities were not examined during this event.

4. Decision Point 15 (DP 15): Sustainment 2020. The objective for DP 15 is to develop a responsive, agile, and adaptable organization and strategy that provides tactical-level sustainment to Army 2020 units while sustainment capabilities migrate out of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to Echelons above Brigade (EAB). Observations and results from the SIMEX were examined from an integrated perspective to determine the FY13 DP 15 implications across warfighting functions and related DOTMLPF considerations.

a. Warfighting Function Integration. The following advantages and disadvantages were determined from the analytic insights listed in the annexes.

 Advantages:

 The modular structures allow the div aligned CSSB to have additional units attached for METT-TC.  Additional FSCs in the SBCT standardizes the sustainment operations for the A/I/S BCTs.  Forward Support Companies, linked to each FA battalion, increase flexibility during sustainment operations.  Aviation provided alternative means of delivery for Class V supply over congested LOCs and canalized terrain.

 Disadvantages:

 (DPI) Moves troop transport from BSB to EAB- competing demands for transportation assets.  FiB's redesigned and greatly reduced BSB has challenges; however, it is enabled to synchronize Sustainment operations.

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 DFCs S4 organizational design. The S4's ability to plan and coordinate support from the CSSB to the FA BN FSCs, especially Class V (rocket and cannon), is limited.  The FSC CSSB fires resupply activities will be challenged to maintain OPTEMPO during transitions between phased tactical operations.

b. DOTMLPF Considerations.

 Recommend the Army review transportation augmentation and coordination procedures that existed prior to Modularization. (D)  Relook mobility requirements for all types of units during the conduct of MCO. (MTOE and TOE). (O)  Recommend a thorough review of the prioritization process for the allocation of limited transportation resources to include criteria and location of approval authority within the organization. (D)  DFC needs a larger S4 section to properly plan and coordinate sustainment. (D, O)  The Division aligned CSSB needs to be able to support the DFC and its attached subordinate Fires BNs.

5. Milestone 18 (MS 18): Intelligence 2020. The objective for MS 18 is to: Develop an incremental, personnel and grade neutral, low cost approach to synchronize the Intelligence WfF with Army 2020 decisions and initiatives. Observations and results from the SIMEX were examined from an integrated perspective to determine the FY13 MS 18 implications across warfighting functions and related DOTMLPF considerations.

a. Warfighting Function Integration. The following advantages and disadvantages were determined from the analytic insights listed in the annexes.

 Advantages:

 Disadvantages:

 Task organized MI assets may not be able to quickly meet unfamiliar unit specific intelligence requirements.  Insufficient number of Gray Eagle (GE) platforms for all GE requirements.  Gray Eagle (GE) multi-mission and dynamic tasking capabilities highlight the need for refined SOP/TTPs for G2/G3/G6 integrated planning.

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 Protecting corps and division support areas will require significant ISR capability/capacity - how Intel 2020 apportions ISR capabilities to the support areas is lacking sufficient detail and discussion.  Increased reliance on Army space support to the Corps.

b. DOTMLPF Considerations.

 Develop institutional, collective and crew training TTPs for dynamic tasking in support of multi-payload operations. (T)  Pre-configure aircraft for better coordination and synchronized deliberate mission planning to improve dynamic re-tasking of multi-purpose payloads.(T)  Increase aircraft and ground control station (GCS) allocation per company. (M)  Continue HA CONOPs development in follow on experiments and war games, engage all CoEs in the development and integration of HA payloads. (D, M)  Establish an Army high altitude force structure that supports Army 2020/A2025 requirements. (O)  Continue advocacy for resources in support of technical development and demonstration of high altitude capabilities. (M)  Explore HA capability to provide the MEB and CSSB with surveillance and long range COTM enabling protection measures as well as Corps and Division support operations. (D, O, T)  Fires require direct access to EAB/EAD sensors during MCO. (D, pol)  Develop reconnaissance and security requirements for the Division and Corps (D)

6. Milestone 19 (MS 19): Signal 2020. The objective for MS 19 is to: Develop an incremental approach in synch with Army 2020, which closes Mission Command Warfighter Functional Gaps due to increased network management and complexity to support BCT operations. Observations and results from the SIMEX were examined from an integrated perspective to determine the FY13 MS 19 implications across warfighting functions and related DOTMLPF considerations.

a. Warfighting Function Integration. The following advantages and disadvantages were determined from the analytic insights listed in the annexes.

 Advantages:

 Direct HA sensor shooter linkage provides enhanced target for Fires and CUAS activities.  High Altitude systems are required and complementary to the aerial layer as an integrated (terrestrial, aerial & space) solution to persistent and resilient communications and surveillance gaps.  Other MILSATCOM capabilities can compliment current warfighter beyond line of site (BLOS) Communications On-the-Move (COTM) requirements in support of tactical operations.

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 Expeditionary Signal Battalion (ESB) network support to functional and multifunctional Brigades is currently projected to be at-the-halt (ATH) transit case capability.  Network extension is a requirement — the Aerial layer is critical.  Intelligence enterprise systems require priority of network access based on the Commanders PIR. G6/S6 planning staffs need to ensure adequate tactical bandwidth is made a priority for this system.

 Disadvantages:

 The current signal architecture does not support the requirement for assured timely responsive fires for FA and AMD assets.  Fires BN FDCs and maneuver BN FSEs lack organic on-platform OTM network capabilities that limit their ability to integrate fires in offensive maneuver operations.

b. DOTMLPF Considerations.

 Study the OTM requirements (collection, analysis, and communications) for FA. (D, O, M, L)  Review management of TAC, Main, and Rear CPs during offensive operations.(T)  Increase senior leaders education as to the capabilities and limitations of these resources, bandwidth is finite like ammunition and fuel. (L)  Continue advocacy for resources in support of technical development and demonstration of high altitude capabilities. (M)  Develop mitigation strategies for Degraded Network (LandWarNet) Operations (D, T, L)  Currently planned NetOps capabilities may not support delivery of timely responsive of fires and targeting data; mission command system must provide a single, integrated air ground picture to decision makers and their staffs. (D, M)  Determine the DFC, FiB, and Fires BN requirements for on-platform OTM network capabilities. (D, O)

7. Decision Point 20 (DP 20): Review EAB. The objective for DP 20 is to: Develop recommendations on Mission Command at echelons above brigade to increase Army responsiveness and operational effectiveness in support of the Ground Component Commander (GCC). Observations and results from the SIMEX were examined from an integrated perspective to determine the FY13 DP 20 implications across warfighting functions and related DOTMLPF considerations.

a. Warfighting Function Integration. The following advantages and disadvantages were determined from the analytic insights listed in the annexes.

