U.S. Army Field Artillery School Annual History (Rcs Chis-6 [R4])

Home , 428th Fighter Squadron, Corps area, Maxwell Murray

U.S. ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL ANNUAL HISTORY (RCS CHIS-6 [R4])

1 JANUARY 2010 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 2010

FIELD ARTILLERY BRANCH HISTORIAN’S OFFICE

COMMANDANT’S INTRODUCTION

The 2010 Annual History captures key training and leader development initiatives and combat development accomplishments of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School. While Soldiers and civilians at Fort Sill worked to ensure local security, the Field Artillery School continued to transform to meet future requirements by playing a key role in futures development and integration. Emerging weapons systems, such as the Paladin Integrated Management Program, Field Artillery munitions, such as the Guided MLRS (GMLRS) and the Excalibur Unitary, assured unparalleled precision lethal fires. The Field Artillery School‟s core mission remained training Soldiers and leaders for Field Artillery units of the operational forces. During the year, the Field Artillery School provided Field Artillery Soldiers and leaders with world-class training and instruction. The School furnished assignment-oriented training to prepare leaders and Soldiers better for their next or first assignment. Recognizing the impact of non-standard missions in the Contemporary Operational Environment on Redlegs, the Field Artillery School energetically furnished training programs to retrain individual Redlegs and units in core Field Artillery competencies. The School also engaged the Army through Warfighter Forums, developed an engagement strategy using the social media, such as Facebook, to encourage West Point and Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets to select the Field Artillery as their branch of choice and to tell the School‟s and the Field Artillery‟s story, and conducted a Cultural and Foreign Language Program to develop leaders with an understanding of foreign cultures and languages and passed an accreditation visit by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. In support of the Field Artillery‟s nonlethal effects mission, the Field Artillery School taught the Tactical Information Operations Warfare Course and electronic warfare courses to officers, warrant officers, and noncommissioned officers to develop Soldiers and leaders with the abilities of providing nonlethal effects. As part of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission‟s effort to co- locate Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery training at one location, the Field Artillery School participated in the full operational capability of the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill and in growing the next generation Fires force. Around the world, Redleg Soldiers are the pride of the Nation‟s forces. At home, Field Artillery units continue to train to unprecedented levels of high-quality performance -- preparing for whatever challenges wait them. Now more than ever, the Caissons are indeed rolling along.

Artillery Strong!

(original signed)

THOMAS S. VANDAL Brigadier General, USA Commandant iii

PREFACE

The 2010 Annual History for the U.S. Army Field Artillery School follows the decision-making process as closely as possible. Through interviews, email, messages, staff reports, fact sheets, correspondence, briefings, and other documentation, the Field Artillery School Historian‟s Office has recreated as closely as possible how the Field Artillery School made key decisions concerning joint issues, training, leader development, doctrine, force design, and equipment requirements. Because the Field Artillery School was involved in many diverse activities during the year, the Historian‟s Office under the direction of the School Commandant selected only those activities deemed to be the most historically significant to include in the History. Preserving historical documents forms a vital part of the historian‟s work. After they are collected from the various School organizations during the process of researching, they are filed in the historical records and documents collection in the Historian‟s Office. All documents are available for use by School staff, other U.S. governmental agencies, and private individuals upon request. Because new documents are often found after research and writing has been completed, this contemporary history is subject to revision. As new documents are discovered, interpretations and conclusions will change. Comments and suggested changes should be directed to the Historian‟s Office. In the process of researching and writing the History, the historian becomes indebted to many people for their advice and assistance. The Field Artillery School Historian‟s Office would like to thank the people who provided their technical expertise. Without their help writing the history would have been far more difficult.

(original signed) BOYD L. DASTRUP, Ph.D. Field Artillery Branch Historian U.S. Army Field Artillery School

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE i COMMANDER’S INTRODUCTION ii PREFACE iii TABLE OF CONTENTS iv CHAPTER ONE: MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND PERSONNEL Mission 1 Organization 1 New Commandant 1 Fires Center of Excellence Regulation 10-5 2 Social Media 3 Personnel 3 Engagement Strategy 3 Radar Maintenance Training for MOS 13R 7 Warfighter Forums 9 Fires Center of Excellence and Field Artillery School Accreditation 10 CHAPTER TWO: LEADER DEVELOPMENT: TRAINING AND EDUCATION Introduction 11 Training Guidance for Fiscal Year 2011 11 Joint and Combined Fires University 11 Gaming 15 Army Learning Concept 2015 16 Cultural and Foreign Language Program 16 Reset, Mobile Training Teams, Battery and Below and Collective Training Evaluation Teams 20 Distance Learning 24 Army National Guard Regional Training Institutes 24 Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations 25 Joint Fires and Effects Training System 25 Call for Fire Trainer 25 Noncommissioned Officer Education System and Noncommissioned Officer Academy 26 Warrior Leader Course 28 Advanced Leader Course 29 Senior Leader Course 29 Warrant Officer Education System 30 Warrant Officer Basic Course 30 Warrant Officer Advance Course 31 Officer Education System 31 Basic Officer Leader Courses 31 Basic Officer Leader Course B 32 Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course 32 Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course-Reserve v

Component 33 Intermediate Level Education Brigade/Division Full Spectrum Fire Support Course 34 Pre-command Course 35 Joint and Combined Integration Directorate 36 Precision Fires Course 36 Joint Fires Observer Course 37 Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course 38 The 138th Combat Training Squadron 39 Joint Fires Support Executive Steering Committee 39 Nonlethal Training 40 Electronic Warfare Courses 40 Tactical Information Operations Course 42 CHAPTER THREE: COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS: FORCE DESIGN, DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS Introduction 43 Force Design 43 Army Capstone Concept 43 Army Operating Concept 44 The United States Army Functional Concept for Fires: 2016-2028 44 Joint Air Ground Integration Cell 44 Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Studies 45 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Studies I and II 46 Precision Effects 47 Precision Fires 47 Precision Munitions 49 Cluster Munitions Assessment 50 TRADOC Capabilities Managers Fires Brigade and Brigade Combat Team-Fires 52 TRADOC Brigade Combat Team-Fires 52 Excalibur Extended-Range Guided Projectile 52 Precision Guidance Kit 58 Future Cannon Munitions Suite 60 Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer 61 M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer 72 Paladin Integrated Management Program 76 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle 78 Knight 79 Joint Effects Targeting System 81 Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder 82 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System 84 Profiler 85 TRADOC Fires Brigade 86 Multiple-Launcher Rocket System 86 vi

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 97 Army Tactical Missile System 105 Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System 110 Firefinder Radars 118 Lightweight Countermortar Radar 119 Command, Control, and Communication Systems 120 Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 120 Handheld Command and Control Systems 123 Fires Battle Laboratory 124 Glossary 138 Appendix One: Student Production for Fiscal Year 2010 150 Appendix Two: Key USAFAS Personnel 151 Appendix Three: Field Artillery School Commandants 152 Appendix Four: Chiefs of Field Artillery 154 Appendix Five: Assistant Commandants 156 Appendix Six: Command Sergeant Majors of NCOA 158 Appendix Seven: USAFCOEFS Organization Chart 159 Appendix Eight: Field Artillery Commandant‟s Office Chart 160 Appendix Nine: List of Documents 161 Index of Names: 167 CHAPTER ONE MISSION, ORGANIZATION, AND PERSONNEL MISSION Influenced by the new field artillery technology introduced after the Spanish- American War of 1898, the development of indirect fire, and the lack of adequately trained Field Artillerymen, the War Department opened the School of Fire for Field Artillery at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, on 15 September 1911. While War Department, General Orders No. 72 of 3 June 1911 tasked the school to furnish practical and theoretical field artillery training to lieutenants, captains, field grade officers, militia officers, and noncommissioned officers, War Department, General Orders No. 73 of 5 June 1911 integrated the school into a sequential and progressive educational system for officers.1 In 2010 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School (USAADAS), the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA), and the 434th Field Artillery Brigade, composed the training mission of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE). During the year, the Field Artillery School trained the field artillery forces of the United States Army and United States Marine Corps, provided joint training, developed Field Artillery leaders, helped design and develop fire support tactics and doctrine, and supported unit training and readiness.2 ORGANIZATION New Commandant In December 2010 Brigadier General Thomas S. Vandal succeeded Brigadier General Ross E. Ridge as the commandant of the Field Artillery School. General Vandal graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, in 1982 where he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Field Artillery. His military education included the Field Artillery Officer Basic and Advance Courses, Combined Arms Services Staff School, Command and General Staff College, and the National War College. General Vandal‟s initial assignment was with the 75th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill Oklahoma, where he served in the 1st Battalion, 17th Field Artillery as B Battery fire direction officer, executive officer, and battalion fire direction officer. Upon completion of Field Artillery Officer Advance Course in 1986, General Vandal was assigned to Baumholder, Germany, where he served as the battalion plans officer and B Battery commander in the 4th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery, 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized). After the Command and General Staff College, he served in the 2nd Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery, 1st Cavalry Division as the brigade fire support officer and battalion S-3. He also served as the S-3 and executive officer for the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery. General Vandal commanded the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, Fort Lewis, Washington, and the 75th Field Artillery Brigade, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, where he deployed to Iraq in support of the

12002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 7. 2“Standing-up the Fires Center of Excellence,” Fires Bulletin, May-Jun 09, pp. 4- 5, Doc I-1. 2

1st Cavalry Division. After brigade command, he served as the commander of the Operations Group at the Joint Multi-National Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, for three years. In 2008 he was assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division where he served as the deputy commanding general. While assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division, General Vandal deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation New Dawn in Iraq as the deputy commanding general for U.S. Division-North. General Vandal‟s assignments also included: Assistant Professor of Military Science at the University of New Hampshire, G-3 executive officer for III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas, G-3 Training Officer for I Corps, Fort Lewis, and Plans Officer for the J- 39, Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon. General Vandal‟s badges included the Parachutist Badge, Air Assault Badge, and Joint Staff Badge. His awards included the Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit (1OLC), Bronze Star Medal, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal (3OLC), Joint Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal (2OLC), and the Army Achievement Medal (4OLC). General Vandal was awarded a Master of Arts in Management from Webster University in 1986 and a Master of Science in National Security Studies from the National War College in 2003.3 Fires Center of Excellence Regulation 10-5 Because the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, was a new organization in 2009 that combined the staffs of the Air Defense Artillery School and Field Artillery School into a Center of Excellence, the FCoE published regulation 10-5 on 1 January 2010 for coordination. The regulation consolidated support and administrative requirements to gain efficiencies, combined functions of combat developments, training and doctrine development, and experimentation and exercises into organizations that supported the Air Defense Artillery and Field Artillery. The FCoE would acquire, allocate, and manage fires force systems and resources, while the Field Artillery School and Air Defense Artillery School commandants would serve as branch proponents, responsible for leader development and education, execute branch-specific training, leverage and disseminate lessons learned from the field, develop an accessions strategy, and provide recommendations to senior Army leaders on the personnel life cycle and career path of branch soldiers and leaders. The commandants would also provide recommendations and needs requirements to the FCoE regarding force management, training development, and modernization.4 Signed by the FCoE chief of staff in October 2010, the regulation also described FCoE governance, role and responsibilities, and interrelationships and integration of the FCoE and its two subordinate branches to ensure that all responsibilities would be fulfilled while maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the entire organization.5

3Official Biography of BG Vandal, Doc I-1. 4FCOE Regulation 10-5 (Extract), 1 Jan 11, pp. 1-7, Doc I-2; Email with atch, subj: FCoE 12 Oct 10 pdf, 6 Jan 11, Doc I-3. 5FCOE Regulation 10-5 (Extract), 1 Jan 11, pp. 1-7; Email with atch, subj: FCoE 12 Oct 10 pdf, 6 Jan 11; Email, subj: FCoE 10-5, 6 Jan 11, Doc I-4; Email, subj: FCOE 10-5 Input to 2010 Annual History, 3 Feb 11, Doc I-5. 3

SOCIAL MEDIA In the last three years the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Army embraced the social media as a means to tell their stories and communicate their missions. In fact, the Army recognized in 2010 that people no longer searched for the news. It found them. With a variety of platforms, the social media instantaneously connected users within a global network, making the transfer of information more rapid and pervasive than in the past. For example, U.S. forces in Vietnam in the 1960s could enter and leave a village before anyone outside the area had any knowledge about it. In 2010 it was possible that a video of coalition forces activities could be uploaded and shared online prior to the patrol returning to base. Because an inaccurate message could distort U.S. forces activities and could be broadcasted via the Internet, the Army and the Field Artillery School had to ensure that the correct message was being shared through the timely release of accurate information. In the past participation in the social media was optional. In 2010 the Army and the Field Artillery School chose a proactive approach to using the social media rather than a reactive one because it had the ability to communicate with a larger audience faster and in many ways.6 In 2010 the Field Artillery School used many social media platforms to get its message out. It employed Facebook, Twitter, Flicker, YouTube, Vimeo, RedlegLive, and a website. Adding to the mix was Field Artillery 101, an informational website to inform the public about the Field Artillery. During the year, it updated Flicker weekly and Twitter daily and completed social media links on Field Artillery-related magazines, Facebooks, websites, and outside outlets with the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Specifically, Facebook disseminated many articles. It highlighted the 3-321st Field Artillery‟s M777 155-mm towed artillery mission in the Pech Valley, Afghanistan; the 3- 6th Field Artillery‟s Afghan security partner mission; the 1-10th Field Artillery‟s medical mission to Al Kut, Iraq; and the 1-41st Field Artillery‟s Operation Glory Outreach that was designed to build trust between Iraqi security forces and local populace. Other stories included commemorating the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War in June 1950.7 PERSONNEL Engagement Strategy Within thirty days of becoming the Chief of Field Artillery and the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Peter M. Vangjel drafted a letter to the Commanding General of the Human Resources Command about the serious challenge of retaining Field Artillery captains. The demand for captains in 2007 exceeded the supply and promised to do so in 2008. According to General Vangjel, four factors contributed to

6Contract Study by Janson Communications, 2010, p. 2, Doc I-6; Army Social: Optimizing Online Engagement, undated, p. 3, Doc I-7. 7Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Proponency Office, Introduction, 7 Jan 11, Doc I- 8; FA Cmdt, SITREP, 13 Aug 10, Doc I-9; FA Cmdt SITREP, 30 Jul 10, Doc I-10; FA Cmdt SITREP, 23 Jul 10, Doc I-11; Email with atch, subj: Social Media‟s Input to 2010 Annual History, 31 Jan 11, Doc I-12. 4

the shortage: attrition, military transition team (MITT) requirements, frequent brigade deployments, and early career field designation and branch detail programs.8 During recent years, the attrition rates of Field Artillery captains increased from six percent in 2003 to seventeen percent in 2007. The perceived lack of career opportunities with the decrease in battery command assignments with the creation of the modular Army and frequent deployments caused many captains to leave the Army.9 Addressing this, General Vangjel noted, “The long term impact of this is devastating -- not only our ability to man the growing Army with Majors and Lieutenant Colonels, but also our ability to be selective at those ranks.”10 Not even the financial bonuses would likely entice captains with multiple deployments of twelve to fifteen months each to stay in because they saw no end in sight for the deployments.11 As General Vangjel explained in October 2007, MITTs also contributed to the shortages of captains in operational units. Between July 2006 and June 2007, 115 captains and senior first lieutenants were assigned to MITTs. From July 2007 through June 2008, he anticipated that 178 captains would be assigned to transition teams. This would be the tactical equivalent of fourteen to fifteen brigade combat teams of captains, creating shortages in combat units.12 Besides using up many captain resources, the MITTs led to another serious problem. Many Field Artillery captains chose to remain with their current units with which they had already deployed and with which they would deploy in the future rather than attend the Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course (FACCC) and subsequently be assigned to MITT to deploy for a second or third twelve- to fifteen-month tour. This ultimately led to staffing field artillery battalions with non-FACCC graduates who were less qualified than FACCC graduates. In fact, almost every field artillery battalion had at least one non-FACCC graduate in battery command because of the limited numbers of FACCC graduates. General Vangjel added that FACCC needed to graduate at least thirty active duty Field Artillery officers from each class to meet adequately the requirements for transition teams, brigade combat teams, and battery command slots.13 The increasing number of brigade deployments, career field designation, branch detail, and imbalanced accessions also contributed to the shortages. While the deployments increased the demand for more Field Artillery captains, career field designation by majors who wanted to get out of the Field Artillery into a functional area and branch detail programs took captains away from the branch for other assignments. In fact, major requests for a branch transfer or career field designation out of the Field Artillery went from a historical average of five annually to forty-seven in 2007. As General Vangjel explained in May 2008, imbalanced accessions also played a part in the

82008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 47. 92008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 47. 10Memorandum, subj: Greybeards, 9 Nov 07, Doc II-91, 2008 USAFACFS ACH. 112008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 47. 122008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 47. 132008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 48. 5

shortages. For 2008 nearly fifty percent of the new Field Artillery second lieutenants would come from the Officer Candidate School (OCS). From the General‟s perspective, this was critical because OCS graduates historically did not serve as long as those from the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). If OCS accessions remained high, the Field Artillery would have a shortage of officers to meet lieutenant colonel and colonel requirements in twelve to fifteen years.14 To reduce the shortages, General Vangjel outlined several courses of action. In a briefing on 22 February 2008, he encouraged assigning more Field Artillery officers and noncommissioned officers to top ROTC programs to persuade cadets to select the Field Artillery, reducing accessions from OCS, and requiring the U.S. Military Academy to fill Army requirements by sending more graduates into the Field Artillery. In fact, the U.S. Military Academy would only permit 98 cadets to go into the Field Artillery whereas the Army wanted 150. He also suggested reducing operational tempo for Field Artillery officers who were among the most deployed officers in the Army, decreasing MITT requirements for Field Artillery officers, finding ways to expand time between deployments, and making the Field Artillery more attractive by increasing command opportunities and working to position battlefield coordination detachment, garrison, and training support brigade commanders for selection to general officer.15 In his state of the branch article in the Fires Bulletin of October-December 2008, General Vangjel related successes with the above initiatives. Air Defense Artillery officers helped cut operational tempo by assuming responsibility for one third of the MITT assignments, alleviating burdens on Field Artillery captains and allowing them to return to Field Artillery units upon graduation from FACCC. The Field Artillery also took steps to make MITT assignments more attractive by requesting a $5,000 to $10,000 bonus for serving in one and designating some MITT assignments as key development positions for mid-grade officers. In the meantime, aggressive support of the ROTC Leader Development Assessment Course (LDAC) that was a graduation requirement and held every summer at Fort Lewis, Washington, and the USMA Cadet Field Training and Mounted Maneuver Training increased the number of graduates selecting the Field Artillery by thirty-three percent in 2008. Also, command opportunities improved.16 Despite this favorable news, the Field Artillery School continued searching for “the best and brightest” in 2009 to serve as Field Artillery officers who would be adaptable and flexible full-spectrum warriors. Through Field Artillery Branch Days at the largest ROTC programs, School representatives showed videos and answered questions about the Field Artillery. At a Field Artillery Tailgate at the U.S. Military Academy, where recently deployed lieutenants and captains spoke to cadets about their personal experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, School leaders advertised the Field Artillery‟s accomplishments and future and encouraged cadets to select the Field Artillery as one of their top three choices. The School even employed Facebook and the

142008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 48. 152008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 48-49. 162008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 49; Email, subj: FAPO Engagement, 31 Jan 11, Doc I-13. 6

Fires Knowledge Network (FKN) to reach cadets. In fact, the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence, Major General David D. Halverson, and the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Ross E. Ridge, put a major emphasis on using Facebook as a tool to reach prospective Field Artillery officers.17 Accession statistics indicated the success of the engagement strategy of recruiting ROTC and USMA cadets into the branch by fighting the negative perceptions of the Field Artillery since 2004. In 2007 227 cadets selected the Field Artillery in their top three choices. Of the class of 2010, 366 U.S. Military Academy cadets listed the Field Artillery as one of their top three choices. Meanwhile, 483 ROTC cadets picked the Field Artillery as one of their top three choices in 2007, while 731 ROTC cadets from the class of 2010 picked the Field Artillery as one of their top three choices, representing an increase of slightly over fifty percent. Of those 731, 110 cadets listed the Field Artillery as their number one choice. This was twenty seven more than in 2009 and thirty seven more than in 2008. According to the School‟s Field Artillery Proponency Office (FAPO), visits to the top producing ROTC programs led to the increase by furnishing favorable impressions to the cadets. As the director of FAPO noted in January 2010, the branch was gradually changing its image for the better; and accessions reflected that. In 2010 660 cadets went into the Field Artillery as compared to 511 in 2007.18 During 2010, FAPO and the School continued its aggressive engagement strategy to improve accessions. They established a goal of accessing fifteen percent of an ROTC class from the most productive ROTC programs by maintaining a communications outreach strategy, engaging and recruiting quality cadets and athletes at the top ROTC programs, and maintaining Warrior Forge and LDAC support for the summer of 2011. From FAPO‟s perspective, engaging and recruiting quality cadets and athletes and maintaining Warrior Forge and LDAC were critical for success.19 FAPO also had an aggressive engagement strategy for the U.S. Military Academy in 2010. It maintained a communications outreach strategy through videos and promotional items, among other things, and informed and educated the cadets through the social media. It engaged and recruited top cadets and maintained Camp Buckner support by resourcing a live-fire cannon platoon with a fire support team there and maintained the Cadet Troop Lead Training (CTLT) program. Of the four strategies, engaging and recruiting top cadets and maintaining Camp Buckner support for CTLT were critical for success.20 In fact, on 5 January 2010 the director of FAPO indicated that the CTLT was one of the best recruiting venues in past years. Basically, the program involved getting

172009 USAFAS Annual History (AH), pp. 20-21. 182009 USAFAS AH, p. 21; Email with atch, subj: Targeting the Best Cadets in America, 5 Jan 10, Doc I-14; Information Paper, subj: Field Artillery Recruiting Strategy, for FY 10, 31 Jul 09, Doc I-15; Briefing, subj: Key Points on Personnel, 12 Jan 10, Doc I-16; Email with atch, subj: FAPO Engagement, 28 Jan 11, Doc I-17. 19Email with atch, subj: FAPO Engagement, 28 Jan 11; Email, subj: FAPO Engagement, 31 Jan 11; Email with atch, subj: FAPO Engagement, 3 Mar 11, Doc I-18. 20Email with atch, subj: FAPO Engagement, 28 Jan 11; Email with atch, subj: FAPO Engagement, 3 May 11. 7

cadets to visit a Field Artillery unit during the summer. At Fort Sill, for example, the Field Artillery School exposed cadets to various field artillery weapon systems and had them interact with soldiers.21 Through outreach programs FAPO visited the U.S. Military Academy and ROTC programs within one hundred miles of Fort Sill in 2010 and educated the cadets about the Field Artillery using videos, booklets, and other promotional items. At the U.S. Military Academy in particular FAPO held a combat arms tailgate party, a junior leadership panel, a branch night, a Field Artillery symposium, and a Saint Barbara‟s Day. In April 2010 FAPO conducted productive engagements at the University of Utah, Brigham Young University, Utah Valley University, Oklahoma State University, Oklahoma University, and other universities in Oklahoma and Arkansas. This work paved the way for accessing 178 cadets into the Field Artillery for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. This represented a twenty-five percent increase in numbers over FY 2009. As the Commandant of the Field Artillery School and Chief of Field Artillery, Brigadier General Ross E. Ridge, briefed in May 2010, the Field Artillery met lieutenant accession requirements for the second consecutive year because the desire to serve as a Field Artillery officer was increasing. He attributed this to a series of networking web sites -- Facebook, Flicker, Twitter, and FKN FCOE/FA blog -- and other engagement strategies that got the message out.22 In 2010 FAPO also added a warrant officer accessions strategy. In concert with the Field Artillery School, FAPO implemented a communications outreach strategy using the social media (Facebook and Twitter, among others), engaged and informed the noncommissioned officer corps and recruited top quality noncommissioned officers to become warrant officers.23 Radar Maintenance Training for MOS 13R In recent years changes in the modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) generated by modularity transitioned the 131A Warrant Officer technician to a targeting technician who worked in a maneuver brigade targeting cell. Moving the 131A Warrant Officer from the radar section to be a targeting technician left the radar vulnerable to mission failure even though on-the-job training for Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13R, Firefinder Radar Operator, tried to fill the capabilities gap.24

21Email with atch, subj: Targeting the Best Cadets in America, 5 Jan 10; Email with atch, subj: FAPO Engagement, 3 May 11. 22FA Cmdt Weekly SITREP, 21-27 Oct, Doc I-19; FA Cmdt Weekly SITREP, 4- 10 Nov 2010, Doc I-20; FA Cmdt Weekly SITREP, 14-20 Oct 2009, Doc I-21; Information Paper, subj: Field Artillery Recruiting Strategy for FY 10, 31 Jul 09, Doc I- 22; FA Cmdt SITREP, 15 Apr 10, Doc I-23; FA Cmdt SITREP, 13 Aug 10, Doc I-24; FA Cmdt SITREP, 2-8 Apr 10, Doc I-25; FA Cmdt SITREP, 5-11 Feb 10, Doc I-26; Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 20 May 10, Doc I-27; Email with atch, subj: FAPO Engagement, 3 May 11. 23Email with atch, subj: FAPO Engagement, 28 Jan 11; Email with atch, subj: FAPO Engagement, 3 May 11. 24Memorandum for Cmdt, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, subj: Radar

Because this failed to provide an adequate resolution to the capabilities gap, the Noncommissioned Officer Academy added maintenance training to the Advanced Leader Course for 13R. In November 2009 the Academy integrated a maintenance block of 120 hours of instruction. However, guidance from the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) did not permit lengthening the course to incorporate all maintenance tasks currently taught to the 131A Warrant Officers, leaving a gap in 13R training.25 Although contract training provided by Northup Grumman to enlisted personnel in support of the transition helped, the Field Artillery required a better solution. The Field Artillery School proposed employing mobile training teams (MTT) to furnish short- term training in radar maintenance supervisor instruction to 13Rs that was not covered in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES). This would train 13R soldiers in advanced maintenance and troubleshooting until a long-term strategy could be developed and would be taught by U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) master technicians and contract instructors. The School also proposed a resident additional skill identifier awarding functional course to be developed to sustain 13R maintenance supervisor training to serve as bridging strategy until a critical task analysis of the 13R could be performed and the appropriate training could be developed to make the 13R more technical rather than its current focus on operations.26 The school maintained this position into 2010. On 7 June 2010 the School wrote, “the staff recommends the establishment of a “Radar Maintenance Leaders Functional Course,” which awards 13R NCOs [noncommissioned officers] an additional skill identifier (ASI), in order to meet the operational force need for personnel trained in radar maintenance. . . . This functional course will serve as a bridging strategy while a review of the 13R‟s life-long learning model is evaluated and changed to reflect the changes in the critical task list brought on by modularity TO&E [Tables of Organization and Equipment] changes.”27 Although the School acknowledged some risk, it never established the functional course. First, the lack of resources (money and time) prevented development of the course. Second, a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine (TRADOC) directive precluded course growth; and TRADOC was not willing to cancel another course to run the 13R course. Third, the School believed that the three weeks of maintenance training in NCOES would be adequate as new, easier to maintain radars came on line. In essence, by the time that the course would be fully implemented, new technology would have ______Maintenance Leader Instruction for 13R NCOs, 6 Jan 10, Doc II-36, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Field Artillery CSM RedLeg-7 Newsletter, 3rd Quarter 2009, p. 14, Doc II-37, 2009 USAFAS AH. 25Memorandum for Cmdt, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, subj: Radar Maintenance Leader Instruction for 13R NCOs, 6 Jan 10. 26Memorandum for Cmdt, U.S. Army Field Artillery School, subj: Radar Maintenance Leader Instruction for 13R NCOs, 6 Jan 10; Fact Sheet, subj: Firefinder Readiness, 10 Dec 09, Doc II-38, 2009 USAFAS AH. 27Memorandum thru Asst Cmdt for Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: Radar Maintenance Leader Instruction for 13R NCOs, 7 Jun 10, Doc I-28. 9

reduced the need for the course. Also, a radar maintenance MOS soldier assigned to the unit would perform the actual maintenance, while the 13R would provide maintenance supervision. Fundamentally, the School concluded that there was no need for the course.28 WARFIGHTER FORUMS Advanced information technology led to the inception of the Army‟s Warfighters‟ Forums. Started late in 2005 at Fort Lewis, Washington, the first Warfighters‟ Forum, originally called Stryker University, was developed as a tool to communicate and share information on the new Stryker units. Late in 2006, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), General Charles C. Campbell and the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General William S. Wallace, witnessed a demonstration of the Stryker University at Fort Lewis. Because of the success of the Stryker University, they decided that the concept would be invaluable to the Army and encouraged adopting it. Following brainstorming sessions at Fort Lewis, the Army subsequently launched a web-based initiative on the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) site known as the Warfighters‟ Forum to enhance training, readiness, and leader development through collaboration and information sharing among the brigade combat teams (BCT) and functional and multifunctional brigades.29 Although the concept was away ahead of the technology in 2007, the Army adopted and employed it as a catalyst for streamlining interaction and staff processes between the operating and generating forces. The initiative recognized the imperative of providing a proactive means to promote collaboration, to share ideas, and to find solutions to common problems across the Army and to learn, innovate, decide, and act faster than the nation‟s adversaries.30 The Warfighters‟ Forum entered its fourth year in 2010 and consisted of three main forums (Stryker Brigade Combat Team, Infantry Brigade Combat Team, and Heavy Brigade Combat Team) and others. Although the Field Artillery School participated in these forums, its primary focus centered on the Fires Brigade Warfighters‟ Forum. Over two years, the school held five sessions. The sessions comprised fires brigade commanders, their battalion commanders, members of their staffs, key school staff, and Fires Center of Excellence staff, such as TRADOC Capabilities Managers, the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, and G3/5/7. These forums permitted exchanging information, advertising upcoming events, sharing photographs, videos, announcements, newsletters, and links to the individual Warfighter pages that included chats, blogs, live online discussions, and file shares to help resolve problems and share pertinent information.31

28Email, subj: MOS 13R, 4 Feb 11, Doc I-29; Email, subj: MOS13R, 9 Feb 11, Doc II-30. 292009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 56. 302009 USAFAS AH, p. 56; Email with atch, subj: Warfighter Forum Information Paper, 6 Jan 11, Doc I-31. 312009 USAFAS AH, pp. 56-57; Email with atch, subj: Warfighter Forum

FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL ACCREDITATION In October 2010 the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted an accreditation visit to the Field Artillery School and the Fires Center of Excellence to assure quality education and training. That month, a team of subject matter experts from Headquarters TRADOC, the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the Deputy Commanding General for Initial Military Training, and the Army Capabilities Integration Center observed, assessed, and evaluated the School and Center based upon a set of standards. Specifically, the team examined the conduct of training, training support, staff processes, and functions across the Fires Center of Excellence, including the Field Artillery School and the Air Defense Artillery School. Overall, the Fires Center of Excellence, the Air Defense Artillery School, the Field Artillery School, and the Noncommissioned Officer Academy were evaluated at the highest level -- “Institutions of Excellence.”32

______Information Paper, 6 Jan 10; Email, subj: Warfighter Forums Input to 2010 Annual History, 3 Feb 11, Doc I-32. 32Email with atch, subj: FCoE Accred Overview 29 Sep V4, 6 Jan 11, Doc I-33; Briefing, subj: FA Commandant‟s Huddle, 13 Jan 11, Doc I-34; Email with atch, subj: Accreditation, 22 Feb 11, Doc I-35. CHAPTER TWO LEADER DEVELOPMENT: TRAINING AND EDUCATION INTRODUCTION During 2010, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School trained Army and Marine field artillerymen to meet the needs of the nation‟s operational forces. While the 434th Field Artillery Brigade reinstituted gender-integrated training, the School established leader development for Field Artillery soldiers and Fires units in the operating force as a top priority, focusing on Field Artillery core competencies and closer synchronization with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate on Fort Sill, and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine with the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) as focal points. To accomplish the training priority, the School employed institutional training and distance learning, utilized sophisticated training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations to enhance training. The Army National Guard, meanwhile, conducted Field Artillery training using the Regional Training Institutes located across the United States as a part of The Army School System.1 TRAINING GUIDANCE FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 On 1 October 2010 the Field Artillery School issued training guidance for Fiscal Year 2011 to ensure that it provided trained, motivated, and adaptable Field Artillery soldiers and leaders to the operational forces. This would be accomplished through rigorous live and virtual training, culling insights and ideas from multiple sources to foster mental agility and confidence and by focusing on the core competencies and maintaining versatility to execute full spectrum operations.2 JOINT AND COMBINED FIRES UNIVERSITY In 2008 the Army recognized that its soldiers and leaders had performed well over the past seven years but simultaneously acknowledged the requirement to improve and adapt. Prior to 11 September 2001 when terrorists flew airplanes into the World Trade Towers in New York City and the Pentagon, the Army prepared to fight a war with large formations against a similarly arrayed force. Men who had spent years preparing for war led the major formations; and decisions were made by those with the most experience, the most training, and the most education. Young and inexperienced officers executed the missions given to them by the more seasoned with strategic decisions residing in the hands of general officers who had years of preparation. However, this was not the scenario of the foreseen future. The era of persistent conflict which was projected to be the norm and the proliferation of information technologies that permitted the almost instantaneous transfer of information created a complex battlefield where the decisions of the young and inexperienced would have strategic implications with leaders and officers being asked to demonstrate flexibility and adaptability in the prosecution of full spectrum operations. In view of this, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General William Casey, Jr., charged the Army in 2008 to transform training and education and to develop soldiers

1Briefing, subj: FA Commandant‟s Priorities, 11 Feb 11, Doc II-1. 2Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: USAFAS Training Strategy and Guidance, FY 11, 1 Oct 10, Doc II-2. 12

and leaders who were skilled in their core competencies, agile, and adaptive.3 The Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, promptly answered the challenge. On 1 April 2008 he published the Field Artillery Campaign Plan (FACP) to transform U.S. Army fires capabilities to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. Among other things, the plan tasked the leaders of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) to develop a strategy for the creation of a Joint Fires University (JFU). A JFU would enable fires excellence through a blend of institutional courses, distant learning, virtual experiences, and on-line forums. Equally important, JFU would furnish continuous access to training and education to support career progression for fires officers and noncommissioned officers and to make available just-in-time knowledge for immerging operational requirements.4 According to General Vangjel, the Joint Fires University would be the leader in providing education and training, developing experts in the art and science of integrating and delivering lethal and nonlethal fires and would produce soldiers, leaders, and units that would enable the maneuver commander to dominate full-spectrum operations using fires. To do this, he envisioned combining existing and emerging technologies to provide a university without walls, tapping into other service universities, and enabling soldiers to take courses of interest to broaden their knowledge and enhance joint interoperability.5 During 2008, an initial Joint Fires University concept emerged. On 11 July 2008 the Training Development Division in the Directorate of Training Development (DOTD) that had the lead in developing the JFU concept briefed General Vangjel on a strawman construct with two options. One alternative included a JFU with a Field Artillery College with departments, an Air Defense College with departments, and a Distributive Learning College with departments. An alternative proposal outlined a JFU with a Lethal Fires College with departments, a Nonlethal Fires College with departments, and a General Education College with departments.6 Over the next month, the concept grew more sophisticated with the creation of near-term and long-term notional structures for the JFU. On 21 August 2008 the Training Development Division briefed General Vangjel once again. For the near-term (Fiscal Years 2009-2015), the notional structure provided an organization based upon the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) initiative. The near-term organization provided a President‟s Office, a Senior Advisory Board, a Personnel Management Office, a Staff and Faculty Office for training staff and faculty, a Registrar‟s Office, a Chief Information Office, an Academic Affairs Office, a Quality Assurance Office, and a Resource Management Office. Five colleges would furnish training and education with each

32008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 24; Joint and Combined Fires University Implementation Strategy, Nov 10, forward, Doc II-3; Alvin Peterson, “Joint and Combined Fires Concept A Year Later: Providing Leaders and Experts in the Art and Science of Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Sep-Oct 10, pp. 20-23, Doc II-4. 42008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 24-25. 52008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 25. 62008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 25.

branch (Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery) having its own training brigade and proponency office. To ensure high-caliber instructors and professors, the concept put forward minimal qualifications, established military experience as being highly desired, and even suggested creating honorary academic chairs to provide expertise beyond the permanent faculty. For the long-term (Fiscal Years 2015 and beyond) the notional structure assumed growing commonality between the Field Artillery and the Air Defense Artillery with the branch schools being dissolved in favor of unit and officer training and education, enlisted training and education, and joint lethal and nonlethal fires integration colleges or tactical fires, unit, and strategic and operational fires colleges.7 Regardless of the JFU‟s structure in the short-term or long-term, General Vangjel understood the need to change the way of training and educating Fires officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers. Besides developing a culture of life-long learning, the JFU had to shift the focus of instruction from familiarization of a wide- range of topics to mastery level in core competencies, had to integrate adaptive leadership development into all courses, had to use a university approach to training and education by employing specialists as instructors, had to change the paradigm of training from seventy percent small group instruction (SGI) and thirty percent subject matter expert (SME) to seventy percent SME instruction and thirty percent SGI, and had to raise the standard from familiarization of a subject to mastery. Also, the JFU had to leverage information technology to create a university without walls and had to move towards functional courses (electives). Ultimately, Vangjel wanted JFU graduates with a depth of knowledge.8 By the end of 2008, the Training Requirements Development Division had taken specific steps to implement JFU. It developed a three-phase draft implementation strategy, a draft JFU organization, draft tenets/objectives/tasks, and a draft governance organization and staffed the draft implementation strategy to a limited audience. The division also established partnerships with universities and military institutions and started marketing JFU. As Alvin W. Peterson, the Chief of Training and Doctrine in the Directorate of Training and Doctrine explained early in 2009, the University of Texas-El Paso provided an opportunity for captains attending the Air Defense Artillery Captain‟s Career Course to earn a master‟s degree in organizational leadership until the career course moved to Fort Sill and afterwards would extend this opportunity to Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery officers at Fort Sill.9 Additionally, the Joint Fires University, renamed Joint and Combined Fires University (JCFU) in 2009, started leveraging technology to provide immersive training opportunities to enhance Fires leaders‟ decision-making abilities. During 2009, it explored employing avatar-based virtual training where students would be able to navigate tactical and garrison scenarios to exercise decision-making skills during class time and on their own time. For example, the Virtual Platoon interactive game concept

72008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 25-26. 82008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 26; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 22-23. 92008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 26; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 23.

was being developed in cooperation with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capabilities Manager for Gaming and other TRADOC Centers of Excellence for leader development using gaming technology. The Virtual Platoon would take the leader through life in garrison, field training, and pre-deployment, deployment, and post-deployment to exercise decision-making skills and the overall knowledge of Army programs and support systems by immersing the individual in a variety of complex scenarios. Feedback would come through JCFU instructors or avatar mentors, while the lieutenant would have to deal with the consequences of his decisions.10 Other technological efforts included the Virtual Experience Immersive Learning Simulation (VEILS) “Danger Close” and the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System (JFETS). VEILS would immerse platoon leadership in a variety of scenarios and prompt it to make decisions. While the decisions were being made, the platoon leader/platoon sergeant relationship was being examined and critically reinforced. Meanwhile, JFETS trained joint close air support, close combat attack, airspace deconfliction, and fires synchronization in an immersive and adaptive virtual environment.11 The JCFU also worked closely with local industry and universities. As of early 2009, the university had created collaboration with the University of Texas and the University of Oklahoma to develop virtual training and educational capabilities as part of the Red River Alliance. Also, Cameron University, Lawton, Oklahoma, was developing a master‟s program in strategic and organizational leadership to permit students in the Captain‟s Career Course take classes that would provide insights into the consequences of decisions at the strategic and operational levels. Using mobile training teams, JCFU also conducted individual and collective training at home station and planned to export courses to the field in the near future. With these outreach efforts and others, the JCFU intended to provide the highest quality training, education, and development opportunities, to furnish training support to units to achieve readiness in essential fires capabilities, and to develop/sustain infrastructure and materials to support life-long learning.12 In 2010 work on JCFU continued making significant progress. In fact, the Chief of Training Development in the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, noted in the Fires Bulletin of September-October 2010, “The FCOE is on target and ahead of schedule in providing a path to achieving TRADOC‟s number one priority of developing leaders and providing Fires professionals a variety of avenues for learning.”13 To this end, the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence, Major General David D. Halverson, signed the JCFU implementation strategy in November 2010. The strategy established the vision, the mission, the principles, the initial organization, and the initial operational date of July 2011, among other things. In addition, the JCFU would provide quality blended learning experiences for a Soldier‟s entire career that would mix

102009 USAFAS AH, p. 23. 112009 USAFAS AH, p. 24. 122009 USAFAS AH, p. 24. 13Alvin Peterson, “Joint and Combined Fires University, A Year Later: Providing Leaders and Experts in the Art and Science of Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Sep-Oct 10, p. 20.

institutional, operational, and self-development learning opportunities and would be delivered anytime and anyplace. The strategy also stressed the imperatives of creating a relevant curriculum to meet the needs of the soldier; inculcating life-long learning; establishing rigorous academic standards; developing and sustaining an expert staff and faculty; creating a world-class research institution; reaching out to Army, Joint, Interagency, combined military and civilian partners; making the university a learning organization; making efficient use of human capital and material resources, and leveraging technology.14 Besides employing cutting edge technology, such as a virtual interactive training experience called “Danger Close‟ and other interactive training games, JCFU outlined overhauling teaching methodologies. While gaming technology, such as “Danger Close,” allowed the university to create a scenario-based game that immersed soldiers in a simulated operational environment where they could safely observe the outcomes of their decisions, the university as well as the Field Artillery School and Air Defense Artillery School intended to incorporate adult learning theories using the Army Learning Concept 2015 into their instructional methodologies rather than using the old standard Army techniques of lectures peppered with PowerPoint slides. This would involve the students more and make them more responsible for their learning. Using outcome based training and education as well as other Socratic teaching methods, JCFU planned to take a student-centered learning approach that would challenge students to develop their own critical thinking skills and engage in analytic discussion.15 Equally important, the JCFU established an organizational design for initial operational capability. It would consist of four schools: the Air Defense Artillery School, the Field Artillery School, the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, and the Joint/Combined School. Each would execute high quality blended learning; select, lead, and develop the school staff and faculty; adapt instructional methods to provide a dynamic curriculum; and support operational units with reach-back, training support materials and mobile training teams when required.16 GAMING In 2010 the Directorate of Training and Doctrine‟s (DOTD) gaming initiative played a key role in training and education in the Fires Center of Excellence and the Field Artillery School by bringing live, virtual, and constructive training and education to the Fires professional in and beyond the school. Gaming permitted students to immerse themselves in true-to-life scenarios to broaden their experience base and intuitive decision making abilities using the computer.17

14JCFU Implementation Strategy, Nov 10, forward, pp. 4-7; Interview, Dastrup with Alvin Peterson, DOTD, 24 Jan 11, Doc II-5; Memorandum, subj: Joint and Combined Fires University Implementation Strategy, undated, Doc II-6. 15Petersen, “Joint and Combined Fires University, A Year Later,” pp. 22-23; Email with atch, subj: Annual Historical Review, 4 Apr 11, Doc II-7. 16JCFU Implementation Strategy, Nov 10, p. 12. 17Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, DOTD, 24 Jan 11, Doc II-8; Al Peterson, “Joint and Combined Fires University Concept a Year Later: Providing Leaders and

During the year, Fires Center of Excellence organizations employed various games. The Noncommissioned Officer Academy utilized the virtual interactive training experience called “Danger Close” in its Senior Leader Course and Advance Leader Course. Through the eyes of an avatar, students explored interaction between officers and noncommissioned officers. Students made life-and-death decisions and learned the outcome of those decisions.18 ARMY LEARNING CONCEPT 2015 In 2010 the Army Learning Model 2015 aimed to provide soldiers and leaders with a more relevant, tailored, engaging learning experience through a career-long continuum of learning that was not location dependent. For the Field Artillery School, this meant shifting training from an instructor-centric to a learner-centric paradigm in a few short years in its initial military training, professional military courses, and functional courses. This would involve reducing instructor-led PowerPoint lectures, would incorporate virtual and constructive simulations, gaming technology, and other technology-delivered instruction, and would convert most classroom experiences into collaborative problem-solving events led by facilitators who would engage learners to think and understand the relevance and context of what they had learned.19 CULTURAL AND FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROGRAM Operational experiences in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq highlighted critical gaps in the Army‟s capability to influence and operate efficiently within different cultures for extended periods of time. These operations demonstrated the need for foreign language capabilities and the understanding of foreign cultures and provided critical lessons learned. First, the Army‟s leaders and soldiers had limited understanding of the influence of culture upon planning and execution of operations. Second, the Army lacked sufficient foreign language capabilities; and third, the Army did not have a bench of future leaders with an understanding of cultures and foreign languages. As the Army‟s culture and foreign language strategy published in December 2009 explained, this gap in culture and foreign language capabilities reduced the Army‟s overall ability to meet the needs of the geographic combatant commanders and required developing leaders with sufficient cross-cultural, regional, and foreign language competencies to enable the successful execution of military operations.20 In view of these gaps, the Army designed a culture and foreign language strategy ______Experts in the Art and Science of Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Sep-Oct 10, pp. 20-23, Doc II-9. 18Interview, Dastrup with Peterson, 24 Jan 11; Peterson, “Joint and Combined Fires University Concept a Year Later,” pp. 20-23; Email with atch, subj: Annual Historical Review, 4 Apr 11. 19“U.S. Army Launches Army Learning Concept 2015,” Army News, 21 Oct 10, Doc II-10; Email with atch, subj: Annual Historical Review, 4 Apr 11, Doc II-7; TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Version 1.0), The United States Army Learning Concept for 2015, 1 Nov 10, pp. 1-4, Doc II-11. 202009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 24; Memorandum for Cdr, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Culture and Foreign Language Guidance, 1 Jul 10, Doc II-12.

to build and sustain the right blend of culture and foreign language capabilities to facilitate full-spectrum operations. Although the strategy focused on creating a baseline of culture and foreign language capabilities for all leaders and soldiers, it acknowledged the requirement for leaders and soldiers with culture and foreign language training skills above the baseline and saw that such skills were critical national security competencies because the Army would have to operate in a joint interagency, intergovernmental, multinational (JIIM) environment. In 2009 the Army developed pre-commissioning programs at the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) and in the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) to enhance cultural and foreign language capabilities. USMA required all cadets to study a foreign language and offered study abroad programs. Under the National Security Education Program, the Army awarded twelve universities grants to establish programs designed to increase ROTC cadets‟ skills in foreign languages that were critical to future defense efforts. Additionally, the Officer Accessions Pilot Program provided newly-commissioned ROTC cadets with a monetary incentive to study critical foreign languages.21 Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) established a Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, to develop cultural training programs for Army schools. The center provided mobile training teams to furnish cultural training to units prior to deployment, while the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center at the Presidio of Monterey, California, which was a TRADOC school, served as the primary vehicle for Army foreign language training.22 As the Army was outlining its program, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) initiated action on 30 March 2009 to develop a culture and foreign language program. On that day the first TRADOC Cultural and Foreign Language Advisor, Dr. Mahir Ibrahimov, began his work with an assessment of cultural and language related education and training being conducted in the School. Based on this assessment, he prepared a draft cultural and foreign language concept/strategy with a specific outline of suggested courses for the Field Artillery School and the U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School (USADAS). Adopted by the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) at Fort Sill, which was over both schools and the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, the strategy outlined providing the Army with expeditionary-minded leaders with ability of operating in a JIIM environment across the full spectrum of operations and with a level of competence necessary to perform assigned tasks in a specific geographical area.23 Basically, the strategy that was built upon the Army Cultural and Foreign Language Strategy and other documents established three levels of competency -- awareness, understanding, and advise/expertise -- in 2009-2010 and determined the focus of both Schools‟ courses. While demonstrating a basic cultural awareness was the focus of the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) B, the desired outcome for the Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course (FACCC) centered on demonstrating an understanding of culture and leveraging that knowledge in a JIIM environment with a level of competence

