JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 1

Intergenerational ISSN 1617-1799 Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 9 · Issue Volume Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations

Issue Topic: Children's and Young People's Rights – with a Focus on the Right to Vote JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 126

Table of Contents

Issue topic: Children's and Young People's Rights – Announcements and Interna with a Focus on the Right to Vote What Would Happen if Citizens Under 18 Years Old Had the Legal Right to Vote? Editorial 127 e German U18 Project Experience 152

What Does it Mean to Have a Right? 128 e 20th Anniversary of the Convention by Prof. Dr. Dieter Birnbacher on the Rights of the Child 153

Should Democracy Grow up? Children and Voting Rights 133 Voting Rights and Age Restrictions - by Prof. Dr. Steven Lecce e Position of the Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations 154 Improving Public Policy for Children: A Vote for Each Child 139 Motion for a resolution presented to the by Prof. Dr. Robert H. Pantell and Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly: Prof. Dr. Maureen T. Shannon Expansion of Democracy by Lowering the Voting Age to 16 155 On Behalf of Children? e Plural Voting System in Belgium – from 1893 to 1919 144 Barring Adults from Voting – by Prof. Dr. Laurent de Briey, Aurélie Héraut Disenfranchisement of Felons and Mentally and Elise Ottaviani Disabled People Around the World 156

Call for Papers: Book Reviews Intergenerational Justice and the Scourge of War 158

Priscilla Alderson (2008): Young Children’s Rights. Possibilities and Limits of Party Cooperation Exploring Beliefs, Principles and Practice. 145 in Democracies 159 David Archard / Colin M.Macleod (eds.) (2002): Ways Towards a Legal Implementation e Moral and Political Status of Children. 149 of Intergenerational Justice 159

New Editorial Staff 159

Imprint 159

Become a supporter of FRFG! 160

e reviewers for this ance for England since April Nira Lamay-Rachlevsky: ber of the NY State Permanent issue were as follows 2007. is a lawyer and works for the Judicial Commission on Justice (in alphabetical order): Knesset (the Israeli parliament) for Children. Prof. Dr. Peter Häberle: legislative committees as a legal Prof. Dr. Bruce Auerbach: Executive Director of the Bei- advisor. Before, she was a de- Prof. Dr. Janna ompson: is an associate professor of poli- rut Research Center for Euro- puty commissioner for future is an associate professor of phi- tical science at Albright College pean Constitutional Law. generations in the Knesset. losophy at La Trobe University. in Reading, Pennsylvania (USA). Prof. Dr. Huey-li Li: Prof. Dr. Jane Spinak: Dr. Gotlind Ulshöfer: is a professor of educational is a professor of law at the is a program director for econo- Samantha Dimmock: philosophy at the University of Columbia Law School and mics, business ethics and gender is the head of policy and public Akron, Akron, Ohio (USA). co-founder of the Child Advo- issues at the Evangelische Aka- affairs at Children's Rights Alli- cacy Clinic. She is also a mem- demie Arnoldshain, Germany.

126 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 127

Editorial

he rights of children and young e right to vote is not mentioned in the e following article by Steven Lecce (Uni- people present an interesting ethical Convention on the Rights of the Child at all. versity of Manitoba, Canada) addresses the T and legal case. Given the existence Article 12, however, states: “States Parties question of whether or not children’s of universal human rights, why formulate shall assure to the child who is capable of continued electoral exclusion is morally extra rights for a special group? Are children forming his or her own views the right to defensible. According to Lecce there is a and young people not human beings? What express those views freely in all matters affect - fundamental tension between the egalitarian are the main differences between the Univer- ing the child, the views of the child being presuppositions of democracy and our refusal sal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in given due weight in accordance with the age to grant voting rights to children and young 1948) and the Convention on the Rights of and maturity of the child.” e struggle for a people. the Child (adopted in 1989)? Is there a need compromise resounds in this formulation. e third peer-reviewed article by Robert H. to adapt human rights in order to make them ere are 2.2 billion youngsters under 18 Pantell (University of California, San Francisco, age-dependent, thus moving away from the years of age living worldwide. But voting USA) and Maureen T. Shannon, University idea of ‘one right for all’? In order to under- rights are only granted to a very small mino- of Hawai`i at Mãnoa, USA) explores current stand the complexity surrounding the issue of rity of them, namely from 16 years on if they thinking about enfranchisement of children, children’s and young people’s rights, two live in Austria, Brazil, Cuba, Indonesia or from the fields of ethics, law and social arguments are key: Nicaragua. Children and adolescents are thus welfare. It proposes a proxy voting right for First, there is an alleged conflict between the excluded from key political decision-making parents. rights of parents and those of the child. For processes which have an impact on their lives. thousands of years, children were regarded as Without access to these processes which are is issue also contains a lot of interesting the property of their parents. In Roman law, integral to the exercise of democratic rights, background readings including a historical the father even had the right to abandon new- children are comparatively invisible as citizens overview of examples of plural voting born children. In the Old Testament, children or subjects. ‘Young people own the future’ is systems, a summary of the Convention of are mentioned in the same breath as slaves – a prominent saying. But they are already here, the Rights of the Child as well as an outline both were at the complete disposal of the now. of voting age and voting restrictions for fe- head of the family. omas Hobbes writes on It is correct that youth participation must be lons in prison and mentally disabled people children that parents may “alienate understood in broader terms than just voting. in more than a dozen countries. Moreover, them…pawn them for hostages, kill them for It is participation in civil society which can this issue features book reviews of Priscilla rebellion, or sacrifice them for peace”.1 take several forms, for instance youth parlia- Alderson’s Young Children’s Rights. Exploring Although this view has been weakened in the ments, youth entitlements to speak or submit Beliefs, Principles and Practice and the Western world in recent centuries, the idea of requests to political bodies or parliaments in anthology e Moral and Political Status of children as the subject of rights does not have all matters affecting young people. Neverthe- Children, edited by David Archard and many friends among authoritarian parents. less, in this issue of Intergenerational Justice Re- Colin M. Macleod. Second, and more important nowadays, there view, we focus on the voting rights of children is a potential conflict between children’s rights and adolescents because they are the most im- I hope you will enjoy reading our current and the protection of children. is can be portant step for increasing youth influence in issue. exemplified by the ‘right to work’. While no politics and to make children’s interests more one questions the necessity of adults to work visible. ere are three possibilities: engage- Joerg Chet Tremmel in order to make a living, a child’s right to ment for young people, engagement with Editor-in-Chief work needs to strike a balance between young people and also participation from London School of exercising personal freedoms and protecting young people. I believe that the last option Economics and them from work which restricts their oppor- should be given more importance in general. Political Science tunities to play and go to school. For adults, e first article of IGJR 4/2009 deals with employment is highly valued because of its the nature of rights in general. Dieter Birn- financial and identity granting dimensions. If bacher (University of Düsseldorf, Germany) children are (or feel) obliged to help their own offers an introduction into the language of poverty-stricken families, or simply just want rights and the role rights play in ethics and Notes: to imitate the behaviour of their parents, they law. His contribution explores whether the 1. Hobbes, omas (1994): e Elements of Law, could have a subjective interest in gaining em- concept of rights can be replaced without loss Natural and Politic, edited with an introduction ployment at a very young age (like 6 or 7). by the concept of obligations, that is whether by J.C.A. Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University Press But this could conflict with the ‘best interests rights should be seen as social constructs de- (first published in 1650), 23.8 of the child’ - i.e. their objective need to be rived from obligations. educated. Intergenerational Justice Review 127 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 128

What Does it Mean to Have a Right? by Prof. Dr. Dieter Birnbacher

bstract: is contribution offers an dren's rights), its advocacy function. Who - and self-correction to which various social introduction into the language of ever claims that a person A has (or should institutions contribute: politicians and other A rights and the role rights play in et- have) a certain right makes himself an advo- opinion leaders, the courts, the media and hics and law, with special reference to the rights cate of A. He takes the side of A and makes the general public. of children. It emerges that there are a number it clear that he is prepared to defend A's A second function of the language of rights of very different functions characteristic of right against anyone who fails to respect it, is the appeal to rights that are not, or not ‘rights talk’, both in ethics and law, and that either in practice, by not observing it, or in yet, part of the respective normative system many of them offer opportunities for strengthe- theory, by calling into question A's legiti- but are postulated as necessary or desirable ning appeals to moral and legal principles mate possession of the right. In many cases, additions by moral or political reformers. while others involve pitfalls that should be the advocacy function goes further and in- is is the manifesto use of the language of avoided. In conclusion, two of the theoretical cludes, beyond appealing to relevant persons rights or, as it may be termed, its revisionary questions raised by rights are addressed: whet- expected to fulfill A's right, an appeal to a use. In this use, rights are postulated in the her the concept of rights can be replaced wit- wider community. In these cases, the advo- knowledge that they are not as a matter of hout loss by the concept of obligation, and cacy is not only directed to those identified fact recognized, or only in special cases or by whether rights should be seen as social con- individuals immediately concerned with A, very few communities, with the hope that structs derived from obligations, or whether it but at an unidentified, anonymous and in- they will come to be recognized more widely is more plausible to reverse the order of prio- definite totality such as the community of at some future point of time. is use is rity. politicians, society, or even, as in the case of perhaps even more typical of ‘rights talk’ human rights, mankind. than the first one because it brings out its e language of rights – a powerful ethi- Within the advocacy function typical of characteristic surplus normativity. Appealing cal and political device ‘rights talk’ a division can be made between to rights does not only signify that they e language of rights is a particularly the kind of norms or principles to which the should be observed where observance is in forceful device in moral and political debate. ascription of rights appeal. One use is to some way deficient, but that they should be No other term is better suited to express appeal to the norms and principles that are recognized in the first place. Rights, in this strong moral emotions and political convic- part of a system of moral or legal norms use, typically have a distinctly utopian flavor. tions. ‘Rights talk’ always carries a conside- widely recognized in a moral or legal com- ey call for changes in the system of rable emphasis, and this seems due to the munity. is use might be termed the morality and/or law that are hoped for but fact that the language of rights from its very enforcing use. Rights held by A are appealed not necessarily expected to come about. e nature focuses on the perspective of those to in order to enforce obligations on the part reference to rights is counter factual rather who have something to gain from a given of B whenever this seems required by than of the nature of a mere reminder. is moral or legal relationship. ough it is hesitation or failure on the part B to act in is evident in fields such as international law widely agreed that rights, at least in their accordance with these rights. e invocation where the institutions necessary to enforce primary sense, are correlated with duties or of rights in this sense is of the nature of a the rights formally asserted by international obligations, and that to ascribe a right to reminder. It is understood that B recognizes declarations are notoriously non-existent. someone implies ascribing a corresponding A's right and has no reason to question the An extreme example is the universal right to duty or obligation to someone else, the legitimacy of these rights or of the claims periodic holidays with pay declared in art. language of rights brings the recipient of based on it. e main purpose of the 24 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights. these obligations sharply in view and reminder is to draw B's attention to impli- e revisionary function is a frequent char - remains silent on those who are expected to cations these rights have for his own dealings acteristic especially of the proclamation of accept these obligations and to act in accor- with A. B, for example, has subscribed to the dance with them. is focus explains, at right to free speech all the time, but under Modesty forbids what the law does least in part, the greater power of the certain circumstances B must be reminded not. language of rights over the moral emotions. of the fact that this right applies even to the / Lucius Annaeus Seneca / In general, it will be much easier to bring expression of opinions that he thinks people to fight for the rights of A than for morally or politically disastrous. In these moral rights: Moral rights are postulated the fulfillment of their or others' duties cases, the advocacy inherent in the language with an intention to transform them into towards A. of rights is based on a shared normative legal rights by changing the legal system e focus on the perspective of the right- system the vitality of which depends on a accordingly and by providing the in sti - holder is only one aspect of the central continuous process of mutual monitoring. tutions necessary for their enforcement. function of the language of rights (which is Viewed from the angle of society at large, it Ethics precedes politics. John Stuart Mill's particularly relevant in the context of chil- functions as device of normative self-control defense, as philosopher and moralist, of the

128 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 129

moral right of women to political participa- tion of A to him- or herself or to God. If, ac- accept certain obligations and to think about tion preceded his (unsuccessful) attempt to cording to traditional Christian thinking, devising, constructing and entertaining in- bring about a vote for women's suffrage as a nobody has a right to suicide, this means no stitutions suited to meet them. Most rights Member of Parliament. more than that suicide is illegitimate, quite postulated in the manifes to sense, including independently from the relations in which the rights of future generations, have to be Rights - some distinctions the individual stands to others and inde- classified as in rem rights in this sense. e To a semantic purist, the fact that the pendently from whether the verdict is justi- same applies to the rights stated in the UN language of rights takes over important fied by any obligations he may have to Convention on the Rights of the Child. rhetorical functions must seem a mixed others. It is no accident that in rem rights are mostly blessing. He will approach ‘rights’ with a moral rights. ey are typically postulated double suspicion. First, like other rhetori- In personam vs. in rem rights with the purpose to establish legal rights cally colored concepts in morality and poli- In its standard use, to have a right means to where they do not yet exist and to establish tics like ‘freedom’ or ‘human dignity’, the stand in a certain normative relation to the institutions necessary for their being concepts of rights is liable to inflation, others, namely that of having a legitimate respected within a society's given framework. thereby blurring its contours and weakening claim against them. If A is declared to have a is sheds light on important characteristics its normative force. Second, its very popu- right against B, A is thereby ascribed a by which legal rights differ from moral larity as a rhetorical device tends to make legitimate expectation that B, by acting or rights. Establishing legal rights is a move in people less inclined to take account of the forbearing to act in appropriate ways, respects a language game that is essentially pragmatic. semantic differences that exist between the that right, and a corresponding obligation on As a pragmatic device, legal rights are judged various uses of this concept in theory and the part of B to do what B owes to A as his or primarily by their instrumentality, i. e. by practice. her due. is kind of right can be of one of the extent to which they serve the ends they I will refrain, in the following, to practice two natures (or both). are designed for. One of these ends is the semantic purism and to present the myriad If A has a legitimate claim against one or safeguarding of moral rights. Moreover, legal of distinctions and classifications that have more concrete persons, one can speak of an rights are relative, both in factual and in been proposed concerning rights in philoso- in personam right. If the claim is against an normative respects. Not only is it possible phy and political science. A minimum of indefinite totality of persons such as society that a person can have a certain legal right distinctions, however, is necessary to make or humanity at large, one can speak of an in in one legal community and none in a transparent, in the words of Joel Feinberg's rem right. e paradigm example of an in neighboring one, it is also the case that these title, "the nature and value of rights" (Fein- personam right is the right involved in the rights often make no stronger claim than berg 1980, 143 ff.) and to clarify what it is institution of promises. It is an essential part that to be valid in a certain society and that is postulated in so many moralities, of promising that the promisor confers a within a certain period of time. Not only constitutions, declarations and manifestos. right on the promisee to expect and to de- can the institutions capable of enforcing One first distinction is that between the mand the fulfillment of the promise. e legal rights be created and abolished at will, standard relational use of the term ‘right’ promise establishes a moral relation between but even the legal rights themselves are where rights refer to a relation between a the partners that is highly personalized and subject to change. Against this, the claim to right-holder A and a B who is correspond - highly asymmetric, by defining one of the validity that goes with moral rights is uni- ingly obligated by this right, and the non- partners as the right-holding and the other versal. If A has a moral right, A has this right relational use in which to have a right just as the right-fulfilling party. Another typical no matter whether this right is in fact means that one is permitted to do some- case of an in personam right is the right of recognized or respected. A can possess this thing. In many contexts we can phrase the the child to be cared for by its parents. Here right even if it is not respected by the statement that A is morally or legally per- again, the distribution of rights and obliga- majority of existing societies. While a state- mitted to act in the way he does by saying tions is highly asymmetric, but differently ment that A has a legal right is descriptive that A has a right to act in this way. from the promise case the right is not estab - and particular, a statement that A has a To have a right, in this non-standard sense, lished by a free agreement but by a ‘natural’ moral right is normative and universal. As a means that A is under no obligation to act relation. A further difference is that in the move in the moral language game, the otherwise than he in fact does. us, in case of the child the right-holder is also the ascription of a moral right shares the claim saying that in any free society everyone has beneficiary of the right, whereas in the case to universal validity built into the very the right to act as he wishes as far as this in of a promise the beneficiary can be a third language of morality, however illusory (or accordance with existing law one expresses party. If B has promised A to do something hypocritical) this claim may seem on the the thought that everyone is permitted to do for A's child, A's child is the beneficiary of background of historical and cultural relativ - what he does provided this is not prohibited the promise but not necessarily the holder ity. e other side of the coin is that moral by an existing law. ere is, in this use, no of the right involved in the promise. An rights are largely ineffectual as long as they question of a special relation, constituted by example of an in rem right is the right to are not transformed into legal rights and a right, in which the individual stands to work. It is clear society at large is the ad- made part of a system of law that sanctions other persons or to society at large. Whet- dressee of this right, but it is far from clear violations. As a rule, a promisee is well ad - her A has the right or not need not depend how fulfillment of this right is to be secured vised to safeguard the moral rights accruing on any interpersonal relations between A and who is concretely obligated by it. As to him from a promise by the legal rights and others. at A is permitted to do some- such, it is an abstract right without concrete going with a legal contract. ough moral - thing might be seen to follow from the rela- addressee. It appeals to society as a whole to ity by itself is not without its own sanctions,

Intergenerational Justice Review 129 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 130

these are in general too weak to provide the parents or, alternatively, by a guardian, and in practice. e distinction according to trust required for cooperation. to receive the health care and education content is also relevant for the question of In some legal systems, legal protection of necessary for its development into an auto- who qualifies as holder of the respective interests is graded by distinguishing between nomous person. To have a negative claim- right. Since each kind of right is concerned objective and subjective rights. Rights are right means not to be exposed to certain with a certain kind of good, there are logical objective if the legal system imposes legal violations of one's integrity and correspond - limits to the range of subjects that qualify as duties on citizens to respect certain limits in ing risks, for example by physical violence right-holders. A right, whether moral or legal, their dealings with one another and with or psychological torture. e corresponding can only be ascribed to beings to which the third parties. Rights are subjective if the legal duties on the part of others are partly corresponding good can be ascribed. As a system makes provisions for opportunities negative and partly positive. Others are not consequence, the range of rights that can be of the right-holders to have their rights only required not to infringe on or to ascribed to animals is narrower than that for protected by legal action, either by laying endanger the integrity of the right-holder, children, which is again narrower than that complaint against violations in person or by but also to actively provide the means for adults. Animals do not qualify as advocates. In many countries, minors have necessary for achieving the good safeguarded candidates for the ascription of liberties, or subjective rights, whilst animals have only by the right. ese are usually taken to only to the extent that they are capable of objective rights. Both have rights that are include whatever may be necessary to intentional action. ey do not qualify as protected by law. But only children are provide for the personal safety of the right- candidates for powers. ey do qualify, capable of being vicariously represented by holder. In the case of children and other however, as holders of positive and negative trustees who secure their rights on their particularly vulnerable groups, rights are claim-rights to the extent that their good behalf. mostly of the nature of negative and positive depends, among others, on how they are claim-rights. is must not blind us, how - treated by humans. Infants do not ordinar i - Liberties, claim-rights and powers ever, to the fact that the members of vulner - ly qualify as candidates for civil rights such Another distinction between rights that as the right to vote (except vicariously). But dominates the theory of rights is that by At his best, man is the noblest of all they obviously qualify for claim-rights such their respective content. e favoured animals; separated from law and as the right to physical and mental integrity approach is to classify the content of moral justice he is the worst. and to being provided with the means or legal rights by the kind of goods that the / Aristotle / necessary for their development to maturity. exercise of the right is intended to safeguard. ere is, then, no once-for-all answer to the In the case of liberties, this is primarily free- able groups also enjoy liberties. Some of question of who qualifies as a bearer of dom and privacy, in the case of claim-rights these may even conflict with the fulfillment rights. It depends on the kind of right in it is primarily integrity and opportunities, in of rights, such as in cases in which children question. In general, the range of beings to the case of powers it is the interest in auto- refuse a medical treatment which they have which claim-rights can be ascribed is wider nomously structuring one's social relations a right to receive. A typical example of a than that to which liberties and powers can by establishing contracts and other agree- claim-right in this sense is the provision of be ascribed. And it follows that there is no ments with others. the UN Convention on the Rights of the reason to uphold the time-honored doctrine A right can be classified as a liberty if it Child that the system of adoption shall of the reciprocity of rights and duties accord - means that A is free to act as he wishes ensure that the best interests of the child shall ing to which rights can only be held by without the interference of others. In par tic - be the paramount consideration (art. 21). beings that are capable of having duties. is ular, a liberty can be positive (right to free A right can be classified as a power if it doctrine is a non-starter because it overlooks speech) or negative (right not to serve in the confers on an individual the opportunity to the central function of the ascription of army). In each case the corresponding duty change the moral or legal relations in which rights, its advocacy function. A being such is negative, that of non-interference. If A has he stands to others. In modern societies, this as a sentient animal, an infant or a demen- a liberty, B has an obligation not to interfere kind of right has become more and more ted adult is no less qualified as right-holder in A's exercise of the liberty, whether this important with the growing liberty of the in- by not being able to put forward its rights consists in an activity or a forbearance. An dividual to establish, within certain limits, or even to know about them. On the example for a liberty in the context of his roles and relations by his own will. e contrary, because of their dependency on children's rights is art.13, 1 of the UN individual has successively become free to others these beings are particularly in need Convention on the Rights of the Child, control the moral and legal obligations of having their rights respected. which assures the child freedom of expres- incumbent on him by making autonomous Another relevant observation is that the legal sion. choices how far to bind himself by contracts, system is considerably more generous in With claim-rights the differences between promises and personal bonds. ascribing rights than the moral code. As an the positive and the negative versions are It goes without saying that distinguishing essentially pragmatic device it is much more more pronounced. To have a positive claim- these kinds of rights does not mean to ignore free to ascribe rights to non-personal entities right means to be entitled to being provided their interrelations, both logical and factual. that would not qualify as holders of moral with some good (such as, for example, the Powers are logically dependent on liberties. rights, such as trusts and heritages or (con- means of subsistence, health care or work Liberties are factually dependent on claim- cerning the right to inherit) the nasciturus, opportunities) by certain identified persons rights, at least if they are not meant as formal the child yet to be born. or by society at large. In this sense, a small guarantees but as entitlements that the Another distinction that is of special impor- child has a claim-right to be cared for by its individual has a realistic chance to exercise tance for the relationship between parents