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– Advantages:

 High Altitude systems are required and complementary to the aerial layer as an integrated (terrestrial, aerial & space) solution to persistent and resilient communications and surveillance gaps.  Division Fire Command and Fires Brigade helped focus fires in support of close, deep, and counter firefights.  Creation of Fires Command achieves unity of effort above brigade and training, readiness, authority (TRA) of BCT Fires BNs.  JAGIC and ADAM/BAE linkage provides responsive integration of fires and airspace.

– Disadvantages:

 During high tempo MCO combined arms operations, full airspace integration, clearing joint Fires, Close Air Support (CAS) and integrating a high volume of artillery fire within close proximity to aircraft can remain a significant challenge for fires and airspace staff integration teams.  Joint Fires Integration was challenging with the introduction of EUAS and swarming tactics for the Division and BCT. Current procedures may be inadequate or soldier skills have atrophied.  AMD assets lack required mobility, survivability, and flexibility to support tactical maneuver operations.  Theater Ballistic Missiles, Cruise Missiles, and Manned/Unmanned Aerial Systems used in multiple simultaneous attacks overwhelmed limited defensive capabilities of critical defended assets.  Low-density critical assets (weapons and sensors) are not manned or equipped to provide self-defense.  Use of new rocket munitions to replace cannon and rocket DPICM in support of the close fight created Joint fires integration and danger close concerns.  Further analysis and refinement of support area operations in support of Class V is needed. The complexity of this effort is not fully understood. The roles and activities in relation to Class V resupply at DIV, Corps, and Theater are not clear to the non-logistician.  Future requirements for space and high altitude support may exceed capability/capacity.

c. DOTMLPF Considerations.

 Review management of TAC, Main, and Rear CPs during offensive operations.(T)  Consider small-scale studies and/or experiments to verify the insight that  Commanders and staffs are not utilizing their ABCS systems (Intelligence and Mission Command systems) in favor of slower but more

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interoperable software tools, in order to determine the best balance between warfighter functionality, interoperability, and ease of use.(D, M, L)  Review and refine Airspace and Joint Fires doctrine as processes and material solutions dictate. (D)  Continue development of DFC/FiB as force artillery headquarters further refine roles, functions, missions, and tasks. (D)  Current graphic control measures, Joint networked fires integration processes and procedures are not synchronized with future manned and unmanned weapon systems and munitions. They require adaptation. (D)  To support ground maneuver and close combat operations the Army needs sufficient quantities of air missile defense assets that are mobile, survivable, and flexible enough to adapt ever changing tactical operations. (M)  There are insufficient quantities of assets to counter complex and saturation attacks by hostile forces throughout an area of operation. (D, M)  Units must have sensors and armament to provide limited self-defense to stay in the fight. CROWS systems or robotics could provide necessary protection. Decoys, decoy emitters and updated camouflage equipment should be investigated. (D, M)  There is need for an area munitions that can provide timely responsive close support fires without requiring Joint coordination as result of violations to coordinating altitude. (D, M)  Continue advocacy for resources in support of technical development and demonstration of high altitude capabilities. (M)

Conclusions/Recommendations. The CUAS SIMEX achieved the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. Conclusions. The Phase III SIMEX concluded the following:

 The MEB/DFC/FiB dependent on CSSB for sustainment support but have no control other than coordination.  Low density, high value assets (Trojan Spirit, Prophet, radars, Avenger, IFPC, WIN-T nodes) need similar mobility and protection as the maneuver force.  The Army lacks sufficient assets to protect the force from missiles and UAS threat.  There was a significant reliance on Gray Eagle for both ISR & Communications. Gray Eagle requires the capability to carry mixed payloads to execute multiple missions simultaneously.  High Altitude/space capabilities provided essential redundancy for communications and surveillance.  Division lacks the ability to integrate fires. At division RADC/SADC authorities are need to fully integrate Joint assets.  At BCT the ADAM/BAE cells not designed for AMD/CUAS and does not have engagement authority or fully control air assets.

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 After 10+ years of COIN focus, specific skills may be atrophied or non- resident.

2. Recommendations.

 Army should train JAGIC personnel and grant RADC/SADC authorities to it just as Navy and Marine Corps have done.  Investigate the network requirements for the DFC/FiB/AMD systems operating over extended distances during major combat operations to provide multi-dimensional single integrated air-ground picture in support of timely integrated fires.  Conduct a Network experiment in FY14 that accurately depicts the communications needs and architecture.  Conduct experiments in FY14 that are enabled by realistic and feasible technology advances such as robotics for next decade.  Provide BCTs, Support Brigades and Multi-functional Brigades with organic limited range CUAS capable systems to attack Group 1-3 systems.  Advance needs and requirements pertaining to elect fires, cyber and electronic warfare activities in support of CUAS operations during FY14 experimentation.

Event POCs: Mr. Anthony Evans, 580 442-3235, [email protected] Dr. Frank Myers, 580 442-2930, [email protected] Digital File location: S:\FBL\FY13 Experimentation\CUAS Experiment

Electric Fires

Name of event: HQDA EXORD 174-13 Electric Fires Roles and Responsibilities Requirements

Event Start Date: 11 June 2013

Event End Date: 01 October each year until relieved of responsibility

Description of event: US ARMY reviews threat-related testing and evaluation programs in order to identify testing and evaluation gaps related to Electric Fires (EF) and Electronic Attack (EA) testing; prioritize testing requirements and identifies funding requirements for such testing and evaluation.