212009 USAFAS AH, pp. 24-25. 222009 USAFAS AH, p. 25. 232009 USAFAS AH, p. 25.

necessary to serve as a company fire support officer and leader within a complex environment. The desired outcome for the Warrant Officer Advance Course (WOAC) was demonstrating the basic awareness of culture and leveraging that knowledge as a corps/theater targeting officer, while the Warrant Officer Basic Course‟s (WOBC) desired outcome concentrated on a basic understanding of culture and leveraging that knowledge as a brigade combat team/division targeting officer. The Noncommissioned Officer Academy‟s (NCOA) Senior Leader Course‟s (SLC) desired outcome centered on demonstrating a basic understanding of foreign culture and leveraging the knowledge as a platoon sergeant and first sergeant. Mid-grade noncommissioned officers attending the Advance Leader Course (ALC) had to demonstrate a basic understanding of a foreign culture and leveraging that knowledge as a senior section sergeant and platoon sergeant.24 Courses in 2009-2010 taught by the Joint and Combined Fires University, the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, and other leadership courses included all three levels of competency. In fact, BOLC B, WLC, ALC, CCC, WOBC, WOAC, and SLC had been revised to contain a specific approach appropriate to each level in order for leaders to attain specific knowledge on culture and foreign language expectations and devoted a certain number of hours to attain the desired outcome. The FCoE also placed greater emphasis on attaining cultural knowledge with some emphasis on learning foreign languages.25 Meanwhile, other aspects of the cultural and foreign language program (CLFP) unfolded. CFLP established a Culture and Foreign Language Resource Center in the Morris Swett Technical Library where FACCC, BOLC B, WOBC, WOAC, and noncommissioned officers could use books for their professional reading program and have access to resources to write their mandatory research papers. BOLC B students employed the Rosetta Stone in the library for foreign language orientation and training to learn phrases and basic dialog in strategically and operationally important languages, such as tactical Iraqi, Dari, and Pashto, and received a certificate of completion upon finishing four to eight hours of language training. Besides writing research papers, FACCC students made oral presentations to their small groups. Also, USAFAS planned

242009 USAFAS AH, p. 26; Sharon McBride, “Creating Culturally Astute Leaders: Joint and Combined Fires University Providing Innovative Cultural Education,” Fires Bulletin, Sep-Oct 10, pp. 23-26, Doc II-13; Dr. Mahir Ibrahimov, “Operational Culture in the U.S. Army: The Fires Center of Excellence Culture and Foreign Language Strategy Sets the Standard for the Rest of TRADOC, Army,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 11, pp. 23-30, Doc II-14. 25McBride, “Creating Culturally Astute Leaders,” pp. 23-26; Ibrahimov, “Operational Culture in the U.S. Army,” pp. 23-30; Alvin Peterson, “Joint and Combined Fires University Concept a Year Later: Providing Leaders and Experts in the Art and Science of Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Sep-Oct 10, pp. 20-23, Doc II-9; Memorandum for Record, subj: Cultural and Foreign Language Program Input, 8 Feb 11, Doc II-15; Memorandum for Cdr, 428th Field Artillery Brigade and Cmdt, Noncommissioned Officer Academy, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Culture and Foreign Language Guidance, FY11, 21 Sep 10, Doc II-16.

to incorporate a research paper into BOLC B and noncommissioned officer courses and developed a reading list that was posted on the Fires Knowledge Network website and contained the most strategically and operationally important books.26 CFLP also developed other programs. International Student Division and Liaison Officers conducted country and cultural briefs to all students to enhance cultural awareness. It also held “Media Engagement Situations” in CCC small groups. “Know Your World” was another separate event held by the international students. To enhance cultural awareness and foreign language training, CFLP established partnerships with the Military Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the Marine Corps University at Fort Quantico, Virginia, the Defense Language Institute at the Presidio of Monterrey, California, the National Defense University, and the Sergeant Majors Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas, among others.27 As a result of these associations and partnerships, the CFLP acquired Army 360 from the U.S. Army Military Intelligence Center and language flash cards and field expedient smart books from the Defense Language Institute. Adopted in 2010 by the NCOA and the FACCC, Army 360, a virtual simulation application, enabled students to immerse themselves in true-to-life scenarios to broaden their experiences in dealing with other cultures. Students practiced intuitive decision-making abilities in a mock environment before facing the real life culture dilemmas. Avatar was a role-playing training system where students trained on key leader engagements and conflict resolution and were forced into the cultural confines of a given operational environment.28 In 2009-2010 CFLP also established formal relationships with the Fort Sill Education Center to expand cooperation with universities, such as Cameron University, Lawton, Oklahoma; University of Oklahoma; Oklahoma State University; and Midwestern State University, Wichita Falls, Texas; to name a few. Faculty members conducted seminars on topics of operational importance to complement the seminars offered by the Cultural and Foreign Language Advisor.29 In 2010 the Culture and Foreign Language Program launched an all volunteer language and cultural awareness orientation class for Field Artillery officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers and Air Defense Artillery officers who were interested in receiving additional language training. They had the opportunity of

262009 USAFAS AH, p. 26; McBride, “Creating Culturally Astute Leaders,” pp. 23-26; Ibrahimov, “Operational Culture in the U.S. Army,” pp. 23-30; FCOE Cultural and Foreign Language Program, 24 Jul 10, pp. 5-7, Doc II-17; Memorandum for Record, subj: Cultural and Foreign Language Program Input, 8 Feb 11; Memorandum for Cdr, 428th Field Artillery Brigade and Cmdt, Noncommissioned Officer Academy, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Culture and Foreign Language Guidance, FY 11, 21 Sep 10. 272009 USAFAS AH, p. 26; Ibrahimov, “Operational Culture in the U.S. Army,” pp. 23-30. 282009 USAFAS AH, pp. 26-27; McBride, “Creating Culturally Astute Leaders,” pp. 23-26; Memorandum for Record, subj: Cultural and Foreign Language Program Input, 8 Feb 11. 292009 USAFAS AH, p. 27.

receiving training on Afghan Dari, Pashto, Iraqi Arabic, Korean, and Russian as part of a twelve-week, twenty-four to thirty-six hour program. Attended by forty-six Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery captains and warrant officers, the first twelve-week session was conducted by a native Arabic speaker. The FCoE Culture and Foreign Language Program planned to identify a Dari or Pashto instructor to initiate a similar program in the future.30 RESET, MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS, BATTERY AND BELOW MOBILE TRAINING TEAM, AND COLLECTIVE TRAINING EVALUATION TEAMS During the first years of the twenty-first century, the Field Artillery performed a wide variety of Army missions during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. Initial operations in OIF and OEF in 2001- 2003 provided field artillery units with opportunities to perform their traditional missions of synchronizing and delivering timely cannon, rocket, and missile fires to support the maneuver forces. In recent years, non-standard missions, such as patrolling, providing base defense, and convoy operations, dominated the Field Artillery‟s time with some Field Artillery units furnishing fire support missions.31 As outlined in the Army Campaign Plan Update of 20 July 2006, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) recognized that Field Artillerymen were not performing their traditional field artillery missions in OIF or OEF and feared a deterioration of their fire support skills. He responded by directing the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Field Artillery School to assess the state of competency of Field Artillery lieutenants to determine if non-standard missions in recent years had degraded their basic branch skills and if they required additional or refresher training. Along with other Army leaders, the VCSA recognized the perishability of field artillery core skills in view of the operational environment.32 Tasked by the VCSA in July 2006 to look at the state of training for lieutenants, the Field Artillery School surveyed field artillery tactical commanders, School instructors, and students at the Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course (FACCC) to determine how seriously field artillery skills had been degraded. Completed in August 2006, the assessment found that non-standard missions were having an adverse impact on junior officers‟ ability to retain branch core competency skills in both the Army and U.S. Marine Corps. Specifically, lieutenants had lost branch technical skills of fire direction, fire support, and weapon-specific platoon leader skills as a result of the non-standard missions. Besides degrading the Field Artillery‟s ability to function across the spectrum of conflict, Field Artillerymen, in this case, officers were not tactically and technically proficient to be promoted to more senior levels of Field Artillery responsibility. On the

30McBride, “Creating Culturally Astute Leaders,” pp. 23-26; FA Cmdt FA Cmdt SITREP, 30 Jul 10, Doc II-18; Memorandum for Cdr, 428th Field Artillery Brigade and Cmdt, Noncommissioned Officer Academy, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Culture and Foreign Language Guidance, FY 11, 21 Sep 10. 312008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 26. 322006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 15.

positive side, non-standard missions reinforced leader skills.33 The same survey also took the liberty of examining the impact of non-standard missions on majors, noncommissioned officers, and Field Artillery units. As the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), Major General David C. Ralston, wrote in a memorandum to the VCSA on 7 August 2006, leaders at all levels have experienced the atrophy of field artillery- specific skills. Field grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers also experienced diminished field artillery skills.34 In that memorandum General Ralston outlined ways of addressing the problem of resetting (retraining) soldiers, officers, and Field Artillery units in field artillery core competencies. The Field Artillery School could increase the length of FACCC. This would furnish more time to retrain senior first lieutenants and captains in branch core competencies after having limited or no tactical experience with these functions in their first assignments. Also, the School could bring entire battalions back to proficiency after spending eighteen or more months performing non-field artillery missions. This could be done by sending mobile training teams to unit locations as necessary or using the Fires Knowledge Network (FKN) to provide “reach back” capability by furnishing lesson plans, interactive multimedia training products, and other materials via the computer and Internet to soldiers and units in the field.35 As a means of implementing the retraining options, General Ralston chartered the Field Artillery War on Terrorism Reset Task Force on 23 August 2006 to develop a concept plan to reset the Field Artillery force. Assigned this mission, the task force looked at employing institutional and unit training to reset skills. As far as institutional training was concerned, the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), the Officer Education System (OES), and the Warrant Officer Education System (WOES) had to focus on core field artillery and leader skills more than they had done. Unit training moreover had to be tailored to meet each unit‟s needs. In a briefing to the TRADOC Deputy Commanding General, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, on 2 October 2006, the task force outlined using paper-based training support packages, mobile training teams (MTT), video teleconferences, and web-based distance learning packages, among other means, for unit reset training. For unit-oriented reset training to succeed, each unit had to determine its needs so that the School could identify training products, assets, and methods, could obtain funding, and could prioritize training.36 With the task force taking the lead, the School initiated action. During the last months of 2006, it solicited ideas, concepts, training plans, hardware, software, and simulations from industry, sought input from resetting commanders to gain a better understanding of the impact of non-standard missions on soldiers and units, and started developing the mechanisms to help field commanders to “re-Red” their soldiers and units

332007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 21; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 27-28. 342006 USAFACFS ACH, p. 16. 352006 USAFACFS ACH, p. 16. 362006 USAFACFS ACH, p. 16; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 21-22; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 28-29.

as quickly as possible.37 The Field Artillery School‟s reset plan to solicit ideas, concepts, training plans, hardware, software, and simulations from industry and input from commanders remained a high priority in 2007, fit neatly into the Army Force Generation model, and began to take shape in 2007 around institutional and unit training. Besides holding industry days to learn about the latest technology, the School made institutional training more realistic. In March 2007 the Noncommissioned Officer Academy incorporated a four-day, live-fire exercise into its Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course for military occupational specialty (MOS) 13B30 (cannon crewmember) and 13M30 (Multiple-Launch Rocket System crewmember) where the students went to the field and executed their core competency field artillery tasks. Also, the Academy instituted situational-based practical exercises in 2007-2008 to provide a more realistic training experience and some core field artillery experiences. The Field Artillery School meanwhile added live-fire exercises in capstone exercises for Advanced Individual Training, Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course, and Basic Officer Leader Course III.38 While institutional training was still basically a one-size-fits-all approach, unit training support required a totally different methodology. This training had to meet the specific needs of the unit and revolved around “reach-back” services and MTTs. As it evolved in 2006-2007, “reach-back” capabilities exploited the Internet. Soldiers could access interactive multi-media training subdivided by MOS and skill level by logging onto the Army Knowledge Network. For more robust training needs, the School provided MTTs. Unlike the normal MTT designed for new equipment training that taught a specific program of instruction, reset MTTs geared their training to satisfy the needs of the unit. For example, one MTT taught refresher training on manual gunnery and the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) to the 18th Fires Brigade at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 2007. During the same year, an MTT trained the 2-8th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, in manual gunnery, survey, AFATDS, and counter-mortar radar while other MTTs trained the 2-320th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, 4-320th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Campbell, and 4-319th Field Artillery Regiment in Afghanistan.39 The Field Artillery Master Gunner Division of the 428th Field Artillery Brigade also sent reset MTTs to units. During 2007, the division helped with field artillery certification and qualification by using the coach-teach-mentor methodology. While visiting a unit, the division‟s team mentors established a certification plan in a three-day process. After meeting with the unit‟s leadership, the team conducted workshops with the master gunner, operations sergeant, and platoon sergeants, while the digital master and his noncommissioned officers participated in a workshop to reset their skills. On the last day the team divided unit personnel into working groups to facilitate the development of draft digital and cannon or Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) certification programs. The Field Artillery Master Gunner Home Page complemented this initiative.

372006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 16-17; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 22. 382007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 22-23; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 29-30. 392007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 23; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 30.

The page had all points of contact and up-to-date examples of unit certification programs and standing operation procedures as well as changes in the Field Artillery. Also, the division supported the two-week Field Artillery Master Gunner and Digital Master Course. The course taught current doctrine, training management, crew-served weapons, and small arms. Field Artillery weapon-specific tracks and fire direction operations helped master gunners and digital masters implement their unit‟s training and certification programs.40 Although these efforts produced solid results, the School acknowledged that they were just a start. It had to continue improving “reach-back” capabilities by enhancing communications with the commanders in the field and examining better methods to deliver training via the Internet. This came about in 2008 in the form of updates on the Fires Knowledge Network, the commanding general‟s monthly e-note, the Redleg 7 Report, and fires and effects video-teleconferences.41 Reset efforts continued unabated in 2008. MTTs supplied training to noncommissioned officers in all MOSs and trained the trainer and developed subject matter expertise to help field artillery units to regain their core skills. During the year, the School also employed MTTs to meet NCOES demands to ensure relevance. For example, one MTT focused on training master gunners to ensure that the commander had a weapon system expert on training, safety, ammunition, and resupply and maintenance operations. Having a qualified master gunner gave a battalion an individual with the skills to help reset the unit. Besides training master gunners, MTTs provided reset training to fifteen active component and National Guard battalions as well as eighteen batteries at unit home station and in theater. The training, for example, covered field artillery safety, manual gunnery, AFATDS, Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System, MOS 13B Cannon Crewmember, and M198 155-towed artillery specific crew drill.42 With help from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, funded two contract mobile training teams -- the Battery and Below MTT and the Collective Training Evaluation Team (CTET) -- at the end of 2008 for unit reset training. For the reset effort, this was a major breakthrough. Through 2008 the School took resources from other activities to fund the MTTs. In some instances, the School took MTT instructors from the instructional base.43 During 2009-2010, both teams restored fires warfighting skills and field artillery core competencies and provided invaluable reset training which continued to be a high priority for the Field Artillery School. While the Battery and Below MTT focused on leader training and train-the-trainer instruction covering cannon battery operations, manual gunnery, automated gunnery, lethal and nonlethal targeting, and tailored its training support to the needs of the requesting unit, the CTET concentrated on collective

402007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 23-24; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 30-31. 412007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 24; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 31. 422008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 31. 432008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 31.

and leader training on core Field Artillery skills and tasks at the platoon, battery, and battalion levels.44 With the advancements in precision delivery systems and precision munitions, commanders demanded accurate target locations. At the heavy brigade combat team and Stryker brigade combat team, the Forward Observer Software (FOS) coupled with the Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Forces (PSS-SOF) application provided commanders with a precision targeting tool. In view of this, the Field Artillery School‟s unit reset MTTs added PSS-SOF certification training in 2009. It focused on operation fundamentals, imagery fundamentals, point dropping fundamentals, digital point position data base management, and graphics production for Army battalion/brigade/division fires cell personnel, Army battery/battalion fire direction personnel and furnished practical exercises to reinforce user learning.45 DISTANCE LEARNING In 2010 the Field Artillery School leveraged information technology to train all Army components effectively and efficiently to a single Total Army standard. For Army National Guard soldiers, distributive learning permitted them to stay at home and earn promotion points. Basically, the School‟s distance learning program exploited computers and other information technologies to furnish military occupation specialty (MOS) qualification courses, additional skill identifier and skill qualification courses, reclassification courses, officer functional area and branch qualification courses, professional military education courses and functional/educational courses.46 Distant learning also took advantage of the Fires Knowledge Network (FKN). Fires Center of Excellence homepage on FKN was divided into forums that contained fully-functional blog and conference capabilities so that Field Artillerymen around the world could share real-time experiences, engage in relevant discussions, exchange ideas, share tactics, techniques, and procedures, and participate in field artillery training courses.47 ARMY NATIONAL GUARD REGIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTES Established in the 1990s, the Total Army School System (TASS), a composite school system comprised of Active Component, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard institutional training systems and renamed The Army School System (TASS) early in the 2000s, continued to play a key role in training in the Field Artillery in 2009. During the year, the five Field Artillery battalions and their ten academically aligned training batteries furnished standardized resident and inactive duty training (IDT) using

442008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 31-32; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 32; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training, 3 Jun 10, Doc II-19; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training, 3 May 10, Doc II-20. 45Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training, 3 Jun 10; Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training, 3 May 10; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Jun 10, p. 9, Doc II-21; FCoE CSM Newsletter, Nov 09, p. 11, Doc II-22. 46Information Paper, subj: Facility Chart, 25 May 11, Doc II-23. 47Information Paper, subj: FKN, 10 Feb 11.

The Army Training System (TATS) courseware. The fifteen RTIs (schools) were accredited by the Quality Assurance Office at Fort Sill, and taught almost everything that was taught in the Field Artillery School. The RTIs trained students in Field Artillery Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) or areas of consideration, special qualification identifier, additional skill identifier, or language identifier code, augmented mobile training teams, provided aggressive distance learning courses to assist in unit training and reset training, and implemented multi-phase courses to include MOS Training for MOS reclassification and the Advanced Leader Course and Senior Leader Course for noncommissioned officers. For the most part, the RTIs conducted individual training, ranging from Career Management Field 13B (Cannon Crewmember) to 13M (Multiple- Launch Rocket System Crewmember) to 13 W (Meteorological Crewmember) and provided unit training to help the Field Artillery reset mission as required.48 TRAINING AIDS, DEVICES, SIMULATORS, AND SIMULATIONS Joint Fires and Effects Training System In recent years Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF) in Afghanistan demonstrated the war fighting potential of integrated joint fires. To train Field Artillery officers, Joint Fires Observers, and Army Military Occupational Specialty 13F (Fire Support Specialist), the U.S. Army Field Artillery School used the Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System (JFETS) in 2010. Although it was a static trainer, JFETS was an adaptive and realistic system because it could replicate almost any environment that American soldiers and leaders would encounter and provide them with a capability to execute multiple, adaptive fire support training scenarios. JFETS consisted of fires and effects command module, an open terrain module, an urban terrain module, a close air support module, and an after-action report module. Based upon its utility, the Army awarded a contract in December 2009 to the construct a JFETS facility on Fort Sill to give the Fires Center of Excellence more training capacity.49 Call for Fire Trainer During 2010, the Call-for-Fire Trainer (CFFT) served as the Army‟s simulation system of record for training Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 13F, Fire Support Specialist, Joint Fires Observers, and Basic Officer Leader Course II and B students on observed fire and close air support tasks. The CFFT institutional 1:30 (one instructor to thirty students) configuration was employed by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command institutions, reserve component institutional training sites, and operational mobilization installations, while the CFFT transportable configuration of 1:4 and 1:12 was used by brigade combat teams, special operation forces, fires brigades, and forward

48COL Robert W. Roshell and LTC Lawrence M. Terranova, “Education for ARNG FA Officers and NCOs,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 09, pp. 30-34, Doc II-22, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Briefing, subj: Army National Guard Information Brief to Mr. Toney Puckett, Jun 09, Doc II-23, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Army National Guard Regional Training Institute Input to 2010 History, 13 May 11, Doc II-24. 49Program Executive Office Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Fact Sheet, subj: JFETS, 4 Jun 10, Doc II-25.

training sites in theater. In 2009-2010 the Field Artillery School linked the CFFT, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and the Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer (FSCATT) into a closed loop system. For example, an observer, training in CFFT, called for fire using his digital entry device to send target information to AFATDS at the battalion fire support cell for clearance and subsequent processing at the fire direction center. The fire direction specialist processed the fire mission through AFATDS and sent the fire order to FSCATT. The crew in FSCATT executed the fire mission and engaged the target. The observer in the CFFT observed the effects and adjusted fire as necessary.50 NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM AND NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY Background On 5 February 1959 Fort Sill established the Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer Academy. The first pilot course began in April 1959, and the first twenty-two students graduated in May 1959. The first expansion of the program of instruction came in 1963 with the development of the Leadership Preparation Course which was a two-week course in leadership. By 1971 the academy had responsibility for the Noncommissioned Officer Academy, the Leadership Preparation School, the Instructor Training Course, and the Drill Sergeant School. Because of its diverse missions, the academy underwent a name change to the Fort Sill Institute. In March 1973 Command Sergeant Major Clifford L. Lewis became the first enlisted commandant of the institute. The Primary Noncommissioned Officer Course for Combat Arms was started in October 1975. In May 1977 only Noncommissioned Officer Courses were being taught at the institute and the name was changed to the Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer Career Development Center. 51 In recent years the non-standard missions of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) caused Field Artillerymen‟s core skills to atrophy. Pre- and post-course surveys conducted by the Quality Assurance Office at Fort Sill with the students at the Noncommissioned Officer Academy validated this. In fact, some noncommissioned officers felt that they could perform a critical task only with the help of another leader or graphic aid. As General Richard A. Cody, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, testified before the U.S. Senate Armed Forces Services Committee on 31 March 2008, soldiers were training for counterinsurgency operations and focusing on the mission of the brigade that they would be replacing in Iraq or Afghanistan and were not training for full-spectrum operations.52

502008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 36; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 33; Fact Sheet, subj: CFFT, 28 Jan 11, Doc II-26. 51“Sill begins Leadership Program,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 6 Dec 63, p. 6, Doc II- 27; Email with atch, subj: History of Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer Academy, 25 Jan 10, Doc II-28. 522008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 40.

Because of this, the Noncommissioned Officer Academy (NCOA) at Fort Sill took action. Supporting the Field Artillery Campaign Plan of the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, the Directorate of Training and Doctrine in the Field Artillery School and Command Sergeant Major Dean J. Keveles, Commandant of the NCOA, submitted a concept plan to re-integrate core competency tasks into all eight Field Artillery Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) for skill levels three and four to the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General William S. Wallace. General Wallace approved the plan on 10 July 2008 even though it would increase course lengths in the Field Artillery Noncommissioned Officer Education System.53 Implemented on 1 October 2009, the approved concept addressed several key issues. Depending upon which of the eight Field Artillery MOSs, the courses expanded from one to three weeks. Expansion was the most critical for MOSs 13B Cannon Platoon Sergeant and 13D Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems Specialist, in the Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course (ANCOC) and in MOSs 13B Cannon Section Chief and 13F Fire Support Specialist in the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC). This expansion promoted mastery of skills rather than familiarizing and restating learned skills and fostered critical thinking and adaptive, flexible leadership. According to the Command Sergeant Major Dean J. Keveles, the Commandant of the NCOA, the expansion of course lengths helped reset core field artillery skills and make graduates more adaptable to today‟s complex operating environment.54 Concurrently, the NCOA transformed its BNCOC and ANCOC in 2009. On 1 October 2009 the BNCOC was redesignated as the Advanced Leader Course (ALC), and ANCOC was redesignated as the Senior Leader Course (SLC). Beyond the name changes and the length of these courses being increased by an average of two weeks to accommodate more training, the courses shifted the focus in ALC from squad to squad/platoon and in SLC from platoon to platoon/battery while the Academy incorporated thirty-five hours of the most relevant First Sergeant Course material into SLC because the First Sergeant Course was scheduled to be phased out beginning in January 2010.55 While it was developing the TRADOC-directed transformation of ALC and SLC and expanding course lengths, the Academy achieved Fires Center of Excellence full operational capability by teaching Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery Noncommissioned Officer Education System courses on 17 August 2008 as part of the Base Realignment and Closure 2005 that directed moving the Air Defense Artillery School and Center from Fort Bliss, Texas, to Fort Sill. The Noncommissioned Officer

53Unit Award Recommendation, 30 Sep 09, Doc II-29; Email with atch, subj: NCOA 2010 History, 7 Feb 11, Doc II-29a. 542008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 40-41; Unit Award Recommendation, 30 Sep 09. 552008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 41; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 37-38; Unit Award Recommendation, 30 Sep 09.

Academy was the first Fires Center of Excellence organization to achieve full operational capability.56 Overview for 2010 During 2009-2010, key developments reshaped all Noncommissioned Officer Academy courses. With the recent publication of the Army‟s new Cultural Awareness and Foreign Language Strategy, the academy adopted several facets to support the strategy. They included: implementation of the immersive training product -- Army 360 Cultural Training Program; cultural discussions in the classroom based on talking points from the Army 360 Cultural Training Program; an individual cultural research paper; attendance at periodic seminars by local university professors on culturally oriented subjects; and weekly demonstrated proficiency of phrases in Dari, Pashto, and/or Iraqi Arabic. Although most of the cultural training program was oriented to Middle Eastern/Asia Minor region, the academy intended for the student to demonstrate an appreciation of foreign culture and how it could apply to the success or failure of a mission when working among or with a host nation or on foreign soil.57 Also, the Academy enhanced NCOES to improve critical thinking skills in noncommissioned officers. Over a period of several months, the Academy provided primary source materials and participated in the development of the Virtual Experience Immersive Learning Simulation (VEILS) “Danger Close” product. “Danger Close” was an interactive decision-making product for officer and noncommissioned officer education systems to give students opportunities to face ethical dilemmas in the contemporary operational environment.58 For the Field Artillery courses, the academy also raised the minimum passing score from seventy percent to eighty percent in accordance with the Chief of the Field Artillery„s Campaign Plan. A three-year analysis of student graduating grade point averages found that approximately ninety percent of all students across all Field Artillery MOSs graduated with greater than an eighty percent grade point average. The remaining ten percent were students at risk of failure because they did not study hard enough or take the course seriously.59 In October 2010 the Noncommissioned Officer Academy underwent their TRADOC accreditation. For the first time ever, the Academy achieved an “Institution of Excellence” rating.60 Warrior Leader Course

56Unit Award Recommendation, 30 Sep 09; Email with atch, subj: NCOA 2010 History, 7 Feb 11. 57Fires Center of Excellence CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 10, p. 7, Doc II-30; Briefing, subj: NCOES Briefing, 27 Apr 10, Doc II-31; Information Paper, subj: NCOES, 27 Jan 11, Doc II-32. 58Unit Award Recommendation, 30 Sep 09; Briefing, subj: NCOES, 27 Apr 10; Email with atch, subj: NCOA 2010 History, 7 Feb 11. 59FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 10, p. 7; Briefing, subj: NCOES, 27 Apr 10. 60Email with atch, subj: NCOA 2010 History, 7 Feb 11.

A backlog of 58,000 soldiers requiring the Warrior Leader Course (WLC) prompted TRADOC to modify the course. Through the first part of 2009, WLC had a thirty-day program of instruction. On 1 August 2009 the Noncommissioned Officer Academy reduced the number of training days to fifteen as an interim solution. Once the backlog had been reduced, the Academy moved to a seventeen-day program of instruction on 1 October 2010 for the live-in course as approved by TRADOC to develop basic leadership skills, knowledge, and behaviors required to become agile and adaptive leaders.61 Besides being a non-MOS specific course, the Academy‟s WLC served as the foundation of the Noncommissioned Officer Education System, continued to be a leader in the training and development for junior leaders, and leveraged technology and conventional face-to-face teaching and delivery methods to train privates first class through sergeants to perform tactical and garrison duties. During 2010, the course consisted of three modules: leadership and management, training management, and operational war fighting. Soldiers were challenged daily on their leadership skills, training management, land navigation, drill and ceremony, and other course material critical to develop strong first line leaders. The course also focused on other intangible skills, such as interpersonal skills, time management, and building the confidence necessary to lead soldiers during any operational environment.62 Advanced Leader Course The Advanced Leader Course (ALC) served as the second course in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System and developed noncommissioned officers to be tactically and technically proficient to train, lead, and fight at the section level. Two research papers were added to all courses to develop a better understanding of culture. ALC also included cultural discussions in the classroom based on talking points from the Army 360 Cultural Training Program. Resiliency training was fully integrated into each course; and the main objective of the course was providing realistic and relevant training to give the section/squad and platoon sergeant level leadership the confidence to perform their mission.63 Senior Leader Course The Senior Leader Course (SLC) was the third course in the Noncommissioned Officer Education System, prepared sergeants first class, selected promotable staff sergeants, and non-promotable staff sergeants to serve as sergeants first class and master sergeants at the platoon and company levels, and prepared sergeants first class for duty assignments as first sergeants. SLC provided some leader and training aspects of being a first sergeant because the First Sergeant Course was being phased out of the proponent

61Unit Award Recommendation, 30 Sep 09; Information Paper, subj: NCOES, 27 Jan 11; Briefing, subj: NCOES, 27 Apr 10. 62Fires Center of Excellence CSM Newsletter, Oct 10, p. 9; Briefing, subj: NCOES Briefing, 27 Apr 10; Information Paper, subj: Warrior Leader Course, 11 Jan 11, Doc II-33. 63Fires Center of Excellence CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 10, p. 8-; Information Paper, subj: Advanced Leader Course, 11 Jan 11, Doc II-34.

schools and would only be taught in the reserve training institutes in Fiscal Years 2011 and 2012. After Fiscal year 2013, the First Sergeants Course would no longer exist. SLC also implemented research papers for battle analysis methodology and cultural awareness topics into all courses to fulfill requirements for military history and cultural awareness.64 WARRANT OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM Warrant Officer Basic Course During 2010, the Field Artillery School conducted a thirty-three week Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC) for 131A Field Artillery Warrant Officers that focused at brigade and below operations. It taught basic electronics, the duties and responsibilities of a radar section leader, operation and maintenance of the target acquisition radar sets and associated equipment, survey techniques, targeting, target acquisitions systems employment, and principles and application of fire support to include target processing.65 Meanwhile, the School completed revamping its two WOBC programs of instruction on 14 September 2010 to reflect Modified Table of Equipment (MTOE) revisions, operational changes, and emerging requirements over the past five years, including precision fires. Initially approved by the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Ross E. Ridge, these changes prepared graduates from the active component WOBC to serve as fires targeting technicians by familiarizing them with the Army targeting process and reduced the active component program of instruction from thirty-three weeks to thirty weeks. During those thirty weeks, students were familiarized for operations on a staff with computer technology, the different warfighting functions, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, the contemporary operating environment, electronic warfare, targeting, public speaking, precision fires, planning, and military decision making process. The School decreased radar operations and radar maintenance from sixteen weeks to seven, added a target acquisition platoon leader module, expanded the capstone exercise to two weeks, and planned to implement the changes in July 2011. The National Guard program of instruction was nineteen weeks and had no radar maintenance but retained basic electronic theory and a brief overview of radar maintenance.66 Subsequently on 19 January 2011, the Deputy Commanding General for Initial Military Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Basic Officer Leader

64Fires Center of Excellence CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 10, p. 11; Briefing, subj: NCOES Briefing, 27 Apr 10; Information Paper, subj: Senior Leader Course, 11 Jan 11, Doc II-35. 65Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 2010, Doc II-36; Fact Sheet, subj: WOBC, 29 Dec 10, Doc II-37; Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB Portion of 2010 Annual History, 4 Apr 11, Doc II-38. 66Email, subj: Warrant Officer Instruction Branch Historical Information FY 2010, 7 Feb 11, Doc II-39; Interview, Dastrup with Chris Atkinson, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 8 Feb 11, Doc II-40; Email with atch, subj: One Page Synopsis of Program, 8 Feb 11, Doc II-41; Email with atch, subj: WOES and OES Input to 2010 Annual Command History, 25 Feb 2011, Doc II-42; Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB Portion of 2010 Annual History, 4 Apr 11.

Course Division, hosted a warrant officer common core task list working group. The group concurred that all warrant officers except for aviators had a wealth of experience and did not need to replicate all sixty-two tasks that second lieutenants received in their Basic Officer Leader Course common core. As a starting point, the group proposed a list of twenty-six tasks for the Warrant Officer Basic Course Common Core Task List. Of those, they reached a consensus on twenty one. Further discussion on the tasks was scheduled for the Basic Officer Leader Course conference in May 2011.67 Warrant Officer Advance Course Approved on 3 August 2010 by the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Ross E. Ridge, the nine-week and two-day Warrant Officer Advanced Course (WOAC) institutionalized all the Modified Tables of Equipment (MTOE) revisions, operational changes, and emerging requirements over the past five years. The course focused on the three primary warfighting functions of maneuver, intelligence, and fires with an emphasis on operational and strategic levels rather than the tactical level. WOAC prepared 131A Field Artillery Warrant Officers with the advanced concepts of Army and joint doctrine, familiarized them with the duties of a senior staff officer at division, corps, echelons above corps and made them proficient with the Army targeting process, and added a module on precision fires for target mensuration, collateral damage estimation, and weaponeering, among other things, so that the graduates would know how to request and employ precision guided, air-to-surface and surface-to-surface ballistic munitions during combat. To incorporate precision fires certification and a capstone exercise, the School expanded WOAC to twelve weeks and planned to implement the expanded course on 1 October 2011.68 OFFICER EDUCATION SYSTEM Basic Officer Leader Courses In 2010 the Basic Officer Leader Course (BOLC) A and BOLC B formed a two- tier training process for newly commissioned second lieutenants. BOLC A involved pre- commissioning training at the United States Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in American colleges and universities, Officer Candidate School (OCS), and Army National Guard Officer Candidate Schools. BOLC A was literally the fundamental building block for all officers within the Army Officer Education System.

67Email with atchs, subj: Initial Military Training - Review of Warrant Officer Common Core Task List Working Group Results, 8 Feb 11, Doc II-43; Email with atch, subj: WOES and OES Input to 2010 Annual Command History, 25 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB Portion of 2010 Annual History, 4 Apr 11. 68Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Targeting Technician, Nov 09, Doc II-44; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 2010; Email, subj: Warrant Officer Instruction Branch Historical Information FY 2010, 7 Feb 11, Doc II-45. Email, subj: Warrant Officer Instruction Branch Historical Information FY 2010, 7 Feb 11; Interview, Dastrup with Chris Atkinson, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 8 Feb 11, Doc II-46; Email with atch, subj: One Page Synopsis of Program, 8 Feb 11; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2010, Doc II-47; Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB Portion of 2010 Annual History, 4 Apr 11.

Following graduation from BOLC A, newly commissioned second lieutenants attended BOLC B.69 Basic Officer Leader Course B The Field Artillery School‟s first BOLC B of eighteen weeks and four days started on 17 February 2010 and graduated on 29 June 2010. Presented in three blocks of instruction (platoon leader, fire support, and fire direction), BOLC B developed and refined basic skills needed by Field Artillery officers with training centering on light/towed artillery systems (M777A2) to qualify them as a field artillery platoon leader, a company fire support officer, or fire direction officer and incorporated three weeks of common core tasks from BOLC II that was discontinued in 2009, such as basic rifle marksmanship, land navigation, small unit operations, leading a tactical convoy, and resiliency training, among others. Resiliency training focused on suicide prevention, how to thrive in adversity, and other topics. 70 Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course In 2010 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) conducted a two-phase Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course (FACCC). Field Artillery captains and senior first lieutenants went through a rigorous twenty-four week FACCC that afforded them the last branch-specific training in their career and some staff training. The officers received the equivalent of four weeks of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) common core instruction, six weeks of reset training to include gunnery and weapons training, and fourteen weeks of branch tactical, branch technical, warfighting, and staff work instruction. After large-group instruction (six weeks) at the beginning of the course on gunnery, advanced fire direction officer responsibilities, the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS), the students moved into the small group instruction (SGI) for the last eighteen weeks for tactical and staff instruction, including training on the military decision making process from the maneuver battalion perspective. Led by a small group leader (SGL) from the U.S. Army, the U.S. Marine Corps, or an allied officer from Great Britain, Australia, or Canada, small-group instruction provided situational-based practical exercises on counterinsurgency tasks, field artillery core competencies, and other learning methodologies to develop agile and adaptive leaders for the full-spectrum battlefield who were also technically proficient to serve as a battery commander, a battalion/brigade fire support officer, a field artillery battalion fire direction officer, and a battalion/brigade/brigade combat team staff officer. Instruction also trained them to

692009 USAFAS AH, p. 41; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 21 Jan 11, Doc II-48. 702009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), Annual History (AH), p. 41; Army Training Requirements and Resource System, BOLC B, 24 Jan 11, Doc II-49; Army Training Requirements and Resource System, BOLC II, 24 Jan 11, Doc II-50; Fact Sheet, subj: FABOLC B, 29 Dec 10, Doc II-51; Interview, Dastrup with Chris Atkinson, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 8 Feb 11, Doc II-52; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 2010, Doc II-54; Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB Portion of 2010 Annual History, 4 Apr 11.

coordinate lethal and nonlethal fires and effects at the battalion level and included media training of one day at the University of Oklahoma where students learned how to work with the media because of experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan where captains often worked with the media. Students also participated in a staff ride to the Battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas. This was a two-day event in which they travelled to Fayetteville, Arkansas, and each student briefed a portion of the field artillery battle on the actual battleground.71 Field Artillery Captain’s Career Course-Reserve Component During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course for the Reserve Component (FACCC-RC) went through significant changes. Prior to 2001, it consisted of a series of Army Correspondence Course Program sub-courses followed by a two-week resident phase. The Field Artillery School offered the resident phase approximately three times a year, usually in the summer months, and conducted it in the standard platform instruction format of two weeks of PowerPoint presentations and a final examination. In 2001 the School adopted an internet-based distance learning format for the non-resident portion of FACCC-RC. Twelve computer- based learning modules replaced the existing correspondence program texts. At the same time the two-week resident phase was converted to the small group instruction format. While there had been many updates to the resident portion of the course over the past eight years, the original computer modules were still used in 2008.72 During 2008, the Field Artillery School conducted a two-phase Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course (Distance Learning) for reserve component officers. Phase IA consisted of “asynchronous” instruction using Internet-based instruction with an instructor available through email to assist and answer questions from enrolled students. Phase IB utilized “synchronous” and “asynchronous” instruction. Synchronous instruction involved Internet-delivered and instructor-led instruction on weekends. Phase II consisted of a two-week active duty training at Fort Sill.73 Meanwhile, the Army and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) expressed concern that the Officer Education System for captains, including Reserve Component captains, did not meet the demands of an Army at war and that Active and Reserve Components‟ training had be standardized so that both received the same training. These issues prompted the Commanding General of TRADOC to publish

712009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 42; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 21 Jan 11, Doc II-48; Fact Sheet, subj: FACCC, 29 Dec 10, Doc II-53; Interview, Dastrup with Chris Atkinson, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 8 Feb 11, Doc II-55; Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 2010; Email with atch, subj: WOES and OES Input to 2010 Annual Command History, 25 Feb 11, Doc II-42; Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB Portion of 2010 Annual History, 4 Apr 11. 72Memorandum for MG Peter M. Vangjel, subj: Overview of FACCC-RC, 24 Oct 08, Doc II-66, 2008 USAFACFS ACH. 732009 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 45.

Operations Order 04-176A in May 2004 that called for the Reserve Component to redesign, develop, pilot, and implement a non-resident version of the Captain‟s Career Course no later than 1 October 2006. This order required an FACCC-RC of two, two- week active duty training periods of 120 hours each with inactive duty training periods between the active duty training periods.74 Upon obtaining the necessary resourcing, the Deputy Assistant Commandant for the National Guard at the Field Artillery School and the Field Artillery School redesigned FACCC-RC in 2008 based upon the 2004 directions and implemented it in 2009. In mid- 2008 two options for training Reserve Component captains existed. The captain could attend the resident Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course of twenty-four weeks. But this presented difficulties. In most cases, reserve captains could not take off six months from civilian employment to attend the course, while states also lacked funds to send them to the resident course. This basically left the second option of taking the newly redesigned (2004 model) five-phase Reserve Component-Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course as the most viable. While the first phase of the course was being developed in 2010, phases one and three were distance learning. Phases two and four were 120-hour resident phases.75 Intermediate Level Education Brigade/Division Full Spectrum Fire Support Course Published and distributed a few years ago, the white paper, entitled “The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery‟s Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders,” asserted that no other branch of the Army had suffered a greater identity crisis than the Field Artillery during the first years of the twenty-first century. Non-standard missions demanded by Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and few opportunities for Field Artillerymen to practice their core competencies degraded skills. In response to this crisis, the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, developed key initiatives to combat skill atrophy among officers and noncommissioned officers in his Field Artillery Campaign Plan. The plan expanded the Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course from twenty to twenty-four weeks, the Pre-Command Course from two to three weeks, and Noncommissioned Officer Education System courses up to

74Memorandum for MG Peter M. Vangjel, subj: Overview of FACCC-RC, 24 Oct 08; Annex A to Operations Order 04-176A, Doc II-67, 2008 USAFACFS ACH. 752008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 45-46; Memorandum for Record, subj: Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course-Reserve Component, 5 Mar 10, Doc II-68, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); COL Robert W. Roshell and LTC Lawrence M. Terranova, “Education for ARNG FA Officers and NCOs,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 09, pp. 30-34, Doc II-69, 2009 USAFAS AH; Memorandum for Assistant Commandant, USAFAS, subj: USAFAS Course Redesign Initiative: Field Artillery Captain-Level Critical Task List, 3 Apr 07, Doc II-70, 2009 USAFAS AH; CPT Bronson M. Sapp, Battery Executive Officer, FACCC, “The Reserve Component Captain‟s Career Course,” unpublished paper, undated, Doc II-71, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: FACCC-RC Input to 2010 Annual History, 11 Feb 11, Doc II-56.

four weeks.76 General Vangjel also recommended increasing the emphasis on fire support in Intermediate Level Education at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. For the most part, Field Artillery officer arrived for Intermediate Level Education (ILE) coming from non-field artillery branch assignments. They had spent time in an active or reserve component training unit, teaching at a branch service school, or a non-field artillery coded position. Basically, they had not been in a field artillery unit for two to three years. Coupled with non-standard missions of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom, recent career experiences did not require performing any core field artillery tasks. As a result, the Fires Center of Excellence developed a “re-Redding” training program in 2009 for majors that was conducted one to two weeks prior to the start of ILE. It consisted of a five-day training program to bring incoming students up to date on doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and field artillery operations and focused on fire support officer and field artillery operation skills that would prepare officers to perform better within their sixteen-person staff group during ILE and future assignments.77 In 2010 the course‟s basic format from the previous year remained intact but its orientation changed. First off, the Field Artillery School redesignated the course as the ILE Brigade/Division Full-Spectrum Fire Support Course to replace the “re-Redding” name. Also, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Ross E. Ridge, and the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Colonel Matt Merrick, directed the course to place more emphasis on full-spectrum fire support in the brigade combat team and division and to stress the brigade fire support officer‟s role during the military decision making process, the relationship with the brigade maneuver commander and staff, and fire support rehearsals. This would give majors an opportunity to reintegrate into brigade combat team fires roles that they would face in the future. The course would also take practical exercises from the School‟s Fire Support Coordinator Course and the Field Artillery Captain‟s Career Course, modify them, and add them to give the ILE students opportunities produce field artillery targeting products. Equally as important, General Ridge and Colonel Merrick proposed making the course an enduring one to complement the elective A307 fire support course in ILE.78 Pre-command Course In 2010 the Field Artillery School taught six three-week Pre-Command Courses by adding an additional week of Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) training for Fires and Brigade Combat Team commanders. Much like their subordinate officers, lieutenant

762009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 36-38, 42-44, 46, 47; Interview, Dastrup with Loyd A. Gerber, Northrup Grumman, 20 Jan 11, Doc II-57. 772009 USAFAS AH, pp. 46-47; Interview, Dastrup with Gerber, 20 Jan 11; Email with atch, subj: ILE Brigade, Division Fire Support Course, 31 Jan 11, Doc II-58. 78Interview, Dastrup with Gerber, 20 Jan 11; FA Cmdt Weekly SITREP, 2-8 Apr 10, Doc II-59; FA Cmdt, SITREP, 16 Jul 10, Doc II-60; Email with atch, subj: ILE Brigade/Division Full-Spectrum Fire Support Course, 31 Jan 11.

colonels‟ and colonels‟ traditional field artillery skills and tasks had deteriorated in recent years by conducting non-standard missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). Besides restoring lost competencies necessary to train, develop, and lead fires battalions, the course built new competencies in precision targeting, tactical information operations, electronic warfare, and lethal and nonlethal fires and trained fire support coordinators. Ultimately, the course developed leaders with the ability to synchronize lethal and nonlethal fires in contemporary military operations.79 JOINT AND COMBINED INTEGRATION DIRECTORATE During 2010, the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) synchronized joint activities for Fort Sill. With the continued emphasis on joint operations, JACI prepared, reviewed, and coordinated all joint issues with the Joint Staff, Component Commands, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Forces Command, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and the Fort Sill staff to avoid duplication and generate cross talk throughout the force to ensure that everyone was moving toward common goals. It also supervised and managed the Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course, the Joint Fires Observer Course, and the Electronic Warfare Course, provided Air Force participation for joint training and exercises, and coordinated live air support activities to Fort Sill. JACI also was the proponent for the Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) and ensured that the Foreign Liaison Officers were providing their expertise to the Field Artillery School.80 Precision Fires Course In Operation Iraqi Freedom of 2003, the Army acknowledged that it lacked the ability to mensurate coordinates for the employment of coordinate seeking munitions. The Army relied upon the Air Force to derive mensurated coordinates. Generally, it took up to twenty-four hours from the time that the target information reached the Air Force until it came back to the Army for engaging. Pushing to reduce the turn around-time, the 75th Field Artillery Brigade and the 1st Cavalry Division developed a process in 2005- 2006 to mensurate coordinates using Rainstorm, a National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency validated tool. This reduced turnaround time to minutes. In the meantime, the Special Operations Forces employed a tool called Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations (PSS-SOF) for mensuration. This tool was not validated by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency until 2009. The 1st Cavalry Division was the first Army unit to apply the mensuration process in combat without the assistance of outside agencies.81 Notwithstanding this accomplishment, a capability gap still existed. The Army

792009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School Annual History, p. 47; Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 21 Jan 11, Doc II- 48; Fact sheet, subj: PCC, 29 Dec 10, Doc II-61; Email with atch, subj: 428 FAB Portion of 2010 Annual History, 4 Apr 11, Doc II-38. 80FCoE CSM Newsletter, Jun 10, p. 20, Doc II-62. 81Interview, Dastrup with CW3 Thomas Taccia, JACI, 23 Feb 11, Doc II-63; Email with atch, subj: Precision Fires Course Input to 2010 Annual History, 4 Mar 11, Doc II-64.

