U.S. ARMY FIELD SCHOOL ANNUAL HISTORY (RCS CHIS-6 [R4])

1 JANUARY 2012 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 2012

BY

FIELD ARTILLERY BRANCH HISTORIAN’S OFFICE

FORT SILL, OKLAHOMA

ii

COMMANDANT’S INTRODUCTION

The 2012 Annual History captures key training and leader development initiatives and combat development accomplishments of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School. During the year, the Field Artillery School continued to meet future requirements by playing a key role in futures development and integration. Emerging weapons systems, such as the Paladin Integrated Management, and Field Artillery munitions, such as the Guided MLRS and the Excalibur, assured unparalleled precision lethal fires, while the School’s ground work on Army Doctrine 2015 prepared the School and the Field Artillery to move into the future. The Field Artillery School’s core mission remained training Soldiers and leaders for Field Artillery units of the operational forces. During the year, the Field Artillery School provided Field Artillery Soldiers and leaders with world-class training and instruction. The School furnished assignment-oriented training to prepare leaders and Soldiers for their next or first assignment and worked to introduce Army Learning Model 2015 and to modernize gunnery. The School also engaged the Army through Warfighter Forums, developed an engagement strategy to encourage West Point and Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets to select the Field Artillery as their branch of choice and to tell the School’s and the Field Artillery’s story, and integrated a Culture and Foreign Language Program to develop leaders with an understanding of foreign cultures and languages and their impact upon Army operations. As part of the Fires Center of Excellence, the Field Artillery School participated in growing the next generation Fires force. Around the world, Redleg Soldiers are the pride of the Nation’s forces. At home, Field Artillery units continue to train to unprecedented levels of high-quality performance -- preparing for whatever challenges wait them. Now more than ever, the Caissons are indeed rolling along.

Artillery Strong!

(original signed) MARTIN C. CLAUSEN , FA Commandant

iii

PREFACE

The 2012 Annual History for the U.S. Army Field Artillery School follows the decision-making process as closely as possible. Through interviews, email, messages, staff reports, fact sheets, correspondence, briefings, and other documentation, the Field Artillery School Historian’s Office has recreated as closely as possible how the Field Artillery School made key decisions concerning joint issues, training, leader development, doctrine, force design, and equipment requirements. Because the Field Artillery School was involved in many diverse activities during the year, the Historian’s Office under the direction of the School Commandant selected only those activities deemed to be the most historically significant to include in the History. Preserving historical documents forms a vital part of the historian’s work. After they are collected from the various organizations during the process of researching, they are filed in the historical records and documents collection in the Historian’s Office. All documents are available for use by School staff, other U.S. governmental agencies, and private individuals upon request. Because new documents are often found after research and writing has been completed, this contemporary history is subject to revision. As new documents are discovered, interpretations and conclusions will change. Comments and suggested changes should be directed to the Historian’s Office. In the process of researching and writing the History, the historian becomes indebted to many people for their advice and assistance. The Field Artillery School Historian’s Office would like to thank the people who provided their technical expertise. Without their help writing the history would have been far more difficult.

(original signed) BOYD L. DASTRUP, Ph.D. Field Artillery Branch Historian U.S. Army Field Artillery School

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE i COMMANDER’S INTRODUCTION ii PREFACE iii TABLE OF CONTENTS iv

CHAPTER ONE: MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND PERSONNEL Mission 1 Organization Commanding General, Fires Center of Excellence 1 Commandant 2 Assistant Commandant 3 Maneuver Center of Excellence Fires Cell 4 Field Artillery Proponency Office 4 Women in the Army and the Field Artillery 7 Fires Center of Excellence and Field Artillery School Preparation for Accreditation 8 Strategic Communications 10 Warfighter Forums 10

CHAPTER TWO: LEADER DEVELOPMENT: TRAINING AND EDUCATION Introduction 12 Deputy Commanding General for Initial Military Training Program of Instruction Visit 12 Cultural and Foreign Language Program 13 Army National Guard Regional Training Institutes 13 Functional Course Review 14 Functional Courses 16 Field Artillery Mobile Training Assistant Team 18 Gaming 18 Leader Decision Exercise 19 Army Learning Model 2015 20 Modernizing Gunnery Instruction 22 Distance Learning 22 Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations, Fires Center of Excellence and Field Artillery School 23 Field Artillery Lessons Learned Branch 24 Advanced Individual Training 25 Noncommissioned Officer Academy and Noncommissioned Officer Education System 25 Warrant Officer Education System 29 Officer Education System 30 Joint and Combined Integration Directorate 35

v

Precision Fires Courses 36 Target Mensuration Only and Collateral Damage Estimation and Weaponeering Courses 39 Joint Fires Observer Course 39 Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course 41 Joint Fires Observer Team 42 Non-lethal Training 43 Electronic Warfare Courses 43 Special Technical Operations Course 47 Tactical Information Operations Course 48

CHAPTER THREE: COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS: FORCE DESIGN, DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS Introduction 49 Force Design and Doctrine 49 Grade Plate Review 49 Army 2020 Redesign 50 Fire Supporter Reorganization 50 Fires Command Force Design Update 51 Army Doctrine 51 Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Studies 53 M777 and M119 Composite and Precision Fires 55 Precision Fires, Target Location Error, Quick Reaction Capability, and Handheld Devices 56 TRADOC Capabilities Manager Brigade Combat Team-Fires 59 Excalibur Extended-Range Guided Projectile 59 Precision Guidance Kit 66 Future Cannon Munitions Suite 69 M777 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer 70 M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer 74 Paladin Integrated Management 77 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System-G 81 TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell 83 Modernizing Gunnery Material Effort 83 Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble 83 Warfighter Information Network-Tactical 84 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle 85 Knight Vehicle 87 Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 88 Joint Effects Targeting System 90 Fire Support Sensor System 91 Profiler 92 Command, Control, and Communications Systems 94 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 94 Handheld Command and Control Systems 97

vi

TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Brigade 97 Multiple Launcher Rocket System 97 Munitions 97 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead 101 Launcher 104 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 106 Army Tactical Missile System 109 Enhanced AN-TPQ-36 Radar 110 Firefinder AN/TPQ-37 112 AN/TPQ-50 Radar 112

CHAPTER FOUR: FIRES BATTLE LABORATORY 115

Appendix One: Student Production for Fiscal Year 2012 122 Appendix Two: Key FCoE and USAFAS Personnel 123 Appendix Three: Field Artillery School Commandants 124 Appendix Four: Chiefs of Field Artillery 126 Appendix Five: Assistant Commandants 128 Appendix Six: Command Sergeant of USAFAS Since 1991 130 Appendix Seven: Command Sergeant Majors of NCOA 131 Appendix Eight: USAFCOEFS Organization Chart as of 8 April 2013 132 Appendix Nine: Field Artillery Commandant’s Office Chart 133 Appendix Ten: List of Documents 134 Index of Names 135

CHAPTER ONE MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND PERSONNEL

MISSION

Influenced by the new field artillery technology introduced after the Spanish- American War of 1898, the development of indirect fire, and the lack of adequately trained Field Artillerymen, the War Department opened the School of Fire for Field Artillery at , Oklahoma, on 15 September 1911. While War Department, General Orders No. 72 of 3 June 1911 tasked the school to furnish practical and theoretical field artillery training to lieutenants, captains, field grade officers, militia officers, and noncommissioned officers, War Department, General Orders No. 73 of 5 June 1911 integrated the school into a sequential and progressive educational system for officers. In 2012 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School (USAADAS), the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), and the 434th Field Artillery Brigade composed the training mission of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence. During the year, the Field Artillery School trained the Field Artillery forces of the Army and United States Marine Corps, provided joint training, developed Field Artillery leaders and Soldiers, helped design and develop fire support tactics and doctrine, and supported unit training and readiness.1

ORGANIZATION

Commanding General, Fires Center of Excellence On 4 May 2012 MG Mark McDonald became the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill. He was commissioned in the Field Artillery through the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps at the University of Tennessee, Chattanooga, in 1980. Early assignments included tours with the 1-509th Airborne Battalion Combat Team at Vicenza, , and duty at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, where he commanded two batteries in the 82nd Airborne Division. In 1987, he served two years as an exchange officer to the Royal Canadian Artillery School and then spent two years with the U.S. Army Field Artillery School. After graduating from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, McDonald served as an brigade fire support officer in the 7th Infantry Division and as the operations officer for 2-8th Field Artillery. His other artillery commands included 3-321st Field Artillery and the 82nd Airborne Division Artillery, involving operations in Iraqi Freedom. Staff positions included duty in Germany at the George C. Marshall Center, two tours on the Department of the Army staff at the Pentagon, an assignment with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Bosnia and chief of staff at Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

12002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 7; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 11 Apr 11, Doc I-1, 2011 USAFAS AH. 2

General officer positions held included Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School and Deputy Commanding General of Fort Sill. At Fort Hood he served as the Deputy Commanding General-Fires (Iraqi Freedom) and Deputy Commanding General of III Corps and Fort Hood. In May 2009 he returned to Iraq as the Deputy Commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, and later as the operations director, J3, United States Forces Iraq. He most recently served as the Commanding General, U.S. Army Cadet Command at Fort Knox. McDonald’s education included Bachelor of Science and Master of Military Arts and Science degrees. He graduated from the U.S. Army War College. His awards included the Defense Superior Service medal, four Legions of Merit, two Bronze Star medals, the Combat Action badge and the U.S. Master Parachutist badge, as well as parachutist badges from Italy, , and Germany.2 Commandant On 12 January 2012 Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan succeeded Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal as Commandant of the Field Artillery School and Chief of Field Artillery. General McKiernan was a 1986 distinguished military graduate of the Vanderbilt University Reserve Officer Training Corps program and completed the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course and Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course at Fort Sill. His career took him to Augsburg, Germany, where he served as fire direction officer and firing leader in the 1-36th Field Artillery and aide-de-camp to the VII Corps Artillery commander. He was then assigned to the 3-319th Airborne Field Artillery , 82nd Airborne Division Artillery, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. During his tour, he served as brigade targeting officer, task force fire support officer, and firing battery commander and participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm After completion of a master’s degree in operations research and system analysis in June 1996, he was assigned to the Army staff where he served as enlisted manpower analysis in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. Following attendance at the Marine Corps Command and General Staff College in 1998-1999, he reported to the 2nd Infantry Division Artillery at Camp Stanley, Korea, where he served as S3 of the 6- 37th Field Artillery (MLRS) and S3 of 2nd Infantry Division Artillery. From there, he moved to Seoul, Korea, and served as theater operations officer, CJ3, ROK-US Combined Forces Command. General McKiernan assumed command of Task Force 4-27th Field Artillery, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Baghdad, Iraq, in July 2003 and redeployed with the battalion to Baumholder, Germany, in July 2004. After battalion command, he was assigned as the senior fire support trainer at the Joint Multinational Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany. General McKiernan graduated from the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, in June 2007 and was again assigned to Korea, where commanded the 210th Fires Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division. In July 2009, he deployed again to Baghdad, Iraq, where he served as the chief of staff, U.S. Forces-Iraq J-9.3

2Official Biography, Doc I-1. 3Official Biography; Fires Forward, Jan 12, Doc I-2.

3

Assistant Commandant Colonel Martin C. Clausen was a native of Stuart, Iowa, and a 1987 graduate of Iowa State University. After attending the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, Colonel Clausen’s initial assignment was to 2-75th Field Artillery, 41st Field Artillery Brigade, Hanau, Germany, later designated 3-20th Field Artillery, where he served as Fire Direction Officer, Platoon Leader, Battery Executive Officer, and Battery Commander. Following Operation Desert Storm, Colonel Clausen attended the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course and was assigned to the 1st Infantry Division Artillery, Fort Riley, Kansas, where he served as Field Artillery Intelligence Officer, Commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Division Artillery, and Battalion Fire Support Officer, 1-34th Armor. His next assignment was with Operations Group, the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California where he served as the Artillery Battalion Logistics Trainer, Brigade Fire Support Trainer, and Fire Support After Actions Review Analyst. Following graduation from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, , Kansas, Colonel Clausen was assigned to Fort Hood, Texas, where he served as the Assistant Fire Support Coordinator for the 1st Cavalry Division Tactical Command Post, the Battalion Operations Officer for 2-82nd Field Artillery, the Executive Officer to the Commanding General, III Corps, and the Executive Officer for the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. He left the 1st Cavalry for 12 months to serve as the Fires Coordinator for the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps, 3rd Turkish Corps Headquarters, Istanbul, Turkey. Colonel Clausen returned to the 1st Cavalry Division and the 5th Brigade Combat Team where he served as the Deputy Commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom II. Colonel Clausen commanded 1-82nd Field Artillery, 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, through Operations Iraqi Freedom 06-08 with operations in North Baghdad and Base Defense Operations on Camp Taji. Following battalion command, he was assigned to the National Training Center as the Senior Fire Support Trainer and later as the National Training Center G3. Colonel Clausen completed his brigade level command as the Garrison Commander of Soto Cano Air Base in Honduras, Central America. Colonel Clausen was a graduate of the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course, the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, the Combined Arms Services Staff School, Command and General Staff College, and the War College. His military awards and decorations included the (1 oak leaf), (2 oak leaves), Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (3 oak leaves), Army Commendation Medal (4 oak leaves), Army Achievement Medal (2 oak leaves), National Defense Service Medal, Southwest Asia Service Medal (3 bronze stars), Iraq Campaign medal, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, and Global War on Terrorism Service Medal.4

4Email with atch, subj: Bio and Picture, 30 Nov 12, Doc I-3.

4

Maneuver Center of Excellence Fires Cell Established in 2010, the Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Fires Cell served as an integral link in coordinating activities to support current priorities and emerging initiatives between the MCoE at Fort Benning, Georgia and the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in 2012. Throughout the year, the MCoE Fires Cell focused on maneuver leader fire support training and development through the various officer and noncommissioned officer education system programs of instruction. Additionally, the MCoE Fires Cell supported a collaborative exchange of information between FCoE, MCoE, and other Centers of Excellence (CoE) Capabilities Development Integration Directorates (CDID) and Directorates of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) activities that were key to the development and implantation of several initiatives. These initiatives included Field Artillery officers assigned as Small Group Leaders (SGL) in the Maneuver Captains Career Course (MCCC), Fire Support personnel assigned to the Experimental Force (EXFOR) and integrated Leadership Decision Exercises (LDXs) with Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader’s Course (FABOLC) and MCCC students through virtual simulation and networked CoEs. The MCoE Fires Cell regularly conducted training for U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Forces Command (FORSCOM) units across Fort Benning, Georgia, while continuing to develop new opportunities to train maneuver leaders in precision fires, combined arms operations, and air-ground integration using a digital fires network. This network consisted of organic digital fire support systems, Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED), Forward Observer Software (FOS), and the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), with the Call for Fire Trainer (CFFT) providing a virtual capability for fires cell Instructors to reinforce learning objectives.5 Field Artillery Proponency Office In 2012 the Field Artillery Proponent Office (FAPO) existed to oversee the maintenance of a balanced and sustainable branch of officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers to facilitate the execution of the Field Artillery’s mission. Throughout the year, the FAPO served as the action office for the Field Artillery School Commandant and the Command Sergeant of the Field Artillery. The team executed its mission through direct action in the eight personnel lifecycle functions: structure, acquisition, distribution, sustainment, compensation, professional development, deployment, and transition. Structure. The most significant action of 2012 involved grade plate reductions directed by the Department of the Army. After more than 10 years of combat and force structure adjustments to support combat operations, the Army directed each career military field (CMF) to review and nominate positions to be reduced in grade. The Army provided the Field Artillery with a significant target to achieve. These targets included most senior grade positions for officers, warrant officers and enlisted members of the

5Email with atch, subj: MCOE Fires Cell, 28 Feb 13, Doc I-4; SITREP to CG, 4- 15 Feb 12, Doc I-5; SITREP to CG, 18-24 May 12, Doc I-6; SITREP to CG, 25-31 May 12, Doc I-7; SITREP to CG, 1-7 Jun 12, Doc I-8; SITREP to CG, 25 Jun-6 Jul 12, Doc I- 9; SITREP to CG, 20-31 Aug 12, Doc I-10; SITREP to CG, 1-12 Oct 12, Doc I-11.

5

branch. The grade plate reduction mission was initiated by the FAPO team and was based on average grade distribution matrices, professional development opportunities by military occupational specialty and officer grade, and appropriate career path models. In coordination with the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) Force Design team at Fort Sill, the FAPO team provided appropriate nominations to the Army which met the desired objectives while preserving Field Artillery capability and professional development opportunities. Accession. In 2012 the Field Artillery extended a six-year trend of exceptional recruiting of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and U.S. Military Academy (USMA) cadets. Of the class of 2012, 366 U.S. Military Academy cadets and 952 ROTC cadets listed the Field Artillery as one of their top three choices. The sustained excellence in recruiting provides remarkable encouragement for the future health of the branch. In the recruiting class of 2012 (graduating class of 2013), 47 Distinguished Military Graduates would join the Field Artillery, a number more than two times greater than any previously recorded recruiting class. Also in 2012, warrant officer accession goals were reduced for the second year in a row from 36 to 24 personnel pending the loss (13 brigade combat teams) of Army force structure. Army G-1 efforts to reduce Chief Warrant Officer 4 over-strengths across the cohort impacted the Field Artillery Targeting Warrant Officers significantly during 2012. The Army canceled its previous policy “Extension of Selective Continuation periods for CW4” in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 resulting in a record number two time non-select CW4s in 2012. 131A CW4 strength was reduced in 2012 from 122% to 108% as a result of involuntary retirement or separation. Professional Development. The Field Artillery continued to evolve. To support this process and ensure the branch was postured to support the Army and Joint Forces, a number of professional development activities were initiated by the FAPO office. (1) During the year, FAPO conducted a physical demands review that was the second most significant action of 2012. It reviewed physical demands identified in Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 611-21. By military occupational specialty (MOS) and for the officer and warrant officer cohorts, the FAPO team examined all critical tasks and subsequently identified related physical demands to execute the critical tasks. Beginning in August 2012 and extending through the completion of the year, the FAPO team worked closely with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to edit DA Pamphlet 611-21, to rewrite the MOS specifications for each MOS, and to include the update of the physical demands tables and the supporting physical demands worksheets (DA Form 5643-R). (2) In January 2012, the Army G-1 directed all branch proponents to update their respective branch chapters of DA Pam 600-3. DA Pam 600-3 served as a professional development guide for all officers. It did not prescribe the path of assignments or education requirements that would guarantee success, but rather described the full spectrum of developmental opportunities an officer could expect for a successful career. This document also served as a mentoring tool for leaders at all levels and was an important personnel management guide for assignment officers, proponents, and HQ DA selection board members. Given the objectives of the pamphlet and recognizing lessons learned during the past 10 years of combat operations, the update included a number of significant changes

6

to the Field Artillery chapter. The more significant changes included: (1) The pamphlet placed a greater emphasis on a repetitive education and assignments-based model that developed and sustained field artillery and fire support core competencies and developed knowledge and skills to operate in joint assignments throughout the officer’s career. (2) It stressed “Branch broadening” to grow field artillerymen who were experts across the breadth of the field artillery spectrum. Captains would be assigned to a different system where they served as a lieutenant. Where it was possible, education and assignments outside of typical field artillery or fire support duties should contribute to the development and broadening of the officer’s core skills. (3) The brigade fire support officer was key developmental position; and commanders were encouraged to place their best majors in the position. (4) The only key developmental position for captains was battery command. (5) Lieutenants in brigade combat teams had to serve in both company fire support assignments and at least one assignment in a firing battery. (6) Lieutenants in fires brigades had to serve in more than one duty type to ensure their professional development. (7) Female assignments were clearly articulated. (8) The roles and functions of targeting warrant officers had been updated to include providing technical and tactical expertise in target mensuration and collateral damage estimate. Warrant officers would be given an opportunity to certify in both target mensuration only and collateral damage estimate while attending the Warrant Officer Basic Course and the Warrant Officer Advance Course. 131As would serve as the unit’s precision fires program manager or assistant manager as well as the commander’s subject matter expert on precision fires. Warrant Officer Education Study. On 15 February 15 2012 the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), directed a Warrant Officer-focused study to assess whether learning outcomes and course curricula along the continuum of learning adequately supported Army requirements. FAPO coordinated the study efforts for the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) and the FCoE Warrant Officer Instruction Branch (WOIB) and executed the Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery Schools’ Self-Assessment to develop an understanding of strengths and weaknesses within their respective Warrant Officer Professional Military Education (PME) Schools. FAPO and WOIB identified, validated, and developed recommendations for facilitating PME improvements in 131A Basic and Advance Course instruction programs. The study was completed December 2012. The strategic conclusion of the study determined that Warrant Officer PME was fundamentally and structurally sound. However, significant improvements were needed along the continuum to address gaps as Warrant Officer systems integrator/technical roles continued expanding to meet Army requirements. These expanding roles and responsibilities required warrant officers to exercise greater leadership, mandated an ability to operate and integrate within staff functions at the tactical to strategic level, and necessitated cultural and Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, Multinational (JIIM) environment expertise. The last Army wide Warrant Officer PME study was conducted in July 2002 by the Army Training Leader Development Panel. Additional Skill Identifiers (ASIs). Establishment and management of ASIs was critical to ensure that Field Artillery leaders and Soldiers had the appropriate skills to perform their duties. In 2012 FAPO led efforts to establish or delete a number of

7

additional skill identifiers for the branch. Most significantly, in October 2012 FAPO finalized all efforts to establish an additional skill identifier for Field Artillery officers and Soldiers who worked in the Special Operations community and were Joint Terminal Air Controller (JTAC) qualified. Additionally, ASI H1 was deleted as an official Army additional skill identifier. H1 was formally known as Meteorological Equipment Maintenance. This identifier was provided for positions requiring soldiers trained in the maintenance of field artillery meteorological equipment. Outreach and Engagement. The FAPO office stood at the forefront of outreach and engagement on behalf of the Chief of Field Artillery and the Command Sergeant Major of the Field Artillery. Two of the most notable programs included the Knox, Hamilton and Gruber Awards Program and the Honorary Colonel, Sergeant Major, the Warrant Officer of the Regiment, and the Distinguished Member of the Regiment Programs. In 2012 the Knox, Hamilton, and Gruber award programs of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School promoted, sustained, and recognized excellence within the Field Artillery. Named after the father of American artillery, Henry A. Knox, the Henry A. Knox Award was presented to Bravo Battery, 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery Regiment of the 172nd Infantry Brigade, Schweinfurt, Germany. The Alexander Hamilton Award was named in honor of Alexander Hamilton’s battery that fought in the Continental Army during the American Revolution. This year, Bravo Battery, 2nd Battalion, 218th Field Artillery Regiment of the Oregon Army National Guard was identified as the best National Guard battery. The Edmund L. Gruber Award honored the memory of Edmund L. Gruber who wrote “The Caisson Song” while he was stationed in the Philippines at the beginning of the 20th Century. The 2012 Gruber Award was presented to Sergeant First Class Thomas A. Robinson, Charlie Battery, 1st Battalion, 377th Field Artillery Regiment of Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. In February 2012 the Field Artillery Proponency Office team formally codified the process for Field Artillery across the Army to recognize the contributions of former members of the respective regiments. Established as an official Army program in DA Pamphlet 600-82, the FAPO team operationalized the Army program in an official standard operating procedure for the Field Artillery. Published across the Army in April 2012, the program gained significant popularity across the branch. During 2012, six individuals were recognized as honorary colonels of their respective regiments. Five leaders were designated as honorary sergeants major of the regiment, and 24 individuals were recognized as distinguished members of the various regiments, and three more were recognized as honorary members of the regiment. These recognitions were being tracked on the FAPO tab of the Fires Knowledge Network.6

WOMEN IN THE ARMY AND THE FIELD ARTILLERY

During 2011, the Field Artillery Proponent Office (FAPO) worked two separate but related issues concerning women in the Army. Tasked by the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Raymond T. Odierno, FAPO refined its officer career path for female

6Email with atch, subj: FAPO Annual History, 18 Mar 13, Doc I-12.

8

Field Artillery officers already on active duty during the latter months of the year. Concurrently, FAPO provided recommendations for future accession strategies for female officers.7 Meanwhile, the Department of the Army issued a short suspense to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in November 2011 to review women in the Army (WITA). Specifically, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed an Army analysis into the impact of modifying the Direct Ground Combat Assignment Rule restriction that was adopted on 1 October 1994 because it did not adequately reflect the current operational environment in Iraq and where non-linear warfare persisted. As outlined in 1994, the rule explained that service members were eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they were qualified, except that women would be excluded from assignments to units below the brigade level whose primary mission would be engaging in direct combat on the ground.8 After carefully analysis the Department of the Army announced a significant policy change concerning women in the Army in 2012. Army Directive 2012-16 opened three Field Artillery military occupational specialties to women (13M, Multiple Launch Rocket System Crewmember; 13P, Multiple Launch Rocket System Fire Direction Specialists; and 13R, Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator). Effective 14 May 2012, females could serve in units or positions that were doctrinally required to collocate physically with ground combat units. For female officers, the change in policy permitted them to serve in all duties in a Multiple Launch Rocket System and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System . For the present, duty assignments within brigade combat teams remained closed for positions below brigade headquarters.9

FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL PREPARATION FOR ACCREDITATION

Over the years, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted accreditation visits to its service schools to assure that quality education and training was taking place and to promote improvements. Generally, an experienced team of subject matter experts outside of the school observed, assessed, and evaluated the

7Email, subj: SITREP 11-17 Nov 11, 17 Nov 11, Doc I-14, 2011 USAFAS AH. 8Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, et al, subj: Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, 13 Jan 94, Doc I-15, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP 18-23 Nov 11, Doc I-16, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Women in the Army Assignment Policy, Jul 11, Doc I-17, 2011 USAFAS AH; Congressional Research Service, Women in Combat: Issues for Congress, 8 Nov 11, p. 5, Doc I-18, 2011 USAFAS AH; 1998 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 83-86. 9Fires Forward, Jul 2012, Doc II-13; RedLeg Update, Jul 2012, Doc I-14; Talking Points for St. Barbara Celebrations, Nov 12, Doc I-15; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Army Directive 2012-16, 27 Jun 12, Doc I-16; Fires Forward, Oct 2012, Doc I-17.

9

schools using a set of standards. Normally, TRADOC evaluated its schools every three years to assure the TRADOC commander that they fully met training and education competency requirements across the DOTMLPF (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities) domains.10 In view of this, TRADOC conducted an accreditation visit to the Field Artillery School and the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) in October 2010 to assure quality education and training. That month, a team of subject matter experts from Headquarters TRADOC, the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Deputy Commanding General for Initial Military Training at TRADOC, and the Army Capabilities Integration Center at TRADOC observed, assessed, and evaluated the School and FCoE based upon a set of standards. Specifically, the team examined training, training support, staff processes, and functions across the FCoE, including the Field Artillery School and the Air Defense Artillery School. Overall, the FCoE, the Air Defense Artillery School, the Field Artillery School, and the Noncommissioned Officer Academy were evaluated at the highest level -- “Institutions of Excellence.”11 On 17 May 2011 the Commanding General of TRADOC, General Robert W. Cone, officially notified the Fires Center of Excellence of the accreditation results. On behalf of the U.S. Army, General Cone awarded the Field Artillery School a certificate of accreditation for “Institution of Excellence” based upon the findings of the TRADOC accreditation team. He commended the school for the dedication, hard work, and efforts to maintain strong doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities functions.12 In keeping with the three-year cycle, TRADOC scheduled an accreditation visit to FCoE for October-November 2013. To prepare FCoE developed a comprehensive program involving all organizations and staff elements with the Quality Assurance Office serving as the oversight agency. Each organization and staff element appointed an action officer to monitor and assist the preparation process which included ensuring the accreditation standards were accurately assess during the self-assessment process. Other tasks included producing written self-assessments and developing detailed briefings that outlined each unit’s current status and measures taken to improve. The Quality Assurance Office also established an aggressive timeline in 2013 to prepare the FCoE and the U.S. Army Field Artillery School in particular for the visit. The timeline included in-progress reviews and briefings to the Commanding General of FCoE and the command group on

10Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Accreditation Team Visit and Evaluation of the Fires Center of Excellence, 18-29 Oct 10, Doc I-18; Email with atch, subj: Fires Center of Excellence and Field Artillery School Accreditation 2012, 8 Feb 13, Doc I-19. 11Email with atch, subj: FCoE Accred Overview 29 Sep V4, 6 Jan 11, Doc I-33, 2010 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: FA Commandant’s Huddle, 13 Jan 11, Doc I-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Accreditation, 22 Feb 11, Doc I-35, 2010 USAFAS AH. 12Email with atch, subj: Approved and Signed FAS Accred Results, 8 Jun 11, Doc I-39, 2011 USAFAS AH.

10

the state of preparation.13

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

In recent years the Strategic Communications (STRATCOM) Office in the Field Artillery School assumed greater importance. During 2012, STRATCOM drafted themes, messages, and talking points for dissemination throughout the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery, determined the optimal venue or medium and leader or Soldier to communicate the message to the desired audience, and developed measures of performance to determine the effectiveness of the message and the response of the audience that included Soldiers, both active duty and National Guard, foreign military allies. Specifically, STRATCOM informed Field Artillery Soldiers and leaders about the School’s focus on training, modernization, organization, and the readiness of the Field Artillery, reported about the available assets to the Warfighter, and shared lessons learned. To get the message out, STRATCOM employed the School’s and Field Artillery’s news and social media, such as Facebook that increased from 3,169 to 3,754 followers, the Fort Sill Cannoneer, the Fires Bulletin, and RedLeg Update, Army-wide news and social media, and direct contact with leaders and Soldiers.14 During the year, STRATCOM highlighted many key initiatives. These emphasized the Field Artillery School commandant’s priorities of modernizing gunnery, improving instruction, addressing the survey gap, finding and retaining talent, designing the future force, and providing direction through updated doctrine. STRATCOM also stressed the Field Artillery’s priorities of recruiting and retaining quality Soldiers, leaders, and civilians, growing leaders, supporting the current fight, providing the Army with campaign-quality, expeditionary Field Artillery forces, transforming the force, establishing the Field Artillery School as a learning organization that was fully capable of supporting the force generation requirement, and developing a culture of outreach, communications, collaboration, and coordination.15

WARFIGHTER FORUMS

Advanced information technology led to the inception of the Army’s Warfighters’ Forums. Started late in 2005 at Fort Lewis, Washington, the first Warfighters’ Forum, originally called Stryker University, was developed as a tool to communicate and share information on the new Stryker units being organized. Late in 2006, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), General Charles C. Campbell and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

13Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Accreditation Team Visit and Evaluation of the Fires Center of Excellence, 18-29 Oct 10; Briefing, subj: FCoE 2013 Accreditation Timeline, 18 Dec 12, Doc I-20; Email with atch, subj: Fires Center of Excellence and Field Artillery School Accreditation 2012, 8 Feb 13. 14Email with atch, subj: STRATCOM Input to 2012, 30 Jan 13, Doc I-21. 15Ibid.

11

(TRADOC), General William S. Wallace, witnessed a demonstration of the Stryker University at Fort Lewis. Because of the success of the Stryker University concept, they decided that it would be invaluable to the Army and encouraged adopting it. Following brainstorming sessions at Fort Lewis, the Army subsequently launched a web-based initiative on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) site known as the Warfighters’ Forum to enhance training, readiness, and leader development through collaboration and information sharing among the brigade combat teams and functional and multifunctional brigades.16 Although the concept was away ahead of the technology in 2007, the Army adopted and employed it as a catalyst for streamlining interaction and staff processes between the operating and generating forces. The initiative recognized the imperative of providing a proactive means to promote collaboration, to share ideas, and to find solutions to common problems across the Army and to learn, innovate, decide, and act faster than the nation’s adversaries.17 The Warfighters’ Forum entered its sixth year in 2012. During the year, the Field Artillery School commandant hosted the Armored Brigade Combat Team, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team, and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Field Artillery breakout Warfighting Forum sessions and hosted the Fires Brigade and the Combat Training Center Warfighting Forums in 2012. The School also participated in the Armored Brigade Combat Team, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team, and the Stryker Brigade Combat Team Warfighter Forums. All forums enabled exchanging information across the Army and shared situational awareness of the current operating environment between the operating and generating forces. Topics included: doctrine updates, lessons from fires brigades exercises, precision fires, integration of women into Military Occupational Specialties 13M (MLRS Crewmember), 13P (MLRS Fire Direction Specialist), and 13R (Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator), and others. Other fire support related forums in 2012 included the Division and Corps Fire Support Warfighters’ Forum, the Armor Brigade Combat Team Field Artillery Battalion Warfighters’ Forum, the Infantry Brigade Combat Team Field Artillery Battalion Warfighters’ Forum, and the Stryker’s Brigade Combat Team Field Artillery Battalion Warfighters’ Forum.18

16Email with atch, subj: Warfighter Forums 2012, 17 Dec 12, Doc I-22. 17Email with atch, subj: Warfighter Forums 2012, 17 Dec 12. 18Email with atch, subj: Warfighter Forums 2012, 17 Dec 12; Memorandum for Record, subj: Deputy Assistant Commandant’s Comments on 2012 Annual History, 29 May 2013, Doc I-22a.

CHAPTER TWO LEADER DEVELOPMENT: TRAINING AND EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

During 2012, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School trained Army and Marine Field Artillerymen to meet the needs of the nation’s operational forces. Under Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, the Commandant of the School, the School established leader development for Field Artillery soldiers and Fires units in the operating force as the top priority and focused on developing Field Artillery core competencies and a closer synchronization with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate in the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill, and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine in the FCoE. To train Soldiers and leaders, the School employed institutional training and distance learning and utilized sophisticated training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations to enhance training. The Army National Guard, meanwhile, conducted Field Artillery training using Regional Training Institutes located across the United States as a part of The Army School System.1

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR INITIAL MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION VISIT

In Fiscal Year 2012 (12-14 December 2011), the Deputy Commanding General for Initial Military Training for the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Major General Richard C. Longo, who had served as the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School from 2007-2008, visited the Fires Center of Excellence and the Field Artillery School. He assessed the School’s program of instruction to help refine courses of instruction, the School’s focus on training those skills required for combat, and the School’s incorporation of U.S. Army Learning and Training Concept for 2015 into instruction and reviewed requirements for personnel and equipment. Specifically, he examined resource requirements, programs of instruction, instructional methodologies, instructional priorities, and efforts to improve the quality of instruction for initial military training that included advanced individual training for Soldiers, the Warrant Officer Basic Course, and the Basic Officer Leader Course for second lieutenants. The review provided an opportunity for the School to evaluate its training efforts and to revise programs of instruction as required and proved to be invaluable tool for improving instruction and training. Although the review pointed out some deficiencies, General Longo concluded that the Fires Center of Excellence and the Field Artillery School set the standard for all TRADOC schools and centers.2

1Briefing, subj: FA Commandant’s Priorities, 11 Feb 11, Doc II-1, 2010 USAFAS AH. 2Email, subj: SITREP 24 Nov-1 Dec, 1 Dec 12, Doc II-1, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP 2-8 Dec 11, Doc II-2, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: DCG

13

CULTURAL AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROGRAM

In 2012 the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan restructured the Cultural and Foreign Language Program in the Field Artillery School to focus more directly on supporting warfighter tasks and missions. During the year, the School conducted a Field Artillery branch wide survey on 7-21 February 2012. An analysis requirements and the program was carried out over the following six months with new School Cultural and Foreign Language Program guidance being published on 25 October 2012. The new guidance directed cultural and foreign language training be integrated into military lessons across the School’s courses to assure that students would be trained in skills to operate with Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) partners globally. Work to restructure cultural training in the School began after the publication of the guidance was expected to extend through 2013.3 The Cultural Awareness Seminars during the year focused on working with partner forces and included presentations by Colonel (Retired) Eric Stanhagen from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Captain John Gwinn. The Cultural and Foreign Language Program provided support to TRADOC initiatives, including training support to U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, and Royal Air Force, and cultural analytical support to a III Corps warfighter exercise, the Maneuver Center of Excellence’s Graphic Training Aid (GTA) cultural cards, and TRADOC for developing a new strategy to update the Army Cultural and Foreign Language Strategy (2009).4

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD REGIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTES

Established in the 1990s by Task Force Future Army Schools 21 (FAST-21), the Total Army School System (TASS), a school system comprised of Active Component, ______IMT Results, undated, Doc II-3, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, DOTD, 20 Jan 12, Doc II-4, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: IMT Improvements, Jul 11, Doc II-5, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP 9-15 Dec, 15 Dec 11, Doc II-6, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: DCG IMT Visit in 2012, 4 Feb 13, Doc II-1. 3Email, subj: Cultural and Foreign Language Program, 31 Jan 13, Doc II-2; “USAFAS Culture and Foreign Language Update,” Redleg Update, 12 Dec 12, p. 2, Doc II-3; “Culture and Foreign Language Capability Survey: One Size Does Not Fill All,” Redleg Update, 12 Apr 12, p. 4, Doc II-4; Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery Branch Culture and Foreign Language Capabilities Survey, 19 Mar 12, Doc II-5; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Annex A (Cultural Appropriate Instruction at the U.S. Army Field Artillery School) to the U.S. Army Field Artillery School Culture and Foreign Language Program Guidance, 20 Feb 13, Doc II-6; Memorandum thru Cdr, 428th FAB, Cmdt, Noncommissioned Officer Academy for Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Culture and Foreign Language Guidance, 25 Oct 12, Doc II-7. 4Email, subj: Cultural and Foreign Language Program, 31 Jan 13.