The Army completes this assessment in five phases:  Phase 1: Compare EF to DE EA threats in order to identify threats to USASMDC/ARSTRAT and FCoE identified systems and facilities. Provide a scope to the problem and the difference between EF and EA DE capabilities along with additional threats identified. HQDA will endorse/not endorse the definition of EF.  Start date was 01 August 13 with an end date of 01 October 13.

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 Leads: TRADOC; SMDC/ARSTRAT; HQDA G3/5/7 (DAMO-ODE) [Electronic Warfare Section]

 Phase 2: Compare EF to DE EA threats to identified Systems Threat Assessment Report (STAR) for equipment and to the Army Prioritized Protection List (APPL) for facilities. Identify gaps in the STAR and APPL and update. US Army confirms/denies that existing STAR and APPL are sufficient.  Start date was 01 October 13 with an end date of 01 October 14.  Leads: Army G2/HQDA G3/5/7

 Phase 3: Combat developers and facilities engineers review updated STAR and APPL to determine if requirements documents require corresponding update. Update requirements documents and proponents confirm/deny requirements documents are updated based on Phase 2 results  Start date is 01 April 14 with an end date of 01 October 14.  Leads: TRADOC/IMCOM/HQDA G3/5/7

 Phase 4: Identify additional testing requirements. Ensure gaps in testing are identified and closed as required. Army identifies additional testing of vulnerabilities for systems and facilities.  Start date is 01 October 14 with an end date of 01 October 15.  Leads: TRADOC/IMCOM/HQDA 3/5/7

 Phase 5: Conduct EF or DE Vulnerability Assessments. : Identify and mitigate risks to equipment and facilities. Army identifies additional testing of vulnerabilities for systems and facilities.  Start date is TBD/NLT 1 October every year until relieved of responsibility.  Leads: AMC/ASA(ALT)/IMCOM

Results: The TRADOC part of Phase 1 was completed as of 19 September 13 in a G3/5/7 led Counsel of Colonels. The General Officer Steering Committee was canceled and never rescheduled.  G3/5/7 determined they would no longer recognize the term Electric Fires but they had no issue if we continued to use it.  MG McDonald made the decision FCoE would continue using the term.  Transitioned from Phase 1 to 2, however still waiting on SMDC/ARSTRAT Phase 1 completion.

Event POC: LTC Shannon D. Judnic, [email protected], 580-442- 3636

Name of event: Electric Fires Seminar

Event Start Date: 26 February 2013

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Event End Date: 28 February 2013

Description of event: This is the 1st Annual Electric Fires Seminar. The purpose is to identify and discuss potential impacts to include Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P) of Electric Fires (EF) capabilities across the Army. The seminar provided an open forum to discuss EF capabilities, planning and coordination measures, Centers of Excellence vulnerability assessment recommendations and input into the development of an EF White Paper. To attain cross warfighting (WfX) functional area input to EF coordination, integration and potential DOTMLPF-P input. Develop an EF White Paper to inform A2020 concept and gap analysis processes, provide a way ahead for military decision makers on how to employ and/or react to electromagnetic capabilities. This is a government-only seminar in which participants include the Centers of Excellence, Sister Services, RDECOM elements, additional government organizations and National Labs.

Results: This seminar provided a greater understanding of how EF could be integrated into the future planning, synchronization and the execution of missions; see what RDECOM is focused on in the EF arena ; identified mission command, targeting and intelligence requirements; identified concerns across the CoEs with implementation of EF; updated Vulnerability Assessment – Systems and coordinated for input into the EF White Paper.

Event POC: LTC Shannon D. Judnic, [email protected], 580-442- 3636

Name of event: Electric Fires Range

Event Start Date: 26 August 2013

Event End Date: TBD

Description of event: During the CDID Future's Board on 26 August 2013, MG McDonald directed the staff to establish a Directed Energy Range on Fort Sill. FCoE is dedicated to the facilitation of future demonstrations in order to better shape and inform the concepts and requirements within CDID.

 In 2013 Fort Sill received “one-time” categorical exclusion waiver to conduct a High Power Microwave (HPM) system live fire event. Since this was a one-time waiver all future prototype experiments require a complete Environmental Assessment as defined in 32 Code of Federal Regulations, which governs environmental considerations and issues and is further defined in Part 651 – Environmental Analysis of Army Actions. The Fires Battle Lab (FBL) in coordination with the Environmental Quality Division (EQD) is working to complete an EA as required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

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 On 06 Nov 13 the FBL presented a briefing to the Department of Public Works (DPW) on potential modifications to a range on Fort Sill. These modifications would enhance the range not only for EF purposes but for any other organizations that use the range. Critical work includes: access road improvement, bury electric cable, and emplace gravel parking area. Additional work includes: add one concrete firing pad with two grounding rods, remove two unused telephone poles, emplace junction box, provide telephone & fiber connections, construct latrine & range building, provide target boards, and warning signs with holders.  On 13 Nov 13, the FBL conducted a kickoff meeting with the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and their contract representatives to gain a better understanding of the requirements for the EA. As a result of the meeting the Electric Fires Office is drafting the Description of Proposed Action and Alternatives (DOPAA). The DOPAA is essentially Chapter 1 & 2 of the EA and provides the USACE the parameters of the environmental study from which a contract and cost estimate is completed.  On 14 Jan 14, the scope of the range along with recommended modifications was presented to the Training Enabler Working Group (TEWG). This quarterly meeting allows for organizations across post to present on-going projects and concur/nonconcur with the project. The TEWG is headed by Director/ Directorate of Plans, Training, Mobilization and Security and the G3.  On 5 Feb 14, the AMO packet requesting funding for the EA was sent to the G8 on Fort Sill. Once funding is secured the EW will take 6-12 months to complete.

Milestones/Timeline:  17 Oct 13: Kick off meeting with organizations across post  29 Oct 13: EQD Discussion  06 Nov 13: DPW Quad presentation  13 Nov 13: Kickoff Meeting with U.S. Army Corps of Engineers  20 Nov 13: Meeting with FCoE Staff Judge Advocate  05 Dec13: In Progress Review with General Atomics (railgun)  19 Dec 13: Scoping and DOPAA complete  14 Jan 14: Training Enabler Working Group (DPTMS)  (T) FY15: Establishment of Electric Fires Range  (T) FY15: Electric Fires Demonstrations

Results: Progress is being made to establish an EF Range on Fort Sill. This task requires continual communication, coordination and synchronization with both internal and external organizations. Ongoing.