lacked institutional training for target coordinate mensuration, weaponeering or the process of determining the quantity of a specific type of lethal or nonlethal weapon required to achieve a specific level of damage to a given target, or collateral damage estimation. Such training would reduce target location error for conventional munitions and would be required for the employment of organic coordinate seeking munitions while mitigating collateral damage. With this in mind, the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate in the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill assumed the lead for developing a precision fires program that encompassed institutional training for target coordinate mensuration, weaponeering, and collateral damage estimation in 2008.82 After creating a working group that developed a mission essential task list, among other things, and developing a concept plan and a capability needs statement over a period of several months in 2009, the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate implemented a precision fires program in 2010. This program trained fire supporters to conduct target coordinate mensuration, weaponeering, and collateral damage estimation through three venues. The first venue provided primary military education for 13F forward observers, 131A targeting warrant officers, and 13A fire support officers to enable operational units that conducted fire support activities to employ indirect fires accurately and effectively while achieving first-round target effects and mitigating collateral damage. The second venue, a functional course, trained 13F forward observers and 131A warrant officers who did not receive this training in their primary military education, while mobile training teams, the third venue, furnished unit training. Instructor training and certification took place during the last three months of 2010; pilot courses for students in the targeted groups were scheduled for January 2011 and February 2011. Ultimately, the precision fires program would furnish Army commanders with trained and certified soldiers who could perform target coordination mensuration, weaponeering, and collateral damage estimation.83 Joint Fires Observer Course Prompted by the 4th Infantry Division‟s inability to access joint fires because of the shortages of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) and U.S. Army modularization that exacerbated the shortage, the Air Force and Army created the joint fires observer (JFO). Although the Air Force planned to increase the number of JTACs in sufficient numbers to have one at the maneuver company by 2012 by training more at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), the Army envisioned using the JFO at the maneuver platoon level as the eyes of the JTAC in the field. Recognizing that the JFO course conducted by the 57th Operations Group at Nellis AFB could not produce sufficient numbers of JFOs to satisfy its requirements, the Army decided to train its own. As agreed upon by the Air Force and Army, Fort Sill developed a JFO course. Following a successful pilot JFO course conducted by the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate

82Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2010, Doc II-65; Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Program, Oct 10, Doc II-66. 83Email with atch, subj: Precision Fires Course Input to 2010 Annual History, 4 Mar 11; Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2010; Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Program, Oct 10; Interview, Dastrup with Taccia, 23 Feb 11.

at Fort Sill in September 2005 using resources from the 138th Fighter Wing of the Oklahoma Army National Guard, the Army and Air Force signed a memorandum of agreement on 14 November 2005 to support the Fort Sill course. Thus, two JFO schools existed -- one at Nellis AFB and one at Fort Sill in 2005. Two years later in 2007, Nellis AFB stopped its JFO course after graduating 183. This caused Fort Sill to increase its seat capacity of JFOs exponentially over the next three years to 1,032 in 2010 employing resident and mobile training to accomplish that.84 In 2010 the 138th Combat Training Flight of the Oklahoma Army Air National Guard provided JFO training at Fort Sill. During the year, it standardized JFO training and certification, acted as the worldwide proponent for JFO training, incorporated a new JFO memorandum of agreement, taught forty resident and mobile training team JFO courses, travelled to Germany to execute back-to-back JFO courses for Combined Joint Task Force 101, and started implementing Army Learning Concept 2015, among other things.85 Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course In 2010 the two-week Joint Fires and Effects Course (JOFEC) was one of the premier joint courses offered by the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill. Resident, mobile training teams, and tailored executive sessions were executed during the year. JOFEC provided instruction to joint fires and effects team members from all services, coalition forces, and other government agencies. JOFEC trained and educated students on joint and service fires capabilities, platforms, operational environment doctrine, and the

84FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 19, Doc II-67; Email, subj: Governor‟s Report 2010, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-68; Email with atch, subj: Air Force 2010, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-69; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with LtCol Rustan S. Schwichtenberg, Cdr, 138th Combat Training Flight, JACI, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-70; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 48; Information Paper, subj: JFO Course Information, 1 Dec 05, Doc II-100, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email, subj: JFOs, 10 Jan 06, Doc II-101, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum of Agreement between the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, and the U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, and the United States Special Operations Command, Director, Operations Support Group for Joint Fires Observer, 14 Nov 05, Doc II-102, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum for Deputy Director of Operations and Training, Deputy Chief of Staff, Air and Space Operations, 13 Oct 05, Doc II-103, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email, subj: JFO Information, 10 Jan 06, Doc II-103a, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email, subj: Number of JTACs required, 10 Jan 06, Doc II-104, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Memorandum for Cdr, TRADOC, subj: Commander‟s Statement - FY06 TRADOC Budget Guidance, undated, Doc II-105, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Email with atch, subj: JFO and 138th Flight Input to 2010 Annual History, 28 Feb 11, Doc II-71. 85FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Nov 09, p. 19; Email with atch, subj: Doc, 22 Feb 11, Doc II-72; Email, subj: Governor‟s Report 2010, 8 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: Air Force 2010, 22 Feb 11; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Schwichtenberg, 22 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: JFO Course and 138th Flight Input to 2010 Annual History, 28 Feb 11.

joint targeting process, trained how the joint fires and effects system operated, and prepared students to function effectively at the joint/operational level in a full spectrum of military operations. Students demonstrated their knowledge through practical exercises where they applied the principles of joint lethal and nonlethal fires and effects. JOFEC was also a part of the core curriculum for the Warrant Officer Advanced Course.86 The 138th Combat Training Squadron The Oklahoma Air National Guard announced in 2007 plans to stand up the 138th Combat Training Squadron at Fort Sill in 2008 to provide support for training. The squadron would be part of the Joint and Combined Integration Directorate at Fort Sill and would act as the schoolhouse liaison between the U.S. Army‟s Fire Center of Excellence and the U.S. Air Force Air Ground Operations School at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada. The squadron would furnish Air Force instructors/subject matter experts to plan, prepare, and execute the Joint Fires Observer Course; plan, prepare, coordinate, and present instruction to the U.S. Army Field Artillery School on Air Force subjects; coordinate air support for Fort Sill training, exercises, and demonstrations; and manage Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) training, qualifications, evaluation, and performance of JTAC duties for all Fort Sill JTACs. However, changes in requirements to be a squadron changed in 2009, leaving Fort Sill with Detachment 1, 138th Operations Group to support the training. On 27 August 2010 the group was redesignated at the 138th Combat Training Flight.87 Joint Fires Support Executive Steering Committee The Joint and Combined Integration Directorate (JACI) represented the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence on the working groups of the Joint Fires Support Executive Steering Committee (JFS ESC) during 2010. Key events included the completion of the review and signature of the Joint Fires Support Action Plan and the Joint Close Air Support Action Plan. Also, the Joint Terminal

862009 U.S. Field Artillery School Annual History, pp. 49-50; Briefing, subj: JOFEC, 12 Jan 2010, Doc II-73; FCoE CSM Newsletter, Nov 09, p. 19; Fact Sheet, subj: JOFEC, 29 Dec 10, Doc II-74; Email with atch, subj: JOFEC Input to 2010 Annual History, 18 Feb 11, Doc II-75. 87Email with atch, subj: Air Force 2010, 22 Feb 11; Email with atch, subj: Doc, 22 Feb 11; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 42-43; Memorandum of Agreement, subj: Funding of Base Operations support for the 138th Fighter Wing, the 6th Combat Training Squadron, and the Air Force Doctrine Center, undated, Doc II-113, 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH; Email with atch, subj: Fort Sill Historian, 10 Mar 09, Doc II-111, 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH; MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery,” Fires Bulletin, Sep-Dec 07, pp. 1-5, Doc II-102, 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH; Email, subj: 138th CTS SATAF Report, Fort Sill, OK, 16 Jan 08, Doc II-103, 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH; Email with atch, subj: JACI Portion of 2007 Annual Command History, 6 Mar 08, Doc II-104, 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH; Email with atch, subj: JFO Course and 138th Flight Input to 2010 Annual History, 28 Feb 11, Doc II-71.

Attack Control (JTAC) Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) and Joint Fires Observer Memorandum of Agreement were signed by all services. Additionally key issues worked included airspace coordination measures; digitally aided close air support coordinated implementation of block 1 engineering change proposals and recommended block 2 topics for consideration; and establishing Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) requirements and member of the JFS ESC sponsored JTAC standardization accreditation team.88 NONLETHAL TRAINING Electronic Warfare Courses Early in the 2000s, the Army renewed its interest in electronic warfare as a part of information age warfare. On 30 October 2003 the Department of Defense concluded that electronic warfare capabilities had to be improved to meet advances in the application and use of the electromagnetic spectrum to deny adversarial situational awareness, to disrupt command and control, and to develop targeting solutions to defeat weapons while protecting the United States‟ electronic capabilities from being successfully attacked. Subsequently on 15 May 2004, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) designated the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as the specified proponent for electronic warfare in the Army and tasked CAC to identify requirements. Later on 23 November 2004, the CAC commander, Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, directed the Commander of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), renamed U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) late in 2005, to take the lead for the Army‟s electronic warfare attack for brigade, division, and corps and doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements. Working with CAC, USAFACFS developed a plan early in 2005 to revitalize electronic warfare within the Army, to establish roles and responsibilities for electronic warfare functions, to begin the process of updating electronic warfare DOTMLPF, and to design, develop, and execute a course of instruction for electronic warfare that eventually led to development of the Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course in 2006-2007.89 Subsequently, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter W. Chiarelli, took action. In May 2006 General Chiarelli directed the Army G-3 to establish electronic warfare as an enduring core warfighting competency within the Army and specifically directed the G-3 to develop an electronic warfare force structure and operational concepts

88Email with atch, subj: JACI Portion of 2010 Annual History, 21 Mar 11, Doc II-76. 89Email with atch, subj: FA Vision and Transformation, 4 Apr 06, Doc III-12, 2005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), Annual Command History (ACH); Briefing, subj: Electronic Attack Mission Analysis Brief, 23 Feb 05, Doc III-13, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Field Manual 34-45, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Electronic Attack (Extract), Jun 2000, Chapter One, Doc III-14, 2005 USAFACFS ACH; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006, Doc II- 77.

to strengthen the Army‟s strategic vision and support the ground force component commander. This would enhance the Army‟s ability to counter electronic threats proactively and permit integrating kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities across the Army and mitigate the threat of electromagnetic spectrum being employed by America‟s enemies, such as improvised explosive devices (IED) that had been so deadly in the War of Terrorism.90 To meet the immediate requirement for electronic warfare personnel, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and the Fires Center of Excellence developed two electronic warfare courses in 2006 under the direction of CAC. The Intelligence School developed a Tactical Electronic Warfare Practioners Course that awarded an additional skill identifier (ASI) 1K and focused on countering radio- controlled improvised explosive devices. Meanwhile, the Fires Center of Excellence conducted a pilot course of the Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course (AOEWC) in October 2006 and January 2007 to train electronic warfare officers to plan, integrate, synchronize, and execute electronic warfare according to the commander‟s scheme of maneuver. This course awarded an ASI 1J.91 As outlined by CAC, the AOEWC served as a bridging strategy until an electronic warfare force structure could be stood up. In preparation for a proposed electronic warfare functional area, CAC directed the Fires Center of Excellence in August 2008 to develop an electronic warfare officer functional course, an electronic warfare integrator course for warrant officers, and an electronic warfare integrator course for enlisted personnel. This would permit the Army to field its own electronic warfare personnel to replace those provided by the Air Force and Navy.92 By 2010 the Fires Center of Excellence taught four electronic warfare courses to satisfy training requirements for Functional Area 29 for officers, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 290A for warrant officers, and MOS 29E for enlisted soldiers that were approved early in 2009. While the Army Operational Warfare Electronic Warfare Course

90Fact Sheet, subj: Electronic Warfare Career Field, 14 Jan 10, Doc II-78; “Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability,” Army News Service, 7 Dec 06, Doc II-79; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006; Interview, Dastrup with LTC James J. Looney, EW-DOTD, 14 Feb 11, Doc II-80; “New Career Field: Electronic Warfare,” Army News Service, 6 Feb 09, Doc II-81. 91Email, subj: EW MOS for Enlisted Soldiers and EW Functional Area for Officers, 23 Feb 07, Doc II-67, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Briefing, subj: Army Electronic Warfare, 4 Jan 07, Doc II-68, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Interview, Dastrup with Alvin W. Peterson, Jr., Northrup Gruman, EW Course Developer, 23 Feb 07, Doc II-66, 2006 USAFACFS ACH; Fact Sheet, subj: Electronic Warfare Career Field, 14 Jan 10; Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006; “Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability,” Army News Service, 7 Dec 06; Email with atch, subj: Electronic Operational Warfare Course, 10 Mar 09, Doc II-117, 2009 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH. 92Interview, Dastrup with Looney, 14 Feb 11; CAC OPORD 08-231a Electronic Warfare Roles and Responsibilities, 18 Aug 08, Doc II-82.

still provided an ASI 1J to furnish deploying units with battalion and brigade electronic warfare personnel, the Functional Area 29 course for officers prepared them to serve as Army electronic warfare officers from brigade to Army Service Component command level. The course also provided the education and training in the essential core skills necessary to perform electronic warfare functions in support of the commander‟s concept of the operations. The course emphasized Army and joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepared electronic warfare officers to participate in electronic warfare operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in a variety of Army and joint organizations. Meanwhile, the Electronic Warfare Warrant Officer Technician (MOS 290A) trained warrant officers to serve as electronic warfare integrators, and the Electronic Warfare Sergeant Noncommissioned Officer Course (MOS 29E) prepared enlisted soldiers to serve as Army electronic warfare specialists.93 Tactical Information Operations Course With information operations growing in importance as attested by Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and other recent operations in complex societies with no central authority and many different ethnic groups, political identities, and religious groups, information operations assumed greater importance, especially at the tactical level. Tasked by the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) took the lead for information operations training for the brigade and below by designing a three-week Tactical Information Operations Course. The School assigned the 30th Field Artillery Regiment, reflagged as the 428th Field Artillery Brigade on 7 December 2006, to head course development.94 In 2010 the Field Artillery School completed the third full year of teaching the three-week Tactical Information Operations Course. The course trained officers and noncommissioned officers, including students from the Active and Reserve Components and other military services, to perform as members of an information cell at the brigade combat team and lower and gave them a working knowledge of tactical information operations integration. The course also taught students how to analyze the informational environment, to execute information operations in a complex environment, and to assess the results and provided a practical exercise to validate the students‟ learning. Also, the school offered mobile training team instruction to the field upon request.95

93FCoE CSM Newsletter, Oct 10, p. 14, Doc II-83; Briefing (Extract), subj: DOTD, 23 Mar 10, Doc II-84; Fact Sheet, subj: Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course, 29 Dec 10, Doc II-85; FIRES Forward, Jan 10, Doc II-86; “New Career Field: Electronic Warfare,” Army News Service, 6 Feb 09; “Electronic Warfare a New Career Field,” Army News Service, 27 Jan 11, Doc II-87; Email with atch, subj: Electronic Warfare Course Input to Annual History, 19 Feb 11, Doc II-88. 942006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 2, 3, 35; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 55. 952008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 55-56; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 52; Fact Sheet, subj: Tactical Information Operations Course, 29 Dec 10, Doc II-89.

CHAPTER THREE COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS: FORCE DESIGN, DOCTRINE, AND REQUIREMENTS INTRODUCTION During the year, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School worked to make the Field Artillery more lethal, deployable, mobile, and responsive to meet the current and future operational environment and to be a vital part of the joint forces team. This involved participating in developing a fires functional concept, force designs, introducing new fire support systems, and testing new concepts. FORCE DESIGN Army Capstone Concept Recent and ongoing combat operations and the analysis of the future operational environment and emerging threats highlighted the uncertainty of armed conflict and the need for the Army to fight under conditions of uncertainty and complexity. Because of this, the Army had to take an evolutionary approach to capability development rather than pursue “leap ahead” capabilities characteristic of the 1990s. Recent combat and ongoing conflicts revealed the need to balance the technological focus of Army modernization with the recognition of the limits of technology and a renewed focus on human, cultural, and political dimensions of armed conflict.1 On 21 December 2009 the Army released the Army Capstone Concept to address these concerns. It described how the future all-volunteer army would conduct operations as part of a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational team and was compatible with joint and Army doctrine. In the 1990s many within the U.S. defense community argued that the country‟s competitive advantages in communications, information, and precision strike technologies had brought about a revolution in military affairs. Literature describing this revolution believed that surveillance, communications, and information technologies would dramatically improve battlespace knowledge, eliminate surprise, and permit U.S. military forces to achieve full spectrum dominance.2 The Army Capstone Concept changed the conceptual focus of the Army from major combat operations to operational adaptability that supported full-spectrum dominance. For the Field Artillery this meant providing fires that were joint, multinational, interagency, and networked-enabled at all echelons, that were capable of furnishing precision, near-precision, or non-precision lethal and non-lethal effects on all targets in all conditions, that fires would be massed in time, space and purpose on point or area targets while minimizing collateral damage or unintended consequences, and that fires would have the range and the reach to support decentralized and distributed

1TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept (Extract), 21 Dec 09, p. 6, Doc III-1; Email with atch, subj: Force Design Portion of 2010 Annual History, 12 Apr 11, Doc III-2. 2TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept (Extract), 21 Dec 09, p. 5; Briefing, subj: Army Capstone Concept, 24 May 10, Doc III-3; Briefing, subj: Pre- Command Course Field Artillery Update, 18 Aug 10, Doc III-4. 44

combined arms, joint and multinational operations.3 Army Operating Concept Published on 19 August 2010, the Army Operating Concept described how Army forces would conduct operations as part of the joint force to deter conflict, prevail in war, and succeed in a wide-range of contingencies in the future operational environment. It expanded on the ideas presented in the Army Capstone Concept of December 2009 and described the employment of forces to guide Army force development and identified capabilities required for future success.4 The United States Army Functional Concept for Fires: 2016-2028 The United States Army Functional Concept for Fires: 2016-2028 built upon the ideas presented in the Army Capstone Concept of 2009 and the Army Operating Concept of 2010. Published on 13 October 2010, the fires concept expanded the fires warfighting function to include indirect fires, air and missile defense, electronic attack, and joint fires as elements of the fires warfighting function. It emphasized the need for operationally adaptable offensive and defensive fires and focused on developing a versatile set of capabilities that future Army forces would employ with increased discrimination to defeat a wide range of threats in the future operational environment. In support of this, The United States Army Functional Concept for Fires served as a foundation for future force development pertaining to fires and the fires warfighting function.5 This concept made an important contribution to realizing the broad vision outlined in the Army Capstone Concept and Army Operating Concept. As the fires concept described, future Army forces would capitalize on rapid target identification, advanced engagement techniques, sensor fusion, and faster data exchange to employ operationally adaptable fires capabilities as part of future full-spectrum operations. The concept also served as a point of departure for wide-ranging discussions, wargames, and other experimentation.6 Joint Air Ground Integration Cell Lessons learned from recent U.S. combat actions over the past several years highlighted significant difficulties integrating airspace control and fires deconfliction over and within the ground commander‟s area of operations. These difficulties stemmed from a significant increase in unmanned aircraft systems, multiple supported commanders within the same area of operations, doctrinal disconnects, and the lack of reliable communications and a common operating picture that led to ad hoc organizations

3TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept (Extract), 21 Dec 09, p. 5; Briefing, subj: Army Capstone Concept, 24 May 10; Briefing, subj: Pre-Command Course Field Artillery Update, 18 Aug 10. 4TRADOC Pam 525-3-1, The United States Army Operating Concept (Extract), 2016-2028, 19 Aug 10, p. 5, Doc III-5. 5The United States Army Functional Concept for Fires: 2016-2028, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-4 (Extract), 13 Oct 10, p. iii, Doc III-6; Email with atch, subj: Force Design Portion of 2010 Annual History, 12 Apr 11, Doc III- 2. 6The United States Army Functional Concept for Fires, pp. iii-iv.

and processes. As of early 2008, there was no single command and control authority/system that facilitated horizontal component integration of all air-ground operations at the tactical levels where decisions had to be made. The inability to integrate all airspace users, fires, air defense, and airspace control in near real-time restricted combat effectiveness. Projecting airspace becoming denser, the Army and Air Force believed that a joint cell operating with the proper authorities would lead to more responsive fires and a better integrated airspace.7 In response, the Army and Air Force created the joint air ground integration cell. Its creation came as a result of a five-year Army-Air Force effort to integrate, rather than simply deconflict, airspace control, and fires over and within a ground commander‟s area of operations. The concept originated from V Corps operational use of joint fires during Operation Iraqi Freedom I in 2003. The corps‟s after action report concluded that the most effective integration of joint fires came from a close geographical relationship between the fires cell, the chief of current operations, and the air support operations center. In September 2008 the Army-Air Force Board‟s General Officer Steering Committee approved staffing the Joint Air Ground Integration Cell (JAGIC) concept for Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Army signatures. One month later in October 2008 an Air Force four-star conference approved JAGIC development. Subsequently, JAGIC was briefed at the February 2009 Air-Air Force Warfighter talks and was well-received.8 As of 2010, JAGIC was composed of elements from an air support operations centers, tactical control party, and Army division functional cell personnel from the Fires, Airspace Control, Air Missile Defense, and Aviation cells. While the JAGIC was an integrating cell in its own right, it would typically function as a subset of the division current operations integration cell. Operating as a single, cohesive cell, JAGIC would build soldier-airman personal relationships resulting in improved communications effectiveness leading to more rapid decisions based on better information to improve effectiveness and reduce risk. JAGIC would also enhance division fires and effects by responding rapidly and efficiently to requests for joint fires by coordinating with the necessary air and ground forces to enable the delivery of joint fires and effects.9 Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Studies Late in 2008, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) directed the Sustainment Center of Excellence at Fort Lee, Virginia, and Centers of Excellence to conduct an analysis to support the Department of the Army‟s development of a tactical wheeled vehicle strategy and implementation plan. As the lead, the Sustainment Center of Excellence/Combined Arms Support Center set out to examine the operational impact and risk of reducing the brigade objective table of organization and equipment (TOE) tactical wheeled vehicles by ten, twenty, and forty percent respectively within each phase of the Army Force Regeneration cycle. Essentially, the study, later called Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study I, aimed to determine if the Army had too many

7Joint Air Ground Integration Cell White Paper, 2010, p. 1, Doc III-7. 8Joint Air Ground Integration Cell White Paper, 2010, p. 1. 9Joint Air Ground Integration Cell White Paper, 2010, p. 1.

trucks, to develop approaches to optimize the number of tactical wheeled vehicles across the Army, and to analyze the risk of reducing tactical wheeled vehicles.10 Started in 2008, the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Study I examined the operational impact and risk of reducing brigade tactical wheeled vehicles. Completed in 2009, the study reduced the size of the Army‟s tactical wheeled vehicle fleet in the eight brigade types (infantry brigade combat team, heavy brigade combat team, Stryker brigade combat team, battlefield surveillance brigade, fires brigade, combat aviation brigade, maneuver enhancement brigade, and sustainment brigade) and replaced smaller capacity vehicles with larger capacity vehicles.11 Prompted by budget considerations to reduce the number of wheeled vehicles even more, the Army initiated the Tactical Wheeled Vehicles Studies II and III. Study II looked at echelons above brigade for more reductions. This study of 2010 validated the number of tactical wheeled vehicles against funding. Budget driven, the Army launched Tactical Wheeled Study III to further refine the number of tactical wheeled vehicles. At a conference on 9-10 September 2010 the Reduction Study III product team reviewed several courses of action and selected its objective course of action. It could reduce (1) Army Force Generation tactical wheeled vehicle equipping, (2) create two-level TOEs across all phases of Army Force Generation with units in the available phase having their full TOE requirements, (3) further reduce TOE requirements and keep constant tactical wheeled vehicle fill levels through all phases of Army Force Generation, (4) create installation-based pooling where units in the available phase could fill their TOE requirements from pooled assets, or (5) make further reductions to TOE requirements. Of the five courses of action, the product team selected options two, three, and five for further analysis.12 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Studies I and II In the past couple of years, the Army raised the question about the distribution of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles that were returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. On 2 September 2009 the Chief of Staff of the Army approved MRAP Study I which placed MRAP vehicles in Army preposition stocks sets for the Infantry Brigade Combat Team, the Heavy Brigade Combat Team, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, the Combat Aviation Brigade, Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Fires Brigade, and on the Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) of the Sustainment Brigade as an interim solution for force protection until the

102008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 65; Interview, Dastrup with Gary Wilds, CDID, 5 Apr 11, Doc III-8. 11Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7, 3rd Quarter 2009, p. 7, Doc III-23, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Interview, Dastrup with Wilds, 5 Apr 11; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 11, Doc III-9; Briefing, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Reduction Study III, 15 Sep 10, Doc III-10; FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Jun 10, p. 12, Doc III-11; Email with atch, subj: WV Studies and MRAP 2010, 8 Apr 11, Doc III-12. 12FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 28, Doc III-13.

Sustainment Convoy Protection Platform could be fielded. A Fires Brigade set equaled the Fires Brigade, Multiple-Launch Rocket System battalion, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System battalion, 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer battalion, and 155-mm. towed howitzer battalion (406 vehicles) per set.13 However, changes in MRAP quantity and quality since 2009 prompted the Army to conduct MRAP Study II beginning in 2010. Under the direction of the Army, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) conducted a comprehensive MRAP re-look that would account for all changes and guidance since the conclusion of the original MRAP Study I. Study II produced five course of actions: (1) filling military all- terrain vehicle requirements prior to allocating to unit TOE, (2) filling all military all- terrain vehicle TOE requirements prior to allocating to Army Preposition Stock, (3) balancing MRAP vehicles and military all-terrain vehicles in both Army Preposition Stock and TOE requirements, (3B) balancing military all-terrain vehicles between Army Preposition Stock and TOE adding robust training, and (4) creating ten MRAP vehicle equipped infantry brigade combat teams.14 PRECISION EFFECTS Precision Fires For centuries, especially after the Napoleonic Wars of the nineteenth century, massing fires characterized fire support on the battlefield. Armed with direct fire cannons, commanders grouped them into large batteries to pound the enemy at relatively short ranges to pave the way for the infantry attack. Indirect fire which was introduced during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 continued the practice of creating large batteries to batter the enemy into submission. Years later, the introduction of the fire direction center in the U.S. Army and similar organizations in other armies permitted spreading the field guns around the battlefield to minimize the impact of counterbattery fires but still allowed massing fires on a particular target. Through the beginning of the twenty-first century, massing fires remained the cornerstone of field artillery tactics.15 As the battlefield started changing in the first decade of the twenty-first century, massed fires fell from favor for key reasons. First, the Transformation of the Army created the modular force and eliminated division and corps artilleries with their battalions and brigades of field artillery. The brigade combat team with an organic fires battalion became the Army‟s main combat organization, and the division commander seldom took the fires battalion away from the brigade combat team commander to mass

13FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 11; Interview, Dastrup with Gary Wilds, CDID, 5 Apr 11; Email with atch, subj: WV Studies and MRAP 2010, 8 Apr 11. 14Interview, Dastrup with Wilds, 5 Apr 11; Briefing, subj: Executive Summary, MRAP Study II, undated, Doc III-14; Email with atch, subj: WV Studies and MRAP, 2010, 8 Apr 11. 15Vincent R. Bielinski, “Massed Precision Fires: A New Way of Thinking,” Fires Bulletin, Mar-Apr 09, pp. 13-14, Doc III-13, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (ACH). See J.B.A Bailey‟s Field Artillery and Firepower (2004) for an extensive discussion on the history of massing fires.

fires. Basically, the brigade combat team and the modularization of the Army discouraged massing fires. Second, the rule of engagement in the contemporary operational environment and the requirement to minimize collateral damage prevented massing fires as the practice had been for years. Third, fielding precision munitions -- the Guided Multiple-Launch System (GMLRS) rocket and the Excalibur 155-mm. Unitary projectile -- at the beginning of the century ended the need for massed fires to engage a target. With this in mind, the Army‟s Precision Fires Study of 2004 stressed the need for investing more science and technology dollars in precision munitions to reduce the logistics burden and to be relevant in the operational environment of the twenty-first century.16 Combat action in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan bore this out. As the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Major General Peter M. Vangjel pointed out in 2007, maneuver commanders‟ first fire support priority was precision. When Colonel David B. Hight, commander of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, deployed with his brigade, he ensured that it had the capability of employing Excalibur. Colonel Kenneth J. Lull, former commander of the 169th Fires Brigade of the Colorado Army National Guard recounted shooting more than one hundred GMLRS rockets during Operation Arrowhead Ripper in 2008. In an email he wrote that his unit fired seventeen Excalibur rounds for the 3-2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team when it cleared Baqubah of insurgents in intense combat during Operation Arrowhead Ripper. In one mission the unit fired Excalibur on a known enemy safe house. Although it did not demolish the house, Excalibur killed everyone in the building without harming the children playing about thirty yards from the house. As of 2010, Excalibur and GMLRS provided brigade combat teams with responsive precision strike capabilities. In the near future, the Non- Line-of-Sight Launch System‟s Precision Attack Munition would furnish added precision capabilities to reduce collateral damage and logistical burden.17 To have precision effects required accurate target location and size. In 2009 the Field Artillery employed the M3A3 Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle, the Stryker Fire Support Vehicle, and the M1200 Armored Knight Fire Support Vehicle to locate targets and planned to integrate the Fire Support Sensor System on them. This system would complement their mission equipment package and provide accurate self-location, target location, and target designation that were critical for precision strike. Fielding the Fire

16Bielinski, “Massed Precision Fires,” pp. 13-14; Roxana Tiron, “U.S. Army Assesses Precision Strike Capabilities,” National Defense Magazine, Mar 04, Doc III-14, 2009 USAFAS AH 2009; Briefing, subj: Army‟s Precision Fires Study, 8 Jul 04, Doc III-15, 2009 USAFAS AH; Fact Sheet, subj: Precision Fires and Effects, Oct 09, Doc III- 16, 2009 USAFAS AH. 17MG Peter M. Vangjel, “State of the Field Artillery: 2007,” Fires Bulletin, Sep- Dec 07, pp. 1-4, Doc III-17, 2009 USAFAS AH; MG David C. Ralston and Patrecia Slayden Hollis, “PGM Effects for the BCT Commander,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 09, pp. 22-27, Doc III-18, 2009 USAFAS AH. Note that the Army cancelled work on the Non- Line-of-Sigh Launch System in May 2010.

Support Sensor System began in 2006 and continued into 2009. In the meantime, the Precision Strike Suite-Special Operation Forces (PSS-SOF) software was the standard application available to all fire support platforms using the rugged handheld computer, had the ability of locating the target accurately for precision munitions, and rapidly determined three-dimensional grid coordinates to employ precision munitions against time-sensitive targets or targets in support of troops in contact.18 In 2009 precision fires added a new dimension with the collocation of the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) School and the Field Artillery (FA) School at Fort Sill. As the Association of the United States Army pointed out in October 2009, Fires Force leaders (ADA and FA leaders) had to meet nine key strategic imperatives as they moved forward. Among others, they had to develop precision strike to deliver ADA and FA munitions precisely where the maneuver or joint force commanders wanted them. Precision strike would rely upon precision targeting and precision engagement technologies and would promote closer ties with the space and intelligence communities.19 Precision Munitions In recent years the Field Artillery experienced a revolution in precision. Through most of its history, the Field Artillery was a weapon of mass destruction and area fire, especially beginning in the Napoleonic Wars of the early 1800s and continuing through Operation Desert Storm of 1991. It relied upon massed fires to destroy and neutralize enemy formations. This started changing in the 1970s with fielding the Copperhead 155- mm. projectile in the American army. A precision munition that used a laser designator to guide it to the target, Copperhead introduced the American Field Artillery to precision. Over the next couple of decades, the American army adopted other precision munitions -- the cannon-launched Search-and-Destroy Armor Munition (SADARM) that employed infrared seekers to locate the target, the Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) Unitary, the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) Unitary, and the Excalibur Unitary, a 155-mm. cannon projectile. Guided to the target using sophisticated inertial navigation systems and/or global positioning system (GPS) capabilities, GMLRS, ATACMS Unitary, and Excalibur Unitary offered unparalleled precision, minimized collateral damage, and were therefore especially valuable for employment in complex, built-up, urban terrain. For precision munitions to be successful, however, the Field Artillery had to locate the targets precisely by using a common reference point and datum to designate precisely a point on the earth in three dimensions -- latitude, longitude, and altitude.20

182008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 129; Ralston and Hollis, “PGM Effects for the BCT Commander,” pp. 22-24. 19AUSA Torchbearer Issue, Key Issues Relevant to U.S. Army Fires and the Warfighter, Oct 09, pp. 9-16, Doc III-19, 2009 USAFAS AH. 20Interview with atch, Dastrup with COL Anthony Daskevich, Dir, TCM RAMS, 23 Feb 10, Doc III-28, 2009 USAFAS AH; Message to Observer, Jul 2009, Doc III-29, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: Precision Munitions, 21 Mar 10, Doc III-30, 2009 USAFAS AH.

Lessons employing precision munitions emerged quickly. During the Global War on Terror in the first decade of the twenty-first century, GMLRS Unitary redefined the role of rocket artillery by becoming known as “the 70 kilometer sniper round” and was often the weapon of choice in complex terrain and close support to friendly troops where collateral damage was of most concern. Also, commanders typically used GMLRS Unitary in one to three round missions rather than high-volume fires, found airspace clearance to be time consuming, encountered special challenges with dispersed operations from forward operating bases that required long-range communications capabilities, and found that given an accurate target location, highly precise guidance together with selectable trajectories and fuse modes that could be tailored to the attack of specific targets could limit collateral damage.21 Cluster Munitions Assessment Over the years, cluster munitions have generated controversy. Armies first used them in World War II, and at least twenty-one countries have employed them since. For example, the United States used them in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s. The International Committee of the Red Cross estimated that nine to twenty-seven million cluster munitions remained unexploded in Laos alone. Since then, the Soviets utilized them in Afghanistan in the 1970s and 1980s, while the British employed them in the Falkland Islands in the 1980s. Subsequently, the United States dropped cluster bombs in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Basically, cluster munitions dispensed large numbers of submunitions imprecisely over an extended area. The submunitions lacked generally self-destruct capability and had the potential of remaining hazardous for decades.22 Frustrated with attempts to prohibit or restrict the use of cluster munitions, a group of nations led by Norway reached an agreement to ban cluster munitions. In December 2008 ninety-four countries signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions that prohibited their development, production, acquisition, transfer, and stockpiling. The United States, Russia, China, Israel, Egypt, India, and Pakistan, however, did not participate in the talks that led to the agreement or sign the convention. By December 2009 103 states had signed the convention.23 Meanwhile, the United States resisted banning cluster munitions. In May 2008 just prior to the signing of Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Political-Military Affairs, Stephen Mull, said that United States relied upon cluster munitions as an important part of its defense strategy and preferred pursuing technological fixes to ensure that the weapons would not be viable once the conflict was over. Moreover, if cluster munitions were eliminated, more money would be spent on new weapon systems, ammunition, and logistical resources. The United States further

21Interview with atch, Dastrup with Daskevich, 23 Feb 10; Email with atch, subj: Precision Munitions, 21 Mar 10. 22Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 22 Dec 09, pp. 1-2, Doc III-31, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH). 23Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” pp. 3-4.

stated that most militaries would increase their employment of massed field artillery and rockets barrages which would increase the destruction of key infrastructure if cluster munitions were banned.24 On 19 June 2008 the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a new policy on cluster munitions although it still recognized them as legitimate weapons with clear military utility and did not support the convention. Acknowledging the unintended harm that unexploded cluster munitions could cause to civilians and civilian infrastructure and worldwide opposition to the dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) that was a cluster munition, the DOD replaced its previous policy with a new one. As soon as possible but no later than one year from 9 July 2008, the military and combatant commands would initiate removal from the active inventory all cluster munitions that exceeded operational planning requirements or for which there would be no operational planning requirements. All excess cluster munitions would be demilitarized as soon as practicable. After 2018 United States military departments and combatant commands could only employ cluster munitions that would not result in more than one percent unexploded ordnance. Until then, the employment of cluster munitions that exceeded the one percent threshold had to be approved by the combatant commander. Prior to 2018, DOD could seek to transfer cluster munitions that did not exceed the one percent threshold to a foreign government if that government agreed not to use them. The old policy required the military to design and procure cluster munitions with a ninety-nine percent reliability rate but did address the use and removal of current munitions.25 In light of DOD‟s new policy on cluster munitions, the Army Capabilities Integration Directorate (ARCIC) issued a directive to the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, on 5 December 2008 to complete a cluster munitions assessment to identify capability gaps, among other things, created by DOD‟s new policy, and to develop an alternative warhead for DPICM to address the need to attack dispersed, area, or imprecisely located targets. After noting that a capability gap would exist with the elimination of cluster munitions in 2019, the Fires Center of Excellence wrote, “Programmed and selected developmental alternatives for mortar, cannon and rocket can mitigate the gaps for the most likely mission profiles.”26 The Fires Center of Excellence findings then outlined key priorities. The Army had to improve sensors, continue the development of the Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead, continue work on the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System, field a 120-mm. precision mortar capability, continue assessing organizational changes to the Infantry Brigade

24Feickert and Kerr, “Cluster Munitions,” pp. 4-5. 25Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, et al, subj: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians, 19 Jun 08, Doc III-32, 2009 USAFAS AH; DOD News Release, Cluster Munitions Policy Released, 9 Jul 08, Doc III-33, 2009 USAFAS AH; Donna Miles, “New Cluster Bomb Policy Aims to Reduce Collateral Damage,” American Forces Press Service, 9 Jul 08, Doc III-34, 2009 USAFAS AH. 26Email with atch, subj: CM Assessment EXSUM, 22 Feb 10, Doc III-35, 2009 USAFAS AH.

Combat Team Fires Battalion to provide precision fires capability, develop and field a 155-mm. proximity initiated submunition (PRAXIS) or a similar cannon munition alternative capability, and develop improved aiming algorithms for current systems as another attack option.27 TRADOC CAPABILITIES MANAGERS FIRES BRIGADE AND BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM-FIRES During the latter months of 2010, the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) initiated action to reorganize TRADOC Capabilities Managers throughout the command. Lieutenant General Michael A. Vane, the Director of ARCIC, announced in July 2010 that TRADOC intended to shift from the existing system-based TRADOC Capabilities Managers (TCM) structure to organizationally-based TCMs. For the Fires Center of Excellence, this meant dissolving TCM Cannon, TCM Rockets and Missiles, TCM Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications, and TRADOC Project Office Sensors. Shortly afterwards, the Commanding General of the Fires Center of Excellence at Fort Sill, Major General David D. Halverson, directed the Center‟s TCMs to begin the move towards the organizationally based structure. He directed the Air Defense Artillery TCMs to begin the shift in August 2010 and tasked the Field Artillery TCMs to create TCM Fires Brigade and TCM Brigade Combat Team-Fires by January 2011. TCM Fires Brigade would assume responsibility for shaping/counter/close supporting fires (rockets and missiles), and long-ranging targeting, including Firefinder radars, while TCM Brigade Combat Team-Fires would have close supporting (cannon), target location (Bradley Fire Support Team Vehicle, among others), survey, and indirect fire protection capability. The new structures would give fires brigades and brigade combat team commanders a single point of contact and provide a Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) integrator to synchronize and coordinate efforts across the domains and to coordinate with capability, training, and material developers, testers and evaluators, major commands, and the Department of the Army. The TCM Fires Brigade and TCM Brigade Combat Team-Fires were stood up effective 1 January 2011.28 TRADOC BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM-FIRES Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile Determined to increase the range of its cannon artillery without sacrificing accuracy, the U.S. Army explored the need of adopting the XM982 Excalibur Extended Range Guided Projectile. As initially planned in 1995 and outlined in the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) of 22 February 1996, Excalibur would be a fire-and- forget projectile with a Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver and inertial

27Email with atch, subj: CM Assessment EXSUM, 22 Feb 10; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army, et al, subj: Directed Requirement for Guided Multiple- Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead Rockets, 25 Jun 08, Doc III-36, 2009 USAFAS AH; Interview with atch, Dastrup with COL Anthony Daskevich, Dir, TCM RAMS, 23 Feb 10, Doc III-37, 2009 USAFAS AH. 28Briefing, subj: Fires TCM Reorganization, 21 Dec 10, Doc III-15.

measurement unit guidance package that would allow the projectile to fly extended ranges (fifty kilometers) to shape the close battle and to improve survivability and would be able it to hit within six meters of the target. The projectile‟s modular design would permit carrying the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition (DPICM) for area targets, the Search-and-Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM) for counterfire against self- propelled artillery or armor, or the Unitary munition for precision targets -- soft or hard. Upon fielding, Excalibur would furnish the Field Artillery with improved fire support, would be compatible with all digitized 155-mm. howitzers, such as the M109A6 (Paladin) Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer, the Lightweight 155-mm. Towed Howitzer (XM777) under development, and the Crusader Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer under development; would reduce fratricide; and would be fielded in Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 with DPICM, in FY 2007 with SADARM, and in FY 2010 with Unitary.29 Several years into development, critical issues altered the direction of the Excalibur program. Insufficient funding and the termination of the SADARM program early in 2000 prompted the Army to limit Excalibur‟s initial development to DPICM. However, the fear of duds and collateral damage, the need for precision, and the Transformation of the Army process that was underway, especially the creation of the Initial Brigade Combat Team, caused another shift in priorities. In December 2000 the Commandant of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Major General Toney Stricklin, signed a school decision paper recommending switching Excalibur‟s initial development to the Unitary munition. Concurring with General Stricklin, the Program Manager for Excalibur subsequently deferred work on the DPICM warhead in January 2001 because it caused collateral damage by scattering sometimes unexploded bomblets upon base ejection. The Program Manager made the Unitary the primary warhead because it produced low collateral damage. This caused Unitary warhead to become more important after being a low priority for years.30 In the meantime, another development influenced the Excalibur program. In 1999 Congress started pulling money from the Excalibur program to fund the Trajectory Correctable Munition (TCM), a howitzer-launched 155-mm. artillery projectile being developed by Bofors Defense of Sweden. Using GPS and an inertial measurement unit, the Bofors TCM would carry three different warheads, including Unitary, would provide a significant increase in accuracy with first-round hit capabilities, and would extend the Field Artillery‟s digitized cannon range from twenty-seven kilometers to thirty-five kilometers with the XM777 Towed 155-mm. howitzer under development and the Paladin and fifty plus kilometers with the Crusader under development. Equally important, TCM would significantly improve warfighting capability and give the Army and the Field Artillery a second long-range, precision-guided munition.31 Raytheon‟s technical problems with the Excalibur airframe or projectile and the inability to afford both TCM and Excalibur soon forced the Army to explore various

292004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 74-75. 302000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79. 312001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79.

developmental options. First, the Army could drop the TCM program and fund Excalibur, but this was a high-risk solution because Excalibur‟s airframe was untested whereas TCM‟s had been tested and had already demonstrated reliability. Second, the Army could drop Excalibur and fund TCM. This alternative involved abandoning a contract with an American company and would be politically troublesome. Third, the Army could merge the programs and take the best from each. After serious consideration the Army Acquisition Executive decided in November 2001 to merge the two developmental programs that had essentially paralleled each other. A merger would deliver a low-risk program that would take advantage of the complementary strengths of each program. While Bofors would be the subcontractor and had years of experience with projectile design, Raytheon would be the prime contractor. Raytheon also possessed extensive experience with guidance electronics and software development.32 As the Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat and Support Systems, Major General Joseph L. Yakovac, Jr., wrote on 21 November 2001 about the merger, “It is in the best interests of the Army. . . .”33 The merger, however, was not free. Before the merger, Excalibur had unfunded requirements. The merger added more unfunded requirements. In view of the importance of developing the projectile, the United States and the Kingdom of Sweden signed a memorandum of agreement on 11 December 2002 for the cooperative development of Excalibur with the Sweden providing $57 million.34 Meanwhile, Excalibur went through key milestones. On 26 February 2002 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, approved a new block approach to field Excalibur Block I to the Crusader in FY 2008 and Blocks II and III which would build on Block I to the Paladin and the Lightweight 155-mm. Towed Howitzer later. When the Office of the Secretary of Defense terminated the Crusader on 8 May 2002, the Army restructured the program to focus developing Excalibur for the Future Combat System (FCS) Cannon of the Objective Force with fielding in FY 2008.35 Prompted by the requirement to get Excalibur to the field as quickly as possible in view of the Global War on Terrorism, the Office of the Secretary of Defense subsequently tasked the Program Manager for Excalibur to develop a plan to accelerate fielding by employing “spiral development.”36 Basically, this approach would deliver sequential, increasing capability over time until the Operational Requirements Document threshold and objective requirements were met. On 28 August 2002 the Army Acquisition Executive attended a review that detailed the program to deliver the Unitary

322001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 79-80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 57. 33Memorandum for Army Acquisition Executive, subj: Merger of Excalibur XM892 and Trajectory Correctable Munitions Programs, 21 Nov 01, Doc III-85a, 2001 USAFACFS ACH. 342001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 57-58. 352002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS ) ACH, p. 49. 36Email with atch, subj: Excalibur History, 12 Feb 03, Doc III-37, 2002 USAFACFS ACH.

Excalibur in three versions, called spirals, and subsequently approved it. The first version (Block/Increment I), Unitary Excalibur, would be the least capable and would be fielded to the Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer in FY 2006. Block/Increment II or enhanced Unitary Excalibur with more capabilities would be fielded to the FCS Cannon in FY 2008. Block/Increment III would meet the original Operational Requirements Document requirements and be fielded in FY 2010 or 2011. The revised ORD signed by the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, Major General Michael D. Maples, on 20 August 2002 and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command‟s Deputy Chief of Staff for Developments, Major General Alan W. Thrasher, on 12 February 2003 and verbally approved by the Vice Chief of Staff for the Army on 23 April 2003 reflected the changes brought by spiral development. Over a year later on 16 September 2004, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army signed the ORD because its key performance parameters were essential for the contemporary operational environment with its urgent requirement for precision fires.37 Meanwhile, development moved forward during 2003-2004. On 23 July 2003 BAE Systems completed the first firing trials of its M777E1 (formerly XM777) Towed 155-mm. Howitzer with the Excalibur at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. The trials evaluated seven XM982 instrumented ballistic test projectiles fired at three different temperatures using the Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS) to characterize the ballistic environment and to assess the projectile‟s physical compatibility with the M777E1. A few weeks later in August 2003, the U.S. government awarded United Defense Industries subsidiary, Bofors Defense, the contract for the systems development and demonstration phase of the Excalibur program. Later in October 2003, the Army and Sweden officially opened the Excalibur Joint Program Office at Picatinnay Arsenal, New Jersey, to improve developmental efficiency. One year later in September 2004, the Guided Series 3b Tests validated the airframe and guidance system design.38 Studies conducted in 2002 and 2003, in the meantime, validated Excalibur development. As a precision munition for the current and future force, Excalibur facilitated the destruction of point targets and selected high-value area targets at extended ranges in complex terrain and urban environments from dispersed locations and would fill an existing deficiency -- the inability to destroy point targets and the requirement to minimize collateral damage. In view of the current operational environment in Afghanistan and Iraq, such capabilities would be crucial for the success of U.S. joint military forces.39 As the studies indicated, Excalibur offered other distinct advantages. The Achieving Transformation in Fire Support Study of June 2002 determined that the firepower of existing Army field artillery systems would be improved much more with the proper precision munitions, such as Excalibur and the Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System munition, than by investing in Crusader. Also, the Alternative Indirect

372002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 58; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 62. 382003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 62-63. 392003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78.