14

Army Reserve, and Army National Guard institutional training systems and renamed The Army School System (TASS) early in the 2000s, played a key role in training the Field Artillery in 2012. During the transition to TASS, Army National Guard State Military Academies converted to Regional Training Institutes (RTI). In 2012, RTIs furnished standardized resident training using The Army Training System Courseware (TATSC).5 Originally, seven regions conducted training in support of units within the specified region. This concept changed to training being conducted at designated RTIs with subject matter experts training only specific courses. During 2012, the five Field Artillery battalions and their nine academically aligned training batteries furnished standardized resident training utilizing TATSC. This courseware was developed in cooperation with Fort Sill. The 14 RTIs were accredited by the Quality Assurance Office at Fort Sill and offered 37 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) courses. The RTIs did not teach Initial Entry Training (IET). Fort Sill handled all IET for 13 series MOS soldiers. The RTIs trained students in Field Artillery MOSs or areas of consideration, special qualification identifier, additional skill identifier or language identifier code, augmented mobile training teams, and implemented multi-phase courses to include MOS Training for MOS reclassification and the Advanced Leader Course and Senior Leader Course for noncommissioned officers. Primarily, these 14 RTIs conducted individual training ranging from Career Management Field 13B (Cannon Crewmember) to 13M (Multiple-Launch Rocket System Crewmember) to 13R (FA Firefinder Radar Operator), and furnished unit training to help the Field Artillery reset mission as required.6

FUNCTIONAL COURSE REVIEW

In July 2011 the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Centers of Excellence (CoEs) submitted specific Army Learning Concept (ALC) 2015 implementation plans to the Combined Arms Center (CAC) that included a holistic review of education and training courses. The review categorized courses, or course content, into what had to be conducted resident; what could be conducted via Mobile Training Team (MTT) or Distributed Learning (DL), and what could be passed to the operational force or eliminated. After reviewing these implementation plans, TRADOC identified inconsistencies in how schools and centers categorized their courses which would warrant further analysis.7 Subsequently in November 2011 the Field Artillery School began preparing for a functional course review at the direction of TRADOC. TRADOC tasked each of its service schools to conduct a holistic review that focused on course content, construct, relevancy, instructional methodology, and course justification by the end of March 2012 and to forward the results to it for review.8 TRADOC also directed all CoEs and Schools

5Email with atch, subj: ARNG Input to 2012 USAFAS AH, 13 Feb 13, Doc II-8 6Ibid. 7Email with atch, subj: Strategies and Integration Division Input, FA School History 2012, 5 Feb 13, Doc II-9. 8Email, subj: FA Commandant SITREP Week of 26-30 Dec 11, 3 Jan 12, Doc II-

15

to re-think the possibilities driven by Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015 implementation and changes required due to resource constraints. This mission analysis would provide the rationale for validating all functional courses offered by the Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery Schools and involved interviewing current Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery School Commandants, commanders of the training units, and instructors at all echelons. The FCoE validated all functional courses for which they were the proponent. It focused not only on content but also more importantly the relevancy to the Army.9 A course by course dialogue followed via Video Teleconference (VTC) in March of 2012 between the FCoE and TRADOC utilizing the following questions regarding each course to drive the discussion: (1) Was this functional course still relevant to the Army? What was the justification? (2)Were critical tasks in this functional course taught in other courses, creating redundancy, and if so, could the course be terminated, migrated, or reduced to generate savings? (3) Was the functional course done in residence or MTT? If so, was it capable of being done by a unit if a current and relevant Training Support package was provided. This could produce savings? What if their instructors could interact with the training developers in advance of the unit administering the course? (4) Was this course capable of being converted from a resident course/MTT construct into a DL or blended (resident/MTT/DL phase combination) construct? (5) Could this course be taught simultaneously in two different methods, such as resident and MTT, while maintaining the same number of iterations and student load? In April 2012 the time had come to once again begin the Functional Training 1-n List for Fiscal Year (FY) 2014. TRADOC and the CoEs aggressively scheduled efforts in order to be able to make key decisions prior to the year of execution. For the FY 2013 list, everyone had input into the Commandant’s Priority, operations relevance, and course type. Most of these did not change, with the possible exception of the proponent Commandant’s Priority. TRADOC established a late June completion for this round. Because this was the third evolution of the 1-n List, the Center understood the process and expectations expected and delivered the list on time.10 For the FY 2014 1-n list, the process started with a re-look at business rules. One of the key areas that Centers were asked to look at was the “Course Ranking Scheme Model,” in which the operations relevance took precedence. The Commanding General of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth; Kansas, Lieutenant General David G. Perkins and the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G3/5/7, Michael D. Formica believed that with our troops coming home, it was possible that some of the precedence reserved for operations relevance could be refocused on some operational support from garrison. The other key change discussed was the addition of the Risk ______7, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP 4-10 Nov, 10 Nov 11, Doc II-8, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP 11-17 Nov, 17 Nov 11, Doc II-9, 2011 USAFAS AH. 9Email with atch, subj: Strategies an Integration Division Input, FA School History 2012, 5 Feb 13, Doc II-10. 10Ibid.

16

Assessment Review Board (RARB) that was recently implemented in the TRADOC 1-n Mission List Prioritization Process. Mr. Formica believed that this process gave credence to the overall risk assessment process and allowed the working group (WG) to make better informed decisions, especially when dealing with risk to TRADOC and to the Army.11 In May 2012 TRADOC released the ranked FY 2014 Functional training 1-n list. This list included a fabricated suspension line. The suspension line was used to have a “best guess” in order to give the field the ability to do risk assessment. This line was based off the man-years allocated last year and fell somewhere in the neighborhood of 50 percent. TRADOC directed each CoE and School to do the following: (1) Check to make sure there were no mistakes in course information. (2) If a course fell below the suspension line, CoEs had to ensure that a valid risk assessment was submitted to CoE/TRADOC G-3/5/7 no later than 25 May 2012). (3) A CoE had to identify a representative to attend the RARB at TRADOC on 30-31 May 2012 and had to notify Mr. Anthony White via e-mail or phone.12 In October of 2012 TRADOC released the initial FY 2015 Functional Training Course 1-n list and timeline. Each CoE had to review the list and ensure that all courses were present. If everything looked good on the list, each CoE had to have its commandant prioritize the list and return it to TRADOC on or before 31 October 2012. For the FY2015 1-n list, the CoEs had to submit the finished list to the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) by 14 January 2013. The ADA and FA Commandants reviewed and prioritized their respective FY 2015 Functional Training Course 1-n list and submitted to TRADOC on 31 October 2012. On 1 November 2012 TRADOC released the updated FY 2015 Functional training Course 1-n list with the commandants’ priorities and the course ranking scheme model leveraged. Each CoE was then required to do the following: (1) Check to make sure there were no mistakes in course information. (2) If a course fell below that suspension line, the CoE had submit a validated risk assessment to the COE/TRADOC G 3/5/7 no later than 9 Nov 2012. (3) The CoE had to identify a representative to attend the RARB at TRADOC on 14-15 November 2012.13

FUNCTIONAL COURSES

Master Gunner Course During 2012, the Field Artillery School conducted a Master Gunners Course. This course was an additional skill identifier A7 producing course of three modules that were progressively sequenced and interdependent with each other. The course focused on an overview of current and future field artillery weapon systems, training management, artillery tables (TC3-09.8), maintenance management, Army Battle Command Systems training and assessing, and developing unit certification programs. The course consisted of 80 hours/10 days of resident training and was taught to Military Occupational

11Ibid. 12Ibid. 13Ibid.

17

Specialties 13B (Cannon Crewmember), 13D (Field Artillery Tactical Data), 13M (Multiple-Launch Rocket System Crewmember), and 13P (Multiple-Launch Rocket System Operations/Fire Direction Specialist).14 Field Artillery Weapons Maintenance Course This course was an additional skill identifier U6 producing course. It covered shop safety, maintenance publications, the Army maintenance management system, maintenance of firing components, fire control equipment, and subsystems of the M119A2 and M777A1 howitzers. The course consisted of 120 hours/15 days of resident and mobile training team instruction.15 Paladin Assignment Oriented Training Course The Field Artillery School conducted the Paladin Assignment Oriented Training Course to familiarize second lieutenants with the Paladin M109A6 self-propelled 155- mm. howitzer and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle system for those with follow-on assignments to mechanized units as a platoon leader, a fire direction officer, and a fire support officer in a mechanized unit following graduation from Basic Officer Leader’s Course B. The course also provided the officer with specialized technical and tactical knowledge required to maintain, operate, and deploy the Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle and the Paladin at section, platoon, and battery levels, to perform crew level maintenance, and supervise the maintenance and operation of the Automatic Fire Control System and associated equipment with the Bradley Fire Support Team vehicle.16 Multiple Launch Rocket System Assignment Oriented Training Course This course trained lieutenants assigned to a Multiple-Launch Rocket System or High Mobility Artillery Rocket System unit after graduating from the Basic Officer Leader Course. It taught the doctrine and tactics of employing the Multiple-Launch Rocket System and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System. Instruction included missions and intents, delivery of fires, reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position, combat service support, safety, use of the safety data calculator, operation orders, pre-combat checks and inspections, and digital communications checks.17 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle Operator Course The course trained soldiers on the operation, employment, and maintenance of the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle and the vehicle’s various weapons systems. The course also provides instruction on safety, tactics, and basic MEP tasks. The Field Artillery

14Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-11. 15Email with atch, subj: Functional Courses, 27 Jan 12, Doc II-65, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13. 16Email, subj: Paladin AOT, 31 Jan 12, Doc II-68, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13. 17Email, subj: MLRS and HIMARS AOT, 31 Jan 12, Doc II-69, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS AOT, 3 Feb 12, Doc II-70, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13.

18

School conducted this course five times during Fiscal Year 2012.18

FIELD ARTILLERY MOBILE TRAINING ASSISTANT TEAM

With help from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, funded two contract mobile training teams -- the Battery and Below Mobile Training Team and the Collective Training Evaluation Team (CTET) -- at the end of 2008 for unit reset training. For reset or retraining in core Field Artillery skills effort, this was a major breakthrough. Through 2008 the School took resources from other activities to fund the mobile training teams. In some instances, the School took mobile training team instructors from the instructional base.19 During 2009-2011, both teams restored fires warfighting skills and field artillery core competencies and furnished invaluable reset training that continued to be a high priority for the Field Artillery School. While the Battery and Below MTT focused on leader training and train-the-trainer instruction covering cannon battery operations, manual gunnery, automated gunnery, and lethal and nonlethal targeting, and tailored its training support to the needs of the requesting unit, the CTET concentrated on collective and leader training on core field artillery skills and tasks at the platoon, battery, and battalion levels. Because of budget cuts, the School merged the two teams in 2011 to form the Field Artillery Mobile Training Assistance Team. In 2012 it provided Fire Support Coordinator instruction in the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course and the following training: Master Gunner Assistance with certification standards training, cannon battery operations, fire direction manual gunnery, and Military Occupational Specialties 13B (Cannon Crewmember), 13D (Field Artillery Tactical Data System Specialist), 13F (Fire Support Specialist), 13M (Multiple Launch Rocket System/High Mobility Artillery Rocket System Crew Member), 13P (Multiple-Launch Rocket System Operational Fire Direction Specialist), and 13R (Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator).20

GAMING

In 2012 the Directorate of Training and Doctrine’s (DOTD) gaming initiative

18ATRRS Course Catalog, Information for Course 250-ASID3, Bradley Fire Support Vehicle Operator, 30 May 13, Doc II-11a. 192008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 31. 202008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 31-32; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 32; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training, 3 Jun 10, Doc II-19, 2010 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training, 3 May 10, Doc II-20, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Chris Atkinson, Executive Officer, 1-30 Field Artillery, 428 FAB, 27 Jan 12, Doc II-72, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, Techwise, Fire Support Coordinator Course Gets Facelift, 6 Apr 12, Doc II-12; Briefing, subj: Maneuver Pre-command Course, 1 Feb 12, Doc II-13.

19

played a key role in training and education in the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) and the Field Artillery School by bringing live, virtual, and constructive training and education to the Fires professional in and beyond the school. Gaming permitted students to immerse themselves in true-to-life scenarios to broaden their experience base and intuitive decision making abilities using the computer.21 For example, the Noncommissioned Officers Academy employed the Army 360 Cultural Awareness trainer to give students a greater appreciation of culture and language on the current conflict in Afghanistan and a greater appreciation of how culture and language understanding influenced the Army’s successes and failures on foreign soils.22

LEADER DECISION EXERCISE

To foster a realistic training environment between future maneuver commanders and fire support officers, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, tasked his subordinates early in 2011 to develop a suitable exercise for Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader’s Course (BOLC) second lieutenants. General Vandal wanted to give them a perspective on integrating fires in a maneuver operation and to establish realism by working with a maneuver officer attending the Maneuver Captain’s Career Course (MCCC) at Fort Benning, Georgia. This led to developing an exercise using the Virtual Battlespace Simulation Two (VBS2) that had been employed by the U.S. Marine Corps since 2008 and the Field Artillery School for a couple of years. VBS2 offered realistic battlefield simulations and the ability to operate land, sea, and air vehicles and could be used to teach doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures during squad and platoon offensive, defensive, and patrolling operations. Also, it was suitable for training small teams in urban tactics, entire combat teams in combined arms operations or even non-military usage such as emergency response procedures in lethal and non-lethal environments or terrain visualization.23

21Interview, Dastrup with Dean Keveles, Operations Officer, DOTD, 23 Jan 12, Doc II-10, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, DOTD, 20 Jan 12, Doc II-11, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Dave Henderson, Dep Dir, DOTD, 17 Jan 12, Doc II-12a, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Mission, 6 Feb 13, Doc II-14. 22Email with atch, subj: Input to 2011 Annual History, 24 Feb 12, Doc II-12, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Keveles, 23 Jan 12; Information Paper, subj: Army 360, undated, Doc II-13, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Danger Close, 23 Jan 12, Doc II-14, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Record, subj: Cultural Awareness 360 Trainer NCOA/DOTD Meetings notes for 5 March 2010, 8 Mar 10, Doc II-15, 2011 USAFAS AH; Danger Close Facilitator’s Guide (Extract), undated, p. 2, Doc II-16, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Leadership for Platoon Leaders and Platoon Sergeants, undated, Doc II-17, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: NCO Academy to 2012 Annual History, 9 Jan 13, Doc II-15. 23Briefing, subj: The Field Artillery, 11 May 11, Doc II-21, 2011 USAFAS AH; White Paper, subj: Virtual Battlespace Simulation Two, 20 Sep 10, p. 5, Doc II-22, 2011

20

During the latter months of 2011, the Field Artillery School conducted two Leadership Development Exercises with the MCCC and the Aviation Center employing VBS2 as part of the Army Learning Concept 2015 that directed integrating gaming platforms into the programs of instruction. The exercises teamed captains from the MCCC and Aviation Captain’s Career Course (ACCC) with Field Artillery BOLC second lieutenants. The MCCC students assumed the roles of company commander, while ACCC captains performed pilot roles and flew rotary wing aircraft during the simulation. BOLC students meanwhile performed company fire support officer duties. Through these collective virtual exercises, maneuver captains and fires officers were exposed to the dynamics of the maneuver commander and fire support officer relationship in planning and executing an operation. The Field Artillery School implemented the exercise into the BOLC program of instruction in January 2012. In fact, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Brian J. McKiernan, that VBS2 was a successful gaming tool and that the exercise was successful.24

ARMY LEARNING MODEL 2015

In December 2009 the Army launched the Army Learning Concept 2015. The concept sought to leverage technology without sacrificing standards so that the Army could provide credible, rigorous, and relevant training and education by making them more tailored and by engaging the learning experience through a career-long continuum of learning that was not location dependent. Basically, Army Learning Model 2015 found the existing Army individual learning model that revolved around three domains of institutional, operational, and self-development to be inadequate and pointed out the requirement to take immediate action to develop the capacity for accelerated learning that extended from the organizational levels of learning to the individual Soldier whose knowledge, skills, and abilities would be tested in the most unforgiving environment. As ______USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP, 30 Jun 11, Doc II-23, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP, 7 Jul 11, Doc II-24, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP, 23 Jun 11, Doc II-25, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Capabilities (Gaming Tools), 21 Mar 12, Doc II-26, 2011 USAFAS AH. 24COL Mike Cabrey, “Distinguished the Unique Profession of Field Artillerymen,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 8-9, Doc II-27, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot Program, 18 Jan 12, Doc II-28, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: SITREP 9-15 Dec, 15 Dec 11, Doc II-29, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot, 28 Oct 11, Doc II-29a, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Implements Army Learning Model in Company Fire Support Officer Training Pilot, undated, Doc II-16; Briefing (Extract), subj: Field Artillery Commandant’s Huddle, 24 Jan 13, Doc II-17; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 13, pp. 14-16, Doc II-18.

21

a representative of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine in the Fires Center of Excellence explained, Army Learning Concept 2015 centered on insuring good training and education for all of the Army’s soldiers.25 For the Field Artillery School in 2011, Army Learning Concept/Model 2015 meant shifting training from an instructor-centric to a learner-centric paradigm in a few short years in its initial military training, professional military courses, and functional courses. This would involve reducing instructor-led PowerPoint lectures, would incorporate virtual and constructive simulations, gaming technology, and other technology-delivered instruction, and would convert most classroom experiences into collaborative problem-solving events led by facilitators who would engage learners to think and understand the relevance and context of what they had learned. Army Learning Concept/Model also would entail more hands-on instruction.26 The Field Artillery School made significant progress toward the transition to ALM 2015 in 2012 with all actions of Phase I implementation either completed or in final refinement. The School’s participation in the ALM 2015 Working Group played a crucial role in the success of the Fires Center of Excellence’s achievements, ensuring collaboration with key players across the Center in the transformation process. The School made major strides in adaptation of instructional delivery through its use of new facilities, such as the Jared Monti Hall simulation center that provided robust, scenario- based simulations to enable full integration of all aspects of Fires. The Center’s investment in an in-house education technology development capability paid major dividends for the School in leveraging computer modeling technology to support both enlisted and officer education through products such as the virtual task trainers for the M119A2, M109A6, and M777A2 weapons systems. The Center’s plan to request $1.1M to support modernization of gunnery instruction was directly linked to ALM 2015 goals and had the potential to revolutionize instructional delivery in this vital discipline.27

25“U.S. Army Launches Army Learning Concept 2015,” Army News, 21 Oct 10, Doc II-10, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Annual Historical Review, 4 Apr 11, Doc II-7, 2010 USAFAS AH; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Version 1.0), The United States Army Learning Concept for 2015, 1 Nov 10, pp. 1-4, Doc II-11, 2010 USAFAS AH; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Extract), The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015, 20 Jan 11, Foreward, p. 23, Doc II-18, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, DOTD, 20 Jan 12, Doc II-11, 2011 USAFAS AH. 26“U.S. Army Launches Army Learning Concept 2015,” Army News, 21 Oct 10, Doc II-10, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Annual Historical Review, 4 Apr 11, Doc II-7, 2010 USAFAS AH; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Version 1.0), The United States Army Learning Concept for 2015, 1 Nov 10, pp. 1-4, Doc II-11, 2010 USAFAS AH; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Extract), The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015, 20 Jan 11, Foreward, pp. 5-9, 23; Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, DOTD, 20 Jan 12, Doc II-19, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Army Learning Model Implementation, 2011; Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Commanding Officer, 428th FAB, 23 Jan 12, Doc II-20, 2011 USAFAS AH. 27Email with atch, subj: Strategies and Integration Division Input, FA School

22

The Field Artillery School collaborated closely with other Center agencies such as Quality Assurance Office (QAO) to develop an improved instructor certification process, better in-house and private-sector education for instructors and training developers, and better methodologies for assessment of training effectiveness. The School supported QAO’s implementation of new ALM 2015-focused training assessment and trending tools that were aligned to evaluate ALM 2015 venues and to provide trends back to instructors, training developers, and unit organization chains of command.28 In addition, the Field Artillery School provided invaluable input into the Center’s Knowledge Management Strategic Plan and collaborated with other Center agencies to work with U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to develop new resourcing models to ensure that the capabilities required for ALM 2015 implementation were supported with programmed resources. Overall, the School was well on its way toward full ALM 2015 implementation.29

MODERNIZING GUNNERY INSTRUCTION

To modernize gunnery instruction the Directorate of Training and Doctrine’s (DOTD) Education Technology Branch outlined an effort in 2012 to teach manual gunnery and ballistic theory. Part of the plan involved collaborating with the Training Brain Operations Center (TBOC) to develop seven scenarios that would demonstrate targeting procedures conducted by forward observers. This required the center to create a Virtual Battle Space 2 (VBS2) model of the new Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR 2H) to be used by virtual forward observers in VBS2. As TBOC worked on building the new model, the Education Technology Branch would create the storyboards.30 The second part of the plan focused on providing experiential learning opportunities on the “process” of gunnery troubleshooting. This effort would provide four scenarios to reinforce the five requirements of accurate predicted fire and provide students with opportunities to hone their troubleshooting skills any time, any place.31

DISTANCE LEARNING

In 2012 the Field Artillery School leveraged information technology to train all Army components effectively and efficiently to a single Total Army standard. For Army National Guard officers and Soldiers, distance learning permitted them to stay at home and train to save costs. Basically, the School’s distance learning program leveraged computers and other information technologies to furnish military occupation specialty ______History 2012, 5 Feb 13, Doc II-19. 28Ibid. 29Email with atch, subj: Strategies and Integration Division Input, FA School History 2012, 5 Feb 13, Doc II-20. 30“Update on Modernizing Gunnery,” RedLeg Update, Apr 13, p. 2, Doc II-20a. 31Ibid.

23

qualification courses, additional skill identifier and skill qualification courses, reclassification courses, officer functional area and branch qualification courses, professional military education courses and functional/educational courses.32

TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATORS, AND SIMULATIONS FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL

In world of constrained budgets and ever-increasing demands on the Soldiers’ duty time in 2012, the Field Artillery had the responsibility of investigating effective and efficient means to sustain core competencies. The Field Artillery School faced the imperative of creating the environment where soldiers felt that they were actually in the field and as a result aggressively pursued simulations/gaming capabilities to enhance the training and educational experience of individuals and units. 33 In 2012 the Field Artillery School conducted the analysis to ensure effective and efficient use of simulation across the three training domains. Training core competencies and closing training gaps remained a key focus of the Field Artillery School. Charting a path forward, the Field Artillery Commandant’s Office published a first draft Live- Virtual-Constructive-Gaming Strategy. Once this document was finalized, leaders, trainers, and training developers would have clear guidance toward a single azimuth of development, procurement, and implementation of Field Artillery simulations. Field Artillery cannon system program managers continued to develop and update training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations (TADSS) for Paladin (M109A6)/Paladin Improvement Management (PIM), M777 and M119 howitzer systems. The Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (FSCATT) upgrade completed phase one and was currently undergoing phase two. Funding was obligated to replace the outdated Paladin Maintenance Trainer with a new system to support current M109A6. PIM would also see a maintenance trainer similar in form and function to the M109A6 trainer. Supporting Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13B (Cannon Crewmember) training, TRADOC Capabilities Manager Brigade Combat Team Fires assisted in the development of the 13B Crew Trainer, a desk-top computer based training system which would eventually provide training for all crew members of all three major howitzer weapon systems.34 Call for Fire Trainer II, Call for Fire Trainer II Plus, and Call for Fire Trainer III During 2012, the Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) contract underwent a “re-compete” with a new vendor being awarded. In order to differentiate those systems built by the new vendor, the nomenclature CFFT III was established. Major functions/operations would remain unchanged. Program Manager (PM) Special Operations Forces (SOF)

32Information Paper, subj: G-3/5/7 Distributive Learning/CRXXI Classroom Request, 14 Jun 12, Doc II-21. 33FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc II-36, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Simulations/Gaming, 21 Mar 12, Doc II-37, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Strategies and Integration Division Input, FA School History 2012, 5 Feb 13, Doc II-22. 34Ibid.

24

Training Systems, Project Executive Office (PEO) Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation (STRI) and TRADOC Capabilities Manager Virtual continued to procure supplemental funding to procure additional modules to complete the fielding of the CFFT II Plus that incorporated the functionality and immersiveness of the technology demonstration/prototype Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System (JFETS) developed by the Fort Sill Fires Battle Laboratory, to upgrade existing CFFT 1:30 systems to CFFT II configuration, and to procure joint close air support Modernization Kits (included a Head-Mounted Display [HMD] and an Infrared Laser Pointer.35

FIELD ARTILLERY LESSONS LEARNED BRANCH

In 2012 the Field Artillery Lessons Learned Branch in the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) actively participated in the collecting, vetting, and disseminating valuable observations, insights and lessons (OIL) from units conducting operations in both the combat as well as the training environments. Personnel facilitated sharing of information during nine unit post-deployment Umbrella Week Collections. These visits provided direct information from units’ first-hand experience in recent theater operations. Additionally, the branch participated in two National Training Center (NTC) Decisive Action (DA) rotations to gather information from units as they transition from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) theater-based training to Department of the Army training readiness.36 The Lesson Learned Branch also actively participated in War Fighter Forums and the Combined Arms Center (CAC) monthly OEF/Army Lessons Learned Forum. The branch attended approximately 36 Quarterly War Fighter Forums, both Corps-led as well as those hosted by the Field Artillery Commandant. The branch helped various Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) agencies and directorates during the monthly Combined Arms Center forum to resolve Army-level issues. Information gained was fully integrated into the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Synch Process as well as in the development of new educational products and course changes. Some of the collected data assisted in making changes in courses, such as the inclusion of the Joint Fires Observer training for some in the Basic Officer Leader Course for second lieutenants as well as additional training of precision fires techniques in the appropriate 13F (Fire support Specialists) classes.37 Lastly, during 2012, the FCoE Lessons Learned Branch made progress providing units with digital means to access and share information. The Field Artillery Lessons Learned webpage, located on Fires Knowledge Network (FKN), had hundreds of files,

35Information Paper, Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation, undated, Doc II-22a; Information Paper, Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation, undated, Doc II-22b. 36Email with atch, subj: Strategic and Integration Division Input, FA School History 2012, 5 Feb 13. 37Ibid.

25

standard operating procedure (SOP) examples, templates, and other documents of interest readily available. The newest effort involved establishing a Fires portal on the Army Lesson Learned Information System (ALLIS). This system allowed units to directly provide observation, insight, and lessons (OILs), standard operating practice examples, articles, or any other critical information in near-real time to Fort Sill. These new data points could drive changes in the DOTMLPF process and were in turn available to all ALLIS members to view the information and progress/status of issues as they are being worked by the appropriate agency.38

ADVANCED INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

During 2012, the Field Artillery School conducted nine advanced individual training (AIT) courses as a part of its initial military training mission. The courses included Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) 13B (Cannon Crewmember), 13D (Fire Control Systems Specialist), 13F (Fire Support Specialist), 13M (Multiple-Launch Rocket System Crewmember), 13P (MLRS Automated Tactical Data System Specialist), 13R (Firefinder Radar Operator), 13T (Field Artillery Meteorological/Survey Crewmember), 94M (Radar Repairer), and 94S (Patriot System Repairer). Each course varied in length from the five-week 13B course to the 33-week 94M course and 94S course and made the Soldier an expert in a specific career field. As a part of the drive to keep each MOS current, the School added more hands-on and field training and more battle drills to give the graduates the capability of contributing to the new unit of assignment, while the 13F AIT student received training on precision devices so that they could provide accurate targeting.39

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Background On 5 February 1959 Fort Sill established the Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer Academy. The first pilot course began in April 1959 with the first 22 students graduating in May 1959. The first expansion of the program of instruction came in 1963 with the development of the Leadership Preparation Course which was a two-week course on leadership. By 1971, the Academy had responsibility for the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, the Leadership Preparation School, the Instructor Training Course, and the Drill Sergeant School. Because of its diverse missions, the Academy underwent a name change to the Fort Sill Institute. In March 1973 Command Sergeant Major Clifford L. Lewis became the first enlisted commandant of the Institute. In October 1975 the Institute started the Primary Noncommissioned Officer Course for Combat Arms. In

38Ibid. 39428 FAB Information Paper, subj: AIT, 15 Jan 13, Doc II-24; Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 11 Dec 12, Doc II-25; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 27 Apr 12, Doc II-26.

26

May 1977, the Institute only taught noncommissioned officer courses, and the Institute's name changed to the Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer Career Development Center.40 Overview for 2012 In 2012, the Fires Noncommissioned Officer Academy continued improving and refining its efforts to produce tactically and technically proficient noncommissioned officers. Continuing efforts centered on implementing Army Learning Model (ALM) 2015 as outlined in TRADOC Pam 525-8-2, the U.S. Army Learning Concept 2015 (ALC 2015), of 6 June 2011. ALM met the Army’s need to develop adaptive, thinking Soldiers and leaders who were capable of meeting the challenges encountered in an era of persistent conflict. ALM 2015 also described a learning continuum that meshed together self-development, institutional instruction, and operational experience.41 To this end, Noncommissioned Officer Academy and the Fires Center of Excellences’ (FCoE) Directorate of Training and Doctrine collaborated to develop five achievable objectives to meet the intended outcomes of the various Army concepts. The Noncommissioned Officer Academy derived all objectives from mutually supporting documents -- The Army Training Concept 2016-2020, The Army Learning Concept 2015, and The Army Functional Concept for fires 2016-2028.42 Objective one involved producing leaders who were subject matter experts in their core and functional competencies, were critical thinkers and effective communicators who embraced leadership attributes outlined in ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership, the Army Leadership Requirements Model, and were confident operators in decisive actions.43 Objective two integrated operational variables into all Advance Leader Course (ALC) and Senior Leader Course (SLC) programs of instruction. Students had to consider all operational variables, political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time variables. Students also had to understand how culture and foreign language application in the region of operation would positively influence their and the force’s presence to the local noncombatants.44 Objective three focused on developing rigorous “closed book tests that measured levels of learning” for all ALC, SLC, and Electronic Warfare (EW) courses. In keeping with the Army Learning Concept 2015, Noncommissioned Officer Academy instructors facilitated learning by using software that was built upon outcomes based training and education. In cooperation with the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) Quality Assurance Office and FCoE Directorate of Training and Doctrine, the Academy transformed how it

40“Sill Begins Leadership Program,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 6 Dec 63, p. 6, Doc II- 27, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: History of Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer Academy, 25 Jan 10, Doc II-28, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, sub: NCOA Input to 2011 Annual History, 14 Feb 12, Doc II-45, 2011 USAFAS AH. 41Email with etch, sub: NCOA Input to 2012 Annual History, 9 Jan 13, Doc II- 27. 42Ibid. 43Ibid. 44Ibid.

27

presented Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery Professional Military Education and how it assessed student’s knowledge. They developed tests measuring levels of knowledge rather than merely knowing where to access the information could.45 Objective four centered on Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) Professional Military Education (PME). In the face of vigorously advancing technologies across the Fires force, re-developing, maintaining, and retaining hands-on, lock-step traditional field artillery and air defense artillery skills were more relevant and critical to know. Knowing when and what button to push was irrelevant when global positioning systems and power supplies to systems failed. The Academy’s NCOs had to transition between technologically advancing processes and proven old school doctrine and tactics, techniques and procedures equally, expertly, effortlessly and comfortably.46 Objective five directed the Noncommissioned Officer Academy to embrace and support the Fires Center. Key to the Fires Center was providing a fires curriculum that was the right content and that provided instruction and training at the right time and the right place to the Army, joint partners, interagency partners, and international partners. Foundational to the concept was excellence in training and education and support of life-long learning.47 Noncommissioned Officer Education System During 2012 the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) provided noncommissioned officers with progressive and sequential leader and technical and tactical training relevant to the duties, responsibilities, and missions that they would perform in operational units after graduation. The training and education process began with an initial, branch-immaterial, leadership development course followed by a basic, branch-specific course, an advanced branch-specific course, and a branch-immaterial senior course.48 Supporting lifelong learning, the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy oversaw the Structured Self Development Program (SSD). SSD linked the operational, self-development, and institutional training domains. SSD participation was mandatory for all Soldiers beginning with Advanced Individual Training (AIT) graduation, Soldiers were automatically enrolled in SSD level I upon graduation from AIT and had successfully complete four modules comprising 34 lessons that focused on team-level leadership to become eligible for Warrior Leader Course Attendance (WLC). Upon graduation of the WLC, Soldiers were automatically enrolled in SSD level II referred to as Advanced Leader Course-Common Core (ALC-CC) and had to complete successfully five modules comprising 28 lessons that focused on squad level leadership. Soldiers were be automatically enrolled and had to complete ALC-CC to become eligible for selection to attend ALC. ALC graduates were automatically enrolled in SSD level III, and Senior Leadership Course (SLC) graduates were automatically enrolled in SSD level IV. Successful completion of levels III and IV was a prerequisite to attending the Senior

45Ibid. 46Ibid. 47Ibid. 48Ibid.

28

Leader Course (SLC) and Sergeants Major Course (SMC), respectively. Sergeants Major and Command Sergeants Major were automatically enrolled in SMC and had to complete SSD level V upon completing the SMC.49 Warrior Leader Course The Warrior Leader Course (WLC) served as the first of four courses in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System. It helped specialists, sergeants, and staff sergeants develop basic leadership skills, knowledge, and behaviors required to become agile and adaptive leaders. WLC was a branch-immaterial 22-day course that provided basic training in leadership, training, and war fighting. WLC also provided Soldiers with the opportunity to acquire the leader skills, knowledge, and experience necessary to lead team-level (three to five soldiers) units. The scope of tasks and competencies that WLC addressed furnished both the team and squad-level perspective, where appropriate, and built upon experience gained in previous training and operational assignments. Each WLC student had to complete successfully a land navigation course and were assessed on small unit leadership during a culminating 72-hour Situational Training Exercise. WLC focused on establishing self-discipline and instilling professional ethics and taught leading, disciplining, developing Soldiers, planning, executing, and evaluating individual and team training, planning and executing missions and tasks assigned to team-size units, and caring for Soldiers and their families.50 Advanced Leader Course The Advanced Leader Course (ALC) served as the second of four courses in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System. It developed promotable sergeants and staff sergeants to train and lead Soldiers at the section and platoon levels. ALC curriculum included requirements for two essay papers -- one essay on branch history and one essay on cultural awareness. These essays filled the requirements for military history research and developed a better understanding of culture and foreign language. Further supporting the Army Culture and Foreign Language Program, ALC included cultural discussions in the classroom using talking points from the Army 360 Cultural Training Program. ALC fully integrated resiliency training into each of the eight Fires ALC courses and furnished demanding, realistic, and relevant leader and military occupational specialty specific training that instilled section, squad, and platoon sergeant level leadership competencies so that section and platoon sergeants could perform their missions. Increasing demands for accurate targeting and use of tactical precision munitions in Iraq and Afghanistan led to the inclusion of 40 hours of precision fires training in the 13F30 Fire Support Sergeant Course. Also in 2012, TRADOC approved the Field Artillery School Commandant’s request for an exception to policy for the 13R ALC course to exceed eight weeks and to grow to 10 weeks in length. This course growth was necessary to ensure noncommissioned officers (NCOs) received adequate basic electronics theory and systems troubleshooting to support Q-36 radar operations. Live fire exercises (LFX) were a culminating requirement for 13B Cannon Section Chief, 13D Field Artillery Tactical Data System Specialist, 13M Multiple-Launch Rocket

49Ibid. 50Ibid.

29

System (MLRS) Section Chief, and 13P MLRS Operations/Fire Direction Specialist courses. To fulfill live-fire requirements the Noncommissioned Officer Academy possessed two M270A1s (Multiple-Launch Rocket System launchers), two M142A1s (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers), two M777 towed 155mm. howitzers, two M109A6 self-propelled 155-mm. howitzers, and two M119A3 towed 105-mm. howitzers, and support vehicles.51 Senior Leader Course The Senior Leader Course (SLC) served as the third of four courses in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System. It developed promotable staff sergeants and sergeants first class to serve as a senior noncommissioned officer in a platoon or battery level leadership team. SLC curriculum included two essay papers -- one essay on battle analysis methodology and one essay on cultural awareness. Increasing demands for accurate targeting and the use of tactical precision munitions in Iraq and Afghanistan led to the inclusion of 120 hours of precision fires training in the 13F40 Fire Support Senior Sergeant Course. Similar to ALC course length increase, TRADOC approved the Field Artillery School Commandant’s request for an exception to policy for the 13R SLC course to grow from eight weeks and to 10 weeks in length. This course growth was necessary to ensure NCOs received adequate basic electronics theory and systems troubleshooting to support Q37 radar operations.52 The NCO Academy achieved a milestone in October 2012 when in collaboration with the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, that was the proponent for Electronic Warfare (EW) and the Fires Center of Excellence Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) that oversaw the initial pilot Senior Leader Course for 29E40 Electronic Warfare Specialist. Seventeen noncommissioned officers successfully completed the pilot SLC and graduated on 14 December 2012. With the inclusion of EW SLC, the NCO Academy now conducted Air Defense Artillery, Field Artillery and Electronic Warfare proponent Enlisted Professional Military Education (EPME) courses.53

WARRANT OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Warrant Officer Basic Course During 2012, the Field Artillery School conducted a 30-week Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) for 131A Field Artillery Warrant Officers that focused at brigade and below operations. In three phases (targeting, Firefinder radar operations, and Firefinder radar maintenance) that focused on Radar platoon leader operations, WOBC included survey techniques, targeting methodology, target acquisition systems employment, and principles and application of fire support to include 120 hours of precision targeting.54

51Ibid. 52Ibid. 53Ibid. 54Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb

30

Warrant Officer Advance Course The 12-week Warrant Officer Advance Course (WOAC) prepared 131A Field Artillery Warrant Officers with the advanced concepts of Army and joint doctrine, familiarized them with the duties of a senior staff officer at division, corps, echelons above corps, made them proficient with the Army targeting process, and included a module on precision fires for target mensuration, collateral damage estimation, and weaponeering, among other things, so that the graduates would know how to request and employ precision guided, air-to-surface and surface-to-surface ballistic munitions during combat.55

OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM

Basic Officer Leader Courses In 2012 Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) A and BOLC B formed a two-tier training process for newly commissioned second lieutenants. BOLC A involved pre- commissioning training at the United States Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in American colleges and universities, Officer Candidate School (OCS) at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Army National Guard Officer Candidate Schools. BOLC A was literally the fundamental building block for all officers within the Army Officer Education System. Following graduation from BOLC A, newly commissioned second lieutenants attended BOLC B.56 Basic Officer Leader Course B Through BOLC B’s program of instruction, the School produced officers who were trained in warrior tasks and warrior battle drills. They were also competent, confident, and adaptable officers who were grounded in the military occupational specialties, were able to conduct full-spectrum operations, were capable of contributing immediately to their new units of assignment, and were able to execute lethal and non- lethal fires.57 During the year, the School conducted eight BOLC B classes of 18 weeks and 4 days each. Presented in three blocks of instruction (platoon leader, fire support, and fire direction), BOLC B developed and refined basic skills needed by second lieutenants with training centering on light/towed artillery systems (M777A2 and M119A2) to qualify them as a field artillery platoon leader, a company fire support officer, or fire direction officer and included three weeks of common core tasks, such as basic rifle ______13, Doc II-28; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 27 Apr 12. 55Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-29; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 27 Apr 12, Doc II-30. 56Information Paper, subj: FA Basic Officer Leader Course B, undated, Doc II- 31; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-32. 57Information Paper, subj: FA Basic Officer Leader Course B, undated; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 27 Apr 12; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS History, 19 Feb 13.