Event POC: LTC Shannon D. Judnic, [email protected], 580-442- 3636

Name of event: Electric Fires White Paper

Event Start Date: 11 April 2012

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Event End Date: FY14

Description of event: The Electric Fires (EF) paper is an ongoing effort. It is at the General Officer Staffing level, followed by officially being published. This WP provides information on vision and a roadmap for follow-on force development activities. Electric Fires embodies rapidly emerging technologies that are likely to be operational Game Changers. The current pace of development and deployment of EF capabilities by foreign nations and the commercial markets are likely to challenge the US Army’s capabilities. US Army CONOPS, personnel, material and facilities vulnerability to EF is untested and unknown.

Results: Ongoing effort. Published document Army wide.

Event POC: LTC Shannon D. Judnic, [email protected], 580-442- 3636

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GLOSSARY

AAR, After Action Review ABCS, Army Battlefield Command System AC, Active Component/Assistant Commandant ACAAP, Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition Program ACAT, Acquisition Category ACCC, Aviation Captain’s Career Course ACTD, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration ADP, Army Doctrine Publication ADRP, Army Doctrine Reference Publication AESA, Army Enterprise Area Standards AFATDS, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System AIT, Advanced Individual Training AKO, Army Knowledge Online ALC, Advanced Leader Course, Army Learning Concept ALM, Army Learning Model AMCB, Army/Marine Corps Board AMRDEC, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research and Development Center AOT, Assignment-Oriented Course AOEWC, Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course APMI, Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative APU, Auxiliary Power Unit ARNG, Army National Guard ARCIC, Army Capabilities Integration Center AROC, Army Oversight Council ASARC, Army System Acquisition Review Council ASI, Additional Skill Identifier ASOC, Air Support Operations Center ASOS, Air Support Operations Squadron ATACMS, Army Tactical Missile System AVC3, Aviation Captain’s Career Course BCT, Brigade Combat Team BFIST, Bradley Fire Support Vehicle BNCOC, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course BOLC, Basic Officer Leader Course C2, Command and Control C4I, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence C4ISR, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance CAC, Combat Arms Center CAM/WAS, Combined Arms Maneuver/Wide Area Security CAS, Close Air Support CATT, Combined Arms Tactical Trainer CBRNE, Chemical, Biological, radiological, and Nuclear Explosive

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CCC, Captains Career Course CCF, Course-correcting Fuse CDD, Capability Development Document CDE, Collateral Damage Estimate CDID, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate CENTCOM, U.S. Central Command CFFT, Call for Fire Trainer CFLCC, Coalition Forces Land Component Command CG, Commanding General CGSC, Command and General Staff College CJTF, Combined Joint Task Force COE, Center of Excellence COLT, Combat Observation Lasing Team CONOPS, Concept of Operations CONUS, Continental United States COTS, Commercial off the Shelf CPD, Capabilities Production Document CPOF, Command Posts of the Future CRADA, Cooperative Research and Development Agreement C-RAM, Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortars CTS, Combat Training Squadron DA, Department of the Army DAC, ARNG, Department of the Army, Army National Guard DAC, Deputy Assistant Commandant/Department of the Army Civilian DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DCG, Deputy Commanding General DFCS, Digital Flight Control System DIVARTY, Division Artillery DL, Distance Learning/Distributive Learning DOTD, Directorate of Training and Doctrine DOTMLPF, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities DOTMLPF-P, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy DPICM, Dual-Improved Conventional Munition DPW, Directorate of Public Works DSABL, Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory ECU, Environmental Control Unit EDT, Engineering Developmental Testing EMD, Engineering and Manufacturing Development ER, Extended Range EW, Electronic Warfare EWTGLANT, Expeditionary Warfare Training Group-Atlantic FA, Field Artillery FAASV, Field Artillery Ammunition Supply Vehicle

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FA BOLC, Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course FACCC, Field Artillery Captains Career Course FACCC-RC, Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Reserve Component FAPO, Field Artillery Proponency Office FAS, Field Artillery School FAST-21, Task Force Future Army Schools 21 FCoE, Fires Center of Excellence FCMS, Future Cannon Munitions Suite FCS, Future Combat System FDC, Fire Direction Center FIST, Fire Support Team FISTV, Fire Support Vehicle FM, Field Manual FMTV, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles FORSCOM, U.S. Army Forces Command FOS, Forward Observer System FRP, Full-rate Production FS3, Fire Support Sensor System FSC, Fire Support Center FSC3, Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications FSCATT, Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer FSCATT-T, Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer-Towed FSO, Fire Support Officer FY, Fiscal Year GOSC, General Officer Steering Committee GPS, Global Positioning System GVLLD, Ground/Vehicular Laser Location Designator HBCT, Heavy Brigade Combat Team HCT, Howitzer Crew Trainer HIMARS, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System HMMWV, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle HQ, Headquarters HQDA, Headquarters, Department of the Army HTU, Handheld Terminal Unit HVAC, Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning HyPAK, Hydraulic Power Assist Kit IBCT, Infantry Brigade Combat Team ICD, Initial Capabilities Document IED, Improvised Explosive Device IET, Initial Entry Training IFCS, Improved Fire Control System ILMS, Improved Launcher Mechanical System IOTE, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation IPADS, Improved Position and Azimuth System JACI, Joint and Combined Integration Directorate