Fire Study of July 2002 concluded that Excalibur was more effective against a wider variety of targets and at a greater range than current munitions even with utilizing current target acquisition capabilities. Excalibur would allow current platforms to complement fully the improved accuracy of future target acquisition systems and would be less expensive to use because it could be used in smaller numbers than non-precision munitions. Subsequently, the Non-Line of Sight Mix Study of March 2003 reinforced that Excalibur Unitary greatly enhanced the lethality of the current cannon force and demonstrated the need for the munition. Ultimately, according to these studies and others, Excalibur and other precision munitions would provide more capability at equal or less cost than the Crusader howitzer to reaffirm the requirement for accelerating the fielding of the precision munition.40 Along with the studies, the urgent needs statement for the Excalibur endorsed by the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in August 2004 created the requirement to accelerate fielding the munition. In response to the urgent need statement, the Field Artillery School presented its case for a formal acceleration of the munition‟s development to the Army Resource and Requirements Board which would vet the requirement and decide the fate of accelerating the acquisition program. Although the product of the accelerated program would not be the objective round identified in the officially approved ORD of September 2004, it would meet the urgent needs statement and create a parallel development program for Excalibur. Essentially, the urgent needs statement required splitting Block/Increment I into two parts. While Increment Ia-1 would provide the theater forces with an immediate need capability and have less capability, Increment Ia-2 would be the program outlined in the 2004 ORD. Increment Ia-2 would continue development and be fielded to M777A2 and Paladin units.41 In March 2005 the Army Resource and Requirements Board validated the urgent needs statement of August 2004 from Central Command‟s Combined Forces Land Component Command for a precision guided cannon artillery munition and designated Excalibur as the materiel solution. To accelerate the fielding of Excalibur to get it to Iraq by the second quarter of FY 2006, the Army condensed the testing schedule, allowing little room for program slippage or delays, and reduced the capabilities. Updated Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) software would accompany Excalibur.42 Subsequently, the contractor held test firings at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. On 1 September 2005 the contractor fired two Excalibur projectiles from a Paladin using the Modular Artillery Charge System (MACS). Both rounds deployed their canards, acquired the GPS signal, and completed their pre-programmed navigational maneuvers. Subsequently on 15 September 2005, the Excalibur Ia-1 demonstrated its accuracy by hitting within seven meters of the target to bring the program a step closer to

402003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78. 412004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 63-64; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 52-53; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 50-51; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 69. 422005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51.

filling the urgent requirement to put the projectile in the hands of 1st Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry Division, and 1st Armor Division soldiers.43 More testing took place in 2006 and early 2007. Tests conducted in March-July 2006 fired twenty-two rounds while the Limited User Test of February 2007 demonstrated the munition‟s reliability and lethality when twenty-three out of twenty-five rounds hit within an average six meters of the target. In fact, the Limited User Test indicated that the munition actually surpassed the requirements outlined by the ORD and had better effects than anticipated to permit fielding the Excalibur Ia-1 to U.S. ground forces in Iraq in May-July 2007. The Limited User Test results also satisfied the urgent release requirement and permitted moving the munition into low-rate initial production. Subsequently, in the Customer Test conducted by I Battery, 11th Marine Regiment at Yuma Proving Ground with the M777A2 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer, Excalibur Ia-1 successfully demonstrated its accuracy when four out of four rounds had an average miss distance of ten meters, allowing material release to the M777A2. Meanwhile, the Army approved the Capability Production Document for the Excalibur Ia-2 and testing beginning in 2008.44 Excalibur quickly demonstrated its value in combat. Following new equipment training on 5 May 2007, the 1st Cavalry Division conducted the first operational firing of the munition at a well-known insurgent safe house in Bagdad. Elements from the 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment teamed with the 1st Battalion, 82nd Field Artillery Regiment to destroy the safe house with one Excalibur round. At the end of 2007, American operational units had fired Excalibur Ia-1 (the urgent requirement Excalibur) in Operation Iraqi Freedom, while Canadian forces had fired the munition in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. In February 2008 American forces also began firing Excalibur Ia-1 in OEF as units equipped with the M777A2 Towed 155-mm. Howitzer deployed to Afghanistan. By October 2009 Army and Marine field artillery units had fired seventy-six Excalibur Ia-1 in OIF and forty-one in OEF.45 Concurrently in 2008-2009, the Field Artillery School educated commanders of deploying units using New Equipment Training Teams (NETT). It trained twenty-nine units in 2008 and another twenty-four units in 2009 on the benefits and terminal effects of Excalibur Ia-1, completed training all active component field artillery units by the end of 2009, and prepared to begin training Army National Guard field artillery units in 2010. For example, NETTs explained that the munition had to be fired at a high angle to achieve the maximum range and optimal flight path to perform the terminal maneuver to achieve a near vertical angle of attack. As it neared the target, the projectile oriented itself to a near-perpendicular angle of fall to optimize the lethal effects on the intended target. This characteristic made Excalibur Ia-1 an ideal solution for engagements in complex and urban settings because it created a minimal amount of collateral damage.

432005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56. 442006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 51; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72. 452007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 56; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 70.

Also, Excalibur Ia-1 had roughly the same explosive power as an M107 high-explosive projectile. Because of its near-perpendicular angle of descent, it furnished more lethality and more uniform detonation pattern. Excalibur Ia-1 had the ability to penetrate four inches of reinforced concrete which was the thickness of the typical load-bearing roof and could penetrate and detonate with devastating lethality.46 Meanwhile, the Field Artillery School worked to introduce the Excalibur Ia-2 and Ib during 2009. Representing the baseline program outlined in the ORD of 2004, Ia-2 would have increased range, improved reliability, improved countermeasures (anti-jam capabilities), and went through an initial operational test in January 2010. At that time Excalibur Ia-2 demonstrated high reliability with charges three and four but was less reliable at charge five. However, technical difficulties set back the demonstration of the Raytheon and Alliant Tech Systems designs of Ib from March 2010 until August 2010. The Ib achieved ORD requirements and provide more range, increased reliability, and lower cost. Raytheon won the shoot off and the contract for Ib. Milestone C was scheduled for 2012, and fielding was scheduled for 2014.47 In the midst of the testing, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army conducted a portfolio review where he looked at precision fires and their high costs. Because of the high costs, he reduced the purchase of Excalibur from 30,000 to 6,264. This drove the cost up per unit, causing a Nunn-McCurdy breach. Passed in 1982 to end wasteful defense programs, Nunn-McCurdy legislation required any program that exceeded fifteen percent of its original cost to be recertified by the Secretary of Defense or be terminated. After going through several reviews, the Excalibur received certification at the end of 2010.48 Precision Guidance Kit Although the U.S. Army had been working to introduce precision munitions since the early 1990s, the effort led to a limited number and types of such munitions, such as the Sense-and-Destroy-Armor Munition (SADARM). Interestingly, combat operations during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) highlighted the need for precision munitions to mitigate collateral damage and improve accuracy. Prompted by the Americans‟ restrictive rules of engagement for attacking targets to minimize collateral damage, American adversaries modified their tactics. By dispersing their forces, often occupying positions in or near populated areas, enemy forces limited the Americans‟ ability to engage targets. This tactic caused the

462008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 72-73; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 70-71. 472009 USAFAS AH, p. 71; Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, TCM BCT- Fires, 3 Mar 11, Doc III-16; Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-41, 2009 USAFAS AH; TCM Newsletter, Sep 09, Doc III-42, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: Project Manager, Combat Ammunitions systems, 28 Oct 09, Doc III- 39, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III- 43, 2009 USAFAS AH. 48Interview, Dastrup with Durant, 3 Mar 11; “Army‟s Prized Excalibur Munition May Not Survive Budget Drills,” National Defense Magazine, 18 Jul 10, Doc III-17.

Army to increase its dependence upon precision munitions.49 The Army initiated a search for less expensive precision munitions than SADARM. On 20 November 2003 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) tasked the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) to head a working group of representatives from the military and industry to conduct the Precision Effects Study, to determine the current or near-current precision engagement solutions, and to select those that would yield the best payoff for field artillery and mortar assets within twenty-four to thirty-six months.50 Various proposals emerged. Among many including the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3), the Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition developed by GD/Denel of South Africa, and the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR), the course-correcting fuse (CCF), renamed Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) in 2005, offered much promise. Based upon analysis of the proposed solutions during the first part of 2004, USAFACFS concluded that CCF/PGK would vastly improve the accuracy of 105-mm. and 155-mm. projectiles and drive down the logistical tail by reducing the number of rounds required for each engagement and ammunition resupply requirements. Through spiral development CCF/PGK could be fielded by Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 with the first increment and by FY 2010 with the second increment that would represent the full performance fuse.51 In 2005 USAFACFS explained that PGK, a low-cost, fuse-size module, intended to replace a standard fuse on current and future non-guided 105-mm. and 155-mm. projectiles, would significantly improve accuracy by using the Global Position System (GPS) to provide location during flight and to make trajectory corrections and would reduce the amount of ammunition required for missions. Basically, the PGK would transform a “dumb projectile” into a “smart projectile.” Late in the year, USAFACFS completed the capabilities development document which noted that the PGK would leverage U.S. Navy Guidance Integrated Fuse Technology Demonstration Program work, forwarded the document through the chain of command for staffing and approval which came on 22 January 2007, and announced that fielding was projected for 2009.52 As of late 2006, the Army planned to field PGK in three increments. Increment I would consist of a fuse-like kit that would contain GPS guidance, power supply, control surfaces, electronic circuitry, and the fuse function modes of point-detonating and proximity, would give the projectile a circular error probable of fifty meters or less, and would address the urgent needs of current operations in the Global War on Terrorism with fielding in FY 2010. Increment II would minimize GPS interference and jamming,

492004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 58; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH). 50Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10. 512004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 58-59. 522005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 53; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 52.

improve delivery accuracy to thirty meters, add delay and GPS time-fuse functions, address the entire 155-mm. family of platforms, munitions, and propellants, and be fielded in FY 2013. Increment III would add the 105-mm. family of platforms, munitions, and propellants and would be fielded in FY 2014.53 In the meantime, developmental efforts moved forward. On 20 December 2005 the Program Executive Officer, Ammunition approved PGK Increment I. Subsequently, the Army Requirements Oversight Council approved the PGK requirement and sent it to joint staffing with the Department of the Army approving the Capability Development Document in January 2007 which established the requirement for PGK. Charged with developing the kit, the Project Manager, Combat Ammunition Systems meanwhile solicited industry for possible Increment I designs that could provide a near-term solution and awarded two six-month technology contracts, one to BAE Systems and one to Alliant Techsystems, for PGK development with a shoot off at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, in March-April 2007. The winner would receive the contract for development of Increment I with an accuracy of fifty meters circular error probable. Alliant Techsystems won the shoot off by meeting the accuracy requirements of less than or equal to fifty meter circular error probable. Eighteen of their rounds impacted within thirty meters of the target. Based on this, the Program Executive Officer, Ammo approved and signed the Milestone B Acquisition Decision Memorandum on 4 May 2007 to permit PGK to enter the System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase of acquisition. Subsequently, Project Manager, Combat Ammunition Systems awarded Alliant Techsystems an eighteen-month System Development and Demonstration contract on 18 May 2007 to develop PGK Increment I for 155-mm. high-explosive and testing in 2009. However, technical difficulties pushed testing back into 2010 with fielding in 2011; and Increment II would adapt the fuse to 105-mm. systems and was scheduled for release in 2013.54 In August 2010 testing to move PGK into the next phase of development did not go well. As a result, the Program Manager put together a team to review the test and to determine the causes of the failures. A few months later, the team‟s findings indicated that design problems had led to the failures and options, running from terminating the program to letting it slip so that fielding would be later than initially planned. The Army decided to allow the program to slip twenty-five months to solve the problems and to field PGK in 2014 rather than 2011.55 Future Cannon Munitions Suite To upgrade existing 105/155-mm. munitions to meet the Army‟s transformation objectives and to modernize the U.S. Army‟s stockpile of cannon munitions, developmental efforts moved forward in 2005-2010 with the Future Cannon Munitions

532006 USAFACFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 57-58; Briefing, subj: TCM Cannon, 2 Nov 09, Doc III-38, 2009 USAFAS AH. 542006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 53; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 58; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Don Durant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10, Doc III-44, 2009 USAFAS AH; Information Paper, subj: IBCT Organic Cannon Precision Strike Capability, 12 Jan 2011, Doc III-18. 55Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant TCM BCT-Fires, 3 Mar 11.

Suite (formerly Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition Program) which would be a common carrier for 105-mm. and 155-mm. families of projectiles and would be capable of carrying future developmental projectiles, such as nonlethal, multi-spectral smoke which was under development and would be less toxic and incendiary, and infrared illumination. During those years, the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), renamed the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) late in 2005, developed a capabilities production development document for a 105-mm. IM High Explosive Preformed Fragmentation (Pff) round for staffing which the Department of the Army approved on 18 July 2007, and projected fielding in 2010. The U.S. Marine Corps approved the 155-mm. insensitive, high-explosive munition in July 2007. A top priority for the Commanding General of Fort Sill, the Pff round would be an insensitive munition, meaning that it would not detonate unexpectedly by a spark or rough handling, would be embedded with 9,300 3-mm. tungsten balls, and would be used against soft and light-skinned targets.56 Meanwhile on 31 October 2008, the Army approved the 105/155-mm. infrared illumination capabilities document. The desired infrared illumination round would provide the friendly ground forces with the capability of target detection and identification using night vision devices during periods of darkness. The area illuminated by infrared would be two and one half times greater than with visible light. One year later in 2009, the Army had to borrow these rounds from the Marine Corps to meet an operational needs statement in Afghanistan and Iraq and accelerated development to achieve full material release in 2010 to meet its own needs and to pay back those borrowed from the Marine Corps. This round gave friendly forces visibility with the use of NVDs to aid them in ground operations at night. Yet, it did not aid the enemy‟s use of the light that would be normally visible with regular illumination and facilitated operations for the observer and the maneuver unit without providing visible light that could illuminate friendly forces.57 Lightweight Towed 155-mm. Howitzer

562005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 54; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 54; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 58-59; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 75; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Don Durant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10; Briefing (Extract), subj: TCM Cannon, 2 Nov 09; Fires Center of Excellence CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 10, p. 7, Doc III-45, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43, 2009 USAFAS AH. 572005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 54; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 54; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 58-59; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 75; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Don Durant, TCM Cannon, 1 Mar 10; Briefing (Extract), subj: TCM Cannon, 2 Nov 09, Doc III-38, 2009 USAFAS AH; Fires Center of Excellence CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 10, p. 7, Doc III-45; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10, Doc III-43; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Jun 10, p. 9, Doc III-19.

When the United States shifted its national defense priorities from forward- deployed forces in Europe to force projection from the continental United States (CONUS) at the end of the Cold War early in the 1990s, lightweight weapons attracted the Army‟s interest more than before. Lightweight weapons were more strategically and tactically deployable than heavier weapons. In view of the emergence of a new world order and the need for strategically deployable equipment, the Army completed an Operational and Organizational Plan in January 1991 for a lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer to replace the aging M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer. Prompted by the urgent need to replace the M101 towed 105-mm. howitzer and the M198 towed 155-mm. howitzer, the Marine Corps also planned to field a lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer as a replacement. With the recognition that they required a new towed lightweight 155- mm. howitzer, the Army and the Marine Corps wrote a Joint Operational Requirements Document (JORD) in 1995 to develop a joint lightweight towed 155-mm. howitzer (LW155) and later formed the Army-Marine Corps Lightweight Howitzer Joint Program Office in 1998 to direct the developmental program. Although Joint Program Management Office at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, managed the overall program, the Marine Corps had the lead in the acquisition of the LW155, also called the XM777. Pressed to obtain the LW155 as soon as feasible, the Marine Corps opted to field one without digital enhancements and to add digital capabilities later, while the Army chose introducing a digitized LW155 which would take longer to field.58 After several years of developmental work, the contractor delivered the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) prototype XM777s in 2000 and 2001. Unveiled at Picatinny Arsenal in June 2000, the first EMD prototype XM777 held out great promise. The howitzer‟s reduced size and weight permitted towing by the same prime mover used to tow the M198 and allowed two howitzers to fit into a C-130 aircraft for strategic deploy ability. Additionally, the howitzer could be emplaced in three minutes or less, could fire faster than the M198, could be displaced in two minutes or less, and had a range of thirty kilometers. By the end of 2001, the Marines had a total of six XM777 EMD howitzers undergoing tests.59 Unfortunately, none of the six EMD howitzers met the “production representative” requirements for an operational test to be conducted in 2002 by the Army and Marine Corps.60 This caused the Marine Corps to restructure the program by adding an operational assessment test or a limited user‟s test in 2002. If the EMD howitzers passed the test, the contractor could start low-rate initial production with the goal of performing an operational test in 2004 to determine if full production would be permitted.61 In 2002 the XM777 underwent testing as scheduled. Following extreme cold

582003 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 82; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 105-08; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 64. 592002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 64-65. 602002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 612000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65.

weather testing in Alaska in January 2002 where the howitzer demonstrated its ability to function in extremely cold weather conditions, the Army and the Marine Corps conducted an operational assessment test from 13 May 2002 to 15 June 2002 at Twenty- Nine Palms, California; Camp Pendleton, California; and the Coronado Naval Amphibious Base, California; to determine if it met the specific requirements outlined in the Joint Operational Requirements Document of 1995. The test included live fire of approximately four thousand rounds, towing, and embarkation. Although the howitzer failed to meet the displacement time, reliability, and maximum rate of fire requirements and other minor equipment problems, it achieved its key operational requirements and later passed the accuracy requirement in a separate accuracy test in August 2002 at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Along with the successful air load test at the Miramar Marine Corps Air Station, California, in June 2002, the operational assessment and the accuracy test indicated that the XM777 program was making satisfactory progress.62 Based upon the accuracy test and especially the operational assessment test of May-June 2002, the Navy held a Milestone C decision meeting on 8 November 2002. Although the key performance parameters of displacement, maximum rate of fire, and reliability were not met and would be addressed in full-rate production exit criteria, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition approved moving the XM777 into the low-rate initial production of ninety- four howitzers to be delivered in 2004-2005 for testing. This decision granted the Marine Corps permission to move forward with development of the XM777.63 After this decision had been made, the contractor delivered its first U.S.-built, pilot-production EMD XM777 from its Hattiesburg, Mississippi, facility for testing.64 More than anything else, the Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD) package that was scheduled to be added to the Army‟s LW155 distinguished the Army‟s howitzer from the M198. As the Army explained, TAD would give the howitzer onboard advanced capabilities like those associated with self-propelled howitzers, such as the Paladin M109A6 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer and the futuristic Crusader 155-mm. self-propelled howitzer, and would eliminate the need for external survey, aiming circles, aiming posts, and collimators. Capabilities, such as self-locating and orienting, onboard firing data computation, easy-to-read electronic sights, digital communications, and improved direct fire sight, would also make the Army version of the LW155 superior to the M198. Additionally, TAD would be compatible with the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System (AFATDS). In light of this, the Army released a request for proposal to industry on 10 February 2000. After analyzing six proposals, the Army awarded a contract to General Dynamics Armament Systems of Burlington, Vermont, on 15 September 2000 to engineer, manufacture, and develop TAD for operational testing by 2003. To distinguish the Army‟s LW155 from the basic LW155 (type classified as the M777 in 2003) for the Marine Corps, the Joint Program Office designated it as the XM777E1 (type classified as the M777E1 in 2003) and made the Army the lead

622002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 632002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 65-66; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 83-84. 642002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 66.

agency.65 With the emergence of the M777E1, two LW155 programs existed -- the M777 with onboard conventional optical fire control capabilities and the M777E1 with digital capabilities.66 In 2001 a critical problem unexpectedly challenged the viability of the TAD program. Early in the year, the Army realized that it had underestimated program costs and lacked the funding to continue. This caused the Program Executive Officer (PEO) for Ground Combat and Support Systems, Major General Joseph L. Yakovac, to ask the Army for additional funding and to examine the possibility of terminating the TAD program and restarting it. The Army subsequently increased the existing funding of $52 million by almost $22 million. When a second funding problem was identified in the summer of 2001, all parties involved in the program concurred that it would be impossible to get more money so soon after the increase in the spring of 2001. As a result, General Yakovac gave the Program Manager and the Field Artillery School ninety days to find a solution. If they failed to provide a solution, he planned to terminate the program and to try to restart it correctly. In response to the tasking, the Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Major General Toney Stricklin, searched for ways to continue the work on TAD because of the need to digitize towed artillery and to abandon wire and aiming circles and even suggested taking a block approach at the minimum to develop the TAD but retired before a final decision was reached.67 After succeeding General Stricklin in August 2001, Major General Michael D. Maples evaluated three different courses of action for TAD. He could recommend terminating and restarting the program, funding a block approach, or pushing for a full development program. Each had strengths and weaknesses. Recognizing that terminating and restarting the program ran the risk of losing all funding and presented other problems, General Maples rejected it. Pushing for the full TAD also presented the possibility of losing the entire program because of funding issues. As a result, General Maples opted for a two-block approach. Based upon XVIII Airborne Corps Airborne/Air Assault package requirements, Block One TAD would have objective hardware and limited software to provide limited communication capabilities with the fire direction center and would be fielded in 2006. Block Two TAD would be the objective hardware and objective software and would be fielded sometime after Block One had been introduced. Late in the fall of 2001, General Yakovac accepted the block approach but cautioned the Field Artillery School and General Maples that funding constraints might force them to live with only Block One. Even so, work began on Block One hardware and software late in 2001 with a successful early user assessment held in July 2002.68 In July 2002 General Maples reiterated the significance of TAD on his cover memorandum to the revised JORD that was later approved by TRADOC in September

652000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 112; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 66-67. 662002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 67; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72. 672001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 88-89. 682001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 67-68.

2002.69 “The XM777E1 version of the LW155, with its embedded Towed Artillery Digitization (TAD) package will increase these forces‟ [Marine Corps field artillery units, and Army light, medium, and special purpose forces] strategic deployability, lethality, survivability, and tactical mobility,” he wrote the Commander of TRADOC on 30 July 2002 subsequent to the XM777E1 early users test of 16-18 July 2002 where a mockup TAD-equipped howitzer was well received by Army and Marine Corps personnel. The successful completion of the TAD detailed design review on 30 October 2002 allowed moving into building and testing actual TAD components and software.70 Following the Milestone C low-rate initial production decision in November 2002 and the TAD design review, the program shifted focus to the TAD-equipped M777E1. The Army and Marine Corps began aggressively pursuing efforts to combine future M777 and M777E1 testing with the objective of a single system operational test late in FY 2004.71 In 2003 development moved forward. In February 2003 the contractor delivered the first of two pre-production XM777s. Initially intended by the contractor to help transfer construction technology and expertise from the United Kingdom to the new factory in Hattiesburg, these systems proved vital in combining M777 and M777E1 testing during the year. Subsequently, the contractor rebuilt three XM777s with TADS. These systems were used for electro-environmental effects, wear, fatigue, blast overpressure, extreme cold weather, software, and other testing during the year. In July 2003 the government and contractor started integrating the Excalibur 155-mm. projectile with the M777 by firing seven ballistic simulator rounds successfully. Altogether, the four LW155s (one M777 and three M777E1s) passed their respective tests during the year. Based upon this, the Marine Corps and Army held an operational test readiness review in December 2003. At that time all parties agreed that the system was sufficiently mature to begin operational test and evaluation.72 In 2004 the Marine Corps and Army conducted a four-phase Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation (MOT&E) to determine the operational effectiveness and operational suitability of the M777 and M777E1 with both the TAD Digital Fire Control System and the onboard conventional Optical Fire Control. With the TAD Digital Fire Control System turned off, both services considered the M777E1 with onboard conventional Optical Fire Control to be representative of the base M777. From 14 January 2004 to 3 March 2004, they carried out the Arctic phase at Fort Greeley, Alaska, using a pilot production M777E1 with TAD Digital Fire Control System which was the most advanced of the EMD howitzers to determine system‟s ability to operate in cold weather. Five months later from 25 August 2004 to 24 October 2004, they held the temperate phase at Twenty Nine Palms using the low-rate initial production howitzer. Subsequently, the Marine Corps and Army carried out the amphibious phase at Camp Pendleton from 25 October 2004 to 31 October 2004 and the Port Operations phase at

692002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 68. 702002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 68. 712002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 68-69; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86. 722003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86.

Naval Station, San Diego, California, on 1 November 2004. With the exception of the Arctic phase, the other phases employed the low-rate initial production howitzer. Altogether, test crews fired over twelve thousand rounds. Along with other tests, this successful operational test and evaluation prompted both services to determine that the M777 and M777E1 were operational effective and operational suitable.73 In the meantime, the M777E1 and M777A1 (the type classified designation for the LW155) passed other significant milestones. Early in 2004, it successfully completed an airdrop test, a software test, a mobility test, and a logistics test. Late in 2004, Fort Sill received three M777A1s and began standing up a new equipment training team, scheduled to be activated early in 2005.74 The Marines and Army also made programmatic decisions in 2004-2005. During the latter months of 2004, the JORD went through Joint Requirements Oversight Council staffing beginning with the Force Application Board on 26 October 2004, the Functional Capabilities Board on 2 November on 2004, and the Joint Capabilities Board on 2 December 2004. Upon reviewing the program, the Joint Capabilities Board recommended a “paper” Joint Requirements Oversight Council that subsequently approved the Operational Requirements Document on 31 January 2005. Shortly afterward on 23 February 2005, the Program Manager briefed the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Littoral and Mine Warfare (Roger Smith), the Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat Systems (Kevin M. Fahey), the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development and Acquisition (John J. Young), and others on the M777 and M777A1 programs, the results of the Multi-Service Operational Test and Evaluation, and the program‟s readiness to enter into full-rate production. On 21 March 2005 the Program Executive Officer for Ground Combat Systems approved full- rate production of the TAD for the Army.75 Meanwhile, fielding the M777 with conventional optical fire control began in the Marine Corps. The MOT&E guns were refurbished and issued as training assets to the Marine Detachments at the Field Artillery School and the Ordnance School, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. On 19 January 2005 at Fort Sill, the Marine Corps conducted their first live fire of the M777 and received fifty-five of the planned ninety- four M777s. These howitzers were fielded to the 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines at Twenty- Nine Palms and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines at Camp Pendleton. On 19 December 2005 Colonel John M. Sullivan, Jr., the Commander of the 11th Marine Regiment, certified that the Marine Corps had achieved their initial operational capability with the M777. Meantime, six M777s were fielded to the Canadian Army in response to an urgent foreign military sales request which in turn shipped four to Afghanistan in January 2006 and fired their first mission with the howitzer on 17 February 2006. Based upon the successes with the M777s in 2006, the Canadian Army asked in 2007 to buy thirty-six more to augment their existing twelve M777s, while the Australian army asked for thirty

732004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 73-74. 742004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 74; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 64; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 64. 752005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 64.

two.76 Work on the software for the TAD and hardware moved forward in 2006. The Block One software for the M777A1 successfully completed its testing in April 2006. Simultaneously, work on improved Block IA software progressed. Block IA software would provide Joint Variable Message Format messaging between the howitzer and the fire direction center and would enable the howitzer to program the XM982 Precision Guided Projectile. A Block IA software dry-run readiness review was conducted on 28 March 2006, leading to a Block IA software dry run test from April through July 2006. A Block IA record test readiness review was conducted on 31 July 2006 with record testing from August through September 2006. During the Block IA tests, the contractor and the Army verified the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical System (AFATDS) 6.4.0.1 software functionality with the M777A2 and the XM982 Excalibur projectile. The final software test of the year, the Government Confidence Demonstration of September- October 2006 held at Fort Sill established the interoperability of AFATDS Block IA software, Excalibur, and the M777 using two fully configured M777A2s and five simulated M777A2 howitzers. On 6 November 2006 six XM982 Excalibur guided projectiles and twelve M795 conventional projectiles with M767/M767A1 inductively set fuses were successfully fired from an M777A2 at Yuma Proving Ground as part of an Excalibur end-to-end demonstration to prove out the linkages from AFATDS to the M777A2 (Excalibur version of the weapon system) to the EPIAFS fuse setter and finally to the XM982 and fuses. Based on this, Headquarters, U.S. Army Communications- Electronic Life Cycle Management Command certified Block IA software for ready use on 9 November 2006. As software testing progressed, the Army carried out a successful first article testing of the Digital Flight Control System (DFCS)-equipped M777A1 howitzer at the Yuma Proving Ground in September-October 2006. Together, the successful Block I software testing and the successful first article testing led to full material release of the M777A1 on 12 January 2007 by Major General William M. Lenaer, Commanding General, U.S. Army Tank Command Life Cycle Management Command.77 Concurrent with these testing activities, maintenance and operator training began with the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. During August 2006, a new equipment training team provided maintenance training that was followed by operator training in September 2006 and a live-fire exercise at Pohakuloa Training Area on the Big Island of Hawaii in October 2006. In November and December 2006 after their return to Schofield Barracks, the howitzers and prime movers were retrofitted from the M777 to the M777A1 configuration in December 2006. This retrofit was followed by M777A1 training in January and February 2007.78 Shortly afterwards, the Army initiated M777A2 testing and fielding. In June 2007 I Battery, 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment successfully fired the first Excalibur from

762005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 64-65; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 67. 772006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 65; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 66. 782006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 66; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 68.

the M777A2. This led to full material release for the M777A2-Excalibur system by the Army on 3 July 2007 and by the U.S. Marine Corps on 7 September 2007 and fielding to the 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in July 2007 and upgrading the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment in August 2007. By the end of the year, 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment was deployed to Afghanistan, and the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment, and four Marine M777A2 batteries, including 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines, were deployed to Iraq.79 Fielding the M777A2 continued into 2008 and 2009. During 2008, the 2nd Battalion, 8th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Wainwright, Alaska, the 1st Battalion, 108th Field Artillery Regiment of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard, the 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Lewis, Washington, and the 1st Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Bragg received their howitzers. Additionally, the 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Drum, New York, a 105-mm. howitzer battalion, received twelve M777A2s in a “deviation” fielding directly to an infantry brigade combat team (IBCT) fires battalion in response to an operational needs statement. On 22 November 2008 the unit completed new equipment training and section certifications and subsequently deployed with the M777A2s in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). During 2009, the 2nd Battalion, 12th Field Artillery Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment, both at Fort Lewis, the 1st Battalion, 103rd Field Artillery Regiment of the Rhode Island Army National Guard, and the Fires Squadron of the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment (SCR) at Stuttgart, Germany, took delivery of their howitzers. In the meantime, the Field Artillery School provided new equipment training to the 4th Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment at Vilseck, Germany, another 105-mm. howitzer battalion, and the 1st Battalion, Seventeenth Field Artillery Regiment, a Paladin battalion at Fort Sill, after they had received their howitzers in preparation for deployment. During these equippings, the Army released software version 2.3, continued to work on version 3.0, and considered selling the M777A2 to India, Australia, and Canada.80 Other crucial developments concurrently occurred. C Battery, 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment fired the first Excalibur precision munition in Operation Enduring Freedom from the M777A2 on 13 January 2008; and later the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment fired the first Excalibur from the howitzer in Operation Iraqi Freedom on 26 April 2008. In the meantime, B Battery, 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment and the Marine Corps conducted the first joint operational M777A2 air assault using the howitzer and the Marine Corps V-22 Osprey aircraft on 29 May 2008. Subsequently on 2 July 2008, B Battery, 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment conducted the first operational airdrop of the howitzer.81 During 2009, critical issues (improper tube temperature reading, damage from

792007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 68-69; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 87. 802008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 87-88; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to 2010 Annual History, 16 Mar 11, Doc III-20. 812008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 87; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11.

firing the M232A1 zone 5 propellant, and two lesser issues (breech latch assembly and prime mover towing pintel) surfaced. On 29 January 2009 an in-bore detonation occurred at Fort Bragg with an M777A2. The 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment had fired a total of 132 M707 projectiles over the course of approximately six hours when the unit was placed under a check fire for about one hour because of an aircraft. The propellant was removed for about one hour. When the check fire was lifted, the propellant was placed in the weapon and fired. A loud blast occurred; and a fire ball exited the M777 tube. A subsequent investigation determined that the in-bore detonation occurred because the tube was hotter than the howitzer‟s thermal warning device indicated, causing the projectile‟s explosive fill to melt during the hour-long check fire. A ground precautionary advisory was issued directing commander to observe misfiring and check fire procedures and to utilize warm tube procedures for all cold fire misfires and hot tube procedures for all warm tube misfires. As an interim measure to prevent future in-bore detonation, the program manager started evaluating off-the-shelf secondary measuring devices that would meet the operational requirements of the M777A2 and M198. In March 2009 the program manager began free issue of the selected pyrometer; and a new ground precautionary advisory was issued relaxing the increased safety misfire measures if the pyrometer was used. The low thermal warning devise reading was eventually tracked to loosening of the mounting hardware that held it to the cannon barrel. A re-engineering effort developed a replacement kit for units to install.82 Additionally, a development effort began to upgrade the thermal warning device to a more dependable system, taking advantage of electronic thermal measuring technologies. As this development effort evolved, it became known as the Electronic Thermal Warning Device.83 Other issues required attention. During 2008 and 2009, tests indicated that M232A1 propelling charge when fired in zone 5 configuration greatly increased the wear of spindle parts on the M777A2, causing the Army to issue an ammunition information notice that restricted M777 from firing M232A1 zone 5 charge until further notice and to initiate a re-engineering effort of the M777‟s prime feed mechanism. In September 2009 U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM) issued a precautionary message about latch assembly failures that could allow priming/arming of the howitzer with the breech open and directed all commanders to inspect the latch assembly for wear, damage, or corrosion. One month later, a team investigated reports of M777A2 howitzers detaching from their prime movers when being towed over rough roads. The report indicated that the problem was caused by an incorrect part in the prime mover‟s towing pintel, prompting the TACOM to direct all units with the M1083 prime movers to inspect all pintel hook latch assemblies and to replace them if necessary.84 Redeployment also presented problems. The U.S. Army Materiel Command required that all M777A2 howitzers would enter automatic reset induction upon returning from a combat theater. The near simultaneous redeployment of nineteen howitzers of the

822009 USAFAS AH, pp. 87-88. 83Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11. 842009 USAFAS AH, p. 88.

2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment, serving an extended tour due to the Operation Iraqi Freedom surge, and twelve howitzers from the 3rd Battalion, 321st Field Artillery in Afghanistan meant that the first reset of M777A2s caused scheduling problems with U.S. Army reset objectives. Shipping delays, unexpected wear and damage, parts shortages, and a Department of the Army directed change in priority caused the reset of these thirty-one howitzers to take almost nine months and forced the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery Regiment and its parent brigade to rearrange their training schedules.85 During the midst of planned fieldings and reset, emerging force structure issues also influenced fielding decisions with the M777A2. In August 2009 the Army decided to convert the 1st Brigade, 1st Armor Division, a Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), and the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) to Stryker Combat Brigade Teams (SBCT) in 2011 and 2012 respectively to shift its focus towards the middle of the spectrum of conflict. This action would require equipping the SBCTs with M777A2s and associated equipment and furnishing new equipment training. Additionally, the Army forced a ten percent manpower reduction across all branches and proponencies; and the Field Artillery community decided to take this hit in all field artillery organizations except for brigade combat teams. The biggest “hit” on structure from force design analyzes required the echelons above brigade cannon battalions to convert from a 3x6 to a 3x4 force structure. In 2010 the Army decided to phase the conversion over a period of five years.86 Just as this was unfolding, pressure for more M777A2s emerged. The Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) at Fort Bliss, Texas, requested three M777A2s to support experimentation, testing, and proof of principle for hybrid organizations and IBCT force structure testing. The Field Artillery School and Ordnance School also pressed for full fielding of their authorized number of M777A2s; and the surge in Operation Enduring Freedom demanded more M777A2s to fill IBCTs that were scheduled for deployment and to phase out the M198 155-mm. towed howitzers in Afghanistan. Decisions to address these and other emerging issues made 2010 to dynamic year for M777A2 production and fielding. As the Army worked to solve these demanding resource requirements, it was determined that the 1st Battalion, 123rd Field Artillery of the Illinois Army National Guard would receive on six of their programmed nineteen howitzers, mainly because of the fact that they were soon deploying to the Sinai in a non-traditional role. This short fielding provided a pool of thirteen new-production howitzers that were used through the year to address several unprogammed requirements. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment returned six howitzers of which four were given to the Field Artillery School to plus up on hand quantities to ten and two were given to the Ordnance School to plus up on hand quantity to four. The Army decided to

852009 USAFAS AH, p. 89. 862009 USAFAS AH, p. 89; Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Scott Veach, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-21; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11.

answer AEFT‟s need for howitzers; and three were given to it in March 2010.87 The Army‟s decision to leave a complete set of nineteen howitzers in Afghanistan complicated the M777A2 picture as the 3rd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment redeployment to homestation at Fort Lewis, Washington. Now, there were not any howitzers available for this unit to reset, so the Army‟s interim solution required the three Stryker Brigade Combat Team fires battalions at Fort Lewis to share two battalion‟s worth of equipment.88 As the Army was approving a new acquisition objective for the M777A2s going from 368 to 394 authorized howitzers, the 1st Battalion, 119th Field Artillery Regiment fielded nineteen howitzers in May 2010 at Camp Grayling, Michigan. Meanwhile, FORSCOM directed that all future IBCTs deploying to RC East in Afghanistan receive M777A2 training; and 4th Battalion, 320th Field Artillery Regiment of the 101st Airborne Division was the first. Short for howitzers to facilitate training, FORSCOM directed that the 18th Fires Brigade, Fort Bragg provide the equipment and personnel to facilitate training six of the unit‟s gun crews at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, with the Program Manager‟s new equipment training team providing the instruction. This effort was followed by the next IBCT to be impact by the FORSCOM directive, the 5th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment of the 10th Mountain Division. It took possession of nine new production howitzers as a new equipment training team (NETT) furnished the training. Both units subsequently deployed to Afghanistan and manned M777A2s.89 The 1st Battalion, 117th Field Artillery Regiment of the Alabama Army National Guard fielded nineteen howitzers in August 2010 at Camp Grayling, Florida. Immediately following this event, the NETT and a Fort Sill mobile training team supported efforts to train six crews from 1st Battalion, 77th Field Artillery Regiment, 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade (SIB), at Vilseck, Germany, on M777A2s, because this unit was the next brigade facing deployment to Afghanistan. Howitzers were made available for this training from howitzers left in storage when 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment (SCR) deployed without their howitzers. In November 2010 2nd Battalion, 150th Field Artillery Regiment of the Indiana Army National Guard was trained at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, receiving only thirteen howitzers, in anticipation of the first of the echelons above brigade to convert to the new 3x4 force design. December 2010 brought another decision by the Army to increase the Acquisition Objective. This time it went from 394 to 418, an increase of 24 guns, in order to provide long-time support to AETF and TPE requirements.90 Other actions influenced the M777A2 during 2010. In August 2010 a limited user assessment held at Fort Bragg demonstrated the Hydraulic Power Assist Kit (HyPAK). It used hydraulic power to lift the weapon off the ground to minimize crew fatigue because

872009 USAFAS AH, p. 89; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11. 88Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11. 89Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11. 90Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11.

the crew would no longer have to pump the wheels down manually, and to free up one soldier to do other tasks. This successful demonstration prompted the Army to continue development to field HyPAK, beginning in FY 2012. Also, the Di-pulse Laser Ignition System (LIS) live-fire demonstration at Fort Sill on 1 December 2010 illustrated the ability to replace the primer as a propellant ignition source, offering the potential of eliminating the difficulties that arose in 2009 with M232A1 zone 5 charge. As long as a restriction for use of this charge continued, the weapon would be unable to reach maximum range, losing about six thousand meters of range. The LIS was still in development at the close of the year, but all indicators were positive. As a result, the Army directed that engineering and development efforts continue, hoping to start fielding a LIS by FY 2013. After the three Stryker Brigades at Ft Lewis returned from Afghanistan and Iraq, a SBCT Warfighter Forum made force protection for cannon crews a high priority capability gap. As TRADOC pondered possible solutions, one immediate strategy under consideration a change in prime mover for the M777A2.91 Additionally, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) commissioned a Precision Effects Analysis (PEA) to determine a solution to mitigate the IBCT capability gap in indirect fire precision effects. The PEA determined that fielding the M777A2 system as an organic weapon system to IBCTs was a viable solution. A subsequent PEA, known as PEA II, examined what the force structure and proper mix of cannons for the IBCT should look like, such as making a composite battalion of M119A2s and M777A2s. As 2010 came to a close, this PEA II was on-going.92 M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer Largely through the efforts of personnel at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the 82nd Airborne Division obtained funding in 1998 for the Light Artillery System Improvement Program (LASIP) to provide some needed changes to the M119 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer to make it more maintainable and more operationally suitable. The Army initiated the LASIP program in 1998 with Block I improvements that included a cold weather recuperator, trail lifting handles, off-the-shelf brakes, and other enhancements. First applied in 2002, Block II upgrades consisted of a redesigned elevation gearbox, a new rammer/extractor tool, an improved buffer, an improved buffer/recuperator connection, a roll bar, and a new fire control system that used LEDs as a light source and not radioactive tritium. Because of the aggregate differences produced by LASIP Block I and II modifications from the original M119A1 that was typed classified in 1985 and was towed by a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), the Army designated modifications as the M119A2 with type classification coming on 15 February

91Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11. 92Interview with atch, Dastrup with Veach, 25 Feb 11; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), subj: M777A2 Authorized Acquisition Objective Increase, 25 May 10, Doc III-22; Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), subj: M777A2 Army Acquisition Objective Increase, 22 Dec 10, Doc III-23; Email, subj: PEA, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-24; Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to Annual History, 16 Mar 11.

2005.93 With the creation of the Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCT) with their organic fires battalion beginning in 2002, the Army required more towed 105-mm. howitzers than in the inventory. This led to a decision by a general officer steering committee (GOSC) in June 2004 to rebuild and refit old M102 towed 105-mm. howitzers. However, in August 2004, the GOSC, pressured by the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), re- evaluated the situation and ordered production of new M119A2 howitzers to fill the shortages. Shortly after, the Army National Guard decided to replace their M102 howitzers with the M119A2 to have a pure M119A2 fleet.94 Two secondary issues soon emerged. First, the Army had insufficient tow kits for the M1097 HMMWV, the howitzer‟s prime mover. Together, a search for missing tow kits that recovered some limited production of tow kits late in 2005 allowed fielding new units to continue. Ultimately, testing proved the capability of the standard 4,200-pound HMMWV bumper to tow the M119A2 safely; and in November 2006 the tow kit was declared no longer required. Second, the Army‟s decision to up-armor all HMMWVs halved their payload capacity, causing the Army to begin looking for a different prime mover.95 Operations in Afghanistan in the meantime magnified known limitations with the M119. Extensive efforts were undertaken by the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS), formerly the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS), the Program Manager, and Rock Island Arsenal to address base plates being damaged by continuous high-charge, high-angle firing. This same condition brought to light problems with the M187A1 fire control mount. To ease the stress on the howitzers caused by firing charge 8 M913 Extended Range High-explosive Rocket-assist (HERA) projectile at high angles, the Army rushed the new M927 HERA to the theater of operations.96 Meanwhile, in July 2007 the Army initiated first article testing and production qualification testing at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, and the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, for the M119A2. Concurrently, rebuilt howitzers were fielded to the 1-6th Field Artillery Regiment of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, and the 10th Infantry Division (Mountain), Fort Drum, New York. Delays caused by problems with the howitzer recuperator that arose during testing moved

932000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 115-16; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 65. 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 66. 942005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 66; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 66-67; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 69. 952006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 67. 962006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 67; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 90-91.

fielding back from June 2007 to October 2007.97 Based upon successful testing, the Army granted new production full materiel release for the M119A2 on 10 June 2008, while new equipment training teams converted five battalions to the M119A2 in 2008. Because of modularity conversions and aging M102 howitzer fleets, the Army National Guard agreed to accept initial half-battalion fieldings for 2008 and 2009, allowing Army National Guard battalions to field their new equipment sooner. Over a period of eight months, the teams trained the 1-141st Field Artillery Regiment of the Louisiana Army National Guard, the 2-122th Field Artillery Regiment of the Illinois Army National Guard, the 1-133rd Field Artillery Regiment of the Texas Army National Guard, the 1-107th Field Artillery Regiment of the Pennsylvania Army National Guard, and the 1-118th Field Artillery Regiment of the Georgia Army National Guard using new production weapons.98 Fielding M119A2 howitzers continued into 2009 and 2010. During 2009, the Army fielded 135 out of 150 howitzers produced to two active and five reserve component field artillery units. In the active force the 1-76th Field Artillery Regiment and the 4-1st Field Artillery Regiment received their howitzers, while the 1-111th Field Artillery Regiment of the Virginia Army National Guard, the 2-116th Field Artillery Regiment of the Florida Army National Guard, the 1-101st Field Artillery Regiment of the Massachusetts Army National Guard, the 1-101st Field Artillery Regiment, and the 1- 258th Field Artillery Regiment of the New York Army National Guard received their M119A2s. The following year, the 1-143rd of the California Army National Guard, the 1-160th Field Artillery Regiment of the Oklahoma Army National Guard, the 1-206th Field Artillery Regiment of the Arkansas Army National Guard, and the 3-133rd Field Artillery Regiment of the Texas Army National Guard received their M119A2s. By the end of 2010, all twenty active component IBCTs and eighteen of the twenty Army National Guard IBCTs had been fully fielded M119A2s with two other Army National Guard IBCTs to be fielded in 2011. The last two National Guard units scheduled for fielding were the 1-163rd Field Artillery Regiment of the Indiana Army National Guard and the 3-122nd Field Artillery Regiment of the New Jersey Army National Guard. This would come in 2011.99 Force structure changes altered the number of howitzers to be fielded. On 6 April 2009 the Secretary of Defense Bill Gates directed the Army to stop the growth of active component brigade combat teams at forty five rather than the forty eight initially planned. Along with fewer howitzers required in preposition stocks, this action reduced the buy of M119A2s from 893 Army Acquisition Objective to 823 Army Program Objective. Subsequently, the Secretary of the Army Peter Geren halted the Army‟s plan to build the

972009 USAFAS AH, pp. 90-91. 982008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 89-90; Email with atch, subj: TCM Cannon Input, 19 Apr 10. 992009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 91; Interview with atch, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-25; SIGACTS, LW155 and M119, 19 Dec 09, Doc III-26; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 11 Dec 10, Doc III-27.

last three active component brigade combat teams at Fort Bliss, Texas; Fort Carson, Colorado; and Fort Stewart, Georgia; while maintaining an authorized end strength in the Army of 547,000. Such action would ensure better-manned units, end the routine use of stop loss for deployment manning, and reduce the risk of hollowing the force.100 Meanwhile in 2006, another critical issue arose with the M119A2. With the fielding of the digitized M777A1 and the phasing out of the M102 Towed 105-mm. Howitzer, the M109A5 Self-propelled 155-mm. Howitzer, and the M198 Towed 155- mm. Howitzer, the M119A2 would be the only howitzer in the Army‟s inventory without digital capabilities; and this would exacerbate the capability gap between the Infantry Brigade Combat Team and Heavy Stryker Brigade Combat Teams because the latter would have digitized howitzers. The lack of digital capabilities with the M119A2 would also prevent the howitzer from using near-precision munitions and the Precision Guidance Kit that would convert dumb munitions into near-precision munitions. The lack of precision in turn would lead to less accuracy and make dispersed operations more difficult to perform. In view of this, the Field Artillery School, TRADOC, and the Army G8 (Programming and Materiel Integration) took steps to develop the requirements and acquire the funds for digitizing the M119A2 along the lines of the M777. Based upon the Material Change Package (MCP) that had been signed on 15 June 2007, the Field Artillery School issued a request for information to digitize the M119A2. Input was used to refine the MCP requirements and subsequently to develop a digitization strategy.101 Digitizing the M119A2 moved forward over the next two years. Major General Peter M. Vangjel, the Commanding General of the USAFCOEFS, Kevin M. Fahey, the Program Executive Officer, Ground Combat Systems, and the Army G8 met on 24 January 2008 with the Program Manager for LW155. They agreed on the requirements, directed work to begin on digitizing the M119A2 through a series of block upgrades, and recommended maximizing the use of digitization components common to the IBCT where they would be fielded. At a subsequent meeting on 2 October 2008, they defined functionality for the blocks -- Block One (aiming, pointing, and basic digital communications to the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System), Block Two (ammunition management and deployment commands), and Block Three (on-board ballistic computation and integrated muzzle velocity management), noted that the lack of off-the-shelf hardware had caused the initial operational capability date to slip from FY 2011 to FY 2012, but pointed out that the delay would enable pulling forward key capabilities that were originally scheduled for delivery in FY 2013.102 Meanwhile, a preliminary design review was conducted on 10 June 2008 and another one in December 2008, while the 4th Battalion, 25th Field Artillery Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 319th Field Artillery Regiment participated in Early User

100Execution Order (FOUO), undated, material used is unclassified, Doc III-71; Email, subj: M119A2 Howitzer AAO Reduction, 9 Nov 09, Doc III-72. 1012006 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 67-68; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 70; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 90. 1022008 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 90-91; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 92-93; SIGACTS LW 155 and M119, 20 Nov 10, Doc III-28.