130 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 131

and children is that between mandatory and rights, each in accordance with its respective tive, for example if helping a friend in need discretionary rights. Mandatory rights are normative weight. In German constitutional is given priority over holding a promise on rights that are conjoined with a duty to law it is agreed that even those basic rights which nothing much depends. Rights are of exercise the right. While liberties and powers that are granted without inherent limits do varying normative weight, and at least those are, in general, discretionary in the sense that not hold absolutely but can in practice be of relatively low priority may well be judged the right-holder is free to exercise the right, limited if their exercise conflicts with other to be negotiable even with imperfect duties. some particular liberties and powers are inherently unlimited basic rights. Only a so- Among the metaethical issues surrounding mandatory in so far as they constrain their called ‘core content’ of these rights is taken rights two stand out as being the subject of exercise. us, parents have the legal right to partake of the non-negotiability that is repeated and fundamental controversies. to bring up their children and thereby the characteristic of the right to human dignity One is the issue whether the language of right to exercise their own personal (and its protection by the state) in the first rights can be completely substituted by the preferences, for example (though with article of the German constitution. e language of duties. Some of the philosophical certain limitations) in point of religion, but same holds for moral rights such as the right defenders of what has been called the this right is conjoined with a corresponding to physical integrity or the rights acquired redundancy theory of rights (such as Richard obligation. e right to vote, in some coun- by accepting a promise. For both rights, Brandt1) have expressed doubts whether the tries, goes together with an obligation to situations are easily thinkable in which they particular psychological force of the vote. Something similar holds for certain have to cede, on reflection, to the rights of language of rights can be reproduced by claim-rights. us, children have a legal others provided these carry more weight using only duty-talk. But they think that at claim-right to education in the sense that than the right sacrificed. It is a moot question, least the semantic content of the language of society has a duty to provide adequate however, whether rights are negotiable not rights is fully reproducible in the language educational opportunities. On the other only against rights but also against duties of duties. ough this theory has found hand, this right is mandatory by being without corresponding rights, i. e. to those quite a number of adherents,2 there are conjoined with a duty. Children in general duties traditionally termed ‘imperfect reasons to doubt whether it is adequate. For have no choice to go to school or not as soon duties’. Examples of ‘imperfect’ duties are one, the correspondence with rights (on the they have reached schooling age. Another the duty of generosity and the duty to come part of the recipient) changes the semantic type of right that is similar to a mandatory to the aid of the needy. Differently from content of the concept of duty in its applica - right in restricting the options open to the ‘perfect’ duties that correspond to a right on tion to those ‘perfect’ duties that are of right-holder are inalienable rights. In this the part of the recipient, imperfect duties central relevance to morality and law as case, the right-holder is free to exercise the leave the moral agent more choice in deter- normative systems. At least for moral rights, right he possesses, but he is not free to mining who is to receive the good the agent having a right is more than being the object renounce the right or to exchange it for is morally bound to provide and in what of others' moral duties. Differently from money or other goods, thereby permanently exact way this is carried out. If I have duties without corresponding rights, the depriving himself of the opportunity of contracted a debt it is usually clear who it is right-holder can claim the fulfillment of his exercising the right. In this way, the right to whom I owe the money and in what way right as something that is due to him and for freedom is customarily understood both in and at what point of time I am expected to which, if fulfilled, gratitude would be out of morality and in (constitutional) law. e pay it back. e same holds for other perfect place. Whoever has a right not to starve, right to freedom implies the right not to duties like fulfill ing a promise or seeing to it need not wait for others to give him to eat. exercise this right in particular situations, that my child at- but it does not imply a right to sell oneself tends school. With No man is above the law and no man is below it: nor do we into slavery. ‘imperfect duties’ ask any man's permission when we ask him to obey it. this is different. I / Theodore Roosevelt / e ethics and metaethics of rights have a choice about ere are a number of controversial ethical the who, how and when of charitable giving, He is in a position to demand that he gets and metaethical issues that regularly come and I have more leeway to exercise my per- what is owed to him. One might even go up in discussions about rights and which can sonal preferences. Charity is nothing I owe further and follow Joel Feinberg by saying fruitfully be debated without going too to its recipients. Is it legitimate to make an that rights seem to involve a second-order deeply into substantive questions concern - ’imperfect duty’ take precedence over a right that entitles the right-holder to claim, ing concrete rights and their limits. One ’perfect duty’? Is it morally unobjectionable under appropriate circumstances, the fulfill- such issue is the status of rights in cases of to break a promise in cases in which this ment of his right.3 Conferring a right on conflict with other rights or duties. conflicts with coming to the aid of someone someone means more than to postulate the It is generally agreed that rights are, as a rule, in need? is is answered in the negative by legitimacy of a claim. It means to encourage not absolute but have the status of prima a great many philosophers, among them and to support the right-holder in the facie rights, i. e. can and must be negotiated Kant and Schopenhauer, and there are many attempt to make appropriate claims. is with other rights in cases in which conflict - examples for which this answer seems ade- connotation of empowerment explains the ing rights cannot be respected at the same quate. Normally, it is no excuse for not pay- close connection between the possession of time. us, liberties are commonly held to ing back a debt that more good would be rights on the one hand and self-respect and be restricted by claim-rights and claim-rights done by spending the money on a needy human dignity on the other. Moreover, the by liberties, so that any one right is limited friend. For other cases, the doctrine of priory redundancy theory fails to do justice to the in its range by other items in the system of of rights over duties is clearly counterintui- advocacy function of rights. Conferring a

Intergenerational Justice Review 131 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 132

right on someone does not only encourage philosophers, including Kant and Mill, have Griffin, James (2002): Do children have the right-holder to put forward his right, but seen a close connection between perfect rights? In: Archard, David / MacLeod, Colin also others to speak up in his name, especially moral duties and duties that it is legitimate to M. (eds.): e moral and political status of if the right-holder is temporarily or perma- enforce by legal sanctions. Another argument children. Oxford: Oxford University Press, nently unable to do so himself. for the priority of duties over rights is that it 19-30. is easy to imagine a system of morality or of In the state of nature...all men are law without rights, but that it is impossible Hohfeld, Wesley Newcombe (1919): Fun- born equal, but they cannot continue to imagine a system of morality or law with - damental Legal Conceptions as Applied in in this equality. Society makes them out duties. In a world of angels where Judicial Reasoning. New Haven: Yale Uni- lose it, and they recover it only by the everyone did what duty enjoins, rights might versity Press. protection of the law. in fact become redundant. / Charles de Montesquieu / Steiner, Hillel (1994): An Essay on Rights. Notes: Oxford: Oxford University Press. Another controversial question is of interest 1. Brandt 1959: 440. primarily for ethical theorists. e question 2. E. g., Frey 1980. Wenar, Leif: Rights. Stanford Encyclopedia is whether rights are fundamental or deriva- 3. Feinberg 1980: 141. of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/en- tive in the order of logical priority. Should 4. Feinberg 1992: 205. tries/rights/. Viewed 20 October 2009. rights be seen as social constructs that are - 5. Feinberg 1992: 205. in some circuitous way - derived from duties Waldron, Jeremy (ed.) (1984): eories of or is it the other way round, so that rights References: Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. are the fundamental category? Joel Feinberg Brandt, Richard B. (1959): Ethical theory. speaks for many legal philosophers in New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs. Submitted: 15 May 2009 preferring the first route: "It is because I have Accepted after revisions: 20 August 2009 a claim-right not to be punched in the nose Feinberg, Joel (1980): Rights, justice, and by you, ... that you have a duty not to punch the bounds of liberty. Essays in social philo- Dieter Birnbacher is me in the nose. It does not seem to work the sophy. Princeton, N. J. professor at the Hein- other way round."4 is shows that for Fein- rich-Heine University berg rights are more fundamental than duties. Feinberg, Joel (1992): Freedom and fulfill- of Düsseldorf. He is also It does not show that rights are the last ment. Philosophical essays. Princeton, N. J. vice president of the word. In a later remark Feinberg makes it Schopenhauer Society, clear that interests are the fundamental cate- Frey, Raymond G. (1980): Interests and Frankfurt/Main, mem- gory and that it is they that lie at the basis of rights. e case against animals. Oxford: ber of the central ethics both rights and duties: "My claim and your Oxford University Press. commission at the Federal Medical Associa- duty both derive from the interest that I have tion and member of the ethics commission in the physical integrity of my nose."5 Both Further Readings: of the Medical faculty at the Heinrich-Heine rights and duties function to protect inte- Archard, David (2004): Children. Rights University in Düsseldorf. His main fields of rests, either actual or prospective, with rights and childhood. London: Routledge (second interest are ethics, practical ethics and protecting those interests that are edition) anthropology. particularly crucial for a good life. However, the fact that there are ‘imperfect duties’ that Campbell, Kenneth (2001): Legal Rights. Contact details: Prof. Dr. Dieter Birnbacher, do not correspond to rights militates against Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Philosophisches Institut Feinberg's proposed order of priority. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal- Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, ’Imperfect duties’ protect the conditions of rights/. Viewed 20 October 2009. 40225 Düsseldorf. a good life in the same way as ‘perfect du- ties’ do. e only difference is that the corre- Dworkin, Ronald (1984): Rights as Trumps. Email: [email protected] spondence with rights enables society to put In: Waldron, Jeremy (ed.): eories of additional pressure on the fulfillment of Rights. Oxford, 153-167. perfect moral duties. is explains why many

Dear Reader, IGJR-Editors Your opinion matters! Postfach 5115 We want to improve the Intergenerational 61422 Oberursel Justice Review with your input. GERMANY Send us your comments to: Phone +49 6171 982 367 Fax +49 6171 952 566 E-Mail: [email protected] Please tell us of any friends to whom we can send one trial issue free of cost.

132 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 133

Should Democracy Grow up? Children and Voting Rights by Prof. Dr. Steven Lecce

bstract: is paper examines whether forward violation of the equality that demo- of proceduralism for children’s voting rights or not children’s continued electoral cracy is supposed to deliver? As we shall see, via David Estlund’s most recent contribu- A exclusion is morally defensible. one answer is based upon children’s mani- tion to normative democratic theory.1 In Ultimately, there is a deep tension between the fest disabilities in relation to whatever capa- Estlund’s hands, the justification of demo- egalitarian presuppositions of democracy and bility benchmark is used to identify the legal cracy crucially depends upon the refutation our apparent unwillingness to grant children age of majority. is move will not do, of ‘epistocracy’ - the rule of the wise.2 Like so voting rights. Unless a plausible distinction can however, at least without further argument, many others, Estlund deliberately chooses to be found, then, between adults and children because, beyond the legal age of majority, omit children from the purview of his ana- that also tracks the underlying reasons for disabilities of those kinds typically do not lysis. However, his arguments bear directly endorsing democracy in the first place, the disqualify adults above the threshold. In upon the question of children’s voting rights, continued political disenfranchisement of our Canada, for example, neither the insane nor because the case for excluding children from youngest citizens is shown for what it is: social convicted criminals are barred from voting. the franchise normally rests explicitly upon injustice. e paper begins by exploring some In short, the common intuition about the the premise that political authority should of the conceptual difficulties that childhood absurdity of granting voting rights to chil- be knowledge-based, and it is this premise creates in relation to democracy. It then assesses dren is, in fact, quite hard to sustain in light that Estlund attacks. us, if the critique of the implications of two very different of both the best arguments for democracy epistocracy succeeds, this might supply approaches to democracy for children’s voting and existing electoral practices. advocates of children’s voting rights with rights: proceduralism and a child’s supposed much-needed theoretical support. Because right to an open future. We worry about what a child will the ideal of personal autonomy has played become tomorrow, yet we forget that such an important role in recent moral and Introduction he is someone today. political philosophy, this paper considers At first glance, the idea that children should / Stacia Tauscher / what (if anything) is implied by a child’s have voting rights probably strikes most right to an ‘open future’ in connection with people - if they ever contemplate it at all - as is paper explores some of the complexi- voting rights.3 an absurdity. One need not be a pediatrician ties surrounding this tension between the or psychologist (or, parent, for that matter) common intuition, on the one hand, and What is a child? to appreciate the fact that, especially when the arguments for democracy and existing From the moral point of view, what could they are very young, children are often practices, on the other. It begins by motivat - be worrisome about the electoral disenfran- emotionally unstable, ethically immature, ing the topic by showing how, in general, chisement of children? Up until fairly re- and cognitively under-developed and, thus, children’s political disenfranchisement raises cently, at least, children have not been typically ill-equipped for discharging the serious questions of justice that must be central figures in ethical analyses of politics rights and responsibilities of democratic addressed rather than ignored. If we are to so the question was unlikely to arise in the citizenship. However, the continued exclu- continue excluding children from the first place.4 But in the West, now, after sion of children from the electoral franchise franchise, that exclusion, itself, should be several hundred years of democratic theory sits rather uneasily with both influential based upon a defensible political morality and practice, there are prima facie tensions, philosophical defences of democracy and the rather than simply the result of unquestioned perhaps even contradictions, between the existing electoral practices of Western convention or habit. e rest of the paper most influential justifications of majority liberal-democratic states. What makes takes up this challenge by exploring two very rule and our continued unwillingness to give democracy ethically attractive as a political different approaches to democracy to see the vote to anyone younger than, say, 18 form is that all citizens are to share equally in what they yield in connection with children’s years of age.5 shaping the law and public policy that sets voting rights. If the core idea of democracy I have repeatedly referred to ‘children’. What, out the basic framework of rights and is the collective authorization of laws by then, is a ‘child’? Our modern conception of responsibilities that determine, or at least voting for them, broadly speaking, there are childhood is parasitic on that of adulthood, greatly influence, their life prospects and two ways of defending that idea: first, as a to the extent that children are often charac- opportunities. A democracy is better than its fair procedure for adjudicating the compet - terized primarily as lacking what defines an rivals, so the argument goes, because it treats ing preferences and interests of citizens, each adult.6 In most philosophical accounts, chil- its citizens with equal concern and respect. of whom are assumed to be equally worthy dren’s relative capacity impoverishment is But children are citizens too, so why are they of political concern and respect; and, pervasive, deep and multi-perspectival. For denied what is probably the single most im- second, as the implication of a character instance, Archard states: “ese include the portant democratic right - the right to vote? ideal rooted in the value of personal auto- moral or juridical perspective from which Furthermore, why isn’t that denial a straight- nomy. is paper examines the implications persons may be judged incapable, in virtue

Intergenerational Justice Review 133 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 134

of age, of being responsible for their deeds; petence correlations alone is inherently un- to govern that they should be entrusted with an epistemological or metaphysical viewpoint fair.11 Clearly, there is something inherently complete and final authority over the from which persons, in view of their imma- arbitrary and therefore unfair about drawing government of the state”.14 On this view, turity, are seen as lacking in adult reason or legal distinctions on the basis of age alone. majority rule follows from the assumption knowledge; and a political angle from which To discriminate against the young because that a legitimate government must give young humans are thought unable to they are young is as bad, morally speaking, as equal consideration to the good and interests contribute towards and participate in the discriminating against, say, blacks or women of every person bound by its decisions. running of the community.”7 because of the colour of their skin, or their Analytically, then, a concept of childhood sex, respectively. at kind of ageism, as it is The major purpose of democracy, requires that children be somehow distin- now called, is indeed reprehensible. But its ritual and its feast - this is the guish able from adults in light of some un- there is nothing necessarily objectionable election. specified set of attributes; a conception of about using age as a reliable proxy for various / Herbert George Wells / childhood is a specification of those attributes. competences that might be relevant to In the contemporary Western world, a people’s abilities to effectively discharge Second, democracy is a fair procedure for widespread, perhaps dominant, conception rights and responsibilities.12 Ultimately, the translating individual preferences into social of adulthood (and therefore also of child- real questions are whether or not the proxy choices when people disagree. Any other hood) goes something like this: an adult is of age reliably tracks (in a probabilistic social choice mechanism will either antece- someone who is rational, physically inde- sense) the competences that are supposed to dently assume that some people’s interests pendent, autonomous, and with a sense of be relevant, whether or not those compe- count for more than those of others (violat - identity that derives partly from critical tences really are relevant, and, finally, whet- ing equality) or it will incorporate some con- reflection upon her beliefs and desires. her a possession of them is fairly demanded troversial pre-political standard of right and Because of this, she can make free and of everyone or, instead, tested for or, even wrong that people’s votes should track (making informed choices for which she can / should worse, assumed, only selectively. voting dispensable). is violates equality and be held responsible. It is because a child lacks For argument’s sake, then, let us divide ignores pluralism.15 Both strategies are fraught these dispositions and capacities that she is childhood into the following subcategories: with difficulties when it comes to denying thought unable to, say, work for a living, be infancy (birth-6 years), childhood proper (6- children - certainly older teenagers - voting legally accountable for her actions, or vote. 12 years), and young personhood (12-18 rights. e egalitarian argument invokes the years).13 With this framework in mind, we interests of every person but proceeds, on the …the voice of children must be should ask: is there a compelling basis for ex- basis of that premise, to limit the franchise heard and respected in all matters cluding children from the franchise, one that to every adult citizen. As critics have pointed concerning their rights. will not also lead to the exclusion of some out, this slide, while characteristic, typically / Unicef / (perhaps many) adults, or to giving some occasions little notice.16 But sound argu- adults plural votes? In sum, is their exclusion ments are required to justify denying chil- A structural problem confronts any concep - consistently defensible in light of the best ar- dren the vote, particularly when the unequal t ion that indexes childhood to adulthood in guments for democracy? voting power of the elderly relative to the the way that Western culture seems to.8 To young leads (predictably) to the latter be at all plausible, a psychological account Is there a problem with children’s politi- group’s heightened liability to poverty and of human development, or an epistemologi- cal disenfranchisement? all of its associated horrors. e procedural cal account of the acquisition of knowledge e core idea of democracy is the collective argument can exclude children tout court will have to be gradual. As Locke sought to authorization of laws by the people who are only by assuming that, as a group, they lack demonstrate, barring social or natural subject to them. As such, democracy is the capacity to make rational decisions catastrophes, humans acquire reason gra- inseparable from voting. about alternative parties and their policies in dually, so the transition from childhood into Symbolically, voting rights are the mark of light of whatever information is available adulthood is typically both continuous and democratic citizenship. Citizens are those about them. Do they? Of course, this is an cumulative.9 But legal rights and responsi- who participate in the government of their empirical, not a philosophical, question, but bilities, including voting rights, would seem society; they do so either by voting on laws we can’t begin to answer it without doing to be all or nothing - either one has the right directly, or by electing representatives to do philosophical legwork first, because precisely to vote, or one does not. As Archard astutely so on their behalf. In the voluminous litera- which capacities are required will depend points out, this creates the problem “of how ture on democratic theory, there are many upon how democracy is interpreted - its to dovetail a psychological account of human different explanations as to why voting has point, value and purpose. We cannot know development, or an epistemological account the normative significance that democrats whether or not their relative capability defi- of the acquisition of knowledge, with the allege, that is, why casting a ballot legitima- cits should disqualify children from voting establishment of criteria whose possession tes the results and makes them binding and until we know which capabilities ground vo- guarantees a certain moral, political and ju- authoritative on everyone, even on political ting rights. And we cannot know what those ridical status”.10 losers. capabilities are, in turn, without closely Some critics have found the problem to be Here are two promising candidates. First, examining leading accounts of democracy. insoluble, such that any attempt to draw democracy is implied by a principle of basic Shortly, we turn to procedural and substan- legal distinctions between children and equality. At least among adults, “no persons tive accounts of democracy shortly to see adults on the basis of supposed age / com- are so definitely better qualified than others whether, in fact, children may be justifiably