31

marksmanship, land navigation, small unit operations, leading a tactical convoy, and resiliency training, among others. Resiliency training focused on suicide prevention, thriving in adversity, and other topics, while training on precision devices prepared them to furnish accurate targeting at their first unit of assignment. The four-day Red Leg War served as the capstone training event and gave the second lieutenants the opportunity to serve on a gun line and in a fire direction center and to serve as a fire support officer and platoon leader.58 Because of lessons learned from Afghanistan and the requirement for more joint fires observer qualified officers, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, introduced an initiative in mid-2011 to add joint fires observer training in the school. This included developing an online joint fires observer course of 20 hours for all second lieutenants and integrating an overview of joint fires observer training to BOLC B during fire support training. The School wanted BOLC B graduates assigned to a brigade combat team to be joint fires observer qualified to meet the demand in the operational forces. The School incorporated these changes with BOLC B 7-11 that graduated on 10 January 2012.59 Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course In 2012 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) conducted six two- phase Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course (FACCC) classes. New for 2012 all instruction was conducted in small groups led by a small group leader (SGL) from the U.S. Army the U.S. Marine Corps, or allied officer from Australia or Canada. Captains and senior first lieutenants went through a rigorous 24-week FACCC that afforded them the last branch-specific training in their career and staff training. The officers received the equivalent of five weeks of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) common core instruction, four weeks of gunnery, advanced fire direction officer responsibilities, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and weapons training, and 14 weeks for tactical and staff instruction, including training on the military decision making process from the maneuver battalion perspective. This instruction provided situational-based practical exercises on field artillery core competencies and other learning methodologies to develop agile and adaptive leaders for

58Information Paper, subj: Field Artillery Basic Officer Leader Course B, undated; Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 27 Apr 12; Interview, Dastrup with Mike Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 11 Dec 12, Doc II-33; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13. 59Sharon McBride, “Joint Fires Observer: Shouldn’t be ‘on the job’ Training,” Fires Bulletin, Nov-Oct 11, pp. 20-23, Doc II-57, 2011 Annual History; Briefing, subj: BOLC Brief to CG, 21 Apr 11, Doc II-58, 2011 Annual History; Email, subj: SITREP, 7 Jul 11, Doc II-58, 2011 Annual History; Interview, Dastrup with COL Gary Hisle, Dir, Joint and Combined Integration Directorate, 12 Jan 12, Doc II-59, 2011 Annual History; MAJ Elijah M. Ward, CPT Fred A. Janoe, CAPT Thomas F. Hicks, and CAPT Richard W. Heaser, “Modern Men of Mars: The Evolution of Junior Fire Supporters,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 36-41, Doc II-60, 2011 USAFAS Annual History; Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-32.

32

the full-spectrum battlefield who were technically proficient to serve as a battery commander, a battalion/brigade fire support officer, a field artillery battalion fire direction officer, and a battalion/brigade/brigade combat team staff officer. Instruction also trained them to coordinate lethal and non-lethal fires and effects at the battalion level with an emphasis on lethal effects and included employing precision munitions, fire support coordinator tasks and responsibilities.60 In effort to meet the requirements of an expeditionary force, the School of Advanced Leadership and Tactics (SALT), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, designed a Mid- Grade Learning Continuum for 2015 (MLC 2015) for the Captain’s Career Course. MLC 2015 revolved around a tailored, student-centered, life-long learning continuum that would shift away from the current resident instruction model. MLC 2015 would establish a system of resident and self-development opportunities that would close the training gap while designating a common core of decisive action skills. Upon implementation, MLC 2015 would establish a culture of life-long learning among officers. As a critical part of MLC 2015, the common core curriculum would be integrated into all branch Captain Career Courses across the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and would designed by SALT with pilot common core curriculum being conducted by TRADOC’s service schools. For the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, this involved executing a multi-branch pilot with Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery officers between 6 November 2012 and 25 January 2013.61 The pilot changed the seven-week common core portion of the career course. The existing career course focused on getting the students to a knowledge comprehension level of learning. In comparison, the pilot centered on learning information and then applying it in scenarios and departed from the emphasis on repetition to developing thinking skills.62 Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Reserve Component During the first decade of the 21st century, the Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course for the Reserve Component (FACCC-RC) went through significant changes. Prior to 2001, it consisted of a series of Army Correspondence Course Program sub- courses followed by a two-week resident phase. The Field Artillery School offered the resident phase approximately three times a year, usually in the summer months, and conducted it in the standard platform instruction format of two weeks of PowerPoint presentations and a final examination. In 2001 the School adopted an internet-based distance learning format for the non-resident phase of FACCC-RC. Twelve computer- based learning modules replaced the existing correspondence program texts. At the same time the two-week resident phase was converted to the small group instruction format. While there had been many updates to the resident portion of the course over the past eight years, the original computer modules for phase one were still used in 2008.63

60Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Input to USAFAS Annual History, 19 Feb 13, Doc II-34. 61“Captains Career Course Pilot Underway,” Redleg Update, Jan 13, Doc II-35. 62“Captains Career Course Pilot Underway,” Redleg Update, Jan 13; SITREP to CG, 3-14 Sep 12, Doc II-36. 63Memorandum for MG Peter M. Vangjel, subj: Overview of FACCC-RC, 24

33

Meanwhile, the Army and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) expressed concern that the Officer Education System for captains, including Reserve Component captains, did not meet the demands of an Army at war and that Active and Reserve Components’ training had be standardized so that both received the same training. These issues prompted the Commanding General of TRADOC to publish Operations Order 04-176A in May 2004 that called for the Reserve Component to redesign, develop, pilot, and implement a non-resident version of the Captain’s Career Course no later than 1 October 2006. This order required an FACCC-RC of two, two- week active duty training periods of 120 hours each with inactive duty training periods between the active duty training periods.64 Upon obtaining the necessary resourcing, the Deputy Assistant Commandant for the National Guard at the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery School redesigned FACCC-RC in 2008 based upon the 2004 directions and implemented it in 2009. In mid- 2008 two options for training Reserve Component captains existed. The captain could attend the resident Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course of 24 weeks. In most cases, reserve captains could not take off six months from civilian employment to attend the course, while states also lacked funds to send them to the resident course. This basically left the second option of taking the newly redesigned (2004 model), four-phase Reserve Component-Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course as the more viable option. The School initiated the four-phase FACCC-RC in 2010.65 In 2012 the Field Artillery Captains’ Career Course (FACCC-RC) consisted of four phases for Field Artillery officers in the U.S. Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserves who were unable to attend the resident course. The Field Artillery School built the FACCC-RC around the 13-month model. Once the student started the course, the individual should be able to complete it in 13 months. Phase one (online, self-paced with instructor access) was asynchronous. Students had five or more months to finish the online modules. Once this was completed, they moved into phase two. It was a two- week resident session at Fort Sill. Phase three then followed. This asynchronous phase was Field Artillery specific. Successful completion of this five or more month online ______Oct 08, Doc II-66, 2008 USAFACFS ACH. 64Memorandum for MG Peter M. Vangjel, subj: Overview of FACCC-RC, 24 Oct 08; Annex A to Operations Order 04-176A, Doc II-67, 2008 USAFACFS ACH. 652008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 45-46; Memorandum for Record, subj: Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Reserve Component, 5 Mar 10, Doc II-68, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); COL Robert W. Roshell and LTC Lawrence M. Terranova, “Education for ARNG FA Officers and NCOs,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 09, pp. 30-34, Doc II-69, 2009 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Assistant Commandant, USAFAS, subj: USAFAS Course Redesign Initiative: Field Artillery Captain-Level Critical Task List, 3 Apr 07, Doc II-70, 2009 USAFAS AH; CPT Bronson M. Sapp, Battery Executive Officer, FACCC, “The Reserve Component Captain’s Career Course,” unpublished paper, undated, Doc II-71, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FACCC-RC Input to 2010 Annual History, 11 Feb 11, Doc II-56, 2010 USAFAS AH.

34

phase permitted students to move into phase four that was the second two-week session at Fort Sill.66 Intermediate Level Education The Fires in Support of Combined Arms Maneuver/Wide Area Security (CAM/WAS) conducted the sixth and seventh iterations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) in 2012. Over the last three years, the course prepared fire support officers to be the subject matter expert (SME) in their staff sections. This five-day course ensured that officers were prepared for school, no matter what positions they served in prior to attending. This course has evolved over time, and now was seminar-based in 2012 with groups of 13 to 15 officers per instructor.67 The instruction team consisted of contracted retired Field Artillery officers in the rank of or above. In addition to the contractors, serving battalion commanders spent the entire week with each group of students. These SMEs provided the students with a wealth of knowledge based on their experiences as a Field Artillery officer and serving battalion commander. The course also invited a multitude of different agencies (depending on the rotation and availability) to join the students throughout the week. For example, the course has had small group leaders, Electronic Warfare officers, U.S. Air Force tactical air control post experts, a Counter Rocket and Mortar SMEs, and a video teleconference with the combat training centers and several other agencies participate throughout the week. Of vital importance was the last day of the class when students spent four hours with a current or former battalion commander and asked questions concerning any range of topics. During the last rotation in January 2013, the Army Joint Support Team from Hurlburt Airfield, Florida, sent a lieutenant colonel and a Department of the Army civilian to show the latest procedures for Air-Ground Integration.68 The Field Artillery School also coordinated with TRADOC Capabilities Manager Fires Cell to provide a team of personnel to participate in the course and to demonstrate the fire support thread (Personal Forward Entry Devise, Forward Observer System, and the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System). This enabled the students to see the systems in action and the effectiveness of the fire support system when utilized properly.69 Students finally spoke with either the Commandant or the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School in a two-hour seminar. The seminar provided Fort Sill leadership an opportunity to inform the students of current and future ventures, but it mostly facilitated interaction with the students and allowed them to ask questions and voice concerns they have.70

66Information Paper, subj: FACCC-RC, 2013, Doc II-37. 67Email with atch, subj: ILE Input to 2012 USAFAS Annual History, 5 Feb 12, Doc II-38. 68Ibid. 69Ibid. 70Ibid.

35

Pre-command Course In 2012 the Field Artillery School reduced its Pre-Command Course from three to two weeks during the last months of the year by eliminating fire support coordinator training. Like their subordinate officers, lieutenant colonels’ and colonels’ traditional field artillery skills and tasks had deteriorated in recent years by conducting non-standard missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). Besides restoring lost competencies necessary to train, develop, and lead fires battalions, the course built new competencies in precision targeting, tactical information operations, electronic warfare, and lethal and non-lethal fires. Ultimately, the course developed leaders with the ability to synchronize lethal and nonlethal fires in contemporary military operations.71

JOINT AND COMBINED INTEGRATION DIRECTORATE

During 2012, the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) synchronized joint fires activities for the Army on behalf of the Commanding General, Fire Center of Excellence (FCoE). With increasing emphasis on joint operations, JACI prepared, reviewed, and coordinated across the Joint Staff, Component Commands, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Forces Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the Fort Sill. It also managed the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course, the Joint Fires Observer Course, and the Electronic Warfare Course, coordinated for Air Force participation in joint training and exercises, and coordinated live air support activities to Fort Sill, to include a multi-national exercise. JACI also was the proponent for the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) and ensured that the Foreign Liaison Officers were providing their expertise to the Field Artillery School.72 JACI’s Joint Integration Division continued to lead the action officer work groups in operational staff talks with the Joint force and represented the FCoE and the Army on behalf of the JACI Director. JACI represented the Army on the Joint Fire Support and Joint Close Air Support Action Officer Working Groups with the JACI Director acting as the O-6 representative and the CG FCoE as the Army principal to the Joint Fires Executive Steering Committee (JFS ESC).73 In 2012, the JFS ESC completed revision of the Joint Fires Support and Joint Close Air Support Action Plans; revised the Joint Tactical Air Coordinator Agreement; and the Joint Fires Observer Memorandums of Agreement. JACI had the lead for the Army for introduction and development of the Joint Air Ground Integration Cell (JAGIC), a staff organization that arranged current staff from the Division Fires Cell and the Air Force Air Support Operations Center to clear airspace for fires more rapidly. JACI continued to coordinate Battlefield Coordination Detachment and Ground Liaison

71428 FAB Information Paper, subj: USAFAS PCC, 15 Jan 13, Doc II-39. 72Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-40. 73Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13; Memorandum for CG, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence, subj: Designation as Army Service Representative on the Joint Fire Support Executive Steering Committee, 7 Jul 09, Doc II-41.

36

Detachment issues for the Field Artillery Commandant. In 2012 JACI’s Joint Integration Division in conjunction with the (ACC) continued preparing each Active Component (AC) Army division with the alignment of one Air Support Operations Center (ASOC). The 25th Infantry Division and the 2nd Infantry Division completed their alignment in Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 with the 25th Air Support Operations Squadron (ASOS) and 5th ASOS respectively.74 Precision Fires Courses In Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, the Army acknowledged that it lacked the ability to mensurate coordinates for the employment of coordinate seeking munitions. At the time the Army relied upon the Air Force to derive mensurated coordinates. Generally, it took up to twenty-four hours from the time that the target information reached the Air Force until it came back to the Army for engaging. Pushing to reduce the turn around-time, the 75th Field Artillery Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division developed a process in 2005-2006 to mensurate coordinates using Rainstorm, a National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency validated tool. This reduced turnaround time to minutes. In the meantime, Special Operations Forces employed Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF) tool for mensuration. This tool was not validated by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency until 2009. The 1st Cavalry Division was the first Army unit to apply the mensuration process in combat without the assistance of outside agencies.75 Precision fires represented a critical requirement in the operating environment of the 21st Century. With the strategic risk associated with unnecessary or unwarranted injury and death of non-combatants, precision fires had to be employed effectively. The accurate employment of ballistic and precision munitions would reduce the risk of collateral damage, making coordinate mensuration critical.76 However, a capability gap still existed. The Army lacked institutional training for target coordinate mensuration, weaponeering or the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or non-lethal weapon required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, and collateral damage estimation. Such training would reduce target location error for conventional munitions and would be required for the employment of organic coordinate seeking munitions while mitigating collateral damage. With this in mind, the Joint and Combined Integration (JACI) Directorate in the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill assumed the lead for developing a precision fires program that encompassed institutional training for target coordinate mensuration,

74Personal account: LTC Anthony Gonzales and Alexander GS12, Integration Division FCoE, Feb, 2013, in Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13. 75Interview, Dastrup with CW3 Thomas Taccia, JACI, 23 Feb 11, Doc II-63, 2010 USAFAS Annual History (AH); Email with atch, subj: Precision Fires Course Input to 2010 Annual History, 4 Mar 11, Doc II-64, 2010 USAFAS AH. 76Information Paper, subj: The Maneuver Commander’s most versatile and lethal weapon system, “The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” undated, Doc II-73, 2011 USAFAS AH.

37

weaponeering, and collateral damage estimation in 2008.77 After creating a working group in June 2009 that developed a mission essential task list, among other things, and developing a concept plan and a capability needs statement over the next several months, the JACI implemented a precision fires program in September 2010. This program trained fire supporters to conduct target coordinate mensuration, weaponeering, and collateral damage estimation through three venues. The first venue provided primary military education for 13F forward observers, 131A targeting warrant officers, and 13A fire support officers to enable operational units that conducted fire support activities to employ indirect fires accurately and effectively while achieving first-round target effects and mitigating collateral damage. The second venue, a functional course, trained 13F forward observers and 131A warrant officers who had not receive this training in their primary military education, while mobile training teams, the third venue, furnished unit training. Instructor training and certification took place during the last three months of 2010. In 2011 the JACI employed these three venues to furnish training. The collateral damage estimation course trained 260 students, while the target mensuration only course trained 400. In the meantime, JACI integrated collateral damage estimation, target mensuration only, and weaponeering into warrant officer education and the 13F (Fire Support Specialist) senior leader course.78 Complementing these courses, the Targeting Division in JACI received formal recognition of its expertise in targeting. First, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency accredited the Target Coordinate Mensuration Certification Program. Second, the Joint Targeting School accredited the Collateral Damage Estimation Program. With these two accreditations in place, the Army had the ability to certify its Soldiers to use Army and joint precision weapons and conduct collateral damage estimation.79 In late 2011, MG David D. Halverson, FCoE CG, decided to instruct PF in several PME courses, recognizing the need to expand precision fires instruction. As a result, the FCoE introduced precision fires courses in the Warrant Officer Instruction Branch (WOIB) and the Noncommissioned Officers Academy (NCOA). The WOIB added Target Mensuration Only (TMO) and weaponeering to the Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) and TMO to the Warrant Officer Advance Course (WOAC) while both courses maintained Collateral Damage Estimation (CDE) instruction. Meantime, the NCOA

77Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2010, Doc II-65, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Program, Oct 10, Doc II-66, 2010 USAFAS AH. 78Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Course 2010, Doc II-74, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: The Maneuver Commander’s Most Versatile and Lethal Weapon System, The Trained and Equipped Forward Observer,” 2011; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2010, Doc II-65, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Program, Oct 10, Doc II-66, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Taccia, 23 Feb 11, Doc II-63, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Courses, 10 Feb 12, Doc II-75, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Precision Fires Courses Input to 2011 Annual History, 28 Feb 12, Doc II-76, 2011 USAFAS AH. 79Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13.

38

integrated Target TMO into the Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F (Fire Support Specialist) Advance Leader Course (ALC) and MOS 13F Senior leader Course (SLC) added Weaponeering and CDE to MOS 13F Senior Leader Course.80 Precision Fires Resident and Mobile Training Teams (MTT) continued to bridge the gap for those soldiers who did not have the opportunity to receive training or certification through Professional Military Education. Precision Fires Course (PFC) Instructors conducted 33 resident and 45 MTT and supported 29 NCOA classes for a total of 117 weeks of precision fires instruction within the United States, Germany, Italy, and Korea. Overall, the PFC instructors trained/certified 867 in TMO, trained 392 in Weaponeering, and certified 392 in CDE.81 A JACI achieved a major victory when the PFC instructors trained and certified the V Corps Headquarters. V Corps was the first Army-led unit to deploy into theater to conduct Weaponeering and CDE within the Joint Forces Targeting Operations Center (JFTOC). V Corps soldiers training consisted of various military occupational specialties to include Field Artillery, Imagery Analyst and Legal Experts.82 As the requests for training continued to grow, the JACI Targeting Division had to develop a course of action to increase the number of trained personnel while still maintaining the ability to support resident and MTT’s. After a series of meetings, Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, Field Artillery School Commandant, made the decision to transfer the TMO and Weaponeering instructor responsibility to WOIB and NCOA which allowed the PFC instructors to maintain the instruction for the resident and MTT courses.83 PFC instructors trained and certified six instructors from WOIB and NCOA, allowing the Warrant Officer Instruction Branch and the NCOA to certify students in TMO and train students in Weaponeering. Additionally, the Targeting Division sought out assistance from the Field Artillery Commandants Office to market the Unit Precision Fires Program where certain soldiers would have the opportunity to become certified TMO instructors. This initiative provided units with the ability to certify soldiers on TMO while additionally providing the certified analyst a means for maintaining currency. Several units, to include the National Training Center, were currently developing Unit Precision Fires Programs to maintain flexibility.84 As the Army’s lead, the Targeting Division played a vital role in developing future collateral damage estimation procedures in creating split collateral effects radii (CER) tables for surface to surface ballistics munitions (SSBM). The change in the tables provided commanders an improved estimate of the collateral damage, in most cases a lower collateral damage call, allowing them the authority to employ surface to surface

80Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13; Personal account: CW5 Robert Tisdale, Precision Fires Division, FCoE, Feb, 13, in Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13. 81Ibid. 82Ibid. 83Ibid. 84Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13; “TMO: Maintaining Certification is a Must for Precision Munitions,” RedLeg Update, Dec 12, Doc II-42.

39

ballistic munitions against targets that they would not normally have the authority to engage with the old tables. The Targeting Division participated in gaining the approval from the Joint Staff to retest students who did not receive a certifying score on the initial CDE examination. Without a retest the students who failed to certify would be sent back to their units instead of being retrained and retested while they were still at the schoolhouse. The uncertified student would have to ask the unit for travel money to attend the next course costing the Army twice for course attendance.85 Target Mensuration Only and Collateral Damage Estimation and Weaponeering Courses In an environment where collateral damage might have operational or strategic implications, the Army required fires delivery with pinpoint accuracy. The development of precision munitions allowed commanders at all levels to achieve the desired effects on a target with the minimal number of munitions and minimal collateral damage. As the precision required have grown, the requirement for Soldiers with the necessary skills to employ precision munitions also grew.86 In 2012 the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence served as functional manager for the Target Mensuration Only and Collateral Damage Estimation and Weaponeering Courses. Fort Sill conducted resident and mobile training team Target Mensuration Only courses to train and certify personnel assigned to fire support and targeting cells to conduct target mensuration only through a National Geospatial Intelligence Agency accredited training certification program. Those attending the course included staff personnel who provided support to the targeting process as well as personnel that delivered coordinate seeking munitions, such as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System munition and the Excalibur. The program consisted of target coordinate mensuration certification and program accreditation using Digital Precision Strike Suite, Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Forces, and Precision Fires Image software.87 In resident and mobile training team formats, the Collateral Damage Estimation and Weaponeering Course trained and certified personnel assigned to fire support and targeting cells advising a supported ground commander to conduct collateral damage estimation and to support the effective employment of joint and organic fire support assets.88 Joint Fires Observer Course Prompted by the 4th Infantry Division’s inability to access joint fires because of the shortages of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) and Army modularization that exacerbated the shortage, the Air Force and Army created the Joint Fires Observer (JFO).

85Personal account: CW5 Robert Tisdale, Precision Fires Division, FCoE, Feb 13, in Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13. 86Fact Sheet, subj: TMO: Maintaining Certification is a Must for Precision Munitions, 30 May 13, Doc II-43. 87Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Target Mensuration Only Course, 30 May 13, Doc II-44. 88Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Collateral Damage Estimation Course, 30 May 13, Doc II-45.

40

Although the Air Force planned to increase the number of JTACs in sufficient numbers to have one at the maneuver company by 2012 by training more at (AFB), the Army envisioned using the JFO at the maneuver platoon level as the eyes of the JTAC in the field. Recognizing that the JFO course conducted by the 57th Operations Group at Nellis AFB could not produce sufficient numbers of JFOs to satisfy its requirements, the Army decided to train its own. As agreed upon by the Air Force and Army, Fort Sill developed a JFO course. Following a successful pilot course conducted by the Joint and Combined Integration (JACI) Directorate at Fort Sill in September 2005 using resources from the 138th Fighter Wing of the Oklahoma Army National Guard, the Army and Air Force signed a memorandum of agreement on 14 November 2005 to support the Fort Sill course. Thus, two JFO schools existed -- one at Nellis AFB and one at Fort Sill in 2005. Two years later in 2007, Nellis AFB stopped its JFO course after graduating 183. This caused Fort Sill to increase its capacity to train JFOs over the next three years employing resident and mobile training to accomplish that.89 In 2011 instructors from the Army, Air Force, 138th Fighter Wing, Detachment 1, 6th Combat Training Squadron (CTS), JTAC guest instructors, and contract instructors from Northrop Grumman and the FSCX company taught 18 JFO resident courses at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and 24 JFO mobile training team courses at select installations, including two in Germany. These courses provided training to integrate joint fires and produced 731 certified JFOs. Following graduation, most deployed to either Afghanistan or Iraq where they put their newly acquired skills to work by integrating close air support, close combat attack (rotary wing aviation), surface-to-surface fires, and other joint missions. As the year drew to a close, the course transitioned from an Army-led course following

89FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 19, Doc II-67, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Governor’s Report 2010, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-68, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Air Force 2010, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-69, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with LtCol Rustan S. Schwichtenberg, Cdr, 138th Combat Training Flight, JACI, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-70, 2010 USAFAS AH; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 48; Information Paper, subj: JFO Course Information, 1 Dec 05, Doc II-100, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email, subj: JFOs, 10 Jan 06, Doc II-101, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, and the U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, and the United States Special Operations Command, Director, Operations Support Group for Joint Fires Observer, 14 Nov 05, Doc II-102, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations and Training, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, 13 Oct 05, Doc II-103, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email, subj: JFO Information, 10 Jan 06, Doc II-103a, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email, subj: Number of JTACs required, 10 Jan 06, Doc II-104, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Commander’s Statement - FY06 TRADOC Budget Guidance, undated, Doc II-105, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email with atch, subj: JFO and 138th Flight Input to 2010 Annual History, 28 Feb 11, Doc II-71, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atch, Dastrup with LTC Michael A. Todd, JACI, 10 Feb 12, Doc II-77, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JFO in 2011, 16 Feb 12, Doc II-78, USAFAS AH.

41

six years under the helm of the Air Force.90 Because of lessons learned from Afghanistan and the requirement for more joint fires observer qualified officers, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal, meanwhile, introduced an initiative in April 2011 to add joint fires observer training to the school. This included developing an online joint fires observer course, integrating an overview of joint fires observer training in BOLC B for Field Artillery second lieutenants, and providing assignment oriented training following graduation from BOLC B for second lieutenants assigned to a brigade combat team. The School wanted every BOLC B graduate assigned to a brigade combat team to be joint fires observer qualified to meet the demand in the operational forces. The joint fires observer assignment oriented training began in January 2012 with BOLC B 7-11 and complemented the joint fires observer course for Military Occupational Specialty 13F (Forward Observer) or fire support specialists, company fire support officers, noncommissioned officers, platoon forward observers, combat observation lasing teams, and members of scout/reconnaissance organizations.91 In addition to BOLC assignment oriented training, the JFO course introduced a capstone exercise in March 2012 for resident and BOLC courses that enabled students to exercise their JFO knowledge during a rigorous multi-phased scenario-based simulation at Monti Hall simulation room, Ft Sill, Oklahoma. In 2012 instructors from the Army, Air Force, 138th Fighter Wing, Detachment 1, 6th Combat Training Squadron (CTS), JTAC guest instructors, and contract instructors from Northrop Grumman and FSCX taught 16 JFO resident and 14 BOLC AOT courses at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and 28 JFO mobile training team (MTT) courses at select FORSCOM installations. These courses produced 1,093 certified JFOs and greatly enhanced the Brigade Combat Teams ability to train with and interoperate with Division Air Support Operations Squadrons (ASOS) and their JTACs. Following graduation from the JFO course, many JFOs deployed to Afghanistan where they put their newly acquired skills to work by integrating close air support, close combat attack (rotary wing aviation), surface-to-surface fires, and other joint missions.92 Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course In 2012 the two-week Joint Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC) was one of the premier joint courses offered by the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill. Resident

90Interview with atch, Dastrup with Todd, 10 Feb 12, Doc II-77, 2011 Annual History; Email with atch, subj: JFO in 2011, 16 Feb 12, Doc II-78, 2011 Annual History; Information Paper, subj: JFO Information Paper, 30 Nov 11, Doc II-79, 2011 Annual History; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, U.S. Army Field Artillery, 12 Mar 11, Doc II-80, 2011 USAFAS AH; Fires Forward, Mar 11, Doc II-81, 2011 USAFAS AH. 91Email, subj: Joint Fires Observer Course and Joint Fires Observer Team, 2 Mar 12, Doc II-82, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JFO in 2011, 16 Feb 12, Doc- 78, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: FA BOLC B Course POI Review, 2011, Doc II- 83, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: BOLC/JFO Integration, 2011, Doc II-84, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-46. 92Email, subj: Fires Chief, 20 Jan 13, Doc II-47.

42

training, mobile training, and tailored executive sessions were executed during the year. JOFEC provided instruction to joint fires and effects team members from all services, coalition forces, and other government agencies. JOFEC trained and educated students on joint and service fires capabilities, platforms, operational environment doctrine, and the joint targeting process, trained how the joint fires and effects system operated, and prepared students to function effectively at the joint/operational level in a full spectrum of military operations. Students demonstrated their knowledge through practical exercises where they applied the principles of joint lethal and non-lethal fires and effects. JOFEC was also a part of the core curriculum for the Field Artillery School’s Warrant Officer Advanced Course.93 Joint Fires Observer Team In 2012 the Joint Fires Observer team represented the Fires Center of Excellence (FCOE) and the Joint and Combined Integration (JACI) Directorate in many significant ways. It provided assistance for three Joint Forces Command accreditation team visits to the -Europe Air Ground Operations School (USAFE AGOS) JFO School, Expeditionary Warfare Training Group-Pacific (EWTGPAC) USMC JFO School, and to the Hungary JTAC School. The JFO team participated in a US- Singaporean combined exercise, “Exercise Daring Warrior 2012,” utilizing JTACs and JFOs along with Singaporean Army observers, performing numerous close air support and joint fires missions. The JFO NCOIC participated on a Fires Assessment team in Afghanistan in August of 2012 in which five BCTs were observed, gathering critical data on JFO employment. The team additionally participated in the Joint Close Air Support (JCAS) Symposium in May 2012 in which the new JFO Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) began development. The JFO team also provided JFO briefs and demonstrations to senior representatives from Israel, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Canada, Fort Sill Department of Resource Management, TRADOC Army Learning Model team, and the Accenture manpower survey team.94 In December 2012, the JFO staff capped a successful year by memorializing the JFO classroom building, Building 2895, in honor of SFC Kristoffer Domeji. SFC Domeji was one of the first JFO graduates from Fort Sill and was an Army JTAC with the 75th Ranger Regiment which had deployed 14 times to Afghanistan. The memorial for SFC Domeji proved to be a huge success for Fort Sill, OK, and more importantly, honored his memory and his family.95

932009 USAFAS AH, pp. 49-50; Briefing, subj: JOFEC, 12 Jan 2010, Doc II-73, 2010 USAFAS AH; Fact Sheet, subj: JOFEC, 29 Dec 10, Doc II-74, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: JOFEC Input to 2010 Annual History, 18 Feb 11, Doc II-75, 2010 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course, 2013, Doc II- 47a; Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-48. 94Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-48. 95Lawton Constitution Journal, “The Fires Spirit”, 18 Dec 12, in Email with atch, subj: Source Documents for Joint Fires Observer, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-49.

43

NON-LETHAL TRAINING

Electronic Warfare Courses Early in the twenty-first century, the Army renewed its interest in electronic warfare as a part of information-age warfare. On 30 October 2003 the Department of Defense concluded that electronic warfare capabilities had to be improved to meet advances in the application and the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to deny adversarial situational awareness, to disrupt command and control, and to develop targeting solutions to defeat weapons while protecting the United States’ electronic capabilities from being successfully attacked. Initially, the Army’s Military Intelligence branch oversaw electronic warfare as part of its intelligence collection activities. However, improvised electronic devices (IED) employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom to attack U.S ground forces prompted the Army to shift electronic warfare from Military Intelligence to the Field Artillery and to stress its operational capability to jam radio signals that denoted the IED rather than its collection responsibilities.96 This transfer generated action. On 15 May 2004, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) designated the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the specified proponent for electronic warfare in the Army and tasked CAC to identify requirements. Later on 23 November 2004, the CAC commander, Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, directed the Commander of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), renamed U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) late in 2005, to take the lead for the Army’s electronic warfare attack for brigade, division, and corps and for doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements. Working with CAC, USAFACFS developed a plan early in 2005 to revitalize electronic warfare within the Army, to establish roles and responsibilities for electronic warfare functions, to update electronic warfare DOTMLPF, and to design, develop, and execute a course of instruction for electronic warfare that eventually led to development of the Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course.97

96Email with atch, subj: FA Vision and Transformation, 4 Apr 06, Doc III-12, 2005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), Annual Command History (ACH); Briefing, subj: Electronic Attack Mission Analysis Brief, 23 Feb 05, Doc III-13, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Field Manual 34-45, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Electronic Attack (Extract), Jun 2000, Chapter One, Doc III-14, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006, Doc II- 77, 2010 USAFAS AH. 97Briefing, subj: Electronic Attack Mission Analysis Brief, 23 Feb 05, Doc II-64, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Field Manual 34-45, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Electronic Attack (Extract), Jun 2000, Chapter One; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006, Doc II-77, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC James J. Looney, EW-JACI, 19 Jan 12, Doc II-85, 2011 USAFAS AH.

44

Meanwhile, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter W. Chiarelli, strengthened the Army’s operational electronic warfare capabilities. He placed Navy electronic warfare officers with ground combat units to manage the electromagnetic spectrum. Later in May 2006, he directed the Army G-3 to establish electronic warfare as an enduring core warfighting competency within the Army and specifically directed the G-3 to develop an electronic warfare force structure and operational concepts to strengthen the Army’s strategic vision and support the ground force component commander. This would enhance the Army’s ability to counter electronic threats proactively and permit integrating kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities across the Army and to mitigate the threat of electromagnetic spectrum being employed by America’s enemies, such as IEDs that had been so deadly in the War of Terrorism.98 To meet the immediate requirement for Army electronic warfare personnel and guidance by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and the Fires Center of Excellence developed two electronic warfare courses in 2006 under the direction of CAC. The Intelligence School developed a Tactical Electronic Warfare Practioneers Course that awarded an additional skill identifier (ASI) 1K and focused on countering radio-controlled improvised explosive devices. Meanwhile, the Fires Center of Excellence conducted a pilot Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course (AOEWC) in October 2006 and January 2007 to train electronic warfare officers to plan, integrate, synchronize, and execute electronic warfare according to the commander’s scheme of maneuver. This six-week course awarded an ASI 1J and served as a foundation course for electronic warfare.99 AOEWC served as a bridging strategy until an electronic warfare force structure

98Fact Sheet, subj: Electronic Warfare Career Field, 14 Jan 10, Doc II-78, 2010 USAFAS AH; “Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability,” Army News Service, 7 Dec 06, Doc II-79, 2010 USAFAS AH; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006, Doc II-77, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC James J. Looney, EW-DOTD, 14 Feb 11, Doc II-80, 2010 USAFAS AH; “New Career Field: Electronic Warfare,” Army News Service, 6 Feb 09, Doc II-81, 2010 USAFAS AH; Shirley Dismuke, “Electronic Warfare: The Newest Military Career Field Choice,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 64-66, Doc II-86, 2011 USAFAS AH. 99Email, subj: EW MOS for Enlisted Soldiers and EW Functional Area for Officers, 23 Feb 07, Doc II-67, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Briefing, subj: Army Electronic Warfare, 4 Jan 07, Doc II-68, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Interview, Dastrup with Alvin W. Peterson, Jr., Northrup Grumman, EW Course Developer, 23 Feb 07, Doc II-66, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Fact Sheet, subj: Electronic Warfare Career Field, 14 Jan 10, Doc II- 78, 2010 USAFAS AH; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006, Doc II-77, 2010 USAFAS AH; “Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability,” Army News Service, 7 Dec 06, Doc II-79, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Electronic Operational Warfare Course, 10 Mar 09, Doc II-117, 2009 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH; Briefing, subj: Fort Sill EW Courses, 2011, Doc II-87, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Electronic Warfare Input to 2011 Annual History, 1 Mar 12, Doc II-88, 2011 USAFAS AH.

45

could be stood up. In preparation for the force structure, CAC directed the Fires Center of Excellence in August 2008 to develop an electronic warfare officer functional course, an electronic warfare integrator course for warrant officers, and an electronic warfare integrator course for enlisted personnel. This would permit the Army to field its own electronic warfare personnel to replace those provided by the Air Force and Navy.100 On 1 March 2009 the Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) for Noncommissioned Officers and Warrant Officers was approved awarding MOS 29E- Electronic Warfare Specialist to graduates of the Electronic Warfare Specialist Course; and MOS 290A-Electronic Warfare Targeting Technician to graduates of the Electronic Warfare Targeting Technician Basic Course.101 In 2011 the Fires Center of Excellence taught four electronic warfare courses to satisfy training requirements for Functional Area 29 for officers, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 290A for warrant officers, MOS 29E for enlisted soldiers, and AOEWC. While AOEWC provided an ASI 1J to furnish deploying units with battalion and brigade electronic warfare personnel, the Functional Area 29 course trained officers during the year to serve as Army electronic warfare officers from the brigade to Army Service Component command level. The course also provided the education and training in the essential core skills necessary to perform electronic warfare functions in support of the commander’s concept of the operations. The course emphasized Army and joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare electronic warfare officers to participate in electronic warfare operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in a variety of Army and joint organizations. Meanwhile, the Electronic Warfare Warrant Officer Technician (MOS 290A) trained warrant officers to serve as electronic warfare integrators, and the Electronic Warfare Sergeant Noncommissioned Officer Course (MOS 29E) prepared enlisted soldiers to serve as Army electronic warfare specialists.102 Meanwhile, the Army transferred responsibility for electronic warfare from the

100Interview, Dastrup with Looney, 14 Feb 11, Doc II-80, 2010 USAFAS AH; CAC OPORD 08-231a Electronic Warfare Roles and Responsibilities, 18 Aug 08, Doc II-82, 2010 USAFAS AH. 101MILPER Message 09-088, Title: FY10 Warrant Officer Military Occupational Classification and Structure (MOCS) Personnel Reclassification Actions, 22 Apr 09, Doc II-50; MILPER Message 09-089, Title: FY 10 Enlisted Military Occupational Classification and Structure (MOCS) Personnel Reclassification Actions, 22 Apr 09, Doc II-51. 102Information Paper, subj: FA 29 Officers Course, 18 Jan 12, Doc II-89, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: EW Warrant Officer Course, 18 Jan 12, Doc II- 90, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Electronic Warfare Specialist 29E, 18 Jan 12, Doc II-91, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: AOEWC Operational Course (1J), 18 Jan 12, Doc II-92, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Fort Sill EW Courses, 2011; Memorandum for Record, subj: FY11 EW Courses, 19 Jan 12, Doc II-93, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Electronic Warfare Input to Annual History, 1 Mar 12, Doc II-94, 2011 USAFAS AH; U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Information Paper, subj: Electronic Warfare Proponent Office, 16 Aug 12, Doc II-52.

46

fires warfighting function to the mission command warfighting function in 2011 as part of its Army Doctrine 2015 effort. This function developed and integrated those activities that enabled the commander to balance the art of command and the science of control. The four primary staff tasks under the mission command warfighting function included conducting the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess), conducting knowledge management and information management, conducting information and influence activities, and conducting cyber electromagnetic activities that included electronic warfare.103 In 2011 the Fires Center of Excellence taught four electronic warfare courses to satisfy training requirements for Functional Area 29 for officers, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 290A for warrant officers, MOS 29E for enlisted soldiers, and AOEWC. While AOEWC provided an ASI 1J to furnish deploying units with battalion and brigade electronic warfare personnel, the Functional Area 29 course trained officers during the year to serve as Army electronic warfare officers from the brigade to Army Service Component command level. The course also provided the education and training in the essential core skills necessary to perform electronic warfare functions in support of the commander’s concept of the operations. The course emphasized Army and joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare electronic warfare officers to participate in electronic warfare operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in a variety of Army and joint organizations. Meanwhile, the Electronic Warfare Warrant Officer Technician (MOS 290A) trained warrant officers to serve as electronic warfare integrators, and the Electronic Warfare Sergeant Noncommissioned Officer Course (MOS 29E) prepared enlisted soldiers to serve as Army electronic warfare specialists.104 Additionally in October 2011, the Institute of Heraldry authorized for wear the Collar Insignia for Electronic Warfare by MOS 290A Electronic Warfare Technicians and MOS 29E Electronic Warfare Noncommissioned Officers. The symbolism of the device is: Black and Gold are the colors of Electronic Warfare. Black represents the mission to blind and confuse enemies, thereby denying access to sensitive data. Black is also the color of the raven, alluding to Electronic Warfare personnel who served during World War II and were referred to as “Ravens.” Gold signifies the task of maintaining dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum, an asset of inestimable value. The shield symbolizes the unconditional commitment to protect warfighters, information, and

103Interview, Dastrup with Looney, 19 Jan 12; Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, p. 13; Email, subj: Electronic Warfare Input to Annual History, 1 Mar 12. 104Information Paper, subj: FA 29 Officers Course, 18 Jan 12, Doc II-89, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: EW Warrant Officer Course, 18 Jan 12, Doc II- 90, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Electronic Warfare Specialist 29E, 18 Jan 12, Doc II-91, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: AOEWC Operational Course (1J), 18 Jan 12, Doc II-92, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Fort Sill EW Courses, 2011; Memorandum for Record, subj: FY11 EW Courses, 19 Jan 12, Doc II-93, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Electronic Warfare Input to Annual History, 1 Mar 12, Doc II-94, 2011 USAFAS AH; U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Information Paper, subj: Electronic Warfare Proponent Office, 16 Aug 12.