Assessments of the M119A2 digitization design concept in September 2008 and November 2008 respectively. The exchange between soldiers and engineers brought increased attention to digitizing the weapon and understanding of operational considerations to the engineers. Subsequently, on 30 June 2009, the program manager for the M119A2 released a request for proposal to industry for an inertial navigation device for the M119A2. Bid sample testing began in August 2009 and ended with an inertial navigation unit contract awarded to Honeywell Inc., Clearwater, Florida, in March 2010. Qualification testing began in December 2010; and the inertial navigation unit completing qualification testing that month. Currently, M119 digitization remained on track for two hundred kits to be fielded in FY 2013 and 623 kits starting in FY 2014.103 Paladin Integrated Management Program In the fall of 2007, the U.S. Army and BAE Systems signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a public-private partnership to develop and sustain the Army‟s M109 Family of Vehicles (FOV) -- the M109A6 Self-Propelled 155-mm. Howitzer (Paladin), the M992A2 Field Artillery Ammunition Resupply Vehicle (FAASV), and the Paladin Operations Center Vehicle (POCV) -- through the Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program and later in May 2008 signed a contract to design and develop the PIM M109 system of vehicles. The Army separately approved the capabilities production document for the POCV, started the process of incorporating it into the M109 FOV capabilities production document to rebaseline the FOV with all three platforms, and initiated testing in 2008.104 The Army intended PIM program to improve readiness, avoid component obsolescence, and increase sustainability of the platforms beyond 2031. Operationally, PIM program upgrades would make the howitzer faster, more maneuverable, more easily sustainable, and more lethal and would reduce the logistics footprint and operation and support costs. To achieve these objectives, PIM would leverage commonality with Future Combat System‟s Non-Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C) and the heavy brigade combat team‟s (HBCT) Bradley fighting vehicle. For example the PIM would use the Bradley‟s engine and transmission and new track/suspension and incorporate select technologies from the NLOS Cannon including but not limited to the automated projectile rammer and modern electric-gun drive systems to replace the current hydraulic operations (elevation and azimuth drives) that were designed in the early 1960s. Once delivered to the field around 2012, the PIM M109 FOV would give the HBCT upgraded capabilities including more maneuverability, higher rate of speed, increased crew survivability, and delivery of accurate and timely fires.105

1032008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 90-91; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 92-93; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 19 Dec 09; SIGACTS LW155 and M119, 20 Nov 10; Email with atch, subj: M119 Input to 2010 Annual History, 7 Mar 11, Doc III-29. 1042007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 70-71; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 91. 1052007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 70-71; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 91-92; 2009

The M109 FOV successfully completed the Preliminary and Critical Design Reviews, among other milestone, in 2008. Upon successful completion of these reviews, the M109 was postured to begin prototype testing in the fourth quarter of FY 2009. Successful completion of prototype testing would positively impact the Milestone C decision scheduled for the third quarter of FY 2010. Upon completion of the Milestone C decision, the program would move forward into Low-Rate Initial Production to produce limited quantities of the vehicles.106 In 2009 key developments took place. In January 2009 the program manager approach the U.S. Army Armament Research and Development and Engineering Center about approving the capabilities documents, but the center did not approve it. However, the cancellation of the NLOS Cannon in April 2009 by the Secretary of Defense caused PIM to become the Army‟s number one modernization effort and led to approval of the capabilities production document on 9 August 2009 that scheduled a Milestone C decision in 2011. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) stripped the POCV from PIM and tied it to a command and control vehicle to replace the M113, the M577, and M1068 vehicles. Meanwhile in August 2009, the Army awarded BAE the contract to produce seven PIM vehicles -- five M109 and two M992 Field Artillery Ammunition Support Vehicles. Five months later on 20 January 2010, the company unveiled its first M109 PIM prototype.107 Later in 2010, Lieutenant General Michael M. Vane, the Director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, TRADOC, made a significant change the PIM program. He increased survivability and force protection requirements, but the changes were not added to the capabilities production document. This created confusion with the program since some government agencies and some contractors did not have the changes and increased the cost of PIM.108 PIM costs generated concern. In March 2010 the Vice Chief of the Staff and the Secretary of the Army received a PIM costs briefing that were based upon contractor estimates so that they could determine how many PIMs could be purchased. The briefing also indicated an aggressive acquisition schedule, causing the Vice Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army to request acquisition changes, because they believed that the schedule was too aggressive. Subsequently, the Army Acquisition Executive adopted the low-risk schedule rather than the moderate-risk schedule or the low- to moderate-risk schedule alternatives. The low-risk schedule slowed down the program and included all test events. For example, it slipped Milestone C where the Army had to decide about going into low-rate initial production or not from 2011 to 2013 and established full-rate production in 2017.109 Using the contractor estimates that had been briefed in March, the Army G-3 ______U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 93-94. 1062008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 92; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 94. 1072009 USAFAS AH, pp. 94-95; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with MAJ Jeffrey R. White, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11, Doc III-30. 108Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11. 109Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11.

subsequently determined in April 2010 how many PIM sets (howitzers and ammunition and resupply vehicles) that the Army could purchase. At that time the G-3 opted to buy 440 sets that was a reduction from the previous number of 718. This would modernize about one half of the M109 fleet in the active and reserve components. Shortly after in May 2010, the Army realized that the cost of the 440 sets was based upon contractor estimates and not the actual cost of the PIM set. Purchasing the PIM would cost considerably more, forcing the Army and the Field Artillery to rejustify PIM program.110 In October 2010 rising costs influenced the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army to question if the program was justifiable and why the costs had changed so frequently during the year. To answer the questions the Army held a cost briefing on 17 November 2010 because the costs had risen from $3.6 million per set to $5.4 million to $9.4 million. The last cost turned PIM into an acquisition category one; and this meant that the Office of the Secretary of Defense would now make the decision about PIM‟s future and not the Army. Because the $9.4 million was considered too expensive, the Office of the Secretary of Defense chose to replace all M109 Paladins with PIM. This would reduce the cost to $7.2 million per set. The Office of the Secretary of Defense accepted this figure as being reasonable.111 Bradley Fire Support Vehicle In 2010 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) continued fielding the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle (BFIST) that was the successor to the M981 Fire Support Vehicle (FISTV). Late in the 1970s, a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) working group, Close Support Study Group (CSSG) II, met to optimize observed fire support for the maneuver forces. Besides reaffirming the necessity of the Fire Support Team (FIST) that had been created in the mid-1970s to integrate fire support with the maneuver arms at the company level, the group recommended fielding a mobile fire support vehicle for reliable, secure communications.112 After funding became available early in the 1990s and after the maneuver arms received their Bradley fighting vehicles, equipping the Field Artillery with the BFIST became a reality. As of 1995-1996, combat and materiel developers envisioned two models of BFIST (the M7 and M7A1) with each being a type-classified system. The M7 would integrate a fire support mission package onto a modified Bradley A2 ODS chassis. The M7A1 would be more advanced and use a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis with the fire support mission package.113 After several years of work on BFIST, the project manager modified the acquisition strategy for the M7A1 in 1999 by initiating an engineering change proposal to the M7 BFIST to develop it into the M3A3 BFIST and halted work on the M7A1. This

110Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11. 111Interview with atch, Dastrup with White, 25 Feb 11; Information Paper, subj: How the PIM Supports Army Concepts, 19 Nov 10, Doc III-31. 1122000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 138-39. 1132000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 140-43; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94.

meant that there would not be a M7A1 as initially planned. The M3A3 BFIST (A3 BFIST) would be based on a digitized Bradley M3A3 chassis, would incorporate the M7 fire support mission package, and would be fielded beginning in 2004 to counterattack units, such as the digitized 4th Infantry Division. Thus, the M7 BFIST and the A3 BFIST existed as official Army programs to adapt the Bradley fighting vehicle to fire support missions as of 2003-2004.114 In FY 2006 the Program Manager acquired funds to retrofit A3 BFISTs with the Fire Support Sensor System (FS3) as the main target location system for underarmor targeting and designation. The FS3 Sensor would provide the A3 BFIST with the most accurate and greatest range sensor available. The FS3 would allow the fire support team to detect, identify, and designate targets for precision munitions at greater ranges while remaining buttoned up (protected by the vehicle‟s armor) and would give the A3 BFIST the same capability as the Stryker fire support platform and the M1200 Armored Knight. The critical design was approved on 18 June 2008; and an integrated development test with soldiers was completed in February 2010 with the first unit equipped scheduled for June 2011.115 Meanwhile, the Army awarded BAE the contract to upgrade one brigade combat team of M7 BFIST under a program called the M7 SA BFIST. This program would bring the M7 capabilities close to those of the A3. Testing on the M7 SA BFIST began in 2010; and the first unit equipped was the 81st Heavy Brigade Combat Team of the Washington Army National Guard. This came in November 2010.116 Knight The Combat Observation Lasing Team (COLT) employed the M981 fire support vehicle. Besides lacking mobility and stealth, the M981 had been designed for armored and mechanized forces and presented a unique signature in forces that used High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) as their scout vehicles. In response to this discrepancy, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) approved a change to the Fire Support Vehicle Operational Requirements Document of April 1997, written by the Field Artillery School, to leverage fire support vehicle technology for heavy and light forces. In the revised Operational Requirements Document the Field Artillery School retained the BFIST for the heavy forces and recommended developing a vehicle with BFIST mission capabilities for the COLT by

1142001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 106-07; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 107; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 94-95. 1152004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 126-27; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 131; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 26, Doc III-32; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-33; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34. 1162009 USAFAS AH, pp. 131-32; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Brown, 17 Feb 11; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Jun 10, p. 10; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 10.

integrating the fire support mission equipment package onto a HMMWV chassis, known as the Striker. This would provide the COLT with unprecedented mobility, flexibility, and stealth. Also, the Striker would be less noticeable because it would present a common signature with other HMMWV vehicles, would save Bradley assets for fire support teams, and would lower operating costs for the COLT. Based upon its performance in the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment of March 1997, the Striker vehicle, as well as the Striker concept that furnished six Striker vehicles to each heavy maneuver brigade, was adopted by the U.S. Army and was approved as a Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP) by the Chief of Staff of the Army on 14 May 1997 for rapid development.117 In 1999-2002 several critical events with Striker occurred. Early in 1999, the Army type-classified the system as the M707 Striker and conducted a successful air-drop test to demonstrate its ability to be dropped from an aircraft. Also, the contractor built three prototypes that went through successful developmental and operational testing in 2000 by the 4th Infantry Division that would be the first unit equipped. The following year, the Army fielded Striker to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Field Artillery School, and Army National Guard units in South Carolina, Oklahoma, and Arkansas. In addition, the Army fielded the Striker to the 82nd Airborne Division in 2002 and to active component units and Army National Guard units in 2003-2004. To avoid confusion with the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, meanwhile, the Army renamed the Striker the Knight in 2002.118 Key actions occurred in 2005 and 2006. In December 2005 the Program Manager Office determined that the current M1025 version of the HMMWV and the planned replacement the M1114 would no longer be able to support the Knight program. Due to armor increases, either vehicle with the Mission Equipment Package (MEP) would no longer be safe to operate because increased vehicle weight would create excessive operating restrictions. In January 2006 Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) at Fort Sill submitted a letter to the Program Manager agreeing with him about the weight and urged finding a suitable replacement. Subsequently, on 17 April 2006 Headquarters Department of the Army G3/5/7 validated Third Army‟s operational needs statement to provide the 10th Mountain Division with five Knight systems on a more survivable platform than the existing one. These two concerns prompted the Product Manager Fire Support Systems to initiate an effort to change the platform of the M707 Knight systems from the M1114 HMMWV based system to a M1117 Armored Security Vehicle based system.119 Shortly afterwards, the Army purchased eight M1117 Armored Security Vehicles and designated the M1117 Armored Security Vehicle based system as the M1200

1172000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 144. 1182000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 145; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 88; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 108; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96. 1192005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 128.

Armored Knight. Production began late in 2007 with a Limited User Test completed in September 2007. Subsequently, the 10th Mountain Division received five Armored Knights in October 2007. The 101st Division received the first four M1200 vehicles in November 2007 with regular fielding beginning in February 2008 and continuing into 2013.120 Meanwhile in December 2006, work began on a new Capability Development Document (CDD) for the Knight. The new CDD established a requirement to provide all COLTs and selected fire support teams in the Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) with the capability to target while on the move and under armor to create the M1200 Knight Targeting Under Armor model that would be equipped with the latest fire support mission equipment mounted on the M1117 Armored Security Vehicle and that would share commonality with all other fire support platforms. The vehicle completed all requirements, received full material release, and was scheduled for operational test/developmental test with soldiers in Fiscal Year 2011.121 Joint Effects Targeting System In June 2004 the Army/Marine Corps Board (AMCB) convened to discuss a common laser-targeting device and directed the services to develop a common system requirement. In response, Army, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Southern Command representatives began developing the Joint Effects Targeting System (JETS). JETS would consist of a Target Location Designation System (TLDS) and a Target Effects Coordination System (TECS). Combined, they would enable the dismounted observer (forward observer, joint target attack controller, special operations forces, and others) to acquire and engage targets and control all available effects providers (field artillery, close air support, attack aviation, and naval gunfire). TECS would provide Blue Force Situational Awareness (BFSA) and communications interface with effects providers through all existing and planned wave forms. As of February 2005, the JETS initial capabilities document (ICD) had been completed and sent out for worldwide staffing. On 19 September 2005 the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approved the ICD.122 In October 2006 the Department of Defense designated the Army as the lead component for JETS. The Army made Program Executive Office Soldier the material developer to assist the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command in the development of the capabilities documents and supporting analysis documentation. Work on the capabilities development document began with an analysis of alternatives being conducted in 2007-2008. The Capabilities Development Document for TLDS was released for worldwide staffing in January 2009, while the Army worked to produce the

1202008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 128. 1212009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 131-32; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 26, Doc III-32; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-35. 1222004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 97.

TECS capability development document.123 In July 2010 a meeting held at the Pentagon with milestone decision authority led to a successful milestone a decision for the JETS TLDS. This moved JETS from the material solution analysis phase into the technology development phase with the program examining technology demonstrator prototypes and refining the draft Capabilities Development Document for final staffing.124 Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder Early in the 1990s, fire supporters employed the Ground/Vehicular Laser Locator Designator (GVLLD) to lase targets for location and precision-guided munitions. The system weighed 107 pounds, reduced the mobility of light fire support teams, did not meet their needs, and was not man-portable. In response to this situation and the lack of a man-portable system to designate targets, the U.S. Army Field Artillery School wrote an Operational Requirements Document for the Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder (LLDR). Approved by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in February 1994, the LLDR would replace the GVLLD. Although the LLDR remained unfunded for several years, the School still pursued acquiring it. Combining technological advances in position/navigation (Precision Lightweight Global Positioning System), thermal sights, and laser development, the LLDR would be a lightweight, compact, man-portable system designed for dismounted or mounted operations. Besides determining range, azimuth, and vertical angle, the LLDR would permit light forces to perform fire support functions quickly and accurately on a fast- paced, less dense, and more lethal battlefield and would offer the best alternative to the GVLLD. Because of its modular design, it could be readily tailored to the mission. In its target location configuration the LLDR weighed about twenty pounds and had the ability of locating targets accurately out to ten kilometers and seeing the battlefield with a near, all-weather capability at shorter ranges. An integrated thermal night-sight would provide continuous day/night operations and the ability to see through obscurants, such as fog and smoke. If needed, the LLDR could be configured with a separate laser designator module to designate moving and stationary targets for precision munitions. This configuration would increase the system‟s weight to thirty-five pounds. Equally important, the LLDR could be used in training environments because of its eye-safe rangefinder.125 Although LLDR passed the initial operational test and evaluation in 2001, testing revealed some deficiencies. As a result, the Army developed a corrective action plan; and LLDR program proceeded to Milestone III where the Army decided to move into it

1232008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 130; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Oct 10, p. 26; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III-99, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH). 124Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-35. 1252000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 145-46.

low-rate initial production (LRIP). The 82nd Airborne Division was scheduled to receive the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) and LRIP production models, but the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon caused the Army to shift fielding priorities. Instead, the Special Operations Command was fielded with the EMD models, while the 82nd Airborne Division and the Interim Brigade Combat Team, later renamed the Stryker Brigade Combat Team, were scheduled to share sixty-six LRIP models. In 2002 the Army fielded fifteen test LLDRs to the 82nd Airborne Division in Afghanistan, started developing plans to reduce the system‟s weight even more, and anticipated a full-rate production decision in 2003 and fielding in 2004.126 In December 2003 the Army meanwhile made the full-rate production decision with contract negotiations continuing into 2004 and shifted its fielding priorities at the same time. Priority of the LRIP systems shifted from the 82nd Airborne Division to the 25th Infantry Division. Just as the 25th Infantry Division was deploying to Iraq in January 2004, it received twenty-one LLDRs. Subsequently in September 2004, the 3rd Infantry Division‟s combat observation lasing teams (COLTs) received twenty LLDRs in conjunction with M707 Knight fieldings. Later in October, the Army fielded two LLDRs to the Field Artillery School to incorporate the latest technology into enlisted and officer instruction and decided to field the LLDR to units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and to the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment), making it the first Stryker Brigade Combat Team to receive the system.127 In November 2005 the Army Requirements and Review Board approved accelerating LLDR production and included increases in funding in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008-2113 Program Objective Memorandum. The production rates would go from three LLDRs per month, doubling every six months until a full rate production of forty per month would be achieved. This funding stream would complete LLDR fielding by FY 2013 to the entire active and reserve components.128 In October 2006 the Program Manager for LLDR initiated a two-year performance improvement and weight reduction effort and designated the effort as the LLDR2. Product improvements included an improved day-and-night imaging performance, solid-state laser designator module that would provide higher reliability and a five-pound overall weight reduction to the system. The improvements would be available in FY 2010 without an increase in unit cost.129 On 21 September 2010 the Army G-3 acknowledged the need for better accuracy to support current and future precision-guided munitions. As a result, it began

1262001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 109; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 110. 1272004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99. 1282005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94. 1292008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS), ACH, 131; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensor History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III-99, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH).

development on the LLDR-2H and initiated testing in 2010. The new system would incorporate the High Accuracy Azimuth Device that would not be subject to the magnet interference issues that had plagued existing target locator systems. The device had three cameras, one day and two nights, that would map the location of the sun and stars and would compare them to its GPS location to determine very accurate direction and angular deviation.130 Improved Position and Azimuth Determining System The Army introduced the self-contained Position and Azimuth Determining System (PADS) early in the 1980s to determine position, azimuth, and elevation rapidly and accurately in either ground or airborne survey operations. The Army wrote the original requirements documents in February 1974 and equipped the first unit with PADS in 1981.131 Because of age and escalating maintenance costs with PADS, the Army acted. In June 1995 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Field Artillery School approved a continuing need for non-global positioning inertial survey systems. Seven years later on 12 August 2002, Army approved an operational requirements document (ORD) for a replacement system to PADS, called the Improved Positioning and Azimuth Determining System (IPADS). The Army selected L3 Communications of New York in August 2003 to produce the system. Developmental testing began in 2003 at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, and Fort Sill; and a milestone decision was made in June 2004 to field the system. Fielding began in August 2005 under a conditional material release until 2007 and was completed in mid-2009.132 In 2006 and early 2007 Fort Sill began working to incorporate a SAASM Global Positioning System (GPS) Card into IPADS which would almost eliminate zero velocity updates (ZUPs) and extend its area of coverage. The GPS-augmented IPADS would be called IPADS-G.133 In February 2008 an IPADS-G prototype was successfully tested over a distance of 230 kilometers for sixty minutes without stopping for a ZUP. The contractor began developmental work on IPADS-G in 2010.134

130Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34; Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11, Doc III-35. 1312002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 85. 1322002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 85-86; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 106; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 96-97. 1332003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 106; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 96-97. 1342008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 124-25; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School Annual History, pp. 129-30; Interview with atch, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-34.

Profiler In 1995 the U.S. Army Field Artillery School started work on replacing the existing Meteorological Measuring Set (MMS) with the MMS-Profiler. The MMS produced meteorological (MET) messages by obtaining data from radiosonde instrumentation carried aloft by balloons and sent back to a ground-based receiver. Given the current state of operational Numerical Weather Prediction systems, the single local balloon-borne radiosonde technology used by MMS was antiquated and limited in capability. The MMS MET messages provided only limited range and carried high operational and support costs. To address these shortcomings, an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the Target Area Meteorological Measuring System (TAMMS) was generated and signed on 15 October 1996 by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). This ORD, later renamed MMS-Profiler, required a system to provide a modernized, real-time meteorological capability over an extended battle space out to five hundred kilometers. The system would provide vital target area meteorological information from a mesoscale model and associated software that acquired information from weather satellites and other MET sensors for use in the employment of smart weapons to ensure proper munitions selection and optimal aiming. The Profiler would also furnish field artillery forces with current or expected weather conditions along the projectile trajectory and within the target area. In 2000 the Army issued a contract for Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) of the Profiler system to Environmental Technologies Group (now Smith Industries) of Baltimore, Maryland. The initial program schedule called for operational testing in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 and low-rate initial production (LRIP) of nine systems to begin in the third quarter of FY 2003. Production of eighty-three systems was originally scheduled to begin in the first quarter of FY 2005, and the first unit equipment would be in the second quarter of FY 2005.135 Progress with the program moved forward but with modifications. The Army changed the acquisition strategy to incorporate a system functional demonstration during the second quarter of FY 2003. In 2004 the program received a Milestone C decision after the completion of a successful developmental test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, and went through an operational test at Fort Sill. Following these tests, LRIP began. Subsequently, the Army granted an urgent material release and fielded Profiler to the 3rd Infantry Division in December 2004. The Profiler program began full- rate production (FRP) in April 2006 after the Program Executive Officer for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare granted approval. In 2007 Program Manager (PM) Target Identification and Meteorological Systems (TIMS) accepted an initial five FRP Profiler systems. The first of these systems was fielded in March 2007 under an urgent material release until the full material release could be attained. In December of 2007 the Army approved full material release and fielded the MMS-Profiler, also known as MMS-

1352005 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 86-87; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 92.

Profiler I, from 2008 through 2010.136 As the Army fielded the FRP Profilers (Block I) to initial brigade combat teams and fires brigades, it retrofitted all LRIP systems to the FRP configuration. Due to end of life on the existing shelter that Profiler was hosted on and the need to modernize, a redesign effort hosted the Profiler on the Command Post Platform (CPP) mounted on a High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and replaced the Tactical- Very Small Aperture Terminal (T-VSAT) satellite subsystem with the more robust Global Broadcast System (GBS).137 At the end of 2007, Fort Sill began establishing requirements for the Block II Profiler system (AN/TMQ-42B). Its primary effort would reduce the system‟s footprint, leverage technology and software advancements to achieve improved accuracy to eliminate the balloon and radiosonde subsystem. In August 2008 the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Major General Peter M. Vangjel, approved eliminating the use of the balloon and radiosonde based on numerous tests. With the elimination of the balloon and radiosonde came some logistical savings. The Army was able to reduce the size of the Profiler crew from six to two and the number of vehicles from three to one and achieved all Block II requirements in Block I.138 The next step in the Profiler system would move to the Block III configuration that the Army authorized in September 2010. Block III would further reduce the footprint by limiting the equipment to a laptop computer and the number of soldiers from four to zero.139 TRADOC FIRES BRIGADE Multiple-Launch Rocket System Munitions. Improvement efforts with the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) in 2010 focused on enhancing the munitions to give them better range and precision. Although MLRS performed well during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, its

1362007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 95; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 10. 1372001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 105; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p.p. 92-93; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 123-24; Information Paper, subj: MMS-Profiler I, 28 Jan 09, Doc III-36. 1382001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 105; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 92-93; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 95; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 127-29; Information Paper, subj: MMS-PI, 28 Jan 09; Information Paper, subj: MMS-Profiler, 2010, Doc III-37; FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Fires 7, Nov 09, p. 10, Doc III-38; Information Paper, subj: MMS-P I, 28 Jan 09, Doc III-39; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir TCM BCT Fires, 17 Feb 11, Doc III-40. 139Interview with atch, Dastrup with Brown, 17 Feb 11.

rockets and their submunitions raised serious concerns. During the war, many Iraqi field artillery assets out-ranged their coalition counterparts, including MLRS. Also, the high dud rate of munitions, including MLRS submunitions, raised apprehensions about the safety of soldiers passing through impact areas. Together, the proliferation of rocket systems with greater ranges than MLRS and the unacceptable dud rate led to the requirement for an extended-range (ER) MLRS rocket with a range of forty-five kilometers and a lower submunition dud rate that would serve as an interim measure until the Guided MLRS (GMLRS) rocket could be developed. A forty-five kilometer range would increase the commander‟s ability to influence the battlefield at depth and to fire across boundaries and simultaneously would improve the survivability of launcher crews.140 After the Army started production of the ER-MLRS rocket with the M77 dual- purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) with a standard fuse in 2001 to meet the range requirements identified in Operation Desert Storm in limited quantities, it turned its efforts to the GMLRS rocket that was already under development and could be fired from the M270A1 MLRS Launcher under development and the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) also under development. Unlike the accuracy of the traditional free-flight MLRS rocket that degraded as the range to the target increased, the guided rocket‟s Global Positioning System (GPS)-aided inertial navigation system would provide consistent, improved accuracy from a minimum range of fifteen kilometers to a maximum of sixty to seventy kilometers, depending upon warhead weight and type of propellant, to attack area and point targets. The GMLRS rocket would also enhance the ability to conduct precision strikes, would reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target, and would give the MLRS an additional fifteen kilometer range beyond the ER- MLRS. Such a range would permit hitting more targets and make the MLRS launcher more survivable because it could be positioned farther from the target. Given the need for the rocket, the Army awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin Vought Systems in November 1998 for a four-year, five-nation (United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, and the United States) engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) effort. Based upon successful testing, low-rate initial production would begin in 2002 with the first unit equipped in 2004. Technical problems, however, arose in 2000, causing the program to slip with the initial operational capability being moved to 2006.141 A restructured schedule and rising production costs in 2000-2001 prompted the Army to hold a Special Army Systems Acquisition Review Council in November 2001 to justify further development. As an integral part of the review, the Nunn-McCurdy Act of 1982 required the Army to determine if the system was essential to national security, to assess the availability of an alternative with equal or greater capability, to ascertain if the program was adequately staffed to control costs, and to assess if unit costs were reasonable. If the Army failed to answer the questions satisfactorily, then development

1402000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 117; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 86-87. 1412000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 117-19; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-93; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 71-72.

would be stopped. The review favorably answered the questions; and development continued.142 As planned, engineering developmental testing (EDT) for GMLRS took place. In May 2002 the contractor completed the last of the six EDT tests of 2001-2002. During the last one, a rocket flew more than seventy kilometers to the target area and dispensed its submunitions. Major test objectives included the successful launch of the rocket from the launcher, nominal motor performance, tail fin deployment and spin rate evaluation, and navigation performance. In all aspects the GMLRS rocket satisfied its EDT objectives to permit moving to the next stage of testing.143 Production qualification test (PQT) at White Sands Missile Range followed shortly after EDT. Over a period of six months beginning in June 2002 and ending in November 2002, the contractor conducted five PQT flights that ranged between fifteen to seventy kilometers to demonstrate accuracy and performance maturity. Although some technical problems still existed, the flights verified the rocket‟s maturity and accuracy and led to the decision on 7 March 2003 to enter into low-rate initial production (LRIP) for GMLRS with Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM). Operational testing was scheduled for 2005, and an initial operational capability was planned for 2006. Later on 3 November 2003, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) at the Joint Staff approved fielding GMLRS. Upon fielding, GMLRS would enhance the ability to conduct precision strikes, reduce the number of rockets required to defeat a target, and extend the range of MLRS fifteen kilometers beyond that of ER- MLRS, but the rocket would not be well suited for target engagements in heavy snow or forested, urban, complex, or restrictive terrain. Debris caused by the warhead skins, nose cone, and rocket motor damage could cause collateral damage.144 Additional testing occurred in 2004. During September and October 2004, the Army and contractor conducted operational testing. They fired more than twenty-four GMLRS rockets from MLRS M270A1 and HIMARS launchers. Testing demonstrated that the rocket met all requirements; and the GMLRS with DPICM was type classified and went into full-rate production in 2005.145 Meanwhile, the Army explored the possibility of adding another MLRS rocket. Looking at Kosovo in 1999 and the need to reduce damage to civilian property and the loss of lives during combat operations and to deliver organic fires in all types of terrain and weather, the Army required a more accurate MLRS rocket with a high-explosive unitary warhead and investigated the possibility of acquiring it. Equipped with the Guided DPICM MLRS motor, the Unitary rocket would have a fuse with the capabilities of a proximity fuse, a point-detonating fuse, or a delay fuse capability, depending upon the target area. The proximity fuse would provide a large burst over the target area. The point-detonating fuse would reduce the size of the burst and collateral damage because of the ground burst, while the time-delay fuse would permit the rocket to penetrate certain

1422001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72. 1432002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 72-73. 1442002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 73; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 88-89. 1452004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 76; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 68.

types of structures or targets and then detonate the rocket. Besides the availability of three different fuses, the GMLRS Unitary rocket would be equipped with an anti-jam antenna to maintain accuracy in the presence of GPS jamming.146 After funding delays in 2000 and 2001, work on the GMLRS Unitary rocket warhead and fuse began in earnest in 2002-2003. On 7 March 2003 GMLRS Unitary passed Milestone B in the acquisition cycle to move the rocket into design and demonstration with operational testing and initial operational capability scheduled for 2007. The initial GMLRS Unitary rocket would have only a point detonating and a delay fuse, while the objective rocket would incorporate the third mode (proximity) of the tri- mode fuse, anti-jam antenna, and an insensitive munition motor. The tri-mode fuse capability would permit commanders to tailor the munition‟s effects to the mission requirements.147 Even before operational testing could be done on the initial GMLRS Unitary rocket, Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, the Commander of the Multi-National Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and also Commander of the U.S. Army III Corps, sent the Army an operational needs statement on 28 March 2004 for the rocket. After the Army denied the request on 13 September 2004, General Metz forwarded an urgent needs statement for the rocket to the Army on 12 October 2004. His forces required a precision, all-weather, low-caliber, high-explosive MLRS munition to integrate into joint fires in an urban environment to attack high pay-off targets and provide large area coverage at the same time; and the initial GMLRS Unitary met those requirements.148 On 6 January 2005 the Army validated General Metz‟s request and accelerated work on the initial GMLRS Unitary rocket to provide it sooner than planned. In May 2005 the contractor, Lockheed Martin, delivered seventy-two rockets with the point detonating and delay dual-mode fuses to the Army. Meanwhile, Congress directed the Army to field 496 GMLRS Unitary rockets with 486 of them going to the field. The rest would be used for further development and testing.149 Within months of Congressional guidance, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Capabilities Manager Rockets and Missiles (RAMS) dispatched a seven-person team to Iraq in May 2005 to train field artillery units on the initial GMLRS Unitary rocket. The team visited to the XVIII Airborne Corps in Iraq first. Before employing the rocket, the commanding general wanted a validation test to determine the rocket‟s effectiveness. B Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment shot the first validation rocket at fifty-three kilometers and hit the target. The same battery fired another validation shot of four rockets at sixty-seven kilometers and hit and destroyed the

1462000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 120; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 95-96; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 73-74; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89; 2007 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 73. 1472007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 73. 1482004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 77; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69. 1492005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 73; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 95.

target. Subsequently, the team briefed the 19th Battle Coordination Detachment in Qatar and trained it how to reduce airspace coordination time.150 Meanwhile, combat operations validated the initial GMLRS Unitary rocket. On 9 and 10 September 2005, B Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment fired a six-rocket mission at an insurgent safe house in a heavy urban environment at fifty-three kilometers and destroyed it, killing insurgents in the process, and shot another two-round mission in the same area, killing insurgents in the process. One day later, A Battery, 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment shot six rockets at a bridge and destroyed it. In all instances, collateral damage to surrounding buildings was almost non-existent according to participants. By 23 December 2008, field artillery units in Iraq and Afghanistan had fired 1,042 GMLRS Unitary rockets. The following year of 2009, American and British field artillery units shot another 1,504. Of these, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps engaged the enemy with 830 and employed them in pre-planned missions against precisely located targets in urban or counterinsurgency operations where collateral damage was of concern. The initial GMLRS Unitary rockets with point detonating and delay fuse capabilities requested by General Metz performed well and as a result generated a paradigm shift that permitted using MLRS rockets in close proximity (two hundred meters or less) to friendly forces whereas the previous practice had a minimum of two thousand meters as the safe distance from friendly forces.151 Work on the objective GMLRS Unitary rocket with software upgrades, new trajectory shaping modes, and the third (proximity) mode of the tri-mode fuse meanwhile proceeded. Phase two engineering developing testing and production qualification testing of 2007 demonstrated the maturity of the objective GMLRS Unitary rocket. This permitted moving to Milestone C decision for low-rate production and operational testing of the objective rocket. Successful completion of the operational testing resulted in full- rate production decision and fielding of the tri-mode fuse (proximity, point detonating, and delay) rocket configuration. As a result, the objective missile entered full-rate production in 2009.152 Meanwhile, the Army searched for a viable candidate to replace GMLRS DPICM. However, its dud rate was too high, causing potentially too much collateral damage. In view of this, Central Command‟s rules of engagement prohibited employing the munition

1502005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 69. 1512006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 71; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 73-74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 95; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Jeff Froysland, TCM RAMS, 1 Feb 10, Doc III-87, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, Doc III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Briefing, subj: MLRS Family of Munitions, Jan 09, Doc III-90, 2009 USAFAS AH. 1522006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 72; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 95-96; Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Froysland, 1 Feb 10; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3, III-88, 2009 USAFAS AH; Fact Sheet, subj: HIMARS Takes the High Ground, 5 Jan 10, Doc III-89, USAFAS AH.

in Iraq or Afghanistan. This prompted the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research and Development Center (AMRDEC) to search for an alternative and to demonstrate a Kinetic Energy Rod warhead successfully at the White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, as early as December 2006. The Kinetic Energy Rod warhead did not contain any explosive munitions and could be employed without any environmental concerns over unexploded ordnance. At the direction of the Product Manager for Precision Guided Missiles and Rockets, the Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) in the Field Artillery School initiated an alternative warhead comparative analysis early in 2007 with the Kinetic Energy Rod and an Explosively Formed Penetrator warhead to determine if they were viable candidates to replace GMLRS DPICM. Basically, alternative warhead candidates had to meet the same operational requirements as GMLRS DPICM.153 In 2008-2009 the Army pressed forward to develop an alternative to GMLRS DPICM to engage area and inaccurately located targets, recognizing the need to minimize unintended harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure associated with unexploded ordnance from cluster munitions and collateral effects from the use of force in pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Although the Army recognized the need for such munitions and noted that unitary munitions did not provide the same capability and effects, the Department of Defense officially announced a moratorium on 18 June 2008 on the production and use of DPICM rounds that would leave more than one percent duds after arming and subsequently approved a prototyping effort on 22 October 2008 to develop a viable alternative to GMLRS DPICM with an initial operational capability in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015. At that time the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7, Lieutenant General James D. Thurman, announced the Army‟s desire to transition to an alternative warhead capability as soon as technologically and programmatically feasible. Later, the Army announced its intention to procure GMLRS Unitary rockets in-lieu of future planned DPICM procurement.154 Work on the alternative warhead continued in 2009-2010. During the 2009, the Army contracted with three vendors to produce a warhead that was equal or greater than DPICM in destructive capabilities. The Army wanted each to produce four prototypes for testing and planned to enter engineering, manufacturing, and developing in FY 2011. Subsequently on 9 February 2010, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued GMLRS Alternative Warhead Analysis of Alternatives Guidance to update the 2003 GMLRS Analysis of Alternatives. The analysis would determine the cost and operational effectiveness of developing an alternative warhead that would eliminate all residual unexploded ordnance to achieve the goal of less than one percent unexploded ordnance. Later on 26 April 2010, the Army directed the Army Material Command Systems Analysis Agency to conduct the study. In August-October 2010 the three vendors successfully fired their prototypes.155

1532007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 74; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 96. 1542008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 96; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3; Briefing, subj: MLRS Family of Munitions, Jan 09. 155Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Froysland, 1 Feb 10; Field Artillery CSM

MLRS Launcher. Based upon after action reports from Operation Desert Storm of 1991, the Army realized that the MLRS M270 launcher required a faster response time, global positioning system-aided munitions, and improvements to its fire control system and launcher drive system. To combat the launcher‟s growing obsolescence the Army initiated the Improved Fire Control System (IFCS) program in 1992 to replace dated electronic systems and to provide for growth potential for future precision munitions. Subsequently, the Army initiated the Improved Launcher Mechanical System (ILMS) program in 1995 to reduce reaction times by decreasing the time required to aim, displace, and reload the launcher. For several years the Improved Fire Control System and Improved Launcher Mechanical System modifications were two separate programs. As a result of the integrated test program initiative, the Army combined the two programs in 1997. Together, the two modernization efforts would produce the M270A1 launcher early in the twenty-first century. Subsequently, the Army opted to modernize the MLRS chassis into the M993A1 Carrier by adding a power take off pump to maintain precise, constant engine revolutions per minutes, and by improving its electrical system, among other things.156 Over the years, developmental work on the M270A1 launcher progressed. Based upon successful testing of the Improved Fire Control System and Improved Launcher Mechanical System early in 1998 to demonstrate that the deficiencies identified in 1997 testing had been fixed, the Program Executive Officer of Tactical Missiles, Brigadier General Willie Nance, approved the low-rate initial production (LRIP) of forty-five launchers on 28 May 1998. At the same time he established the goal of conducting the initial operational test and evaluation in September 1999 and fielding the launchers in the fourth quarter of FY 2000.157 Meanwhile, the Transformation of the Army Campaign Plan caused the Army to revise the number of M270A1 launchers to be purchased. Initially, the Army had planned to buy 857 launchers. With the emphasis shifting to medium forces of the Objective Force of Army Transformation, the Army cut the number to 412 in 1999. These launchers would go to the counterattack forces of the III Corps. Subsequently in February 2001, the Army increased the number of launchers to 456 to ensure that sufficient systems were fielded to include U.S. Forces, Korea. A few months later in August 2001, the Army cut the number of battalions to be fielded with the M270A1 from ______Newsletter, Redleg-7 (Extract), 3rd Quarter 09, p. 3; Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, subj: GMLRS Alternative Warhead Analysis of Alternatives, 9 Feb 10, Doc III- 41; Interview, Dastrup with Jeff Froysland, TCM Fires Brigade, 15 Feb 11, Doc III-42; Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for GMLRS Alternative Warhead to Initiate Analysis of Alternatives, 7 Apr 10, Doc III-43; Briefing, subj: GMLRS-U Fire, undated, Doc III-44; Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: GMLRS-AW Analysis of Alternatives Study Directive, 26 Apr 10, Doc III-45. 1562000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 120; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 74. 1572000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 120; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 74-75.

twenty to fifteen based upon the Army‟s recapitalization decision. In 2002 the Army further decreased the number of M270A1 battalions to be fielded to ten and decided to retain the M270 battalions until the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) could be fielded and replace them sometime in the future. Thus, in three years, the number of battalions of the M270A1 to be fielded decreased from twenty to ten for a fifty percent reduction with fielding to be completed in March 2006. This reduction reflected the growing emphasis upon the Transformation of the Army and the M270A1‟s ties with the Legacy Force, later called the Current Force.158 In September 2000 system integration anomalies, in the meantime, emerged that adversely influenced system functionality and operational safety. This forced the Army to move the early system integration testing phase from December 2000 to March 2001 and to reschedule the initial operational test and evaluation from April-May 2001 to August-September 2001. To meet the new schedule the contractor made numerous software fixes, while revised crew procedures during reload and maintenance operations were implemented to ensure soldier safety so that the system would be ready for testing in 2001.159 In 2001 the M270A1 underwent the scheduled testing. Early in the year, the Army conducted a logistical demonstration test and followed this with a maintenance demonstration test. In April 2001 the Army held an extended system integration test (ESIT) at Fort Sill to determine the system‟s readiness to enter into initial operational test and evaluation in August 2001. Based upon the success of the integration test, the Army administered a two-phase initial operational test and evaluation in the fall of 2001. The Army held the ground phase at Fort Sill and the flight phase at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. Designed as a side-by-side comparison with the M270 launcher, the ground phase consisted of three, ninety-six hour operational scenarios. During the flight phase, the M270A1 launcher fired a variety of MLRS munitions (M26 basic rocket, M26A2 extended-range rocket, M28A1 reduced-range practice rocket, and M39A1 ATACMS Block 1A). In each phase soldiers from the 1-12th Field Artillery operated both the M270 and the M270A1 launchers. Based upon the results of the operational testing that was concluded in October 2001, the Army test and evaluation community deemed the M270A1 to be suitable and effective. The M270A1 demonstrated its ability to load, hide, move, aim, shoot, and reload in an unprecedented manner. When it was compared to the M270, it reduced nearly every time standard to include total mission cycle time, launcher lay, the completion of fire, reload, and the last round fired to first movement. The shorter times improved effects on target and increased soldier survivability by demonstrating that the launcher could receive, process, service the target, and move long before the crew would be susceptible to counterfire.160 In 2002 the Army continued software improvements, conducted integration testing with various rocket and missile munitions at White Sands Missile Range, and started fielding the M270A1. The 2-20th Field Artillery Regiment, the 4th Infantry

1582002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 75. 1592000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 124-25; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 75. 1602001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 76.