134 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 135

excluded on the basis of their relative capa- following general structure: pro tanto a legitimate or authoritative ruler.23 bility deficits. For now, we can say at least (1) ere are true (procedure-independent) David Estlund makes the point as follows: this much: in order for children’s continued normative standards by which political “It is important to see that authority does political disenfranchisement not to require decisions ought to be judged; not simply follow from expertise. Even if we justification, the following three highly (2) Some (relatively few) people know those grant that there are better and worse politi- dubious things would have to be true: normative standards better than others; cal decisions (which I think we must), and (1) Children have no distinctive interests of therefore that some people know better what should their own; (3) e normative political knowledge of be done than others (we all think some are (2) Even if they do have such distinctive the relative few is a warrant for their much worse than others), it simply does not interests, their parents can adequately having political authority over the rest.19 follow from their expertise that they have represent them at the polling booth; Call this the argument for ‘epistocracy’, or authority over us, or that they ought to. is (3) e costs of disenfranchisement are rule by the knowledgeable.20 Let us ignore expert/boss fallacy is tempting, but some - borne by all children, not simply by the the separate and admittedly difficult issue as one’s knowledge about what should be done poor and powerless.17 to the precise content of the relevant leaves completely open what should be done As Schrag points out, the most obvious chil- knowledge and the education responsible for about who is to rule. You might be correct, dren’s interest that is not shared by adults is producing it. Assume that such knowledge but what makes you boss?”24 the interest in receiving an adequate educa- exists and also that people with that educa- Like so many other contemporary defenders tion, one that potentially conflicts with tion will tend to rule more wisely than those of liberal-democracy, Estlund invokes a interests in maximally high after-tax paren- without it.21 Both seem like fairly minimal principle of political legitimacy in which state tal incomes. Even if children’s interests could assumptions and, if we concede them, we power must be publicly justified, that is, be fully represented by their parents, how - finally have a promising basis for justifiably reasonably agreed to by everyone subjected to ever, such representation will hardly be excluding children from the franchise be- it.25 It is this justificatory standard that rules equally influential or effective, given existing cause, along with the majority of adults, they out epistocracy: the inference from (2) to (3) levels of socio-economic inequality, and this lack the expertise of the politically wise.22 above would be reasonably rejected by free seems to violate the procedural fairness that Given our purposes, then, it is worth and equal citizens unwilling to irrevocably many democratic accounts champion. pondering whether or not the argument for surrender power to putative political experts. Finally, because parents from different social epistocracy succeeds. e kind of pluralism - cultural, religious, classes are not equally likely to vote, children ethical, metaphysical - likely to survive and of the most vulnerable will remain the least A child becomes an adult when he thrive under free institutions is not conducive effectively represented, even if we assume realizes that he has a right not only to generating a normative consensus that that children’s interests are best represented to be right but also to be wrong. would identify the relevant experts.26 by their own parents. In the end, if we want / Thomas S. Szasz / Estlund highlights the expert / boss fallacy to continue to deny children the vote, we in order to block epistemic justifications of will have to confront questions that our Premise (1) looks unassailable and child plural voting systems, that is, of systems that political ancestors have ignored, that is, their liberationists, in particular, are certainly in grant more votes to those better qualified exclusion must be justified rather than no position to reject it to the extent that (because better educated) to rule.27 He simply assumed. Can it be? their demand for children’s political inclu- chooses to ignore children, but the omission sion itself is advanced as a true requirement is rather curious in this context. e reason - Democracy, Plato’s shadow and the rule of political morality. Premise (2) might able rejection standard of political legitimacy of the wise render the argument tautological, but only if that he deploys to vindicate egalitarian Western political theory begins with the we identify the content of the requisite democracy by blocking the inference from suggestion that democracy is not naturally political education as whatever happens to (2) to (3) seems to cut both ways. On Est- plausible because it hands over political lead the relative few to rule more wisely. If lund’s view, all adults are to have the same decision-making to those too stupid to be there is a way of giving content to that voting rights despite their being differentially entrusted with power.18 Today, and at least education such that, contingently, people endowed with political wisdom because such openly, this is almost universally denied, but with it will tend to rule more wisely, then wisdom is not the basis of justified author ity. the conclusion is surprisingly hard to resist. (3) seems to follow from (2), and democracy Fine, but why should we deprive children of After all, when it comes to life and death is a non-starter along with children’s voting the vote on the basis of their relative medical decisions, for example, could there rights, because it is certainly reasonable to epistem ic deficits when similar deficits are be anything more moronic than holding a think that children, especially the very not grounds for excluding adults? e argu- vote instead of relying on a doctor’s exper- young, will in all likelihood lack the relevant ment that vindicates egalitarian democracy tise? Surely, the stakes in political decisions knowledge that grounds political authority. from Plato’s elitist shadow also casts serious are sometimes equally high, involving as doubt on the continued exclusion of chil- they do national security, warfare, the admin - How to reject epistocracy dren from the franchise. istration of criminal justice, the provision of Perhaps this is too quick, though. Even if we One way for proceduralists to resist this essential educational and social services, and concede (1) and (2) - and we probably should conclusion would be to identify a threshold so on. If the ancient medical/political - the inference from (2) to (3) commits the level of competence below which children analogy is apt, we seem to have the basis for ‘expert/boss fallacy’ by illicitly assuming that are thought to fall. On this satisficing con- an anti-democratic argument with the because someone would rule better they are ception, voting rights require people to have

Intergenerational Justice Review 135 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 136

enough of whatever composite of abilities is and autonomy as a set of capacities for criti- and pursing projects - relationships, commit - relevant to collective self-rule but, over and cal self-reflection, we could then say, and on ments, goals - then she must possess a range above that amount, differential abilities the basis of that supposed right, that parents of cognitive skills. She will require, at mini- would not translate into unequal entitle- have positive duties to foster, and negative mum, practical reasoning skills that enable ments. If the legal age of majority is actually duties not to harm, those capacities. In her to conceive of alternative options for a reliable proxy for that composite, then pro- attributing fairly sophisticated autonomy choice. Additionally, she must have the cedural accounts of democracy may, in the rights to children, admittedly many of mental abilities to form complex intentions end, justifiably exclude children from the whom are not yet capable of exercising as well as the capacity to comprehend the franchise. Lacking the requisite knowledge them, we are not making a fundamental means required for the realization of her and abilities, children would not count category mistake, as some critics allege.35 goals. Such cognitive skills and mental among those whose reasonable consent was Instead, we are only ruling out kinds of abilities are clearly damaged by inadequately required to justify state power. Subjected to violating parental conduct now that will funded, under-staffed and poorly managed parental authority, they would be as Locke guarantee, or at least make it significantly educational systems. described them - gradually on the way to ac- more likely, that important options for chil- quiring freedom (including political free- dren are foreclosed later. So the kind of A child educated only at school is an dom) as they developed over time into autonomy that’s invoked here might be called uneducated child. competent reasoners.28 anticipatory: ”[a child’s] right while he is still / George Santayana / So the central question is this: are children a child is to have these future options kept unreasonable? Before rushing to the conclu- open until he is a fully formed self- determining Children’s anticipatory autonomy is also sion that they most certainly are, there are adult capable of deciding among them“.36 thwarted by adults / parents pre-committing several things to keep in mind. Some of the Does children’s political exclusion violate expenditures, thus damaging the material children currently below the legal age of ma- their right to an open future? If so, this means for its exercise. Alongside the cogni- jority in Canada (18) are ‘young persons’, as would be problematic for both children and tive capacities necessary for project pursuit I’m calling them, between 12-18 years of democracy, because democratic institutions and freedom from manipulation and coercion, age. Many of these children are probably are often defended precisely on the grounds the final precondition of personal autonomy more computer literate, news savvy and that, under them, personally autonomous is an adequate range of options for choice. politically sophisticated than their parents, lives are likely to flourish.37 ere are several is adequacy criterion is satisfied primarily and in a way that makes it likely that they reasons for thinking that children’s political through variety, and not number, of options. possess basic abilities to understand and disenfranchisement might undermine their Because choices are guided by reasons, the rationally evaluate alternative parties and interest in their having futures left options available for an autonomous indivi- policies. is seems like a prima facie reason sufficiently open. To begin with, there is the dual must differ enough to rationally affect to lower the voting age to somewhere correlation I hinted at earlier between that choice. To be sufficient for personal auto- around 15, perhaps even lower.29 In any disenfranchisement and heightened levels of nomy, then, an option-set must contain: (1) event, rationality - the ability to relate ends poverty and its concomitant miseries. Since a plurality of options with (2) distinct to means in logically consistent and coherent the young are so disproportionately power- opportunities that yield (3) significantly fashion - is not critical to the proceduralist’s less relative to the elderly, law and policy- different reasons for choice and, of these (4) standard of political legitimacy. Failing to be makers have very little incentive to take at least one and ideally several of them must rational in that sense will certainly impugn young people’s interests and preferences se- be thought of as worthwhile by the person a person’s capacity to be autonomous, that riously. As a result, they are neglected along in question.38 When adults / parents pre- is, to live a partly self-chosen life that’s various dimensions - health, education, and commit public expenditures in ways that reflective of one’s fundamental values and day care, for example - in ways that adversely unfairly shift fiscal burdens onto subsequent commitments. We examine the connection impact the range and quality of options generations, there is the worry that such between personal and political autonomy open to them later in life as adults, as well as generations will have their capacities for later in connection with a child’s supposed their capacities to assess and make use of personal autonomy stunted via a diminished right to an open future. But personal auto- those options. Children’s anticipatory auto- and impoverished range of choices - social, nomy, itself, is a contested value about nomy is damaged by adults / parents choos - economic, cultural, recreational, artistic, which reasonable people will disagree.30 ing to fund education inadequately, thereby aesthetic, and so on. damaging what might be called its internal A child’s right to an open future? resources. ere are many different accounts Children’s voting rights: addressing the For some political philosophers, the central of personal autonomy and, therefore, many lingering worries task of governments is to help people lead different ways of interpreting its anticipatory Granting children the vote is one way to decent, or ethically valuable, lives.31 Today, dimensions. However, any plausible inter- block uses of parental / political power that such lives are often characterized as person - pretation will make personal autonomy a foreclose the anticipatory autonomy of chil- ally autonomous ones.32 Suppose, then, that composite of three distinct conditions: dren in these various ways. On the one children have a moral ‘right to an open appropriate mental abilities, an adequate hand, there is an obvious flaw with this future’33, one in which they, rather than their range of options to choose from, and suggestion, namely, that while anticipatory parents, are to choose the ethical ideals that independence from outside manipulation autonomy implicates future abilities, the guide their lives.34 Distinguishing between and coercion. Clearly, if a person is to be effective and intelligent use of voting rights autonomy as a substantive character ideal partly the author of her own life by choos ing depends upon children’s present capacities to

136 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 137

share in collective self-determination.39 parents (or other indirect strategies for that ting on childhood. ere is something incoherent about grant - matter, including the guardianship propo- 7. Archard 2004: 32. ing ‘rights-in-trust’40 to people (children) sal) does nothing to address or rectify the 8. e contemporary Western conception whose very capacities to exercise them are underlying cause of children’s exclusion in now insists upon a sharp distinction bet- developed by having their freedom pater - the first place - their relative capability ween the behaviour demanded of children nalistically limited now. On the other hand, deficits. and that expected of adults. ere is now a and within limits, children’s present incapa- marked division of roles and responsibilities cities might, themselves, be partially related Conclusion that did not always obtain, or at least not ne- to their political disenfranchisement. In On Where does all of this leave us? In connect - arly so sharply. Other non-Western cultures Liberty, J.S Mill argues that: “e human ion with the franchise, a child’s right to an today also possess the concept of childhood, faculties of perception, judgment, discrimi- open future leads to less decisive conclusions recognizing as they do a difference between native feeling, mental activity, and even than does the procedural understanding of children and adults, but ”they see children moral preference, are exercised only in democracy. However, an appropriate solution differing from adults in a far less dramatic making a choice. He who does anything to the balance of considerations seems to and obvious fashion than is implied by the because it is the custom makes no choice. point in the direction of a gradualist com- modern conception“, Archard 2004: 39. He gains no practice either in discerning or prise, not to a total rejection of the case for 9. Locke 1964. in desiring what is best. e mental and lowering the age at which people are legally 10. Archard 2004: 12. moral, like the muscular powers, are improved entitled to vote. While there is not much to 11. Farson 1974; Holt 1974. only by being used” [emphasis mine].41 be said in favour of politically empowering 12. Clayton 2006: 186. If the capacities for effective democratic par- young infants who are as likely to eat, rather 13. Archard 2004: 65. ticipation track those implicated in chil- than mark, a ballot, we should do more than 14. Dahl 1998: 79. dren’s anticipatory autonomy, that is, if we presently do to expedite and facilitate 15. Lecce 2003; 2005; 2008a. being personally autonomous is, in some children’s full inclusion into the political 16. Schrag 2004. sense, a constitutive part of what makes process. Aside from encouraging various 17. Schrag 2004: 374. someone a good democratic citizen, then we forms of democratic participation at home 18. Plato 1974: 206-212. should not be too quick to point to chil- and in school, we should encourage children 19. Estlund 1993/ 2008. dren’s relative disabilities to deny them to take a more active interest in the values, 20. Estlund 2008: 30. voting rights which we currently grant to processes and results of political decision- 21. Estlund’s examples are the following: adults.42 Why not? Because, if Mill is right, making. Lowering the voting age would be ”basic literacy, basic knowledge of how one’s some of those capacities will likely be deve- a good way of doing so. Nothing in this pro- government works, some historical loped and subsequently improved only by posal is offensive to the proceduralist argu- knowledge, knowledge of some variety of ex- regular use. erefore, one familiar objection ment, because that argument does not tant ways of life in one’s society, some can be turned on its head: we shouldn’t determine a particular age cut-off. It is also knowledge of economics, some knowledge exclude children because they are incompe- consistent with the essentially evolving of the legal rights and responsibilities of one- tent; we should include them so they nature of childhood.45 self and others, basic knowledge of the con- become less so, and much sooner. Children stitution of one’s political community, and have to grow up; perhaps democracy should Notes so forth“, Estlund 2008: 212. too. 1. Estlund 2008. 22. Schumpeter 1976. is conclusion also reveals a critical but un- 2. Plato 1974. 23. Estlund 2008: 40. noticed flaw in recent proposals for the 3. Feinberg 1980. 24. Estlund 2008: 3. political enfranchisement of children via 4. In the canon of Western political thought, 25. Barry 1995; Cohen 1997; Larmore proxy votes. Some philosophers argue that, the three most notable exceptions are, of 1987; Lecce 2008a; Nagel 1991; Rawls in order to instantiate genuinely universal course: Plato 1974; Locke 1964; Rousseau 1971; 1993; Scanlon 1998 and see Lecce suffrage, parents should be granted plural 1979. For a comprehensive survey of the 2008a for analyses of alternative formulati- votes, for example, either one extra vote if growing contemporary (Anglophone) litera- ons of the liberal principle of political legiti- they have minors living with them, or one ture, see the ‘Bibliographical Essay’, Archard macy. extra vote for each minor in their house- 2004: 231-242. I have written about the 26. ”Even if some have knowledge, others hold.43 e idea assumes that children’s ethics of upbringing. See Lecce 2008b. have no way of knowing this unless they can interests are best represented by their parents 5. For an especially clear and succinct state- know the same thing by independent or whoever is rearing them, given the fairly ment of these tensions and potential contra- means, in which case they have no use for predictable workings of affection and natu- dictions, see Schrag 2004. the other’s expertise“, Estlund 1993: 84. ral partiality. e standard objection is that, 6. Schapiro 1999: For example, Schapiro 27. See Mill 1972 for a liberal justification unfortunately, we cannot count on parents claims that childhood is essentially a predi- of plural voting. to effectively represent their children’s inte- cament that must be overcome before moral 28. Locke 1964. rests.44 Because of a variety of factors - responsibility can be ascribed to people. See 29. See, for example, Wahlrecht ohne selfishness, shortsightedness, irrationality, Archard 2004 for a very illuminating dis- Altersgrenze? Verfassungsrechtliche, demokra- and ignorance, to mention but a few - they cussion of how Locke’s picture of children as tietheoretische und entwicklungspsychologische often will not do so. But Mill reminds us of fledgling but imperfect reasoners is typical Aspekte, Foundation for the Rights of Future a deeper worry, namely, that empowering of much contemporary philosophical wri- Generations 2007, for claims that the ap-