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JADOCS, Joint Automated Deep Operations Coordination System JAGIC, Joint Air Ground Integration Center JCAS, Joint Close Air Support JDAM, Joint Direct Attack Munition JETS, Joint Effects Targeting System JFETS, Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System JFO, Joint Fires Observer JNN, Joint Network Node JOFEC, Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course JROC, Joint Requirement Oversight Council LASIP, Light Artillery System Improvement Program LCMR, Lightweight Countermortar Radar LDM, Laser Designator Module LED, Light Emitting Diode LLDR, Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder LRIP, Low-rate Initial Production LSAC, Low Signature Armored Cab LSAC-H, Low Signature Armored Cab HIMARS LRAS3, Long-range Advanced Scout Surveillance System MACS, Modular Artillery Charge System MANPRINT, Manpower Personnel Integration MCCC, Maneuver Captain’s Career Course MCoE, Maneuver Center of Excellence MEP, Mission Equipment Package MET, Meteorological MLCS, Modular Launcher Communication System MLRS, Multiple Launch Rocket System MMS, Meteorological Measuring Set MOS, Military Occupational Specialty MRAP, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle MTOE, Modified Tables of Equipment MTT, Mobile Training Team NCO, Noncommissioned Officer NCOA, Noncommissioned Officer Academy NCOES, Noncommissioned Officer Education System O&O, Organizational and Operational OCONUS, Outside Continental United States OEF, Operation Enduring Freedom OES, Officer Education System OIF, Operation Iraqi Freedom ORD, Operational Requirements Document PEO STRI, Program Executive Officer for Simulations, Training, and Instrumentation PEO, Program Executive Officer PERSCOM, Personnel Command PFC, Precision Fires Course

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PFED, Palm Forward Entry Device Pff, Preformed Fragmentation Round PFRMS, Precision Fires, Rockets, and Missile System PGK, Precision Guidance Kit PIM, Paladin Integrated Management PLDC, Primary Leadership Development Course PM, Program Manager POCV, Paladin Operations Center Vehicle POI, Program of Instruction POM, Program Objective Memorandum POV, Privately Owned Vehicle PQT, Production Qualification Test PSS-SOF, Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Forces QAO, Quality Assurance Office QRC, Quick Response Capability ROTC, Reserve Officer Training Corps RSTA, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition RTI, Regional Training Institute SADARM, Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition SAP, Special Access Programs SBCT, Stryker Brigade Combat Team SBL, Soldier Battle Laboratory SDD, System Development and Demonstration SSD, Structured Self-Development SGI, Small Group Instruction SHARP, Sexual Harassment and Rape Prevention Program SINCGARS, Single-channel Ground and Airborne Radio System SLC, Senior Leader Course SMC, Sergeant Major Course SMDC, Space and Missile Defense Command SME, Subject Matter Expert/Simulated Military Equipment SOCOM, Special Operations Command SPTD, Soldier Precision Targeting Device SRC, Standard Requirement Code STRATCOM, Strategic Communications Office TACFIRE, Tactical Fire Direction System TAD, Towed Artillery Digitization TADSS, Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations TAMMS, Target Area Meteorological Measuring System TASS, Total Army School System/The Army School System TATS, The Army Training System TATS-C, The Army Training System Courseware TBOC, Training Brain Operations Center TCM, Trajectory Correctable Munition/TRADOC Capabilities Manager TDA, Tables of Distribution and Allowances

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TDY, Temporary Duty TECS, Target Effects Coordination System TLDS, Target Location Designation System TLM, Target Location Module TMO, Target Mensuration Only TRAC, TRADOC Analysis Center TRADOC, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TSM, TRADOC System Manager TSP, Training Support Package TTP, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures TWV, Tactical Wheeled Vehicle USAADAS, U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School USACGSC, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College USAFAS, U.S. Army Field Artillery School USAFCOE, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence USAFCOEFS, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill USAIC, U.S. Army Infantry Center USMA, U.S. Military Academy USMC, U.S. Marine Corps VBS2, Virtual Battlespace Simulation 2 VCSA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army WITA, Women in the Army WLC, Warrior Leadership Course WOAC, Warrant Officer Advance Course WOBC, Warrant Officer Basic Course WOES, Warrant Officer Education System ZUP, Zero Velocity Updates

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APPENDIX ONE STUDENT PRODUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013

428th Field Artillery Brigade Course Initial Inputs Graduates FACCC 358 349 FACCC DL 29 95 FACCC-RC ADT 138 138 BOLC B 969 936 WOAC 49 49 WOBC 37 36 NCOA 2,101 1,996 USMC 1,364 1,321 Other Courses 6,086 6,018 Total 11,392 10.938

Source: Email with atch, subj: Student Production Figures for Fiscal Year 2013, 3 Feb 14, Doc I-57.

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APPENDIX TWO KEY FCoE AND USAFAS PERSONNEL

Commanding General, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill MG James M. McDonald, 4 May 2012-present USAFAS Commandant and Chief of Field Artillery BG Brian J. McKiernan, Jan 12-Apr 13 (Interim) COL Martin C. Clausen, Apr 13-Jun 2013 BG Christopher F. Bentley, Jun 2013-present USAFAS Assistant Commandant U.S. Army Field Artillery School COL Martin C. Clausen, 9 Jul 2012-present Commander, 428th Field Artillery Regiment COL Gene D. Meredith, 29 Jun 2012-present

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APPENDIX THREE FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL COMMANDANTS

CPT Dan T. Moore, 19 Jul 1911-l5 Sep 1914 LTC Edward F. McGlachlin, Jr., l5 Sep 19l4-26 Jun 1916 School was closed 9 July 1916-2 July 1917. COL William J. Snow, 27 Jul 1917-26 Sep 1917 BG Adrian S. Fleming, 26 Sep l9l7-11 May 1918 BG Laurin L. Lawson, 11 May 1918-18 Dec 1918 BG Dennis H. Currie, 24 Dec 1918-l0 Jun 1919 BG Edward T. Donnely, 30 Jun 1919-9 Jul 1919 MG Ernest Hinds, 25 Oct 1919-l Jul 1923 MG George LeR. Irwin, l Jul 1923-l Apr 1928 BG Dwight E. Aultman, 6 Apr 1928-l2 Dec 1929 BG William Cruikshank, 8 Feb 1930-3l Jul 1934 MG Henry W. Butner, l7 Sep 1934-10 May 1936 BG Augustine McIntyre, 29 Jun 1936-31 Jul 1940 BG Donald C. Cubbison, l Aug 1940-22 Dec 1940 BG George R. Allin, 20 Jan 1941-31 Jun 1942 BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-11 Jan 1944 MG Orlando Ward, l2 Jan 1944-30 Oct 1944 MG Ralph McT. Pennell, 3l Oct 1944-30 Aug 1945 MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug 1945-4 Jun 1946 MG Clift Andrus, 18 Jun 1946-9 Apr 1949 MG Joseph M. Swing, 1 Jun 1949-3l Mar 1950 MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr 1950-l6 Nov 1953 MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan 1954-28 May 1954 MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul 1954-23 Feb 1956 MG Thomas E. de Shazo, 12 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959 MG Verdi B. Barnes, 15 Feb 1959-6 Mar 196l MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 196l-3l Mar 1964 MG Harry H. Critz, 1 Apr 1964-15 May 1967 MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970 MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-31 May 1973 MG David E. Ott, 1 Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976 MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-21 Oct 1977 MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980 MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982 MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985 MG Eugene S. Korpal, 4 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987 MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991 MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993 MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995 MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997 MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999