47

equipment from danger and harm. The lightning bolt and its three sharp bends represent the intent to rapidly, decisively, and precisely strike at the adversary in an electronic attack. The key and its “E, W” shaped ward denote the dual parted mission of unlocking access to knowledge of the adversary and the safekeeping of friendly capabilities and knowledge. The three knobs on the bow of the key denote the warrant officers, enlisted servicemen and women, and the entire Electronic Warfare team that proudly serve in the United States Army.105 In 2012 the U.S. Army Electronic Warfare School taught three electronic warfare courses to satisfy training requirements for Functional Area 29 for officers, two courses to satisfy Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 290A for warrant officers, eight courses to satisfy MOS 29E for enlisted soldiers, and 7 courses to satisfy AOEWC.106 Special Technical Operations Course Based on lessons learned from past and current operations, the Army acknowledged a need for an enduring capability to incorporate Special Technical Operations (STO) training within the Army. The Army developed the US. Army Special Technical Operations Course (USASTOPC) in 2005 to fill a critical training gap. Since its inception in 2006, the USASTOPC continued to see increased attendance. The Army assessed that the force required additional information to fully leverage STO capabilities.107 On 27 July 2010 the Army tasked the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to institutionalize STO in order to establish it as an enduring capability within the Army. In turn, TRADOC tasked the FCoE to provide the facilities and training oversight. The Army further stipulated that a STO facility would be established at the FCoE. FCoE submitted a concept plan that received Army approval in April 2012. The concept plan received Army validation for four Department of the Army Civilian (DAC) requirements for the FCoE.108 On 27 July 2010, the Army tasked TRADOC to institutionalize STO in order to establish STO as an enduring capability within the Army. Directed by the Army, TRADOC would further develop the DOTMLPF mission conducted by the Army and take a holistic approach to institutionalizing STO at TRADOC. Since STO has grown throughout the Army, the transfer of DOTMLPF activities from the Army to TRADOC was appropriate. Key to this effort was effective leader development, TRADOC’s number one priority. TRADOC would further develop key aspects of training, education, and experience by establishing a more integrated and functioning STO presence at key

105Memorandum for Record, subj: Collar Insignia for Electronic Warfare (EW), 26 Oct 11, Doc II-53. 106Personal account: LTC Steven Oatman, Director, Electronic Warfare School, FCoE, Feb, 13, in Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-54. 107Email with atch, subj: Source Documents for Special Technical Operations, 7 Mar 13, Doc II-55. 108Email with atch, subj: Source Documents for Special Technical Operations, 7 Mar 13; Memorandum for Cdr, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, subj: Special Technical Operations Concept Plan, 26 Apr 12, Doc II-56.

48

institutions.109 Given that the Joint and Combined Directorate (JACI) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma trained Army, Joint, and Coalition commanders and staff on the coordination, integration and synchronization of lethal and non-lethal fires and effects, it was only natural for TRADOC to task JACI with the STO mission. The Army provided funding to FCoE to build a STO facility in which the resident STO planner’s course instruction will be conducted.110 Tactical Information Operations Course With information operations growing in importance as attested by Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and other recent operations in complex societies with no central authority and many different ethnic groups, political identities, and religious groups, information operations assumed greater importance, especially at the tactical level. Tasked by the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) took the lead for information operations training for the brigade and below by designing a three-week Tactical Information Operations Course. The School assigned the 30th Field Artillery Regiment, reflagged as the 428th Field Artillery Brigade on 7 December 2006, to head course development.111 In 2012 the Field Artillery School completed the fifth full year of teaching the three-week Tactical Information Operations Course. It taught resident and mobile training team courses. Both formats trained officers and noncommissioned officers, including students from the Active and Reserve Components and other military services, to perform as members of an information cell at the brigade combat team and lower and gave them a working knowledge of tactical information operations integration. The course also taught students how to analyze the informational environment, to execute information operations in a complex environment, and to assess the results and provided a practical exercise to validate the students’ learning.112

109Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13. 110Email with atch, subj: JACI History, 7 Mar 13. 1112006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 2, 3, 35; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 55. 1122008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 55-56; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 52; Fact Sheet, subj: Tactical Information Operations Course, 29 Dec 10, Doc II-89, 2010 USAFAS AH; Army Training Requirements and Resources System, Information for Course 9E-SI/ASIP4/950/ASIP-4, FY 2011, Doc II-95; Briefing (Extract), subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 11 Apr 11, Doc II-96, 2011 USAFAS AH; ATRRS Catalog, 1 Apr 13, Doc II-57.

CHAPTER THREE COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS: FORCE DESIGN, DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS

INTRODUCTION

During the 2012, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School worked to make the Field Artillery more lethal, deployable, mobile, and responsive to meet the current and future operational environment and to be a vital part of the joint forces team. This involved participating in force design and doctrine, introducing new fire support systems, and testing new concepts.

FORCE DESIGN AND DOCTRINE

Grade Plate Review Over the past 10 years, the Army’s Grade Structure grew significantly more senior. This imposed pressure on the Army to fill requirements, to sustain a balanced force, and to afford the cost of the force. Since 2003, grade growth in brigade combat team design, senior headquarters, and Joint, Defense, and specialized capabilities occurred at the expense of operating units at battalion level and below. Increased grade requirements adversely impacted the potential health of the future force by reducing selectivity, competition, and forcing earlier promotions. Cost comparisons indicated an increase of more than $1.9B could be attributable to grade growth. The Army began addressing these grade plate challenges in the 2011 Officer Grade Plate Review. During this phase, Fires Grade Plate adjustments eliminated 25 and rolled down 86 active component positions. The Army still needed to do more to mitigate grade growth in field grade, warrant officer, and noncommissioned officer authorizations.1 Consequently in 2012, the Army continued reviewing warrant officer and enlisted grade plates. Fires Center of Excellence’s methodology identified field grade officers (O4-O6), senior chief warrant officers (W3-W4), and senior noncommissioned officers (E6-E9) positions within Standard Requirements Code (SRC) 06 (Field Artillery Organizations) and SRC 44 (Air Defense Artillery organizations) that could be rolled down to enable the Army to achieve a viable, sustainable, and acceptable grade plate pyramid while maintaining operational force capabilities within an acceptable level of risk. On 28 April 2012 Chief of Staff of the Army reviewed and approved moving forward on officer, warrant officer, and enlisted grade plate changes. Total number of positions to be approved were 18,500 (officer/warrant officer/enlisted). In phase two Fires Grade Plate adjustments would be rolled down an additional active component positions.2

1Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-1; “ARCIC FDD Leads Recent Officer Grade Plate Review,” www.army.mil, 5 Apr 11, Doc III-2. 2Email with atch, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2012-2013, Army 2020

50

Army 2020 Redesign Late in 2011, the Army initiated Army 2020 and directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to design the Army of 2020 with the capabilities required to support the Joint Force and to posture the Army to succeed in an era of constrained resources. The course of action reduced Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) from 73 to 60 while adding a third maneuver battalion to the Armored BCT and the Infantry BCT. This prompted changes to the Field Artillery force structure: (1) a 3x6 composite fires battalion for the Infantry BCT (two M119A2 batteries and one M777A2 battery, (2) a third field artillery battalion for the Armored BCT, (3) a firing platoon fire direction cell to support distributed operations for two-gun pairs in Infantry BCT, and (4) an executive officer position at the firing battery in all BCTs. The changes also added one 13D40 Field Artillery Tactical Data fires control noncommissioned officer and one 13D10 Field Artillery Tactical Data fires control specialist to the battery fire direction cell, a fifth crew member for all BCT Q-53 Radars, a Chief Warrant Officer 3 as targeting warrant officer to the Stryker BCT fires cell (eliminated during 2008 BCT holistic review), and a Colt capability in the all BCT reconnaissance squadrons. Also, the Infantry BCT reconnaissance squadron platoon forward observer would be equipped with M1200 Colt equipment package. The platoon forward observer could be re-missioned to perform Combat Observation and Lasing Team (COLT) functions when required. In addition, the dual mission Company Fire Support Team (FIST) in Heavy BCT and Stryker BCT could perform COLT functions when required.3 The redesign also standardized BCTs target acquisition with two Q-53 Radar Systems and four Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar sections, reorganized BCTs fire support personnel into the fires battalion, and retained the current Air Defense Airspace Management (ADAM) cell capability in all formations.4 As a part of the Army 2020 effort a new Sustainment Concept of Support was developed to address known capability/capacity gaps based on Army 2020 initiatives to better support the BCT, maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB), fires brigade (FiB), and other functional/multi-functional units operating in the Division Area of Operation and not simply focusing on a resourcing solution. As a result, the Fires Brigade’s Brigade Support Battalion was reduced from 248 to 136 there by placing a greater reliance on habitually aligned Division Combat Service Support Battalions (CSSBs) to provide support to the Fires Brigade and Echelons above Brigade (EAB) Battalions.5 Fires Supporter Reorganization Over the past several years, the Field Artillery focused on locating targets better, minimizing target location errors, and executing proper fire support training, certifications, and leader development. To address these issues the Field Artillery School asked the Army to consider a force design update that would move fire support Soldiers and leaders back into the Fires battalions in the brigade combat teams. Such a move ______Redesign and Fires Command Force Design Update, History GPR, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-3. 3Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13. 4Ibid. 5Ibid.

51

would standardize fire support training, refine certification and leader development, and ensure better fire support to the maneuver forces. In response, the Army approved assigning brigade-level fire support personnel to the direct support field artillery battalions in 2012. This reorganization would ensure developing fire support experts who would be trained and certified in their core competencies.6 Fires Command Force Design Update The purpose of the Fires Command Force Design Update was to reorganize Fires Headquarters at echelons above brigade (EAB) and to provide efficient and effective mission command for tactical, operational, and strategic fires through all phases to meet Army and Joint Commanders operational requirements. The change was driven by clear guidance within Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) and Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) to ensure responsiveness to the combatant commanders needs and to have the ability to integrate and synchronize joint and coalition capabilities in support of Globally Integrated Operations.7 Current Fires headquarters structure could not adequately integrate/synchronize fires during all phases at the tactical, operational and strategic echelons while current EAB Mission Command Field Artillery force structure and organizational design did not sufficiently meet the required capabilities in support of combatant commander requirements as part of the Joint Force. Limitations were the inability to integrate and synchronize fires effectively at division, corps, and theater in support of unified land operations, the lack of training oversight of Fires battalions in the brigade combat teams, and the inability to provide consistent fire support certifications and leader development. This force design update created three fires brigades and 10 Division Fires Commands.8 Army Doctrine On 23 August 2011 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General Robert W. Cone, issued Doctrine 2015 guidance. Once completed, Doctrine 2015 would give the Army well-defined enduring principles, tactics, and standard procedures. The transition to Doctrine 2015 required all doctrine publications to be reviewed and separated into new categories. Even though resources would be constrained, he added, TRADOC had to produce quality doctrine by its best and brightest. He concluded, “In summary, we need to make the development and implementation of Doctrine 2015 a priority. We must seize the initiative we now enjoy as we reflect on this decade of war our Army has fought. We have too many hard

6BG Brian McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 12, pp. 14-16, Doc III-3a; BG Brian McKiernan, “Shaping the Field Artillery Force of the Future,” Fires Bulletin, Jul-Aug 12, pp. 10-13, Doc III-3b; Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and MA119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-3c; Email with atchs, subj: Fire Support Reorganization in BCT and Fire Support to the HHB in FA BN, 17 Jun 13, Doc 3d. 7Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-3c. 8Ibid.

52

earned lessons, and we must capitalize on the talent we have across our force to ensure the next fight we find our Army in we can win upon arrival.”9 In his guidance General Cone established key priorities. First, he wanted Army Doctrine Publications/Army Doctrine Reference Publications to be completed by August 2012. Second, he directed field manuals to be finished by December 2013. Third, he wanted technique publications to be written by December 2015. To accomplish these goals, service schools, such as the Field Artillery School, could increase their manning levels commensurate with the workload and fill the positions with the best qualified personnel who would be competitive for battalion command and beyond and had recent operational experience, subject matter expertise, and a fundamental understanding of Army concepts.10 Besides increasing the number of people required to write the publications, the Field Artillery School started writing its Army Doctrine Publications, Army Doctrine Reference Publications, Field Manuals, and Army Techniques Publications during 2011. On 6 January 2012 the School submitted initial drafts of Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-09 that explained the fundamental principles of fire support and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-09 that provided detailed information on the fundamentals to the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth and meanwhile initiated work on Field Manual (FM) 3-09, Field Artillery Operations that would focus on fire support tactics and procedures and planned using writing teams composed of individuals with the requisite experience to write it.11 In July 2012 writing team from Forces Command (FORSCOM), Air Defense, and Field Artillery began rewriting doctrine as a part of the Army’s Doctrine 2015 campaign and as one of the Chief of Staff the Army’s, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander’s, and the Fires Center of Excellence Commanding General’s top priorities. Phase I included writing ADP 3-09 and ADRP 3-09 that were published in August 2012 and that brought the Air Defense Artillery under the fires warfighting function. A Department of Army publication, an ADP contained the fundamental principles that guided military forces’ actions and expressed them so that Army forces could seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Meanwhile, the ADRP furnished a detailed explanation of all doctrinal principles in support of offensive and defensive tasks. The first ATP 3-09.24 Techniques for the Fires Brigade was published in November 2012.12

9Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Doctrine 2015 Guidance, 23 Aug 11, Doc III-6, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Army Doctrine 2015, 7 Mar 12, Doc III-7, 2011 USAFAS AH. 10Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: Doctrine 2015 Guidance, 23 Aug 11; Interview, Dastrup with Bo Bielinski, FA Supervisor, Doc Div, DOTD, 15 Feb 12, Doc III-8, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Army Doctrine 2015, 7 Mar 12. 11Interview, Dastrup with Bielinski, 15 Feb 12; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Doctrine Update, 20 Jan 12, Doc III-9, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: Army Doctrine 2015, 7 Mar 12. 12“Update on Doctrine,” Redleg Update, Aug 12, p. 2, Doc III-4; Briefing, subj:

53

The Center’s writing team moved into Phase II in January 2013 after getting initial drafts of Field Manual 3-09 (Field Artillery Operations) and Field Manual 3-01 (Air and Missile Defense) that were the only authorized field manuals as part of the fires warfighting function. During the latter months of 2012, the Field Artillery School prepared for Phase II for Doctrine 2015. It planned to host a writing team from FORSCOM) and TRADOC that would focus on describing the entire fire support system functionally in tactics and procedures to the combined arms maneuver commander that would advise on the employment of field artillery operations.13 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies Late in 2008, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) directed the Sustainment Center of Excellence at Fort Lee, Virginia, and Centers of Excellence to conduct an analysis to support the Department of the Army’s development of a tactical wheeled vehicle strategy and implementation plan. As the lead, the Sustainment Center of Excellence/Combined Arms Support Center set out to examine the operational impact and risk of reducing the brigade’s objective table of organization and equipment (TOE) tactical wheeled vehicles by 10, 20, and 40 percent respectively within each phase of the Army Force Regeneration cycle. Essentially, the study, later called Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) Study I, aimed to determine if the Army had too many trucks, to develop approaches to optimize the number of tactical wheeled vehicles across the Army, and to analyze the risk of reducing tactical wheeled vehicles.14 Started in 2008, the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study I examined the operational impact and risk of reducing the number of brigade tactical wheeled vehicles. Completed in 2009, the study reduced the size of the Army’s tactical wheeled vehicle fleet in the eight brigade types (infantry brigade combat team, heavy brigade combat team, Stryker brigade combat team, battlefield surveillance brigade, fires brigade, combat aviation brigade, maneuver enhancement brigade, and sustainment brigade) and replaced smaller capacity vehicles with larger capacity vehicles.15 Prompted by budget considerations to reduce the number of wheeled vehicles even more, the Army initiated the Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Studies II and III. Study II ______Doctrine 2015 Information Briefing, undated, Doc II-5; BG Brian J. McKiernan, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 12, pp. 14-16, Doc III-6; “Revised FM 3- 09 is in the Works,” Redleg Update, 2-13 Feb 13, Doc III-7. 13 “Revised FM 3-09 is in the Works.” 142008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 65; Interview, Dastrup with Gary Wilds, CDID, 5 Apr 11, Doc III-8, 2010 USAFAS, AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Army 2020 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy Kick-Off IPT, 24 Feb 12, Doc III-20, 2011 USAFAS AH. 15Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7, 3rd Quarter 2009, p. 7, Doc III-23, 2009 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Wilds, 5 Apr 11; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 11, Doc III-9, 2010 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Reduction Study III, 15 Sep 10, Doc III-10, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Jun 10, p. 12, Doc III-11, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: WV Studies and MRAP 2010, 8 Apr 11, Doc III-12, 2010 USAFAS AH.

54

looked at echelons above brigade for more reductions. The study of 2010 validated the number of tactical wheeled vehicles against funding. Budget driven, the Army launched Tactical Wheeled Study III to further refine the number of tactical wheeled vehicles. At a conference on 9-10 September 2010, the Study III team reviewed several courses of action and selected its objective course of action. It could reduce (1) Army Force Generation tactical wheeled vehicle equipping, (2) create two-level TOEs across all phases of Army Force Generation with units in the available phase having their full TOE requirements, (3) further reduce TOE requirements and keep constant tactical wheeled vehicle fill levels through all phases of Army Force Generation, (4) create installation- based pooling where units in the available phase could fill their TOE requirements from pooled assets, or (5) make further reductions to TOE requirements. Of the five courses of action, the product team selected options two, three, and five for further analysis. Even before the options could be evaluated, funding constraints required an additional cut in the number of tactical wheeled vehicles. This led to include reducing the number of vehicles in the tables of distribution and allowances (TDA) Army in 2011 as a part of the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study III. Together, the three studies reduced the tactical wheeled fleet by 20,000 vehicles by 2012.16 Meanwhile, the Chief of Staff of the Army asked what does a 170,000-vehicle Army look like, prompting the Army to take more aggressive action to reduce its tactical wheeled vehicle fleet. Although Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study IV developed to examine further tactical wheeled vehicle reductions and the Army 2020 Study to scrutinize future force structure had just been initiated as separate studies, the Army merged them in 2011 because it could not discuss the number of tactical wheeled vehicles required without knowing the future force structure that would be created by Army 2020. It tasked the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to develop an aggressive, bold methodology to reduce the tactical wheeled vehicle fleet to 170,000 as directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army. Specifically, the merged study proposed examining options, such as pooling common-use vehicles at the installation or regional levels as a means of reducing the numbers and retaining low-density vehicles in unit motor pools. Pooling would permit reducing the number of common-use vehicles in an organization but make them available for deployment if necessary.17 Early 2012, the Army directed TRADOC to identify the impact and risk of reducing the TWV fleet from 233,000 to 170,000 vehicles. Led by Army Capabilities

16FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 28, Doc III-13, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Gary Wilds, CDID, 28 Feb 12, Doc III-21, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: Army 2020 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy Kick-Off IPT, 24 Feb 12; Email with atch, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2011, 13 Mar 12, Doc III-22, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Reductions and Pooling Recommendations, undated, Doc III-8. 17Interview, Dastrup with Wilds, 28 Feb 12; Briefing (Extract), subj: Army 2020 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy Kick-Off IPT, 24 Feb 12; Email with atch, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2011, 13 Mar 12; Briefing, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Reduction and Pooling Recommendations, undated.

55

Integration Center (ARCIC), the Army’s initial plan reduced TWV fleet in three parts. First, the plan had to identify minimum quantity and vehicle types for offensive and defensive operations, assessment and re-baseline. This would become the new requirement. Second, it had to identify vehicles for pooling and divestment, while retaining the minimum essential equipment required for training. Third, it had to identify vehicles (mainly MRAPs) required to augment units for stability operations. These reductions were base on the premise that the Army did not use 100 percent of its vehicles, 100 percent of the time. ARCIC asked the Center of Excellence (CoE) to begin by assessing the impact of a target 20 percent reduction to each Standard Requirement Code (SRC). During the 20 percent analysis, planners realized other Army actions and decision points were impacting the TWV study. The decision was made to divide the Army 2020 TWV strategy into a two-part approach with decision point (DP) DP11a: Truck Requirement Reductions Based on SRCs not affected by Army 2020 Force Redesign, and DP11b: Truck Requirement Reductions Based on Army 2020 Force Redesign and Concept of Support (BCTs, BEB, Fires, BfSB). Upon completion of the 20 percent analysis planners realized that TWV reductions created a significant impact and unacceptable risk to combined arms maneuver (CAM). All CoE recommended reductions had to be based on acceptable levels of risk. The acceptable levels of risk across proponents turned out to be an average reduction of eight percent. Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery averaged between 8-10 percent across all formations.18 To indentify the effect that these reductions would have on mobility and the unit’s ability to perform it mission, the Army directed the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Requirements Management Office (TWVRMO) and Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) to conduct a mobility study utilizing the proponents’ recommended TWV reductions to analyze the unit’s ability to transport personnel and equipment in one lift. This analysis provided the SRC actual mobility rating and identified the residual amount of personnel and equipment which could not be transported in one lift. Additionally, the Army tasked TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) at Fort Lee, Virginia, to conduct modeling of a division taskforce using SRC with reduced TWVs to inform a risk and operational assessment in 2013. In February 2013 the Chief of Staff of the Army approved all 13,000 reductions for documentation and directed another study of TWV requirements to further identify additional reductions. The Chief of Staff of the Army voiced concern that the TWV reduction of 13,000 was not enough and did not view the availability of TWVs as more crucial than keeping BCT Force structure intact.19 M777 and M119 Composite Battalion and Precision Fires Additionally, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commissioned a Precision Effects Analysis (PEA) to determine a solution to mitigate the

18Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-9; Briefing, subj: Army 2020 TWV Mobility Study, 1-2 Star In-Progress Review, 23 Jan 13, Doc III-10. 19Email with atch, subj: Composite M777 and M119 FA Battalion, 22 Feb 13; Briefing, subj: Army 2020 TWV Mobility Study, 1-2 Star In-Progress Review, 23 Jan 13.

56

IBCT capability gap in indirect fire precision effects. As of 2010-2011, the IBCT employed the M119A2 towed 105-mm. howitzer that did not have digital capabilities. The PEA determined that fielding the M777A2 system as an organic weapon system to IBCTs was a viable solution to give the IBCT precision capabilities. A subsequent PEA, known as PEA II, examined what the force structure and proper mix of cannons for the IBCT should look like, such as a composite battalion of M119A2s and M777A2s. This led to a TRADOC decision in 2011 to organize a composite battalion of one or two batteries of M119A2s and a battery M777A2s to give the IBCT precision capabilities, greater flexibility, mobility, range, and lethality. As of the end of 2011, the Army Capabilities Integration Directorate (ARCIC) had approved the composite battalion, and the Field Artillery awaited the Army’s decision on the composite battalion. In 2012, the Army settled on two M119A2 batteries and one M777A2 battery in the battalion because this mix was less expensive than two M777A2 batteries and one M119A2 battery.20 Precision Munitions, Target Location Error, Quick Reaction Capability, and Handheld Devices In recent years the Field Artillery experienced a revolution in precision. Through most of its history, the Field Artillery was a weapon of mass destruction and area fire, especially beginning in the Napoleonic Wars of the early 1800s and continuing through Operation Desert Storm of 1991. It relied upon massed fires to destroy and neutralize enemy formations. This started changing in the 1970s with fielding of the Copperhead 155-mm. projectile in the Army. A precision munition that used a laser designator to guide it to the target, Copperhead introduced the American Field Artillery to precision. Over the next couple of decades, the Army adopted other precision munitions -- the cannon-launched Search-and-Destroy Armor Munition (SADARM) that employed infrared seekers to locate the target, the Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Unitary, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Unitary, and the Excalibur Unitary, a 155-mm. cannon projectile. Guided to the target using sophisticated inertial navigation systems and/or global positioning system (GPS) capabilities, GMLRS

20Interview with atch, Dastrup with Veach, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-21, 2010 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), subj: M777A2 Authorized Acquisition Objective Increase, 25 May 10, Doc III-22, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), subj: M777A2 Army Acquisition Objective Increase, 22 Dec 10, Doc III-23, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: PEA, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-24, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 Annual History; Email, subj: M777, 1 Mar 12, Doc III-45, 2011 USAFAS AH; COL Gene Meredith and COL Richard M. Cabrey, “Meeting the Fire Support Challenge,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 20-23, Doc III-46, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Thomas L. Hills, CDID, 2 Apr 12, Doc III-47, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: IBCT PEA Portion of the 2011 Annual History, 3 Apr 12, Doc III-48, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies 2012-2013, Army 2020 Redesign and Fires Command Force Design Update, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-11.

57

Unitary, ATACMS Unitary, and Excalibur Unitary offered unparalleled precision, minimized collateral damage, and were therefore especially valuable for employment in complex, built-up, urban terrain. For precision munitions to be successful, however, the Field Artillery had to locate the targets precisely by using a common reference point and datum to locate precisely a point on the earth in three dimensions -- latitude, longitude, and altitude.21 For precision munitions to be effective, the Field Artillery therefore required precise target location -- one of the five requirements (accurate deliver system location, timely and accurate meteorological data, accurate computational procedures, accurate weapon and ammunition information, and accurate target location and size) for accurate, predicted fires. As the Global War on Terror demonstrated, the Field Artillery delivered responsive, effective fires with the GMLRS Unitary employing deliberate targeting methods, while the Air Force employed Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) effectively for deliberate targeting. Essentially, deliberate targeting was the procedure for attacking targets that were detected, identified, and developed in sufficient time to schedule actions in a tasking cycle. In contrast, dynamic targeting at the Army battalion and below proved to be challenging because it involved attacking time-sensitive, fleeting targets that required a quick response. Often, forward observers could not provide the precise location of the targets; and this minimized the effectiveness of Excalibur Unitary that was employed frequently in deliberate and dynamic targeting missions. Some dismounted forward observers even preferred maps, binoculars, and compasses as opposed to automated targeting systems; and this further restricted obtaining a precise location.22 The Accelerated Precision Mortar Initiative (APMI) introduced in 2010-2011 further highlighted the need for precise target location as would the Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) for field artillery rounds upon being fielded in the near future. As a representative from the Picatinney Arsenal, New Jersey, explained, APMI was a GPS- guided mortar with a 10 meter circular error probable that gave the infantry commander precision-strike capabilities. APMI provided first-round fire-for-effect capability and could be employed in restricted urban areas where collateral damage was a consideration. It also reduced the logistical burden of ammunition resupply. Until the introduction of this mortar, the infantry commander relied upon mortar volleys against an area target because the mortar was inherently inaccurate. This minimized employing mortars in urban areas. As such, the inability to provide precise target location for APMI and PGK created a critical capabilities gap, especially at the platoon, company, and battalion levels, for dynamic targeting. In fact, dismounted observers lacked the ability to locate ground targets rapidly with sufficient accuracy to use precision munitions.23

21Interview with atch, Dastrup with COL Anthony Daskevich, Dir, TCM RAMS, 23 Feb 10, Doc III-28, 2009 USAFAS AH; Message to Observer, Jul 2009, Doc III-29, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Precision Munitions, 21 Mar 10, Doc III-30, 2009 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, pp. 24-28. 22Interview with atchs, Dastrup with COL Craig M. Newman, Doug Brown, and Gordon Wehri, CDID, 1 Mar 12, Doc III-25, 2011 USAFAS AH. 23Email with atch, subj: Precision Munitions, TLE, and QRC, 29 Mar 12, Doc

58

To eliminate this target location error gap that the Field Artillery School considered to be the number one gap in the Field Artillery, the Army took action. The Project Manager, Soldier Precision Targeting Devices (PM SPTD) developed the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR) 2H for dismounted soldiers that was scheduled for fielding in 2013. After changes were made to the target location module (TLM), the LLDR 2H would provide precision targeting capability by integrating a celestial navigation system with a digital magnetic compass in the target locator module to furnish highly accurate target coordinates. The target locator module could be used as a stand-alone device or in conjunction with the laser designator module (LDM). During daytime operations, the LLDR 2H could detect a target at more than 10 kilometers, could recognize it at seven kilometers, and could designate a stationary target at five kilometers and a moving target at three kilometers. In comparison, the LLDR 2H could detect a target at three kilometers, could recognize it at two kilometers, and designate it at almost two kilometers during nighttime operations.24 The Army and the Field Artillery also envisioned the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS) as a means to minimize target location error. The handheld JETS would provide the dismounted observer and joint terminal attack controller with the ability to acquire, locate, mark, and designate for precision GPS-guided and laser-guided munitions without target mensuration but would not be fielded until Fiscal Year 2016. 25 Given this and the pressing requirement to eliminate target location error, the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence, Major General David D. Halverson, directed the Combat Development Integration Directorate (CDID) to hold a handheld precision optical targeting demonstration and assessment at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to develop a quick reaction capability that would be fielded before JETS could be introduced. Held in December 2011, the demonstration provided industry with ______III-26, 2001 USAFAS AH; Audra Calloway, “Picatinney Fields First Precision-Guided Mortars to Troops in Afghanistan,” Public Affairs Picatinney Arsenal, 29 Mar 11, Doc III-27, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Handheld Devices and Target Location Error, 22 Mar 12, Doc III-28, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Newman, Brown, and Wehri, 1 Mar 12; Information Paper, subj: LLDR, undated, Doc III-29, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: TRADOC Overview Concept Requirements to Capabilities for Procuring Affordable Tactical Missiles, 4 May 10, Doc III-30, 2011 USAFAS AH. 24Email with atch, subj: Precision Munitions, TLE, and QRC, 29 Mar 12; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Newman, Brown, and Wehri, 1 Mar 12; Information Paper, subj: LLDR, undated; Briefing, subj: TRADOC Overview Concept Requirements to Capabilities for Procuring Affordable Tactical Missiles, 4 May 10; Email, subj: CDID Input to 2011 Annual History, 21 Mar 12, Doc III-31, 2011 USAFAS AH. 25Email with atch, subj: Handheld Devices and Target Location Error, 22 Mar 12; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Newman, Brown, Gordon Wehri, CDID, 1 Mar 12; Information Paper, subj: LLDR, undated; Briefing, subj: TRADOC Overview Concept Requirements to Capabilities for Procuring Affordable Tactical Missiles, 4 May 10; Information Paper, PEO Soldier, 27 Feb 13, Doc III-12.

59

the opportunity to demonstrate its target location systems. Based on this demonstration and the state of technology, CDID submitted the desired capabilities for a future target location system to the Rapid Equipping Force for the development of a limited number of handheld and tripod-held systems for experimentation with the goal of fielding an objective system at the same time that the Precision Guidance Kit was fielded and before JETS could be fielded.26 The Army planned to field the Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) hand-held targeting device in 2013. It would provide the dismounted forward observer with the ability to locate targets accurately in a timely manner and within the standards required to employ precision munitions. Basically, the QRC would bridge the gap between the existing target location capability found in units today and the objective capability of JETS and would be fielded to the units in Afghanistan first.27

TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGER BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM-FIRES

Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile Determined to increase the range of its cannon artillery without sacrificing accuracy, the U.S. Army explored the need of adopting the XM982 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile. As initially planned in 1995 and outlined in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) of 22 February 1996, Excalibur would be a fire-and- forget projectile with a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and inertial measurement unit guidance package that would allow the projectile to fly extended ranges (50 kilometers) to shape the close battle and to improve survivability and would be able it to detonate within six meters of the target. The projectile’s modular design would permit carrying the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) for area targets, the Search-and-Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM) for counterfire against self-propelled artillery or armor, or the Unitary munition for precision targets -- soft or hard. Upon fielding, Excalibur would furnish the Field Artillery with improved fire support, would be compatible with all digitized 155-mm. howitzers, such as the M109A6 (Paladin) Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer, the Lightweight 155-mm. Towed Howitzer (XM777) under development, and the Crusader Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer under development; would reduce fratricide; and would be fielded in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 with DPICM, in FY 2007 with SADARM, and in FY 2010 with Unitary.28 Several years into development, critical issues altered the direction of the Excalibur program. Insufficient funding and the termination of the SADARM program early in 2000 prompted the Army to limit Excalibur’s initial development to DPICM. However, the fear of duds and collateral damage, the need for precision, and the

26Interview, Dastrup with Josh A. Dexter and John H. Deel, CDID, 27 Mar 12, Doc III-32, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Handheld Devices and Target Location Error, 22 Mar 12. 27Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-13. 282004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 74-75.

60

Transformation of the Army process that was underway, especially the creation of the Initial Brigade Combat Team, caused another shift in priorities. In December 2000 the Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Major General Toney Stricklin, signed a school decision paper recommending switching Excalibur’s initial development to the Unitary munition. Concurring with General Stricklin, the Program Manager for Excalibur subsequently deferred work on the DPICM warhead in January 2001 because it caused collateral damage by scattering sometimes unexploded bomblets upon base ejection. The Program Manager made the Unitary the primary warhead because it produced low collateral damage. This caused the Unitary warhead to become more important after being a low priority for years.29 In the meantime, another development influenced the Excalibur program. In 1999 Congress started pulling money from the Excalibur program to fund the Trajectory Correctable Munition (TCM), a howitzer-launched 155-mm. artillery projectile being developed by Bofors Defense of Sweden. Using GPS and an inertial measurement unit, the Bofors TCM would carry three different warheads, including Unitary, would provide a significant increase in accuracy with first-round hit capabilities, and would extend the Field Artillery’s digitized cannon range from 27 kilometers to 35 kilometers with the XM777 Towed 155-mm. howitzer under development and the Paladin and 50 plus kilometers with the Crusader under development. Equally important, TCM would significantly improve warfighting capability and give the Army and the Field Artillery a second long-range, precision-guided munition.30 Raytheon’s technical problems with the Excalibur airframe or projectile and the inability to afford both TCM and Excalibur soon forced the Army to explore various developmental options. First, the Army could drop the TCM program and fund Excalibur, but this was a high-risk solution because Excalibur’s airframe was untested whereas TCM’s had been tested and had already demonstrated reliability. Second, the Army could drop Excalibur and fund TCM. This alternative involved abandoning a contract with an American company and would be politically troublesome. Third, the Army could merge the programs and take the best from each. After serious consideration the Army Acquisition Executive decided in November 2001 to merge the two developmental programs that had essentially paralleled each other. A merger would deliver a low-risk program that would take advantage of the complementary strengths of each program. While Bofors would be the subcontractor and had years of experience with projectile design, Raytheon would be the prime contractor. Raytheon also possessed extensive experience with guidance electronics and software development.31 The merger, however, was not free. Before the merger, Excalibur had unfunded requirements. The merger added more unfunded requirements. In view of the importance of developing the projectile, the United States and the Kingdom of Sweden signed a memorandum of agreement on 11 December 2002 for the cooperative development of

292000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79. 302001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79. 312001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 79-80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 57.

61

Excalibur with the Sweden providing $57 million.32 Meanwhile, Excalibur went through key milestones. On 26 February 2002 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, approved a new block approach to field Excalibur Block I to the Crusader in FY 2008 and Blocks II and III which would build on Block I to the Paladin and the Lightweight 155-mm. Towed Howitzer later. When the Office of the Secretary of Defense terminated the Crusader on 8 May 2002, the Army restructured the program to focus developing Excalibur for the Future Combat System (FCS) Cannon of the Objective Force with fielding in FY 2008.33 Prompted by the requirement to get Excalibur to the field as quickly as possible in view of the Global War on Terrorism, the Office of the Secretary of Defense subsequently tasked the Program Manager for Excalibur to develop a plan to accelerate fielding by employing “spiral development.”34 Basically, this approach would deliver sequential, increasing capability over time until the Operational Requirements Document threshold and objective requirements were met. On 28 August 2002 the Army Acquisition Executive attended a review that detailed the program to deliver the Unitary Excalibur in three versions, called spirals, and subsequently approved it. The first version (Block/Increment I), Unitary Excalibur, would be the least capable and would be fielded to the Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer in FY 2006. Block/Increment II or enhanced Unitary Excalibur with more capabilities would be fielded to the Future Combat System (FCS) Cannon in FY 2008. Block/Increment III would meet the original Operational Requirements Document requirements and be fielded in FY 2010 or 2011. The revised ORD signed by the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, Major General Michael D. Maples, on 20 August 2002 and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Developments, Major General Alan W. Thrasher, on 12 February 2003 and verbally approved by the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army on 23 April 2003 reflected the changes brought by spiral development. Over a year later on 16 September 2004, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army signed the ORD because its key performance parameters were essential for the contemporary operational environment with its urgent requirement for precision fires.35 Meanwhile, development moved forward during 2003-2004. On 23 July 2003 BAE Systems completed the first firing trials of its M777E1 (formerly XM777) Towed 155-mm. Howitzer with the Excalibur at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. The trials evaluated seven XM982 instrumented ballistic test projectiles fired at three different temperatures using the Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS) to characterize the ballistic environment and to assess the projectile’s physical compatibility with the M777E1. A few weeks later in August 2003, the U.S. government awarded United

322001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 57-58. 332002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS ) ACH, p. 49. 34Email with atch, subj: Excalibur History, 12 Feb 03, Doc III-37, 2002 USAFACFS ACH. 352002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 62.

62

Defense Industries subsidiary, Bofors Defense, the contract for the systems development and demonstration phase of the Excalibur program. Later in October 2003, the Army and Sweden officially opened the Excalibur Joint Program Office at Picatinnay Arsenal, New Jersey, to improve developmental efficiency. One year later in September 2004, the Guided Series 3b Tests validated the airframe and guidance system design.36 Studies conducted in 2002 and 2003, in the meantime, validated Excalibur development. As a precision munition for the current and future force, Excalibur facilitated the destruction of point targets and selected high-value area targets at extended ranges in complex terrain and urban environments from dispersed locations and would fill an existing deficiency -- the inability to destroy point targets and the requirement to minimize collateral damage. In view of the current operational environment in Afghanistan and Iraq, such capabilities would be crucial for the success of U.S. joint military forces.37 As the studies indicated, Excalibur offered other distinct advantages. The Achieving Transformation in Fire Support Study of June 2002 determined that the firepower of existing Army field artillery systems would be improved much more with the proper precision munitions, such as Excalibur and the Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System munition, than by investing in Crusader. Also, the Alternative Indirect Fire Study of July 2002 concluded that Excalibur was more effective against a wider variety of targets and at a greater range than current munitions even with utilizing current target acquisition capabilities. Excalibur would allow current platforms to complement fully the improved accuracy of future target acquisition systems and would be less expensive to use because it could be used in smaller numbers than non-precision munitions. Subsequently, the Non-Line of Sight Mix Study of March 2003 noted that Excalibur Unitary greatly enhanced the lethality of the current cannon force and demonstrated the need for the munition. Ultimately, according to these studies and others, Excalibur and other precision munitions would provide more capability at equal or less cost than the Crusader howitzer to reaffirm the requirement for accelerating the fielding of the precision munition.38 Along with the studies, the urgent needs statement for the Excalibur endorsed by the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in August 2004 created the requirement to accelerate fielding the munition. In response to the urgent need statement, the Field Artillery School presented its case for a formal acceleration of the munition’s development to the Army Resource and Requirements Board which would vet the requirement and decide the fate of accelerating the acquisition program. Although the product of the accelerated program would not be the objective round identified in the officially approved ORD of September 2004, it would meet the urgent needs statement and create a parallel development program for Excalibur. Essentially, the urgent needs statement required splitting Block/Increment I into two parts. While Increment Ia-1 would provide the theater forces with an immediate need capability and have less

362003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 62-63. 372003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78. 382003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78.