Intergenerational Justice Review 137 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 138

propriate age should be 12. Dahl, Robert A. (1998): On Democracy. Personal? Justice in Upbringing. In: eory 30. Lecce 2008a. New Haven: Yale University Press. And Research in Education. Vol. 6 (1), 21- 31. Raz 1986. 46. 32. Dworkin 1990; Feinberg 1980; Kym- Dworkin, Ronald (1990): e foundations licka 1989; Raz 1986. of liberal equality. In: Peterson, Grethe B. Locke, John (1964): Some oughts Con- 33. Feinberg 1980. (ed.): e Tanner Lectures on Human Va- cerning Education. Edited by F. W. Gar- 34. See Lecce 2008b for reasons to doubt lues. Salt Lake City: University of Utah forth. London: Heinemann. (Originally that they do have this right, at least as it is ty- Press, 1-119. published in 1693) pically interpreted. 35. Onora O’Neill insists that the way for Estlund, David M. (1993): Making Truth Mill, John S. (1972): Utilitarianism, On Li- children to overcome their dependence and Safe for Democracy. In: Copp, David. / berty and Considerations on Representative vulnerability is not to assert their rights but Hampton, Jean / Roemer, John (eds): e Government. Edited by H. B. Acton. Lon- to ‘grow up’. O’Neill 1989: 204. Idea of Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge don: Everyman. 36. Feinberg 1980: 126. University Press, pages? 71-100. 37. Dworkin 1990; Kymlicka 1989; Mill Nagel, omas (1991): Equality and Partia- 1972. Estlund, David M. (2008): Democratic Aut- lity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 38. Lecce 2008a: 106. hority. A Philosophical Framework. O’Neill, Onora (1989): Constructions of 39. Tremmel 2006; Van Parijs 1999. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. Reason. Exploration of Kant’s Practical Phi- 40. Feinberg 1980: 126. 71-100 losophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 41. Mill 1972: 126. Press. 42. Callan 1997; Gutmann 1995. Farson, Richard E. (1974): Birthrights. Lon- 43. Van Parijs 1999. don: Collier Macmillan. Plato (1974): e Republic. Translated by 44. Schrag 2004. G. M. A Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett. 45. “…children change through the process Feinberg, Joel (1980): e child’s right to an (Greek original edition Πολιτεία/Politeía. of intellectual, emotional, and moral deve- open future. In: Aiken, William / Lafollette, 380 BC.) lopment from being the sort of creatures Hugh (eds): Whose Child? Children’s whose interests are protected by rights to Rights, Parental Authority, and State Power. Rawls, John (1971): A eory of Justice. being the sort of creatures whose rights pro- New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 112- Cambridge: Harvard University Press. tect their choices”. Brennan 2002: 54. 123 Rawls, John (1993): Political Liberalism. References Gutmann, Amy (1995): Civic Education New York: Columbia University Press. Archard, David (2004): Children, Rights and Social Diversity. In: Ethics. Vol 105, and Childhood. 2nd Edition. London: 557-579. Raz, Joseph (1986): e Morality of Free- Routledge. dom. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Holt, John C. (1974): Escape from Child- Barry, Brian (1995): Justice as Impartiality. hood. e Needs and Rights of Children. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1974): Emile, or, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harmondsworth: Penguin. On Education. Edited by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books. (French original edition: Brennan, Samantha (2002): Children’s Kymlicka, Will (1989): Liberalism, Com- Emile ou de l'éducation. 1762.) Choices or Children’s Interests. Which do munity and Culture. Oxford: Oxford Uni- their Rights Protect? In: Archard, David / versity Press. Scanlon, omas (1998): What we Owe to MacLeod, Colin (eds.): e Moral and Po- Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard Univer- litical Status of Children. Oxford: Oxford Larmore, Charles E. (1987): Patterns of sity Press. University Press, 53-70. Moral Complexity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schapiro, Tamar (1999): What is a Child? Callan, Eamon (1997): Creating Citizens. In: Ethics. Vol. 109, 715-738. Political Education and Liberal Democracy. Lecce, Steven (2003): Contractualism and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Liberal Neutrality. A Defence. In: Political Schrag, Francis (2004): Children and De- Studies. Vol. 51 (3), 524-41. mocracy. eory and Policy. In: Politics, Clayton, Matthew (2006): Justice and Legi- Philosophy & Economics. Vol. 3 (3), 365- timacy in Upbringing. Oxford: Oxford Uni- Lecce, Steven (2005): Should Egalitarians be 379. versity Press. Perfectionists? In: Politics. Vol. 25 (3), 127- 134. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1976): Capitalism, Cohen, Joshua (1997): Deliberation and Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Har- Democratic Legitimacy. In: Bohman, James Lecce, Steven (2008a): Against Perfectio- per and Row. / Rehg, William (eds.): Deliberative Demo- nism. Defending Liberal Neutrality. To- cracy. Essays on Reason and Politics. Cam- ronto: University of Toronto Press. Stiftung für die Rechte zukünftiger Genera- bridge: MIT Press, 67-92. tionen (ed.) (2008): Wahlrecht ohne Alters- Lecce, Steven (2008b): How Political is the grenze? Verfassungsrechtliche, demokratie -

138 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 139

theoretische und entwicklungspsychologi- Steven Lecce teaches sche Aspekte. Munich: oekom Verlag Political eory at the New Release University of Mani- e Institute of Development Studies has devoted issue Tremmel, Joerg C. (2006): Handbook of toba, Canada. His 13 (november) 2009 of its "Policy Briefing" to the Intergenerational Justice. Cheltenham: Ed- research interests in- topic: Climate Change, Child Rights and Intergenera- ward Elgar. clude: theories of social tional Justice. and distributive jus - Van Parijs, Philippe (1999): e Disenfran- tice; ethical founda - From the cover: "e response to climate change will chisement of the Elderly, and Other Attempts tions of liberalism; and children, families profoundly affect the quality of life of future generati- to Secure Intergenerational Justice. In: Philo- and the state. ons of children, yet this intergenerational aspect has yet to be placed at the heart of climate change discussions. sophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 27, 292-333. Contact details: Prof. Dr. Steven Lecce, A child rights approach to climate change would take University of Manitoba, 521 Fletcher Argue the concerns of intergenerational justice into account Submitted: 1 June 2009 Building, Winnipeg, MB R3T 5V5. and radically transform the policies and commitments Accepted after revisions: 12 October 2009 of those in power." Email: [email protected] More information: www.ids.ac.uk

Improving Public Policy for Children: A Vote for Each Child by Prof. Dr. Robert H. Pantell and Prof. Dr. Maureen T. Shannon1

bstract: Changes in social policy in 25 percent of the population, should have there are still ten million children who will the United States (US) over the past considerable influence in how policy is made be uninsured due to the disparity that A four decades have provided health in Congress. However, due to disenfranchise - characterizes healthcare funding. insurance for 100 percent of persons over age ment, children’s issues are no match for the Newacheck highlighted the shift in spending 65 and decreased poverty for this group while political agendas of groups with voting toward the elderly that occurred within the the number of children in poverty has risen and power. last generation.4 In response to the high ten million are uninsured. is increasing Peterson was one of the first to analyze the poverty rate in the elderly in 1965 there was intergenerational inequity reflects political consequences of children’s disenfranchise- a rise in the percent of all social welfare decisions where children lack a voice. e pur- ment.2 Using data from 1959 to 1990 he expenditures allocated to the elderly from 21 poses of this paper are to: 1) summarize, from documented the steady fall in poverty percent to 33 percent by 1986. However the fields of ethics, government, law, social wel- among the elderly from 35 percent to 11 there was a simultaneous decrease in chil- fare and public health, current thinking about percent while the poverty rate in children dren’s share of social welfare spending from enfranchisement of children; 2) review the increased from 14 percent to 21 percent. He 37 percent to 25 percent. Between 1980 and evolution of voting and representation in the US anticipated that if children were given the 2000, the gap between the funding of pro- and identify misperceptions about barriers to right to vote, substantial changes in health grams for the elderly compared with chil- equitable representation of children; 3) discuss care, funding of public schools, and policies dren’s programs increased by 20 percent. He the legal basis for children being regarded as addressing retirement pensions would result. clearly articulates the basis for the inequity: adults and adult proxy decision making for He concluded, “Benefits to children would “democracy does not always yield fair results, children; and 4) suggest strategies to stimulate become a matter of right rather than a especially when important segments of the an equitable system of child representation by public benefaction”.3 population are disenfranchised from the altering our current system of voting. Paralleling the discrepancy in poverty is the voting process”.5 inequity in healthcare. e upcoming Analyses of intergenerational inequity: (2010) budget for Medicare, which provides Children, after all, are not just adults- the case for proxy voting health insurance for all individuals over age in-the-making. They are people e status of children in the US reflects how 65, is 453 billion dollars. In contrast, the whose current needs and rights and they are regarded in the American political national initiative for insuring low-income experiences must be taken seriously. system. Every child born in the US is a children has been funded at five billion / Alfie Kohn / citizen and granted equal protection under dollars annually since 1997 with funding for the law by the 14th Amendment to the US 2010 scheduled to be increased to ten billion Newacheck proposes the federal government Constitution. Each child is also counted for dollars. is budget, less than 20 percent of guarantee children a minimum benefit level apportioning representatives to the US the amount Medicare spends on prescription to parallel the support offered to the elderly. House of Representatives as declared in the drugs, was considered a major accomplish- While recognizing this would require an in- Constitution. erefore the 75 million chil- ment with passage of the Child Health crease in taxes to more closely reflect the Eu- dren under the age of 18, representing about Insurance Reauthorization Act of 2009, yet ropean Union he believes “the country can

Intergenerational Justice Review 139 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 140

choose to meet the basic needs of both po- children, advocates proxy voting, “I can think the Revolutionary War to vote. However, pulations”.6 However, given the insight of of no other single act which, if achieved, the majority of soldiers, at any age, could his previous statement, this seems unlikely would more dramatically change the ‘politi- not cast a ballot even if they had taken a without addressing directly the core problem cal economy’ of children’s issues than to bullet to establish the right to have an of disenfranchisement. enable parents/legal guardians to vote for elected government because they did not Van Parijs developed proposals to promote their children”.14 own property. Neither could Catholics, Jews intergenerational justice based on several Despite substantial writing on intergenera- nor Quakers vote. assumptions including that each generation tional inequity resulting from children’s Over the next century states changed voter should make sure the situation of the next disenfranchisement, there has yet to be requirements so that virtually all white males generation is no worse than its own.7 is movement towards change. is may in part over 21 years of age could vote. e post could occur with “genuine universal be due to misperceptions about who gets to Civil War amendments prohibited states suffrage: every member of the population is vote and who decides who gets to vote. e from denying voting privileges to former given the right to vote from the very first day following section provides a brief historical slaves under penalty of losing representatives of her life”.8 He recommends granting parents overview and some common misperceptions in Congress. However, starting in the late proxy votes.9 about US voting. 19th century states found ways to limit Rutherford provides a foundation for legally voting by requiring literacy tests which were establishing proxy voting. “Proxies are a Voting in the United States able to exclude voting by former slaves in the common system for delegating the right to e history of voting in the US is one of south or Irish immigrants in Massachusetts vote. In fact, the entire system of democracy struggling to achieve ever increasing repre- and Connecticut. Poll taxes and judgments can be seen as giving elected representatives sen tation. While a rallying cry of the Ame- of moral fitness by election workers were proxies to vote for their constituents”.10 Her rican Revolution was ‘No taxation without also methods used to eliminate voting criteria for who should hold a child’s proxy representation’ and the Declaration of Inde- rights.16 A number of states (Wyoming in include personal familiarity, the child’s pendence called for ‘equal representation for 1910, New York in 1917) allowed voting by access to the representative, accountability all’, the path to universal representation has women before the 21st Amendment was on the part of the representative and an been a slow, difficult and often violent ratified August 18, 1920. Widespread emotional bond. She argues this is consistent struggle that still excludes the 75 million disenfranchisement of African-Americans in with existing legislation and the premise that children constituting a quarter of the popu- southern states resulted in the Voting Rights parents will make decisions in the best lation. Although free elections are the Act of 1965 and 1970 which prohibited interest of their children. In reviewing the hallmark of a true democracy, the Constitu- barriers to voting including poll taxes and constitutionality of proxy voting she cites tion did not guarantee voting rights to its literacy tests. ere was also growing pres- many ways in which parents already act as citizens but in 1789 granted decision-ma- sure to allow voting by 18-21 year olds since proxies for their children in medical and king about voting to the thirteen states.15 many soldiers serving in the Viet Nam War legal issues but concludes that the Supreme How ever, the way in which representatives had access to the cartridge box but not the Court is unlikely to hold that states should to Congress were apportioned was specified. ballot box. e 1970 Voting Rights Act extend voting rights to children. She notes All ‘free persons’, including women and lowered the age of voting to 18, but was that voters without children comprise 34 children, were to be counted. Slaves were in- challenged by several states. In Oregon v. percent of the population but control 46 cluded as ‘three fifths of all other persons’ as Mitchell (400 US 112 [1970]), the Supreme percent of the vote and argues that this extra they were considered both property and Court held that Congress did not have the voting power dilutes the votes of parents. right to set the age for state elections, but She concludes that “a law to expand the We cannot solve the problems we could for federal elections, allowing 18 year franchise to children through proxies would have created with the same thinking olds to vote for the president. Confronting be both desirable and constitutional because that created them. two sets of registration procedures (for neither the Constitution nor sound public / Albert Einstein / national and for state elections) the states policy requires that we give disproportionate quickly ratified the 26th amendment lower - electoral power to childless individuals”.11 persons. is was done to assure slave hold - ing the voting age to 18. e importance of Proxy voting has also been advanced ing states were not under-represented and voting rights is underscored by the fact that through writings examining a broader would therefore vote to ratify the Constitu- since ratification of the Bill of Rights in approach to improve the status of children. tion. e Census was established to count 1791, nine of the subsequent 17 constitutio- Hewlett and West advocate a pro-family the population every ten years for apportion - nal amendments address electoral policies. electoral system that would give parents ment to remain accurate. incentives to vote through mechanisms such Voter qualifications, established by each Voting misperceptions as waving fees for drivers’ licenses and state, were fairly uniform; only white male Perhaps the leading myth is that the providing monetary bonuses for parents property owners over the age of 21 would Constitution guarantees the rights of citizens receiving public assistance.12 ey also state have the right to chose representatives. e to vote. It does not. e Constitution sets the that “serious consideration should be given age of 21 was a holdover from the Middle qualifications for office holders but criteria for to the suggestion that parents be given the Ages in England because males of that age who votes for them are set by states and local right to vote on behalf of their children”.13 could wear armor and therefore were eligible districts. Constitutional amendments have Aber, contributing to a monograph focusing for knighthood. Some states allowed those ensured that groups are not excluded from on ‘big ideas’ to improve the well-being of under 21 who fought in the militia during voting in state or federal elections.

140 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 141

It is erroneous that age qualifications ensure and re-affirmed in a series of related cases in Finally, all children pay sales, local, state and voting by mature/responsible individuals. 1963-64.17 None of these cases addresses federal income taxes at the same rate as e argument for what indicates a responsi- persons with no vote (children), nor whether adults. Unfortunately, for children, the ble voter has been progressively changed as a proxy could deliver their vote. Ironically, concept of taxation without representation states shed the rule that only property in the apportionment process, children are continues to be a reality. owners could vote and constitutional counted as persons when allocating represen - Parents are responsible for overseeing their amendments recognized the abilities and tatives to Congress. e ‘one person one child’s growth, development and well-being rights of slaves, women and 18 year olds to vote’ concept was summarized by Bennett, and are given legal rights over decisions cast ballots. In addition, individuals with “Despite the slogan, the apportionment de- regarding their children such as signing legal cognitive or psychiatric impairment are cisions were not about the assignment of a contracts. Also, they are held accountable for permitted to vote in all 50 states. Seven single vote to each voter”.18 Rutherford takes their child’s well-being and there are legal states have no provision to exclude persons an even stronger position: “If, however, chil- consequences for failures in responsible on account of mental disability, 34 exclude dren are viewed as persons with a right to be parenting. ere is a long legal (and moral) only those who have been declared legally represented in the political process, then the tradition that allows parents to make proxy incompetent while eight have electoral laws principle of one person, one vote authorizes, decisions for their child. Allowing parents to that are vague or unlikely to be enforceable if not requires, such proxies”.19 make proxy decisions for their child in Another myth is that persons under 18 are electing officials or voting on public policies The greatest truth must be recogni- legally barred from the electoral system. could be considered in this tradition. It has tion that in every man, in every child Teenagers and younger children can volun- been argued that parents given proxy votes is the potential for greatness. teer in campaigns. In addition the Supreme for a child might not vote for what is in the / Robert F. Kennedy / Court in 2003 (McConnell v. Federal Elec- child’s best interest. While this may be true, tion Commission) overturned a section of it also applies to every decision a parent (in one state a person must be of ‘quiet and the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act makes for a child from those legally granted peaceable behavior’ several states exclude Law by permitting persons less than 18 years to parents (e.g. the right to commit a child ‘idiots’). Only one state has an affirmative old to participate in the electoral process by to a mental institution) to financial decisions statute stating that all developmentally contributing money to candidates. ere (e.g. choosing a college based on the cost of disabled persons are eligible to vote. have been bills introduced in twelve states to tuition rather than the school’s ability to Another myth is that citizenship is required lower the voting age. None has been provide the best education suitable to the to vote. As districts can set qualifications for successful. However, 18 states now allow 17 child’s needs and abilities). local elections a number of districts in cities year olds to vote in primary elections if they with large immigrant population such as will be 18 by the time of the subsequent Strategies for Reform Chicago and New York have granted non- general election. is, in effect, gives 17 year While this paper focuses on children’s citizens the right to vote in school board olds the vote in certain situations, such as disenfranchisement in the US it is surprising elections. In 1991 a Maryland community when a political party dominates voting in there has not been greater international allowed non-citizens the right to vote. ese a district or a candidate runs without an attention to the issue since the United local decisions have been upheld by the opponent from another political party. Nations Convention on the Rights of the courts. Child, ratified by 193 countries (but not the Prisoners and ex-felons are not necessarily Legal basis for child enfranchisement US or Somalia) states in article 12 “Parties excluded from voting. e Constitution While persons under 18 years old cannot shall assure to the child who is capable of ignores a criminal’s ”right to vote except for vote they are treated as adults by the crimi- forming his or her own views the right to not reducing states“ congressional represen- nal justice system with many states prosecut - express those views freely in all matters tation for disenfranchising citizens partici- ing and sentencing juveniles as young as age affecting the child, the views of the child pating ”in rebellion, or other crime“. 14 as adults. Until 2004, 16 year olds could being given due weight in accordance with States retain the authority to grant voting be sentenced to execution. Persons under 18 the age and maturity of the child”. While privileges to current or former prisoners. are also granted many other legal rights that Semashko advocates children’s suffrage in an With 2,3 million prisoners and 4,9 million require ‘adult’ judgment. Eight year olds analysis focusing on the Russian Constitu- on probation or parole, this issue has been need to give assent for participating in tion,20 only Germany has taken action with widely addressed with substantial changes in human experimentation; twelve year olds 43 members of the German Parliament sub- the past decade. In another example of can obtain hunting licenses enabling them mitting a bill in August 2008 to give parents intergenerational injustice, there is currently to carry loaded weapons; without parental proxy voting rights for their children. As for greater advocacy for enfranchising adults involvement children can consent to certain a lower voting age, Austria, Brazil, Cuba, convicted of crimes against children than medical treatments (sexually transmitted Somalia and Nicaragua have 16 as a voting there is for enfranchising children. infections) at any age; if a legally emancipa- age while East Timor, Indonesia, Sudan, Another misperception is that ‘one person ted minor they can consent to medical pro- North Korea set the age at 17. one vote’ is the law of the land and therefore cedures; they can serve in the military at age Despite proposals to increase children’s proxy voting cannot happen. e concept of 17; and while most states set the legal age for representation summarized in this paper, the ‘one person one vote’ was first put forward marriage at 18, several allow it legally at 16 idea has not gained traction. It is unlikely, in a 1962 Supreme Court decision (Baker v and all allow substantially lower ages of given the current international economic Carr) addressing legislative apportionment marriage (as low as 13) with parental consent. crisis, that this will become a priority in the