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MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 2001 MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 2001-9 Dec 2003 MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 2003-4 Aug 2005 MG David C. Ralston, 4 Aug 2005-13 Sep 2007 MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 2007-4 June 2009 BG Ross E. Ridge, 4 Jun 2009-1 Oct 2010 BG Thomas S. Vandal, 10 Dec 2010-30 Sep 2011 BG Brian J. McKiernan, Jan 2012-Apr 2013 BG Christopher F. Bentley, Jun 2013-present

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APPENDIX FOUR CHIEFS OF FIELD ARTILLERY

*MG William J. Snow, 10 Feb 1918-19 Dec 1927 *MG Fred T. Austin, 20 Dec 1927-15 Feb 1930 *MG Harry G. Bishop, 10 Mar 1930-9 Mar 1934 *MG Upton Birnie, Jr., 10 Mar 1934-24 Mar 1938 *MG Robert M. Danford, 26 Mar 1938-9 Mar 1942 BG George R. Allin, 9 Mar 1942-31 Jun 1942 BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-11 Jan l944 MG Orlando Ward, 12 Jan 1944-30 Oct 1944 MG Ralph McT. Pennell, 3l Oct 1944-30 Aug 1945 MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug 1945-4 Jun 1946 MG Clift Andrus, 20 Jun 1946-15 Apr 1949 MG Joseph M. Swing, 9 Apr 1949-31 Mar 1950 MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr 1950-16 Nov 1953 MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan 1954-28 May 1954 MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul 1954-23 Feb 1956 MG Thomas E. de Shazo, 12 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959 MG Verdi B. Barnes, 15 Feb 1959-25 Mar 196l MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 1961-31 Mar 1964 MG Harry H. Critz, l Apr 1964-15 May 1967 MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970 MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-31 May 1973 MG David E. Ott, 1 Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976 MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-21 Oct 1977 MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980 MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982 *MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985 *MG Eugene S. Korpal, 3 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987 *MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991 *MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993 *MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995 *MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997 *MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999 *MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 2001 *MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 2001-9 Dec 2003 *MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 2003-4 Aug 2005 *MG David C. Ralston, 4 Aug 2005-13 Sep 2007 *MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 2007-4 Jun 2009 *BG Ross E. Ridge, 4 June 2009-1 Oct 2010 *BG Thomas S. Vandal, 20 Dec 2010-30 Sep 2011 *BG Brian J. McKiernan, Jan 2012-Apr 2013 *BG Christopher F. Bentley, Jun 2013-present

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Individuals with an asterisk by their name were officially recognized by the Department of War or Department of the Army as the Chief of Field Artillery. The War Department created the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery on 15 February 1918 to supervise the Field Artillery during World War One. On 9 March 1942 the War Department abolished the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery as part of a World War Two reorganization and placed the Field Artillery under the Army Ground Forces. When the War Department dissolved the Chief of Field Artillery on 9 March 1942, General Allin who was serving as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School became the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery. He served as the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery and the Commandant of the Field Artillery School until 31 June 1942. In 1983 the Department of the Army reestablished the Chief of Field Artillery to oversee the development of Field Artillery tactics, doctrine, organization, equipment, and training. Although the War Department and later the Department of the Army did not recognize an official Chief of Field Artillery from 1942 through 1983, the Commandants of the Field Artillery School considered themselves to be the Chief of Field Artillery. See TRADOC Annual Command History for 1 Oct 82-30 Sep 83, pp. 57, 308, Doc I-122. Note: The article, “Three Chiefs,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1931, p. 115, lists Snow’s date of tenure as Chief of Field Artillery as 10 February 1918 to 19 December 1927. USAFAS’s records list 15 February 1918 to 19 December 1927. The same article lists Austin’s tenure as 22 December 1927 to 15 December 1930. USAFAS’s records list 20 December 1927 to 15 February 1930.

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APPENDIX FIVE ASSISTANT COMMANDANTS