Division (Mechanized) at Fort Hood, Texas, received eighteen systems in April 2002 and started training on them shortly afterwards. About the same time the 2-131st Field Artillery Regiment of the 49th Armored Division of the Texas Army National Guard, a roundout unit to the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), obtained new M270A1 launchers and initiated training. In the meantime, the Army fielded M270A1 launchers to the 1-38th Field Artillery Regiment in Korea in the third quarter of FY 2002, the 6-37th Field Artillery Regiment in Korea in the first quarter of FY 2003, and the 2-4th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Sill in the first quarter of FY 2003. In response to world events, the Army moved up fielding the M270A1 to the 2-4th Field Artillery Regiment nearly one year to December 2002. Subsequently, the Army fielded ten M270A1 launchers to the Republic of Korea Army in 2003, fielded the M270A1 to 1-21st Field Artillery Regiment, and 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood in the first quarter of FY 2004. As planned, ten battalions, preposition stocks, and institutional training and testing centers would receive 225 launchers with fielding completed in 2006. Of the ten battalions, five had their M270A1s at the end of 2003.161 Fielding the M270A1 continued as planned. Early in 2004, the 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment received its M270A1s just prior to a part of the unit deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and then the 1-142nd Field Artillery Regiment of the Arkansas Army National Guard received its launchers. Altogether, the Army fielded sixty-five M270A1s in 2004.162 The following two years, the Army fielded the M270A1 to the 2-18th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Sill and the 1-147th Field Artillery Regiment of the South Dakota Army National Guard. These fieldings left one M270A1 battalion of the programmed ten M270A1 battalions to be fielded as of the end of 2005. In 2006 the Army completed fielding the M270A1 to the active component and the reserve component when the 2-20th Field Artillery Regiment and the 1-21st Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Hood and the 2-131st Field Artillery Regiment of the Texas Army National Guard each received their final six launchers.163 In the midst of the fieldings, the Army upgraded the M270A1. During 2005, thirteen launchers from 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Sill received the Improved Weapon Interface Unit (IWIU). The IWIU was required for firing Guided MLRS munitions, both Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) and Unitary. Subsequently, the upgraded M270A1 launchers from 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment were deployed to support Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) where the battalion was the first M270A1 unit to fire a Guided MLRS Unitary in combat. Later in October 2005, thirteen launchers from 2-20th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Hood were upgraded with IWIUs and were deployed to OIF to replace the launchers from 3-13th Field Artillery regiment. Thirteen launchers from 2-4th Field Artillery regiment also

1612002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 76-77; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 92. 1622004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80. 1632005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72, 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 74.

received IWIUs as part of the scheduled IWIU upgrades.164 Meanwhile, the Army conducted two significant M270A1 modification projects -- machine gun mount and Auxiliary Power Unit and Environmental Control Unit (APU/ECU) in 2005. OIF after action reviews and lessons learned expressed a need for a mount for the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon (SAW) that was the primary weapon for the M270A1‟s launcher chief. Lengthy road marches and traveling down unimproved roads presented a challenge for the launcher chief to maintain control and stability of his SAW while standing in the hatch as the vehicle was moving. Several designs of the mount were evaluated with a prototype being developed. Thirteen early prototypes were provided to the 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment during its OIF deployment. Although feedback had not been obtained from the 3-13th Field Artillery Regiment as of December 2005 to generate any modifications to the SAW, several test firings led to design changes with the final design being provided to Program Manager Crew Served Weapons for procurement in 2006. By the end of 2007, all M270A1 units were equipped with this machine gun mount.165 Because the current ventilation system in the launcher cab did not meet Manpower Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) requirements for a crew during firing and silent watch operations in all weather and because multiple radios and electronic equipment in the cab generated heat, the Army had to find a way to improve conditions in the cab. It opted for installing the Environmental Control Unit (ECU) to control adverse climate conditions and permit the maximum use of radios and computer systems. The Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) would provide a reduction in maintenance time and cost while providing the capability for silent watch operations. The EPU/APU consisted of an environmental control unit and an auxiliary power unit. The auxiliary power unit was a diesel generator designed to provide a source of electricity. This would permit the launcher to remain powered while in the hide area with the main engine shut off. The ECU was an 18,000 BTU environmental control unit that could reduce the temperature inside the cab when it was subjected to extreme heat environments like those found in OIF. Several test firings were conducted as part of the validation of the APU/ECU. The first test involving soldiers took place in the spring of 2006 and was successful to permit fielding to the 2-4th Field Artillery Regiment, the 2-131st Field Artillery Regiment, and 2-20th Field Artillery Regiment in 2007.166 With the increasing need for better communications over long distances, the Army, meanwhile, initiated the Modular Launcher Communication System (MLCS) for MLRS and HIMARS in 2006 to permit long-range communications between the fire direction center and the launchers. MLCS would integrate long-range radios (high frequency and satellite communication), tactical fire direction software, a display panel, and a data entry device. As of 2006, digital messages to the launcher were transmitted from the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) via a SINCGARS

1642005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72. 1652005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 72; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 77. 1662005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 72-73; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 75; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 77-78.

radio. This message flow was sequential from command and control node to command and control node with line-of-sight radio communications limiting the distance between each command and control node. Although there were advantages to this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of time- sensitive targets by taking a long time to process, and increased the quantity of equipment required to complete a fire mission. MLCS would furnish a means to receive and transmit long-range digital messages in a network consisting of multiple subscribers with different communication devices and underwent a successful user test utilizing high frequency radios at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 2007.167 As explained in 2009, MLCS consisted of capabilities that were not resident on field artillery launchers and aimed to improve command and control, addressing a capability gap in MLRS M270A1 and HIMARS M142 launchers, among other things. In the near-term the Army planned to use the Harris 150 High Frequency Radio to satisfy long-range communications requirements. For the long-term (2011-2017) the plan foresaw migrating both launchers to the Joint Tactical Radio System when it became available, and integrating limited tactical fire control, among other capability improvements. For the present, the plan outlined using Blue Force Tracker for situational awareness with fielding in the first quarter of FY 2011. Additional situational awareness would be met by the acquisition of the Driver‟s Vision Enhancement for both launchers that would provide the driver the capability to drive in reduced visibility with the use of forward looking infrared sensor and display control module. Beyond 2017 the plan identified incorporating tactical fire control functions managed at the battery and/or platoon command and control echelons utilizing an integrated battle space communications and adding the ability to receive and execute valid fire missions digitally from field artillery sensor platforms, among others.168 Meanwhile in June 2009, the Army started fielding M270A1 and M142 launcher software 7.08B that was a robust software, provided several improvements and capabilities for the M270A1 and M142 launchers, and furnished improved fire mission processing, streamlining alignment, two-hour Global Positioning System (GPS) key expiration notification, and multiple precision aim point capability. For improved fire mission process the functionality of the buffers was specifically designed with the expectation that they would be loaded up with multiple missions. This design philosophy differed significantly with the one in 1983 when the M270 launcher was first fielded. At that time a six-round mission was the norm; and this practice was carried forward with the M270A1. Enhancements with the buffers created flexibility and robustness to meet fire support needs across an array of scenarios.169 Unlike unguided rockets, Guided Unitary rockets were packed with components that required data from the launcher. Passing data from the M270A1 and M142

1672007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 104. 1682007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 78; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 101; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 104. 1692009 USAFAS AH, p. 104.

launchers to the rocket took more time than desired. In an effort to reduce fire mission times, streaming alignment was incorporated into launcher software 7.08B to reduce the time to process and fire the Guided Unitary rocket. In fact, time savings could be as much as forty seconds if five or more rockets were fired in a single mission.170 Because GPS-aided munitions were optimized by GPS, the Field Artillery and the Field Artillery School wanted to keep them optimized as long as possible. In the case where the crew had not loaded the next period‟s keys, the launcher would continue firing GPS-aided munitions up to fifteen minutes prior to the expiration of those keys. Past versions of software eliminated the GPS-aided capability at the two-hour mark.171 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System In 2009 the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) provided the Army with a critical precision deep fires capability for light and early entry forces and furnished field artillery medium and long-range rocket and long-range missile fires as part of the MLRS fleet of launchers.172 A wheeled, indirect fire, rocket/missile system capable of firing all rockets and missiles in the current and future MLRS family of munitions, HIMARS originated in the 1990s. On 26 October 1990 the Operational and Organizational Plan for HIMARS established an urgent need for a strategically deployable, tactically mobile, indirect fire, long-range, rocket/missile system that could operate semi-autonomously and achieve the range, accuracy, and lethality required to support combat operations effectively. The Operational and Organization Plan stated that the light divisions and early entry forces did not have the organic assets to perform battle tasks on a worldwide basis effectively. While corps-level assets could furnish supporting fires with 155-mm. howitzers and M270 MLRS launchers, these systems‟ lack of strategic deployability could limit or even preclude their introduction into the theater in time to influence the battle. In comparison, a HIMARS unit would require less lift than an equivalent MLRS unit and expand airlift capacity by extending airlift platforms to include C-130 aircraft. Use of C-130 aircraft would also expand tactical mobility once forces arrived in the area of operations. Examination also revealed that doctrinal changes alone would not correct the identified shortfalls of not having a rapidly deployable launcher system to support light forces. Organizational changes of field artillery units also would not address the basic problems associated with worldwide deployment.173 Analysis by the Field Artillery School also supported HIMARS development. In December 1991 the school conducted an in-house Legal Mix VII analysis to determine the preferred composition for the Field Artillery to meet worldwide requirements in the future. The analysis concluded that HIMARS would provide a much-needed, lethal punch for the light forces. It would do this while remaining as mobile as the supported

1702009 USAFAS AH, pp. 104-05. 1712009 USAFAS AH, p. 105; Email with atch, subj: MLRS and HIMARS Launchers Input to 2010 Annual History, 28 Feb 11, Doc III-46. 1722002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 77; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 95; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence (USAFCOEFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 102. 1732002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 77-78.

force. The wheeled chassis and C-130 deployability capabilities would provide unique means for rapid intra-theater employment. The effectiveness comparisons of equal airlift alternatives for M198 cannons, MLRS launchers, and HIMARS launchers revealed that the HIMARS was approximately twenty percent more effective than the MLRS alternative and approximately seventy percent more effective than the M198 alternative.174 In view of this, the Department of the Army approved the HIMARS Operational Requirements Document (ORD) on 3 December 1992, outlining the requirement for two battalions with three being desired. However, the Army failed to fund development because the payoff of fielding only two battalions was not deemed worth the cost of a new start.175 In 1997 an emerging force structure study at the Field Artillery School called for two field artillery brigades of two HIMARS battalions and one towed cannon battalion each to support one light division. The study confirmed that adding a rocket/missile system to the light corps artillery force structure would increase lethality against high- payoff targets, field artillery, and other special targets. The analysis also highlighted an increase in field artillery survivability when HIMARS was integrated into the light force artillery structure. In view of this evidence, the Army funded HIMARS.176 Subsequently, the Rapid Force Projection Initiative (RFPI), a joint effort sponsored by the U.S. Army Missile Command and the Dismounted Battle Space Battle Laboratory, planned to conduct an Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration (ACTD) in 1998 using new target acquisition systems, “shooters,” and command and control systems at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. These selected systems would be C-130 deployable and be used by the first-to-fight forces. Among the systems to be tested were four HIMARS prototypes.177 In August 1998 following the ACTD, the RFPI reviewed the contributions of HIMARS as a lightweight MLRS system. RFPI‟s assessment cited the advantage of increased firepower for early entry forces, less time spent on the firing point versus the M270 launcher‟s time, and the ease of the training transition from the M270 to the HIMARS. With the recommendation from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), HIMARS was selected as one of only four “leave behind” systems following the ACTD to provide a limited go-to-war capability. Three HIMARS prototype launchers remained with the 3-27th Field Artillery Regiment, XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery, Fort Bragg, and one was sent to Lockheed-Martin, Dallas, Texas, for troubleshooting after the ACTD.178 One year later on 19 October 1999, the TRADOC Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Combat Developments approved an updated HIMARS Operational Requirements Document in light of the RFPI ACTD. The updated document permitted HIMARS to

1742002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78. 1752002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78. 1762002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 78. 1772002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 78-79. 1782002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 97.

enter into the engineering, manufacturing, and development (EMD) phase of acquisition and also identified the requirement for sixteen HIMARS battalions -- two in the active force and fourteen in the Army National Guard.179 HIMARS made significant progress in 2000.180 Impressed by the exercise in July 2000 where HIMARS demonstrated its deployability and firepower and influenced by the need for a general support weapon system to furnish fire support in the early stages of amphibious operations, the U.S. Marine Corps decided in December 2000 to participate with the Army in the EMD phase by purchasing two EMD HIMARS for a two-year user evaluation program in 2002-2004. In view of this development, the Army announced that EMD HIMARS would be delivered in FYs 2001 and 2002 for testing by the Army (six launchers) and U.S. Marine Corps (two launchers) and that low-rate initial production would begin in FY 2003.181 The Army which had the lead in developing HIMARS and the Marine Corps made several key decisions with the system in 2001. Early in the year, the Marine Corps announced its plans for HIMARS. Upon receiving its two EMD HIMARS in October 2002, it would form them into a platoon for early user training; would train the crew; and would refine techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) and general support doctrine. To move the aging MLRS M270 launcher out of the inventory faster, the Army decided later in 2001 to field HIMARS to selected M270 units before replacing the M198s as initially intended with the exception of the first unit equipped being an M198 unit. The Army decided to put soldiers on the EMD launcher at Fort Sill in August 2002 for an extended system integration test (ESIT) of the October 1999 HIMARS Operational Requirements Document‟s (ORD) key performance parameters.182 Other critical developments influenced HIMARS in 2001-2002. In August 2001 the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army designated HIMARS as an acquisition category (ACAT) I project and increased the number to be purchased from 363 to 888 for two key reasons. First, the Army Transformation Campaign Plan designated HIMARS as an Interim to Objective Force system, meaning that it would play a key role in the Transformation of the Army. Second, the Army made the MLRS M270 launcher part of the Legacy Force, renamed Current Force in 2002, and did not intend to spend additional funds to modernize it beyond the M270A1 under development. Making the HIMARS an ACAT I acquisition also gave it more visibility and more oversight by the Department of the Army than previously when it was an ACAT II. Subsequently on 16 May 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense redesignated the HIMARS as an ACAT ID. This gave Department of Defense oversight of development because of its importance in the future force. Seven months later on 17 December 2002, the Secretary of Defense downgraded HIMARS to ACAT IC to give more authority to the Army.183 In the meantime, the Army conducted two extended system integration tests

1792002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79. 1802000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 125-30; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79. 1812002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 79. 1822000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 100; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 79-80. 1832002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 79-80; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 98.

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(ESIT). After training the crews the Army held the first test at Fort Sill during the last two weeks of August 2002. Still in the engineering and manufacturing development phase, one EMD HIMARS demonstrated the ability to receive a fire mission, to move to the firing point, to fire the mission, and to reload and basically proved its ability to perform all of its key performance parameters during two, sixty-hour exercises. One year later in December 2003, the Army completed a second ESIT. Using the same launchers that had been employed in the first ESIT but with improvements that would be found in the low-rate initial production launchers, the Army gathered performance and reliability data for a low-rate initial production configured launcher.184 Following the low-rate initial production decision of March 2003 which outlined the Army‟s plan to purchase eighty-nine HIMARS and the Marine‟s intention of buying four HIMARS for additional testing before full production, both services conducted two production qualification tests in an operational environment in 2003. On 19 November 2003 a C-130 flew a combat-loaded HIMARS more than 650 nautical miles from Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, to a dirt airstrip, known as an assault landing zone (ALZ) at Fort Sill, to determine how fast it could be offloaded and ready for a fire mission. After landing the Army crew unloaded the HIMARS vehicle in less than five minutes; and the launcher was fully operational and ready to receive a fire mission in less than fifteen minutes. After receiving a digital fire mission, the crew drove the launcher to the firing point and successfully fired six MLRS reduced-range practice rockets. This test displayed the system‟s strategic mobility and ability to support the early entry forces. Following this test, the Army and Marines conducted the second test at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, where they successfully fired an Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) from a HIMARS launcher.185 Further testing took placed in 2004. In January 2004 a HIMARS, manned by an Army crew from the New Equipment Training Division, U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) underwent additional testing to include a flight demonstration that consisted of firing 180 reduced-range practice rockets at pace simulating the Operational Mode Summary Mission profile. While the test did much to demonstrate HIMARS‟s ability to meet its performance and reliability requirements, enough software and hardware issues occurred to warrant further investigation and testing once the appropriate system improvements were made. Subsequently in April 2004, HIMARS low-rate initial production launchers fired four Guided MLRS rockets at the White Sands Missile Range to verify Guided MLRS interoperability with the HIMARS launcher, successfully verified rocket performance, and demonstrated the new version of software.186 In June 2004 HIMARS underwent Extended System Integration Test (ESIT) III at White Sands Missile Range. In this test two Low-Rate Initial Production launchers (LRIP) and one LRIP configured launcher, manned by Army, Marine, TSM RAMS, and contractor personnel, were put through an operationally realistic scenario consisting of dry and live-fire missions (180 reduced-range practice rockets). Test results validated

1842002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 98-99. 1852003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 99; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86. 1862004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86.

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system improvements made since ESIT II and HIMARS‟s readiness to enter the Operational Test scheduled for September 2004.187 Prior to the follow-on testing, a Maintainability and Logistics Maintenance Demonstration was held with soldiers to test the fault isolation and built in test capability of HIMARS and the ability of HIMARS to be repaired and maintained by an Army crew. Also during this time, HIMARS conducted additional developmental testing including nuclear hardening testing, an automotive endurance test and the firing of additional tactical rockets and missiles.188 Following the successful conclusion of ESIT III, the Army and contractors directed their focus and energy towards preparing for the Combined Guided MLRS and HIMARS Initial Operational Test (IOT) scheduled for September 2004. In the Ground IOT which was conducted at Fort Sill, crews from the 2-18th Field Artillery Regiment tested three HIMARS LRIP launchers and six resupply vehicles (RSVs) with resupply trailers in an operationally realistic scenario over two, ninety-six hour field training exercises. In the ground IOT the three launchers successfully performed 120 live-fire missions totaling 719 reduced-range practice rockets and conducted approximately 240 dry missions. Following the ground phase, the launchers and crews moved to White Sands Missile Range to conduct the flight phase. Train-up of the crews and maintainers began in July 2004 and continued into August 2004. In the IOT flight phase eighteen Guided MLRS rockets and one ATACMS missile were fired to further exhibit the ability of HIMARS to conduct live-fire missions using representative Army crews under realistic conditions and the ability of Guided MLRS to meet its operational requirements.189 Following the successful IOT, the Army awarded Lockheed Martin a contract in December 2004 for continued low-rate initial production.190 In the meantime, HIMARS participated in the Counterstrike Task Force exercise at the Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, in November-December 2004. As part of this Department of the Army-directed exercise, HIMARS simulated the firing of Guided Unitary MLRS rockets to determine the timelines associated with firing MLRS munitions in these scenarios and to find ways to reduce the time between the acquisition of an enemy mortar or rockets system and the attack of these systems. The Guided Unitary Rocket which was under development was chosen because of the need in certain theaters to limit collateral damage.191 As part of this effort, HIMARS used a prototype command and control system located on the launcher known as Enhanced Command and Control (C2). This system allowed the launcher to communicate directly with sensors, reducing the sensor to shooter timeline, as C2 nodes were bypassed. At the end of 2004, Enhanced C2 was an unfunded Block II requirement for HIMARS that was expected to be fielded in 2007.192

1872004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86. 1882004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87. 1892004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87. 1902004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87. 1912004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 87. 1922004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 87-88.

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A sensor to effects demonstration was conducted on 14 April 2005 at the White Sands Missile Range. During the demonstration, an Air Force Scan Eagle unmanned aerial vehicle acquired the target and digitally transmitted a call for fire to a HIMARS launcher. The launcher computed the firing solution, and the crew attacked the target with an Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missile.193 HIMARS fielding began in earnest in 2005 and carried into the following years. In March 2005 the 3-27th Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Bragg, received the first M142 launchers with Initial Operating Capability (IOC) established on 29 June 2005. All M142 launchers were produced with the Improved Weapon Interface Unit (IWIU), unlike M270A1 launchers which were being upgraded as IWIUs became available. The acquisition strategy involved procuring seventeen M142 battalions -- five for the active component and twelve for the reserve component. The next M142 fielding occurred in 6 March 2006-11 May 2006 for the 1-181st Field Artillery Regiment of the Tennessee Army National Guard. In 2007 the 1-158th Field Artillery Regiment of the Oklahoma Army National Guard and the 5-3rd Field Artillery Regiment received HIMARS launchers, and the following year the 1-14th Field Artillery Regiment, the 2-300th Field Artillery Regiment of the Wyoming Army National Guard, and the 5-3rd Field Artillery Regiment were equipped with HIMARS.194 Although the Army Acquisition Executive, Claude M. Bolton, Jr., approved moving HIMARS into full-rate production and type classification on 6 July 2005, key developmental activities took place afterwards. During 2005, the Army, Marines, and Air Force conducted a joint forces demonstration involving an Army and Marine HIMARS and an Air Force C-17 flight crew from Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma. Several technologies were demonstrated during the flight -- keeping the fire control system energized, using High Frequency radios (Harris 150), and maintaining the Global Positioning System (GPS) throughout the flight. These capabilities were desired to answer Key Performance Parameters in the HIMARS Operational Requirements Document and an Operational Needs Statement (ONS) initiated by the XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery. This demonstration also reaffirmed the launcher‟s ability to be inserted into an airfield to conduct fire missions and helped refine tactics, techniques, and procedures. Subsequent enhanced initialization experiments conducted in April 2006 and October 2006 to meet the same Operational Needs Statement of the XVIII Airborne Corps demonstrated the ability of the HIMARS launcher to receive GPS data while being transported by a C-17 aircraft so that the launcher could roll off the aircraft with the fire control system initialized to permit completing a fire mission quickly. These experiments led to testing the “hot panel” in 2009 that allowed HIMARS to link into the aircraft‟s GPS and track itself in the air anywhere in the world so that it could find its location and targets rapidly upon exiting the aircraft, plans to procure hardware for a limited number of launchers, and continued work on initialization during flight.195

1932005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80. 1942005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 84; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 87; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 106-07. 1952006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 84-85; Briefing, subj: M270A1 and M142, Jan

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Meanwhile, the Department of the Army approved an urgent need statement on 20 October 2005 by the 3-27th Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Bragg and XVIII Airborne Corps for increased crew protection in the HIMARS by armoring the launcher cab. Even with the armor, the cab still had to meet C-130 transportability requirements while achieving STANAG level II armor requirements. Developed in 2005-2006 to meet an operational need statement from the XVIII Airborne Corps, the near-term solution involved using a modified design of the Low Signature Armored Cab (LSAC) developed for use with the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV) and using “bolt on” or “appliqué” armor which would be applied after the launcher had been transported by C- 130. This modified cab design was designated the Low Signature Armored Cab- HIMARS (LSAC-H). The appliqué armor consisted of forty-three pieces of armor that could be installed on the cab in less than two hours and removed in less than one hour. A removable machine gun mount was also developed because of after action reviews and lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan).196 To reduce production sustainment costs and to provide even greater crew protection, the Army initiated work on the Increased Crew Protection (ICP) Cab late in 2006. During 2007, the ICP Cab went through a series of tests including a live fire test and evaluation and road shock and vibration testing. The cab would incorporate enhancements suggested in the test phase of the LSAC-H with production beginning in 2010. The ICP Cab would protect the crew from ballistic attack, mine blast, foreign object debris, and fumes from the rocket launch and would be retrofitted to HIMARS without armored cabs and HIMARS with LSAC-H capabilities.197 Testing the ICP Cab continued into 2008. In July 2008 the Army and contractor completed the final test which consisted of an extended field exercise to evaluate the operational effectiveness and suitability of the ICP Cab configured HIMARS to ensure that the system met performance standards identified in the HIMARS operational requirements document and system specifications prior to production and fielding. It was a developmental test with the flavor of an operational test. Soldiers from the 5-3rd Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Lewis, Washington, operated the launchers and fire direction center at the operational mode summary/mission profile rates during a two-week exercise at White Sands Missile Range. Test results indicated that the ICP Cab configured HIMARS met the critical operational criteria and demonstrated that the launcher‟s ability to conduct shoot-and-scoot tactics to make it survivable in a hostile threat environment. As a result in 2009, the Army awarded BAE Systems the contract for sixty-four ICP Cab up-armor kits.198 ______09, Doc III-92; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), p. 110. 1962005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 85; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 110-11. 1972005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 80-81; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 85; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 111. 1982008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 108; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 111.

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With the increasing need for better communications over long distances, the Army meanwhile initiated acquisition action for the Modular Launcher Communication System (MLCS) for HIMARS and MLRS in 2006. MLCS would integrate long-range radios (high frequency and satellite communication), tactical fire direction software, situation awareness, a display panel, and a data entry device. As of 2006, digital messages to the launcher were transmitted from the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) via a SINCGARS radio to the launcher. This message flow was sequential from command and control node to command and control node with line-of- sight radio communications limiting the distance between each command and control node. Although there were advantages to this communications flow, it increased fire mission times, reduced effectiveness of time-sensitive targets by taking a long time to process, and increased the quantity of equipment required to complete a fire mission. MLCS would furnish a means to receive and transmit long-range digital messages in a network consisting of multiple subscribers with different communication devices and underwent a successful user test in 2007 utilizing high frequency radios at Fort Bragg, another test in 2008, and one in 2009.199 Concurrently, TCM RAMS worked on a block improvement strategy for the MLRS M270A1 launcher and HIMARS in 2007-2009. Specifically, it sought to improve command and control and address a capability gap with the integration of a prototype long-range high frequency and satellite communications kits and plans to improve battle space awareness by integrating blue forces tracking into the HIMARS in 2008. For the long-term (2011-2017) the plan outlined migrating HIMARS launchers to the Joint Tactical Radio System when it became available to replace the Harris 150 High Frequency radio, incorporating further on-board situational awareness, and integrating limited tactical fire control, among other capability improvements. Beyond 2017 the plan identified incorporating more robust tactical fire control functions currently managed at the battery and/or platoon command and control echelons utilizing an integrated battle space communications and the ability to receive and execute valid fire missions digitally from field artillery sensor platforms, among others. For situational awareness, the Army planned to use Blue Force Tracker with fielding coming in the first quarter of FY 2011. Additional situational awareness would be met by the acquisition of the Driver‟s Vision Enhancement that would provide the driver with the capability of driving in reduced visibility with the employment of forward looking infrared sensor and display control module.200 Meanwhile in June 2009, the Army started fielding launcher software 7.08B that provided several improvements and capabilities for the M270A1 and M142 launchers. To enhance fire mission processing the functionality of the buffers was specifically designed with the expectation that they would be loaded up with multiple missions. This design philosophy differed significantly with the one in 1983 when the M270 launcher was first fielded. At that time six-round mission was the norm; and this practice was

1992006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 85-86; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 88; 2009 USAFAS AH, pp. 111-12. 2002008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 109; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 112.

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carried forward with the M270A1. Enhancements with the buffers created flexibility and robustness to meet fire support needs across an array of scenarios.201 Unlike unguided rockets, Guided MLRS Unitary rockets were packed with components that required data from the launcher. Passing data from the launcher to the rocket took more time than desired. In an effort to reduce fire mission times, streaming alignment was incorporated into 7.08B to reduce the time to process and fire the Guided Unitary rocket. In fact, time savings could be as much as forty seconds if five or more rockets were fired in a single mission.202 Because GPS-aided munitions were optimized by GPS, the Field Artillery and the Field Artillery School wanted to keep them optimized as long as possible. In the case where the crew had not loaded the next period‟s keys, the launcher would continue firing GPS-aided munitions up to fifteen minutes prior to the expiration of those keys. Past versions of software eliminated the GPS-aided capability at the two-hour mark.203 Army Tactical Missile System After several years of full-scale engineering and development in the 1980s, the Army fielded the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) in 1990 to meet the pressing requirement for attacking second-echelon forces and soon tested it in battle. During Operation Desert Storm of 1991, the Army fired over thirty ATACMS later renamed ATACMS I as newer versions were introduced. A decade later, the Army fired over 450 ATACMS I during Operation Iraqi Freedom of 2003. Both operations demonstrated the system‟s combat effectiveness.204 Operational considerations in 1991-1992, meanwhile, raised the necessity of an extended-range ATACMS. The U.S. Army Strategic Defense Command‟s concern about theater missile defense and the Field Artillery‟s requirement for greater range to engage more targets led to the development of ATACMS IA. It integrated an onboard Global Positioning System (GPS) to augment the inertial navigation system of ATACMS I to achieve improved accuracy that permitted reducing the payload to achieve the requisite extended range. Production began in 1997 with fielding in 1998. During Operation Iraqi Freedom of 2003, field artillery units launched over forty ATACMS IAs against enemy targets.205 During the 1980s and 1990s, the Army also worked on ATACMS II and made it the primary carrier for the Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition (BAT) in 1994 when the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army terminated the Army‟s participation in the Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) because of test failures with TSSAM and growing costs. BAT was designed to employ acoustic and infrared seekers to acquire, classify,

2012009 USAFAS AH, pp. 112-13. 2022009 USAFAS AH, p. 113. 2032009 USAFAS AH, p. 113; Email with atch, subj: MLRS and HIMARS Launchers Input to 2010 Annual History, 28 Feb 11. 2041999 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 132-33; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 81; 2008 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 109. 2051999 USAFACFS ACH, p. 133; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 81.

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and destroy moving armored combat vehicles deep within enemy territory (one hundred kilometers or more). BAT would also have allocation logic to minimize the possibility of multiple BATs engaging a single vehicle and a large acquisition footprint to locate targets within four kilometers of the dispense point.206 After successful testing during the late 1990s, the Army System Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) of December 1998 approved low-rate initial production with ATACMS II BAT and prepared for the Defense Acquisition Board of February 1999 which had oversight responsibilities for the missile. Successful testing in 1999 led to a low-rate initial production contract in the fall of 1999.207 During 2000, ATACMS II underwent successful testing. Based upon the results of an operational test in May 2000, the Army concluded that the command and control systems, computers, and target acquisition systems could support ATACMS II. Subsequently in August 2000, a test conducted at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, demonstrated the missile‟s ability to deliver the BAT submunitions to their targets accurately. Although the ATACMS II went into limited production in 2002, the evolving nature of the contemporary operating environment from an armored force to small, more dispersed elements that sought shelter in urban or complex dwellings caused the Army to end the missile‟s production in 2004.208 Meanwhile, the Deputy Undersecretary for Operational Research for the Army decided to suspend the operational testing for the ATACMS II BAT scheduled for 2001. He determined that the BAT‟s seekers would not meet the operational requirements and directed the Army to conduct two BAT drop tests and a missile shoot in 2002. If those tests proved to be successful, the ATACMS II BAT would resume operational testing.209 Even before the additional tests could be conducted, the Army‟s testing community questioned the ATACMS II BAT‟s ability to hit certain countermeasure targets effectively. This caused the Army to hold a special Army Systems Acquisition Review Council (ASARC) in April 2002 to review the acquisition strategy for Pre- planned Product Improvement (P3I) BAT under development that would be carried by ATACMS II, would attack stationary armored vehicles and surface-to-surface missile (SSM) transporter erector and launcher (TELS), and would be more robust than BAT. Rather than making a decision about the future of ATACMS II BAT in April 2002, the Army Acquisition Executive, Claude M. Bolton, Jr., postponed making one pending the outcome of an Army Requirements Oversight Council (AROC). On 9 May 2002 the AROC approved the operational requirements document for the ATACMS Unitary and approved changing the BAT operational requirements document to add an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) carrier vehicle in light of the successes of the armed American UAVs in Afghanistan in 2001 and directed UAV and P3I BAT demonstrations and testing. Subsequently, the Army Acquisition Executive directed the BAT program to be

2061996 USAFACFS ACH, p. 131; 2000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 131-35; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 81-81. 2072005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 82. 2082005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 82; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 110. 2092001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 82.

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restructured to reflect the requirement to integrate it with an UAV and to conduct demonstration tests.210 In December 2002 the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) approved the requirement for an armed Hunter UAV using the BAT submunition with an integrated Semi-Active Laser (SAL) seeker system to be operational by 1 February 2003 for testing. Until this, the BAT had been qualified as a submunition in the ATACMS II. Both ATACMS II and the BAT submunition finished production in December of 2003 with 88 missiles fielded and 1,300 BATs included. As a result of the VCSA‟s directive, the Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems and the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (UAVS) Project Office successfully completed and demonstrated an Army-directed nine- week Viper Strike (VS) Program at White Sands Missile Range. The VS (two-pound shaped charge warhead) leveraged the BAT airframe and subsystems by replacing the terminal seeker with the SAL seeker. The SAL seeker provided for lock-on-after-launch (LOAL) precision point targeting of an unlimited vehicle threat target set. Moving, stationary, hot, cold, hard, or soft targets could be engaged using a designator from the UAV or from the ground. Although it was still collected, data from the acoustic subsystem was not used in an engagement. The Viper Strike configuration used a strap- down seeker that restricted the search field of view for target acquisition. As a result, near vertical attack trajectory against a target was required for optimal performance. For attack of targets between buildings in urban areas, this near vertical attack would be ideal if a line-of-sight from a laser designator could be maintained during an engagement. This nine-week program and demonstration validated the VS concept and provided the Army an opportunity to deploy armed UAVs with a lethal precision strike capability with minimal collateral damage.211 Following the 18 April 2003 Army Systems Acquisition Review Council‟s (ASARC) decision for the Future Combat System, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army asked about the status of weaponizing UAVs. As tasked by the VCSA to review the requirement for an armed UAV capability and to provide the way ahead, TRADOC provided the VCSA with an information paper entitled “Road Ahead for Weaponization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems (UAVS)” on 20 June 2003 that outlined the recommended courses of action. Subsequently, the Acting Chief of Staff of the Army directed the execution of the near-term actions involving VS outlined in the paper.212 In late June 2003 the Army fielded a Viper Strike to a Hunter UAV unit in Iraq. To meet the 30 September 2003 deadline, a joint effort by the TRADOC System Manager (TSM) for Unmanned Air Vehicles and Rockets and Missiles (proving the fire support perspective), Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Program Manager Viper Strike, and the Directorate of Combat Developments at Fort Rucker, Alabama, finalized the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and the concept of operations

2102000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 131-35; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 101-02; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 82; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 100. 2112003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 101-02; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90. 2122004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 90-91.

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(CONOPS).213 Meanwhile, the ATACMS II BAT program changed dramatically in view of the success with the UAV program. On 15 October 2002 a congressional joint appropriations meeting on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 budget terminated the BAT program and allocated funding for developing and testing the P3I BAT multi-mode seeker technology to be carried on a variety of platforms (ATACMS, Guided-Multiple- Launch Rocket System, and unmanned aerial vehicle), leaving the Army with less than one hundred ATACMS II BATs in its inventory. Later in 2004 when ATACMS II went out of production, the Army concentrated its attention on using the remaining BAT submunitions and P3I BAT submunitions with UAVs. Basically, ATACMS II would no longer carry BAT or P3I BAT submunitions.214 Like the BAT but more robust, the P3I BAT would employ acoustic sensors to locate moving targets. Once the acoustic sensor had acquired the target (surface-to- surface missile transporter erector launchers, heavy multiple rocket launchers, and armor), the multi-mode seeker would use its millimeter wave and imaging infrared sensors to track the target to impact. When the system was employed against a silent, stationary target, the submunition would fly a pre-programmed search path and use its millimeter wave and infrared seekers to detect, acquire, and track a target to impact in adverse weather and battlefield obscurants.215 Meanwhile, the Army fielded the Congressionally-directed Quick Reaction Unitary (QRU) ATACMS in 2002 in response to the urgent need statement from Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Korea, of 2001. Highly responsive, all-weather, long-range, and GPS-aided, the QRU ATACMS added a further deep strike capability for responsive precision employment in areas of dense foliage, deep snow cover, and built-up urban environments. It would provide the corps and joint task force commander with the capability to attack time sensitive targets where collateral damage, fratricide, bomblet dud rates, or pilot/aircraft risk might be of concern. It had a range of 270 kilometers and a point detonating fuse.216 Initially, Congress provided $7 million for the development, testing, and procurement of the ATACMS QRU missile but increased funding. Additional congressional supplemental appropriations in 2001 through 2004 placed 326 QRU systems under contract with 150 of these systems having been delivered through December 2004. The Army‟s procurement plan only covered procurement of these missiles until FY 2008 unless otherwise directed by Congress.217 In an effort to ensure continued procurement of QRU missiles since no requirement previously existed for the munition, the recommendation was made during the General Officer level adjudication of comments to the ATACMS Unitary ORD that

2132003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101-02; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91. 2142002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 82-83; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 83-84. 2152002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 82-83; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84. 2162002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 83; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84. 2172004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89.

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QRU specific data be added to the ORD expressing it as an increment to the objective Unitary missile. Initially, the idea met some resistance because some feared that QRU would then be viewed as an adequate solution for the objective missile. Based on the fact, however, that QRU met one of three key performance parameters (KPPs) as well as several other factors, the decision was made to incorporate spiraling the QRU to ATACMS Unitary in the Unitary ORD.218 Shortly thereafter, the General Officer level comment matrix was sent forward to the Future Center‟s Director for Capabilities Developments for review and signature. Because he was unavailable, his Deputy Director signed in his absence on 29 November 2004. Pending additional adjustments currently being made to the ORD at the Army level, the signed document was scheduled to be loaded onto the Knowledge Management Database System (KMDS) for joint level review. Upon completion of the joint review, the ORD would then go before several boards preceding the final decision to accept, partially accept, or reject the document. In 2006 the Army approved the Unitary ORD.219 While Joint Staff comments on the ORD were being resolved in 2005, the Army took steps to improve the QRU ATACMS besides integrating the system into the ATACMS operational requirements document for approval. The Army updated the guidance package to increase the attack angle to near vertical and redesignated the missile as the ATACMS 2000.220 In 2006 the Army had two Unitary QRU ATACMS. One became the M48, while the other, the XM57 (ATACMS 2000), was undergoing testing and would provide vertical attack to minimize collateral damage. During the year, the Army conducted several successful XM57 test flights and initiated action to develop an optimized warhead with a Tri-mode fuse that would give the Unitary the ability to execute an air burst, a point detonation, or delay missions. Two years later in 2008, the Army Aviation and Missile Command approved full materiel release of the Army Tactical Missile System Unitary M48 fuse to give the Army four ATACMS variants -- Block I, Block IA, QRU Unitary, and Block II that was no longer in production.221 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) meanwhile provided ATACMS with its first combat test since Operation Desert Storm of 1991. From 20 March 2003 to 10 April 2003, field artillery units fired over 450 ATACMS missiles in support of joint combat operations with thirteen QRU ATACMS being part of the initial preparation of the battlefield that allowed the ground campaign to commence. During the Mother of All Sandstorms (24-27 March 2003) that had a one hundred-meter visibility and winds gusting up to fifty knots with thousands of Iraqi paramilitary in the area, “Ground based indirect fires (ATACMS) were absolutely critical . . .” according to Brigadier General Lloyd J. Austin III, the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) for the 3rd Infantry

2182003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 89-90; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 89. 2192004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 89-90; 2006 USAFACFS ACH, p. 89. 2202005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 85; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 113. 2212006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 90; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 113; 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS), Annual History (AH), p. 117.

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Division.222 This organic fire support capability allowed the ground commander the freedom to maneuver his forces out of contact while setting the conditions for his next fight and permitting him the flexibility to adapt to overcome the actions of an interactive, thinking enemy.223 Specifically, the Army had two variants of the ATACMS in 2009. ATACMS Unitary (M48/M57) had been used with great effectiveness in OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan. ATACMS Unitary had the precision to attack high-payoff targets at extended ranges as well as troops in contact with minimal collateral damage. The other variant, the Anti-Personnel/Anti-Material (APAM) cluster munition (Block I/Block II), dispensed cluster munitions over a wide area. While they were employed extensively early in the major combat portion of OIF, the APAM variants did not comply with the 2008 DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians that would preclude using them after 2018 and force employing ATACMS Unitary.224 Despite this success and others in OIF and the global war on terrorism, scarce funding prompted the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Claude M. Bolton, Jr., to sign a memorandum to terminate ATACMS. This required the Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space to cancel all remaining contract actions as required. This involved closing out production facilities after final deliveries had been made in FY 2008. The Army‟s request for additional eighty-four ATACMS Unitary to replenish stockpiles in the FY 2008 Supplemental Budget led to the Army‟s decision in April 2008 to move termination activities scheduled for 2009 to 2010. As scheduled, the Army stopped production of the ATACMS Unitary in 2010.225 As of January 2010, the Army‟s inventory of ATACMS was 2,036. This included 1,503 APAM variant missiles and 533 ATACMS Unitary missiles. Nearly seventy-five percent of the ATACMS missiles failed compliancy requirements with the DOD Cluster Munition Policy and would be prohibited from being used after 2018. To ensure the stockpile of ATACMS missiles until their expiration dates of FY 2016 for APAM and approximately FY 2021 for the Unitary variant the Army developed a service life extension program in 2009 to extend the APAM variant by ten years and to convert them to Unitary. This would give the Army a serviceable all-weather, long-range precision missile attack capability and eliminate the non-compliant APAM variant missiles.226 Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System In “Fires: The Cutting Edge for the 21st Century” in the Field Artillery Magazine in the May-June 1998 edition, the Assistant Commandant of the Field Artillery School, Brigadier General Toney Stricklin, outlined the school‟s vision of the future of fire

222Patrecia S. Hollis, “3d ID in OIF: Fires for the Distributed Battlefield,” Field Artillery Magazine, Sep-Oct 03, p. 12, Doc III-80b, 2003 USAFACFS ACH. 2232003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 103; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91. 2242009 USAFAS AH, p. 118; Interview, Dastrup with Leighton Duitsman, TCM RAMS Dep Dir, 10 Feb 11, Doc III-47. 225Interview, Dastrup with Duitsman, 10 Feb 11. 2262009 USAFAS AH, p. 118.

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support. Among other things, the vision proposed an advanced fire support system that would be a family of precision missiles. They would have the capability of attacking with precision or loitering over the target area before attacking with precision and would not require a large, heavy, expensive and crew-intensive launch platform.227 Out of this vision evolved the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) NetFires technology demonstration program. Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and Boeing Corporation began work on the concept definition in 1998 to establish an initial concept. In 1999 the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory at Fort Sill (renamed the Fires Battle Laboratory in 2006) became the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command‟s (TRADOC) proponent to give DARPA and the contractor teams the information needed to develop critical design parameters and system characteristics. One year later in August 2000, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon started fabricating the system with detailed design for two missile variants (precision attack missile and loiter attack missile) being completed later in the year. Basically, NetFires would consist of a container/launch unit with fifteen containerized missiles and an on-board computer and communications system. NetFires would deliver two missile variants -- the loiter attack missile (LAM) with a range of seventy kilometers plus a search time of approximately thirty minutes and the precision attack missile (PAM) with a maximum range of forty kilometers.228 Over a period of several years beginning in 2001, the DARPA-managed NetFires technology demonstration program designed, fabricated, tested, and demonstrated small, container-launched missiles to provide massive, responsive, precision firepower early in a conflict. NetFires would be designed for a low logistics burden and low life-cycle cost. The system would be shipped in its launching container, would require no additional launch support equipment, and could be fired remotely from trucks, a variety of other platforms, or the ground. NetFires rounds would be ready to fire almost immediately, resulting in a much faster response time and a higher potential rate of fire than possible with current howitzers or missile launchers and would provide a precision non-line-of- sight capability. Equally important, NetFires would operate within the Battle Command System (a command and control system), would be one of eighteen Future Combat Systems (FCS) core systems, and would be organic to the Unit of Action in the Objective Force, later renamed brigade combat team.229 In June 2002 the Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) and Fort Sill‟s Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory

2272002 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 102. 2282002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 103; 2001 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 122-23; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 93; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 80. Because of Base Realignment and Closure 2005 initiatives that involved collocating the Air Defense Artillery Center and School and the Field Artillery Center and School at Fort Sill, TRADOC changed the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory name to the Fires Battle Laboratory. 2292001 USAFACFS ACH, p. 122; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 103-04; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 93-94; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 81.

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began a cooperative examination of NetFires Command, Control, and Communications (C3). From November 2002 through September 2003, they conducted four experiments to develop technical requirements and demonstrated a networked C3 solution.230 In the meantime, on 25 October 2002 there was a successful test of the NetFires controlled test vehicle number one at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The entire system, including the missile, container/launch unit, and test control unit performed flawlessly. Preliminary review of the pre-launch and post-launch data indicated that all primary and secondary mission objectives were achieved. Upon ignition of the flight test motor, PAM controlled test vehicle number one left the launch canister vertically. The thrust vector control assembly successfully guided the missile during the first three seconds of flight. The missile successfully pitched over toward its intended impact area. In the first forty seconds of flight, the missile performed each of its programmed maneuvers prior to apogee of approximately twenty thousand feet. At that point the missile successfully performed its second and third set of maneuvers. Following the completion of the third set of maneuvers, preliminary review of the data indicated that the missile successfully glided to its intended impact point.231 In view of the successful tests, the Army initiated a formal NetFires acquisition program which was renamed the Non-Line of Sight Launch System (NLOS-LS) late in 2002 to avoid confusion with Fort Sill‟s evolving Networked Fires concept for the Objective Force. In June 2003 oversight of the program moved from the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory at Fort Sill to the TRADOC System Manager (TSM) Rockets and Missiles (RAMS). Concurrently, the Army established Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 for equipping the first unit for operational testing and FY 2013 for full operational capability. In the meantime, in controlled test vehicle number two, a PAM was launched and flew nineteen kilometers using only GPS navigation to impact twenty- nine inches from the intended target. Two months later in August 2003, in guided vehicle test number one, a PAM flew nine kilometers using its semi-active laser seeker to locate and impact a stationary target that was being laser designated by a ground observer.232 Work on the NLOS-LS moved forward in 2004. In March of that year, the Army signed a contract with NetFires, a limited liability company established by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, for a six-year System Design and Development (SDD) of the system. This contract included designing the unattended Container/Launch Unit (CLU), the Loitering Attack Missile, and the Precision Attack Missile. After the termination of the NLOS-LS had been considered, the Defense Authorization Bill for FY 2005 subsequently modified the system‟s acquisition program. The bill cut NLOS-LS funding by $15 million, accelerated work on the Precision Attack Missile, and slowed down work on the Loiter Attack Missile. Although the LAM was deemed capable of meeting all of its threshold requirements, this bill returned it to the science and technology base for further maturation and permitted moving the Precision Attack Missile into System

2302003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 81. 2312003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 94. 2322002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 103; 2003 USAFACFS ACH; pp. 94-95; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 81-82.

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Design and Development because its technology was easier to integrate with existing command and control systems than Loiter Attack Missile‟s.233 In view of the funding modification, the Army revamped its FCS fielding plan with the intent of fielding the NLOS-LS‟s PAM and CLU by 2010. To accomplish this objective the Army accelerated developing PAM and CLU to get it to the field as soon as possible through an evolutionary spiral development. Development would proceed in four discrete phases or blocks, called spin outs, each of which would result in the development of fieldable CLU prototypes being delivered to the Army in December 2005. Moving into the next spin out meant that the prototype had to meet specific performance parameters. As one of the first three Future Combat System systems to be employed in the Current Force, NLOS-LS with PAM would initially be incorporated into the fires battalion of the Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT) and then the other modular brigades. This HBCT organization later would be transformed from a modular brigade into the FCS Brigade Combat Team in 2014.234 In 2005 the Army made a number of other key decisions with the NLOS-LS program. In the HBCT command and control for the system would be the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) and would reside in a dedicated control cell added to the Fires Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Battery. This High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle-mounted system would plan and execute NLOS-LS missions and allow communication with missile in flight to engage moving targets. Two control cells would be provided to the Evaluation Brigade Combat Team (EBCT) at Fort Bliss, Texas, in 2008. After evaluation of the control cell and launch units, passage of acquisition Milestone C, and entry into limited rate initial production in 2008, operational testing would be conducted with initial operational capability for NLOS-LS coming in 2010.235 In 2006 Fort Sill began experiencing the consequences of the Army‟s decision to accelerate fielding the NLOS-LS in 2008 for FCS Spinout One. One of the first consequences involved the need for a command and control system to take the place of the FCS Battle Command System which would not support NLOS-LS until after 2010. Another consequence required a decision where the NLOS-LS would be located within the modular brigade combat team structure and was complicated by the delay in the availability of the Joint Tactical Radio System radios for the CLU and the controlling headquarters. By mid-2006 the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) had decided that the NLOS-LS section, consisting of eleven personnel and six CLUs, would be assigned to the headquarters battery of the fires battalion in the HBCT. Meanwhile, the Army published system requirements as a capabilities description document within the FCS Operational Requirements Documents which was approved by the Joint

2332004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 82; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 74-75; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 78. 2342004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 82; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 75; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 77; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 80. 2352006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 77.

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Requirements Oversight Committee on 27 April 2006.236 Because of the earlier decision to use AFATDS as NLOS-LS‟s command and control system, the Army developed requirements in 2006 that would add functionality to AFATDS and the Forward Observer System. An interface control document was written and numerous interoperability meetings were held to ensure that the CLU and PAM would interface completely through AFATDS. The Project Office provided funding for this effort and modifications to the Forward Observer System to allow the forward observer to engage moving targets with PAM and send messages to the missile in flight.237 The Army completed other critical milestones with NLOS-LS in 2006. Even though LAM was still being used in experimentation, work was halted on the system because of the lack of funding. Meanwhile, TRADOC started crucial preparations for fielding the first NLOS-LS section by assembling the EBCT at Fort Bliss, Texas. The EBCT would be responsible for evaluating all spin out systems to determine their effectiveness before a final decision would be made to field them to the Army. As a result, Fort Sill began preparing the necessary soldier and leader training materials and developing test plans and procedures.238 Filmed in 2006, the Discovery Channel presented a “Future Weapons” segment in February 2007 devoted to the significance of NLOS-LS precision capabilities and small operational footprint. On 2 May 2007 at the request of Major General Charles A. Cartwright, the Program Manager for FCS, the Army conducted a low-velocity airdrop test at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, from twelve hundred feet. There were no visual damages on the CLU. Developmental testing did not go well in 2007 as hoped. The last successful NLOS-LS test flight, an Enhanced Ballistic Test Vehicle (EBTV), was conducted at White Sands Missile Range in April 2007. The next three Captive Test Vehicle (CTV) flights (July through November) ended in failure but for unrelated reasons.239 Meanwhile, influenced by competing priorities and needs, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology (ASAALT) restructured the FCS program in January 2007 by eliminating or deferring some systems and requirements. The description of the spin out scheme was changed by referring to the final FBCT spin out as the objective design. This effectively reduced the number of spin outs from four to three. There was little effect on NLOS-LS, except that the success of Spinout One came to depend more and more on fewer systems.240 As TRADOC gathered together the Spin Out test unit in 2007 to demonstrate the technical readiness of unattended ground sensors, the NLOS-LS, and the fledgling Battle Command System, the EBCT was temporarily flagged as 5-1st Field Artillery Regiment and renamed the Army Evaluation Task Force (AETF) with the NLOS-LS section

2362006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 78-79; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 81. 2372006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 79. 2382006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 79; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 117-18. 2392007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 81-82; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 118. 2402007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 82.

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assigned to the 1-3rd Field Artillery Regiment. Control of the AETF was formally transferred from the Unit of Action Battle Lab (UAMBL) at Fort Knox to the Future Force Integration Directorate (FFID) at Fort Bliss in March 2007. Contributing to the effort, TRADOC Capabilities Manager (TCM) Rockets and Missiles (RAMS) prepared and had oversight of materials needed to conduct a number of AETF training events such as the tactical leader‟s course (TLC), the new material information briefing (NMIB), and new equipment training (NET). This led to fielding prototype production CLUs and prototype control cells to the NLOS-LS new equipment training team (NET) of the AETF by a combined military, government and contractor team in October 2007. This fielding was necessarily complex due to the revolutionary nature of NLOS-LS and changes that were made to the Forward Observer System and AFATDS, requiring the retraining of 13B (Cannon Crewmember), 13D (Field Artillery Tactical System Specialists), 13F (Fire Support Specialist), and 13A/131A (Warrant Officer) soldiers in the employment of precision munitions. To support the prototype fielding, TCM RAMS completed a major rewrite of Special Text 3-09.65 which was released in September 2007.241 Numerous studies and integration events also occurred throughout 2007. They included logistics demonstrations, FCS Experiment 1.1 connectivity display, analysis of munition mixes and numbers of systems, Army Research Lab (ARL) Control Cell experiments and studies on mission throughput and MANPRINT issues at the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab (DSABL), and a series of software integration exercises at Fort Sill and Baltimore, Maryland, designed to evaluate requirements implementation and “shake out” hardware and software incompatibilities. Through analysis and compromise, the number of CLUs required to support a modular BCT was determined to be twenty-four, although only six per brigade were funded in the program objective memorandum in the out years, as the idea of proliferating NLOS-LS beyond the HBCT gained acceptance. Thus, work continued unabated along many avenues to prepare NLOS-LS for a rigorous technical and operational test schedule in 2008.242 Modeled after a heavy brigade combat team, AETF meanwhile tested the CLU and control cell hardware and software in 2008 at Fort Bliss, while the NLOS-LS Program Management Office/Netfires LLC conducted PAM developmental testing at the White Sands Missile Range. The Program Management Office/Netfires LLC conducted a total of six PAM test flights, completed the captive test vehicle (CTV) and began the Army guided test vehicle (GTV) series. Although some of the test objectives were deferred, the flights were generally successful. However, the annual window for cold weather testing in Alaska was missed due to late delivery of test missiles by the contractor.243 Tests also encompassed all aspects of system utilization from tactics, techniques, and procedures for tactical movement and employment of the system to exercising the digital fire mission thread from sensor to shooter. The tests consisted of a technical field test, a force development test and evaluation, and a preliminary limited user test. All of

2412007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 82. 2422007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 82-83. 2432008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 119.