Intergenerational Justice Review 141 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 142

next few years. Nevertheless, it remains as - Facilitate voting: given the additional time refusal to tolerate police harassment at the important to work towards increasing the constraints involved in raising children, Stonewall Inn encounter that galvanized the visibility of children’s enfranchisement as providing polling sites in all schools and gay rights movement26 are examples of securing voting rights has been for other daycare centers would increase accessibility defining events in launching social change. historically disenfranchised groups. Bennett to voting by parents and guardians of minor We believe it unlikely that a spontaneous argues that ignoring children’s enfranchise- children. is would also facilitate voting by singular event or social movement is about ment, an idea with “such normative appeal students granted the right to vote. Additio- to happen. erefore, we advocate emulat - and one with great potential to change the nal monetary incentives can be given to ing the approach that launched women’s pattern of public policy decisions”,21 is due parents to vote as suggested by Hewlett and enfranchisement,27 by holding a summit of to complacency with American democracy. West22 and mirroring the cost transfers invited participants that would include While the Civil War and Viet Nam War discussed by Aber.23 scholars in social welfare, education, health, were sentinel events underpinning changes - Monetary consequences: children are law, ethics, economics, journalists, advocacy in the voting rights of slaves and persons 18- clearly in the position of American colonists groups, parents, religious organizations; boys 21 respectively, securing woman’s suffrage in prior to the Revolutionary War in terms of and girls clubs, organizations with experience the US took more than seventy years from being taxed without representation. Elimi- in ‘framing’ social movements; and, impor- the 1848 issuance of e Declaration of nating taxes for goods purchased for and/or tantly, children. Also critical would be Sentiments in Seneca Falls. e timeframe by children without enfranchisement is a involving groups likely to oppose expanding for achieving women’s suffrage may have suggestion with historic underpinnings. the franchise to children. e goal would be been even longer without the conceptuali- to initiate a public dialogue about consider - zation and framing of women’s right to vote Potential inequities created by proxy ing children’s enfranchisement not as a novel as a fundamentally important and just issue voting. idea but a logical step in guaranteeing uni- of gender equity combined with the While enfranchising children would be a versal suffrage to all persons and establishing persistence of those who believed in this step towards intergenerational justice, no intergenerational justice. right. change is without consequence and there is Another goal could be to identify potential To achieve equity in enfranchising all citizens, the potential for creating other inequities. avenues for progress where there has been including children, we propose four core e foremost concern would be to increase related success. One potential would be to strategies. the inequities between rich and poor chil- build on the success of enfranchising non- dren. It is well established that voting rates citizens with children in local school board “The ballot is stronger than the are influenced by socioeconomic status. elections. Building upon the logic that bullet.” erefore parents in higher socioeconomic formed the basis for this electoral reform, it / Abraham Lincoln / groups would have even greater power to can be argued that parents should have implement a political agenda than parents proxy votes in such elections as it bears - Proxy voting: parents/guardians should in lower socioeconomic categories. directly on the education and well-being of have the right to represent each child in the Furthermore, single mothers, who have the their children. Another incremental strategy voting process. e process of allocating highest rate of poverty, have on average would be to have a state that currently grants proxy rights would be a matter of decision fewer children than two parent families. is 17 year olds voting rights in primaries lower by each state (or country) and a variety of factor could also shift voting patterns favor - the voting age for general elections. scenarios are likely including allocating 1/2 ing more affluent two parent families. vote to each legally responsible parent with Nevertheless, it might be expected that the Conclusion odd number of children and single parents common concern of rich and poor, single In spite of the pressing need for economic getting one vote for each child. Administra- and two parent families, would be to ensure and healthcare reform that has been magni- tive processes are already in place to identify the current and future well-being of their fied by the current economic crisis, we the legally responsible guardian for purposes children. should not become apathetic to the interge- of taxes, schooling and medical-decision nerational inequity that exists for children. A making and could form the basis for deter- Translating ideas into action continuing decline in the political voice of mining who holds a child’s proxy vote. While there are many voices speaking about children means a continuing decline in the Special situations such as foster care and enfranchising children they do not seem to status of children. is should not be the institutionalized children would need to be be speaking to each other and they are not legacy of this generation. While this paper addressed. Parents/guardians should have speaking collectively. Historically, sentinel the right to allow children to vote on their events have often been the impetus to over- The greatest Glory of a free-born own above a certain age. is would parallel coming the inertia that accompanies the People is to transmit that Freedom to parents’ abilities to permit their children to ‘good idea’ phase of a movement. Upheavals their Children marry as governed by state marriage laws. such as the Civil War directly enfranchised / William Havard / - Lower voting age: follow the lead of some slaves while the Viet Nam War did the same countries by lowering the voting age for all chil- for 18-21 year olds. Events such as the has frequently highlighted intergenerational dren to age 16. An alternate proposal would be Seneca Falls Convention for women’s inequity, the most persuasive argument for to set a specific age (e.g. 16 or 17) or have evi- suffrage24, and the less well-orchestrated children’s enfranchisement is that it is the dence of completing three or four years of high events such as Rosa Park’s refusal to acquiesce fair thing to do and, therefore, should be school education, whichever is achieved first. to segregation on a public bus25 or the and can be done.

142 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 143

Notes: individuals (race, women, 18-21 year olds). Newacheck, Paul / Benjamin, A. (2004): In- 1. is paper was presented in part at the 16. A brief history of the origin and abo- tergenerational Equity and Public Spending. annual meeting of the Pediatric Academic lishment of poll taxes can be found at In: Health Affairs. Vol. 23 (5/2004), 142- Societies in Boston on May 4, 2009. We are www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting. 146. grateful for the opportunity to have discus- 17. Despite these rulings, in the current elec- sed ideas in this paper with many individuals toral college system, a Wyoming resident has Peterson, Paul (1992): An Immodest Proposal. particularly Laura Rosenbury, professor of four times the voting power as a resident in In: Daedalus. Vol. 121 (4/1992), 151-174. law, Washington University School of Law, Texas in selecting the President. Saint Louis and John Takayama, associate 18. Bennett, 2000: 9. Rutherford, Jane (1998): One Child, One professor UCSF. Inspiration was provided 19. Rutherford, 1998: 1516. Vote: Proxies for Parents. Minneapolis, MN: by Kate Pantell who graduated from New 20. Semashko, 2004 Minnesota Law Review. York University School of Law in 1909 but 21. Bennett, 2000: 41. was not allowed to vote for another eight 22. Hewlett and West 1999. Semashko, Leo. Electronic Journal of Socio- years. 23. Aber 2008: 201. logy (2004): Children's Suffrage as a Key 2. Peterson 1992. 24. is convention, held in Seneca Falls, Way of Improvement of Children's Well- 3. Peterson 1992: 171. New York in July 1948, produced the first being in an Age of Globalization. 4. Newacheck 2004. document demanding the right to vote for www.sociology.org. Viewed 17 June 2008. 5. Newacheck 2004: 145. women. 6. Newacheck 2004: 145. 25. Rosa Parks became a symbol of the civil Van Parijs, Philippe (1998): e Disfran- 7. Van Parijs 1998. rights movement when on December 1, chisement of the Elderly, and Other At- 8. Van Parijs 1998: 17. 1955 she refused a bus driver’s request to va- tempts to Secure Intergenerational Justice. 9. From a child welfare perspective Duncan cate her seat for a white passenger in Mont- Philosophy & Public Affairs (Fall 1998), agrees that the political system fails to pro- gomery, Alabama. 292-333. vide a mechanism to represent children’s in- 26. Following a June 28, 1969 raid by police terests (Duncan, 2003). Concerned with the on the Stonewall Inn in New York a series Submitted: 1 August 2009 high number of children in poverty (14 mil- of riots ensued protesting police hostility to- Accepted after revisions: 15 November 2009 lion in 1991) he argued that in order to end wards homosexuals. is is regarded as laun- childhood poverty, children must have the ching the gay rights movement. Robert H. Pantell, is a right to representation in order to ensure 27. See endnote 24. professor of pediatrics, their interests are protected. Imig questions at the University of why the richest nation in the world could References California, San Fran- rank next to last among developed nations in Aber, J. Lawrence (2008): A Big, New In- cisco. child poverty without evolving a social move- vestment in America’s Poorest (and Youn- ment to improve the status of children (Imig, gest?) Children: Conditional Cash Transfers. 2006). He argues that while US Americans In: Big Ideas for Children. Investing In Our agree that children are in trouble, there is no Children’s Future. First Focus: Washington Contact Details: agreed upon master frame defining the plight D.C. Pp 192-202. 3333 California Street of children or what needs to be done. Bennett San Francisco, CA 94143-0503 also believes that children’s disenfranchisement Bennett, Robert (2000): Should Parents Be E-mail: [email protected] has a substantial impact on public policy. He Given Extra Votes on Account of eir advances the idea that for meaningful repre- Children?: Toward a Conversational Under- Maureen T. Shannon, sentation of children parents should have extra standing of American Democracy. North- is an associate professor votes (Bennett, 2000) and that this principle western Law Review vol 94 2: 2000 pg 9: and Frances A. Mat- “is grounded in the liberal vision and its basic http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?ab- suda Chair in Wo- belief that politics is about adding up private stract_id=186071. men's Health at the interests, though it is republican in its faith that University of Hawai`i at least part of the accounting can be accom- Duncan, Lindsey. Why Children Should at Mãnoa plished by the representation of the interest of Have a Vote (2003): http://www.childwel- one by another”. fare.com/Kids/kidsvote.htm.Viewed 29 Fe- Contact Details: 10. Rutherford 1998: 1502. bruary 2008 2528 McCarthy Mall 11. Rutherford 1998: 1516. Webster Hall 402 12. Hewlett and West 1999. Hewlett, Sylvia Ann/ West, Cornel (1999): Honolulu, HI 96822 13. Hewlett and West 1999: 240. e War Against Parents. Boston Massa- email: [email protected] 14. Aber 2008. chusetts: Houghton Mifflin. 15. Amendments to the Constitution since 1789 have not changed the fundamental Imig, Doug (2006): Building a Social Mo- right of the states to determine voting vement for America’s Children. In: Journal qualifications but have denied the rights of of Children and Poverty. Vol. 12 (1/2006), states to discriminate based on a class of 21-37(17).

Intergenerational Justice Review 143 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 144

On Behalf of Children? The Plural Voting System in Belgium – from 1893 to 1919 by Prof. Dr. Laurent de Briey, Aurélie Héraut and Elise Ottaviani

he voting rights of children have suffrage, who were helped along by workers’ to take into consideration the interests of received renewed attention in recent strikes and conservative circles, concerned several people and whose behaviour is T years. One idea being discussed is with maintaining the privileges that the honourable. to allow legal representatives to exercise this suffrage granted to the favoured social classes In the then parliamentary debates, the only right by proxy from the day the child is born (based on capabilities and on ownership of explicit mention of children’s representation until he/she reaches the legal voting age. e property/tax assessment).3 by their parents is an a contrario argument concept behind vicariously exercising chil- against the thesis of equality put forward by dren’s voting rights - ChiVi1 - is supported Political rights versus civil rights supporters of universal suffrage. Catholic in the academic literature by political scien- Supporters of this system also underline the deputy Auguste Beernaert conceived that, “if tist Paul Peterson (1992) and sociologist specific nature of political rights in opposition the absolute right to vote could be admitted Stein Ringen (1997). Several publications2 to civil rights. Usually political rights are on grounds of political equality, it should be have also dealt with the arguments in its considered as ‘functional rights’. Citizens are enforced with all its consequences. Women favour as well as the objections raised. not granted these rights in their own interest and children would also have their say. How - Recently, there have been attempts to estab - and for their own satisfaction, rather they ever, the father would exercise the child’s lish ChiVi in the political arena, too. In have to exercise them ‘in the interest of the right, such as for the civil rights. e father Germany, a bill was introduced to the Bun- state’ or at least according to their percept ion would also exercise the woman’s right”.6 des tag in 2003 by 47 MPs from a range of of this interest. Citizens exercise, by means political parties but it was eventually turned of these rights, the functions they have been e differences between the Belgian down. invested with by the Constitution.4 As far as plural voting right and the ChiVi is short article primarily deals with histo- the right to vote is concerned, the functio- Conversely, the most interesting argument rical examples: a legal system existed in Bel- nality of this system consists of one major in favour of the ChiVi is one which intends gium between 1893 and 1919 which did in factor – taking part in the nomination of to establish a real universal suffrage by ma- fact permit fathers to cast several votes. political authorities. king a distinction between the right to vote In 1893, Belgium opted for ‘universal male According to the supporters of the plural and the exercise of that right. According to suffrage tempered by the plural voting voting system suffrage is an important the universality of suffrage, the right to vote system’. e new article 47 of Belgium’s function, so obtaining it requires some should be granted to every citizen from the Constitution stated that all men had the abilities and competencies.5 is is a justifi- day of his/her birth. However, suffrage should right to vote, with up to two additional votes cation for giving the most competent people no longer be assimilated as a function, but as being granted to some categories of the po- in society increased electoral weight. Conse- an individual right which should be handled pulation. One additional vote was granted quently those with higher levels of education in the same way as civil rights: when a child to fathers over 35 years of age who owned were able to exercise up to three votes each. is unable to exercise his/her right himself/ accommodation costing at least 5 Belgian Real or personal property was seen as proof herself, his/her legal representative should francs in taxes, as well as the owners of real of a certain financial independence and an exercise it in his/her name. estate (worth at least Belgian 2,000 francs) ability to administer one’s goods. is meant In reality, the principle of ChiVi came closer and those who earned at least 1,000 Belgian that the owner, by means of the taxes paid, to being put into practice in France than in francs. A third vote was also granted to those contributed to public finances. is provid - Belgium. Several bills were seriously discussed who held a university degree or a secondary ed legitimate grounds for one to be able to by the French between World War I and school certificate. ese requirements were influence the administration of public World War II. ey aimed at enforcing full relatively restrictive: around 20 percent of finances. Moreover, because the right to vote universal suffrage through family voting. Of the 1.4 million voters had two votes and was deemed as a function, it was made com- note the National Assembly almost adopted around 15 percent of them had three votes. pulsory in 1893. the following bill in 1923, proposed by In practice - except for the exemption of e additional vote granted to the head of M.H. Roulleaux-Dugage: women - the ChiVi and the Belgian plural the family functions via the same logic. A “Article 2: e personal exercise of the right voting system lead to a similar outcome family is conceived of as a fundamental so- to vote belongs to all French citizens, men whereby fathers can in fact vote several cial reality, which deserves to be represented and women, who are at least 21 years old. times. However, the plural voting system is as such. However, the system was not intend - Article 3: e father exercises the right to based on principles which are opposed to ed to allow the father to represent his wife vote for himself, for his legitimate, natural those of the ChiVi. and children. As specified by article 47, or recognized children, male or female.”7 Universal suffrage tempered by plural voting which describes the additional financial re- In actuality, although these voting systems is a hybrid system. It originates from a com- quirements, it is justified through the image are based on opposite principles, the ChiVi promise between supporters of universal of the father as an administrator, who is used suffers from its similarity to the plural vot ing

144 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 145

system. It produces a reactionary aspect Delpérée, Francis (2000): Le droit constitu- Ringen, Stein (1997): Citizens, Families, while the ChiVi intends to push further the tionnel de la Belgique. Bruxelles: Bruylant. and Reform. Oxford: Clarendon Press. logic of the universality of suffrage. e fact remains that, in practice, it results in an Deutscher Bundestag (2004): Plenarproto- Toulemon, André (1933): Le suffrage fami- inequality between citizens when it comes koll 15/102, 1. April 2004. Berlin: 9269 lial ou suffrage universel intégral. Paris: to casting votes. is inequality mainly ex- 9280. Librairie du Recueil Sirey. plains why the ChiVi has found difficulty gaining support. Deutscher Bundestag (2005): Plenarproto- About the authors : koll 15/178, 2. June 2005. Berlin: 16838 Prof. Dr. Laurent de Briey is assistant pro- Notes 16849. fessor in philosophy, Faculty of Economics, 1. Grötzinger 2001. Social Sciences and Business Administra- 2. Hinrichs 2002, 2007; and de Briey 2007, Grözinger, Gerd (2001): Proxy Votes for tion, University of Namur among others. Children and the Case for Representation, 3. See Pilet 2007: 23. Deliberation, Sustainability: One Size Fits Aurélie Héraut is junior researcher in Con- 4. Delpérée 2000: 152-155. All? Flensburg: Mimeo. stitutional Law Research Centre on the State 5. Chambre des représentants de Belgique, and the Constitution, Catholic University 1892-1893: 797-1176. Hinrichs, Karl (2002): Is Enfranchising of Louvain 6. Chambre des représentants de Belgique, Children a Good Idea? In: European Jour- 1892-1893: 797-1176. nal of Sociology. Vol. 43, 35-38. Elise Ottaviani is junior researcher at the 7. Toulemon 1933: 125. Permanent Centre for Citizenship and Hinrichs, Karl (2007): Faut-il accorder le Participation (Centre Permanent pour la References: droit de vote aux enfants? In: Revue philo- Citoyenneté et la Participation – CPCP) Chambre des représentants de Belgique sophique de Louvain. Vol. 105, 42-76. (1893): Annales parlementaires, ordinary Corresponding author: sessions 1892-1893, sessions from February Moiné, Willy (1970): Résultat des élections Prof. Dr. Laurent de Briey 28th to April 14th: 797-1176. belges entre 1847 et 1914. Bruxelles: Insti- Faculty of Economics, Social Sciences and tut belge de sciences politiques. Business Administration de Briey, Laurent, Vanderborgh, Yannick University of Namur (2001): Le suffrage universel intégral. In: Le Peterson, Paul E. (1992): An immodest pro- Rempart de la Vierge, 8 Soir (12 Jan 2001). posal. In: Daedalus, 151-174. 5000 Namur Belgium de Briey, Laurent (2007): Droit de vote des Pilet, Jean-Benoît (2007): Changer pour enfants par procuration. In: Bourdeau, Vin- gagner? Les réformes des lois électorales en E-Mail : [email protected] cent, Merrill, Roberto (dir.), DicoPo, Dicti- Belgique. Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université onnaire de théorie politique, http://www. de Bruxelles. is article did not undergo peer-review. dicopo.org.

New book release

is three-part book explores the situation of young people of today in comparison to their direct predecessors. e first part, e Financial Situation of the Young Generation in a Generational Comparison, deals with this generation’s financial standing; the second part, e Rush Hour of Life, examines their time restrictions. Both are considered from a life-course perspective. e third part, On the Path to Gerontocracy?, addresses the de- mographic shift in favor of the elderly in aging Western democracies.