COL Oliver L. Spaulding, 24 Nov 1917-3 May 1918 LTC William Bryden, 4 May 1918-25 Oct 1918 COL Rine E. De R. Hoyle, 26 Oct 1918-25 May 1919 MAJ John W. Kilbreth, 24 Jun 1919-14 Nov 1919 MAJ Augustine McIntyre, 15 Nov 1919-28 Jul 1920 COL Henry W. Butner, 28 Jul 1920-30 Jun 1924 COL Daniel W. Hand, 22 Jul 1924-25 Jun 1925 LTC William P. Ennis, 26 Jul 1925-22 Jul 1929 LTC Lesley P. McNair, 23 July 1929-30 Jun 1933 COL Charles S. Blakely, 28 Jun 1933-15 Jun 1937 COL Donald C. Cubbison, 1 Aug 1937-30 Jun 1938 COL Maxwell Murray, 15 Aug 1938-12 Nov 1938 BG LeRoy P. Collins, 12 Dec 1938-17 Feb 1941 COL Mert Proctor, 17 Mar 1941-25 Jun 1941 COL James A. Lester, 4 Jul 1941-20 Feb 1942 COL Theodore L. Futch, 21 Feb 1942-2 Sep 1942 COL Lawrence B. Bixby, 7 Nov 1942-28 Nov 1943 COL Dinar B. Gjelsteen, 1 Dec 1943-3 Oct 1944 COL Thomas P. DeShazo, 16 Oct 1944-10 Oct 1947 BG Stanley R. Mickelsen, 1 Sep 1947-1 Oct 1949 BG William H. Colbern, 9 Jan 1950-1 Feb 1952 BG James F. Brittingham, 19 Mar 1952-31 Jul 1953 BG Thomas W. Watlington, 1 Aug 1953-31 Jul 1955 MG John E. Theimer, 1 Aug 1955-8 Jul 1956 BG Paul A. Gavan, 9 Jul 1956-29 Aug 1957 BG Philip C. Wehle, 30 Aug 1957-26 Apr 1959 BG Edwin S. Hartshorn, Jr., 23 Jul 1959-31 Jul 1962 BG James W. Totten, 1 Aug 1962-7 May 1964 BG Charles P. Brown, 15 Jun 1964-15 Jun 1965 BG John S. Hughes, 1 Jul 1965-21 May 1967 BG John J. Kenney, 22 May 1967-14 Jul 1968 BG Lawrence H. Caruthers, Jr., 15 Jul 1968-30 Jun 1972 BG Robert J. Koch, 1 Aug 1972-11 Jul 1974 BG Vernon B. Lewis, Jr., 15 Jul 1974-16 Jul 1975 BG Albert B. Akers, 17 Jul 1975-13 Jan 1978 BG Edward A. Dinges, 10 Aug 1978-27 Jun 1980 BG Robert C. Forman, 1 Jul 1980-8 Mar 1981 BG Donald Eckelbarger, 2 Mar 1981-29 Apr 1983 BG Thomas J.P. Jones, 29 Apr 1983-16 Jul 1984 BG Raphael J. Hallada, 1 Aug 1984-1 Apr 1986 BG Jerry C. Harrison, 29 May 1986-13 Jul 1987 BG Fred F. Marty, 13 Jul 1987-24 Aug 1989

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BG John C. Ellerson, 24 Aug 1989-13 Aug 1990 COL Marshall R. McCree, 14 Aug 1990-14 Apr 1991 BG Tommy R. Franks, 17 Apr 1991-8 Jul 1992 BG David L. Benton III, 8 Jul 1992-1 May 1994 BG Leo J. Baxter, 24 May 1994-25 Sep 1995 BG William J. Lennox, Jr., 1 Dec 1995-13 Jun 1997 BG Toney Stricklin, 14 Jun 1997-17 Apr 1998 BG Lawrence R. Adair, 18 Apr 1998-13 Aug 1999 BG William F. Engel, 1 Oct 1999-11 Oct 2001 BG David C. Ralston, 11 Oct 2001-27 Apr 2003 BG James A. Cerrone, 4 Aug 2003-23 Aug 2004 BG Mark A. Graham, 24 Aug 2004-25 Jul 2005 BG James M. McDonald, 25 Jul 2005-22 May 2006 COL Jeffrey W. Yaeger, 22 May 2006-25 Sep 2006 COL Albert Johnson, Jr., 25 Sep 2006-27 Aug 2007 COL (P) Richard C. Longo, 27 Aug 2007-8 Sep 2008 BG Ross E. Ridge, 8 Sep 2008-4 Jun 2009 COL Matt Merrick, 19 Aug 2009-Jul 2011 COL Richard M. Cabrey, Sep 2011-4 Apr 2012 COL Martin D. Clausen, 9 Jul 2012-present

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APPENDIX SIX COMMAND SERGEANT MAJORS OF USAFAS SINCE 1991

CSM Joseph J. McFadden, Jan 1991-Aug 1995 CSM Gary R. Green, Sep 1995-Aug 1998 CSM Perry L. Roberts, Aug 1998-Jun 2000 CSM Ricky Hatcher, Jul 2000-Mar 2002 CSM Dennis M. King, May 2002-May 2004 CSM Armando Ramirez, Jul 2004-Jul 2006 CSM Gary J. Bronson, Aug 2006-Aug 2008 CSM Daniel R. Willey, Jul 2009-Aug 2011 CSM Sam K. Young, Aug 2011-Sep 2013 CSM Daniel S. Moriarty, Sep 2013-present

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APPENDIX SEVEN COMMAND SERGEANT MAJORS OF NCOA

CSM Clifford L. Lewis, Mar 1973-Sep 1974 CSM Ralph Pitcher, Aug 1974-Jun 1975 CSM Coyle C. Bohn, Jul 1975-Apr 1976 CSM Tommy Morgan, Apr 1976-May 1977 CSM Nick Mastrovito, May 1977-Jun 1978 CSM James Kennedy, Jun 1978-May 1980 CSM George Phillips, Aug 1980-May 1983 CSM Pat Fowler, May 1983-Nov 1984 CSM John A. Pierce, Nov 1984-Jan 1986 CSM Kenneth E. Mills, Jan 1986-Aug 1988 CSM Jerry M. Laws, Aug 1988-Feb 1990 CSM William J. Kermode, Feb 1990-Jun 1991 CSM Mal Causby, Jun 1991-Oct 1991 CSM Harold F. Shrewsberry, Oct 1991-Oct 1993 CSM Karl L. Purdy, Oct 1993-May 1995 CSM Jerry L. Wood, May 1995-Oct 1997 CSM Gene Odom, Oct 1997-Jun 1999 CSM Rickey Hatcher, Jun 1999-Jun 2000 CSM Joseph Stanley, Jun 2000-Dec 2001 CSM Carl B. McPherson, Jan 2002-Jan 2004 CSM Allie R. Ousley, Jan 2004-May 2006 CSM Robert L. White , May 2006-Jul 2007 CSM Dean J. Keveles, Nov 2007-Jun 2011 CSM Bryan A. Pinkney, Jun 2011-present

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APPENDIX EIGHT U.S. ARMY FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FORT SILL ORGANIZATIONAL CHART AS OF 8 APRIL 2013

US ARMY FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FORT SILL ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE Command Sergeant Major Commanding General Deputy to the CG USAFCoEFS USAFCoEFS USAFCoEFS CSM Dwight Morrisey MG James M. McDonald Mr. Joe E. Gallagher (580)-442-3205 (580)-442-3006 (580)-442-2604 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Personal Staff