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them supported the FCS Spin Out I testing program, including flight tests. The first PAM test flight in November 2008 scored a direct hit on a T-72 tank. The second test in December 2008 demonstrated the PAM‟s ability to acquire a laser designated target with its semi-active laser seeker, process the target information, and transfer the information to its imaging infrared mode seeker for final target processing and attack. Later in December 2008, NLOS-LS completed its third successful flight test by making a direct hit on a T-72 tank. The tests scheduled for 2009 would include sixteen more GTV flights and a Limited User Test. Upon the successful completion of the tests and passage of a critical program review, low-rate initial production would begin.244 Experimentation and simulation in 2008, meanwhile, failed to yield a definitive answer on the right number of control cells for the platoon which had grown from an eleven-man section to a platoon of twelve with the inclusion of a 13A Field Artillery officer as platoon leader. The control cell, collocated with the CLUs, received fire missions via AFATDS, sent the mission data to a specific CLU, using the Single Channel Radio System and Soldier Radio Waveform, and relayed communications between the forward observer and the missile. The Fort Gordon Signal Center championed plans to field additional radios to forward observers for direct communication to the missile in flight, but the idea lost inertia due to unanticipated limitations of the Joint Tactical Radio System and repeated slips in that program‟s schedule. While the intent was also to replace the modified missile radio being used in the prototype control cell with a JTRS ground mobile radio (GMR) for communication with CLUs and missiles in flight, it became clear that that this temporary solution would have to make do for the foreseeable future.245 Meanwhile, FCS and Army leadership decided that the Spin Out systems would provide greater advantage if first fielded to IBCTs rather than HBCTs to give them additional situational awareness and self-protection capabilities and organic precision fires which they did not have. This necessitated rewriting the Spin Out Capabilities Production Document (CPD) with an IBCT focus as well as all supporting documentation and rewriting Special Text 3-09.65 to reflect an IBCT focus and staffing it with the intent of releasing it in December 2008 which did not happen. The new version struggled with the NLOS-LS platoon‟s limited self-defense capability and recommended teaming it with a cannon platoon for security. This replaced the earlier operational concept formulated by DARPA where CLUs would be scattered around the battlefield with little or no means of security. In addition, collocating NLOS-LS with a firing battery would provide the IBCT with the means of engaging long- and short-range targets with precision and area munitions throughout the brigade‟s battle space. Along with this turmoil caused by the change in leadership and soldiers in the AETF, the change to an IBCT organization would require revalidating some events already completed.246 In 2009 NLOS-LS work shifted to the right, meaning all test events and milestones were delayed, to allow more development and production time for the PAM

2442008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 119-20. 2452008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 120. 2462007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 83; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 120.

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and CLU. The GTVs were delayed until they could move no more while still supporting the Flight User Test (F-LUT) in July 2009 and subsequently the Milestone C decision Low-Rate Initial Production decision in December 2009. Although the program completed fourteen of the remaining seventeen GTV flights by December 2009, the results were generally encouraging with a record of seven hits, four misses, and three no- launch events. However, this delayed the F-LUT until January 2010 and pushed the interim Defense Acquisition Board to 2 April 2010.247 Meanwhile, the developers conducted two major tests -- Force Development Test and Evaluation in July 2009 and the Ground LUT in August 2009. The tests supported an organizational change of adding a second control cell to the platoon. Other recommendations included either adding more weapons and personnel to the platoon and/or collocating with another unit such as a cannon platoon or battery.248 To support the two tests, TCM RAMS NLOS-LS team updated and provided a revised version of the Special Text 3-09.65. Following the summer‟s tests and in preparation for the coming F-LUT, the team published addendum one to the special text. TCM RAMS and the NLOS-LS program management office also provided AETF Fires Battalion personnel a capabilities and limitations training brief to correct some command perceptions about the missile‟s infrared seeker along with a detailed explanation of the safety precautions.249 A significant temporary change to the CLU‟s design also started as a concept during the year. Since the SCRS Rev 4 radio in the CLU did not communicate securely and the Joint Tactical Radio System was not yet available, TCM RAMS recommended connecting the CLU to the radio in the FMTV for communication with the control cell. However, Major General John Bartley, Program Executive Office, Integration, and Major General Keith Walker, Director of the Army‟s Future Force Integration Directorate at Fort Bliss, determined that the CLU had to be able to operate apart from its prime mover. The Program Manager therefore decided to add a SINCGARS radio in place of one of the fifteen missiles as an interim design change to support secure communications.250 On 13 May 2010 the Department of Defense announced an abrupt change in the NLOS-LS program. Because the missile failed to hit four of six targets during the LUT of January-February 2010, because the Army determined fixing the system‟s problems would delay the program more than a year, and because a review of the precision munitions portfolio determined that the PAM was unaffordable and did not provide a cost-effective precision fire capability, the Army opted to pursue other capabilities to engage a moving target in all-weather conditions in order to fulfill the operational requirement defined for the NLOS-LS and concluded that the system was no longer required. In view of this, the Secretary of the Army recommended cancellation of the program; and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

2472009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH), pp. 124-25. 2482009 USAFAS AH, pp. 124-25. 2492009 USAFAS AH, pp. 124-25. 2502009 USAFAS AH, pp. 124-25.

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approved and authorized the request on 13 May 2010. This cancelled the program.251 Firefinder Radars As the Firefinder Q-36 Version 7 radar was being developed and fielded, the Field Artillery School introduced another change to its counterfire radar system modernization program in 1990. Because the existing Firefinder Q-37 radar was based upon 1970s technology and because the Q-36 modernization effort would not meet all of the Field Artillery‟s radar requirements as initially planned, the School identified the need for developing the Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System (ATACS) to replace the Q-37. The Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System would take advantage of leap-ahead technology to give the Army a passive system or, at a minimum, passive or active cuing, would reduce the equipment and manpower needs significantly, and would furnish support to the corps area of influence in AirLand Operations. In addition, it would be capable of driving on and off a C-130 and larger aircraft and air insertion by CH-47D helicopter and would reduce crew size from twelve to six to cut personnel costs.252 As it fielded the Q-37 Block I which was an upgrade to the Q-37 as an interim measure, the Army initiated developmental work on the ATACS. Besides utilizing advanced technology to furnish dramatically improved capabilities over the Q-37, ATACS would replace all Q-37s, including the Q-37 Block I, on a one-for-one basis and would meet the needs of the objective force.253 Challenges altered the program. In 1999 the Army redesignated the ATACS program as the AN/TPQ-47 (Q-47). Technological problems and schedule delays necessitated the rebaselining of the Q-47 program several times. In 2002, the Army redesignated the radar program as the Phoenix Battlefield Sensor System (PBS2). Hardware reliability issues and software interface developmental delays forced the Army to terminate the developmental contract with Raytheon in September 2004. The problem with cost overruns and schedule delays was compounded by the Army‟s transition to the modular force and redefining the contemporary operational environment. The Phoenix system, while providing increased capability in range and accuracy, was a 90-degree sensing system when it was becoming increasingly apparent that the Army required a 360-degree sensing capability.254 Because of the demise of the Phoenix Program, the Army deferred approved long- range counterfire target acquisition capability requirements. However, the medium range threat set (cannon and rockets) and the 360-degree medium range coverage identified a

251“Army Cancels Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,” DOD News Release, 13 May 10, Doc III-48; “Army Asks to Cancel NLOS-LS,” Army Times, 23 Apr 10, Doc III-49; Interview, Dastrup with Leighton Duitsman, TCM RAMS, Dep Dir, 10 Feb 11, Doc III-49a; Fires Forward, Apr 10, Doc III-50. 2521995 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 141-42. 2532000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 135-37; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 84. 2542005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 86; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 91.

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capability gap with no fielded solution. The Futures Development and Integration Center (FDIC) in the Field Artillery School then began defining a material change to the Q-36 radar that would incorporate new technology into an existing radar to close that gap with a relatively short developmental cycle. The Enhanced Q-36 (EQ-36) radar would reduce crew size and footprint, would increase range and accuracy against cannon and rockets in a 90-degree mode, and would spiral from an initial increment 360-degree capability against only mortars to a 360-degree capability for mortars, cannon, and rockets. In January 2007 the Army awarded a contract to Lockheed Martin to produce a prototype in thirty months with the goal of having the first unit equipped in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2010.255 Lockheed Martin and the Syracuse Research Corporation made significant progress with the EQ-36 in 2007-2008. In the spring of 2007, the prototype successfully completed testing in 90- and 360-degree modes at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Later in November 2007 and December 2007, the contractors tested a prototype EQ-36 again at Yuma Proving Ground. During the tests which were designed to evaluate the radar‟s ability to meet Army requirements, the prototype successfully located the firing positions of rockets and mortar launchers in a 360-degree mode. Based upon this, the Army awarded Lockheed Martin a contract for initial production systems.256 As of the end of 2010, the contractor had produced and fielded twelve initial production systems. Six of the twelve were delivered to the theaters of operations, while prototypes had been delivered to Fort Sill for training the trainers and developing programs of instruction for institutional training. Meanwhile, the Army directed full-rate production for the system to be awarded on full and open competition with the contractor selected to produce the Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) of 174 systems.257 Lightweight Countermortar Radar Over the past several years, the Field Artillery School worked to introduce the Lightweight Countermortar Radar (LCMR). Originally called the man-portable countermortar radar, the LCMR emerged from requirements identified late in the 1990s by the Special Operations Forces. Because the existing AN/TPQ-36 and AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars lacked the ability to scan 360 degrees and the mobility and agility to accompany light, early and force entry forces, the Special Operations Forces had a critical need for a lightweight countermortar radar with the capability of scanning 360 degrees to detect the location of short-range mortars rapidly and accurately. This led to the development of the LCMR (AN/TPQ-48) prototype that was specially designed to support the Special Operations Forces and Ranger units. A man-portable system with a maximum range of seven thousand meters and a minimum range of one thousand meters, the LCMR had the ability to search 360 degrees and to detect and track mortar fire. Such capabilities would permit responsive counterfire to destroy fleeting improvised shooters

2552008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 121-22. 2562008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 121-22; Email with atch, subj: TPSO Sensors History for 2010, 22 Feb 10, Doc III-99, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH). 257Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 11, Doc III-51.

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including those in urban area.258 Subsequently, the Army awarded a contract to Syracuse Research Corporation to develop and produce the radar. Requirements documentation was written and approved. It adopted the Special Operations Command‟s (SOCOM) requirements as a baseline and planned to utilize a spiral development strategy to achieve the full capability needed for fielding. An operational needs statement (ONS) further defined the requirements. Accuracy and range would increase while maintaining the mobility and transportability of the original LCMR concept.259 In 2004 the Army started fielding the Special Operations Forces Increment I version of LCMR to forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Increment I met the immediate needs of deployed forces with a range of five kilometers and a target location error of 100-plus meters, while future spirals (Increment II and out) would satisfy the capability gaps identified the Operational and Organizational Concept of 2004. Fielded in 2005- 2006, Increment II provided more rugged hardware and better software and was part of the counter rocket, artillery and mortar (C-RAM) system of systems, while Increment III would double the radar‟s range to ten kilometers and improve its accuracy to a fifty-meter target location error.260 In 2008 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Program Officer Sensors at Fort Sill wrote and staffed a capabilities document for the LCMR. Syracuse Research Corporation received the contract to produce the record LCMR (AN/TPQ-50) that had an Army Acquisition Objective (AAO) of four hundred systems. Syracuse Research Corporation produced and fielded fourteen initial AN/TPQ-50 systems. According to information and plans in 2010, record production systems would include a vehicle mount configuration and the current stand-alone configuration and would be fielded to the brigade combat teams (BCT) with four per Heavy BCT and five per Stryker BCT and the Fires Brigades (two per brigade).261 COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System Because the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE) was large, heavy, and based on 1950s and 1960s technology, the Army decided to supplant it with a new system. In 1981 after three years of work, the Army and the Department of Defense (DOD) approved developing the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

2582004 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), p. 99; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, p. 100; Information Paper, SRC Tec, 2010, Doc III-52; Scott R. Gourley, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar,” Army Magazine, Apr 02, Doc III-53; Navy Lt.j.g. Jason Calandruccio, Defense Contract Management Agency, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar, www.dcma.mil, Winter 02, Doc III-54. 2592006 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 91-92; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 94; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 122. 2602004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 99; Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 11, Doc III-55. 261Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 11.

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(AFATDS) to replace TACFIRE and to be a part of the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) which would be a family of computers, peripherals, operating systems, utilities, and software and would support each individual battlefield operating system.262 After a decade of work that was fraught with many developmental delays, the Army decided to field AFATDS software incrementally in versions with each building on the previous to get the software to the field sooner. On 27 April 1990 the Army signed a contract with Magnavox for version one (later renamed AFATDS 96) software.263 To accommodate growing fire support requirements the Army revamped AFATDS software fielding schedule in 1996. The Army planned to field three variations of AFATDS version two software between 1997 and 1999 as AFATDS 97, AFATDS 98, and AFATDS 99 (also called A99) and AFATDS software version three in 2000 as AFATDS 00 (renamed AFATDS Version 7 in 2000 to match Army Battlefield Command System numbering). Fielded in 1998, AFATDS 97 furnished corps and echelons-above- corps functionality, modified MLRS/Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) command and control processes, and enabled the Field Artillery to plan and execute deep battle operations faster and safer than ever before. Later in 2000, the Army fielded AFATDS 98 that was the first AFATDS software version to address specific U.S. Marine Corps requirements.264 Fielded to active and reserve component units beginning in April 2002, AFATDS 99 (A99), renamed Version 6 in 2002 to match Army Battlefield Command System (ABCS) numbering convention and officially released in November 2002, enhanced AFATDS ability to compute tactical and technical fire direction. It reorganized and simplified menus and windows, streamlined plain text message access, enhanced alerts, created shortcuts, and incorporated technical fire direction. Equally important, the new capabilities of Version 6 eliminated the Battery Computer System (BCS) for cannon field artillery and Fire Direction System (FDS) for the Multiple-Launch Rocket System (MLRS). Also, Version 6 had improved interoperability with other ABCS computers, underwent successful initial interoperability testing in 2002 with several allied systems, including the French Automation des tires et liaison de l-Artillery sol-so (ATLAS), the German Artillerie Daten, Lage und Einsatz-Rechnerverbund (ADLER), the Italian (Sistema Informatico di Reggimento (SIR), and the United Kingdom Battlefield Artillery Target Engagement System (BATES), and was a part of the Artillery Systems Cooperative Activity (ASCA). ASCA was created to provide guidance for establishing interface among the five nations‟ automated field artillery systems.265

2622000 U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill (USAFACFS) Annual Command History (ACH), pp. 148-49. 2632000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 149-51. 2642000 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 148-55; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 90. 2652000 USAFACFS ACH, p. 155; 2002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96; 2006 U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill (USAFCOEFS) ACH, pp. 102-03; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 104; Artillery Systems Cooperation Activities Operator‟s Notebook (Extract), 11 Oct 06, pp. 1-3, Doc III-101,

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Developed to achieve interoperability among the fire support command and control systems of the five participating nations (France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and the United States) ASCA Version 4 software completed operational evaluation in May 2003. The five nations fielded the software in 2004 and 2005; and NATO adopted it as STANAG 2245 in 2005. Available in all AFATDS in 2009 and 2010, Version 4 supported artillery system functions (meteorological messages and battlefield and airspace control measures), deployment commands, status reports (fire unit status and ammunition status), artillery intelligence functions (target information requests and target information reports), fire missions (initial call for fire, response to originator, subsequent orders, and methods of control), fire planning (reservation of resources and fire plan orders), target management (specifying target attack means and specifying ammunition exclusions), requests/free texts (requests for data and free text), and nuclear-biological-chemical messages.266 In 2007 successful ASCA Version 5 Technical testing occurred with operational evaluation in 2009. AFATDS software with ASCA Version 5 included maintenance (reeducation in national restrictions, changes to NATO doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and changes to national systems), improved functionality, and new functionality (smart munitions, radar tasking and deployment, and unmanned aerial vehicle tasking). Fielding ASCA Version 5 began in 2010 was schedule to continue into 2011.267 As the fielding of AFATDS 6.3.1 that replaced Version 6 in 2003 moved forward, meanwhile, the Army proceeded with the development of AFATDS 6.4 which was formerly AFATDS Version 7 (AFATDS version 3/AFATDS 00). Pushing to automate all Army units, the Chief of Staff of the Army made ABCS 6.4 the minimum standard and directed that Version 7 would not be developed. To ensure full integration with ABCS 6.4, the Field Artillery School started working on ABCS/AFATDS 6.4 in 2003- 2004. Early in 2005, a general officer steering committee approved universal fielding and training on ABCS/AFATDS 6.4. Subsequently, the Army conducted operational testing at Fort Hood, Texas, provided collective training to active and reserve component units, initiated training in the Field Artillery School in October 2005, and began fielding ABCS/AFATDS 6.4 to the Total Force. In addition to this, AFATDS Version 6.4.0.1, supporting Excalibur, was fielded in 2007, while AFATDS Version 6.4.0.2 was released in September 2008. Priority fielding went to units deploying or deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; and AFATDS Version 6.5 was granted full materiel release in December 2008.268 Subsequently, the Army initiated work on AFATDS Version 6.6 and started ______2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH). 266Field Artillery CSM Newsletter (Extract), Nov 2009, p. 8, Doc III-56. 2672006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 103; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 104-05; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 134; Field Artillery CSM Newsletter (Extract) Nov 2009, p. 8. 2682005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 96; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 105; 2008 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 134-35; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 140; Information Paper, subj: PM Battle Command, undated, Doc III-57.

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fielding it in 2010 with completion in 2012. This version modernized fire planning and scheduling that permitted drag and drop and time scheduling, among other improvements.269 During 2007 and 2008, work to restructure AFATDS software to permit it to be installed and run on personal computers with a Windows operating system began. The ability to operate on Windows increased the options for reusing commercial software applications and helped to control program costs. The first AFATDS Windows version software, version 6.5.1, was scheduled to be completely fielded by 2013. Version 6.5.1 contained the same features as the UNIX version 6.5 and was compatible with version 6.5. A Windows version and a UNIX version of software would be provided for each software issue until all UNIX based systems were replaced with the Windows based hardware.270 In July 2010 the Army released AFATDS Version 6.6.0 to the field. For this version, the entire human interface moved to Java, the Fire Planning/Target Scheduling Worksheet was completely redesigned, and a web portal was created to access AFATDS data through a web browser. Air support features improved to include a digital link to the USMC‟s TLDHS (strikelink); and digital threads were now able to be processed from initial request through aircraft control and mission complete.271 AFATDS Version 6.7.0 was scheduled to be released in early 2011. Capabilities include multiple precision aimpoint missions, expanded AFATDS interface to Centaur, and a digital link to USAF‟s (Terminal Air Control Party) TACP for CAS management.272 Handheld Command and Control Systems To improve mobility the Field Artillery and the Army aggressively pursued handheld devices to augment AFATDS and to ensure that the entire force had common command and control systems that would improve the capabilities of early-entry forces. Beginning in 2002, they began investigating the Pocket-sized Forward Entry Device (PFED) and the Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System (LWTFDS) (Centaur) for fielding.273 Of the new systems, the PFED was the closest to materiel release beginning in the third quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2003. A small, one-channel communications capable, portable computer for the forward observer in all divisions, the PFED which was compatible with AFATDS would allow the forward observer to request or coordinate fire missions, provide combat information, receive orders and information, and interface with laser devices. Initially, the Field Artillery and the Army planned to field PFED beginning

269FCoE CSM Newsletter, Oct 10, p. 25. 2702008 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 135; 2009 USAFAS AH, p. 140; FCoE CSM Newsletter, Fires-7, Nov 09, p. 8; Information Paper, subj: PM Battle Command, undated; RDT&E Budget Item (Extract), Feb 10, Doc III-58. 271Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells Update, 7 Apr 11, Doc III-59. 272Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells Update, 7 Apr 11. 2732002 USAFACFS ACH, p. 91; 2003 USAFACFS ACH, p. 113; 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 103; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 105.

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in March 2004 or April 2004. However, an urgent material release requested by units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) prompted the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) System Manager for Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (TSM FATDS), redesignated as TRADOC Capability Manager (TCM) Fire Support Command, Control, Communications (FSC3) in 2006, to move the fielding date up to February 2004 in order to equip the 3-7th Field Artillery Regiment so that the unit had the system before it deployed to Iraq. Full materiel release came in FY 2005. In 2009-2010 Infantry Brigade Combat Teams had either the PFED 5700 or 3900 with software version 3.00 which produced a refined precision target location and which was the first digital entry device into the fire support command and control system in infantry brigade combat teams. As of the end of 2010, PFED 4.0 was scheduled to be released in the 3rd quarter of 2011 and would include improved fires planning and precision fires imagery (PFI) enhancements.274 FIRES BATTLE LABORATORY In 1992 Fort Sill became an active participant in the Army‟s new Battle Laboratory program. Designed to prepare the Army better for warfighting in the post Cold War era, the battle laboratory program took root in six of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command‟s (TRADOC) key service schools to coordinate ideas about technology and warfighting on the future battlefield. At Fort Sill the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory (now called the Fires Battle Laboratory) was created to fulfill one of the six major components in the program.275 The Fires Battle Laboratory (FBL) concept represented a significant break with Cold War era threat-driven decision making. As General Frederick Franks, the former TRADOC commander, explained it, the FBL was focused on tailoring post-Cold War Army force projections into the twenty first century. In seeking to increase battlefield effectiveness by optimizing combinations between technology and warfighting, the FBL concept envisioned giving the Army a technological edge on future battlefields as well as streamlining the technological modernization process. Before any concept or equipment was tested in the field, the battle laboratories tested it through computer simulations and virtual prototyping. General Franks established the first of six battle laboratories in early April 1992 at the Armor Center at Fort Knox, Kentucky, with the remaining five selected by the end of the month. The six were the Early Entry Battle Lab at TRADOC Headquarters, Fort Monroe, Virginia; the Mounted Battle Space Laboratory, Fort Knox, Kentucky; the Dismounted Battle Space Battle Laboratory, Fort Benning, Georgia; the Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Lab, Fort Sill, Oklahoma; the Battle Command

2742003 USAFACFS ACH, pp. 113-14; 2004 USAFACFS ACH, p. 101; 2005 USAFACFS ACH, p. 97, 2006 USAFCOEFS ACH, p. 104; 2007 USAFCOEFS ACH, pp. 105-06; AUSA Torchbearer Issue (Extract), Key Issues Relevant to the U.S. Army Fires and Warfighters, Oct 09, p. 34, Doc III-103, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School (USAFAS) Annual History (AH); FCoE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Mar 10, p. 9, Doc III-104, 2009 USAFAS AH; Email with atchs subj: TCM Fires Cell Update, 11 Apr 11. 275Email with atch, subj: Fires Battle Lab History 2010, 8 Apr 11, Doc III-60.

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Leavenworth, Kansas; and the Combat Service Support, Fort Lee, Virginia.276 Fort Sill‟s Depth and Simultaneous Attack battle lab began operating on August 1992 with a mission to identify depth and simultaneous needs and then initiate action to resolve these needs using analysis, simulation, experimentation, evaluation, and integration of materiel and non-materiel solutions. The FBL was the first to identify a need to develop an interface that translated simulations‟ messages into tactical messages to stimulate Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) for training. This led to the development of the Enhanced Protocol Interface Unit that enabled artillery staffs to train in a “free play” simulated environment on a large scale. This first step into “doing the impossible” provided immeasurable benefits to the Army and Department of Defense. In 2010 the Fires Center of Excellence (FCoE) was leading simulations development on many fronts and was on the cutting edge of providing enhanced training capabilities. The FBL continued to provide support to FORSCOM units, Fires TRADOC schools, FCoE Capabilities Development Integration Directorate (CDID), and other Battle Labs experiments.277 Fires Battle Laboratory Mission The Fires Battle Laboratory mission involved using live, virtual and/or constructive simulations to gain insights, impacts, and recommended changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF), based on input from soldiers and their leaders, as well as emerging technologies and materiel initiatives to support current and future forces.278 Fires Battle Lab Charter The Battle Laboratory was chartered to provide the means to develop refine and integrate future operational capabilities and architectures in support of Joint and Army concepts and focused on developing and refining tactical and some operational concepts for the Future Force. The Laboratory integrated DOTMLPF imperatives to support the task and purpose of mission concepts and employed experimentation/wargaming and analysis, utilizing modeling, and simulation to produce the underpinnings for concepts and requirements validation.279

Experiments & Wargaming Division (E&W)

The Experiments and Wargaming Division provided tactical scenario development, analytical support, training support, and Subject Matter Expert (SME) support to TRADOC Battle Laboratory experiments, joint experiments, and the CDID. E&W reviewed and provided input to all Fires doctrine, such as Field Manuals, as well as operational and tactical concepts. On order, it provided tactical scenario development, analytical support, training support, and SME support and expertise throughout the Department of Defense.

276Email with atch, subj: Fires Battle Lab History 2010, 8 Apr 11. 277Email with atch, subj: Fires Battle Lab 2010 History, 8 Apr 11. 278Email with atch, subj: Fires Battle Lab 2010 History, 8 Apr 11. 279Email with atch, subj: Fires Battle Lab 2010 History, 8 Apr 11.

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Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment (AEWE) Event Date: January – February 2010

The Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment (AEWE) Spiral F was the sixth in the spiral of live experiments with a simulation wrap-around held at Fort Benning. AEWE is designed to look at technologies that support soldiers in the platoon and company fight in 2014. Spiral F was divided into two experiments; the first experiment a Live platoon equipped with the Land Warrior system participate in a company fight located at the McKenna MOUNT site; this portion of the experiment focus on soldiers use of these new and current technologies and the application of these technologies during an integrated platoon fight. The second experiment within AEWE focused on how an Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) employs a robotic platoon in a simulated brigade fight. The simulated robotic platoon experiment was conducted at the Maneuver Battle Lab‟s (MBL) simulation building. Both experiments were conducted simultaneously and each experiment executed a separate scenario mission set (i.e. attacks, defense, search, and ambush).

AEWE Experiment Objectives

 Inform interoperability between Special Operations Force (SOF) and General Purpose Force (GPF) SOF/GPF – all linked via a network.  Assess force effectiveness via networked fires and maneuver.  Assess the effectiveness of a robotics organization at battalion versus company level.  Examine tactical application of a network at the small unit level and inform brigade combat team network architecture development.  Examine degraded network operations.  Inform Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C2ISR) technology impacts on small unit leader cognition.  Assess force effectiveness via networked fires and maneuver.  Examine advanced Opposing Forces (OPFOR) capabilities and Blue Forces (BLUFOR) counter-tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).  Examine IBCT Networked Lethality in a Mounted Reconnaissance Element

Digital Warfighting Experiment 2010 (DWE 10) Event Date: March 2010

The Digital Warfighting Experiment 2010 (DWE 10) was conducted at the Battle Command Battle Lab (BCBL), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This experiment worked in conjunction with and in support of the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) formerly named the Command & General Staff College (CGSC). ILE‟s and DWE‟s purpose is to train students on the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), Division Full Spectrum Operations (FSO), while leveraging a Major Combat Operation (MCO), and Stability Operations (SO) scenario focusing on:

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 Analyzing division battle command  Synthesizing division staff officer roles, responsibilities and actions  Evaluating division concurrent Full Spectrum Operations (FSO)  BCBL leverages the DWE, exploring the impact of human aspects of the operational environment on staff processes and procedures, in order to inform the battle command and information operations concepts. DWE Analytical Objectives

 The analytic objective is to identify the key tasks associated with integrating Human Aspects of the Operational Environment (OE) into planning and execution of FSO, to include SO.  Adapt the Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey (GAAT) scenario to force the staff to identify and assess conflicting information within the Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information, Physical Environment, Time (PMESII-PT) threads and adjust the staff‟s understanding of the COP/situation.  Introduce conflicting PMESII-PT threads into select staff Working Groups (for example, Information Operations and Targeting cells).  Measure the collection of the information across the PMESII-PT categories and assess the staff “understanding” along the inductive, deductive and rational analysis (system inference) steps compared to the scenario threads by PMESII- PT.  The key to making this information is to provide a set of conditions across PMESII-PT that cause a decision between two or more – “right” or “wrong” options. This is where we see what level of understanding is developed at the unit/staff.

DWE Scenario Overview

 GAAT Scenario, 2018  Coalition conducts full-spectrum operations  Attacking (STARTEX = D+4)  Intend to transition to stability operations prior to ENDEX  Enemy situation incorporates hybrid threat  Opportunistic alliances between South Azerbaijan People‟s Army (SAPA) and criminal elements.  Tribal feuds, assassinations, kidnapping, human trafficking, corruption, diversion of funds, other criminal activity  Corps Tactical Command Post (CTAC) representative has expressed a desire for 4 to 5 role players to interface with 4ID Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC)

Earth, Wind & Fire 2009 (EWF 09) Mini-Ex Event Date: March 2010

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Task: Create a quick turn low cost experiment to relook and update airspace and Joint fires integration insights within Division and multiple Brigades Areas of Operation

Conditions:  Must have Joint Air Ground Integration Cell (JAGIC) experts to enable maneuver operations.  Must have Fires Cell (FC), Air Defense and Airspace Management (ADAM), Tactical Air Control Party, and Brigade Aviation Element (BAE) experts at maneuver Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to enable S3 execution of unit operations.  Have multiple brigades fighting an irregular force in open-rolling and urban terrain.  Have enemy forces supported by Unmanned Aerial Surveillance (UAS) and rotary wing units.  Have multiple BLUFOR UAS users using UASs for Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) operations through zone of action.  Have United States Air Force (USAF) and Army Aviation assets supporting maneuver and Special Forces operations.  Key players will have participated in EWF09 or reviewed insights.  Participants will have current available doctrinal literature onsite.  Participants will be familiar with systems, operational plans, and current tactical situation.

Standard:  Use same Multi-Level Scenario (MLS) 1.2 scenario, combat organizations, battle plans to reduce variables and planning costs  Use battle runs with best statistical correlation to ensure best representation of typical Battle Runs and data reliability  Use selected events to focus on specified perceived problem areas concerning manned, unmanned aircraft, and fires integration in limited airspace.  Create large multi-screen display for FireSim and Advanced Tactical Combat Model (ATCOM) replay.  Have 3D tool that allows view of single air-ground Common Operating Picture (COP) in real time that has ability to replay and discuss air tracks for munitions and manned and unmanned aircraft.

Talon Strike / Omni Fusion (TS/OF) 2010 Event Date: May 2010

Talon Strike / Omni Fusion (TS/OF 10) was a highly successful, “hybrid” multinational combined exercise and experiment that will improve US-UK operational effectiveness. Specifically, it informed the Army Staff Talks (Nov 10) and follow-on multi-national American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) interoperability and integration

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experiments (e.g., Allied Auroras, 2011). An effective partnership was developed between Combined Arms Center, TRADOC Analysis Center, and UK Land Warfare Center that contributed to the success of the event. The event demonstrated that operational unit involvement in Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) and inclusion of TRADOC Schools‟ and Centers‟ participation provides a viable experimentation venue. Demonstrated benefits in Talon Strike in support of current and future operations support NATO, UK, and US Interoperability through the use of key NATO and UK applications and integration with the US Army Battle Command System (ABCS).

Future Land Operations Interoperability Study (FLOIS) Command Control Communications Intelligence (C3I) Capstone Event

 UK Bde in a US Modular Div  Distributed Hybrid Event „Experiment/Training‟  US-UK Common Operating Pictures (COP), Supply Support Activities (SSA) Command Posts (CP)  Information Exchange Requirements (IERs) based on ABCA but with greater detail/richness.  UK/US use of OneSAF in a federation with US Battle Lab Collaborative Simulation Environment (BLCSE) extension and limit the use of other simulations  Use of Multi-National Interoperability Program (MIP)  UK Bde and US ARFORGEN Div  Use of US and UK command and control (C2) capabilities/Battle Command System (BCS)

Joint Distributed Operations (JDO) Event Date: June – July 2010

Problem Statement: The Joint Force Commander (JFC) requires the capability to conduct joint distributed operations (JDO) in complex environments enabled by a robust, responsive, and resilient C2 network, and capabilities enabling all weather joint fires and maneuver.

JDO Outcomes

 OUTCOME 1, Improved C2: The JFC will have improved C2 network supporting real-time collaborative planning and de-centralized execution of fires and maneuver operations, including identifying potential solutions for over the horizon (OTH), beyond line-of-sight (BLOS), and on-the-move (OTM) capabilities.

 OUTCOME 2, Improved Ability to Share situational awareness (SA) of the Battlespace: The JFC and subordinate Commanders will have improved ability to

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share SA of the battlespace, enabling both a better understanding of Cmdr‟s intent and detailed knowledge of the operating area.

 OUTCOME 3, Improved Tools and Processes: The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) will have improved tools and processes to support de-centralized execution of fires and maneuver during JDO. JDO Genesis/Mandate as it related to Warfighting Challenges

 WFC 7: Forcible Entry #1. The JFC requires the capability to collect, process, and disseminate relevant information in near real time to gain access and support all weather joint/combined maneuver and fires while opening entry points in order to conduct forcible entry operations.

 WFC 35: Distributed Operations #3. The JFC requires the capability to rapidly move, disaggregate, and/or re-aggregate a greater number of smaller, more dispersed units- supported by a robust and resilient C2 network with over-the- horizon, on-the-move, and beyond-line-of-sight characteristics- to gain positional advantage relative to the enemy and to enhance force protection measures in support of distributed operations.

JDO Objectives

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Functional Concept Integrating Experiment 10 (FCIE 10) Event Date: July 2010

Purpose: The Army Functional Concept-Integrating Experiment (FCIE) examined the sufficiency of the six Army Functional Concepts and their linkage to the Army Capstone Concept and the Army Operating Concept and clarified the mutual dependencies among these concepts to assist in the development and refinement of a coherent Army Concept Framework.

Key Tasks:

1. Examine the sufficiency of the Army Functional Concepts to drive capabilities development in the 2016-2028 timeframe.

2. Clarify mutual dependencies among the Army Functional Concepts to produce a cohesive approach to capabilities development.

3. Employ three BCTs, Heavy, Infantry, and Stryker, to stretch the concepts and stress the ability of functional and support brigades to support the BCTs.

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End-state: The FCIE senior leader seminar delivered an assessment of the suitability and soundness of the six Army Functional Concepts and provided recommendations for revision to the concepts prior to their approval by the Director of the Army Capabilities and Integration Center.

20 & 23 July CAMEX/Seminar for senior role players in experiment  Orders brief and brief back  Standard military operations orders process  Div Commanders Guidance and Intent plus update and focus on new concepts  Each Brigade Commander (IBCT, Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), Fires Brigade (FiB), Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB), Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB), Army Warfighting & Experimentation Division (AWED/Medical Command), and USAF) briefs back his mission, intent and scheme of maneuver, as guidance key points  Conducted a five hour seminar focused on the Functional Concepts, Missions, and key Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA) that were selected for investigation.  Missions for Computer-Assisted Map Exercise (CAMEX) phase are cross-walked with key learning demands gaps and mutual dependencies are highlighted and questioned prior to use in battle runs following two day facilitated discussions.

Nightly Hot-wash Focus  Command Echelon & Functional Concept EEA  Insights / Mutual Dependencies / Estimate of Concept Soundness / Gaps

29 July General Officers/VIPs arrive  Walk through FCIE facility  Discussion with Key Role Players  Update from Seminars and Daily hot-washes in preparation for Senior Leader Seminar 30 July.

30 July Final Senior Leader Seminar

 LTG Vane and Joint and Army Concepts Division (JACD) staff moderated and facilitated Senior Leader Seminar  Point papers on insight / sufficiency / soundness of functional concepts  Concept of Process / each proponent provides findings relating Concepts and Required Capabilities and the status of mutual dependencies within the concepts  Mission Command  Intel  Movement and Maneuver  Fires  Protection

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 Sustainment  Additional Areas  Airspace Management & Air-Ground Operations  Special Operations  Space  Joint Operations with United States Marine Corps (USMC), and USAF

Models and Simulations Division Fires Battle Lab‟s M&S Division provided modeling and simulation support to TRADOC Battle Labs within the construct of Battle Lab Collaborative Simulation Environment (BLCSE) to support Transformation Experimentation and Concept Development. M&S Division also supported Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate (CDID) analysis with FireSim XXI development, and FCOE soldier training and leader development courses with simulation supported exercises. In addition, M&S Division provided M&S support and expertise to M&S exercises and M&S developments for throughout the Department of Defense.

Army Expeditionary War-fighter Experiment (AEWE) – Spiral F Event Date: January – February 2010

M&S Division accurately designed, developed, integrated and simulated all of the “Fires” force structures required to support Maneuver Battle Lab‟s Army Expeditionary War-fighter Experiment (AEWE) - Spiral F, a key U.S. Army technology insertion testbed. Real-world live/manned tactical systems were integrated with simulated Fires forces to provide realistic fires responses in real-time to AEWE‟s live units. This alleviated costly needs for participation from 16 - M119 155mm howitzers, 8 - M777 155mm howitzers, 8 - NLOS-LS container/launchers, and 4 – 120mm mortars plus numerous support systems and ammunitions. The M&S integrations began in January 2010. The M&S effort culminated with the Spiral F exercises which were conducted February through March 2010. AEWE‟s highly-resolute FireSim-simulated Fires forces were seamlessly integrated with multiple and diverse tactical C4ISR systems AFATDS, Geospatial Environment for C2 Operations (GEC20), and Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). Simulating AEWE‟s Fires forces saved significant live unit operational dollars. By “stimulating” AEWE‟s live tactical C4ISR structures and providing the realistic responses and interactions between FireSim XXI-simulated fire units and the AEWE maneuver companies they supported, FBL M&S Division played a pivotal role in Spiral F‟s success, while advancing the art and science of M&S application to small unit experimentation.

Army Functional Concept Integrating Experiment (FCIE) 2010. Event Date: July 2010

The Fires Battle Lab (FBL) M&S Team was selected to serve as the “Lead M&S Agency” for the Army Functional Concept Integrating Experiment (FCIE) 2010. This

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large-scale Joint concept experiment was TRADOC‟s highest-priority experiment for FY10. FCIE 2010 Lessons-Learned will influence positive changes in DOTMLPF throughout the U.S. Army and sister services. The FCIE M&S federation was required to replicate seven separate brigade sized organizations in order to inform the development and review of six functional concepts. In addition, the FBL was required to design the federation to inform forty-two Learning Demands given by twenty-one partners from across TRADOC, USAF, USMC, United States Navy (USN) and Industry partners. The FBL‟s government lead M&S team conceived, designed, integrated, tested and operated an M&S federation consisting of 12 combat simulations and 12 M&S software support tools. This federation provided stimulation to 16 current and future Army and Joint Battle Command Systems. The culmination of this effort enabled over 300 human operators, at 10 locations across the United States, operating on a common battlefield with a combination of live, virtual and constructive simulations, to identify mutual dependencies and gaps in our developing Warfighting Concepts. The FBL M&S Team “raised the bar” for M&S federations in support of U.S. Army experimentation. In addition to supporting all immediate experiment concepts and issues, their FCIE 2010 M&S federation provided TRADOC, the U.S. Army, and DoD partners with “a cutting-edge blueprint” federation for human-in-the-loop experimentation. From the fidelity of air track reporting to the real-time collaboration needed for seminars, battle runs, and after action reviews, the Fires Battle Lab delivered an integrated solution to meet all objectives. The M&S by-product of FBL M&S support to FCIE 2010 was the development of a simulation federation to stimulate both Army and Joint Battle Command Systems across various communications protocols, platforms and software. Included in this effort was a fidelity display of air track information in order to support Air and Missile Defense Engagement Operations as well as the first time stimulation of the Tactical Air Control Party – Close Air Support System which was used to provide operators hands-on training prior to deployment to a combat theater. The Fires Battle Lab M&S Team received top U.S. Army M&S Team Award. Fires Battle Lab‟s M&S Team won the 2010 Army M&S Team Award in the “Experimentation” category for their exceptional M&S support to the FCIE 2010. Award-winning FBL M&S Team members were: Chris D. Niederhauser, MAJ Brian W. McLaughlin, Chesley “Burt” Montague, William H. Green, Robin Sexton, Ron Laird, Johnny Horn, Melanie Prince, Brian Carney, Kay Bowen, Scott Fagan, Jeffrey Milam, Lee Abbott, Carl Armstrong, Tyrone Matheney, Samuel Saiz. Award citation narration read as follows: “The Fires Battle Lab Models and Simulation Team implemented a simulation federation for the Army Functional Concept Integrating Experiment that supported all objectives and exceeded all expectations. The experiment was designed to inform forty-two Learning Demands compiled from twenty- one partners across TRADOC, the United States Air Force, the United States Marine Corps, the United States Navy and Industry partners. The federation replicated seven separate brigade-sized organizations to inform development and review of six functional concepts. Insights gained from the Army Functional Concept Integrating Experiment 2010 are directly changing the way the Army provides resources and will fight in the

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future. Insights gained from the simulation runs resulted in immediate changes to the Army‟s six Warfighting Functional Concepts. The success realized during this experiment can be directly attributed to the professionalism, technical expertise and dedication of the Fires Battle Lab Models and Simulations Team.” Mr. Robin D. Sexton (Lead Software Engineer for FireSim XXI) received top U.S. Army M&S Individual Award. Mr. Robin D. Sexton was awarded the 2010 Army M&S Individual Award in the “Cross-Cutting” category for his exceptional configuration management of FireSim XXI and its prolific application across multiple domains: experimentation, analyses, and training. Award citation narration read as follows: “As the FireSim XXI Lead Software Engineer, Mr. Robin Sexton has developed FireSim XXI to become one of the most widely-used combat simulations in the U.S. Army and Department of Defense. Mr. Sexton guides FireSim XXI developments to simultaneously satisfy an impressive and cross-cutting range of experimentation, analysis and training needs. By doing so, he lends consistency, fidelity and realism to field artillery systems, organizations, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures as they are designed, acquired, developed, integrated and trained from cradle-to-grave. The modeling and simulations development efficiencies gained and the analytic consistencies realized throughout the field artillery life-cycles are unmatched by other Army simulations. Mr. Sexton fosters independence and developmental agility at a tremendous savings to the taxpayer by managing all developments and applications entirely within his organization. The cost to develop a similar constructive simulation and employ it for comparable cross-cutting applications easily exceeds millions of dollars per year.”

M&S Support to Fires CoE Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) Thunder Fusion IV. Event Date: September 2010

FBL and Raytheon Partners completed the fourth in a series of integration events at the Fires Battle Lab, Fort Sill, OK from 20 to 24 September 2010. The event objective was to show how fusion software could provide an unprecedented ability to fuse radar tracks in a Brigade Combat Team structure. This will allow the BCT the option to engage the enemy with precision munitions according to the Current Operations Environment rules of engagement. Investigation findings demonstrated that live data from multiple FA radar sensors could be sent to Total Battle Space Awareness (TBSA) the Raytheon Fusion Engine to be combined into an optimal single Call for Fire (CFF). This validated that a Joint Variable Message Format (JVMF) message could be sent from multiple radars through the fusion software to initiate a CFF message for the AFATDS to process. 684 rounds were fired from multiple firing platforms (M777, M109A6 M119); 896 tracks were reported; 239 tracks were fused. The live fire event was supported by FORSCOM, TRADOC, Information Management Command (IMCOM) and Industry personnel and equipment to meet its objectives.

M&S Development 2010 CDID Analyses. M&S Division continued to maintain and

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enhance FireSim XXI to provide stand-alone M&S support for 2010 CDID Analyses (e.g., Fires force trade-offs and system requirement analyses) which influence DA- and DoD acquisition decisions. In 2010, CDID employed FireSim XXI to support six such analytic efforts: - IBCT Precision Effects Analysis - Phase I - Cluster Munitions Assessment - Precision Munitions Resourcing Strategy Study - Excalibur Nunn-McCurdy Breach Analysis - Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Rocket Alternative Warhead Analysis of Alternatives - Guided MLRS Rocket Increment 4 Requirements Analysis

M&S Development and Support for Worldwide U.S. Army Training. M&S Division provided accurate simulation of worldwide “fielded” Fires architectures with seamless tactical command and control interoperability for Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability - Entity Resolution Federation (JLCCTC-ERF) throughout 2010 and beyond. JLCCTC-ERF is the U.S. Army‟s M&S federation which is used worldwide to support Brigade-and-Below Battle Staff Training. One key JLCCTC-ERF M&S achievement in 2010 was the integration of FireSim XXI with Tapestry Solution‟s Joint Deployment and Logistics Model (JDLM) for Class V (ammunition). JDLM is high- fidelity, comprehensive logistics simulation and training software. FireSim XXI was verified, validated and accredited (VV&A) for ERF v5.3 (August 2010) and is undergoing enhancement, testing and integration to support ERF v6.0 to be released in 2011.

M&S Support to Tri-National Integrated Air and Missile Defense Architecture Analysis Event. Event Date: November 2010 FBL participated in the Tri-National Integrated Air and Missile Defense Architecture Analysis Event in November 2010. The primary event objective was to prove the technical feasibility of using a data centric approach to multinational ground based air defense command and control (GBAD C2) interoperability provided by a middleware solution. Investigation findings would be used to inform architecture frameworks for future air defense systems. All goals for the event were successfully achieved. Evaluation of the data findings indicated that the data distribution service (DDS), when unconstrained by bandwidth reductions, provided real-time distribution of engagement operations information which was capable of supporting ADA operations over a vast distance of thousands of miles. The Common Integrated Air and Missile Defense eXtensible Markup Language Schema (CIXS) messaging protocol was used successfully to facilitate all communications of engagement operations messages across the DDS. This was the first time that CIXS had ever been used to communicate engagement operations messaging under any venue.

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Battle Simulation Center Training Division The Battle Simulation Center (BSC) provided simulations based instruction to 3303 soldiers attending courses at the Field Artillery and Air Defense Artillery Schools. MSC Staff supported 324 separate training events during a total of 9788 student man days of training. During the training year 2010, the BSC incorporated additional Army Battle Command System training into the simulation exercises. Several new systems including, six (6) Air & Missile Defense Warning System (AMDWS), six (6)Forward Area Air Defense (FAAD),two (2) Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS) and two (2) Air Defense Systems Integrator (ADSI) systems were added to the suite of equipment used by students training in the facility. The BSC also upgraded its gaming capabilities. The Virtual Battle Space II(VBS2) Fires gaming system was fielded.

Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System (JFETS) The JFETS Facility provided training to 3,205 Soldiers, Marines, and Airmen of the U.S. Armed Forces. Training support for Canadian Forward Air Controllers, Singaporean Ground Forward Air Controllers, and soldiers assigned to the FA School took part in training in accordance with the applicable Programs of Instruction. Soldiers from FORSCOM units also took advantage of the unique training opportunities offered by JFETS. This year soldiers from the 1st Infantry Division, the 4th Infantry Division, the 10th Mountain Division, the 75th Ranger Battalion, 95th AG, 95th Div, OKNG, 10th Special Forces Group, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO), 1st and 146th Air Support Operations Squadrons trained in JFETS.