Intergenerational Justice Review 145 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 146

Priscilla Alderson: Young Children’s Rights. Exploring Beliefs, Principles and Practice Reviewed by Alessy Beaver

hilst twenty years have passed inalienable right to non-interference (articles since the United Nations crea- 16.1 and 16.2 UNCRC) when, as has been W ted created the Convention on proposed in the UK, the creation of data the Rights of the Child (CRC), its influence bases and vetting procedures supporting on the civil, political, economic, social and these protective measures contravene the cultural rights of children is still a hot topic basis of familial privacy. Other cases of over- of debate. Of the body of literature that protection are also referenced, including the exists on the subject, few works have focused international labour market, where overly specifically on the impact for the very zealous protective measures have served to youngest in society. Priscilla Alderson’s latest limit children’s working opportunities, book - an updated edition of her 2000 thereby push ing them into more precarious publication Young Children’s Rights - makes forms of labour such as begging and sex a welcome exception, offering a brief over- work. Again this point seems to reiterate the view of how the implementation of the key message of the chapter that a meaning- CRC has affected British children 8 years ful counter-balance between children’s old and under. e book is designed to cover entitlements to security and exercise of basic the basic inalienable rights children are freedoms is required to ensure protection entitled to in accordance with the Conven- rights are not counterproductive. tion, with particular focus on the ‘3 Ps’; In addition to presenting a powerful case for protection, provision and participation. As respecting children’s provision and protec- well as providing a solid introduction to the school, the reader is offered a compelling tion rights, Alderson tackles the more con- subject area the book also presents the case evidence for the empowerment of children tentious issue of whether children should for greater involvement of, and consultation as determiners of their own welfare. have active participation rights in chapter 3. with children in private and public sphere Chapter 2 tackles the issue of children’s pro- Alderson argues that greater respect for chil- to ensure their needs and interests are tection rights through an examination of the dren’s views is necessary in familial, public adequately represented. ethical, social and financial implications of and policy fields to ensure children are not e book opens with an examination of the their implementation. Alderson cites a range overlooked or excluded from opportunities ‘3 Ps’. Chapter 1 deals with the right to of data highlighting the need for greater and resources. is point is continued in provision by succinctly setting out the protection for the countless millions of vul- chapter 4 where Alderson examines what she standards of care and consultation British nerable children worldwide. With well sees as the route of children’s omission from children are entitled to in accordance with chosen evidence showing the alarming num- the sphere of adult’s right; traditional per- the UNCRC. is includes a brief overview ber of young people living in precarious ceptions of ‘children’ and the construction of issues such as health care, education, child conditions, who face the daily prospect of of ‘childhood.’ Alderson argues that children care and living and working standards. abuse, exploitation, discrimination, people have been too rigidly defined in legislative Alderson argues in favour of a more trafficking and extreme poverty the moral and familial circles to adequately represent meaningful consultation process between force of Alderson’s claim for increased pro- their worth, dignity and agency, which has young children and adults to ensure appro- tection appears hard to refute. With refe- led to their exclusion from certain autono- priate standards of care are set that reflect the rence to the ‘Every Child Matters’ govern ment mous rights. She says that respect for chil- needs and desires of both parties. She believ es Green Paper, Alderson suggests that state le- dren and their capabilities can only be this is required to avoid adult-centric poli- gislation should reflect a baseline which achieved through deconstructing the myths cies and child based exclusion from the starts with every child being at risk, rather and normative conceptions which have decision making process on the basis of than assumed safe. is is not offered as a resulted in their initial misrepresentation perceived lack of agency and capacity. e merely idealistic proposal; Alderson is more and exclusion. reader is provided with several good reasons than ready to consider the practical difficul- In comparing the plight of children’s rights to believe that children are capable of play- ties of its implementation. To begin with the to that of standpoint feminism, Alderson ing an important part in determining their level of bureaucracy required to execute this convincingly argues that children’s exclusion own care, with a number of well chosen case baseline could be problematic, especially from the ‘we’ of society closely mirrors that studies supporting this hypothesis. From a when it comes to reconciling the right to of women who were previously barred from three year old diabetic who is able to moni- privacy with universal application. For ex- aspects of public life due to arbitrary and tor her own blood sugar levels to children in ample, the right to security and protection erroneous assessments pertaining to their Rajasthan who set up their own night could be seen conflict with the equally competence and ability. Alderson suggests it

146 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 147

is necessary for society to deconstruct the ing their treatment. Alderson fiercely rebukes relatable text which aims to appeal to a rhetoric, language and perceptions of child- those who claim children lack the moral wide-ranging audience. e book compe- hood in much the same way as it was im- sense to take part in such decisions, claiming tently cuts through the extensive policy portant to re-conceptualize gender. Key to it is adults rather than children who have language of the CRC, simplistically relaying this is recognising children as full-human difficulty delineating between right and how the key concepts relate to young chil- beings, rather than sub-people, who should wrong. dren, without ever alienating the more have access to a full range of rights, not on Chapter 9 provides a succinct summary of casual reader with cumbersome rhetoric. the basis of age, but because of their person- Alderson’s research and findings. It reitera- Alderson’s positions are clearly explicated hood. tes the key objections to children having full and forwarded with a commendable amount Chapter 5 provides a brief synopsis of the autonomous rights (can not/should of passion, though the book never verges on case for and against the consultation of chil- not/must not) whilst offering valuable coun- being a moral crusade for children’s rights. dren, drawing on the work of Professor Free- ter arguments, which are detailed throug- Instead it should be seen as a list of pragma- man, University College London. In turn hout the case studies and evidence listed in tic reasons for respecting children’s dignity this includes an examination of how the pro- her book. Alderson sees our functionalist and worth which would be hard to refute. cess of consultation advocated throughout society as the main barrier to progress on the An excellent use of case studies and evidence the book can be reconciled with rights of rights issues, stating that people are unlikely is employed to explicate Alderson’s argu- children to be protected from the adult to be critical of present inequalities if the ments, which humanises the debate for world. rough providing a list of useful structure of society best suits their interests. those not well acquainted with the issues starting points for debate, Alderson She believes that the best way to promote a discussed. In doing so a ‘child-centric’ challenges readers to reconsider their own moral and just order is to move towards the approach is provided, which serves to chal- position and common beliefs about the role CRC’s vision of “inherent dignity and in - lenge pre-conceived ideas about the nature children should play in the consultation alienable rights for all members of the human of childhood and capabilities of young chil- process. Alderson believes that regardless of family.” Alderson states that the focus on the dren, which have resulted in their uncom- the side of the debate the reader sympathises CRC is crucial because it sets out a practical pensated exclusion from major aspects of with, there needs to be a greater emphasis framework from which duties can be dis - society. on trusting children’s capabilities to ensure charged, which also allows for the views of Whilst the majority of the book’s audience they are not excluded from decisions which the children to be represented, not as a mat- are likely to sympathise with the moderate affect them directly. ter of privilege but as a matter of justice. arguments Alderson forwards, there will be Leading on from the merits of consulting is ensures children are protected from others who find the case for children’s in - children, chapters 6 and 7 consider the adult centric policies and allows them to be volve ment too modest, and conversely those appropriate means and levels of involving represented as active competent social who believe it is overstated. In relation to the children in this process. Alderson argues that beings. first claim, some readers might wonder why the consultation process itself is fraught with Alderson concludes by calling for the em - Alderson – who so adeptly argues for young practical barriers including time restraints, powerment of children; advocating the crea- children’s inclusion in a range of ‘adult’ language obstacles, skill deficits, managing a tion of power sharing arrangements to rights - stops short of advocating full voting work/play mix, which complicates the enable greater respect for children’s rights rights. Indeed the exemption of children process of involving children. Drawing on and change the current dynamics by which from the electoral process is barely addres- the work of other authors in the field, in- they are infantilised. She offers that the re- sed by Alderson, although neither explicitly cluding Miller, Treseder and Morrow, distribution of power between old and rejected. roughout the text frequent Alderson presents a range of appropriate young is a necessary requisite of social justice reference is made to children’s interest in, measures to facilitate work and communi- in much the same way as the redistribution and comprehension of a plurality of com- cation with young children in order to of resources is necessary for global justice. plex political and social issues such as increase their level of involvement. Alderson Alderson believes this is unlikely to come citizenship, racism, inequality, poverty, and claims that a wider level of adult and child about because society’s attitudes towards the environment, which could be viewed as participation can only be achieved through children are so deeply entrenched that the an implied justification for their electoral gaining confidence and experience in the balance of power will always be in the favour involvement. Whilst the text may be seen by consultation process. of adults. Alderson suggests that a radical some to tacitly support the concept of for Chapter 8 considers how children can be rethinking of perspectives and policies is children’s voting rights, Alderson’s reticence actively involved in sharing decisions and required to ensure adults and children can to dedicate more space to its discussion responsibility for matters which directly co-operatively create a better future. means that her position remains somewhat affect their own wellbeing. Alderson claims Alderson’s Young Children’s Rights is a unclear. young children are capable of making ratio- valuable addition to the existing body of In relation to the second point, many of the nal decisions even when presented with a literature on children’s rights. It offers an arguments Alderson forwards for wider wide range of information and that this excellent introduction to the subject area participation and consultation of children should serve as a justification for their and provides a unique insight into the lives, could be viewed as unjustified, since they involvement in major personal decisions. relationships, experiences and aims of young rely on a conception of children which will She cites examples such as health care where children. From the outset it is clear that not be shared by everyone. Indeed to state hospital staff are increasingly allowing chil- Alderson’s book is not intended to be a solely that most children are intuitive, capable dren to make autonomous decisions concern - academic exercise, rather a straightforward, beings, with basic human facets is hardly

Intergenerational Justice Review 147 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 148

problematic, but to imply that they may son’s argument for a radical overhaul of subject of children’s rights. It touches on a possess the level of abstract thought and resource distribution between age brackets largely neglected subject area – the nature logic necessary to dictate their own provi- as a requisite of generational justice might and scope of young children’s right - which sion of care for example, is far more contro- be seen to miss the point of what justice is desperately in need of consideration and versial. Considering the book deals with very requires. provides a voice and forum for the youngest young children, sceptics maybe not be However none of the issues constitute a real and most vulnerable in our society. Alder- convinced that the examples of children sticking point for the book. e key argu- son’s claims are cogently argued and well arranging ribbons or organising discos really ment, for a better understanding of children thought out, and she is able to circumvent translate into a realistic argument for their and their needs, remains convincing, even if serious objections to children having rights involvement in key decision making matters. the level of their participation and consulta- through relating her wealth of experience Another point which readers may find tion remains open for debate. Indeed when and research in the field. In doing so she contentious is Alderson’s claim that the the book focuses on issues that are interge- produces a book full of sensible ideas, which current inequitable distribution of resources nerational in scope, such as the provision of carries both moral force and practical use. between young and old is somewhat unjust. resources in the near future, it is clear to see If we consider that, in most cases, a person’s that allowing children a say in matters which Priscilla Alderson (2008): Young Children’s life span is expected to cover both youth and will directly influence their present and Rights. Exploring Beliefs, Principles and Prac- old age, the distribution of resources is not future prospects is essential. tice. London/Philadelphia: Jessica Kingsley Pu- technically unjust since the age bias favours Young Children’s Rights is to be recommen- blishers. Second Edition, 231 pages, ISBN everyone at some point. In this sense Alder- ded to anyone with an active interest in the 978-1-84310-599-2, price: £19.99 / $39.95:

Available books and journals of the FRFG

Books Issues of the journal "Intergenerational • Partizipation und Kinderwahlrecht • Tremmel, Jörg (ed.) (2008): Demographic Justice Review" (IGJR) (vol. 5 issue 2) Change and Intergenerational Justice. e e following, previously released issues • Unternehmensleitbild Implementation of Long-Term inking in can be purchased from the FRFG: Generationengerechtigkeit (vol. 5 issue 1) the Political Decision Making Process. • German-Polish edition: Einführung in die Berlin: Springer Verlag. €79.95 Peer-reviewed Generationengerechtigkeit (vol. 4 issue 4) • Tremmel, Jörg (ed.) (2006): Handbook of • Climate Change and Intergenerational • Generationenbeziehungen und Bildung Intergenerational Justice. Cheltenham: Ed- Justice (vol. 9 issue 3) (vol. 4 issue 3) ward Elgar. €50 • Young Generation Under Pressure? • Justice, Ethics, Ecology - 2nd Engl. Ed. • Stiftung für die Rechte zukünftiger Genera- (vol. 9 issue 2) (vol. 4 issue 2) tionen (ed.) (2008): Wahlrecht ohne Alters- • Historical Injustice (vol. 9 issue 1) • Generationengerechtigkeit und grenze? Verfassungsrechtliche, demokratietheo- Bevölkerungspolitik (vol. 4 issue 1) Not peer-reviewed retische und entwicklungspsychologische • Generationengerechtigkeit und • Junge Generation unter Druck? Aspekte. Munich: oekom Verlag. €39.90 Familienpolitik (vol. 3 issue 3) (vol.8 issue 3) • Tremmel, Jörg / Ulshöfer, Gotlind (eds.) • Unternehmen und • Grundlagen der Generationengerechtigkeit (2005): Unternehmensleitbild Generatio- Generationengerechtigkeit (vol. 3 issue 2) (vol.8 issue 2) nengerechtigkeit. eorie und Praxis. Frank- • Generationengerechtigkeit oder • Groundwork for Intergenerational Justice furt: IKO Verlag. €25 Nachhaltigkeit (vol. 3 issue 1) (vol.8, issue 1) • Stiftung für die Rechte zukünftiger Genera- • What is Generational Justice? - • Was ist Gerechtigkeit? Was ist tionen (ed.) (2003): Handbuch Generatio- 1st Engl. Ed. (vol. 2 issue 3) Generationengerechtigkeit? (vol. 7, issue 4) nengerechtigkeit. Munich: oekom Verlag. €25 • Ressourcenproduktivität (vol. 2, issue 2) • Wege zu mehr Kindern in Deutschland • Stiftung für die Rechte zukünftiger • Finanzielle Generationengerechtigkeit (vol. 7 issue 3) Generationen (ed.) (1999): Was bleibt von (vol. 2, issue 1) • Gesellschaftliche Generationen am Beispiel der Vergangenheit? Die junge Generation der 89er-Generation (vol. 7 issue 2) im Dialog über den Holocaust (with a pre- Printed Journals: • Nachhaltige Entwicklung in Spanien - face by Roman Herzog). Berlin: Ch.Links Unit price: €10 - subscription rate: €25 pa. German-Spanish edition (vol. 7 issue 1) Verlag. €20 To download pdf versions of the journal from • Erneuerbare Energien - 2nd German- our website is free of charge. • Stiftung für die Rechte zukünftiger Genera- French edition (vol. 6 issue 4) tionen (ed.) (1998): Die 68er. Warum wir • Wahlrecht von Geburt an (vol. 6 issue 3) Jungen sie nicht mehr brauchen. Freiburg: • Generationendialog (vol. 6 issue 2) Kore Verlag. €10 • Einwände gegen Generationengerechtigkeit • Gesellschaft für die Rechte zukünftiger - 1st German-French edition (vol. 6 issue 1) Generationen (ed.) (1997): Ihr habt dieses • Institutionalisation of Intergenerational Land nur von uns geborgt. Hamburg: Rasch Justice - 3rd Engl. Ed. (vol. 5 issue 3) und Röhring Verlag. €10

148 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 149

David Archard and Colin M. Macleod (ed.): The Moral and Political Status of Children Reviewed by Marisa dos Reis

he questions ‘what is a ‘child?’ or rights can be defined as a shield for our ‘what rights do children have?’ are far human standing, our ‘personhood’. Person- T from being consensually answer ed. In hood can be defined when we analyse the fact, children have been more commonly concept of ‘agency’. Being an agent means ha- defined for what they are not than for what ving the ability of assessing and making choi- they are. ces, taking decisions concerning one’s own In a 1973 article, Children Under the Law, course through life. Furthermore, the author Hillary Clinton (then an attorney) argued for argues that ‘personhood’ cannot be the only an interesting point of view: children's rights ground for human rights. He is not particu- were a “slogan in need of a definition”. larly explicit when explaining which other Her suggestion was to abolish the legal status grounds should be taken into account when of children as minors, and instead ensure that we are referring to human rights. But he all the procedural rights guaranteed to adults briefly describes those grounds as ‘practicali- under the American Constitution should be ties’ (pp. 23-24). granted to children whenever the state moves Referring to the Convention, the author against them. For her, describing a ‘minor’ as identifies the purpose of this legislation as an ‘everyone under 18 or 21’ was artificial and instrument to protect vulnerable children. did not take into account the differences in e author concludes that infants have no competency levels and maturity amongst ‘human rights’, just like severe mentally children of different ages. impaired people, but that society in general In a very creative and surprising move, Clin- it addresses the question of how we should imposes on itself heavier obligations towards ton argued in favour of creating something define a child (p. 13). them. Nevertheless, many children, though like a ‘scale’ whereby children could ey argue that defining someone as a child not infants, are capable of agency. For that ‘gradually’ see their maturity and competence under chronological criteria seems inappro- reason, the author agrees that children may recognised. priate. It also seems inaccurate to define a be entitled to rights, given that human rights Now, in 2009, 20 years since the Convention child by referring to their lack of ability when are claims that individuals can make against on the Rights of the Child was created, the compared to adults when some adults lack others, including their society (p. 28). notion of children’s rights is yet to be well de- those same competencies. Archard and Harry Brighouse’s point of view, in What fined. ere is no singularly accepted defini- MacLeod argue against the division generally Rights (if any) do Children Have? does not tion or theory on the rights held by children. made between ‘childhood’ and ‘adulthood’. differ greatly from Griffin’s article. He begins Today Somalia and the United States are the More properly, we should distinguish by saying that fundamental rights, seen from only countries who have not ratified the Con- between the terms ‘infants’, ‘young people’, the liberal perspective, are concerned with vention. In fact, in 2002, Somalia's previous ‘teenagers’ and ‘adolescents’, instead of using autonomous capable individuals and for that transitional government signed the Conven- ‘childhood’ to refer to all groups (p.14). reason, we cannot assume that children have tion, just as the United States did under Clin- e anthology is structured in three parts them. However, he argues children can be ton’s presidency in 1995, though neither has which explore the different dimensions of the granted legal rights. He believes that children ratified it. However UNICEF announced last main topic: I. Children and Rights; II. have solely welfare rights instead of agency November that the Somali Cabinet of Autonomy and Education and; III. Children, rights (pp. 31-32). And he goes further: chil- Ministers has agreed to ratify the Convention. Families and Justice. dren not only lack fundamental rights but at- is makes the Convention the most widely e first block consists of five articles on the tributing those types of rights to them would ratified international human rights treaty, definition of children’s rights. risk their best interests (p. 32). Here the leaving the United States as the only country An interesting thesis is one defended by James author makes an exception. He says that it is outside the pact. Griffin in the first article Do children have acceptable to grant children some agency In the Introduction of e Moral and Politi- Rights?. He contributes to the extensive rights, but only in as far as those rights are dif- cal Status of Children, (from 2002), the edi- debate around legal and human rights. He ferent from those of adults and when the age tors recognise that an apparent trend already argues confidently for children having legal of entitlement is clearly specified. is ought exists towards viewing children as distinct rights but questions if they also have human to be made in respect to their welfare rights individuals and as subjects of moral and rights (pp. 19-21). He starts by comparing and their prospective autonomy. Brighouse political theory. ey clarify in the book that children’s vulnerable status to zygotes, argues that the Convention jeopardizes chil- the so-called status of children does not really embryos, foetuses, animals or severe mentally dren’s prospective autonomy, granting some refer to their ‘moral or political status’. Better, impaired people. Griffin believes human legal agency rights to young children, and at