Aide SJA IG CPT Valton King COL Mark Seitsinger LTC James Mattox Chief of Staff (580)-917-9444 (580)-442-2685 (580) 442-3224 COL Brian Dunn [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Commandant (580)-442-3005 Commandant US Army ADA School [email protected] Deputy Chief of Staff SGS Deputy SGS US Army FA School COL(P) Donald Fryc Mr. Jimmy Dailey MAJ Sheriff Olalekan CPT Sarah Savageau (580)-442-8994 (580)-442-8300 (580)-558-0599 (580)-442-8313 VACANT th [email protected] 434 FA BDE NCO Academy [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] COL Michael Dvoracek CSM Bryan Pinkney (580)-442-1261 (580)-442-3141 Directorates AC AC [email protected] [email protected] COL Martin Clausen COL Christopher Spillman CDID JACI DOTD Senior Guard Advisor (580) 442-6606 (580)-442-5421 COL David Hill COL John T. Smith COL Thomas Quintero COL Paul Caviness [email protected] [email protected] (580)-442-6230 (580)-442-1701 (580)-442-2301 (580)-442-6770 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] TCM Fires Cells [email protected] TCM AAMDC th th COL Scott Patton 428 FA BDE 30 ADA BDE COL Edward J. O’Neill Coordinating Staff COL Gene Meredith COL Michael Simley (580) 442-6836 580-442-8947 G2 (580)-442-4704 (580)-442-0779 [email protected] G1/G4 G3/5/7 G6 [email protected] Ms. Pamela-Jackson-Williams [email protected] [email protected] LTC James Speegle COL Steven Parker Mr. Eddie Henderson (580)-442-0314 (580)-442-5207 (580)-558-0504 (580)-442-2318 [email protected] Pamela.s.jackson- [email protected] [email protected] USMC Detachment TCM Fires Brigade TCM ADA Brigade [email protected] Office, Chief ADA Col. Douglas P. Thomas COL David Brost LTC Matthew Tedesco VACANT (580)-442-6311 580-442-8754 580-442-2419 (580)-442-0617 G 3/3 G5 G7 G8 (DRM) [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] LTC Anthony Behrens LTC Noah Villanueva LTC John l. Rainville Ms. Young, Julie (580)-442-4603 (580)-442-4603 (580)-442-1778 (580)-442-2044 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] FAPO COL Kelly Ivanoff TCM BCT Fires TCM Deputy Chief Special Staff (580)-442-3820 COL Michael Hartig Concepts/Development Protocol STRATCOM PAO QAO [email protected] 580-442-1995 VACANT [email protected] 580-442-6980 Mr. Mike Kunz LTC Brian Adams Mr. Darrell Ames Mr. James Connolly (580)-442-4237 (580)-442-3944 (580)-442-4500 (580)-442-2002 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

TCM Fires Integration COL Toby Brooks Retention Equal Opportunity Director of Museums Ft Sill Band 580-558-0731 SGM Daniel Hilton MSG Wendell Huddleston Mr. Frank Siltman WO1 Matthew David [email protected] (580)-442-4707 (580)-442-6968 (580)-558-0384 (580)-442-2208 Wendell.m.huddleston.mil@ [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] mail.mil FORSCOM UNITS In Accordance with Title 5, U.S.C. 552a (Privacy Act of 1974) as implemented by the Federal Register, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, 32 CFR Part 505, The Army Privacy Program; Final Rule, protected personal information (home address and home telephone numbers) will not be disclosed from this roster to anyone outside the Department of Defense. This alert roster will be kept in a secure place at all times. When updated, obsolete copies will 75thth Fires BDE 214th Fires BDE 31st ADA BDE be destroyed as required by paragraph 4-501, AR 25-55, The Department of the Army Freedom of information Act Program. COL Alfredo Najera COL Tim Daugherty COL Michael Morrissey TENANT UNITS (580)-442-4501 (580)-442-4919 (580)-442-0421 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] USAOTC FSTD US Army Garrison MEDDAC DENTAC COL Steven Scioneaux COL Paul Hossenlopp COL Jennifer Bedick COL Michael Roberts EOC (580)-442-8400 (580)-442-3106 (580)-558-3000 (580)-442-4111 (580)-442-3241 Steven.a.scioneaux.mil@ [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] mail.mil As of 4/8/2013

Briefing, subj: FCoE Organization from FCoE Home page, 3 June 2013, Doc I-24, 2012 USAFAS AH.

182

APPENDIX NINE FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL COMMANDANT OFFICE CHART AS OF 27 MARCH 2014

Source: Email with atch, subj: FA Cmdt Organizational Chart, 27 Mar 14, Doc I-58.

183

APPENDIX TEN LIST OF DOCUMENTS

See Footnotes

184

INDEX OF NAMES

Austin, Gen Lloyd J. III, 70

Bentley, BG Christopher F., 1, 2, 23, 46, 50

Campbell, Gen Charles C., 9 Campbell, Gen John F., 70 Chiarelli, Gen Peter W., 51, 69 Cone, Gen Robert W., 12, 60, 61

Fahey, Kevin M., 89 Funk, BG Paul E. II, 16

G Gates, Bill, 88 Geren, Peter, 88 Gruber, Edmund L., 6

Halverson, MG David D., 45, 68, 69 Hamilton, Alexander, 6

Knox, Henry A., 6

Lenaer, MG William M. 85 Longo, BG Richard C., 16

Maple, MG Michael D., 73

185

McDonald, MG James M., 11, 13, 59, 60, 71 McGuiness, BG John, 90 McKiernan, BG Brian J., 15, 18, 23, 25, 37, 55 Metz, LTG Thomas F., 120 Mull, Stephen, 122

Odierno, Gen Raymond T., 7, 8

Shinseki, Gen Eric K., 73 Stricklin, MG Toney, 72

Thrasher, MG Alan W., 74 Thurman, LTG James D., 123

Vandal, BG Thomas S., 24, 37 Vangjel, MG Peter M., 89, 108 Vane, LTC Michael M., 92

Wallace, Gen William S., 9, 51