63

capability, Increment Ia-2 would be the objective program outlined in the 2004 ORD. Increment Ia-2 would continue development, would have improved reliability, and improved countermeasures, and would be fielded to M777A2 155-mm. towed howitzer and Paladin units.39 In March 2005 the Army Resource and Requirements Board validated the urgent needs statement of August 2004 from Central Command’s Combined Forces Land Component Command for a precision guided cannon artillery munition and designated Excalibur as the materiel solution. To accelerate the fielding of Excalibur to get it to Iraq by the second quarter of FY 2006, the Army condensed the testing schedule, allowing little room for program slippage or delays, and reduced the capabilities. Updated Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) software would accompany Excalibur.40 Subsequently, the contractor held test firings at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. On 1 September 2005 the contractor fired two Excalibur projectiles from a Paladin using the Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS). Both rounds deployed their canards, acquired the GPS signal, and completed their pre-programmed navigational maneuvers. Subsequently on 15 September 2005, the immediate need capability Excalibur Ia-1 demonstrated its accuracy by hitting within seven meters of the target to bring the program a step closer to filling the urgent requirement to put the projectile in the hands of 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 1st Armor Division.41 More testing took place in 2006 and early 2007. Tests conducted in March-July 2006 fired 22 rounds while the Limited User Test of February 2007 demonstrated the munition’s reliability and lethality when 23 out of 25 rounds hit within an average six meters of the target. In fact, the Limited User Test indicated that the munition actually surpassed the requirements outlined by the ORD and had better effects than anticipated to permit fielding the Excalibur Ia-1 to U.S. ground forces in Iraq in May-July 2007. The Limited User Test results also satisfied the urgent release requirement and permitted moving the munition into low-rate initial production. Subsequently, in the Customer Test conducted by I Battery, 11th Marine Regiment at Yuma Proving Ground with the M777A2 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer, Excalibur Ia-1 successfully demonstrated its accuracy when four out of four rounds had an average miss distance of 10 meters, allowing material release to the M777A2. Meanwhile, the Army approved the Capability Production Document for the Excalibur Ia-2 and testing beginning in 2008.42 Excalibur quickly demonstrated its value in combat. Following new equipment training on 5 May 2007, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted the first operational firing of the munition at a well-known insurgent safe house in Bagdad. Elements from the 1st

392004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 63-64; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 52-53; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 50-51; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 69; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 Dec 10, Doc III-14. 402005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51. 412005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56. 422006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72.

64

Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment teamed with the 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment to destroy the safe house with one Excalibur round. At the end of 2007, American operational units had fired the urgent requirement Excalibur Ia-1 in Operation Iraqi Freedom, while Canadian forces had fired the munition in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. In February 2008 American forces also began firing Excalibur Ia-1 in OEF as units equipped with the M777A2 deployed to Afghanistan. Through late 2010, Army and Marine field artillery units had fired 370 Excalibur Ia-1s in OIF and OEF.43 Concurrently in 2008-2009, the Field Artillery School educated commanders of deploying units using New Equipment Training Teams (NETT). It trained twenty-nine units in 2008 and another twenty-four units in 2009 on the benefits and terminal effects of Excalibur Ia-1, completed training all active component field artillery units by the end of 2009, and prepared to begin training Army National Guard field artillery units in 2010. For example, NETTs explained that the munition had to be fired at a high angle to achieve the maximum range and optimal flight path to perform the terminal maneuver to achieve a near vertical angle of attack. As it neared the target, the projectile oriented itself to a near-perpendicular angle of fall to optimize the lethal effects on the intended target. This characteristic made immediate need capability Excalibur Ia-1 an ideal solution for engagements in complex and urban settings because it created a minimal amount of collateral damage. Also, Excalibur Ia-1 had roughly the same explosive power as an M107 high-explosive projectile. Because of its near-perpendicular angle of descent, it furnished more lethality and more uniform detonation pattern. Excalibur Ia-1 had the ability to penetrate four inches of reinforced concrete which was the thickness of the typical load-bearing roof and could penetrate and detonate with devastating lethality.44 Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School worked to introduce the Excalibur Ia-2 and Ib. Representing the baseline program outlined in the ORD of 2004, Ia-2 would have increased range, improved reliability, improved countermeasures (anti-jam capabilities), and went through an initial operational test in January 2010. At that time Excalibur Ia-2 demonstrated high reliability with charges three and four but was less reliable at charge five. It received full material release in April 2011 and fielding began in August 2011. Meanwhile, the Army awarded Raytheon the contract to produce me and scheduled testing for 2012. As planned, I that would reduce unit price and increase reliability underwent testing scheduled for October 2012 to determine if the munitions could move into low-rate initial production.45

432007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 70; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-33, 2011 USAFAS AH; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract) 31 Dec 10. 442008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 72-73; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 70-71. 452009 USAFAS AH, p. 71; Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, TCM BCT- Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-41, 2009 USAFAS AH; TCM Newsletter, Sep 09, Doc III-42, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Project Manager, Combat Ammunitions

65

However, technical difficulties set back the demonstration of the Raytheon and Alliant Tech Systems designs of Ib from March 2010 until August 2010; Raytheon won the shoot off the contract for Ib. The Ib achieved ORD requirements during testing and provided more range, increased reliability, and lower cost than the Ia-2. A critical design review in April 2011 revealed that the fins were being destroyed upon firing the projectile. As a result, the Army decided in February 2012 to use the Ia-2’s base assembly as opposed to the Ib’s base assembly. This approach would lower the developmental risk and used a base that had already demonstrated its reliability. Subsequently, testing in October 2012 validated the I and led to Milestone C Decision in December 2012 that permitted moving it into low-rate initial production with initial operational testing and evaluation scheduled for October 2013, Additionally, the Army approved the capabilities production document in December 2012.46 Meanwhile, the Army fired two Ib rounds at Fort Bliss, Texas, in June 2012. This marked a significant development. For the first time, an Army unit fired the Excalibur Ib in the continental United States outside of 29 Palms, the National Training Center, California, Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, and White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, all of which were testing facilities where units trained before deploying. The Fort Bliss firing presaged the Army’s authorization to fire the munition at other installations because units wanted to fire it even if they were not deploying.47 ______systems, 28 Oct 09, Doc III-39, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-35, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, Excalibur XM 982 Precision Engagement Projectiles, undated, Doc III-14a; Selected Acquisition Report (Extract), 31 Dec 10, Doc III-15; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 Feb 13, Doc III-16. 462009 USAFAS AH, p. 71; Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, TCM BCT- Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-41, 2009 USAFAS AH; TCM Newsletter, Sep 09, Doc III-42, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Project Manager, Combat Ammunitions Systems, 28 Oct 09, Doc III-39, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12; Memorandum for TCM Cannon, COL Michael Hartig, 6 Feb 12, Doc III-35, 2011 USAFAS AH;. Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 12 Feb 13; Raytheon Information Paper, subj: Raytheon’s Excalibur Ib Demonstrates Accuracy during Flight Tests, 24 Oct 12, Doc III-17; Memorandum for Cdr, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Army Capabilities Integration Center, subj: Approval of the Precision Engagement Projectile, Excalibur Ib Capability Production Document, 18 Dec 12, Doc III-18; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer, Ammunition, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for Low Rate Initial Production of Increment Ib Excalibur M982E1, 13 Dec 12, Doc III-19; Email with atch, subj: Excalibur, PGK, and Future Cannon Munition Suite 2012, 26 Feb 13, Doc III-20. 47Interview, Dastrup with Pack and Belcher, 11 Feb 13. See COL Gene Meredith,

66

Precision Guidance Kit Although the U.S. Army had been working to introduce precision munitions since the early 1990s, the effort led to a limited number and types of such munitions, such as the Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM). Interestingly, combat operations during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) highlighted the need for precision munitions to mitigate collateral damage and improve accuracy. Prompted by the Americans’ restrictive rules of engagement for attacking targets to minimize collateral damage, American adversaries modified their tactics. By dispersing their forces and often occupying positions in or near populated areas, enemy forces limited the Americans’ ability to engage targets. This tactic caused the Army to increase its dependence upon precision munitions.48 The Army initiated a search for less expensive precision munition than SADARM. On 20 November 2003 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) tasked the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) to head a working group of representatives from the military and industry to conduct the Precision Effects Study, to determine the current or near-current precision engagement solutions, and to select those that would yield the best payoff for field artillery and mortar assets within twenty-four to thirty-six months.49 Various proposals emerged. Among many including the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3), the Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition developed by GD/Denel of South Africa, and the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR), the course-correcting fuse (CCF), renamed Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) in 2005, offered much promise. Based upon analysis of the proposed solutions during the first part of 2004, USAFACFS concluded that CCF/PGK would vastly improve the accuracy of 105-mm. and 155-mm. projectiles and drive down the logistical tail by reducing the number of rounds required for each engagement and ammunition resupply requirements. Through spiral development CCF/PGK could be fielded by Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 with the first increment and by FY 2010 with the second increment that would represent the full performance fuse.50 In 2005 USAFACFS explained that PGK, a low-cost, fuse-size module, intended to replace a standard fuse on current and future non-guided 105-mm. and 155-mm. projectiles, would significantly improve accuracy by using the Global Position System ______MAJ David Moser, CPT Andrew Zikowitz, and Daniel Hallagin, “A Current Assessment of Excalibur Employment in Afghanistan,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 12, pp. 27-32, Doc III-21; MG (Ret) Toney Stricklin, “Employment of the M982in Afghanistan: US Army and Marine Corps Differences,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 12, pp. 16-19, Doc III-22; Email with atch, subj: Excalibur, PGK, and Future Cannon Munitions Suite 2012, 26 Feb 13. 482004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 58; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH. 49Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH. 502004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 58-59.

67

(GPS) to provide location during flight and to make trajectory corrections and would reduce the amount of ammunition required for missions. Basically, the PGK would transform a “dumb projectile” into a “smart projectile.” Late in the year, USAFACFS completed the capabilities development document which noted that the PGK would leverage U.S. Navy Guidance Integrated Fuse Technology Demonstration Program work, forwarded the document through the chain of command for staffing and approval which came on 22 January 2007, and announced that fielding was projected for 2009.51 As of late 2006, the Army meanwhile planned to field PGK in three increments. Increment I would consist of a fuse-like kit that would contain GPS guidance, power supply, control surfaces, electronic circuitry, and the fuse function modes of point- detonating and proximity, would give the projectile a circular error probable of fifty meters or less, and would address the urgent needs of current operations in the Global War on Terrorism with fielding in FY 2010. Increment II would minimize GPS interference and jamming, improve delivery accuracy to thirty meters, add delay and GPS time-fuse functions, address the entire 155-mm. family of platforms, munitions, and propellants, and be fielded in FY 2013. Increment III would add the 105-mm. family of platforms, munitions, and propellants and would be fielded in FY 2014.52 In the meantime, developmental efforts moved forward. On 20 December 2005 the Program Executive Officer, Ammunition approved PGK Increment I. Subsequently, the Army Requirements Oversight Council approved the PGK requirement and sent it to joint staffing with the Department of the Army approving the Capability Development Document in January 2007 which established the requirement for PGK. Charged with developing the kit, the Project Manager, Combat Ammunition Systems meanwhile solicited industry for possible Increment I designs that could provide a near-term solution, awarded two six-month technology contracts, one to BAE Systems and one to Alliant Techsystems, for PGK development, and scheduled a shoot off at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, in March-April 2007. The winner would receive the contract for development of Increment I with an accuracy of 50 meters circular error probable. Alliant Techsystems won the shoot off by meeting the accuracy requirements of less than or equal to 50 meter circular error probable. Eighteen of their rounds impacted within 30 meters of the target. Based on this, the Program Executive Officer, Ammo approved and signed the Milestone B Acquisition Decision Memorandum on 4 May 2007 to permit PGK to enter the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of acquisition. Subsequently, Project Manager, Combat Ammunition Systems awarded Alliant Techsystems an 18-month System Development and Demonstration contract on 18 May 2007 to develop PGK Increment I for 155-mm. high-explosive and testing in 2009. However, technical difficulties pushed testing back into 2010 and developing PGK

512005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 52. 522006 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 57-58; Briefing, subj: TCM Cannon, 2 Nov 09, Doc III-38, 2009 USAFAS AH; Capability Development Document for the PGK (Extract), 11 Ju 12, Executive Summary, Doc III-23.

68

Increment II.53 In August 2010 testing to move PGK into the next phase of development did not go well. In response, the Program Manager for Combat Ammunitions Systems put together a team to review the test and to determine the causes of the failures. A few months later, the team’s findings indicated that design problems had led to the failures and recommended terminating the program or letting it slip so that fielding would be later than initially planned. In December 2010 the Army Systems Acquisition Review Board approved a plan by the Program Manager for Combat Ammunition Systems to restructure the engineering and manufacturing development program to allow the program to slip 25 months in order to make minor design changes and to field PGK Increment I in 2014 rather than 2011. Subsequently on 21 January 2011, the Army Acquisition Executive authorized moving forward with the restructured plan for PGK Increment I and directed the Program Manager for Combat Ammunitions System to provide PGK Increment I acquisition program baseline for approval within 120 days. The Army Acquisition Executive approved the acquisition program baseline restructure on 16 July 2011.54 Meanwhile, the Department of the Army G-3 directed an urgent material release on 17 May 2011. This would accelerate fielding of PGK Increment I with reduced reliability to support Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) based upon successful testing in August 2011. Subsequently, the contractor conducted a PGK Increment I guided flight test in August-September 2011 where it collected sufficient data for entrance into the next engineering, manufacturing, and development phase as well as considering the accelerated fielding to Operation Enduring Freedom. In March 2012 the Army approved accelerated fielding approval to field the PGK to Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) in 2013 to give the kit two tracks -- the baseline program and the urgent material release program. The Army also scheduled an initial operational test and evaluation for October 2013 in support of the baseline program and a subsequent milestone c decision to move into production.55

532006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 58; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Don Durant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-44, 2009 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: IBCT Organic Cannon Precision Strike Capability, 12 Jan 2011, Doc III-18, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: PGK, undated, Doc III-37, 2011 USAFAS AH. 54Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant TCM BCT-Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Steve Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-34, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Program Executive Officer for Ammunition, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for the XM1156 Precision Guidance Kit Increment I, 21 Jan 11, Doc III-38, 2011 USAFAS AH. 55Interview with atch, Dastrup with Worth, 22 Feb 11; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army, subj: Acceleration and Urgent Materiel Release for XM 1156 Precision Guidance Kit, 17 May 11, Doc III-39, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 Feb 13, Doc III-; DOTE Information Paper, subj: PGK, 2012, Doc III-24; Audra Calloway, Picatinny Arsenal, “Fort Bliss soldiers First to Fire Army’s New Near-precision Artillery Rounds,”

69

Future Cannon Munitions Suite To upgrade existing 105/155-mm. munitions to meet the Army’s transformation objectives and to modernize the U.S. Army’s stockpile of cannon munitions, developmental efforts moved forward in 2011 with the Future Cannon Munitions Suite (FCMS), formerly called the Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition Program (ACAAP), which would be a common carrier for 105-mm. and 155-mm. families of projectiles, would be capable of carrying future developmental projectiles, such as non- lethal, multi-spectral smoke under development, would be less toxic and incendiary, and would include infrared illumination. During those years, the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), renamed the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) late in 2005, developed a capabilities production development document for a 105-mm. IM High Explosive Preformed Fragmentation (Pff) round (M1130) for staffing. The Department of the Army approved the document on 18 July 2007. A top priority for the Commanding General of Fort Sill, the M1130 Pff round would be an insensitive munition, meaning that it would not detonate unexpectedly by a spark or rough handling, would be embedded with 9,300 3-mm. tungsten balls, and would be used against soft and light-skinned targets. Following successful testing in 2010, the Army granted full materiel release in March 2011 for the M1130 with some rounds being accepted for prepositioning in theater (Afghanistan). While the concept of ACAAP and FCMS provided for a more efficient artillery stockpile, contractor development and test failures forced the materiel developer to look at other options.56 Concurrently, the Army developed an initiative in 2011 to re-use the M483 Dual- Purpose Improved Conventional Munition by demilitarizing it to save money. The Army planned to demilitarize the M483 and to use it as a replacement for aging or less capable munitions. The first munition using this re-use concept was the M1122 training round. The M1122 was intended to replace the M804 Low-cost Indirect Fire Training Round (LITR) and eventually the M107 for training purposes. Full material release for the munition came on 22 June 2012, meaning that it was reliable, operationally sustainable, and effective with full-rate production scheduled for July 2013. Full-rate production ______www.army.mil, Doc III-25; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC Army Capabilities Integration Center, subj: Approval of Capability Development Document in lieu of Capabilities Production Document for the Precision Guidance Kit, 11 Jul 12, Doc III-26. 562005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 54; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 54; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 58-59; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 75; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Don Durant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-44, 2009 USAFAS AH; Fires Center of Excellence CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 10, p. 7, Doc III-45, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12; Briefing (Extract), subj: PM Update, 24 Feb 12; General Dynamics Information Paper, subj: 105-mm. M1130 HE-Pff, undated, Doc III-40, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History, 6 Apr 12, Doc III-41, 2011 USAFAS AH.

70

would generate approximately 280,000 rounds by 2018. Other munitions using the demilitarized M483 included the XM1123 Infrared Illuminating Projectile and XM1124 Visible Light Illuminating Projectile for use by the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps. A third re-use round included the M110A3 White Phosphorous Smoke Projectile.57 M777 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer When the United States shifted its national defense priorities from forward- deployed forces in Europe to force projection from the continental United States (CONUS) at the end of the early in the 1990s, lightweight weapons attracted the Army’s interest more than before. Lightweight weapons offered greater strategic and tactical deployability than heavier weapons. In view of the emergence of a new world order and the need for strategically deployable equipment, the Army completed an Operational and Organizational Plan in January 1991 for a lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer to replace the aging M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer. Prompted by the urgent need to replace the M101 towed 105-mm. howitzer and the M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer, the Marine Corps also planned to field a lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer as a replacement. With the recognition that they required a new towed lightweight 155- mm. howitzer, the Army and the Marine Corps wrote a Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) in 1995 to develop a joint lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer (LW155) and later formed the Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office in 1998 to direct the developmental program. Although Joint Program Management Office at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, managed the overall program, the Marine Corps had the lead in the acquisition of the LW155, also called the XM777. Pressed to obtain the LW155 as soon as feasible, the Marine Corps opted to field one without digital enhancements and to add digital capabilities later, while the Army chose introducing a digitized LW155 which would take longer to field.58 After several years of developmental work, the contractor delivered the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) prototype XM777s in 2000 and 2001. Unveiled at Picatinny Arsenal in June 2000, the first EMD prototype XM777 held out great promise. The howitzer’s reduced size and weight permitted towing by the same prime mover used to tow the M198 and allowed two howitzers to fit into a C-130 aircraft

57Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-41a, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Steve Worth, TCM BCT-Fires, 22 Feb 12, Doc III-41b, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 7 Feb 12, Doc III-42, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History, 6 Apr 12; Interview, Dastrup with LTC Arthur A. Pack and Mark W. Belcher, TCM BCT Fires, 11 Feb 13, Doc III-27; Information Paper, Picatinny Arsenal, subj: Recycling Produces Cheaper, Safer, Realistic Artillery Rounds, 5 Oct 12, Doc III-28; “TCM BCT Fires Update,” RedLeg Update, Jul 12, Doc III-29; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-30. 582003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 82; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 105-08; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 64.

71

for strategic deployability. Additionally, the howitzer could be emplaced in three minutes or less, could fire faster than the M198, could be displaced in two minutes or less, and had a range of 30 kilometers. By the end of 2001, the Marines had a total of six XM777 EMD howitzers undergoing tests.59 Unfortunately, none of the six EMD howitzers met the “production representative” requirements for an operational test to be conducted in 2002 by the Army and Marine Corps.60 This caused the Marine Corps to restructure the program by adding an operational assessment test or a limited user’s test in 2002. If the EMD howitzers passed the test, the contractor could start low-rate initial production with the goal of performing an operational test in 2004 to determine if full production would be permitted.61 In 2002 the XM777 underwent testing as scheduled. Following extreme cold weather testing in Alaska in January 2002 where the howitzer demonstrated its ability to function in extremely cold weather conditions, the Army and the Marine Corps conducted an operational assessment test from 13 May 2002 to 15 June 2002 at Twenty- Nine Palms, California; Camp Pendleton, California; and the Coronado Naval Amphibious Base, California; to determine if it met the specific requirements outlined in the Joint Operational Requirements Document of 1995. The test included live fire of approximately 4,000 rounds, towing, and embarkation. Although the howitzer failed to meet the displacement time, reliability, and maximum rate of fire requirements and other minor equipment problems, it achieved its key operational requirements and later passed the accuracy requirement in a separate accuracy test in August 2002 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Along with the successful air load test at the Miramar Marine Corps Air Station, California, in June 2002, the operational assessment and the accuracy test indicated that the XM777 program was making satisfactory progress.62 Based upon the accuracy test and especially the operational assessment test of May-June 2002, the Navy held a Milestone C Decision meeting on 8 November 2002. Although the key performance parameters of displacement, maximum rate of fire, and reliability were not met and would be addressed in full-rate production exit criteria, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition approved moving the XM777 into the low-rate initial production of 94 howitzers to be delivered in 2004-2005 for testing. This decision granted the Marine Corps permission to move forward with development of the XM777. After this decision had been made, the contractor delivered its first U.S.-built, pilot-production EMD XM777 from its Hattiesburg, Mississippi, facility for testing.63 More than anything else, the Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD) package that was scheduled to be added to the Army’s LW155 distinguished the Army’s howitzer from the M198. As the Army explained, TAD would give the howitzer onboard

592002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 64-65. 602002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 612000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 622002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 632002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 65-66; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 83-84.

72

advanced capabilities like those associated with self-propelled howitzers, such as the Paladin M109A6 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer and the futuristic Crusader 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer under development, and would eliminate the need for external survey, aiming circles, aiming posts, and collimators. Capabilities, such as self-locating and orienting, onboard firing data computation, easy-to-read electronic sights, digital communications, and improved direct fire sight, would also make the Army version of the LW155 superior to the M198. Additionally, TAD would be compatible with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System (AFATDS). In light of this, the Army released a request for proposal to industry on 10 February 2000. After analyzing six proposals, the Army awarded a contract to General Dynamics Armament Systems of Burlington, Vermont, on 15 September 2000 to engineer, manufacture, and develop TAD for operational testing by 2003. To distinguish the Army’s LW155 with TAD from the basic LW155 (type classified as the M777A1 in 2003) for the Marine Corps, the Joint Program Office designated the Army’s LW155 as the XM777E1 (type classified as the M777E1 in 2003) and made the Army the lead agency. With the emergence of the M777E1, two LW155 programs existed -- the M777A1 with onboard conventional optical fire control capabilities and the M777E1 with digital capabilities.64 Fielding the M777 with conventional optical fire control began in the Marine Corps. On 19 January 2005 at Fort Sill, the Marine Corps conducted their first live fire of the M777 and received 55 of the planned 94 M777s. These howitzers were fielded to the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines at Twenty-Nine Palms and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines at Camp Pendleton. On 19 December 2005 Colonel John M. Sullivan, Jr., the Commander of the 11th Marine Regiment, certified that the Marine Corps had achieved their initial operational capability with the M777.65 Work on the software for the TAD and hardware meanwhile moved forward. In September-October 2006, the Army carried out a successful first article testing of the Digital Flight Control System (DFCS)-equipped M777A1 howitzer at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Together, the successful software testing and the successful first article testing led to full material release of the M777A1 with TAD capabilities on 12 January 2007 by Major General William M. Lenaer, Commanding General, U.S. Army Tank Command Life Cycle Management Command.66 Shortly afterwards, the Army initiated testing and fielding the M777A2 that would have software upgrades to fire the Excalibur precision munitions. In June 2007 I Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment successfully fired the first Excalibur from the M777A2. This led to full material release for the M777A2 system by the Army on 3 July 2007 and by the U.S. Marine Corps on 7 September 2007 and fielding to the 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in July 2007

642000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 112; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 66-67; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72. 652005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 64-65; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 67. 662006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 66.

73

with fielding continuing into 2010.67 Other crucial developments concurrently occurred. C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment fired the first Excalibur precision munition in Operation Enduring Freedom from the M777A2 on 13 January 2008; and later the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment fired the first Excalibur from the howitzer in Operation Iraqi Freedom on 26 April 2008.68 Subsequently to these operational firings, emerging force structure issues influenced fielding decisions with the M777A2. In August 2009 the Army decided to convert the 1st Brigade, 1st Armor Division, a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to Stryker Combat Brigade Teams (SBCT) in 2011 and 2012 respectively to shift their focus towards the middle of the spectrum of conflict. This action would require equipping the SBCTs with M777A2s and associated equipment and furnishing new equipment training. Additionally, the Army forced a 10 percent manpower reduction across all branches and proponencies; and the Field Artillery community decided to take this hit in all field artillery organizations except for brigade combat teams. The biggest “hit” on structure from force design analyzes required the echelons above brigade cannon battalions to convert from a 3x6 to a 3x4 force structure. In 2010 the Army decided to phase the conversion over a period of five years.69 Upgrade actions also influenced the M777A2 during 2010-2011. In August 2010 a limited user assessment held at Fort Bragg demonstrated the Hydraulic Power Assist Kit (HyPAK). It used hydraulic power to lift the weapon off the ground to minimize crew fatigue because the crew would no longer have to pump the wheels down manually. The HyPAK would also free up one soldier to do other tasks. This successful demonstration led to fielding HyPAK in FY 2012. Also, the Di-pulse Laser Ignition System (LIS) live-fire demonstration at Fort Sill on 1 December 2010 illustrated the ability to replace the primer as a propellant ignition source, offering the potential of eliminating the difficulties that arose in 2009 with M232A1 zone 5 charge. As long as a restriction for use of this charge continued, the weapon would be unable to reach maximum range, losing about 6,000 meters of range. The LIS was still in development at the close of the 2011, but all indicators were positive.70

672007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 68-69; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 87-88; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to 2010 Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH). 682008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 87; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 USAFAS AH. 692009 USAFAS AH, p. 89; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Scott Veach, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-21, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20, 2010 USAFAS AH. 70Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11; Briefing, subj: M777A2 Future Initiatives Demo, 8 Feb 12, Doc III-43, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Rafael Acevedo, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-44, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History, 6 Apr

74

As a result, the Army directed that engineering and development efforts continue in 2012, hoping to start fielding a LIS by FY 2014. Other upgrade actions in 2012 included the muzzle velocity sensor system, the electronic thermal warning device to warn of excessively high temperatures in the tube, an improved power conditioning and control module, and improved batteries to the automated equipment can run longer before recharging, among other initiatives.71 M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer Largely through the efforts of personnel at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 82nd Airborne Division obtained funding in 1998 for the Light Artillery System Improvement Program (LASIP) to provide some needed changes to the M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer to make it more maintainable and more operationally suitable. The Army initiated the LASIP program in 1998 with Block I improvements that included a cold weather recuperator, trail lifting handles, off-the-shelf brakes, and other enhancements. First applied in 2002, Block II upgrades consisted of a redesigned elevation gearbox, a new rammer/extractor tool, an improved buffer, an improved buffer/recuperator connection, a roll bar, and a new fire control system that used LEDs as a light source and not radioactive tritium. Because of the aggregate differences produced by LASIP Block I and II modifications from the original M119A1 that was typed classified in 1985 and was towed by a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), the Army designated modifications as the M119A2 with type classification coming on 15 February 2005.72 With the creation of the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) with their organic fires battalion beginning in 2002, the Army required more towed 105-mm. howitzers than in the inventory. This led to a decision by a general officer steering committee (GOSC) in June 2004 to rebuild and refit old M102 towed 105-mm. howitzers. Pressured by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, the GOSC re-evaluated the situation in August 2004 and ordered production of new M119A2 howitzers to fill the shortages. Shortly after, the Army National Guard decided to replace their M102 howitzers with the M119A2 to have a pure M119A2 fleet.73 ______12, Doc III-41, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Historical M119A2, 12 Feb 13, Doc III-31; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-32. 71Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11; Briefing, subj: M777A2 Future Initiatives Demo, 8 Feb 12; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Rafael Acevedo, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12; Email with atch, subj: TCM BCT-Fires Input to 2011 History, 6 Apr 12, Doc III-41, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Historical M119A2, 12 Feb 13; Interview, Dastrup with Brown, 5 Feb 13. 722000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 115-16; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 66. 732005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 66; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 66-67; 2007

75

Based upon successful testing, the Army granted new production full materiel release for the M119A2 on 10 June 2008 and fielding began. Because of modularity conversions and aging M102 howitzer fleets, the Army National Guard agreed to accept initial half-battalion fieldings for 2008 and 2009, allowing Army National Guard battalions to field their new equipment sooner. Over a period of eight months, the teams trained the 1st Battalion, 141st Field Artillery Regiment of the Louisiana Army National Guard, the 2nd Battalion, 122th Field Artillery Regiment of the Illinois Army National Guard, the 1st Battalion, 133rd Field Artillery Regiment of the Texas Army National Guard, the 1st Battalion, 107th Field Artillery Regiment of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard, and the 1st Battalion, 118th Field Artillery Regiment of the Georgia Army National Guard using new production weapons.74 Fielding M119A2 howitzers continued into 2011. By the end of 2010, 20 active component IBCTs and 18 of the twenty Army National Guard IBCTs had been fully fielded M119A2s. In 2011 the Army completed fielding the M119A2s. Twenty active component brigade combat teams and 20 Army National Guard brigade combat teams had M119A2s.75 Force structure changes meanwhile altered the number of M119A2s to be fielded. On 6 April 2009 the Secretary of Defense Bill Gates directed the Army to stop the growth of active component brigade combat teams at 45 rather than the 48 initially planned. Along with fewer howitzers required in preposition stocks, this action reduced the buy of M119A2s from 893 Army Acquisition Objective to 823 Army Program Objective. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Army Peter Geren halted the Army’s plan to organize the last three active component brigade combat teams at Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Carson, Colorado, and Fort Stewart, Georgia, and authorized an end strength in the Army of 547,000 to ensure better-manned units, to end the routine use of stop loss for deployment manning, and to reduce the risk of hollowing the force.76 Meanwhile, another critical issue arose with the M119A2 in 2006. With the fielding of the digitized M777A1 and the phasing out of the M102 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer, the M109A5 Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer, and the M198 Towed 155- mm. Howitzer, the M119A2 would be the only howitzer in the Army’s inventory without digital capabilities; and this would exacerbate the capability gap between the Infantry Brigade Combat Team and Heavy Stryker Brigade Combat Team because the latter ______USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 69. 742008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 89-90; 2099 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 90-91. 75Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie L. Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-49, 2011 USAFAS AH; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 91; Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie L. Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-25, 2009 USAFAS AH; SIGACTS, LW155 and M119, 19 Dec 09, Doc III-26, 2009 USAFAS AH; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 11 Dec 10, Doc III-27, 2009 USAFAS AH. 76Execution Order (FOUO), undated, material used is unclassified, Doc III-71, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: M119A2 Howitzer AAO Reduction, 9 Nov 09, Doc III- 72, 2010 USAFAS AH.

76

would have digitized howitzers. The lack of digital capabilities with the M119A2 would also prevent the howitzer from using near-precision munitions and the Precision Guidance Kit that would convert dumb munitions into near-precision munitions. The lack of precision in turn would lead to less accuracy, would make dispersed operations more difficult to perform, and would decrease the survivability of the Infantry Brigade Combat Team. In view of these reasons, the Field Artillery School, TRADOC, and the Army G8 (Programming and Materiel Integration) developed the requirements for digitizing the M119A2 along the lines of the M777A1. Based upon the Material Change Package (MCP) signed on 15 June 2007, the Field Artillery School and the Army developed a strategy for digitizing the M119A2. One year later in January 2008, the Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill approved digitized the M119A2.77 Over the next two years, digitizing the M119A2 moved forward. Major General Peter M. Vangjel, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS), Kevin M. Fahey, the Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems, and the Army G8 met on 24 January 2008 with the Program Manager for LW155. They agreed on the requirements, directed work to begin digitizing the M119A2 through a series of block upgrades, and recommended maximizing the use of digitization components common to the IBCT where they would be fielded. At a subsequent meeting on 2 October 2008, they defined functionality for the blocks -- Block One (aiming, pointing, and basic digital communications to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System), Block Two (ammunition management and deployment commands), and Block Three (on-board ballistic computation and integrated muzzle velocity management) and noted that the lack of off-the-shelf hardware had caused the initial operational capability date to slip from FY 2011 to FY 2012.78 Meanwhile, the Army conducted a preliminary design review on 10 June 2008 and another one in December 2008, while the 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment participated in Early User Assessments of the M119A2 digitization design concept in September 2008 and November 2008 respectively. The exchange between soldiers and engineers brought increased attention to digitizing the weapon and understanding of operational considerations to the engineers. Subsequently, on 30 June 2009, the program manager for the M119A2 released a request for proposal to industry for an inertial navigation device for the M119A2. Bid sample testing began in August 2009 and ended with a Global Positioning System (GPS) inertial navigation unit contract awarded to Honeywell

772006 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 67-68; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 70; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 90; Information Paper, subj: M119A2, 27 Oct 10, Doc III-50, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Digitized M119A2 Information Paper/Airdrop Certification, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-51, 2011 USAFAS AH; Joseph Lipinski, “Commonality of Towed Artillery Digital Fire Control Systems,” Army AL&T, Jul-Sep 10, pp. 21-24, Doc III-32a. 782008 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 90-91; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 92-93; SIGACTS LW 155 and M119, 20 Nov 10, Doc III-28, 2010 USAFAS AH.

77

Inc., Clearwater, Florida, in March 2010. Testing ended in December 2010 with digitizing remaining on track to retrofit 200 of 603 M119A2s starting in FY 2013 and to type classify the digitized howitzer as the M119A3. This would be followed by a Modification Work Order starting in FY 2014 for the remaining 403 howitzers to be digitized. By FY 2017 at the conclusion of the fielding, the Army would have a total of 823 M119 howitzers (603 M119A3s and 220 M119A2s). Meanwhile, the M119A2 was being upgraded with a titanium firing base plate to reduce weight and base plate crack, an improved muzzle velocity sensor system, an updated wheel assembly (valve stem protection), and a suspension lockout system to absorb the shock when the weapon was fired at top zone.79 Work on the M119A2 moved forward in 2012. In March 2012 a new howitzer production line was completed. The production line was originally scheduled to be completed in August 2011, but delays and contractor issues caused the program to miss the original date and to finish in March 2012. Between July 2012 and September 2012, the Program Office conducted a Follow-on Test and Evaluation on the digitized M119A2 at Fort Sill, using soldiers from B Battery, 2-2nd Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Taking place over a nine-week period, testing included the Fires Directorate (FTD), Program Manager-Towed Artillery Systems (PM-TAS), and TRADOC Capabilities Manager-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (TCM-IBCT) and consisted of three 96-hour vignettes in which B Battery fired over 12,000 rounds. Testing went well. At the end of the year in December 2012, the Program Executive Officer Brigadier General John McGuiness signed the Milestone C Type Classification Standard for the M119A2 as the M119A3. Fielding began in March 2013 when the 3-391 Field Artillery Regiment received its howitzers. Subsequently, the 1-320 Field Artillery Regiment and the 1-78 Field Artillery Regiment would receive their M119A3s.80 Paladin Integrated Management In the fall of 2007, the U.S. Army and BAE Systems signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a public-private partnership to develop and sustain the Army’s M109 Family of Vehicles (FOV) -- the M109A6 Self-Propelled 155-mm. Howitzer

792008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 90-91; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 92-93; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 19 Dec 09; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 20 Nov 10; Email with atch, subj: M119 Input to 2010 Annual History, 7 Mar 11, Doc III-29, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie L. Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 29 Feb 12; Audra Calloway, “M119A2 Howitzer Upgrade Gives Quicker Firepower,” Army News Service, undated, Doc III-52, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atchs, subj: Digitized M119A2 Information Paper, 29 Feb 12, Doc III-53, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: M119 Tow 105 2011, 9 Mar 12, Doc III-54, 2011 USAFAS AH; Lipinski, “Commonality of Towed Artillery Digital Fire Control Systems,” pp. 21-24. 80Email with atch, subj: Historical M119A2, 12 Feb 13, Doc III-33; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-34; Email, subj: Historical M119A2, 14 Feb 13, Doc III-34a; Audra Calloway, “M119A2 Howitzer Upgrade Provides Quicker Firepower,” www.army.mil, Doc III-35; “Update on the Digitized M119A3 Program,” RedLeg Update, Mar 13, Doc III-36.

78

(Paladin), the M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Resupply Vehicle (FAASV), and the Paladin Operations Center Vehicle (POCV) -- through the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program and later in May 2008 signed a contract to design and develop the PIM M109 system of vehicles. The Army separately approved the capabilities production document for the POCV, started the process of incorporating it into the M109 FOV capabilities production document to rebaseline the FOV with all three platforms, and initiated testing in 2008.81 The Army intended PIM program to improve readiness, avoid component obsolescence, and increase sustainability of the M109 platforms beyond 2031. Operationally, PIM program upgrades would make the howitzer faster, more maneuverable, more sustainable, and more lethal and would reduce the logistics footprint and operation and support costs. To achieve these objectives, PIM would leverage commonality with Future Combat System’s Non-Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) and the heavy brigade combat team’s (HBCT) Bradley fighting vehicle. For example the PIM would use the Bradley’s engine and transmission and new track/suspension and incorporate select technologies from the NLOS Cannon including but not limited to the automated projectile rammer and modern electric-gun drive systems to replace the current hydraulic operations (elevation and azimuth drives) that were designed in the early 1960s. Once delivered to the field, the PIM M109 FOV would give the HBCT upgraded capabilities including more maneuverability, higher rate of speed, increased crew survivability, and delivery of accurate and timely fires.82 The M109 FOV successfully completed the Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews, among other milestones, in 2008. Upon successful completion of these reviews, the M109 was postured to begin prototype testing in the fourth quarter of FY 2009. Successful completion of prototype testing would positively impact the Milestone C decision scheduled for the third quarter of FY 2010. Upon completion of the Milestone C decision, the program would move forward into Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) to produce limited quantities of the vehicles.83 In 2009 key developments took place. In January 2009 the program manager approached the U.S. Army Armament Research and Development and Engineering Center about approving the capabilities documents, but the center did not approve it. However, the cancellation of the NLOS Cannon in April 2009 by the Secretary of Defense caused PIM to become the Army’s number one modernization effort and led to approval of the capabilities production document on 9 August 2009 that scheduled a Milestone C decision in 2011. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine

812007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 70-71; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 91. 82Kris Osborn, “Army Developing New Self-Propelled Howitzer,” www.army.mil/article, 6 Sep 11, Doc III-55; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 70-71; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 91-92; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 93-94. 832008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 92; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 94.