Intergenerational Justice Review 149 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 150

the same time, giving parents too much ef- interests (pp. 75-86). explain that autonomy is a sine qua non con- fective control over the development of their e article is quite descriptive albeit coherent - dition to a ‘good life’ at least, from a liberal rational abilities and their access to informa- ly argued. However, it may not add much to point of view (p. 118). However, what ‘a good tion (p. 51-52). the discussion. e solution pointed out by life’ is or what ‘a good life’ seems to be is In Children’s Choices or Children’s Interests: the author does not seem creative or a true unclear. us, autonomy would be an Which do their Rights Protect? Samantha Bren- answer to the question. It opens a second instrument which helps enable agents to nan intelligently presents the debate between door towards ethics but does not close the make their own choices according to their the choice theory of rights and the interest first towards rights (pp. 89-91). e other own conception of good (p. 119-121). theory of rights (pp. 55-63). Again, there is three authors in this chapter assumed a more Nevertheless, the instrumental theory collap- the suggestion of graduating the conceptions practical and interesting approach, even if, in ses once we acknowledge that autonomy can of rights in such a way that one can protect some cases, like Brighouse’s, the article does be a virtue and not just an instrumental both choices and interests. She stands for a not have so many references or a well insipid thing. erefore, the author tries to ‘compromise’ between the two models where, balanced structure. In fact, Brighouse barely explain that emphasizing autonomy as an in the beginning, rights for children function stepped away from Onora O’Neill, Robert instrument, could lead to failure of our to protect their interests and as they grow up Godin and Dianne Gibson in his references. judgement about goodness (p. 123). Callan and become autonomous choosers, rights Griffin and Brennan have clear and profound argues that, not only have we to gain auto- function as a protection of their own indivi- articles, carrying true answers and pointing nomy, but we also need to recognise the im- dual choices. is theory is directly connected out relevant references on the subject. portance of fostering our capacities leading to to Neil MacCormick’s, who argued for a e second part of the book tries to relate the a conception of good. Autonomy belongs to reconciliation of both theories: choices’ and progressive autonomy gained by children as character rather than being a mere instrument. interests’. He stands up for a common foun- they grow up with progressive moral evolu- From Callan’s liberal point of view, exposing dation for both sorts of rights. Brennan finds tion, achieved by education. children to a multicultural environment may his theory attractive but disagrees with him Robert Noggle starts his chapter with a very not facilitate this task (p. 137-138). when he believes that rights do not only pro- explicit position: children should not be given David Archard develops this issue in his tect interests but choices as well. e author a completely open future by making their article Children, Multiculturalism, and Educa- argues that MacCormick does not give us the present free of values or religious concepts tion. He attempts to become clearer about the answer about the foundation of these rights. (pp. 112-115). In Special Agents: Children’s balance required between individuals’ or She argues that these rights base themselves autonomy and Parental Authority he says that groups’ interests and children’s interests to on the protection of choices even if those if we do so, we would be preventing children acquire (or not) an identity as an individual. choices are against the chooser’s best interests. from progressing from what he calls “a special He argues that it is legitimate for a group or For her, children are “would-be choosers” agent” to a full developed, “temporally family to transmit its own values to children and, such as adults, they do have rights, only extended moral agent” with a sense of moral and that the existence of cultural diversity is from a different kind (pp. 63-67). decency. He describes the relation between not, in itself, a bad thing. Barbara Arneil brings us Becoming versus children and their parents as a fiduciary one However it is wrong to raise children merely Being: A Critical Analysis of the Child in Libe- where the parents should decide under a kind as means to the fulfilment of parental or a ral eory. e early liberal theory classifies of Rawlsian “veil of ignorance” how to raise group’s wishes. Children have, as future children as potential right-bearing citizens: on the moral new being (pp. 97-100). He adults, an interest in how they will be raised. one hand, “half beings with a kernel of ratio- believes children should carry the moral But raising a child as a mere future group nality” and, on the other hand, “the negation values of their families in the early stages to member may contribute to prevent her to of their future adult form” since there are still avoid them from being raised without prin- choose any other paths in her life. So then seen as irrational creatures. e definition of ciples at all. Otherwise, we could expect a what does it mean to have a right to an ‘open- ‘becoming’ derives from seeing children as “moral psychopath” (p. 111). However, future’? ere is a right for parents to share future adults and not as already existing parents cannot force children to keep these their family life with children to such an independent human beings. For John Locke, values when they grow up. extent that children may be raised to share the the ‘product’ of ‘becoming’ will be the e idea of applying Rawl’s theory to chil- values of the group. Just like Noogle, Archard rational citizen or the property owner, capable dren’s education is not new. However, the way believes neither the parents nor groups have of understanding rules and accepting author - the author relates it with the fiduciary special the right to impose their way of life to the next ity and the State (pp. 71-74). relationship between parents and children is generation. (pp. 158-159). Several theories on children’s rights have tried very interesting and seems to explain well the Archard claims that children may bear the to deny this point of view, arguing that chil- moral relationship between both agents. Nog- cost of being exposed to differences between dren are beings entitled with rights. Against gle does not hide himself behind hypocrisy their families’ values and the ones existing in Locke’s position, where only the father had and assumes that children are not free to society (pp. 150-152). something to say, here the state and society choose their moral and religious values. On Joe Coleman’s brilliant article Answering must get involved in their lives and take care the other hand, parents do not have permis- Susan: Liberalism, Civic Education and the of them as well. Similarly to Brighouse, Ar- sion to perpetuate their own beliefs in time Status of Younger Persons starts with an hypo- neil finishes by saying that a possible solution nor have they the right to do it in an intole- thetical situation where Susan, a 15 years old should emphasize responsibilities towards chil- rant, unreasonable way. girl and a 10th grade student, addresses a dren rather than focusing on rights, in a way e second article, Autonomy, Child-Rearing, panel of political theorists that are debating that allows us to better address children’s and Good Lives by Eamonn Callan tries to topics such as what does liberalism require in

150 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 151

the way of civic education. Coleman realises the Affective Family tries to conciliate liberal must be aware that individuals will not have that if on one hand, young children lack a theory with children’s special status. He equal opportunities in life. e conclusion is capacity to understand a Rawlsian concept of recognises that liberals did not pay much that a theory of justice, even a Rawlsian one, the good, on the other hand, we cannot attention to the role of children or their sta- cannot have equal opportunity as a prior advocate that an adolescent closer to majority tus. Children should be seen as full, equal and principle to family (pp. 267-268). lacks that power as well. Coleman advocates distinct subjects. If liberal ideology allows is book offers a good opportunity to go a more democratic, participation-orientated some inequalities among adults, those deeper into such subjects concerning chil- approach where educators and students are inequalities should not be reflected (or com- dren’s rights (especially the debate around seen as equals. pletely reflected) on children. (p. 219) Public children’s status, welfare or agency rights). e author points to a very relevant and provisions could help to reduce these inequa- It is especially pertinent given that the debate fallacious aspect of liberal theory about citi- lities. It is acceptable that some inequalities about children’s rights has grown in the last zenship and age (pp. 163. Liberals accept a arise among adults due to individual choices years. person as a citizen as long as that person made in an initial position of equality, but it Should today’s adolescents be treated as achieves 18 years of age (in most countries). is not that when those differences arise due to infants, when it is known that they possess e status of childhood cannot be limited by other factors such as social or natural con - nearly the same capacities and knowledge as any artificial criteria (p. 170). Joe Coleman’s tingencies. Another interesting point is that an adult? Should we abolish the idea of article is, indeed, one of the most well written inequalities arise among children because pa- majority because it is based on artificial and articles in the whole book and deserves our rents care more about their own children than mainly historical criteria? Again, the question praise. In fact, Coleman reaches important about others’. MacLeod believes that it is pos- of creating a “graduation scale” arises. conclusions, written in a pleasantly amusing sible to limit these ‘side-effects of love’ by After reading the preamble of the Conven- albeit serious way. pursuing social policies that constrain parents tion on the Rights of the Child, we could say Hillel Steiner starts the third chapter of the to express themselves impartially about their that the Convention was created under the book. is final cluster of essays is dedicated own children (pp. 226-228). vision that entitles children to welfare rights to issues concerning distributive justice. In It is hard to understand how this would be but without agency rights. It is said that chil- Silver Spoons and Golden Genes: Talent Diffe- possible in a liberal society. is may be the dren should be “afforded the necessary pro- rentials and Distributive Justice he approaches only weakness of his thesis. is position tection and assistance, recognising that the some polemic – and still present – ethical could hardly cope with the liberal ideals of child, for the full and harmonious develop- questions. Steiner theorizes about what choice, freedom and propriety. ment of his or her personality, should grow people should give or get from others. e What Children Really Need: Towards a Critical up in a family environment, in an atmosphere author says that this question should be eory of Family Structure, by Shelley Burtt, of happiness, love and understanding”. answered by taking into account one’s talents tells us about the family structure in the USA. Moreover, it is said that a child should be fully or abilities (p. 183). is is important when During the 90’s, approximately half the chil- prepared to live an individual life in society. It we deal with children’s education or the dren that were born were raised by single-pa- goes without saying that in this legislation, development of children’s abilities. e rent families, thereby increasing poverty rates the child is not yet seen as a full moral indi- author wants to show how differences in (p. 231). is phenomenon made most vidual, but rather like a human being ‘under natural endowment can lead to inequalities politicians and scholars argue in favour of a construction’. is Aristotelian concept of (p. 184). It is said that children have a right to return to the traditional family model in children – as being something similar to claim against adults, for they have the obliga- order to ‘disguise’ the moral and economical ‘unfinished human beings’ – is still the tion of creating the necessary environment for failure of society (p. 232-234). Burtt thinks predominant theory. children to develop in. Is it possible for chil- it is more important to create new policies However, today we can observe a rising inte- dren to claim from their parents a better that cope with the different family models rest in the idea that children should be recog- genetic heritage? Steiner argues that children existing at present. She stands for a “critical nised as capable individuals. A good example could claim a right against bad genetic theory of family structure” where one evalua- of this change in focus is the motion for a re- endowment, as long as the changes that could tes children’s needs and also gives some clues solution presented to the Council of Europe have been made did not change the person’s on how to achieve those needs in each kind of last May which proposed lowering the voting (child’s) identity (p. 190). family model (pp. 241-245). age to 16 in all the countries from the Coun- From a softer point of view, Peter Vallentyne e book ends with Véronique Muñoz-Dar- cil. in Equality and the Duties of Procreators advo- dé’s article, addressing some questions Ma- Despite the fact that it may be a little cates that the only special duty procreators cleod already approached. In Family, Choice exhaustive or repetitive concerning liberal have towards their children is to ensure that and Distributive Justice she says something theory and John Rawls’ works – and some - they have good perspectives in life and that very pertinent: the simple existence of family times not particularly innovative – we can they do not violate their rights (p. 195). It is is so strong, that it can for itself impair the surely recommend this book as a major, offered that agents have the moral duty of de- access of individuals to equal opportunities. provocative and still up to date reference on ciding not to have children when there are is affects not only material distribution. It the topic. bad prospects for the offspring’s life (p. 199). affects the moral and psychological develop- However, there is no special duty to assure the ment of the child and their ability to have a David Archard and Colin MacLeod (eds). offspring have the highest standards of life future in equal circumstances. (2003): e Moral and Political Status of Chil- possible. However a fair society must contain a family dren. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 296 Colin MacLeod’s article Liberal Equality and in some form. But if we agree with it, we pages. ISBN 0199242682. Price: £64.60/$65.

Intergenerational Justice Review 151 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 152

What Would Happen if Citizens Under 18 Years Old Had the Legal Right to Vote? The German U18 Project Experience by Dan Sylvain and Marisa dos Reis

opinion. Even though the minimum age for young people usually go. e Foundation local elections in some Länder is 16, the for the Rights of Future Generations also voting age for general elections is 18. is opened a polling station in Oberursel and does not count for the U18: for several years thus contributed to the success of the U18 this initiative has called on children and project. e youngest voter was a nine year youngsters to participate in their own old girl. ‘general elections’. Meanwhile, the most Here are the results, in comparison to the influential child and youth German organi- real German election one week later: sations supported the non-party and Young people have chosen the Social n recent decades increasing attention independent initiative. Even though the Democrats (SPD), with 20.45 percent of the has been given to children’s and young results of the U18-elections have no direct votes, closely followed by the ecological I people’s civil and political rights. Some repercussions for the composition of the party ‘e Greens’ with 20 percent. e authors argue that the principle of demo- German Bundestag it reflects the opinion third place was given to the Christian cracy requires us to recognise that all citizens and the political interests of today's young Democrats (CDU/CSU) with 19.35 percent. have the right to express their voice, generation. e aim of this initiative was to Another important result, is the one for the independent of their gender, beliefs, ethnic direct politicians’ and parties’ attention to smaller parties, such as the Far Left party, or cultural background – and age. A discri- children’s and young people’s will to actively with 10.35 percent, the ‘Pirates’, with 8.7 mination according to age is dubbed participate in a democratic process and to percent, the Liberals (FDP) with 7.6 percent ‘ageism’. produce their own political choices. and the Animal Protection party, 5.19 In fact, it is very contested if people under e purpose of the U18 was to help young percent. 13.54 percent of the votes were 18 should have the legal right to vote. On people to understand politics, to identify spread among other parties. the one hand, some theories argue that differences between party programmes and As a matter of fact, on the German elections, people under 18 are not yet mentally and to question promises made by politicians. that took place on 27th September 2009, emotionally developed in such a way that is way children and youngsters could the incumbent Christian Democrats won, they could have a valuable political point of learn to recognise and formulate their own with 33.8 percent of the votes and the Social view. Some go even further and argue that interests, and to find answers to political Democrats were second with 23 percent. people under 18 years old don’t really care questions, whilst taking an active part in e Liberals came in third, with 14.6 per- about politics and don’t have any idea of shaping their future. cent, the Far Left party reached 11.9 percent what a democratic society is. On the other is was the second time the U18 promoted and the ecological party ‘e Greens’ gained hand, some authors defend the idea that an election for people under 18 years old. In 10.7 percent. e ‘Pirates’ had 2 percent of people should be entitled to vote from the 2005, 48,461 children and youngsters the votes and the Animal Protection Party cradle through familial representation until expressed their political opinion by voting only 0.5 percent. they are of vote casting age. Some theories in 583 polling places. e party’s leaders commented on these take a more moderate position, defending But on 18th September 2009, the number results. For instance, Andrea Nahles, party the proposal that societies should lower the of votes cast in the U18 reached a surprising leader for the Social Democrats considered minimum age limit to vote to 14 or 16 years 127,208 at 1,000 polling places: in schools, the U18 election a full success and said it old, but are against the idea of having their leisure facilities and other places where showed that children and youngsters know children and youngsters opinion ‘represented’ by their families while they’re younger. U18 results German general election results us, regardless of what your own opinion is SPD: 20.45 percent CDU/CSU: 33.8 percent on this topic, the following question arises: What would happen if citizens under 18 years Die Grüne: 20 percent SPD: 23 percent of age had the opportunity to vote in an CDU/CSU: 19.35 percent FDP: 14.6 percent election? Die Linke: 10.35 percent Die Linke: 11.9 percent On 18th September 2009, nine days before Die Piraten: 8.7 percent Die Grüne: 10.7 percent the ‘real’ general elections in Germany, an interesting political education initiative FDP: 7.6 percent Die Piraten: 2 percent unfolded: the U18 election (under 18 Die Tierschutzpartei: 5.19 percent Die Tierschutzpartei: 0.6 percent election). People under 18 years old could Others: 8.36 percent Others: 3.4 percent vote and freely express their political

152 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 153

the 21st century. Had young people's participation in the U18 translated into real votes the Animal Protection Party would have received ten times its actual volume of votes in the Bun- destag. Its chairman Stefan Bernhard Eck considers this result a gigantic success for his party's cause. ere is no doubt that after crosschecking how important it is to participate in demo- the results for both the U18 election and the cracy and to defend their interests through German official election there are several the medium of voting. significant discrepancies. e younger gene- Kai Gehring from ‘e Greens’ party reacted ra tions have contrasting political views from to their good U18 election results by saying those who are older. In a true democracy, that many youngsters support their de- Ballot Boxes created by young people their opinion would have the same strength mands for climate protection and for the per capita as the ones from older individuals. strengthening of civil rights. electoral procedure. More over, we have strong reasons to believe Diana Golze from the Far Left party added Jens Seipenbusch, chairperson of the that if young people already had the legal that more important than the results is the ‘Pirates’ is pleased with the results and right to vote, even more citizens under 18 fact that all over Germany about 125,000 believes that they are related to his party's years old would feel mo tivated to vote and children and youngsters were listened in an manifesto, which include crucial topics for to participate in a democratic society.

The 20th Anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of the Child

s the international community the age of majority if it is set below 18 and available measures to make sure children’s celebrates the 20th anniversary of to increase the level of protection for all chil- rights are respected, protected and fulfilled. A the Convention on the Rights of dren under 18. When countries ratify the Convention, they the Child (CRC) in November 2009, it is agree to review their laws relating to chil- time to take a closer look at this document. Article 2 (Non-discrimination): e Con- dren. is involves assessing their social As a legally binding document, the Con- vention applies to all children, whatever services, legal, health and educational vention has been instrumental in setting their race, religion or abilities; whatever they systems, as well as levels of funding for these standards of children’s rights and motivating think or say, whatever type of family they services. Governments are then obliged to institutional capacity-building for the pro- come from. It doesn’t matter where children take all necessary steps to ensure that the motion and protection of children. live, what language they speak, what their minimum standards set by the Convention e Convention acknowledges provision, parents do, whether they are boys or girls, in these areas are being met. ey must help protection and participation rights, for what their culture is, whether they have a families protect children’s rights and create instance that every child has the right to life, disability or whether they are rich or poor. an environment where they can grow and his or her own name and identity, to be rai- No child should be treated unfairly on any reach their potential. In some instances, this sed by his or her parents within a family or basis. may involve changing existing laws or creat - cultural grouping and have a relationship ing new ones. Such legislative changes are with both parents, even if they are separat ed. Article 3 (Best interests of the child): e not imposed, but come about through the Here is a summary of the rights under the best interests of children must be the same process by which any law is created or Convention on the Rights of the Child: primary concern in making decisions that reformed within a country. Article 41 of the may affect them. All adults should do what Convention points out the when a country Article 1 (Definition of the child): e Con- is best for children. When adults make already has higher legal standards than those vention defines a 'child' as a person below decisions, they should think about how their seen in the Convention, the higher stand - the age of 18, unless the laws of a particular decisions will affect children. is particular - ards always prevail. country set the legal age for adulthood ly applies to budget, policy and law makers. younger. e Committee on the Rights of Article 5 (Parental guidance): Governments the Child, the monitoring body for the Article 4 (Protection of rights): Govern- should respect the rights and responsibilities Convention, has encouraged States to review ments have a responsibility to take all of families to direct and guide their children

Intergenerational Justice Review 153 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 154

so that, as they grow, they learn to use their government. Children have the right to a Two optional protocols were adopted on 25 rights properly. Helping children to under- nationality (to belong to a country). Chil- May 2000. e first restricts the involvement stand their rights does not mean pushing dren also have the right to know and, as far of children in military conflicts, and the se- them to make choices with consequences as possible, to be cared for by their parents. cond prohibits the sale of children, child pro- that they are too young to handle. Article 5 stitution and child pornography. All nations encourages parents to deal with rights issues Article 8 (Preservation of identity): Children of the world except Somalia and the US have "in a manner consistent with the evolving have the right to an identity – an official ratified the convention. Compliance is mo- capacities of the child". e Convention record of who they are. Governments should nitored by the United Nations Committee does not take responsibility for children respect children’s right to a name, a nationality on the Rights of the Child which is compo- away from their parents and give more and family ties. sed of members from countries around the authority to governments. It does place on world. Once a year, the Committee submits governments the responsibility to protect Article 9 (Separation from parents): Chil- a report to the ird Committee of the Uni- and assist families in fulfilling their essential dren have the right to live with their ted Nations General Assembly, which also role as nurturers of children. parent(s), unless it is bad for them. Children hears a statement from the CRC Chair, and whose parents do not live together have the the Assembly adopts a Resolution on the Article 6 (Survival and development): Chil- right to stay in contact with both parents, Rights of the Child. All States parties are ob- dren have the right to live. Governments unless this might hurt the child. liged to submit regular reports to the Com- should ensure that children survive and mittee on how the rights are being develop healthily. Article 10 (Family reunification): Families implemented. States must report initially two whose members live in different countries years after acceding to the Convention and Article 7 (Registration, name, nationality, should be allowed to move between those then every five years. e Committee cannot care): All children have the right to a legally countries so that parents and children can stay consider complaints by individuals. registered name, officially recognised by the in contact, or get back together as a family. jt

Voting Rights and Age Restrictions – The Position the of Foundation for the Rights of Future Generations

he aim of the FRFG is to ensure a e vast majority of countries in the world country's voting age to 18 years. generationally just and sustainable have established a voting age of 18, lowering Despite the Iranian case, there is a worldwide T society on the basis of democratic it in many cased in the 1970s. Although an trend in favour of lowering the voting age. principles. One fundamental principle of artificial criterion, countries consider those In Germany, the voting age has been democracy is that attention is being paid to under this preassigned threshold to lack the lowered to 16 in the ‚Land’ of Bremen in a the rights and interests of all societal groups necessary capabilities and knowledge to historical decision – this is the first time in that are being affected by the decisions vote. Age restrictions vary a lot around the the long German history that 16-18-years- taken. is includes children and young world. In the Indonesian case everybody is olds are allowed to cast their ballot on a Län- persons. Nevertheless their needs are only entitled to full voting rights providing der level. e FRFG supports the lowering considered insufficiently in many cases. he/she is married. If not, voting rights of the voting age to 16 but deems this limit is year marks the 20th anniversary of the become available on reaching 16 years of as being chosen at random and being unfair approval of the UN Convention on the age. Countries such as Austria, Brazil, Cuba, in individual cases. e politically interested Rights of the Child. e gap between the Nicaragua, as well as some Länder in 15-year-old, who has been engaged in standards and reality is especially obvious Germany (see below), and a Canton in cleaning up the environment in a Green- concerning participation rights. Article 12 Switzerland have already set 16 as the mini- team for years, is still being treated unfairly. of the Convention states: “States Parties shall mum voting age. us the FRFG advocates a voting right assure to the child who is capable of forming However, at present, some countries like through registration independently of age. his or her own views the right to express Japan and Saudi Arabia respectively still have It is not to be confused with a voting age of those views freely in all matters affecting the 20 and 21 years of age as the minimum age zero. FRFG's solution does not feature the child, the views of the child being given due to vote, and in Saudi Arabia only men can downsides of a fixed limit and is much more weight in accordance with the age and vote. creative than a step-wise lowering of the maturity of the child.” For voting rights, the Iran is an particularly interesting example. voting age. inflexible age limit of 18 years does not meet Until 2006 the voting age was 15 but in us we demand the implementation of a these requirements from our point of view. 2006 parliamentary legislation increased the individual voting right for minors. To be