GLOSSARY

AAEF, Air Assault Expeditionary Force AAR, After Action Review ABCS, Army Battlefield Command System AC, Active Component/Assistant Commandant ACAAP, Advanced Cannon Artillery Ammunition Program ACAT, Acquisition Category ACH, Annual Command History ACR, Armored Cavalry Regiment ACTD, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration ADA, Air Defense Artillery AETF, Army Evaluation Task Force AEWE, Army Expeditionary Warrior Experiment AFATDS, Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System AG, Adjutant General AGM, Attack Guidance Matrix AHR, Annual Historical Review AI, Artificial Intelligence, Air Interdiction AIT, Advanced Individual Training ALC, Advanced Leader Course ALZ, Assault Landing Zone AMCB, Army/Marine Corps Board AMRDEC, U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research and Development Center ANCOC, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course AOEWC, Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course API, Application Program Interface APU, Auxiliary Power Unit AR2B, Army Requirements and Review Board ARAC, Army Radar Approach Control ARCIC, Army Capabilities Integration Center ARFOR, Army Forces ARL, Army Research Laboratory ARNG, Army National Guard AROC, Army Oversight Council ASAALT, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology ASARC, Army System Acquisition Review Council ASAS, All-source Analysis System ASI, Additional Skill Identifier ASMP, Army Strategic Mobility Program ASV, Armored Security Vehicle ATACMS, Army Tactical Missile System ATACS, Advanced Target Acquisition Counterfire System ATC, Artillery Training Center ATCAS, Advanced Towed Cannon System 139

ATCCS, Army Tactical Command and Control System ATCOM, Advanced Tactical Combat Model ATDL, Army Training Digital Library ATLAS, Advanced Technology Light Artillery System ATLDP, Army Training and Leader Development Panel ATSC, Army Training Support Center ATTD, Advanced Technological Transition Demonstration BAT P3I, BAT Preplanned Product Improvement BAT, Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition BCBL, Battle Command Battle Laboratory BCD, Battlefield Coordination Detachment BCPT, Battle Command Post Training BCS, Battery Computer System BCT, Brigade Combat Team BCTP, Battle Command Training Program BDA, Battlefield Damage Assessment BFIST, Bradley Fire Support Vehicle BFSA, Blue Force Situational Awareness BLCS, Battle Lab Collaborative Simulations Environment BLOS, Beyond Line-of-Sight BNCOC, Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course BOLC, Basic Officer Leader Course BRAC, Base Realignment and Closure BSC, Battle Simulation Center C2, Command and Control C4I, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence C4ISR, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance CAS, Close Air Support CAST, Close Air Support Trainer CBRNE, Chemical, Biological, radiological, and Nuclear Explosive CCC, Captains Career Course Co-Op Coordination Council CCF, Course-correcting Fuse CCNW&S, Close Combat Networked Weapons and Sensors CDD, Capability Development Document CDID, Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate CENTCOM, U.S. Central Command CEP, Concept Evaluation Program/Concept Experimentation Program CFFT, Call for Fire Trainer CFLCC, Coalition Forces Land Component Command CG, Commanding General CGRS, Common Grid Reference System CGS, Command Ground Station CGSC, Command and General Staff College

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CIF, Central Issue Facility CIM, Centralized Installation Management CJTF, Combined Joint Task Force CMF, Career Management Field COB, Command Operating Budget COE, Center of Excellence/Contemporary Operational Environment COF, Correlation of Forces COLT, Combat Observation Lasing Team CONOPS, Concept of Operations CONUS, Continental United States COP, Common Operating Picture CPD, Capabilities Production Document CPP, Command Post Platform CRADA, Cooperative Research and Development Agreement C-RAM, Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortars CRSS, Common Reconfigurable Sensor System CSTF, Counterstrike Task Force CTC, Combat Training Center CTET, Collective Training Evaluation Team CTV, Captive Test Vehicle D&SABL, Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory DA, Department of the Army DAB, Defense Acquisition Board DAC, ARNG, Department of the Army, Army National Guard DAC, Deputy Assistant Commandant/Department of the Army Civilian DAIG, Department of the Army Inspector General DAMA, Defense Against Mortar Attack DARPA, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DCG, Deputy Commanding General DCP, Directorate of Civilian Personnel DCSINT, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence DCSOPST, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training DCSRM, Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management DCST, Deputy Chief of Staff for Training DENTAC, U.S. Army Dental Activity DFAS, Defense Finance and Accounting Service DFCS, Digital Flight Control System DIOPTIC, Dismounted Optic System DIS, Distributed Interactive Simulation DIVE, Dynamic Interactive Virtual Environment DL, Distance Learning/Distributive Learning DMD, Digital Message Device DMOC, Distributed Mission Operations Center DMWR, Directorate of Morale, Welfare, and Recreation DMZ, Demilitarized Zone

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DOC, Directorate of Contracting DOD, Department of Defense DOES, Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization DOIM, Directorate of Information Management DOL, Directorate of Logistics DOTD, Directorate of Training and Doctrine DOTE, Directorate of Training and Evaluation DOTMLPF, Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities DOTS, Directorate of Training Support DPICM, Dual-Improved Conventional Munition DSABL, Depth and Simultaneous Attack Battle Laboratory DTLOMS, Doctrine, Training, Leader Development, DTT, Doctrine, Tactics, and Techniques EBCT, Evaluation Brigade Combat Team EBO, Effects Based Operations EBTV, Enhanced Ballistic Test Vehicle ECC, Effects Coordination Cell ECOORD, Effects Coordinator ECP, Engineering Change Proposal ECU, Environmental Control Unit EDT, Engineering Developmental Testing EDTM, Enlisted Distribution Target Model EEA, Essential Elements of Analysis EEO, Equal Opportunity Office EGT, Effects Guidance Tool EMD, Engineering and Manufacturing Development ER, Extended Range ESIT, Extended System Integration Test ESS, Essential Soldier Skill EST, Engagement Skills Trainer EW, Electronic Warfare EXFOR, Experiment Force F2C2, Future Fires Command Control F2DSS, Future Fires Decision Support System FA, Field Artillery FAA, Federal Aviation Administration FAASV, Field Artillery Ammunition Supply Vehicle FAC, Forward Air Controller FACCC, Field Artillery Captains Career Course FACP, Field Artillery Campaign Plan FADAC, Field Artillery Digital Automated Computer FAOAC, Field Artillery Officer Advance Course FAOBC, Field Artillery Officer Basic Course FAS, Field Artillery School

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FATC, Field Artillery Training Center FBCB2, Force Battle Command Brigade and Below FBCT, Future Brigade Combat System FCS, Future Combat System FDC, Fire Direction Center FDIC, Futures Development and Integration Center FDO, Fire Direction Officer FDS, Fire Direction System FDTE, Force Development Test and Evaluation FEC, Fires and Effects Center FECC, Fire Effects Coordination Cell FECM, Fires and Effects Command Module FED, Forward Entry Device FF, Firefinder FFID, Future Force Integration Directorate FID, Fires Integration Division FIST, Fire Support Team FISTV, Fire Support Vehicle FLIR, Forward Looking Infrared FLOT, Forward Line of Troops FM, Field Manual FMTV, Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles FOB, Forward Operating Base FORSCOM, U.S. Army Forces Command FOTE, Follow-on Test and Evaluation FOXS, Forward Observer Exercise Simulation FPCON, Force Protection Condition FRAGO, Fragmentary Order FRP, Full-rate Production FS3, Fire Support Sensor System FSC, Fire Support Center FSC3, Fire Support Command, Control, and Communications FSCATT, Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer FSCATT-T, Fire Support Combined Arms Tactical Trainer-Towed FSCOORD, Fire Support Coordinator FSE, Fire Support Element FSKN, Fire Support Knowledge Network FSO, Fire Support Officer FSST, Fire Support Sustainment Tool FSTS, Fire Support Training Strategy FTX, Field Training Exercise FUE, First Unit Equipped FY, Fiscal Year GAO, General Accounting Office GBS, Global Broadcasting System

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GCTT, Ground Combat Tactical Trainer GIT, Gender-integrated Training GLPS, Gun Laying Positioning System GMR, Ground Mobile Radio GOSC, General Officer Steering Committee GPS, Global Positioning System GS, General Support GSM, Ground Station Module GSU, Garrison Support Unit GUARDFIST II, Guard Unit Armory Device-Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer II GUI, Graphical User Interface GVLLD, Ground/Vehicular Laser Location Designator GWOT, Global War on Terror HBCT, Heavy Brigade Combat Team HCT, Howitzer Crew Trainer HIMARS, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System HITL, Human in the Loop HMMWV, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle HQ, Headquarters HQDA, Headquarters, Department of the Army HTU, Handheld Terminal Unit HVAC, Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning IAV, Interim Armored Vehicle IBCT, Initial/Interim Brigade Combat Team ICD, Initial Capabilities Document ICT, Institute for Creative Technology IDT, Inactive Duty IED, Improvised Explosive Device IFCS, Improved Fire Control System ILMS, Improved Launcher Mechanical System IOTE, Initial Operational Test and Evaluation IPADS, Improved Position and Azimuth System IPDS, Improved Positioning Determining System IPT, Integrated Product Team IWIU, Improved Weapon Interface Unit JACI, Joint and Combined Integration Directorate JACKKNIFE, Joint Networked Fires and Effects JAG, Judge Advocate General JCATS, Joint Conflict and Tactical Simulation JEFEX, Joint Expeditionary Force Experiment JETS, Joint Effects Targeting System JFCAAT, Joint Fires Combined Arms Assessment JFCOE, Joint Fires Center of Excellence JFCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command JFECS, Joint Fires and Effects Course

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JFETS, Joint Fires and Effects Trainer System JFO, Joint Fires Observer JFU, Joint Fires University JCFU, Joint and Combined Fires University JIM, Joint Improvement and Modernization JLCCTC-ERF, Joint Land Component Constructive Training Capability - Entity Resolution Federation JNN, Joint Network Node JOFEC, Joint Operational Fires and Effects Course JORD, Joint Operational Requirements Document JPSD, Joint Precision Strike Demonstration Office JROC, Joint Oversight Council JRTC, Joint Readiness Training Center JSTARS, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System JTAC, Joint Terminal Attack Controller KPP, Key Performance Parameter LAM, Loiter Attack Missile LARIAT, Loiter and Route Interactive Analysis Tool LASIP, Light Artillery System Improvement Program LCD, Liquid Crystal Display LCMR, Lightweight Countermortar Radar LED, Light Emitting Diode LFCC, Lawton/Fort Sill Chamber of Commerce LFED, Lightweight Forward Entry Device LLDR, Lightweight Laser Designator Rangefinder LOAL, Lock-on-after Launch LOS, Line-of-Sight LRAS3, Long-range Advanced Scout Surveillance System LRIP, Low-rate Initial Production LSAC, Low Signature Armored Cab LSAC-H, Low Signature Armored Cab HIMARS LSI, Lead System Integrator LVC, Live-virtual Constructive LW, Lightweight LWTFDS, Lightweight Tactical Fire Direction System M&S, Modeling and Simulation MACS, Modular Artillery Charge System MANCEN, Maneuver Support Center MANPRINT, Manpower Personnel Integration MAPEX, Map exercise MAPS, Modular Azimuth Positioning System MARDET, Marine Detachment MC2, Mobile Command and Control MCA, Military Construction, Army MCG, Mobile Command Group

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MCO, Major Combat Operations MDMP, Military decision making process MELIOS, Miniaturized Eye-Safe Laser Infrared Observation Set METL, Mission Essential Task List MICOM, U.S. Army Missile Command MITT, Military Transition Team MLCS, Modular Launcher Communication System MLRS, Multiple-Launch Rocket System MMS, Meteorological Measuring Set MNF-I, Multinational Force Iraq MOA, Memorandum of Agreement MOS, Military Occupational Specialty MOUT, Military Operations in Urban Terrain MRE, Meals Ready to Eat/Mission Readiness Exercises MRS, Mobility Requirements Study MSTAR, MLRS Smart Tactical Rocket/Manportable Surveillance and Target Acquisition System MTOE, Modified Tables of Equipment MTP, Mission Training Plan MTT, Mobile Training Team MUSE, Multiple Unified Simulation Environment NCO, Noncommissioned Officer NCOA, Noncommissioned Officer Academy NCOES, Noncommissioned Officer Education System NET, New Equipment Training NETD, New Equipment Training Detachment NETT, New Equipment Training Team NETWARCOM, Naval Networked Warfare Command NFE, Networked Fires Environment NLOS, Non-Line of Sight NSWC, Naval Surface Warfare Center NSWCDD, Naval Surface Warfare Center-Dahlgren Division NTC, National Training Center O&O, Organizational and Operational OCIE, Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment OCONUS, Outside Continental United States ODCPRO, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs ODCSOPS, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations OES, Officer Education System OFOTB, Objective Force One SAF Testbed Baseline OIF, Operation Iraqi Freedom OIPT, Overarching Integrated Product Team OMA, Operational Maintenance, Army ONS, Operational Needs Statement OPLAN, Operational Plan

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OPNET, Operational New Equipment Training OPORD, Operation Order OPTEMPO, Operational Tempo ORD, Operational Requirements Document OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense OTM, Open Terrain Module P3I, Preplanned Product Improvement PAM, Precision Attack Missile PAO, Public Affairs Office PBS2, Phoenix Battlefield Sensor System PCS, Permanent Change of Station PD-CFFT, Product Director, Call for Fire Trainer PEO STRI, Program Executive Officer for Simulations, Training, and Instrumentation PEO, Program Executive Officer PERSCOM, Personnel Command PFED, Palm Forward Entry Device Pff, Preformed Fragmentation Round PFRMS, Precision Fires, Rockets, and Missile System PGK, Precision Guidance Kit PI, Product Improvement PIM, Paladin Integrated Management PK, Probability of Kill PLDC, Primary Leadership Development Course PM, Program Manager POCV, Paladin Operations Center Vehicle POI, Program of Instruction POM, Program Objective Memorandum POV, Privately Owned Vehicle PQT, Production Qualification Test PSS-SOF, Precision Strike Suite-Special Operations Forces QAO, Quality Assurance Office QRU, Quick Reaction Unitary RAM, Random Access Memory RAMS, Rocket and Missile Systems RC, Reserve Component RCIED, Radio-controlled Improvised Explosive Devices RFPI ACTD, Rapid Force Projection Initiative Advanced RFPI, Rapid Force Projection Initiative ROTC, Reserve Officer Training Corps RSTA, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition RTI, Regional Training Institute S&C4ISR, Space and Command, Control, Communications, and Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance SADARM, Sense-and-Destroy Armor Munition SATS, Standard Army Training System

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SAW, Squad Automatic Weapon SBCT, Stryker Brigade Combat Team SBL, Soldier Battle Laboratory SDD, System Design and Development SGT, Sergeant SINCGARS, Single-channel Ground and Airborne Radio System SLC, Senior Leader Course SMDC/ARSTRAT, Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Strategic Command SME, Subject Matter Expert/Simulated Military Equipment SOCOM, Special Operations Command SRM, Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization SSC, Small-scale Contingency SSG, Staff Sergeant SSM, Surface-to-Surface Missile ST, Special Text STOW, Synthetic Theater of War STRAP, System Training Plan STRATCOM, Strategic Communications Office STRI, Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation STX, Situational Training Exercise T3BL, Training and Training and Technology Battle Laboratory TAA, Total Army Analysis TAC, Tactical Command Center TACFIRE, Tactical Fire Direction System TAD, Towed Artillery Digitization TADSS, Training Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations TAMMS, Target Area Meteorological Measuring System TASS, Total Army School System TATS, The Army Training System TBG, TRADOC Budget Guidance TBSA, Total Battlefield Situational Awareness TC, Terminal Controller TCM, Trajectory Correctable Munition/TRADOC Capabilities Manager TDA, Tables of Distribution and Allowances TDY, Temporary Duty TECS, Target Effects Coordination System TELS, Transporters, Erectors, and Launchers TF, Task Force TFSO, Training Set Fire Observation TIM, Transformation in Installation Management TIMS, Target Identification and Meteorological System TLDS, Target Location Designation System TMA, Training Mission Area TOC, Tactical Operations Center TPFDD, Time-Phased Deployment Document

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TRADOC, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command TRAP, TRADOC Remedial Action Program TSC, Training Service Center TSM, TRADOC System Manager TSP, Training Support Package TSSAM, Tri-Service Stand-off Attack Missile TTP, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures T-VSAT, Tactical-Very Small Aperture Terminal UA, Unit of Action UADEV, Unit of Action Development UAMBL, Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Laboratory UAS, Unmanned Aerial System UAV, Unmanned aerial/air vehicle UE, Unit of Employment UFD, User Functional Description UGS, Unattended Ground Sensor UGV, Unmanned Ground Vehicle USACGSC, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College USAFAC, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center USAFACFS, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill USAFACS, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and School USAFAS, U.S. Army Field Artillery School USAFATC, U.S. Army Field Artillery Training Center USAFCOE, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence USAFCOEFS, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill USAIC, U.S. Army Infantry Center USAMAA, U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency USAOTEC, U.S. Army Operational Test and Evaluation Command USAR, U.S. Army Reserve USFJCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command USFK, United States Forces, Korea USMC, U.S. Marine Corps USPACOM, U.S. Pacific Command UTM, Urban Terrain Module VC, Virtual Character VCSA, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army VS, Viper Strike VSEL, Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited VTC, Video Training Conference VTT, Video Teletraining WCBF, World Class Blue Force WIDD, Warfighting Integration and Development Directorate WLC, Warrior Leadership Course WOAC, Warrant Officer Advance Course WOBC, Warrant Officer Basic Course

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WOES, Warrant Officer Education System WRAP, Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program

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APPENDIX ONE STUDENT PRODUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010

428th Field Artillery Brigade Course Initial Inputs Graduates FACCC 374 372 FACCC DL 333 208 FACCC-RC ADT 314 306 BOLC III 704 697 BOLC B 986 943 BOLC II 4,212 4,171 WOAC 31 31 WOBC 78 53 NCOA 2,486 2,422 USMC 1,564 1,369 Other Courses 9,167 9,029 Total 20,249 19,601

Source: Email with atch, subj: Student Inputs and Graduates, 28 Jan 11, Doc I- 36. Strip out BOLC II figures to get more accurate figures for FY 2010 because the last BOLC II class graduated in December 2009.

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APPENDIX TWO KEY USAFAS PERSONNEL

Commanding General, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill MG David D. Halverson, 26 Aug 2009-present Commandant and Chief of Field Artillery: BG Ross E. Ridge, 4 Jun 2009-1 Oct 2010 COL Matt Merrick, 1 Oct 2010-10 Dec 2010 BG Thomas S. Vandal, 10 Dec 2010-present Assistant Commandant U.S. Army Field Artillery School: COL Matt Merrick, 19 Aug 2009-present Commander, 428th Field Artillery Regiment COL John S. Fant, 11 Jul 2008-13 Jul 2010 COL John P. Drago, 13 Jul 2010-present

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APPENDIX THREE FIELD ARTILLERY SCHOOL COMMANDANTS

CPT Dan T. Moore, l9 Jul l9ll-l5 Sep l9l4 LTC Edward F. McGlachlin, Jr., l5 Sep l9l4-26 Jun l9l6 School was closed 9 July 1916-2 July 1917. COL William J. Snow, 27 Jul l9l7-26 Sep l9l7 BG Adrian S. Fleming, 26 Sep l9l7-ll May l9l8 BG Laurin L. Lawson, ll May l9l8-l8 Dec l9l8 BG Dennis H. Currie, 24 Dec l9l8-l0 Jun l9l9 BG Edward T. Donnely, 30 Jun l9l9-9 Jul l9l9 MG Ernest Hinds, 25 Oct l9l9-l Jul l923 MG George LeR. Irwin, l Jul l923-l Apr l928 BG Dwight E. Aultman, 6 Apr l928-l2 Dec l929 BG William Cruikshank, 8 Feb l930-3l Jul l934 MG Henry W. Butner, l7 Sep l934-l0 May l936 BG Augustine McIntyre, 29 Jun l936-3l Jul l940 BG Donald C. Cubbison, l Aug l940-22 Dec l940 BG George R. Allin, 20 Jan 1941-31 Jun l942 BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-ll Jan l944 MG Orlando Ward, l2 Jan l944-30 Oct l944 MG Ralph McT. Pennell, 3l Oct l944-30 Aug l945 MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug l945-4 Jun l946 MG Clift Andrus, 18 Jun l946-9 Apr l949 MG Joseph M. Swing, 1 Jun l949-3l Mar l950 MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr l950-l6 Nov l953 MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan l954-28 May l954 MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul l954-23 Feb l956 MG Thomas E. de Shazo, 12 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959 MG Verdi B. Barnes, l5 Feb 1959-6 Mar 196l MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 196l-3l Mar 1964 MG Harry H. Critz, l Apr 1964-l5 May 1967 MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970 MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-3l May 1973 MG David E. Ott, l Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976 MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-2l Oct 1977 MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980 MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982 MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985 MG Eugene S. Korpal, 4 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987 MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991 MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993 MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995 MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997 MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999

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MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 2001 MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 2001-9 Dec 2003 MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 2003-4 Aug 2005 MG David C. Ralston, 4 Aug 2005-13 Sep 2007 MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 2007-4 June 2009 BG Ross E. Ridge, 4 Jun 2009-1 Oct 2010 BG Thomas S. Vandal, 10 Dec 2010-present

Note: Since World War I, the school commandant has also served as post commander of Fort Sill. Because of the Base Realignment and Closure effort, the Fires Center of Excellence commanding general became the post commander on 4 June 2009 and the school commandant no longer served as post commander.

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APPENDIX FOUR CHIEFS OF FIELD ARTILLERY

*MG William J. Snow, 10 Feb 1918-19 Dec 1927 *MG Fred T. Austin, 20 Dec 1927-15 Feb 1930 *MG Harry G. Bishop, 10 Mar 1930-9 Mar 1934 *MG Upton Birnie, Jr., 10 Mar 1934-24 Mar 1938 *MG Robert M. Danford, 26 Mar 1938-9 Mar 1942 BG George R. Allin, 9 Mar 1942-31 Jun 1942 BG Jesmond D. Balmer, l Jul l942-ll Jan l944 MG Orlando Ward, l2 Jan l944-30 Oct l944 MG Ralph McT. Pennell, 3l Oct l944-30 Aug l945 MG Louis E. Hibbs, 30 Aug l945-4 Jun l946 MG Clift Andrus, 20 Jun l946-15 Apr l949 MG Joseph M. Swing, 9 Apr l949-3l Mar l950 MG Arthur M. Harper, 2 Apr l950-l6 Nov l953 MG Charles E. Hart, 4 Jan l954-28 May l954 MG Edward T. Williams, 8 Jul l954-23 Feb l956 MG Thomas E. de Shazo, l2 Mar 1956-31 Jan 1959 MG Verdi B. Barnes, l5 Feb 1959-25 Mar 196l MG Lewis S. Griffing, 6 Apr 196l-3l Mar 1964 MG Harry H. Critz, l Apr 1964-l5 May 1967 MG Charles P. Brown, 5 Jul 1967-20 Feb 1970 MG Roderick Wetherill, 24 Feb 1970-3l May 1973 MG David E. Ott, l Jun 1973-24 Sep 1976 MG Donald R. Keith, 9 Oct 1976-2l Oct 1977 MG Jack N. Merritt, 22 Oct 1977-26 Jun 1980 MG Edward A. Dinges, 27 Jun 1980-27 Sep 1982 *MG John S. Crosby, 28 Sep 1982-3 Jun 1985 *MG Eugene S. Korpal, 3 Jun 1985-17 Aug 1987 *MG Raphael J. Hallada, 20 Aug 1987-19 Jul 1991 *MG Fred F. Marty, 19 Jul 1991-15 Jun 1993 *MG John A. Dubia, 15 Jun 1993-7 Jun 1995 *MG Randall L. Rigby 7 Jun 1995-7 Jun 1997 *MG Leo J. Baxter, 7 Jun 1997-11 Aug 1999 *MG Toney Stricklin, 11 Aug 1999-23 Aug 2001 *MG Michael D. Maples, 23 Aug 2001-9 Dec 2003 *MG David P. Valcourt, 9 Dec 2003-4 Aug 2005 *MG David C. Ralston, 4 Aug 2005-13 Sep 2007 *MG Peter M. Vangjel, 13 Sep 2007-4 June 2009 *BG Ross E. Ridge, 4 June 2009-1 Oct 2010 *BG Thomas S. Vandal, 20 Dec 10-present

Individuals with an asterisk by their name were officially recognized by the Department of War or Department of the Army as the Chief of Field Artillery. The War

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Department created the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery on 15 February 1918 to supervise the Field Artillery during World War One. On 9 March 1942 the War Department abolished the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery as part of World War Two reorganization and placed the Field Artillery under the Army Ground Forces. When the War Department dissolved the Chief of Field Artillery on 9 March 1942, General Allin who was serving as the Commandant of the Field Artillery School became the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery. He served as the unofficial Chief of Field Artillery and the Commandant of the Field Artillery School until 31 June 1942. In 1983 the Department of the Army reestablished the Chief of Field Artillery to oversee the development of Field Artillery tactics, doctrine, organization, equipment, and training. Although the War Department and later the Department of the Army did not recognize an official Chief of Field Artillery from 1942 through 1983, the Commandants of the Field Artillery School and its successors considered themselves to be the Chief of Field Artillery. See TRADOC Annual Command History for 1 Oct 82-30 Sep 83, pp. 57, 308, Doc I-122. On 4 June 2009 MG Peter M. Vangjel transferred duties of the Chief of Field Artillery and Commandant of the Field Artillery School to BG Ross E. Ridge as part of the Base Realignment and Closure effort. Note: The article, “Three Chiefs,” Field Artillery Journal, Mar-Apr 1931, p. 115, lists Snow‟s date of tenure as Chief of Field Artillery as 10 February 1918 to 19 December 1927. USAFAS‟s records list 15 February 1918 to 19 December 1927. The same article lists Austin‟s tenure as 22 December 1927 to 15 December 1930. USAFAS‟s records list 20 December 1927 to 15 February 1930.

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APPENDIX FIVE ASSISTANT COMMANDANTS

COL Oliver L. Spaulding, 24 Nov 1917-3 May 1918 LTC William Bryden, 4 May 1918-25 Oct 1918 COL Rine E. De R. Hoyle, 26 Oct 1918-25 May 1919 MAJ John W. Kilbreth, 24 Jun 1919-14 Nov 1919 MAJ Augustine McIntyre, 15 Nov 1919-28 Jul 1920 COL Henry W. Butner, 28 Jul 1920-30 Jun 1924 COL Daniel W. Hand, 22 Jul 1924-25 Jun 1925 LTC William P. Ennis, 26 Jul 1925-22 Jul 1929 LTC Lesley P. McNair, 23 July 1929-30 Jul 1930 COL Charles S. Blakely, 28 Jun 1933-15 Jun 1937 COL Donald C. Cubbison, 1 Aug 1937-30 Jun 1938 COL Maxwell Murray, 15 Aug 1938-12 Nov 1938 BG LeRoy P. Collins, 12 Dec 1938-17 Feb 1941 COL Mert Proctor, 17 Mar 1941-25 Jun 1941 COL James A. Lester, 4 Jul 1941-20 Feb 1942 COL Theodore L. Futch, 21 Feb 1942-2 Sep 1942 COL Lawrence B. Bixby, 7 Nov 1942-28 Nov 1943 COL Dinar B. Gjelsteen, 1 Dec 1943-3 Oct 1944 COL Thomas P. DeShazo, 16 Oct 1944-10 Oct 1947 BG Stanley R. Mickelsen, 1 Sep 1947-1 Oct 1949 BG William H. Colbern, 9 Jan 1950-1 Feb 1952 BG James F. Brittingham, 19 Mar 1952-31 Jul 1953 BG Thomas W. Watlington, 1 Aug 1953-31 Jul 1955 MG John E. Theimer, 1 Aug 1955-8 Jul 1956 BG Paul A. Gavan, 9 Jul 1956-29 Aug 1957 BG Philip C. Wehle, 30 Aug 1957-26 Apr 1959 BG Edwin S. Hartshorn, Jr., 23 Jul 1959-31 Jul 1962 BG James W. Totten, 1 Aug 1962-7 May 1964 BG Charles P. Brown, 15 Jun 1964-15 Jun 1965 BG John S. Hughes, 1 Jul 1965-21 May 1967 BG John J. Kenney, 22 May 1967-14 Jul 1968 BG Lawrence H. Caruthers, Jr., 15 Jul 1968-30 Jun 1972 BG Robert J. Koch, 1 Aug 1972-11 Jul 1974 BG Vernon B. Lewis, Jr., 15 Jul 1974-16 Jul 1975 BG Albert B. Akers, 17 Jul 1975-13 Jan 1978 BG Edward A. Dinges, 10 Aug 1978-27 Jun 1980 BG Robert C. Forman, 1 Jul 1980-8 Mar 1981 BG Donald Eckelbarger, 2 Mar 1981-29 Apr 1983 BG Thomas J.P. Jones, 29 Apr 1983-16 Jul 1984 BG Raphael J. Hallada, 1 Aug 1984-1 Apr 1986 BG Jerry C. Harrison, 29 May 1986-13 Jul 1987 BG Fred F. Marty, 13 Jul 1987-24 Aug 1989

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BG John C. Ellerson, 24 Aug 1989-13 Aug 1990 COL Marshall R. McCree, 14 Aug 1990-14 Apr 1991 BG Tommy R. Franks, 17 Apr 1991-8 Jul 1992 BG David L. Benton III, 8 Jul 1992-1 May 1994 BG Leo J. Baxter, 24 May 1994-25 Sep 1995 BG William J. Lennox, Jr., 1 Dec 1995-13 Jun 1997 BG Toney Stricklin, 14 Jun 1997-17 Apr 1998 BG Lawrence R. Adair, 18 Apr 1998-13 Aug 1999 BG William F. Engel, 1 Oct 1999-11 Oct 2001 BG David C. Ralston, 11 Oct 2001-27 Apr 2003 BG James A. Cerrone, 4 Aug 2003-23 Aug 2004 BG Mark A. Graham, 24 Aug 2004-25 Jul 2005 COL (P) James M. McDonald, 25 Jul 2005-22 May 2006 COL Jeffrey W. Yaeger, 22 May 2006-25 Sep 2006 COL Albert Johnson, Jr., 25 Sep 2006-27 Aug 2007 COL (P) Richard C. Longo, 27 Aug 2007-8 Sep 2008 BG Ross E. Ridge, 8 Sep 2008-4 Jun 2009 COL Matt Merrick, 19 Aug 2009-present

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APPENDIX SIX COMMAND SERGEANT MAJORS OF THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY

CSM Clifford L. Lewis, Mar 1973-Sep 1974 CSM Ralph Pitcher, Aug 1974-Jun 1975 CSM Coyle C. Bohn, Jul 1975-Apr 1976 CSM Tommy Morgan, Apr 1976-May 1977 CSM Nick Mastrovito , May 1977-Jun 1978 CSM James Kennedy, Jun 1978-May 1980 CSM George Phillips, Aug 1980-May 1983 CSM Pat Fowler, May 1983-Nov 1984 CSM John A. Pierce, Nov 1984-Jan 1986 CSM Kenneth E. Mills, Jan 1986-Aug 1988 CSM Jerry M. Laws, Aug 1988-Feb 1990 CSM William J. Kermode, Feb 1990-Jun 1991 CSM Mal Causby, Jun 1991-Oct 1991 CSM Harold F. Shrewsberry, Oct 1991-Oct 1993 CSM Karl L. Purdy, Oct 1993-May 1995 CSM Jerry L. Wood, May 1995-Oct 1997 CSM Gene Odom, Oct 1997-Jun 1999 CSM Rickey Hatcher, Jun 1999-Jun 2000 CSM Joseph Stanley, Jun 2000-Dec 2001 CSM Carl B. McPherson, Jan 2002-Jan 2004 CSM Allie R. Ousley, Jan 2004-May 2006 CSM Robert L. White , May 2006-Jul 2007 CSM Dean J. Keveles, Nov 2007-Present

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APPENDIX SEVEN U.S. ARMY FIRES CENTER OF EXCELLENCE AND FORT SILL ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Source: Email with atch, subj: FCOE Organizational Chart, 18 Aug 09, Doc I- 11, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School Annual History

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APPENDIX EIGHT FIELD ARTILLERY COMMANDANT OFFICE CHART

Source: FCOE Homepage, 30 Apr 10, Doc I-12, 2009 U.S. Army Field Artillery School Annual History

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APPENDIX NINE LIST OF DOCUMENTS

CHAPTER ONE

1. Official Biography of BG Vandal. 2. FCOE Regulation 10-5 (Extract), 1 Jan 11. 3. Email with atch, subj: FCOE 12 Oct 10 pdf, 6 Jan 11. 4. Email, subj: FCOE 10-5, 6 Jan 11. 5. Email, subj: FCOE 10-5 Input to 2010 Annual History, 3 Feb 11. 6. Contract Study by Janson Communications, 2010. 7. Army Social: Optimizing Online Engagement, undated. 8. Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Proponency Office, Introduction, 7 Jan 11. 9. FA Cmdt, SITREP, 13 Aug 10. 10. FA Cmdt, SITREP, 30 Jul 10. 11. FA Cmdt, SITREP, 23 Jul 10. 12. Email with atch, subj: Social Media‟s Input to 2010 Annual History, 31 Jan 11. 13. Email, subj: FAPO Engagement, 31 Jan 11. 14. Email with atch, subj: Targeting the Best Cadets in America, 5 Jan 10. 15. Information Paper, subj: Field Artillery Recruiting Strategy for FY 10, 31 Jul 09. 16. Briefing, subj: Key Points on Personnel, 12 Jan 10. 17. Email with atch, subj: FAPO Engagement, 28 Jan 11. 18. Email with atch, subj: FAPO Engagement, 3 Mar 11. 19. FA Cmdt, Weekly SITREP, 21-27 Oct 10. 20. FA Cmdt, Weekly SITREP, 4-10 Nov 09. 21. FA Cmdt, Weekly SITREP, 14-20 Nov 09. 22. Information Paper, subj: Field Artillery Recruiting Strategy for FY 10, 31 Jul 09. 23. FA Cmdt SITREP, 15 Apr 10. 24. FA Cmdt SITREP, 13 Aug 10. 25. FA Cmdt SITREP, 2-8 Apr 10. 26. FA Cmdt SITREP, 5-11 Feb 10. 27. Briefing (Extract), subj: State of the Branch, 20 May 10. 28. Memorandum thru Asst Cmdt for Cmdt, USAFAS, subj: Radar Maintenance Leader Instruction for 13R NCOs, 7 Jun 10. 29. Email, subj: MOS 13R, 4 Feb 11. 30. Email, subj: MOS 13R, 9 Feb 11. 31. Email with atch, subj: Warfighter Forum Information Paper, 6 Jan 11. 32. Email, subj: Warfighter Forums Input to 2010 Annual History, 3 Feb 11. 33. Email with atch, subj: FCOE Accred Overview, 29 Sep V4, 6 Jan 11. 34. Briefing, subj: FA Commandant‟s Huddle, 13 Jan 11. 35. Email with atch, subj: Accreditation, 22 Feb 11. 36. Email with atch, subj: Student Inputs and Graduates, 28 Jan 11.

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CHAPTER TWO

1. Briefing, subj: FA Commandant‟s Priorities, 11 Feb 11. 2. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: USAFAS Training Strategy and Guidance, FY 11, 1 Oct 10. 3. Joint and Combined Fires University Implementation Strategy, Nov 10. 4. Alvin Peterson, “Joint and Combined Fires Concept A Year Later: Providing Leaders and Experts in the Art and Science of Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Sep-Oct 10, p. 20. 5. Interview, Dastrup with Alvin Peterson, DOTD, 24 Jan 11. 6. Memorandum, subj: Joint and Combined Fires University Implementation Strategy, undated. 7. Email with atch, subj: Annual Historical Review, 4 Apr 11. 8. Interview, Dastrup with Al Peterson, DOTD, 24 Jan 11. 9. Alvin Peterson, “Joint and Combined Fires Concept A Year Later: Providing Leaders and Experts in the Art and Science of Fires,” Fires Bulletin, Sep-Oct 10, p. 20. 10. “U.S. Army Launches Army Learning Concept,” Army News, 21 Oct 10. 11. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-8-2 (Version 1.0), The United States Army Learning Concept for 2015, 1 Nov 10. 12. Memorandum for Cdr, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Culture and Foreign Language Guidance, 1 Jul 10. 13. Sharon McBride, “Creating Culturally Astute Leaders: Joint and Combined Fires University Providing Innovative Cultural Education,” Fires Bulletin, Sep-Oct 10, p. 23. 14. Dr. Mahir Ibrahimov, “Operational Culture in the U.S. Army: The Fires Center of Excellence Culture and Foreign Language Strategy Sets the Standard for the Rest of the TRADOC, Army,” Fires Bulletin, Jan-Feb 11, p. 23. 15. Memorandum for Record, subj: Cultural and Foreign Language Program Input, 8 Feb 11. 16. Memorandum for Cdr, 428th Field Artillery Brigade and Cmdt, Noncommissioned Officer Academy, subj: U.S. Army Field Artillery School Culture and Foreign Language Guidance, FY 11, 21 Sep 10. 17. FCOE Cultural and Foreign Language Program, 24 Jul 10. 18. FA Cmdt SITREP, 30 Jul 10. 19. Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training, 3 Jun 10. 20. Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Reset Assistance Training, 3 May 10. 21. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Jun 10, p. 9. 22. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Nov 09, p. 11. 23. Information Paper, subj: Facility Chart, 25 May 11. 24. Email with atch, subj: Army National Guard Regional Training Institute Input to 2010 History, 13 May 11. 25. Program Executive Officer, Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Fact Sheet, subj: JFETS, 4 Jun 10. 26. Fact Sheet, subj: CFFT, 28 Jan 11. 27. “Sill Begins Leadership Program,” Fort Sill Cannoneer, 6 Dec 63, p. 6. 28. Email with atch, subj: History of Fort Sill Noncommissioned Officer

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Academy, 25 Jan 10. 29. Unit Award Recommendation, 30 Sep 09. 29a. Email with atch, subj: NCOA 2010 History, 7 Feb 11. 30. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 10, p. 7. 31. Briefing, subj: NCOES Briefing, 27 Apr 10. 32. Information Paper, subj: NCOES, 27 Jan 11. 33. Information Paper, subj: Warrior Leader Course, 11 Jan 11. 34. Information Paper, subj: Advanced Leader Course, 11 Jan 11. 35. Information Paper, subj: Senior Leader Course, 11 Jan 11. 36. Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 2010. 37. Fact Sheet, subj: WOBC, 29 Dec 10. 38. Email with atch, subj: 428th FAB Portion of 2010 Annual History, 4 Apr 11. 39. Email, subj: Warrant Officer Instruction Branch Historical Information FY 2010, 7 Feb 11. 40. Interview, Dastrup with Chris Atkinson, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 8 Feb 11. 41. Email with atch, subj: One Page Synopsis of Program, 8 Feb 11. 42. Email with atch, subj: WOES and OES Input to 2010 Annual Command History, 25 Feb 11. 43. Email with atch, subj: Initial Military Training - Review of Warrant Officer Common Core Task List Working Group Results, 8 Feb 11. 44. Briefing, subj: Field Artillery Targeting Technician, Nov 09. 45. Email, subj: Warrant Officer Instruction Branch Historical Information FY 2010, 7 Feb 11. 46. Interview, Dastrup with Chris Atkinson, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 8 Feb 11. 47. Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2010. 48. Interview, Dastrup with Michael Dooley, Dep Cdr, 428th FAB, 21 Jan 11. 49. Army Training Requirements and Resource System, BOLC B, 24 Jan 11. 50. Army Training Requirements and Resource System, BOLC II, 24 Jan 11. 51. Fact Sheet, subj: FABOLC B, 29 Dec 10. 52. Interview, Dastrup with Chris Atkinson, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 8 Feb 11. 53. Fact Sheet, subj: FACCC, 29 Dec 10. 54. Briefing, subj: 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 2010. 55. Interview, Dastrup with Chris Atkinson, 428th Field Artillery Brigade, 8 Feb 11. 56. Email with atch, subj: FACCC-RC Input to 2010 Annual History, 11 Feb 11. 57. Interview, Dastrup with Loyd A. Gerber, Northrup Grumman, 20 Jan 11. 58. Email with atch, subj: ILE Brigade, Division Fire Support Course, 31 Jan 11. 59. FA Cmdt Weekly SITREP, 2-8 Apr 10. 60. FA Cmdt Weekly SITREP, 16 Jul 10. 61. Fact Sheet, subj: PCC, 29 Dec 10. 62. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Jun 10, p. 20. 63. Interview, Dastrup with CW3 Thomas Taccia, JACI, 23 Feb 11.

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64. Email with atch, subj: Precision Fires Course Input to 2010 Annual History, 4 Mar 11. 65. Briefing, subj: Precision Fires Program Brief, 2010. 66. Information Paper, subj: Precision Fires Program, Oct 10. 67. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Nov 09, p. 19. 68. Email, subj: Governor‟s Report 2010, 22 Feb 11. 69. Email with atch, sub j: Air Force 2010, 22 Feb 11. 70. Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Lt Col Rustan S. Schwichtenberg, Cdr, 138th Combat Training Wing, JACI, 22 Feb 11. 71. Email with atch, subj: JFO and 138th Flight Input to 2010 Annual History, 28 Feb 11. 72. Email with atch, subj: Doc, 22 Feb 11. 73. Briefing, subj: JOFEC, 12 Jan 10. 74. Fact Sheet, subj: JOFEC, 29 Dec 10. 75. Email with atch, subj: JOFEC Input to 2010 Annual History, 18 Feb 11. 76. Email with atch, subj: JOFEC Input to 2010 Annual History, 21 Mar 11. 77. Msg, subj: HQDA Electronic Warfare Execute Order, 2006. 78. Fact Sheet, subj: Electronic Warfare Career Field, 14 Jan 10. 79. “Army Initiates Electronic Warfare Capability,” Army News Service, 7 Dec 06. 80. Interview, Dastrup with LTC James J. Looney, EW-DOTD, 14 Feb 11. 81. “New Career Field: Electronic Warfare,” Army News Service, 6 Feb 09. 82. CAC OPORD 08-231a Electronic Warfare Roles and Responsibilities, 18 Aug 08. 83. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 10, p. 4. 84. Briefing (Extract), subj: DOTD, 23 Mar 10. 85. Fact Sheet, subj: Army Operational Electronic Warfare Course, 29 Dec 10. 86. Fires Forward, Jan 10. 87. “Electronic Warfare a New Career Field,” Army News Service, 27 Jan 11. 88. Email with atch, subj: Electronic Warfare Course Input to Annual History, 19 Feb 11. 89. Fact Sheet, subj: Tactical Information Operations Course, 29 Dec 10.

CHAPTER THREE

1. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept (Extract), 21 Dec 09. 2. Email with atch, subj: Force Design Portion of 2010 Annual History, 12 Apr 11. 3. Briefing, subj: Army Capstone Concept, 24 May 10. 4. Briefing, subj: Pre-Command Course Field Artillery Update, 18 Aug 10. 5. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The United States Army Operating Concept (Extract), 2016-2028, 19 Aug 10. 6. The United States Army Functional Concept for Fires: 2016-2028, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-4 (Extract), 13 Oct 10.

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7. Joint Air Ground Integration Cell White Paper, 2010. 8. Interview, Dastrup with Gary Wilds, CDID, 5 Apr 11. 9. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Nov 09, p. 11. 10. Briefing, subj: Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Reduction Study III, 15 Sep 10. 11. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Jun 10, p. 12. 12. Email with atch, subj: WV Studies and MRAP 2010, 8 Apr 11. 13. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 10, p. 28. 14. Briefing, subj: Executive Summary, MRAP Study II, undated. 15. Briefing, subj: Fires TCM Reorganization, 21 Dec 10. 16. Interview, Dastrup with Don Durant, TCM BCT Fires, 3 Mar 11. 17. “Army‟s Prized Excalibur Munition May Not Survive Budget Drills,” National Defense Magazine, 18 Jul 10. 18. Information Paper, subj: IBCT Organic Cannon Precision Strike Capability, 12 Jan 11. 19. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Jun 10, p. 9. 20. Email with atch, subj: LW 155 Input to 2010 Annual History, 16 Mar 11. 21. Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Scott Veach, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11. 22. Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), subj: M777A2 Authorized Acquisition Objective Increase, 25 May 10. 23. Memorandum for Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology), subj: M777A2 Army Acquisition Objective Increase, 22 Dec 10. 24. Email, subj: PEA, 25 Feb 11. 25. Interview, Dastrup with MAJ Jessie Taylor, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11. 26. SIGACTS, LW155 and M119, 19 Dec 09. 27. SIGACTS, LW155 and M119, 11 Dec 10. 28. SIGACTS, LW 155 and M119, 20 Nov 10. 29. Email with atch, subj: M119 Input to 2010 Annual History, 7 Mar 11. 30. Interview with atchs, Dastrup with MAJ Jeffrey R. White, TCM BCT-Fires, 25 Feb 11. 31. Information Paper, subj: How the PIM Supports Army Concepts, 19 Nov 10. 32. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Oct 10, p. 26. 33. Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11. 34. Interview with atchs, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11. 35. Email, subj: BFIST, Knight, etc, Input to 2010 Annual History, 9 Mar 11. 36. Information Paper, subj: MMS-PI, 28 Jan 09. 37. Information Paper, subj: MMS-Profiler, 2010. 38. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Nov 08, p. 10. 39. Information Paper, subj: MMS-PI, 28 Jan 09. 40. Interview, Dastrup with Doug Brown, Dep Dir, TCM BCT-Fires, 17 Feb 11. 41. Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, subj: GMLRS Alternative Warhead Analysis of Alternatives, 9 Feb 10. 42. Interview, Dastrup with Jeff Froysland, TCM Fires Brigade, 15 Feb 11. 43. Memorandum for Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, subj: Acquisition Decision Memorandum for GMLRS Alternative Warhead to Initiate Analysis of Alternatives, 7

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Apr 10. 44. Briefing, subj: GMLRS-U Fire, undated. 45. Memorandum for See Distribution, subj: GMLRS-AW Analysis of Alternatives Study Directive, 26 Apr 10. 46. Email with atch, subj: MLRS and HIMARS Launchers Input to 2010 Annual History, 28 Feb 11. 47. Interview, Dastrup with Leighton Duitsman, TCM Fires Brigade, 10 Feb 11. 48. “Army Cancels Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System,” DOD News Release, 13 May 10. 49. “Army Asks to Cancel NLOS-LS,” Army Times, 23 Apr 10. 49a. Interview, Dastrup with Leighton Duitsman, TCM Fires Brigade, 10 Feb 11. 50. Fires Forward, Apr 10. 51. Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 11. 52. Information Paper, SRC Tec, 2010. 53. Scott R. Gourley, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar,” Army Magazine, Apr 02. 54. LtJG Jason Calandruccio, Defense Contract Management Agency, “Lightweight Counter-Mortar Radar, www.dcma.mil, Winter 02. 55. Email with atch, subj: Updated Sensor History, 15 Mar 11. 56. FCOE CSM Newsletter (Extract), Nov 09, p. 8. 57. Information Paper, subj: PM Battle Command, undated. 58. RDT&E Budget Item (Extract), Feb 10. 59. Email with atch, subj: TCM Fires Cells Update, 7 Apr 11. 60. Email with atch, subj: Fires Battle Lab History, 8 Apr 11.

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INDEX OF NAMES

Bolton, Claude, 102

Campbell, GEN Charles C., 9 Cartwright, MG Charles A., 114 Casey, GEN William, Jr., 11 Chiarelli, GEN Peter W., 40 Cody, GEN Richard A., 26

F Fahey, Kevin M., 66, 75 Franks, GEN Frederick, 124

Gates, Bill, 74

Halverson, MG David D., 6, 14, 52 Hight, COL David B., 48

Ibrahimov, DR Mahir, 17

Keveles, CSM Dean J., 27

Lewis, CSM Clifford I., 26 Lull, COL Kenneth J., 48

Maples, MG Michael D., 55, 64 Merrick, COL Matt, 35 Metz, LTG Thomas M., 21, 89

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Mull, Stephen, 50

Peterson, Alvin W., 13

Ralston, MG David C., 21 Ridge, BGT Ross E., 6, 7, 30, 31, 35 Shinseki, GEN Eric K., 54

Smith, Roger, 66 Stricklin, MG Toney, 53, 64, 110 Sullivan, COL John M., 66

Thrasher, MG Alan W., 55 Thurman, LTG James D., 91

Vandal, BG Thomas S., 1, 2 Vangjel, MG Peter M., 3, 4, 5, 12, 13, 23, 27, 34, 35, 48, 75, 86 Vane, LTG Michael M., 77

Wallace, GEN William S., 9, 27, 40

Y Yakovac, MG Joseph L., 54, 64 Young, John J., 66