79

Command (TRADOC) stripped the POCV from PIM and tied it to a command and control vehicle to replace the M113, the M577, and the M1068 vehicles. In August 2009 the Army awarded BAE the contract to produce seven PIM vehicles -- five self-propelled howitzers and two carrier ammunition tracked (CAT) vehicles. Five months later on 20 January 2010, the company unveiled its first M109 PIM prototype.84 Later in 2010, Lieutenant General Michael M. Vane, the Director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, TRADOC, made a significant change to the PIM program. He increased force protection and survivability, but the changes were not added to the capabilities production document. This created confusion with the program since some government agencies and some contractors did not have the changes and consequently increased the cost of PIM.85 PIM costs generated concern. In March 2010 the Secretary of the Army and the Vice Chief of the Staff of the Army received a PIM costs briefing that were based upon contractor estimates so that they could determine how many PIMs could be purchased. The briefing also indicated an aggressive acquisition schedule, causing them to request acquisition changes, because they believed that the schedule was too aggressive and created a high-risk program. Subsequently, the Army Acquisition Executive adopted the low-risk schedule rather than the moderate-risk schedule or the low- to moderate-risk schedule alternatives. The low-risk schedule slowed down the program, included all test events, slipped Milestone C decision where the Army had to decide about going into LRIP or not from 2011 to 2013, and established full-rate production in 2017.86 Using the contractor estimates that had been briefed in March 2010, the Army G- 3 subsequently determined in April 2010 how many PIM sets (howitzers and ammunition and resupply vehicles) that the Army could purchase. At that time the G-3 opted to buy 440 sets that was a reduction from the previous number of 718. This would modernize about one half of the M109 fleet in the active and reserve components. Shortly after in May 2010, the Army realized that the cost of the 440 sets was based upon contractor estimates and not the actual cost of the PIM set. Purchasing the PIM would cost considerably more, forcing the Army and the Field Artillery to rejustify PIM program continually.87 In October 2010 rising costs influenced the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army to question if the program was justifiable and why the costs had changed so frequently during the year. To answer the questions the Army held a cost briefing on 17 November 2010 because the costs had risen from $3.6 million per set to $5.4 million to $9.4 million.

842009 USAFAS AH, pp. 94-95; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with MAJ Jeffrey R. White, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-30, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12, Doc III-56, 2011 USAFAS AH 85Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12. 86Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12. 87Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12.

80

The last cost turned PIM into an acquisition category one; and this meant that the Office of the Secretary of Defense would now make the decision about PIM’s future and all major program decisions and not the Army. Because the $9.4 million was considered too expensive, the Office of the Secretary of Defense chose to replace all M109 Paladins with PIM. This would reduce the cost to $7.2 million per set. Subsequently in May 2011, the Army decided to field 580 PIMs to have a pure PIM fleet.88 Meanwhile, congressional staffers who were concerned about the status of the PIM project visited the BAE facilities. While there, they had an opportunity to ride in a PIM prototype. This visit allayed their fears, earned their support, and provided the Army with an opportunity to reaffirm congressional commitment to the PIM program.89 Subsequently, the Army conducted a two-part de-scoping effort using the Army Oversight Council (AROC) in January-February 2011 to review the status and requirements of the program in the face of rising costs and funding shortfalls. The AROC approved the capability production document with revisions and a classified annex E. The AROC reduced the reliability requirement to permit flexibility with the testing schedule and acceptance of the PIM and added Office of the Secretary of Defense directed force protection and survivability requirements with add-on armor kits for operational flexibility that would permit the commander to choose the right configuration for the mission.90 Several months after the AROC in June 2011, the Army began developmental testing at the Yuma Proving Grounds, Arizona, for firing and automotive performance and the Aberdeen Test Center, , for automotive performance. Test events were designed to achieve system requirements. Successful test results permitted development and testing to continue that laid the groundwork for a Milestone C decision in June 2013 and award of a low-rate initial production contract.91

88Briefing, subj: Update for Secretary of Army and Chief of Staff of the Army, 14 Mar 12, Doc III-57, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: PIM AROC Update, 4 Feb 11, Doc III-58, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jeff White, TCM BCT Fires, 13 Mar 12, Doc III-59, 2011 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, subj: M109 Family of Vehicles Army Acquisition Objective, 24 May 11, Doc III-60, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Information Paper, subj: How the PIM Supports Army Concepts, 19 Nov 10, Doc III-31, 2010 USAFAS AH. 89Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12; Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jeff White, TCM BCT-Fires, 13 Mar 12; Email, subj: EXSUM: PIM, 11 Feb 11, Doc III-61, 2011 USAFAS AH. 90Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12; Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jeff White, TCM BCT-Fires, 13 Mar 12; Email, subj: PIM AROC Update, 3 Feb 11, Doc III-62, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Paladin PIM AROC, 21 Jan 11, Doc III-63, 2011 USAFAS AH. 91Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12; Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 13 Mar 12; Kris Osborn, “U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center Information Paper, subj: Army Developing New Self-

81

The Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel (JROC) approved the requirements listed in the M109 FOV capability production document on 16 December 2011 as an acquisition category ID program. Concerns continued about the increasing costs and government risk generated by a poor contract structure choice. Following the JROC, a Defense Acquisition Board in December 2011 approved modification to the contract from a cost plus fixed-fee type to a cost plus incentive-fee type. This would reduce overall costs and incentivize the contractor with additional money to deliver a quality product on time. The new contract modification also extended the period of performance for developmental testing through 2015.92 Subsequently, the Army conducted several key events in 2012. From May to November 2012, it conducted a logistics demonstration. During the demonstration, soldiers performed field level operations and maintenance to demonstrate the PIM’s suitability for maintenance in the field and the requirement to update procedures in the draft technical manuals. Running from October to November 2012, the limited users test gave soldiers the first opportunity to employ the PIM in an operational environment. Following individual and collective training, soldiers from the 4-27th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas, ran the vehicle through two 72-hour scenarios with the PIM and CAT, firing 1,255 rounds and driving 882 miles. The soldiers demonstrated the PIM’s ability to deliver accurate and timely fires in an operational environment. Essentially, the Limited User Test helped prove how soldiers would be able to operate the system and provide additional data showing that the system could continue development testing and move into Low-Rate Initial Production in 2013.93 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System-G The Army introduced the self-contained Position and Azimuth Determining System (PADS) early in the 1980s to determine position, azimuth, and elevation rapidly and accurately in either ground or airborne survey operations. The Army wrote the original requirements documents in February 1974 and equipped the first unit with PADS in 1981.94 ______Propelled Howitzer,” live.usaac.info, 27 Oct 11, Doc III-64, 2011 USAFAS AH; Kris Osborn, “Army Developing New Self-Propelled Howitzer,” www.army.mil/article, 1 Sep 11, Doc III-65, 2011 USAFAS AH. 92Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 13 Mar 12; Email, subj: EXSUM CCM, 9 Jan 12, Doc III-66, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: DRM EXSUM, 5 Dec 11, Doc III-67, 2011 USAFAS AH; CPD, 21 Dec 11, Doc III-68, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: PIM Input for Ft. Sill Historian 2012, 21 Mar 12. 93Interview, Dastrup with Cpt Dusty Gray, TCM BCT Fires, 8 Feb 13, Doc III-37; Briefing (Extract) Log Demo EAD Review, 15 Jan 13, Doc III-38; “Update on the Paladin Integrated Management Program,” RedLeg Update, 2-13 Feb 13, Doc III-39; Email, subj: PIM Input to 2012 USAFAS Annual History, 22 Feb 13, Doc III-39a; Email with atch, subj: Dr. Dastrup Article, 9 Apr 13, Doc III-39b. 942002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 85.

82

Because of age and escalating maintenance costs with PADS, the Army acted. In June 1995 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School approved a continuing need for non-global positioning inertial survey systems. Seven years later on 12 August 2002, Army approved an operational requirements document (ORD) for a replacement system to PADS, called the Improved Positioning and Azimuth Determining System (IPADS). The Army selected L3 Communications of New York in August 2003 to produce the system. Developmental testing began in 2003 at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, and Fort Sill; and the Army made a milestone decision in June 2004 to field the system and awarded a contract to L3 Communications of New Jersey in September 2004 to produce the system. Fielding began in August 2005 under a conditional material release until 2007 and was completed in mid-2009.95 In 2006 and early 2007 Fort Sill began working to incorporate a SAASM Global Positioning System (GPS) Card into IPADS which would almost eliminate zero velocity updates (ZUPs) and extend its area of coverage. The GPS-augmented IPADS would be called IPADS-G.96 In February 2008 an IPADS-G prototype was successfully tested over a distance of 230 kilometers for 60 minutes without stopping for a ZUP. The contractor began developmental work on IPADS-G in 2010.97 Fielding for IPAD-G began in September 2012 and was later put on hold because of a manufacture error with the GPS card. In January 2013 fielding started again starting with the 5-25th Fires Battalion of the 4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Combat Team of Fort Polk, Louisiana. Currently, the Army planned to field eight IPAD-G units per month until all Field Artillery brigades and battalions had their upgraded systems. This also included Marine Corps and Allies’ units.98

952002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 85-86; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 106; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 96-97; L-3 Information Paper, subj: L-3 Communications Space and Navigation Awarded Major Indirect Fire Support Contract in Support of U.S. Army TACOM, 13 Sep 04, Doc III-40. 962003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 106; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 96-97. 972008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 124-25; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School Annual History, pp. 129-30; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2001 USAFAS AH; L-3 Communications Information Paper, subj: L-3 Awarded Contract to Add GPS Capabilities to U.S. Army’s IPADS Equipment, 16 Sep 10, Doc III-41; Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 5 Feb 13, Doc III-42. 98Email with atch, subj: IPADS Input to 2012 USAFAS Annual History, 8 Feb 13, Doc III-43; Briefing, subj: Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System- GPS Aided ECP, New Material Introduction, undated, Doc III-44.

83

TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGER FIRES CELL

Modernizing Gunnery Material Effort The purpose of the modernizing gunnery effort was to provide a technologically feasible material solution that modernized current manual gunnery tools for Fires Soldiers. The goal for the modernizing gunnery solution was to make these tools more efficient, accurate, and intuitive. There were three phases to this effort. Phase one was currently ongoing and was conducted by the Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) Fire Support Engineering Division (FSED). They were tasked to produce a “Proof of Principle” by 30 September 2013. This proof of principle would be informally evaluated locally by soldiers for suitability and functionality. Once this evaluation was completed, phase two would begin by providing the program and the evaluation results to U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research and Development Center (AMRDEC) for further development and to operationalize the final product. The operational fieldable solution would be called Fire Direction Warrior and would ultimately become part of the NETT Warrior family of systems. Phase three would begin once AMRDEC development was complete, and the program was provided to Product Manager Fire Support Command and Control (PM FSC2) for final testing and fielding. This material solution would better facilitate visualization of the gunnery problem/solution. It would enhance the efficiency and accuracy of gunnery computations and provide a modernized technical firing computation back-up to current automated systems at echelons battery and below. The modernizing gunnery program would continue to develop technology enhancements to current manual gunnery for Fires Soldiers.99 Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble During the first years of the 21st Century, the advent of Global Positioning System (GPS) aided munitions, such as the 155-mm. Excalibur, the Multiple-Launch Rocket System Guided Unitary, and the 120-mm. Precision Guided Mortar outpaced the dismounted forward observer’s organic ability to locate targets in a timely and accurate manner. Weight, power, consumption rates, cabling difficulties, and the lack of simultaneous voice and digital transmission means prevented the dismounted forward observer at company and below levels from exploiting the precision munitions. Although Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF) could refine grid coordinates for precision strikes, it generally resided at levels above the dismounted forward observer. As a result, the dismounted forward observer lacked the ability to employ precision munitions because he did not have the capability of providing precise target location. Specifically, the dismounted forward observer lacked the ability to locate ground targets rapidly with better than 10-meter accuracy without target mensuration, preventing engagement with precision attack indirect fire systems. As one Field Artilleryman indicated, the munitions would fly precisely to the assigned coordinates, but those coordinate would be incorrect.100

99Email with atch, subj: Modernizing Gunnery Paragraph, 30 May 13, Doc III- 44a. 100Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-45.

84

With the advent of technological advances in targeting that complemented the increased accuracy in munitions, the Army established the requirement to increase target location accuracy for the dismounted forward observer. This led the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Capabilities Manager (TCM) Fires Cell and others to develop the precision fires warrior ensemble. Conceived in June 2012, the ensemble included a collection of technology that would be worn by the Soldier on the Integrated Outer Tactical Vest. The heart of the ensemble was the Forward Observer Software (FOS) application located on a ruggedized commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) smart phone called an End User Device (EUD). While running the FOS software, the EUD would be able to display a digital map depicting the selected situational awareness and fire support measures on its five-inch screen. To locate targets precisely, the dismounted precise warrior would employ the hand-held Joint Effects Targeting System underdevelopment with fielding scheduled for 2016. In the meantime, the discounted forward observer would utilize the Quick Reaction Capability hand-held precision targeting device that was scheduled for fielding in 2013 and would bridge the gap between existing equipment, the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 2H (LLDR2H) and Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS). JETS would be capable of night observation, target location, and designation. The precision fires warrior ensemble would give the dismounted forward observer the capability of employing all of the available precision munitions and ability to locate a target for precision munitions without mensuration. As planned in 2012, the Army would field the ensemble initially to the infantry brigade combat teams and Ranger regiments in 2015 followed by the armored brigade combat teams, and the Stryker brigade combat teams.101 Warfighter Information Network-Tactical In 2012 the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) leveraged the networked battlefield more than ever with the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) that was a multiyear program to improve communications. In 1982 the Army acquired the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) system to fill the communications requirements from division down to battalion. Adopted before the widespread availability of satellite communications technology, the MSE required installation and maintenance of relay towers. Military operations during Operation Desert Storm (Iraq) of 1991, Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2001, and Operation Iraqi Freedom of 2003 revealed the inability of MSE systems to keep with high mobile and dispersed forces in a digital environment.102 In 2002 the Army conceived the WIN-T to solve this problem and to enable mobile mission command on the battlefield and decided to field it in increments to address Nunn-McCurdy guidelines on costs. Work began that year with the Joint Network Node (JNN) being introduced in 2004 as WIN-T Increment 1 (completed fielding in 2012) to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan to bridge the gap between

101Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; “Precision Fires Warrior Ensemble,” Redleg Update, Dec 12, Doc III-46. 102Email with atch, subj; Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-47; Maryann Lawlor, “WIN-T Marches Forward,” Signal Online, www.afcea.org, Jul 12, Doc III-48.

85

MSE and full WIN-T on-the-move capabilities. Although it was limited, JNN provided beyond-line-of-sight communications and enabled units to operate autonomously. It also provided the battalion and above with the ability to connect to the Army’s digitized voice, data, and video systems via satellite Internet connection at the quick-halt. Subsequently, the Army adopted WIN-T Increment 1a. It upgraded JNN to access the Ka-band defense Wideband Global Satellite, while Increment 1b introduced the Net Centric Waveform that optimized bandwidth and satellite utilization and colorless core technology for further security.103 As the Army fielded WIN-T Increment 1a and 1b, it conducted tests with WIN-T Increment 2 in December 2012 with the goal of fielding it in 2013. Increment 2 provided a single integrated tactical network program by leveraging proven commercial and government technology and furnished on-the-move capability and a mobile infrastructure. It also enabled network mobility by employing military and commercial satellite connectivity and line-of-sight terrestrial radios operating on the Joint Tactical Radio System and antennas to achieve end-to-end connectivity and dynamic networking operations. Equally important, Increment 2 extended the network to company/battery level within the brigade combat team.104 The Army scheduled two more increments for fielding in the near future. WIN-T Increment 3 would provide fully mobile, flexibly dynamic tactical networking capability need to support highly dispersed forces over isolated areas, while Increment 4, the Transformational Satellite Communications System would furnish the Department of Defense with a high data rate Military Satellite Communications and Internet-like services.105 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle In 2012 the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle (BFIST) fielded as a replacement to the M981 Fire Support Vehicle (FISTV) served as the Field Artillery’s fire support vehicle for the heavy forces, such as the heavy brigade combat team. Late in the 1970s, a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) working group, Close Support Study Group (CSSG) II, met to optimize observed fire support for the maneuver forces. Besides reaffirming the necessity of the Fire Support Team (FIST) that had been created in the mid-1970s to integrate fire support with the maneuver arms at the company level, the group recommended fielding a mobile fire support vehicle for reliable, secure communications.106

103Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Maryann Lawlor, “WIN-T Marches Forward.” 104Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Maryann Lawlor, “WIN-T Marches Forward;” Information Papers, PEO Command, Control, Communications- Tactical, subj: WIN-T, undated, Doc III-49. 105“Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13; Maryann Lawlor, “WIN-T Marches Forward;” Information Papers, PEO, Command, Control, Communications- Tactical, subj: WIN-T undated. 1062000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 138-39.

86

After funding became available early in the 1990s and after the maneuver arms received their Bradley fighting vehicles, equipping the Field Artillery with the BFIST became a reality. As of 1995-1996, combat and materiel developers envisioned two models of BFIST (the M7 and M7A1) with each being a type-classified system. The M7 would integrate a fire support mission package onto a modified Bradley A2 ODS chassis. The M7A1 would be more advanced and use a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis with the fire support mission package.107 After several years of work on BFIST, the project manager modified the acquisition strategy for the M7A1 in 1999 by initiating an engineering change proposal to the M7 BFIST to develop it into the M3A3 BFIST and halted work on the M7A1. This meant that there would not be a M7A1 as initially planned. The M3A3 BFIST (A3 BFIST) would be based on a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis, would incorporate the M7 fire support mission package, and would be fielded beginning in 2004 to counterattack units, such as the digitized 4th Infantry Division. Thus, the M7 BFIST and the A3 BFIST existed as official Army programs to adapt the Bradley fighting vehicle to fire support missions as of 2003-2004.108 In Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 the Program Manager acquired funds to retrofit A3 BFISTs with the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) as the main target location system for underarmor targeting and designation. The FS3 Sensor would provide the A3 BFIST with the most accurate and greatest range sensor available. The FS3 would allow the fire support team to detect, identify, and designate targets for precision munitions at greater ranges while remaining buttoned up (protected by the vehicle’s armor) and would give the A3 BFIST the same capability as the Stryker fire support platform and the M1200 Armored Knight. The critical design was approved on 18 June 2008; and an integrated development test with soldiers was completed in February 2010. The 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Georgia, was the first unit equipped; and this came in June 2011.109 Subsequently, the Army awarded BAE a contract in August 2012 to upgrade Bradley M2A2, M2A3, and M7 to the Operation Desert Storm Situational Awareness (SA) configuration with final delivery in 2014 This program would bring these vehicles close to those of the A3 by integrating the latest digitized electronics to provide optimal

1072000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 140-43; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94. 1082001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 107; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 94-95. 1092004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 126-27; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 131; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 26, Doc III-32, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-33, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 11, p. 30, Doc III-69; FCOS CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27, Doc III-70, 2011 USAFAS AH; “Ground Combat Systems,” “Army, Oct 11, p. 338, Doc III-71, 2011 USAFAS AH.

87

situational awareness, network connectivity, and enhanced communications hardware.110 Knight Vehicle The Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) employed the M981 fire support vehicle. Besides lacking mobility and stealth, the M981 had been designed for armored and mechanized forces and presented a unique signature in forces that used High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) as their scout vehicles. In response to this discrepancy, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) approved a change to the Fire Support Vehicle Operational Requirements Document of April 1997, written by the Field Artillery School, to leverage fire support vehicle technology for heavy and light forces. In the revised Operational Requirements Document the Field Artillery School retained the BFIST for the heavy forces and recommended developing a vehicle with BFIST mission capabilities for the COLT by integrating the fire support mission equipment package onto a HMMWV chassis, known as the Striker. This would provide the COLT with unprecedented mobility, flexibility, and stealth. Also, the Striker would be less noticeable because it would present a common signature with other HMMWV vehicles, would save Bradley assets for fire support teams, and would lower operating costs for the COLT. Based upon its performance in the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment of March 1997, the Striker vehicle, as well as the Striker concept that furnished six Striker vehicles to each heavy maneuver brigade, was adopted by the U.S. Army and was approved as a Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) by the Chief of Staff of the Army on 14 May 1997 for rapid development.111 In 1999-2002 several critical events with Striker occurred. Early in 1999, the Army type-classified the system as the M707 Striker and conducted a successful air-drop test to demonstrate its ability to be dropped from an aircraft. Also, the contractor built three prototypes that went through successful developmental and operational testing in 2000 by the 4th Infantry Division that would be the first unit equipped. The following year, the Army fielded Striker to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Field Artillery School, and Army National Guard units in South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. In addition, the Army fielded the Striker to the 82nd Airborne Division in 2002 and to active component units and Army National Guard units in 2003-2004. To avoid confusion with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, meanwhile, the Army renamed the Striker the Knight in 2002.112

1102009 USAFAS AH, pp. 131-32; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Brown, 17 Feb 11; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 10; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 11, p. 30; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338; BAE Information Paper, 13 Aug 12, Doc III-50; Interview, Dastrup with Col Scott Patton, Dir, TCM Fires Cell, and Gordon Wehri, TCM Fires Cell, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-51. 1112000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 144. 1122000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 145; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p.

88

Key actions occurred in 2005 and 2006. In December 2005 the Program Manager Office determined that the current M1025 version of the HMMWV and the planned replacement the M1114 would no longer be able to support the Knight program. Due to armor increases, either vehicle with the Mission Equipment Package (MEP) would no longer be safe to operate because increased vehicle weight would create excessive operating restrictions. In January 2006 Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) at Fort Sill submitted a letter to the Program Manager agreeing with him about the weight and urged finding a suitable replacement. Subsequently, on 17 April 2006 Headquarters Department of the Army G-3/5/7 validated Third Army’s operational needs statement to provide the 10th Mountain Division with five Knight systems on a more survivable platform than the existing one. These two concerns prompted the Product Manager Fire Support Systems to initiate an effort to change the platform of the M707 Knight system from the M1114 HMMWV based system to a M1117 Armored Security Vehicle based system.113 Subsequently, the Army purchased eight M1117 Armored Security Vehicles and designated them as the M1200 Armored Knight. Production began late in 2007 with a Limited User Test completed in September 2007. In October 2007 the 10th Mountain Division received five M1200 Armored Knights. The 101st Division received the first four M1200 vehicles in November 2007 with regular fielding beginning in February 2008 and continuing into 2013. Through the end of Fiscal Year 2012, the Army had fielded 414 M1200 Armored Knights out of 465 systems to be procured out of Army Acquisition Objective.114 Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder Early in the 1990s, fire supporters employed the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator (GVLLD) to lase targets for location and precision-guided munitions. The system weighed 107 pounds, reduced the mobility of light fire support teams, did not meet their needs, and was not man-portable. In response to this situation and the lack of a man-portable system to designate targets, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School wrote an Operational Requirements Document for the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR). Approved by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in February 1994, the LLDR would replace the GVLLD. Although the LLDR remained unfunded for several years, the School still pursued acquisition. Combining technological advances in position/navigation (Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System), thermal sights, and laser development, the LLDR would be a lightweight, compact, man-portable system designed for dismounted or mounted operations. Besides determining range, azimuth, and vertical angle, the LLDR would permit light forces to perform fire support functions quickly and accurately on a fast- ______96. 1132005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 128. 1142008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 128; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 11, pp. 338-40, Doc III-72, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, subj: M1200 Armored Knight, 11 Mar 13, Doc III-52.

89

paced, less dense, and more lethal battlefield and would offer the best alternative to the GVLLD. Because of its modular design, it could be readily tailored to the mission. In its target location configuration the LLDR weighed about 20 pounds and had the ability of locating targets accurately out to 10 kilometers and seeing the battlefield with a near, all- weather capability at shorter ranges. An integrated thermal night-sight would provide continuous day/night operations and the ability to see through obscurants, such as fog and smoke. If needed, the LLDR could be configured with a separate laser designator module to designate moving and stationary targets for precision munitions. This configuration would increase the system’s weight to 35 pounds. Equally important, the LLDR could be used in training environments because of its eye-safe rangefinder.115 Although LLDR passed the initial operational test and evaluation in 2001, testing revealed some deficiencies. As a result, the Army developed a corrective action plan; and LLDR program proceeded to Milestone III where the Army decided to move into it low-rate initial production (LRIP). The 82nd Airborne Division was scheduled to receive the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) and LRIP production models; but the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon caused the Army to shift fielding priorities. Instead, the Special Operations Command was fielded with the EMD models, while the 82nd Airborne Division and the Interim Brigade Combat Team, later renamed the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, were scheduled to share 66 LRIP models. In 2002 the Army fielded 15 test LLDRs to the 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan, started developing plans to reduce the system’s weight even more, and anticipated a full-rate production decision in 2003 and fielding in 2004.116 In December 2003 the Army made the LLDR full-rate production decision with contract negotiations continuing into 2004 and shifted its fielding priorities at the same time. LRIP fielding priority shifted from the 82nd Airborne Division to the 25th Infantry Division. Just as the 25th Infantry Division was deploying to Iraq in January 2004, it received 21 LLDRs. Subsequently in September 2004, the 3rd Infantry Division’s combat observation lasing teams (COLTs) received 20 LLDRs in conjunction with M707 Knight fieldings. Later in October, the Army fielded two LLDRs to the Field Artillery School for enlisted and officer instruction and decided to field the LLDR to units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and to the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment), making it the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to receive the system.117 In November 2005 the Army Requirements and Review Board approved accelerating LLDR production and increased funding in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008-2113 Program Objective Memorandum. The production rates would go from three LLDRs per month, doubling every six months until a full rate production of 40 per month would be

1152000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 145-46. 1162001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 109; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 110. 1172004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99.

90

achieved. This funding stream would complete LLDR fielding by FY 2013 to the entire active and reserve components. In fact, the Army completed fielding LLDR, also called LLDR1, in 2011.118 Meanwhile in October 2006, the Program Manager for LLDR initiated a two-year performance improvement and weight reduction effort and designated the effort as the LLDR2. Product improvements included improved day-and-night imaging performance, solid-state laser designator module that would provide higher reliability, and a five-pound overall weight reduction to the system. The improvements would be available in FY 2010 without an increase in unit cost. Fielding began in FY 2011 to units supporting Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.119 On 21 September 2010 the Army G-3 acknowledged the LLDR’s need for better accuracy to support current and future precision-guided munitions. As a result, it began development on the LLDR 2H, initiated testing in 2010, awarded a contract to retrofit LLDR1 and LLDR2 as the high-accuracy LLDR 2H. Upon fielding in 2012, the new system would incorporate the High Accuracy Azimuth Device that would not be subject to the magnet interference issues that had plagued existing target locator systems. The device had three cameras, one day and two nights, that would map the location of the sun and stars and would compare them to its GPS location to determine very accurate direction and angular deviation to permit the soldier to call for fire with precision- munitions. A limited number of hardened prototype LLDR 2Hs have been produced as of 2012.120 Joint Effects Targeting System In June 2004 the Army/Marine Corps Board (AMCB) convened to discuss a common laser-targeting device and directed the services to develop a common system requirement. In response, Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Southern Command representatives began developing the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS). JETS would consist of a Target Location Designation System (TLDS) and a Target Effects Coordination System (TECS). Combined, they would enable the dismounted observer (forward observer, joint target attack controller, special operations forces, and others) to acquire and engage targets and control all available effects providers (field artillery, close air support, attack aviation, and naval gunfire) and to designate stationary and moving targets out to five and three kilometers respectfully. A Forward observer equipped with JETS with TLDS capabilities would be capable of target recognition out to ranges of

1182005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED- 1, 2012, Doc III-74, 2011 USAFAS AH. 1192008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS), ACH, p. 131; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III- 99, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012. 120Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-35, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: LLDR AN/PED-1, 2012; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-53.

91

3,000 meters during the day and 1,300 meters during the night. TECS would provide Blue Force Situational Awareness (BFSA) and communications interface with effects providers through all existing and planned wave forms. As of February 2005, the JETS initial capabilities document (ICD) had been completed and sent out for worldwide staffing. On 19 September 2005 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the ICD.121 In October 2006 the Department of Defense designated the Army as the lead component for JETS. The Army made Program Executive Office Soldier the material developer to assist the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in the development of the capabilities documents and supporting analysis documentation. Work on the capabilities development document began with an analysis of alternatives being conducted in 2007-2008. The Capabilities Development Document for TLDS was released for worldwide staffing in January 2009, while the Army worked to produce the TECS capability development document.122 In July 2010 a meeting held at the Pentagon with milestone decision authority led to a successful milestone a decision for the JETS TLDS. This moved JETS from the material solution analysis phase into the technology development phase with the program examining technology demonstrator prototypes and refining the draft Capabilities Development Document for final staffing. Two years later in 2012, the Army Contracting Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, awarded contract to design, develop, fabricate, test, and deliver prototypes for engineering and manufacturing development of the system with fielding scheduled for 2016.123 In the interim, the Army planned to field the Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) hand-held targeting device in 2013. It would provide the dismounted forward observer with the ability to locate targets accurately in a timely manner and within the standards required to employ precision munitions. Basically, the QRC would bridge the gap between the existing target location capability found in units today and the objectively capability of JETS.124 Fire Support Sensor System The Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) was an engineer change proposal to the

1212004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 97. 1222008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 130; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 26; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III-99, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH). 123Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-35, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: Joint Effects Targeting System, 12 Jun 12, Doc III-54; Information Paper, U.S. Army, subj: Joint Effects Targeting System Target Location Designation System, undated, Doc III-55; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-56. 124Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13.

92

Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3). The engineer change proposal integrated the laser designation module from the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR) onto the LRAS3 that in turn could be mounted on the Knight and Striker fire support vehicle (potentially BFIST in the future). The FS3 would be complemented by the platform’s mission equipment package, providing very accurate self-location and accurate target location. The FS3 would be the most capable observation, target location, and designation sensor on the battlefield.125 Fielding the FS3 began in 2006. The 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) at Fort Lewis, Washington, was retrofitted with the FS3 in February-April 2006. The 4th SBCT received its FS3s in July-September 2006 while the 3rd SBCT, currently deployed, was retrofitted upon returning from its overseas deployment. Integrating the FS3 onto the M3A3 BFIST began in 2007 and continued into 2011.126 Profiler In 1995 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School started work on replacing the existing Meteorological Measuring Set (MMS) with the MMS-Profiler. The MMS produced meteorological (MET) messages by obtaining data from radiosonde instrumentation carried aloft by balloons and sent back to a ground-based receiver. Given the current state of operational Numerical Weather Prediction systems, the single local balloon-borne radiosonde technology used by MMS was antiquated and limited in capability. The MMS MET messages provided only limited range and carried high operational and support costs. To address these shortcomings, an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Target Area Meteorological Measuring System (TAMMS) was generated and signed on 15 October 1996 by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This ORD, later renamed MMS-Profiler, required a system to provide a modernized, real-time meteorological capability over an extended battle space out to 500 kilometers. The system would provide vital target area meteorological information from a mesoscale model and associated software that acquired information from weather satellites and other MET sensors for use in the employment of smart weapons to ensure proper munitions selection and optimal aiming. The Profiler would also furnish field artillery forces with current or expected weather conditions along the projectile trajectory and within the target area. In 2000 the Army issued a contract for Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) of the Profiler system to Environmental Technologies Group (now Smith Industries) of Baltimore, Maryland. The initial program schedule called for operational testing in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 and low-rate initial production (LRIP) of nine systems to begin in the third quarter

1252004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 96. 1262005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 129; Email with atch, subj: TPSO History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III-99, 2010 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), Annual History (AH); “Ground Combat System,” Army, Oct 11, p. 338, Doc III-75, 2011 USAFAS AH; “Ground Combat Systems,” Army, Oct 09, p. 355, Doc III-76, 2011 USAFAS AH; Raytheon Information Paper, subj: FS3, 2011, Doc III-77, 2011 USAFAS AH.

93

of FY 2003. Production of 83 systems was originally scheduled to begin in the first quarter of FY 2005, and the first unit equipment was equipped the second quarter of FY 2005.127 Progress with the program moved forward but with modifications. The Army changed the acquisition strategy to incorporate a system functional demonstration during the second quarter of FY 2003. In 2004 the program received a Milestone C decision after the completion of a successful developmental test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and went through an operational test at Fort Sill. Following these tests, LRIP began. Subsequently, the Army granted an urgent material release and fielded Profiler to the 3rd Infantry Division in December 2004. The Profiler program began full- rate production (FRP) in April 2006 after the Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare granted approval. In 2007 Program Manager (PM) Target Identification and Meteorological Systems (TIMS) accepted an initial five FRP Profiler systems. The first of these systems was fielded in March 2007 under an urgent material release until the full material release could be attained. In December of 2007 the Army approved full material release and fielded the MMS-Profiler, also known as MMS- Profiler I, from 2008 through 2010.128 As the Army fielded the FRP Profilers (Block I) to initial brigade combat teams and fires brigades, it retrofitted all LRIP systems to the FRP configuration. Due to end of life on the existing shelter that Profiler was hosted on and the need to modernize, a redesign effort hosted the Profiler on the Command Post Platform (CPP) mounted on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and replaced the Tactical- Very Small Aperture Terminal (T-VSAT) satellite subsystem with the more robust Global Broadcast System (GBS).129 At the end of 2007, Fort Sill began establishing requirements for the Block II Profiler system (AN/TMQ-42B). Block II would reduce the system’s footprint, leverage technology and software advancements to achieve improved accuracy, and eliminate the balloon and radiosonde subsystem. In August 2008 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, approved eliminating the use of the balloon and radiosonde. Basically, obtaining meteorological data was no longer dependent upon a balloon borne radiosonde and was

1272005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 86-87; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 92; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-53. 1282007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 95; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 10, Doc III-102, 2010 USAFCOEFS ACH. 1292001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 105; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p.p. 92-93; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 123-24; Information Paper, subj: MMS-Profiler I, 28 Jan 09, Doc III-36, 2010 USAFAS AH.

94

no longer based upon the modeling of the atmosphere. With the elimination of the balloon and radiosonde came some logistical savings. The Army was able to reduce the size of the Profiler crew from six to two and the number of vehicles from three to one and achieved all Block II requirements (eliminating the balloon and radiosonde) in Block I that completed fielding in November 2011.130 The next step in the Profiler system involved moving to the Block III configuration that the Army authorized in September 2010. Block III Profiler would further reduce the footprint by limiting the equipment to a laptop computer, would reduce the number of soldiers from two to zero, and would be embedded in the tactical operations center via a local area network and eventual integration within the Fire Support Command and Control software. Block III would provide meteorological data to target acquisition radars, cannons, rockets, missiles, and mortars to improve first round hits, conserve ammunition, achieve surprise, and reduce the chances of fratricide. During the first part, of 2012, the Army completed developmental and operational testing on the Profiler III (Computer Meteorological Data-Profiler). Later in the year, Program Executive Officer Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors approved the developmental effort to produce Profiler Block III with fielding beginning in 2013.131 Command, Control, and Communications Systems Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. Because the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE) was large, heavy, and based on 1950s and 1960s technology, the Army decided to supplant it with a new system. In 1981 after three years of work, the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) approved developing the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) to replace TACFIRE and to be a part of the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) which would be a family of computers, peripherals, operating systems, utilities, and software and would support each individual battlefield operating system.132

1302001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 105; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 92-93; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 95; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 127-29; Information Paper, subj: MMS-PI, 28 Jan 09; Information Paper, subj: MMS-Profiler, 2010, Doc III-37, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 10, Doc III-38, 2010 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: MMS-P I, 28 Jan 09, Doc III-39, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-40, 2010 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27, Doc III-78, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Field Artillery, 21 Sep 11, Doc III- 79, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-56. 131Interview with atch, Dastrup with Brown, 17 Feb 11; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 27; RDT&E Project Justification (Extract), Feb 11, Doc III-80, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, MMS-P/Computer Meteorological Data- Profiler, undated, Doc III-57; Information Paper, PEO IEW&S, 18 May 10, Doc III-58; Email with atch, subj: Documents, 7 Feb 13, Doc III-59. 1322000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual

95

Fielding began in 1996 with the original AFATDS version 96 (also version one) with planned updates to improve the software over a period of years. To accommodate growing fire support requirements the Army revamped AFATDS software fielding schedule in 1996. The Army fielded three variations of AFATDS version two software as AFATDS 97, AFATDS 98, and AFATDS 99 (also called A99) and AFATDS software version three in 2000 as AFATDS 00 (renamed AFATDS Version 7 in 2000 to match Army Battlefield Command System numbering). Fielded in 1998, AFATDS 97 furnished corps and echelons-above-corps functionality, modified MLRS/Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) command and control processes, and enabled the Field Artillery to plan and execute deep battle operations faster and safer than ever before. Later in 2000, the Army fielded AFATDS 98 that was the first AFATDS software version to address specific U.S. Marine Corps requirements.133 Fielded to active and reserve component units beginning in April 2002, AFATDS 99 (A99), renamed Version 6 in 2002 to match Army Battlefield Command System (ABCS) numbering convention and officially released in November 2002, enhanced AFATDS ability to compute tactical and technical fire direction. It reorganized and simplified menus and windows, streamlined plain text message access, enhanced alerts, created shortcuts, and incorporated technical fire direction. Equally important, the new capabilities of Version 6 eliminated the Battery Computer System (BCS) for cannon field artillery and Fire Direction System (FDS) for the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Also, Version 6 had improved interoperability with other ABCS computers, underwent successful initial interoperability testing in 2002 with several allied systems, including the French Automation des tires et liaison de l-Artillery sol-so (ATLAS), the German Artillerie Daten, Lage und Einsatz-Rechnerverbund (ADLER), the Italian (Sistema Informatico di Reggimento (SIR), and the Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System (BATES), and was a part of the Artillery Systems Cooperative Activity (ASCA). ASCA was created to provide guidance for establishing interface among the five nations’ automated field artillery systems.134 As the fielding of AFATDS 6.3.1 that replaced Version 6 in 2003 moved forward, meanwhile, the Army proceeded with the development of AFATDS 6.4 which was formerly AFATDS Version 7 (AFATDS version 3/AFATDS 00). Pushing to automate all Army units, the Chief of Staff of the Army made ABCS 6.4 the minimum standard and directed that Version 7 would not be developed. To ensure full integration with ABCS 6.4, the Field Artillery School started working on ABCS/AFATDS 6.4 in 2003- ______Command History (ACH), pp. 148-49; RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11. 1332000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 148-55; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90; RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11. 1342000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 155; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 102-03; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 104; Artillery Systems Cooperation Activities Operator’s Notebook (Extract), 11 Oct 06, pp. 1-3, Doc III-101, 2009 USAFAS AH.