154 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 155

more precise, we suggest that children and We recommend not letting children below young people can claim the right to vote at 16 participate through postal voting in order a self-chosen moment. e adolescent is of to ensure that the child has the maximum course free to register for only the local chance to vote without being influence by elections, without making use of the voting his parents. We deem the polling booth is right for the regional, federal and European the best place to ensure this. levels. e adolescent can make his decision FRFG has published a book (in German) on to claim his voting right official, by register - the complex question of voting rights for ing at the electoral authority in charge. e minors. An English summary can be found young boy or girl would pay a visit to the at http://www.intergenerationaljustice.org > competent authority (on his own, without Publications > Books > "Wahlrecht ohne being accompanied by his parents) and sign Young girl in a ballot box Altersgrenze? Verfassungsrechtliche, demo- a form stating: „I want to participate in elec- kratietheoretische und entwicklungspsycho- tions.“ is is not a ‘claim’, since a claim the ability to vote of persons who have logische Aspekte" (engl. translation of the could be turned down, but a declaration of reached the legal voting age. title: "Voting Rights without Age Limits? intent. is declaration of intent works the Apart from this ‚individual’ voting age that Constitutional Law, Democratic eory same way as registering in many other states, is created by the free choice to claim a right, and Psychological Development") like the USA, where adults have to register a general voting age of 16 should be imple- once before they are allowed to vote in mented. is would mean that everybody FRFG’s position paper on Children’s Rights elections. ere should be no examination from the age of 16 onwards should be is available (only in German) at www.gene- whatsoever of the ability to vote of the granted the right to vote and thus receive a rationengerechtigkeit.de > Publikationen > adolescents, since this would lead to a two- polling card at his home address automati- Positionspapiere tiered society as there is no examination of cally. e FRFG board members

Motion for a resolution presented to the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly: ”Expansion of Democracy by Lowering the Voting Age to 16“

n May 2009, a motion in favour of 16-17 year olds, they apparently do not lowering the voting age to 16 in all show up at the ballot boxes or register as I countries of the Council of Europe was voters. According to IDEA, International presented to the Parliamentary Assembly Institute for Democracy and Electoral (not to be confused with the European Assistance, voter turn-out amongst young Parliament): people in the age from 18-29 years in Western Europe is systematically lower than 1. Twelve years have passed since the the average level of turnout in the popula- Assembly adopted Recommendation 1315 tion (see Voter turnout since 1945, a global (1997), recommending to “rapidly harmonise report – IDEA, 2002). the age for the right to vote and stand for election at 18 years in all countries and for 4. Furthermore, there is a fear that the all elections”. Since then, we have witnessed knowledge on the experiences from elec tions demographic development in many Euro- a significant development in issues concern - in these countries is very promising in terms pean countries will worsen the problem. ing the minimum age for voting. It is there- of 16-17-year olds level of participation. According to EUROSTAT statistics we will fore time to re-evaluate the Assembly’s for instance see a 44,5 percentage increase in position on this very important topic. 3. In Great Britain, Finland, Norway and the 65-79 year olds and a 24,3 percent the Czech Republic the possibility of decline in the 15-24 year olds by year 2050. 2. e trend of lowering the voting age has lowering of the voting age to 16 is currently ere is a real risk that young people will be spread throughout Europe: In Austria the being evaluated by the governments. e marginalised in the political process, both voting age has been lowered to 16 years for primary reason hereof has been a deep on a specific level as they will be numerically all elections. In Germany and Switzerland, concern over young people’s reluctance to out-numbered, but also because the politi- 16-17 year olds can vote at local elections in participate in democracy. Despite a wide- cal agenda risks becoming dominated by some of the constituent states. Current spread interest in political issues amongst the issues that are primarily interesting for older

Intergenerational Justice Review 155 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 156

people. is is particularly problematic in a standing, participation and commitment of e motion was signed by: time, when societies more than ever will young people in political and institutional need the commitment and work efforts of life at local, national and European levels.” Jensen Mogens, Denmark, SOC young people in order to keep up economi- Ayva Lokman, Turkey, EPP/CD cal growth, social security systems and social 7. Recalling Resolution 1630 (2008) on van der Bellen Alexander, Austria, NR cohesion. Refreshing the youth agenda of the Council Bilozir Oksana, Ukraine, EPP/CD of Europe that underlines that in the youth Brasseur Anne, Luxembourg, ALDE 5. Needless to say, this development is policy of the Council of Europe: “A key Duesund Åse Gunhild Woie, Norway, dangerous for the future stability of Euro- element has been encouragement of the EPP/CD pean democracy. We need to find means to active participation of young people in civil Dzembritzki, Detlef, Germany, SOC make young people engaged in democracy. and institutional life.” Freire Antunes José, Portugal, EPP/CD Lowering of the voting age could be a part of Hancock Michael, United Kingdom, ALDE that solution. 8. e Assembly recommends an investiga- de Melo Maria Manuela, Portugal, SOC tion on the advantages and drawbacks of Muttonen Christine, Austria, SOC 6. Recalling Recommendation 1019 (1985) engaging and securing young people’s parti- Neugebauer Fritz, Austria, EPP/CD on the participation of young people in cipation in democracy by lowering of the O'Hara Edward, United Kingdom, SOC political and institutional life, the Assembly voting age to 16 in all member countries of Poulsen Jørgen, Denmark, ALDE said that it was “‘convinced - if democracy the Council of Europe. Wurm Gisela, Austria, SOC is to survive and develop – of the importance of the active and effective awareness, under- At the time of writing (December 2009), the motion has not yet been discussed. mdr

Barring Adults from Voting: Disenfranchisement of Felons and Mentally Disabled People Around the World by Marisa dos Reis

he revocation of the right to suffrage cifically denied the right to vote, they are also franchisement of hospitalized persons and to a person or group of people, or not provided with appropriate access to a bal- prisoners in pre-trial detention who have not T rendering a person's vote less effec- lot station, so are effectively disenfranchised. lost their right to vote but do not have access tive/ineffective is called disenfranchisement. Until 2002 Canada allowed only prisoners to a ballot station. Law can determine it or it can occur impli- serving a term of less than 2 years the right to Mentally disabled people are also the subject citly by intimidation or due to lack of con- vote, but this was found to be unconstitu- of disenfranchisement. With the exceptions ditions to make voting effective. tional by the Supreme Court in Sauvé v. Ca- of Canada, Sweden, Nicaragua, Italy and Ire- Around the world, there are several countries nada (Chief Electoral Officer). Now, land, the majority of countries worldwide that restrict the possibilites to vote of their prisoners are allowed to vote. Besides Ca- limit their right to vote. In some countries citizens if they are convicted criminals. nada, countries like Israel, Hungary, Japan there has to be a court decision declaring e USA (in the majority of states) and New and South Africa also allow felons to vote. such impairments, but in others, it will be Zealand for example disenfranchise those ere are several movements against felon enough that the person is visibly mentally who have been convicted of serious crimes disenfranchisement around the world. In the disabled. (e.g. Portugal). In the USA, again, even after they are released from prison. In US the Democracy Restoration Act (DRA) is legislation differs across states. these countries, the denial of the right to vote an example of federal legislation that seeks to New trends towards the enfranchisement of is automatic on a felony conviction, whereas restore voting rights in federal elections to ex- these two excluded groups (felons and men- in other countries (e.g. China, Cape Verde, felons. e bill was introduced on July 24th, tally impaired persons) are becoming increa- France and Germany, Portugal, Spain,) vo- 2009 by Senator Russell Feingold and Re- singly visible around the world. ting rights can be limited in accordance with presentative John Conyers. e table on page 157 gives an overview on certain crimes such as those against the elec- In Brazil in July 2009 several religious and disenfranchisement of adults around the toral system or are dependent on a court’s de- civil organizations created the “Movimento world. Moreover, it lists the legal voting age. cision. In other places such as Brazil or Nacional pela Cidadania da Pessoa Presa ou East-Timor prisoners who are in pre-trial de- Internada” (National Movement for Citizen- tention are not disenfranchised. However, ship of Arrested or Hospitalized Persons) like in Ireland, where prisoners are not spe- which attempted to fight the de facto disen-

156 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 157

e Right to Vote in the World - December 2009 Countries Age Mentally disabled Felons (in prison) Additional informations on voting legislation Angola 18 Not allowed to vote. Not allowed to vote. Compulsory. Argentina 18 Not allowed to vote. Not allowed to vote. Compulsory. Exceptions: older than 70, impaired persons; judges and their assistants working in the electoral act; some State workers. Australia 18 Not allowed to vote. Not allowed except people serving relatively short prison sentences, up to 3 years can vote. Compulsory for all over 18. Austria 16 Not allowed to vote. Allowed to vote with restrictions. Compulsory in two Länder. Brazil 16 Not allowed to vote. Not allowed to vote except prisoners in pre-trial detention. Compulsory for individuals from 18 to 70. Canada 18 Have the right to vote. Have the right to vote. Cape Verde 18 Not allowed to vote. Have the right to vote, but if the penalty is more than 3 years or if the felon was convicted for a crime against the State they cannot. Compulsory. China 18 Not allowed to vote. Have the right to vote except those stripped of their political rights. Compulsory. Cuba 16 Not allowed to vote. Not allowed to vote. East-Timor 17 Not allowed to vote. Not allowed to vote unless they are in pre-trial detention. France 18 Not allowed to vote. Have the right to vote. Permits disenfranchisement only when it is imposed by a court. Germany 18. 16 for Not allowed to vote. Have the right to vote except those municipal convicted for electoral crimes or elections in crimes that undermine the some Länder. democratic order, and whose court-imposed sentence expressly includes disenfranchisement. Hungary 18 Not allowed to vote. Have the right to vote. India 18 Not allowed to vote. Not allowed to vote except in pre-trial detention. Indonesia 16 if single, Not allowed to vote. any age if married. Iran 18 Not allowed to vote. Before 2007 it was 15. Ireland 18 Have the right to vote. Have the right to vote. Israel 18. 17 for Not allowed to vote. Have the right to vote. municipal elections Italy 18 Have the right to vote. Have the right to vote with restrictions. Japan 20 Not allowed to vote. Have the right to vote New Zealand 18 Not allowed to vote. Not allowed to vote. ey cannot vote for several years even after completing their sentence, but only in cases where they were convicted for buying or selling votes or for corrupt practices. Nicaragua 16 Have the right to vote. Have the right to vote with restrictions. Norway 18 Not allowed to vote. Have the right to vote with restrictions. Portugal 18 Not allowed to vote. Have the right to vote. Except those convicted for crimes against the State. Permits disenfranchisement only when it is imposed by a court order. Russia 18 Saudi Arabia 21 Not allowed to vote. Only male citizens.

Intergenerational Justice Review 157 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 158

South Africa 18 Not allowed to vote. Have the right to vote. Spain 18 Not allowed to vote. Have the right to vote. Permits disenfranchisement only when it is imposed by a court order. Sweden 18 Have the right to vote. Have the right to vote. Switzerland 18. 16 for Not allowed to vote. Have the right to vote. Compulsory in one Canton only. cantonal and municipal elections. United 18 Not allowed to vote. Not allowed to vote, except those Kingdom in pre-trial detention. USA 18. In many Not allowed to vote for Not allowed to vote, but rules e Democracy Restoration Act states people presidential election, about this depend on the State. (DRA) is federal legislation that can vote in but different rules in seeks to restore voting rights in primary state elections depend federal elections to ex-felons. elections if on the State. e bill was introduced on July they will be 24th, 2009. Currently, 35 states 18 on or continue to disenfranchise people before the after release from prison. day of general election. Turkey 18 Not allowed to vote. Not allowed to vote except felons Compulsory. convicted of negligent offences Venezuela 18 Not allowed to vote. Permits disenfranchisement when it is imposed by a court order.

Call for Papers for the Intergenerational Justice Review

‘Intergenerational Justice and the Scourge and Central Asia. According to findings of In this context it is remarkable that studies of War’ the AKUF (Working Group on the Causes on intergenerational justice have so far ne- We are looking for articles in English for the of Wars) in Hamburg, Germany, the num- glected the topic, especially considering that upcoming issue 1/2010 of the IGJR with the ber of conflicts has even steadily risen since the UN Charter specifically pointed out ‘suc- topic Intergenerational Justice and the the end of the Second World War, while ceeding generations’ as the beneficiaries of its Scourge of War. inner state conflicts increasingly dominate determination to rid the world of wars. the statistics. e upcoming issue 1/2010 of the Interge- e Charter of the United Nations signed in e persistence of the institution of ‘war’ nerational Justice Review addresses this issue, San Francisco on 26 June 1945 starts with might be the greatest threat of all to future with the aim to establish the groundwork for the words “We the peoples of the United Na- generations. Its negative consequences for the a comprehensive discussion of peace policies tions determined to save succeeding genera- future of societies are obvious. Apart from in the scope of intergenerational justice. e tions from the scourge of war, which twice the people dying, traumatised soldiers and issue aims to clarify the relation between the in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to victims pass down the psychological dama- rights of present and future generations for a mankind […]”. e Charter was obviously ges they suffered in war times to the future peaceful life, the role of humanitarian inter- formulated and signed under the impression generations as parents. Additionally new ventions based on chapter VII of the UN of the recently ended Second World War, forms of inner state conflicts have a much Charter and interventions in general. is which was the single event with the sharpest longer duration in comparison to classic in- includes interventions for conflict manage- decrease of human welfare in history. e terstate wars and leave the economies, state ment, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, priorities have since shifted during an era of structures and societies of the states they ra- peacekeeping, state and nation building. unprecedented peace in the OECD world vaged in ruins for decades to come. us Weapons of mass destruction pose an excep- and on a global scale. But even though as modern inner state conflicts are more likely tional danger to the future of mankind. e- many as 192 states have signed the UN to affect future generations than classical refore the ban and demolition of nuclear Charter, starting with an expression of de- wars with clearly defined warring parties that arms as well as the elimination of chemical termination to rid the world of the scourge of usually end with a truce or a peace treaty. and biological weapon are important ele- war, conflicts still ravage large parts of the Evidently the problem the ‘scourge of war’ ments of the topic. world, particularly in Africa, the Middle East poses to mankind is far from being solved. Deadline for the submission of full articles is 12th February 2009. 158 Intergenerational Justice Review Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 159

Possibilities and Limits of Party Coopera- necessary decisions. Democracy is always a Ways Towards a Legal Implementation of tion in Democracies struggle to balance between cooperation and Intergenerational Justice e editors are seeking articles in English for competition. Across the globe there are many Future individuals are not yet born, that is an upcoming issue in 2010 of the IGJR with different approaches to finding this balance; why they cannot participate in our decision- the topic ‘Possibilities and limits of party co- the British Majority system, the concordance making processes today. How can we legally operation in democracies’. system in Switzerland, the coalition system in guarantee that their rights are not infringed Germany and the Presidential democracies of upon? Every democratic system requires the compe- France and the USA. But which system is One upcoming issue of IGJR 2010 will be tition of political parties and parliament fac- preferable from the point of view of future ge- devoted to this topic. e Call for Papers will tions, and to a certain degree it is part of the nerations? be published online in January 2010. democratic role play to maintain such com- petition. Nevertheless, in a democratic system Deadline for the submission of abstracts is it is important to aim for as much competi- 15 February 2010. tion as needed and as much cooperation as Deadline for the submission of full articles is possible, in order to achieve the majorities for 30 March 2010.

New Editorial Staff

Marisa dos Reis has a licentiate degree in law by the Faculty diploma in international law by the Faculty Mrs. dos Reis has been of Law of Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Du- of Law of Universidade de Lisboa and now collaborating with the ring her studies, she worked as a free-lance she is writing her final thesis on Human Foundation for the journalist in the portuguese regional press Rights for an Advanced Masters Degree Rights of Future Gene- and radio. After completing her studies in Course that she attends at that institution. rations in the Interge- 2002, she worked in a lawyers’s firm in Lis- Marisa dos Reis: “Collaborating with this nerational Justice Review bon and then worked as a deputy district at- Foundation and contributing to this noble since September 2009 torney from 2003 to 2007. In that context, mission is the perfect scenario for pursuing and her project is financially supported by she had a close professional relationship with my studies and self development, both in a the European Commission. She is 30 years two commissions for the protection of mi- professional and personal dimension”. old and comes from Lisbon, Portugal. She nors at social risk. She achieved a specialist

Imprint

Publisher: Foundation for the Rights of e peer reviewed journal Intergenerational selected by the editorial staff to complement the Future Generations (Stiftung für die Rechte Justice Review aims to improve our understand - articles.e authors of the articles have no influ- zukünftiger Generationen) ing of intergenerational justice and sustainable ence on the selection of these quotes. Citations Editor-in-Chief: Jörg Chet Tremmel development through pure and applied ethical from articles are permitted upon accurate Editorial staff: Hannah Taylor-Kensell, research. Quarterly published in English and quotation and submission of one sample of the Marisa dos Reis, Alessy Beaver, Patrick Wegner, German, the IGJR (ISSN 1617-1799) seeks incorporated citation to FRFG. All other rights Dan Sylvain articles representing the state of the art in are reserved. Layout: Angela Schmidt, OblaDesign philosophy, politics and law of intergenerational Print: LokayDruck, Königsberger Str. 3, relations. It is an open access journal that is pub - is project has been funded with support from 64354 Reinheim (www.lokay.de) lished on a professional level with an extensive the European Commission. is publication international readership. e editorial board reflects the views only of the editors, and the Editorial office address: comprises over 50 international experts from ten Commission cannot be held responsible for any Foundation for the Rights of Future countries, and representing eight disciplines. e use which may be made of the information Generations, (Stiftung für die Rechte IGJR is not only read by the scientific commu- contained therein. zukünftiger Generationen) nity but also by members of parliaments, Postfach 5115, 61422 Oberursel decision makers from the economy and persons Germany with a general interest in intergenerational Telephone: +49(0)6171-982367, justice. e internet version is free of charge, the fax: +49(0)6171-952566 printed version has an annual subscription cost Email: [email protected] of 25 Euros which has to be paid in advance. e Website: www.intergenerationaljustice.org cancellation period is three months until the end FRFG wholeheartedly thanks our EVS partici- of the year. For subscription, see last page. pants Hannah Taylor-Kensell, Dan Sylvain and Published contributions do not necessarily reflect Marisa dos Reis for their work as our editorial opinions of members or organs of FRFG. e staff members. Special thanks go to Alessy Beaver thematic quotes within the articles have been for proof-reading this journal.

Intergenerational Justice Review 159 Volume 9 · Issue 4/2009 JFG_09_11 14.12.09 10:24 Seite 160

Subscription Form Fax-No. +49 6171 952566

Foundation for the Rights FRFG, Postfach 5115, 61422 Oberursel, PVSt., DPAG, Entgelt bezahlt, D 54906 of Future Generations Postfach 5115 61422 Oberursel

Last Name First Name

Street Town/Postcode

Phone Fax

E-mail Date of Birth

Membership in other organisations, parties, NGOs etc.

Occupation (details voluntary)

I am particularly interested in the following (tick all that are applicable):

Philosophical eories of Intergenerational Justice Institutionalization of Intergenerational Justice

Ecological Policy Pension Policy

Finance Policy Labour Market Policy

Youth Policy Education Policy

Subscription of IGJR costs 25 Euro/Dollar p.a.

SRzG Account no. 803 9555 800 · GLS Bank eg (BLZ 430 609 67) IBAN: DE64430609678039555800 · BIC: GENODEM1GLS More information: [email protected] or http://www.intergenerationaljustice.org/ > Friends of FRFG ank you for your support!