96

2004. Early in 2005, a general officer steering committee approved universal fielding and training on ABCS/AFATDS 6.4. Subsequently, the Army conducted operational testing at Fort Hood, Texas, provided collective training to active and reserve component units, initiated training in the Field Artillery School in October 2005, and began fielding ABCS/AFATDS 6.4 to the Total Force. In addition to this, AFATDS Version 6.4.0.1, supporting Excalibur, was fielded in 2007, while AFATDS Version 6.4.0.2 was released in September 2008. Priority fielding went to units deploying or deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; and AFATDS Version 6.5 (Windows version) was granted full materiel release in December 2008, while AFATDS Version 6.5.0.1 (Windows version) was achieved in June 2010.135 Subsequently, the Army initiated work on AFATDS Version 6.6 (Windows version) and started fielding it in 2010 with completion in 2012. This version modernized fire planning and scheduling that permitted drag and drop and time scheduling, among other improvements. For this version, the entire human interface moved to Java, the Fire Planning/Target Scheduling Worksheet was completely redesigned, and a web portal was created to access AFATDS data through a web browser. Air support features improved to include a digital link to the USMC’s TLDHS (strikelink); and digital threads were now able to be processed from initial request through aircraft control and mission complete.136 AFATDS Version 6.7.0 was released in early 2011 to replace AFATDS Version 6.6. Capabilities included multiple precision aim point missions, expanded AFATDS interface to Centaur, and a digital link to USAF’s (Terminal Air Control Party) TACP for CAS management.137 Basically, Version 6.7 automated fire support planning and coordination for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and automated planning, coordinating, and controlling of all fire support assets in the joint battlespace (field artillery, mortars, close air support, naval gunfire, attack helicopters, and offensive electronic warfare). Because of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the contractor added precision fires capabilities and other capabilities, such as automatic conduct of unit fratricide avoidance checks and collateral damage avoidance.138 Needing improved capabilities, the Army signed a contract with Raytheon for the development of AFATDS 6.8x (Increment II) to replace AFATDS Version 6.7 around 2018. This version would focus on improving and simplifying the user interface while

1352005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 105; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 134-35; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 140; Information Paper, subj: PM Battle Command, undated, Doc III-57, 2010 USAFAS AH; RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11, Doc III-60. 136Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells Update, 7 Apr 11, Doc III-59, 2010 USAFAS AH; RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11. 137Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells Update, 7 Apr 11; RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11. 138RDT&E Budget Item Justification (Extract), Feb 11; USMC Systems Command Information Paper, subj: AFATDS I and II, undated, Doc III-61.

97

enhancing speed and capabilities. At the same time AFATDS Increment II would migrate all field artillery command and control systems under it around 2018. This would include the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED), Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System (Centaur), Forward Observer System, and others.139 Handheld Command and Control Systems. To improve mobility for the Field Artillery, the Army aggressively pursued hand-held devices to augment AFATDS and to ensure that the entire force had common command and control systems that would improve the capabilities of early-entry forces. Beginning in 2002, they began investigating the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED) and the Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System (LWTFDS) (Centaur) for fielding.140 The PFED was a lightweight, portable, low-power Rugged Personal Digital Assistant designed for the dismounted forward observer. It was a handheld tactical device that was used to compose, edit, transmit, receive, store, and display messages, process data, and monitor status used in the conduct, planning, and execution of fire support missions. With the Precision Fire Imagery software the PFED gave the dismounted observer the capability to mensurate the target and provide a precision grid in his call for fire.141 During 2012, Field Artillerymen also used the Centaur. It was a rugged personal digital assistant that computed a technical firing solution for cannon units. It was used as a backup to AFATDS, performed a mandatory check for AFATDS firing data, and computed range safety data in an operational environment. Additionally, it provided immediate and early entry automated fire direction capabilities and auxiliary technical fire control for Light/Heavy Fire Direction Centers and the Cannon Firing Platoon Leaders. It computed automated safety, displayed safety-T, checked computed firing solutions against safety-T and identified violations.142

TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGER FIRES BRIGADE

Multiple-Launch Rocket System Munitions. Improvement efforts with the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in 2012 focused on enhancing the munitions to give them better range and precision. Although MLRS performed well during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, its rockets and their submunitions raised serious concerns. During the war, many Iraqi field artillery assets out-ranged their coalition counterparts, including MLRS. Also, the high dud rate of munitions, including MLRS submunitions, raised apprehensions about the

139USMC Systems Information Paper, subj: AFATDS I and II, undated; “AFATDS Version for U.S. Army,” www.army-technology.com, 25 Jul 12, Doc III-62. 1402002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 113; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 103; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 105. 141Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Cells, 29 Nov 11, Doc III-63. 142Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Cells, 29 Nov 11.

98

safety of soldiers passing through impact areas. Together, the proliferation of rocket systems with greater ranges than MLRS and the unacceptable dud rate led to the requirement for an extended-range (ER) MLRS rocket with a range of 45 kilometers and a lower submunition dud rate that would serve as an interim measure until the Guided MLRS (GMLRS) rocket could be developed. A 45 kilometer range would increase the commander’s ability to influence the battlefield at depth and to fire across boundaries and simultaneously would improve the survivability of launcher crews.143 After the Army started production of the ER-MLRS rocket with the M77 dual- purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) with a standard fuse in 2001 to meet the range requirements identified in Operation Desert Storm in limited quantities, it turned its efforts to the GMLRS rocket that was already under development and could be fired from the M270A1 MLRS Launcher under development and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) also under development. Unlike the accuracy of the traditional free-flight MLRS rocket that degraded as the range to the target increased, the guided rocket’s Global Positioning System (GPS)-aided inertial navigation system would provide consistent, improved accuracy from a minimum range of 15 kilometers to a maximum of 60-70 kilometers, depending upon warhead weight and type of propellant, to attack area and point targets. The GMLRS rocket would also enhance the ability to conduct precision strikes, would reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target, and would give the MLRS an additional 15+ kilometer range beyond the ER-MLRS. Such a range would permit hitting more targets and make the MLRS launcher more survivable because it could be positioned farther from the target. Given the need for the rocket, the Army awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin Vought Systems in November 1998 for a four-year, five-nation (United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States) engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) effort. Based upon successful testing, low-rate initial production would begin in 2002 with the first unit equipped in 2004. Technical problems, however, arose in 2000, causing the program to slip with the initial operational capability being moved to 2006.144 Meanwhile, a restructured schedule and rising production costs in 2000-2001 prompted the Army to hold a Special Army Systems Acquisition Review Council in November 2001 to justify further development. As an integral part of the review, the Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982 required the Army to determine if the system was essential to national security, to assess the availability of an alternative with equal or greater capability, to ascertain if the program was adequately staffed to control costs, and to assess if unit costs were reasonable. If the Army failed to answer the questions satisfactorily, then development would be stopped. The review favorably answered the questions; and development continued.145

1432000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 117; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87. 1442000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 117-19; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-93; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 71-72; Memorandum with atch, subj: Annual History, 10 Apr 13, Doc III-63a. 1452001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72.

99

As planned, engineering developmental testing (EDT) for GMLRS took place. In May 2002 the contractor completed the last of the six EDT tests of 2001-2002. During the last one, a rocket flew more than 70 kilometers to the target area and dispensed its submunitions. Major test objectives included the successful launch of the rocket from the launcher, nominal motor performance, tail fin deployment and spin rate evaluation, and navigation performance. In all aspects the GMLRS rocket satisfied its EDT objectives to permit moving to the next stage of testing.146 Production qualification test (PQT) at White Sands Missile Range followed shortly after EDT. Over a period of six months beginning in June 2002 and ending in November 2002, the contractor conducted five PQT flights that ranged between 15-70 kilometers to demonstrate accuracy and performance maturity. Although some technical problems still existed, the flights verified the rocket’s maturity and accuracy and led to the decision on 7 March 2003 to enter into low-rate initial production (LRIP) for GMLRS with Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM). Later on 3 November 2003, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) at the Joint Staff approved fielding GMLRS. Upon fielding, GMLRS would enhance the Army’s and Marine Corps’s ability to conduct precision strikes, reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target, and extend the range of MLRS 15 kilometers beyond that of ER-MLRS, but the rocket would not be well suited for target engagements in heavy snow or forested, urban, complex, or restrictive terrain. Debris caused by the warhead skins, nose cone, and rocket motor damage could cause collateral damage.147 Subsequent to the JROC decision, additional testing occurred. During September 2004 and October 2004, the Army and contractor conducted operational testing. They fired more than 24 GMLRS rockets from MLRS M270A1 and HIMARS M142 launchers. Testing demonstrated that the rocket met all requirements; and the GMLRS with DPICM was type classified and went into full-rate production in 2005.148 Concurrently, the Army explored the possibility of adding another MLRS rocket. Looking at Kosovo in 1999 and the need to reduce damage to civilian property and the loss of lives during combat operations and to deliver organic fires in all types of terrain and weather, the Army required a more accurate MLRS rocket with a high-explosive unitary warhead and investigated the possibility of acquiring it. Equipped with the Guided DPICM MLRS motor, the Unitary rocket would have a fuse with the capabilities of a proximity fuse, a point-detonating fuse, or a delay fuse capability, depending upon the target area. The proximity fuse would provide a large burst over the target area. The point-detonating fuse would reduce the size of the burst and collateral damage because of the ground burst, while the time-delay fuse would permit the rocket to penetrate certain types of structures or targets and then detonate the rocket. Besides the availability of three different fuses, the GMLRS Unitary rocket would be equipped with an anti-jam antenna to maintain accuracy in the presence of GPS jamming.149

1462002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 72-73. 1472002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 73; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 88-89. 1482004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 76; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 68. 1492000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 120; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 95-96; 2002

100

After funding delays in 2000 and 2001, work on the GMLRS Unitary rocket warhead and fuse began in earnest in 2002-2003. On 7 March 2003 GMLRS Unitary passed Milestone B in the acquisition cycle to move the rocket into design and demonstration with operational testing and initial operational capability scheduled for 2007. The initial GMLRS Unitary rocket would have only a point detonating and a delay fuse, while the objective rocket would incorporate the third mode (proximity) of the tri- mode fuse, anti-jam antenna, and an insensitive munition motor. The tri-mode fuse capability would permit commanders to tailor the munition’s effects to the mission requirements.150 Even before operational testing could be done on the initial GMLRS Unitary rocket, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, the Commander of the Multi-National Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and also Commander of the U.S. Army III Corps, sent the Army an operational needs statement on 28 March 2004 for the rocket. After the Army denied the request on 13 September 2004, General Metz forwarded an urgent needs statement for the rocket to the Army on 12 October 2004. His forces required a precision, all-weather, low-caliber, high-explosive MLRS munition to integrate into joint fires in an urban environment, to attack high pay-off targets and to provide large area coverage at the same time; and the initial GMLRS Unitary met those requirements.151 On 6 January 2005 the Army validated General Metz’s request and accelerated work on the initial GMLRS Unitary rocket to provide it sooner than planned. In May 2005 the contractor, Lockheed Martin, delivered 72 rockets with the point detonating and delay dual-mode fuses to the Army. Meanwhile, Congress directed the Army to field 496 GMLRS Unitary rockets with 486 of them going to the field. The rest would be used for further development and testing.152 Combat operations validated the initial GMLRS Unitary rocket. On 9 and 10 September 2005, B Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment fired a six-rocket mission at an insurgent safe house in a heavy urban environment at 53 kilometers and destroyed it, killing insurgents in the process, and shot another two-round mission in the same area, killing insurgents in the process. One day later, A Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment shot six rockets at a bridge and destroyed it. In all instances, collateral damage to surrounding buildings was almost non-existent according to participants. By 23 December 2008, field artillery units in Iraq and Afghanistan had fired 1,042 GMLRS Unitary rockets. The following year of 2009, American and British field artillery units shot another 1,504. Of these, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps engaged the enemy with 830 and employed them in pre-planned missions against precisely located targets in urban or counterinsurgency operations where collateral damage was of concern. The ______USAFACFS ACH, pp. 73-74; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 73. 1502007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 73. 1512004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69. 1522005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 73; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 95.

101

initial GMLRS Unitary rockets with point detonating and delay fuse capabilities requested by General Metz performed well and as a result generated a paradigm shift that permitted using MLRS rockets in close proximity (200 meters or less) to friendly forces whereas the previous practice had a minimum of 2,000 meters as the safe distance from friendly forces. GMLRS Unitary continued to be used in theater in 2011, predominately by the U.S. Marine Corps and United Kingdom military forces, to support troops in contact. The Army fired 41 rockets in a single mission in July 2011 utilizing new, multiple precision aimpoint launcher software.153 Work on the objective GMLRS Unitary rocket with software upgrades, new trajectory shaping modes, and the third (proximity) mode of the tri-mode fuse meanwhile continued. Phase two engineering developing testing and production qualification testing of 2007 demonstrated the maturity of the objective GMLRS Unitary rocket. This permitted moving to Milestone C decision for low-rate production and operational testing of the objective rocket. Successful completion of the operational testing resulted in full- rate production decision and fielding of the tri-mode fuse (proximity, point detonating, and delay) rocket configuration. As a result, the objective missile entered full-rate production in 2009. Between 2005 and 2012, U.S. military combat forces shot over 2,400 GMLRS Unitary rockets.154 In 2012 the Army also launched development on the next-generation GMLRS. The Army wanted the munition to have a maximum range of 250-300 kilometer range, a warhead with a Tri-Mode Fuse (proximity, point detonating, and delay), and effectiveness to achieve required target effects, among other requirements. Work on the capabilities document also began.155 Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead. Over the years, cluster munitions have generated controversy. Armies first used them in World War II, and at least 21 countries have employed them since. For example, the United States used them in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that nine to 27 million cluster munitions remained unexploded in Laos alone. Since then, the Soviets utilized them in Afghanistan in the 1970s and

1532006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 71; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 73-74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 95; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Jeff Froysland, TCM RAMS, 1 Feb 10, Doc III-87, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: MLRS Family of Munitions, Jan 09, Doc III-90, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 History, 29 Mar 12, Doc III-81, 2011 USAFAS AH. 1542006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 95-96; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Froysland, 1 Feb 10; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3; Fact Sheet, subj: HIMARS Takes the High Ground, 5 Jan 10, Doc III-89, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-64. 155Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13.

102

1980s, while the British employed them in the Falkland Islands in the 1980s. Subsequently, the United States dropped cluster bombs in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first decade of the 21st Century. Basically, cluster munitions dispensed large numbers of submunitions imprecisely over an extended area, while the submunitions lacked generally self-destruct capability and had the potential of remaining hazardous for decades.156 Frustrated with attempts to prohibit or restrict the use of cluster munitions, a group of nations led by Norway reached an agreement to ban cluster munitions. In December 2008 94 countries signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions that prohibited their development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling. The United States, Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, and Pakistan, however, did not participate in the talks that led to the agreement or sign the convention. By December 2009 103 states had signed the convention.157 Meanwhile, the United States resisted banning cluster munitions. In May 2008 just prior to the signing of Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Political-Military Affairs, Stephen Mull, said that United States relied upon cluster munitions as an important part of its defense strategy and preferred pursuing technological fixes to ensure that the weapons would not be viable once the conflict was over. Moreover, if cluster munitions were eliminated, more money would be spent on new weapon systems, ammunition, and logistical resources. The United States further stated that most militaries would increase their employment of massed field artillery and rockets barrages which would increase the destruction of key infrastructure if cluster munitions were banned.158 On 19 June 2008 the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a new policy on cluster munitions although it still recognized them as legitimate weapons with clear military utility and did not support the convention. Acknowledging the unintended harm that unexploded cluster munitions could cause to civilians and civilian infrastructure and worldwide opposition to the dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) which was a cluster munition, the DOD replaced its previous policy with a new one. As soon as possible but no later than one year from 9 July 2008, the military and combatant commands would initiate removal from the active inventory all cluster munitions that exceeded operational planning requirements or for which there would be no operational planning requirements. All excess cluster munitions would be demilitarized as soon as practicable. After 2018 United States military departments and combatant commands could only employ cluster munitions that would not result in more than one percent unexploded ordnance. Until then, the employment of cluster munitions that exceeded the one percent threshold had to be approved by the combatant commander. Prior to 2018, DOD could seek to transfer cluster munitions that did not exceed the one percent threshold to a foreign government if that government agreed not to use them. The old

156Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 22 Dec 09, pp. 1-2, Doc III-31, 2010 USAFAS AH. 157Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” pp. 3-4. 158Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” pp. 4-5.

103

policy required the military to design and procure cluster munitions with a 99 percent reliability rate but did address the use and removal of current munitions.159 Because the dud rate for GMLRS DPICM did not meet DOD and international agreements on the reduction of dud munitions, the Army pressed forward to develop an alternative to GMLRS DPICM to engage area and inaccurately located targets, recognizing the need to minimize collateral effects in pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Although the Army acknowledged the need for such munitions and noted that unitary munitions did not provide the same capability and effects, the Department of Defense officially announced a moratorium on 18 June 2008 on the production and use of DPICM rounds that would leave more than one percent duds after arming and subsequently approved a prototyping effort on 22 October 2008 to develop a viable alternative to GMLRS DPICM with an initial operational capability in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. At that time the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7, Lieutenant General James D. Thurman, announced the Army’s desire to transition to an alternative warhead capability as soon as technologically and programmatically feasible. Later, the Army announced its intention to procure GMLRS Unitary rockets in-lieu of future planned DPICM procurement and to develop a GMLRS Alternative Warhead.160 Work on the alternative warhead carried on over the next several years. During the 2009, the Army contracted with three vendors to produce a warhead that was equal or greater than DPICM in destructive capabilities. The Army wanted each to produce four prototypes for testing and planned to enter engineering, manufacturing, and developing. In August-October 2010 the three vendors successfully fired their prototypes (warhead designs). Based upon this, the Project Office conducted a three-part system preliminary design review of each alternative warhead in January 2011. Six months later in July 2011, the Army Missile Command Source Selection Authority completed evaluating the three competing alternative warhead designs and selected Alliant Tech Systems to develop the alternative warhead. Subsequently, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the GMLRS Alternative Warhead capability development document and validated the key performance parameters for the system on 8 November 2011. Later on 19 November 2012, the Army approved production of the warhead.161

159Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians, 19 Jun 08, Doc III-32, 2010 USAFAS AH; DOD News Release, Cluster Munitions Policy Released, 9 Jul 08, Doc III-33, 2010 USAFAS AH; Donna Miles, “New Cluster Bomb Policy Aims to Reduce Collateral Damage,” American Forces Press Service, 9 Jul 08, Doc III-34, 2010 USAFAS AH. 1602007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 96; Briefing (Extract), subj: Precision Guided Missiles and Rockets Program Review, 24 Apr 07, Doc III-82, 2011 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: MLRS Family of Munitions, Jan 09, Doc III-90, 2009 USAFAS AH. 161Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr 12, Doc III-83, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc

104

Launcher. Based upon after action reports from Operation Desert Storm of 1991, the Army realized that the MLRS M270 launcher that had been introduced in 1983 required a faster response time, global positioning system-aided munitions, and improvements to its fire control system and launcher drive system. To combat the launcher’s growing obsolescence the Army initiated the Improved Fire Control System (IFCS) program in 1992 to replace dated electronic systems and to provide for growth potential for future precision munitions. Subsequently, the Army initiated the Improved Launcher Mechanical System (ILMS) program in 1995 to reduce reaction times by decreasing the time required to aim, displace, and reload the launcher. For several years the Improved Fire Control System and Improved Launcher Mechanical System modifications were two separate programs. As a result of the integrated test program initiative, the Army combined the two programs in 1997. Together, the two modernization efforts produced the M270A1 launcher early in the twenty-first century; and fielding began in 2002.162 After the fieldings began in 2002 the Army upgraded the M270A1 over the next decade. During 2005, 13 launchers from 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, received the Improved Weapon Interface Unit (IWIU). The IWIU was required for firing Guided MLRS munitions, both Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) and Unitary. Meanwhile, the Army completed other significant M270A1 modification projects -- machine gun mount and Auxiliary Power Unit and Environmental Control Unit in 2005. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) after action reviews and lessons learned expressed a need for a mount for the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) that was the primary weapon for the M270A1’s launcher chief. Lengthy road marches and traveling down unimproved roads presented a challenge for the launcher chief to maintain control and stability of his SAW while standing in the hatch as the vehicle was moving. By the end of 2007, all M270A1 units were equipped with this

______III-84, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires, Rockets and Missiles, 21 Apr 11, Doc III-85, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Froysland, 1 Feb 10, Doc III-87, 2009 USAFAS AH; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, subj: GMLRS Alternative Warhead Analysis of Alternatives, 9 Feb 10, Doc III- 41, 2010 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with Jeff Froysland, TCM Fires Brigade, 15 Feb 11, Doc III-42, 2010 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G- 3/5/7, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for GMLRS Alternative Warhead to Initiate Analysis of Alternatives, 7 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2010 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: GMLRS-U Fire, undated, Doc III-44, 2010 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: GMLRS-AW Analysis of Alternatives Study Directive, 26 Apr 10, Doc III-45, 2010 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-65. 1622000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 120; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 74-76; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 92.

105

machine gun mount.163 Because the current ventilation system in the launcher cab did not meet Manpower Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) requirements for a crew during firing and silent watch operations in all weather and because multiple radios and electronic equipment in the cab generated heat, the Army had to find a way to improve conditions in the cab. It installed the Environmental Control Unit (ECU) to control adverse climate conditions and to permit the maximum use of radios and computer systems and the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) to reduce maintenance time and cost while providing the capability for silent watch operations. The APU was a diesel generator designed to provide a source of electricity and permitted the launcher to remain powered while in the hide area with the main engine shut off; and the ECU was an 18,000 BTU environmental control unit that could reduce the temperature inside the cab when it was subjected to extreme heat environments like those found in Operation Iraqi Freedom.164 With the increasing need for better communications over long distances, the Army, meanwhile, initiated development of the Modular Launcher Communication System (MLCS) for MLRS and HIMARS in 2006 to permit long-range communications between the fire direction center and the launchers. MLCS would integrate long-range radios (high frequency and satellite communication), tactical fire direction software, a display panel, and a data entry device. As of 2006, digital messages to the launcher were transmitted from the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) via a SINCGARS radio. This message flow was sequential from command and control node to command and control node with line-of-sight radio communications limiting the distance between each command and control node. Although there were advantages to this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of time- sensitive targets by taking a long time to process, and increased the quantity of equipment required to complete a fire mission. MLCS would furnish a means to receive and transmit long-range digital messages in a network consisting of multiple subscribers with different communication devices and underwent a successful user test utilizing high frequency radios at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 2007.165 MLCS addressed a communications capability gap in MLRS M270A1 and HIMARS M142 launchers. In the near-term the Army planned to use the Harris 150 High Frequency Radio to satisfy long-range communications requirements. For the long- term (2011-2017) the Army foresaw migrating both launchers to the Joint Tactical Radio System when it became available and integrating limited tactical fire control, among other capability improvements. For the present, the Army outlined using Blue Force Tracker for situational awareness with fielding scheduled in the first quarter of FY 2011. Additional situational awareness would be met by the acquisition of the Driver’s Vision Enhancement for both launchers that would provide the driver the capability to drive in reduced visibility with the use of forward looking infrared sensor and display control

1632005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 77. 1642005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 72-73; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 75; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 77-78. 1652007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 104.

106

module. Beyond 2017 the plan identified incorporating tactical fire control functions managed at the battery and/or platoon command and control echelons utilizing an integrated battle space communications and adding the ability to receive and execute valid fire missions digitally from field artillery sensor platforms, among others.166 In 2012 the Army launched the big three modifications to the M270A1. They included long-range communications mentioned above, Blue Force tracker for situational awareness, and driver night vision enhancement.167 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System In 2012 the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) provided the Army with a critical precision deep fires capability for light and early entry forces and furnished field artillery medium and long-range rocket and long-range missile fires as part of the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) fleet of launchers. A wheeled, indirect fire, rocket/missile system capable of firing all rockets and missiles in the current and future MLRS family of munitions, HIMARS originated in the 1990s. On 26 October 1990 the Operational and Organizational Plan for HIMARS established an urgent need for a strategically deployable, tactically mobile, indirect fire, long-range, rocket/missile system that could operate semi-autonomously and achieve the range, accuracy, and lethality required to support combat operations effectively. The Operational and Organization Plan stated that the light divisions and early entry forces did not have the organic assets to perform battle tasks on a worldwide basis effectively. While corps-level assets could furnish supporting fires with 155-mm. howitzers and MLRS M270 launchers, these systems’ lack of strategic deployability could limit or even preclude their introduction into the theater in time to influence the battle. In comparison, a HIMARS unit would require less lift than an equivalent MLRS unit and expand airlift capacity by extending airlift platforms to include C-130 aircraft. Use of C-130 aircraft would also expand tactical mobility once forces arrived in the area of operations. Examination also revealed that doctrinal changes alone would not correct the identified shortfalls of not having a rapidly deployable launcher system to support light forces. Organizational changes of field artillery units also would not address the basic problems associated with worldwide deployment.168 Analysis by the Field Artillery School also supported HIMARS development. In December 1991 the school conducted an in-house Legal Mix VII analysis to determine the preferred composition for the Field Artillery to meet worldwide requirements in the future. The analysis concluded that HIMARS would provide a much-needed, lethal punch for the light forces and would be as mobile as the supported force. The wheeled chassis and C-130 deployability capabilities would provide unique means for rapid intra-

1662007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 101; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 104; Email, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011, 19 Apr 12, Doc III-86, 2011 USAFAS AH. 167Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launchers and Munitions, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-65a. 1682002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 77-78; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 102.

107

theater employment. The effectiveness comparisons of equal airlift alternatives for M198 cannons, MLRS launchers, and HIMARS launchers revealed that the HIMARS was approximately 20 percent more effective than the MLRS alternative and approximately 70 percent more effective than the M198 alternative.169 In view of this, the Department of the Army approved the HIMARS Operational Requirements Document (ORD) on 3 December 1992, outlining the requirement for two battalions with three being desired. However, the Army failed to fund development because the payoff of fielding only two battalions was not deemed worth the cost of a new start.170 In 1997 an emerging force structure study at the Field Artillery School called for two field artillery brigades of two HIMARS battalions and one towed cannon battalion each to support one light division. The study confirmed that adding a rocket/missile system to the light corps artillery force structure would increase lethality against high- payoff targets, field artillery, and other special targets. The analysis also highlighted an increase in field artillery survivability when HIMARS was integrated into the light force artillery structure. In view of this evidence, the Army funded HIMARS.171 Subsequently, the Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI), a joint effort sponsored by the U.S. Army Missile Command and the Dismounted Battle Space Battle Laboratory, conducted an Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD) in 1998 using new target acquisition systems, “shooters,” and command and control systems at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that would be C-130 deployable and be used by the first- to-fight forces. Among the systems to be tested were four HIMARS prototypes. In August 1998 following the ACTD, the RFPI reviewed the contributions of HIMARS as a lightweight MLRS system. RFPI’s assessment cited the advantage of increased firepower for early entry forces, less time spent on the firing point versus the M270 launcher’s time, and the ease of the training transition from the M270 to the HIMARS.172 Over one year later on 19 October 1999, the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments approved an updated HIMARS Operational Requirements Document in light of the RFPI ACTD. The updated document permitted HIMARS to enter into the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) phase of acquisition and also identified the requirement for 16 HIMARS battalions -- two in the active force and 14 in the Army National Guard.173 After five years of development and testing, the Army fielded HIMARS beginning in began in earnest in 2005 and carried on for several years. In March 2005 the 3-27th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Bragg, received the first M142 launchers with Initial Operating Capability (IOC) established on 29 June 2005. All M142 launchers were produced with the Improved Weapon Interface Unit (IWIU). The acquisition strategy involved procuring 17 M142 battalions -- five for the active component and 12 for the

1692002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78. 170Ibid. 171Ibid. 1722002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 97. 1732002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79.

108

reserve component. The next M142 fielding occurred in 6 March 2006-11 May 2006 for the 1-181st Field Artillery Regiment of the Tennessee Army National Guard. In 2007 the 1-158th Field Artillery Regiment of the Oklahoma Army National Guard and the 5-3rd Field Artillery Regiment received HIMARS launchers, and the following year the 1-14th Field Artillery Regiment, the 2-300th Field Artillery Regiment of the Wyoming Army National Guard, and the 5-3rd Field Artillery Regiment were equipped with HIMARS.174 Meanwhile, the Department of the Army approved an urgent need statement on 20 October 2005 by the 3-27th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Bragg and XVIII Airborne Corps for increased crew protection in the HIMARS by armoring the launcher cab. Even with the armor, the cab still had to meet C-130 transportability requirements while achieving STANAG level II armor requirements. Developed in 2005-2006 to meet an operational need statement from the XVIII Airborne Corps, the near-term solution involved using a modified design of the Low Signature Armored Cab (LSAC) developed for use with the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) and using “bolt on” or “appliqué” armor which would be applied after the launcher had been transported by C- 130. This modified cab design was designated the Low Signature Armored Cab- HIMARS (LSAC-H). The appliqué armor consisted of 43 pieces of armor that could be installed on the cab in less than two hours and removed in less than one hour. A removable machine gun mount was also developed because of after action reviews and lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan).175 To reduce production sustainment costs and to provide even greater crew protection, the Army initiated work on the Increased Crew Protection (ICP) Cab late in 2006. During 2007, the ICP Cab went through a series of tests including a live-fire test and evaluation and road shock and vibration testing. The cab would incorporate enhancements suggested in the test phase of the LSAC-H with production beginning in 2010. The ICP Cab would protect the crew from ballistic attack, mine blast, foreign object debris, and fumes from the rocket launch and would be retrofitted to HIMARS without armored cabs and HIMARS with LSAC-H capabilities.176 Testing the ICP Cab continued into 2008. In July 2008 the Army and contractor completed the final test which consisted of an extended field exercise to evaluate the operational effectiveness and suitability of the ICP Cab configured HIMARS to ensure that the system met performance standards identified in the HIMARS operational requirements document and system specifications prior to production and fielding. Test results indicated that the ICP Cab configured HIMARS met the critical operational criteria and demonstrated that the launcher’s ability to conduct shoot-and-scoot tactics to make it survivable in a hostile threat environment. As a result in 2009, the Army

1742005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 84; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 87; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 106-07. 1752005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 85; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 110-11. 1762005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 85; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 111.

109

awarded BAE Systems the contract for 64 ICP Cab up-armor kits.177 With the increasing need for better communications over long distances, the Army meanwhile initiated acquisition action for development of the Modular Launcher Communication System (MLCS) for HIMARS and MLRS in 2006. MLCS would integrate long-range radios (high frequency and satellite communication), tactical fire direction software, situation awareness, a display panel, and a data entry device. As of 2006, digital messages to the launcher were transmitted from the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) via a SINCGARS radio to the launcher. This message flow was sequential from command and control node to command and control node with line-of-sight radio communications limiting the distance between each command and control node. Although there were advantages to this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of time-sensitive targets by taking a long time to process, and increased the quantity of equipment required to complete a fire mission. MLCS would furnish a means to receive and transmit long-range digital messages in a network consisting of multiple subscribers with different communication devices and underwent a successful user test in 2007 utilizing high frequency radios at Fort Bragg, another test in 2008, and one in 2009.178 Concurrently, TCM RAMS which was rechartered as part of TCM Fires Brigade in 2010 that was responsible for the capability development and user requirements for the Fires Brigade sought to improve command and control and address a capability gap with the integration of prototype long-range high frequency and satellite communications kits and plans to improve battle space awareness by integrating blue forces tracking into the HIMARS. In 2011 the Army implemented the Hot Panel capability for the HIMARS. This capability allowed the launcher software to receive positional updates while in flight aboard a C-130 or C-17 aircraft to give the HIMARS a true roll off and fire capability allowing for greater flexibility in projecting the force on the battlefield. Further efforts in implementing long range communications led to the AN/PRC 150 being fielded to the 5- 3rd Field Artillery Regiment and the 3-27th Field Artillery Regiment. This radio gave true beyond line of sight communications capability. Plans were also underway for the installation of the Blue Force Tracker and Drivers Vision Enhancement. Currently, the projected completion date for those modifications was late in Fiscal Year 2013. During 2011, significant software improvements in both AFATDS and fire control system for the M270A1 and HIMARS were made. Multiple precision aim points were introduced allowing for multiple rockets to be sent to multiple targets in one fall for fire.179 Army Tactical Missile System In 2012 the Army had two variants of the Army Tactical Missile System

1772008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 108; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 111. 1782006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 85-86; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 111-12. 1792008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 109; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 112; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 11, p. 28, Doc III-87, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 25; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Launcher and HIMARS 2011, 19 Apr 12, Doc III-88, 2011 USAFAS AH.

110

(ATACMS). ATACMS Unitary (M48/M57) had been used with great effectiveness in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and had the precision to attack high-payoff targets at extended ranges as well as troops in contact with minimal collateral damage. The other variant, the Anti-Personnel/Anti- Material (APAM) cluster munitions (Block I/Block II), dispensed cluster munitions over a wide area. While they were employed extensively early in the major combat portion of OIF, the APAM variants did not comply with the 2008 DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians that would preclude using them after 2018 and force employing ATACMS Unitary.180 Although United States ground forces employed ATACMS Unitary and ATACMS APAM effectively in recent combat actions, scarce funding prompted the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Claude M. Bolton, Jr., to sign a memorandum to terminate ATACMS. This required the Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space to cancel all remaining contract actions as required and involved closing out production facilities after final deliveries had been made in FY 2008. The Army’s request for additional ATACMS Unitary to replenish stockpiles in the FY 2008 Supplemental Budget led to the Army’s decision in April 2008 to move termination activities scheduled for 2009 to 2010. As scheduled, the Army stopped production of the ATACMS Unitary in 2010 once the additional missiles had been delivered.181 As of January 2010, the Army’s inventory of ATACMS included APAM variant missiles (Block I/II) and ATACMS Unitary missiles. Nearly 75 percent of the ATACMS missiles failed compliancy requirements with the DOD Cluster Munitions Policy and would be prohibited from being used after 2018. To ensure a stockpile of ATACMS missiles until their expiration dates of FY 2016 for APAM and approximately FY 2021 for the Unitary variant, the Army developed a service life extension program in 2009 to extend the APAM variant by 10 years and to convert them to Unitary. This would give the Army a serviceable all-weather, long-range precision missile attack capability and eliminate the non-compliant APAM variant missiles. However, Army continued to examine the value of converting the APAM to Unitary in 2011.182 Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Radar In view of the current operational environment in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and the need to replace the AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars with their limited scan capabilities, the Army decided in

180Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr 12, Doc III-84, 2011 USAFAS AH; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 118; Interview, Dastrup with Leighton Duitsman, TCM RAMS Dep Dir, 10 Feb 11, Doc III-47, 2010 USAFAS AH. See 2010 USAFAS AH for history of ATACMS from the early 1990s to 2009, pp. 105- 10. 181Interview, Dastrup with Duitsman, 10 Feb 11, Doc III-47, 2010 USAFAS AH. 1822009 USAFAS AH, p. 118; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 29 Mar 12, Doc III-81, 2011 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: MLRS Munitions Input to 2011 Annual History, 12 Apr 12, Doc III-83, 2011 USAFAS AH.

111

2002 to field a new radar with the ability to locate medium range indirect fire systems in a 360-degree radius. Based on this, the Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, began defining a material change to the Q-36 radar to make it the Enhanced Q-36 (EQ-36) radar that would incorporate new technology into the existing radar, would reduce crew size and footprint, would increase range and accuracy in a 90-degree mode, would spiral from an initial increment 360-degree capability against only mortars to a 360-degree capability for mortars, cannon, and rockets, and would replace the aging Q-36 and Q-37 radars. Developmental work by Lockheed Martin started in January 2007.183 Shortly afterwards, an urgent material release prompted the Army to develop and field a Quick Response Capability (QRC) EQ-36 radar to support Operation Iraqi Freedom. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 the Army approved developing 12 QRC EQ-36 radars. Later, the Army approved procuring 38 QRC EQ-36 radars to meet combat operation requirements. Of these, Lockheed Martin would produce 36 based upon an initial production contract of July 2008 while another company would provide the remaining six.184

183Briefing, subj: The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar, undated, Doc III-90, 2011 USAFAS AH; Lockheed Martin Information Paper, subj: Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar, undated, Doc III-91, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-66. 184Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-92, 2011 USAFAS AH; PM Radars Information Paper, subj: Q-37, undated, Doc III-93, 2011 USAFAS AH; U.S. Army Information Paper, subj: Enhanced Q-36, undated, Doc III-94, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with COL Matt Merrick, Dir, CDID, 25 Jan 12, Doc III-95, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, 2011, Doc III-96, 2011 USAFAS AH; “First U.S. Army EQ-36 Radar Deploys to Iraq,” Defense News, 9 Sep 10, Doc III-97, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: The Enhanced AN/TPQ-36 Counter fire Target Acquisition Radar, undated, Doc III-90, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, FY 2010, Doc III-98, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-99, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, FY 2011, Doc III- 96, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, Army Technology, 7 Mar 12, Doc III-73; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade, 29 Nov 11, Doc III-70; Information Paper, DOTE, subj; EQ-36, undated, Doc III-74; Interview, Dastrup with McDonald, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-100, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, FY 2011, Doc III-96, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, undated, Doc III-75; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 11, Doc III-67; Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III-68; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 Mar 13; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” RedLeg Update, Mar 13, Doc III-68a; Memorandum for Record with atch, subj: Annual History, 10 Apr 13, Doc III-68b.

112

Meanwhile, a production capabilities document in September 2010 outlined the requirements for a system of record with comparable capabilities as the QRC EQ-36 radar and initiated the program of record QRC EQ-36 as the AN/TPQ-53. In August 2011 the Army released a proposal contract to industry for low-rate initial production with the intention of selecting a contractor in FY 2012 to produce 33 program of record Q-53 radars. Lockheed Martin received the contract and began developmental work. Once these Q-53 radars had been fielded, the Army planned to retrofit the QRC EQ-36 radars to make them Q-53 radars and scheduled a limited users test in 2013, an initial operational test and evaluation in 2014, a full-rate production decision in 2014, and a follow-on test and evaluation in 2014. The Army outlined fielding the system to the brigade combat teams and using it to replace the Q-36 and Q-37 radars.185 Firefinder AN/TPQ-37 Although the Army planned to replace the Fire finder AN/TPQ-37 radar which was first fielded in the 1970s and underwent several modernization programs over the next several decades, the Army acknowledged that it would be around for several more years and decided to upgrade it for the heavy and Stryker brigade combat teams and the fires brigades. In conjunction with the Army, Thales Raytheon Systems developed reliability and maintainability initiative in 2011-2012 to incorporate into the Q-37 to reduce sustainment costs and increase the life span of the radar system beyond its scheduled Fiscal Year 2017 retirement date.186 AN/TPQ-50 Radar Over the past several years, the Army worked to introduce the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR). Originally called the man-portable countermortar radar, the LCMR emerged from requirements identified late in the 1990s by the Special Operations Forces. Because the existing AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars lacked the ability to scan 360 degrees and the mobility and agility to accompany light, early and force entry forces, Special Operations Forces had a critical need for lightweight countermortar radar with the capability of scanning 360 degrees to detect the location of short-range mortars rapidly and accurately. This led to the development of the Quick

185Interview, Dastrup with McDonald, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-100, 2011 USAFAS AH; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH; DOTE Information Paper, subj: EQ-36 Radar System, FY 2011, Doc III-96, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army, undated, Doc III-75; Information Paper, Army Technology, 7 Mar 12; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 11, Doc III-69; Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III-70; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 Mar 13; “Update on AN/TPQ-53, AN/TPQ-50,” RedLeg Update, Mar 13. 186Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-89, 2011 AH; Information Paper, ThalesRaytheonSystems, 2010, Doc III-71; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 11, Doc III-72; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade, 29 Nov 11, Doc III-73; Briefing, subj: Firefinder Radar AN/TPQ-37(V)8, 2013, Doc III-74; Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, 8 Mar 13.

113

Response Capability LCMR (AN/TPQ-48) that was specially designed to support the Special Operations Forces and Ranger units. A man-portable system with a maximum range of 7,000 meters and a minimum range of 1,000 meters, the LCMR had the ability to search 360 degrees and to detect and track mortar fire. Such capabilities would permit responsive counterfire to destroy fleeting improvised shooters including those in urban area.187 Subsequently, the Army awarded a contract to Syracuse Research Corporation to develop and produce the radar. Requirements documentation was written and approved. Syracuse Research Corporation adopted the Special Operations Command’s (SOCOM) requirements as a baseline and planned to utilize a spiral development strategy using increments/versions to achieve the full capability needed for fielding. An operational needs statement (ONS) further defined the requirements. Accuracy and range would increase while maintaining the mobility and transportability of the original LCMR concept.188 In 2004 the Army started fielding the Special Operations Forces QRC Q-48 to forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The radar met the immediate needs of deployed forces of the United States Special Operations Command with a range of five kilometers and a target location error of 100-plus meters, while future spirals (Increment II/Version I and out) would satisfy the capability gaps identified the Operational and Organizational Concept of 2004. Fielded in 2005-2006, Increment II/Version II (QRC AN/TPQ-49) provided more rugged hardware and better software and supported the counter rocket, artillery and mortar (CRAM) system of systems.189 In 2008 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Program Office Sensors at Fort Sill wrote and staffed a capabilities document for the program of record

1872004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 99; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 100; Information Paper, SRC Tec, 2010, Doc III-52, 2010 USAFAS AH; Scott R. Gourley, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar,” Army Magazine, Apr 02, Doc III-53, 2010 USAFAS AH; Navy Lt.j.g. Jason Calandruccio, Defense Contract Management Agency, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar, www.dcma.mil, Winter 02, Doc III-54, 2010 USAFAS AH; AN/TPQ-48 was the initial designation of the LCMR as noted in Scott R. Gourley, “Soldier Armed,” Army, Feb 11, pp. 63-66, Doc III- 102, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH. 1882006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 91-92; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 94; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 122; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11. 1892004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 99; Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 11, Doc III-55, 2010 USAFAS AH; Gourley, “Soldier Armed,” pp. 63-66; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, Syracuse Research Corporation, undated, Doc III-75; Information Paper, Syracuse Research Corporation, undated, Doc III-76; Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III-70; Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Scott Prochniak, CDID, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-66.

114

LCMR. Syracuse Research Corporation received the contract to produce LCMRs (AN/TPQ-50) or Increment III/Version III.190 After conducting a successful initial operational test and evaluation early in February and March 2012 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, the Army planned to start fielding in the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2013 and anticipated full material release in 2014.191

190Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 11; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-104, 2011 USAFAS AH; Interview, Dastrup with CW4 Daniel E. McDonald, TCM Fires Brigade, 13 Apr 12, Doc III-100, 2011 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: LCMR, 21 Oct 11, Doc III-103, 2011 USAFAS AH. 191FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 11, p. 26, Doc III-104, 2011 USAFAS AH; PM Radars Information Paper, subj: LCMR, undated, Doc III-105, 2011 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, U.S. Army Equipment, undated, Doc III-77; Information Paper, PM Radars, 16 Jan 13, Doc III-78; Presolicitation Synopsis for LCMR, 15 May 12, Doc III-79; DAC for ARNG SITREP, Apr 12, Doc III-80; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 19 May 11, Doc III-81; Information Paper, subj: TRADOC Capability Manager Fires Brigade, 29 Nov 11, Doc III-73; Interview, Dastrup with COL David J. Brost, Dir, TCM Fires Brigade, 6 Mar 13, Doc III-82; Interview, Dastrup with Prochniak, 8 Mar 13, Doc III-66.

CHAPTER FOUR FIRES BATTLE LABORATORY

In 1992 Fort Sill became an active participant in the Army’s new Battle Lab program. Designed to prepare the Army better for warfighting in the post Cold War era, the Battle Lab program took root in six of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) key service schools to coordinate ideas about technology and warfighting in future battlefield effectiveness. At Fort Sill, the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab (now called the Fires Battle Lab [FBL]) was created to fulfill one of the six major components in the program. The FBL concept represented a significant break with Cold War era threat driven decision making. As General Frederick M. Franks, the former TRADOC commander, explained it, the FBL focused on tailoring post-Cold War Army force projections into the 21st Century. In seeking to increase battlefield effectiveness by optimizing combinations between technology and warfighting, the FBL envisioned giving the Army a technological edge on future battlefields as well as streamlining the technological modernization process. Before any concept or equipment was tested in the field, the Battle labs tested them through computer simulations and virtual prototyping. General Franks established the first of six battle labs in early April 1992 at the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, with the remaining five selected by the end of the month. The six were: (1) Early Entry Battle Lab at TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia, (2) Mounted Battle Space Laboratory, Fort Knox, Kentucky, (3) Dismounted Battle space Battle Laboratory, Fort Benning, Georgia, (4) Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, (5) Battle Command Leavenworth, Kansas, and (6) Combat Service Support, Fort Lee, Virginia. Fort Sill’s Depth and Simultaneous Attack battle lab began operating on August 1992 with a mission to identify depth and simultaneous needs and then initiate action to resolve these needs using analysis, simulation, experimentation, evaluation, and integration of materiel and non-materiel solutions. The FBL was the first to identify a need to develop an interface that translated simulations messages into tactical messages to stimulate Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) for training. This led to the development of the Enhanced Protocol Interface Unit that enabled field artillery staffs to train in a “free play” simulated environment on a large scale. This first step into “doing the impossible” provided immeasurable benefits to the Army and Department of Defense. In 2012, the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) was leading simulations development on many fronts and was on the cutting edge of providing enhanced training capabilities. The FBL continues to provide support to Forces Command (FORSCOM) units, TRADOC schools, Capability Development and Integration Directorate (CDID), and other Battle Labs experiments.1

1Email with atch, subj: FBL History Input 2012, 15 Mar 13, Doc IV-1. Everything that follows comes from this email. 116

THE FIRES BATTLE LAB MISSION

The Fires Battle Lab mission used live, virtual and /or constructive simulations to gain insights, impacts, and recommended changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF), based on inputs from Soldiers and their leaders, as well as emerging technologies and materiel initiatives to support current and future forces.

FIRES BATTLE LAB CHARTER

The Battle Lab was chartered to provide the means to develop, refine, and integrate future operational capabilities and architectures in support of Joint and Army concepts and to focus on developing and refining tactical and some operational concepts for the Future Force. The Battle Lab integrated DOTMLPF imperatives to support the task and purpose of mission concepts and employed experimentation/wargaming and analysis, utilizing modeling and simulation to produce the underpinnings for concepts and requirements validation. Experiments and Wargaming Division The Experiment and Wargaming Branch’s primary mission involved designing, developing, executing, analyzing, and reporting all FCoE and FBL experiments in support of the Army Capability Integration Center’s (ARCIC) annual experimentation plan. This was done to support the Joint and Army’s Warfighter Functional Concept Development process and FCoE Combat and Material Development processes. This required internal and external planning, coordination, and synchronization of each experiment with the Joint community of practice using a model-test-model process designed to evaluate critical issues and feasibility as part of an outcome based focus. Modeling and Simulation Division Fires Battle Lab’s Modeling and Simulation Division provided modeling and simulation support to TRADOC Battle Labs within the construct of Battle Lab Collaborative Simulation Environment (BLCSE) to support Transformation Experimentation and Concept Development. The Division also supported Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) analysis with FireSim XXI development, and FCoE soldier training and leader development courses with simulation supported exercises. In addition, the division provided modeling and simulation support and expertise to modeling and simulation exercises and developments throughout the Department of Defense. Experiments and Wargaming Division Contributions Event Name: Joint Fires Experiment (JFEX)

Event Start Date: 30 July 2012

Event End Date: 30 Aug 2012

Event Description: The Fires Center of Excellence (CoE) Fires Battle Lab executed the Joint Fires Experiment from 30 July 2012-30 August 2012 distributed from

117

Fort Sill, Oklahoma, to other CoE laboratories in support of the TRADOC Commander’s Fiscal Year 2012 Army 2020 Campaign of Experimentation objectives. This experiment focused on looking at Fires force structure and design while conducting transition from Forced Entry Operations into close attack combat operations during Major Combat Operations (MCO). This effort would inform proposed operational techniques for echelons above division and technical and tactical procedures from Corps to Brigade as they pertain to offensive and defensive fires requirements where limited lines of effort (LOE) dictate priorities of fire, roles, functions, tasks, and missions. Results: C-UAS required a Joint and DOTMLP solution set. Developing and identifying capabilities against threat UAS required further study and involved all Warfighting Functions in order to counter the threat. (1) Airspace control and responsive fires integration were more complex as result of interservice and intraservice doctrinal implementation and interpretation. Published airspace control doctrine and JAGIC doctrine with TTPs were required to integrate airspace control and synchronize Joint enabled fires to defeat UAS’s. (2) The implications on airspace control, management, and integration were made more complex by each service’s interpretation of tactical definitions and approaches to identification and engagement authorities. Because of theater specific and doctrinal complexities, an annual certification process should be considered. (3) Division combat operations were best supported by a composite FiB with cannons, rockets, missiles, and IFPC/Avenger assets because of the responsiveness, adaptability and flexibility. Joint forces lacked the capability to integrate Patriot, THAAD, JLENS, and JIIM AMD systems into a single fire control integrated air picture. [GAMOA Shaping Event, GAMOA SIMEX, GAMOA Wargame, Build and Prepare Experiment, Joint Fires SIMEX] 1. Insight: Automated IAMD procedures were required to facilitate synergistic fires and force protection. 2. The development of a single air-ground picture would facilitate rapid responsive sense, warn, and engagement of hostile threats to critical assets. Event POC: Anthony Evans, [email protected], 580 442-3235

Event Name: Electric Fires (All information on this program is classified as of 17 Jan 2013)

Event POC: No additional information available.

Event Name: Black Dart 2012

Event Start Date: 1 Aug 12

Event End Date: 10 AUG 12

118

Event Description: Black Dart was an annual event sponsored by the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense (JIAMDO) and provided a venue for Armed services exercise the Joint Engagement Sequence (kill chain) to defeat Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), develop and integrate capabilities, and develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Additionally government sponsored systems were invited to demonstrate counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities. Many of these systems were stand- alone systems in the developmental phase and Black Dart provided a venue test to evaluate and demonstrate capability at various technology readiness levels. Black Dart was the premier event to develop and demonstrate C-UAS capability. Participating systems, sensors, shooters, and command and control nodes, operated in both the classified and unclassified modes and some systems could be discussed in this report. JIAMDO identified four primary objectives for Black Dart 2012, with concentration on the combat identification. Blue force UAS were employed. 1. Detect, track, identify, and negate 2. Evaluate possible architecture, technology, and Concept of Operations (CONOPS) solutions 3. Support development of TTPs and lessons learned 4. Demonstrate emerging and developing technologies Finding: Concepts gained insights into the developing Army C-UAS CONOPS vignettes and emerging and future capabilities to influence C-UAS capability developments across all Army warfighting functions. Scenario driven events provided a realistic, real-time; to exercise the Joint Engagement Sequence, develop a correlated air picture to see if sensors could identify friendly, hostile, and neutral aircraft with a given airspace. The tactics, techniques, and procedures, although not fully developed, would aid in the development of future C-UAS documents. Specific insights include: 1. Apache demonstrated capability to acquire and defeat UAS. 2. Electronic Warfare (EW) demonstrated significant capability improvement. Event POC: Mr. Chris Niederhauser, [email protected], 580 442-3649.

Name: Gain & Maintain Operational Access (GAMOA) Event Start Date: 4 June 2012 Event End Date: 22 June 2012 Description: The Fires Battle Lab during the GAMOA experiment was the Fires executive agent for GAMOA experimentation effort. In that capacity, it supported the Mission Command Battle Lab on attaining insights supporting the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Campaign of Learning (CoL) and Army Warfighting Functional Concept (AWFC) analysis for Army Operational Concept (AOC) review and update process. Additionally in support of FCoE CoL and gap analysis the following issues were also addressed: 1. DSO#3: Anti-Access and Area Denial with emphasis on; Counter UAS Capability, ADA 360 degree capability to detect and track cruise missiles, Integrated Air and Missile Defense.

119

2. This effort also looked at increased responsiveness and optimized timeliness of Fires when airspace command and control (AC2) coordination below the coordinating altitude when it is 18,000 feet, as well as, enhanced targeting through limited sensor fusion of space based assets, unmanned aerial systems, and indirect fire sensors. 3. Offensive and Defensive Fires with a special emphasis on Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) Interoperability pertaining to mission command concerns for synchronization, coordination and mission execution of; Indirect fires, air and missile defense, electronic attack, and joint fires integration. 4. DSO#5: Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) Brigade support with an emphasis on; Fires support to the R&S Brigade, Clearance of Fires, and Airspace coordination requirements. Results: 1. Enemy Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) created a significant cross service and functional area series of gaps. The lack of published JAGIC and Airspace Control doctrine further hindered understanding of how to best attack this problem. The Counter UAS CONOPS and workgroup have to provide a clear path for resolution of this weakness. 2. Airspace Control and its effects on integration of Joint Fires (Indirect fires, air missile defense fires, army aviation close combat attack fires, and close air support) were impaired by the lack of understanding service component requirements as it related to timeliness and responsiveness, risk mitigation, and command authorities. Current force procedures and practices required revitalization. 3. Without a Brigade Support Battalion and sufficient trucks the FiB might not be able to support combat operations. The ability to sustain the force through a just-in-time sustainment process did not appear to take into consideration enemy force capabilities when extended sustainment lines of communication were the norm. Currently sustainment operations appeared to be founded in current force requirements rather major combat operations needs. The rate of fire to support surge, peak, and sustained indirect fires required detailed study. 4. A Reconnaissance and Surveillance Brigade required the capability to plan for and direct all fires during combat operations. Current organic indirect fire systems and staff planners were insufficient to support the full range of expected mission sets this unit be directed to accomplish. Event POC: Dr. Frank Myers, [email protected], 580 442-2930

Modeling & Simulation Division Contributions

Name: Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability (JLCCTC) Entity Resolution Federation (ERF) Integration Event (IE) Event Start Date: Annual Training Federation Event End Date: Annual Training Federation Description: The Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (PEO-STRI) hosted the Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability (JLCCTC) Entity Resolution Federation (ERF) Integration Event (IE) at the Joint Development Integration Lab (JDIL) in Orlando, FL, 25 Feb-8 Mar 2013.

120

JLCCTC-ERF facilitated brigade and battalion staff collective training by providing the stimulation for mission command systems through constructive representation of the units that are under the control of the command. This integration event served to provide participating federates the opportunity to integrate their software in a full up training environment. The Fires Battle Lab provided the Fires simulation driver, FireSimXXI, for the AFTADS v12.2.N.sp2. This integration event was in preparation of the Maintenance Release Test (MRT) of ERFv5.4 that was scheduled for 15-19 April 2013 at the National Sims Center (NSC) at Ft. Leavenworth. Results: JLCCTC-ERF facilitates brigade and battalion staff collective training by providing the stimulation for mission command systems through constructive representation of the units that are under the control of the command. This is an annual requirement for the support of this training. Event POC: Ms. Kay Bowen, [email protected], 442-3629

Name: Joint Tactical Air Picture (JTAP) Execution Date: 3-14 Dec 2012 Description: The Fires Battle Lab is conducting a simulation event in support of the TCM AAMDC’s JTAP Joint Development Engineering Plan (JDEP). JTAP was a capability that supports the improvement of a common tactical air picture. JTAP supported or enhanced mission areas such as air space management, joint counter air/integrated air and missile defense (JIAMD), air interdiction, and advanced engagement concepts. The JTAP had the potential for improving integrated air picture track reporting, timeliness and joint interoperable data sharing of all air and missile tracks (Improving the Air Picture). JTAP had the potential for improving capabilities such as cueing, early engagement, and advanced engagement concepts by providing quality fire control to AMD interceptors (Fire Control Contribution). Finally, the JTAP capability, using JTAP developed procedures and an IP-enabled aerial gateway to exchange data with 5th generation aircraft, and had the potential to extend AMD capability beyond current AMD system capability (Expanding the Battle Space). Results: Final Report pending Event POC: Mr. Scott Fagan, [email protected], 442-2937.

Name: Directed Energy Warfare (DEW) Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) with Raytheon Execution: April 2012-9 May 3013 Description: Directed Energy Warfare (DEW) Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA). The Fires Battle Lab (FBL) partnered with Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) and Raytheon in a DEW CRADA. The purpose was to identify and investigate potential technologies to support DEW. The objective was to validate directed energy solutions to defeat Class I-III Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) for transition to an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). The FBL was scheduled to conduct a series of simulation events leading up to an ACTD. Simulation I was conducted in April 2012 followed by an analytical review to determine what changes were needed to be incorporated for the next simulation. Simulation II was conducted from 17-21 September 2012 focusing on the employment of Lasers, High

121

Power Microwaves, and mission command requirements and the implications of speed of light engagements at varying ranges using counter unmanned aerial system (CUAS). Simulation III’s focus was the validation within simulation of the command and control and event layout replicating the planned culminating event in May. Simulation III was conducted 11-13 March. The culminating event for this was an ACTD planned for the first week in May 2013. The FBL, SMDC and Raytheon were working together to ensure all requirements are met in preparation for the live-fire. Results: This will be first event with directed energy warfare on Fort Sill. Event POC: MAJ Saul Gonzalez, [email protected]. (580) 442-4645

122

APPENDIX ONE STUDENT PRODUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012

428th Field Artillery Brigade Course Initial Inputs Graduates FACCC 379 379 FACCC DL 309 129 FACCC-RC ADT 137 137 BOLC B 940 925 WOAC 49 49 WOBC 51 51 NCOA 2,264 2,212 USMC 1,444 1,377 Other Courses 6,267 6,207 Total 11,840 11,466

Source: Email with atch, subj: Student Production Figures for Annual History, 31 Jan 13, Doc I-23.

123

APPENDIX TWO KEY FCoE AND USAFAS PERSONNEL

Commanding General, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill MG David D. Halverson, 26 Aug 2009-4 May 2012 MG James P. McDonald, 4 May 2012-present USAFAS Commandant and Chief of Field Artillery: (Interim) COL Richard M. Cabrey, 30 Sep 2011-12 Jan 2012 BG Brian J. McKiernan, 12 Jan 2012-present USAFAS Assistant Commandant U.S. Army Field Artillery School: COL Richard M. Cabrey, Sep 2011-4 Apr 2012 COL Martin C. Clausen, 9 Jul 2012-present Commander, 428th Field Artillery Regiment COL John P. Drago, 13 Jul 2010-29 June 2012 COL Gene D. Meredith, 29 June 2012-present

124

APPENDIX THREE FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL COMMANDANTS

CPT Dan T. Moore, 19 Jul 1911-l5 Sep 1914 LTC Edward F. McGlachlin, Jr., l5 Sep 19l4-26 Jun 1916 School was closed 9 July 1916-2 July 1917. COL William J. Snow, 27 Jul 1917-26 Sep 1917 BG Adrian S. Fleming, 26 Sep l9l7-11 May 1918 BG Laurin L. Lawson, 11 May 1918-18 Dec 1918 BG Dennis H. Currie, 24 Dec 1918-l0 Jun 1919 BG Edward T. Donnely, 30 Jun 1919-9 Jul 1919 MG Ernest Hinds, 25 Oct 1919-l Jul 1923 MG George LeR. Irwin, l Jul 1923-l Apr 1928 BG Dwight E. Aultman, 6 Apr 1928-l2 Dec 1929 BG William Cruikshank, 8 Feb 1930-3l Jul 1934 MG Henry W. Butner, l7 Sep 1934-10 May 1936 BG Augustine McIntyre, 29 Jun 1936-31 Jul 1940 BG Donald C. Cubbison, l Aug 1940-22 Dec 1940 BG George R. Allin, 20 Jan 1941-31 Jun 1942 BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-11 Jan 1944 MG Orlando Ward, l2 Jan 1944-30 Oct 1944 MG Ralph McT. Pennell, 3l Oct 1944-30 Aug 1945 MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug 1945-4 Jun 1946 MG Clift Andrus, 18 Jun 1946-9 Apr 1949 MG Joseph M. Swing, 1 Jun 1949-3l Mar 1950 MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr 1950-l6 Nov 1953 MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan 1954-28 May 1954 MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul 1954-23 Feb 1956 MG Thomas E. de Shazo, 12 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959 MG Verdi B. Barnes, 15 Feb 1959-6 Mar 196l MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 196l-3l Mar 1964 MG Harry H. Critz, 1 Apr 1964-15 May 1967 MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970 MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-31 May 1973 MG David E. Ott, 1 Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976 MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-21 Oct 1977 MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980 MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982 MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985 MG Eugene S. Korpal, 4 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987 MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991 MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993 MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995 MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997 MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999

125

MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 2001 MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 2001-9 Dec 2003 MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 2003-4 Aug 2005 MG David C. Ralston, 4 Aug 2005-13 Sep 2007 MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 2007-4 June 2009 BG Ross E. Ridge, 4 Jun 2009-1 Oct 2010 BG Thomas S. Vandal, 10 Dec 2010-30 Sep 2011 (Interim) COL Richard M. Cabrey, 30 Sep 2011-12 Jan 2012 BG Brian J. McKiernan, 12 Jan 2012-present

126

APPENDIX FOUR CHIEFS OF FIELD ARTILLERY

*MG William J. Snow, 10 Feb 1918-19 Dec 1927 *MG Fred T. Austin, 20 Dec 1927-15 Feb 1930 *MG Harry G. Bishop, 10 Mar 1930-9 Mar 1934 *MG Upton Birnie, Jr., 10 Mar 1934-24 Mar 1938 *MG Robert M. Danford, 26 Mar 1938-9 Mar 1942 BG George R. Allin, 9 Mar 1942-31 Jun 1942 BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-11 Jan l944 MG Orlando Ward, 12 Jan 1944-30 Oct 1944 MG Ralph McT. Pennell, 3l Oct 1944-30 Aug 1945 MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug 1945-4 Jun 1946 MG Clift Andrus, 20 Jun 1946-15 Apr 1949 MG Joseph M. Swing, 9 Apr 1949-31 Mar 1950 MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr 1950-16 Nov 1953 MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan 1954-28 May 1954 MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul 1954-23 Feb 1956 MG Thomas E. de Shazo, 12 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959 MG Verdi B. Barnes, 15 Feb 1959-25 Mar 196l MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 1961-31 Mar 1964 MG Harry H. Critz, l Apr 1964-15 May 1967 MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970 MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-31 May 1973 MG David E. Ott, 1 Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976 MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-21 Oct 1977 MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980 MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982 *MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985 *MG Eugene S. Korpal, 3 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987 *MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991 *MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993 *MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995 *MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997 *MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999 *MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 2001 *MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 2001-9 Dec 2003 *MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 2003-4 Aug 2005 *MG David C. Ralston, 4 Aug 2005-13 Sep 2007 *MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 2007-4 June 2009 *BG Ross E. Ridge, 4 June 2009-1 Oct 2010 *BG Thomas S. Vandal, 20 Dec 10-30 Sep 2011 *BG Brian J. McKiernan, 12 Jan 2012-present

Individuals with an asterisk by their name were officially recognized by the

127

Department of War or Department of the Army as the Chief of Field Artillery. The War Department created the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery on 15 February 1918 to supervise the Field Artillery during World War One. On 9 March 1942 the War Department abolished the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery as part of a World War Two reorganization and placed the Field Artillery under the Army Ground Forces. When the War Department dissolved the Chief of Field Artillery on 9 March 1942, General Allin who was serving as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School became the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery. He served as the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery and the Commandant of the Field Artillery School until 31 June 1942. In 1983 the Department of the Army reestablished the Chief of Field Artillery to oversee the development of Field Artillery tactics, doctrine, organization, equipment, and training. Although the War Department and later the Department of the Army did not recognize an official Chief of Field Artillery from 1942 through 1983, the Commandants of the Field Artillery School considered themselves to be the Chief of Field Artillery. See TRADOC Annual Command History for 1 Oct 82-30 Sep 83, pp. 57, 308, Doc I-122. Note: The article, “Three Chiefs,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1931, p. 115, lists Snow’s date of tenure as Chief of Field Artillery as 10 February 1918 to 19 December 1927. USAFAS’s records list 15 February 1918 to 19 December 1927. The same article lists Austin’s tenure as 22 December 1927 to 15 December 1930. USAFAS’s records list 20 December 1927 to 15 February 1930.

128

APPENDIX FIVE ASSISTANT COMMANDANTS

COL Oliver L. Spaulding, 24 Nov 1917-3 May 1918 LTC William Bryden, 4 May 1918-25 Oct 1918 COL Rine E. De R. Hoyle, 26 Oct 1918-25 May 1919 MAJ John W. Kilbreth, 24 Jun 1919-14 Nov 1919 MAJ Augustine McIntyre, 15 Nov 1919-28 Jul 1920 COL Henry W. Butner, 28 Jul 1920-30 Jun 1924 COL Daniel W. Hand, 22 Jul 1924-25 Jun 1925 LTC William P. Ennis, 26 Jul 1925-22 Jul 1929 LTC Lesley P. McNair, 23 July 1929-30 Jul 1930 COL Charles S. Blakely, 28 Jun 1933-15 Jun 1937 COL Donald C. Cubbison, 1 Aug 1937-30 Jun 1938 COL Maxwell Murray, 15 Aug 1938-12 Nov 1938 BG LeRoy P. Collins, 12 Dec 1938-17 Feb 1941 COL Mert Proctor, 17 Mar 1941-25 Jun 1941 COL James A. Lester, 4 Jul 1941-20 Feb 1942 COL Theodore L. Futch, 21 Feb 1942-2 Sep 1942 COL Lawrence B. Bixby, 7 Nov 1942-28 Nov 1943 COL Dinar B. Gjelsteen, 1 Dec 1943-3 Oct 1944 COL Thomas P. DeShazo, 16 Oct 1944-10 Oct 1947 BG Stanley R. Mickelsen, 1 Sep 1947-1 Oct 1949 BG William H. Colbern, 9 Jan 1950-1 Feb 1952 BG James F. Brittingham, 19 Mar 1952-31 Jul 1953 BG Thomas W. Watlington, 1 Aug 1953-31 Jul 1955 MG John E. Theimer, 1 Aug 1955-8 Jul 1956 BG Paul A. Gavan, 9 Jul 1956-29 Aug 1957 BG Philip C. Wehle, 30 Aug 1957-26 Apr 1959 BG Edwin S. Hartshorn, Jr., 23 Jul 1959-31 Jul 1962 BG James W. Totten, 1 Aug 1962-7 May 1964 BG Charles P. Brown, 15 Jun 1964-15 Jun 1965 BG John S. Hughes, 1 Jul 1965-21 May 1967 BG John J. Kenney, 22 May 1967-14 Jul 1968 BG Lawrence H. Caruthers, Jr., 15 Jul 1968-30 Jun 1972 BG Robert J. Koch, 1 Aug 1972-11 Jul 1974 BG Vernon B. Lewis, Jr., 15 Jul 1974-16 Jul 1975 BG Albert B. Akers, 17 Jul 1975-13 Jan 1978 BG Edward A. Dinges, 10 Aug 1978-27 Jun 1980 BG Robert C. Forman, 1 Jul 1980-8 Mar 1981 BG Donald Eckelbarger, 2 Mar 1981-29 Apr 1983 BG Thomas J.P. Jones, 29 Apr 1983-16 Jul 1984 BG Raphael J. Hallada, 1 Aug 1984-1 Apr 1986 BG Jerry C. Harrison, 29 May 1986-13 Jul 1987 BG Fred F. Marty, 13 Jul 1987-24 Aug 1989

129

BG John C. Ellerson, 24 Aug 1989-13 Aug 1990 COL Marshall R. McCree, 14 Aug 1990-14 Apr 1991 BG Tommy R. Franks, 17 Apr 1991-8 Jul 1992 BG David L. Benton III, 8 Jul 1992-1 May 1994 BG Leo J. Baxter, 24 May 1994-25 Sep 1995 BG William J. Lennox, Jr., 1 Dec 1995-13 Jun 1997 BG Toney Stricklin, 14 Jun 1997-17 Apr 1998 BG Lawrence R. Adair, 18 Apr 1998-13 Aug 1999 BG William F. Engel, 1 Oct 1999-11 Oct 2001 BG David C. Ralston, 11 Oct 2001-27 Apr 2003 BG James A. Cerrone, 4 Aug 2003-23 Aug 2004 BG Mark A. Graham, 24 Aug 2004-25 Jul 2005 COL (P) James M. McDonald, 25 Jul 2005-22 May 2006 COL Jeffrey W. Yaeger, 22 May 2006-25 Sep 2006 COL Albert Johnson, Jr., 25 Sep 2006-27 Aug 2007 COL (P) Richard C. Longo, 27 Aug 2007-8 Sep 2008 BG Ross E. Ridge, 8 Sep 2008-4 Jun 2009 COL Matt Merrick, 19 Aug 2009-Jul 2011 COL Richard M. Cabrey, Sep 2011-4 Apr 2012 COL Martin D. Clausen, 9 Jul 2012-present

130

APPENDIX SIX COMMAND SERGEANT MAJORS OF USAFAS SINCE 1991

CSM Joseph J. McFadden, Jan 1991-Aug 1995 CSM Gary R. Green, Sep 1995-Aug 1998 CSM Perry L. Roberts, Aug 1998-Jun 2000 CSM Ricky Hatcher, Jul 2000-Mar 2002 CSM Dennis M. King, May 2002-May 2004 CSM Armando Ramirez, Jul 2004-Jul 2006 CSM Gary J. Bronson, Aug 2006-Aug 2008 CSM Daniel R. Willey, Jul 2009-Aug 2011 CSM Sam K. Young, Aug 2011-present

131

APPENDIX SEVEN COMMAND SERGEANT MAJORS OF NCOA

CSM Clifford L. Lewis, Mar 1973-Sep 1974 CSM Ralph Pitcher, Aug 1974-Jun 1975 CSM Coyle C. Bohn, Jul 1975-Apr 1976 CSM Tommy Morgan, Apr 1976-May 1977 CSM Nick Mastrovito, May 1977-Jun 1978 CSM James Kennedy, Jun 1978-May 1980 CSM George Phillips, Aug 1980-May 1983 CSM Pat Fowler, May 1983-Nov 1984 CSM John A. Pierce, Nov 1984-Jan 1986 CSM Kenneth E. Mills, Jan 1986-Aug 1988 CSM Jerry M. Laws, Aug 1988-Feb 1990 CSM William J. Kermode, Feb 1990-Jun 1991 CSM Mal Causby, Jun 1991-Oct 1991 CSM Harold F. Shrewsberry, Oct 1991-Oct 1993 CSM Karl L. Purdy, Oct 1993-May 1995 CSM Jerry L. Wood, May 1995-Oct 1997 CSM Gene Odom, Oct 1997-Jun 1999 CSM Rickey Hatcher, Jun 1999-Jun 2000 CSM Joseph Stanley, Jun 2000-Dec 2001 CSM Carl B. McPherson, Jan 2002-Jan 2004 CSM Allie R. Ousley, Jan 2004-May 2006 CSM Robert L. White , May 2006-Jul 2007 CSM Dean J. Keveles, Nov 2007-Jun 2011 CSM Bryan A. Pinkney, Jun 2011-present

132

APPENDIX EIGHT U.S. ARMY FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FORT SILL ORGANIZATIONAL CHART AS OF 8 APRIL 2013

US ARMY FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FORT SILL ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE Command Sergeant Major Commanding General Deputy to the CG USAFCoEFS USAFCoEFS USAFCoEFS CSM Dwight Morrisey MG James M. McDonald Mr. Joe E. Gallagher (580)-442-3205 (580)-442-3006 (580)-442-2604 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Personal Staff

Aide SJA IG CPT Valton King COL Mark Seitsinger LTC James Mattox Chief of Staff (580)-917-9444 (580)-442-2685 (580) 442-3224 COL Brian Dunn [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Commandant (580)-442-3005 Commandant US Army ADA School [email protected] Deputy Chief of Staff SGS Deputy SGS US Army FA School COL(P) Donald Fryc Mr. Jimmy Dailey MAJ Sheriff Olalekan CPT Sarah Savageau (580)-442-8994 (580)-442-8300 (580)-558-0599 (580)-442-8313 VACANT th [email protected] 434 FA BDE NCO Academy [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] COL Michael Dvoracek CSM Bryan Pinkney (580)-442-1261 (580)-442-3141 Directorates AC AC [email protected] [email protected] COL Martin Clausen COL Christopher Spillman CDID JACI DOTD Senior Guard Advisor (580) 442-6606 (580)-442-5421 COL David Hill COL John T. Smith COL Thomas Quintero COL Paul Caviness [email protected] [email protected] (580)-442-6230 (580)-442-1701 (580)-442-2301 (580)-442-6770 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] TCM Fires Cells [email protected] TCM AAMDC th th COL Scott Patton 428 FA BDE 30 ADA BDE COL Edward J. O’Neill Coordinating Staff COL Gene Meredith COL Michael Simley (580) 442-6836 580-442-8947 G2 (580)-442-4704 (580)-442-0779 [email protected] G1/G4 G3/5/7 G6 [email protected] Ms. Pamela-Jackson-Williams [email protected] [email protected] LTC James Speegle COL Steven Parker Mr. Eddie Henderson (580)-442-0314 (580)-442-5207 (580)-558-0504 (580)-442-2318 [email protected] Pamela.s.jackson- [email protected] [email protected] USMC Detachment TCM Fires Brigade TCM ADA Brigade [email protected] Office, Chief ADA Col. Douglas P. Thomas COL David Brost LTC Matthew Tedesco VACANT (580)-442-6311 580-442-8754 580-442-2419 (580)-442-0617 G 3/3 G5 G7 G8 (DRM) [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] LTC Anthony Behrens LTC Noah Villanueva LTC John l. Rainville Ms. Young, Julie (580)-442-4603 (580)-442-4603 (580)-442-1778 (580)-442-2044 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] FAPO COL Kelly Ivanoff TCM BCT Fires TCM Deputy Chief Special Staff (580)-442-3820 COL Michael Hartig Concepts/Development Protocol STRATCOM PAO QAO [email protected] 580-442-1995 VACANT [email protected] 580-442-6980 Mr. Mike Kunz LTC Brian Adams Mr. Darrell Ames Mr. James Connolly (580)-442-4237 (580)-442-3944 (580)-442-4500 (580)-442-2002 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

TCM Fires Integration COL Toby Brooks Retention Equal Opportunity Director of Museums Ft Sill Band 580-558-0731 SGM Daniel Hilton MSG Wendell Huddleston Mr. Frank Siltman WO1 Matthew David [email protected] (580)-442-4707 (580)-442-6968 (580)-558-0384 (580)-442-2208 Wendell.m.huddleston.mil@ [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] mail.mil FORSCOM UNITS In Accordance with Title 5, U.S.C. 552a (Privacy Act of 1974) as implemented by the Federal Register, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, 32 CFR Part 505, The Army Privacy Program; Final Rule, protected personal information (home address and home telephone numbers) will not be disclosed from this roster to anyone outside the Department of Defense. This alert roster will be kept in a secure place at all times. When updated, obsolete copies will 75thth Fires BDE 214th Fires BDE 31st ADA BDE be destroyed as required by paragraph 4-501, AR 25-55, The Department of the Army Freedom of information Act Program. COL Alfredo Najera COL Tim Daugherty COL Michael Morrissey TENANT UNITS (580)-442-4501 (580)-442-4919 (580)-442-0421 [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] USAOTC FSTD US Army Garrison MEDDAC DENTAC COL Steven Scioneaux COL Paul Hossenlopp COL Jennifer Bedick COL Michael Roberts EOC (580)-442-8400 (580)-442-3106 (580)-558-3000 (580)-442-4111 (580)-442-3241 Steven.a.scioneaux.mil@ [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] mail.mil As of 4/8/2013

Briefing, subj: FCOE Organization from FCOE Home page, 3 June 2013, Doc I-24.

133

APPENDIX NINE FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL COMMANDANT OFFICE CHART

FIELD ARTILLERY COMMANDANT DCG FA ARNG

ASSISTANT FA COMMAND SNR ARNG COMMANDANT SERGEANTS MAJOR ADVISOR

428TH FAB FAPO COMMANDANT CMDT SPEC DAC FA CDR DIRECTOR STAFF STAFF ARNG

1-30 FA DEP PROPONENT DEPUTY EXECUTIVE CULT/ FOR ANALYST COMMANDANT OFFICER LANGUAGE ADVISOR 1-78 FA ADMINISTRATIVE STRATCOM AIDE-DE-CAMP OFFICER COMMAND

2-2 FA CDR HISTORIAN INTEGRATION COMMAND FAPO SGM OFFICER SECRETARY

PROJECT OFFICER OPERATIONS

ASSISTANT CMDT DRIVER SECRETARY LOGISTICS SPECIALIST

Source: Briefing, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School, 11 Apr 11, Doc I-1, 2011 USAFAS Annual History.

134

APPENDIX TEN LIST OF DOCUMENTS

See Footnotes

135

INDEX OF NAMES

B

Bolten, Claude M., Jr., 110

C

Campbell, GEN Charles C., 11 Chiarelli, GEN Peter W., 44 Clausen, COL Martin C., 3 Cone, GEN Robert W., 9, 51

F

Formica, Michael D., 15 Franks, GEN Frederick M., 115

G

Gates, Bill, 75 Geren, Peter, 75 Gwinn, CPT John, 13

H

Halverson, MG David D., 37, 58

L

Lewis, CSM Clifford L., 25 Longo, MG Richard C., 12

M

Maples, MG Michael D., 61 McConald, MG Mark, 1, 2 McKiernan, BG Brian J., 2, 12, 13 Metz, LTG Thomas F., 100 Mull, Stephen, 102

O

Odierno, GEN Raymond, 8

136

P

Perkins, LTG David G., 15

S

Shinseki, GEN Eric K., 61 Stanhagen, COL (R) Eric, 13 Stricklin, MG Toney, 60

T

Thrasher, MG Alan W., 61

V

Vandal, BG Thomas S., 19 Vane, LTG Michael M., 79 Vangjel, MG Peter M., 18, 76, 93

W

Wallace, GEN William S., 11, 43 White, Anthony, 16