BACKGROUNDER Military a Nalysis Andeducation for Civilian Leaders January 27, 2011

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BACKGROUNDER Military a Nalysis Andeducation for Civilian Leaders January 27, 2011 INSTITUTE FOR THE David Witter STUDY of WAR BACKGROUNDER Military A nalysis andEducation for Civilian Leaders January 27, 2011 UZbek militancy in Pakistan’S TRibal REGion The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) leader, had met with Taliban officials and al- has been active in the Pakistani tribal region Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan since late 2001, where it reconstituted after as early as 1997.1 While living in Kandahar in sustaining heavy losses fighting alongside the 1998, Yuldashev secured the Taliban’s approval Taliban during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. to set up a base of operations in Afghanistan. 2 After years of targeting the Pakistani military In November 1999, Juma Namangani, the other and pro-government tribal elders, the IMU is founding member of the IMU and the group’s now an increasingly active part of the insurgency military commander, led 600 IMU fighters into in Afghanistan and has recently planned Afghanistan from across the border in Tajikistan.3 terrorist attacks in Europe. This new strategic The IMU set up a training camp and several orientation—targeting coalition forces in political offices in Mazar-e Sharif, the capital of Afghanistan and civilians in Europe instead of the Afghanistan’s Balkh province, with the militants’ Pakistani security establishment—has made the families housed nearby in a former United Nations IMU a much more dangerous organization. refugee camp.4 This report will first provide a brief background In exchange for using Afghanistan as a safe haven on the IMU and its movement from Afghanistan to from which to launch attacks into Central Asia, the Pakistani tribal region, as well as its subsequent the IMU provided militants to the Taliban to fight entrenchment in South Waziristan. It will examine against Ahmed Shah Massoud and the Northern the IMU’s alliances and operations in both Alliance.5 The IMU, which numbered close to two South and North Waziristan, and document the thousand militants, fought alongside the Taliban splintering and movement of the group, as well against the Northern Alliance in several battles, as its evolving objectives. Finally, it will discuss including the siege of Taloqan.6 It was during this the consequences of these changes for security in time that the IMU came to the attention of the Afghanistan and in the West. United States government in August 2000, after it kidnapped four American mountain climbers on an expedition in Kyrgyzstan.7 Shortly thereafter, INITIAL IMU PRESENCE IN the U.S. government designated the IMU a AFGHANISTAN terrorist group, noting the IMU’s association with Osama bin Laden.8 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is a terrorist organization founded in 1998. Its original goal was The IMU maintained its alliance with the Taliban the overthrow of Uzbek President Islam Karimov after the September 11, 2001 attacks, and suffered and the creation of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. heavy casualties fighting the U.S. military in The IMU first appeared in Afghanistan in late Afghanistan in late 2001. Juma Namangani is 1999. Toher Yuldashev, one of the two original reported to have commanded a unit consisting founders of the IMU and the group’s spiritual of foreign fighters affiliated with the Taliban at WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 1 BackGRounDER | UZbek militancy in Pakistan’S TRibal REGion | DaVID witteR | januaRY 27, 2011 18 Kunduz in November 2001.9 Namangani was west of Wana. Local tribesmen were reported to killed that same month by a U.S. airstrike in have helped more than thirty IMU fighters escape 19 northern Afghanistan.10 Yuldashev, now the sole from the firefight. Five days later, Pakistani Army leader of the IMU, is believed to have led IMU officers made an agreement with a local tribal militants in the fight against the U.S. Army during jirga (council) to inform tribesmen of upcoming Operation Anaconda in the Shahikot Valley.11 U.S. operations against al-Qaeda fighters and their forces found few bodies after the battle, but it is affiliates, and to allow the tribesmen to expel the 20 believed that the IMU suffered heavy casualties.12 foreign fighters first. Animosity between the local Overall, it is unknown how many IMU militants tribesmen and the Pakistani military continued to were killed during the invasion, but it is estimated develop, however, after 2,500 Pakistani soldiers that the fighting reduced their numbers to between assaulted the village of Baghar, South Waziristan, 21 500 and 1,000.13 in October 2003. It was reported that thirty-one Pakistani soldiers, as well as seven foreign fighters, were killed in the firefight, with many more POST 2001: RETREAT INTO SOUTH militants escaping.22 WAZIRISTAN In early 2002, Yuldashev led the remaining 2002-2004: RECOVERY IN WAZIR fighters across the Pakistani border into the SANCTUARIES South Waziristan Agency, the largest agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).14 Between 2002 and 2004, reports of IMU activity To its north is the North Waziristan Agency, and are limited in the open source. The few instances to the west is Afghanistan’s Paktika province. of IMU activity outside of the Pakistani border South Waziristan has a rough topography that has region occurred in Kyrgyzstan, where the IMU contributed to the isolation and independence was blamed for two terrorist attacks. In December of its two main Pashtun tribes, the Ahmadzai 2002, an explosion at a market in the Kyrgyz 23 Wazirs and the Mehsuds. The Ahmadzai Wazirs capital city of Bishkek killed seven people. In May are primarily situated in the south, whereas the 2003, eight people were killed when an exchange 24 Mehsud tribe is positioned in the central and booth was bombed in Osh. There were also northern parts of South Waziristan.15 Several threats to the U.S. Embassy in Kyrgyzstan in 2003, Wazir clans agreed to host the Uzbek militants but it appears that the perpetrators were arrested in 25 under the principles of Pashtunwali, a set of social May 2003 before the attacks could be carried out. norms that includes hospitality to guests, known as There is little indication that these attacks were melmastia. During this time, Yuldashev is reported directed from the IMU central leadership in South to have become a popular speaker at local mosques, Waziristan. while many of his Uzbek followers bought land and Yet, it was during this time that the IMU became settled down in farming communities.16 further entrenched in South Waziristan during Under U.S. pressure, Pakistani President Pervez this time, though it was not particularly active. The Musharraf targeted the foreign fighters fleeing IMU was hosted by two clans within the Zalikhel Afghanistan in June 2002, when the Pakistani sub-tribe of the Ahmadzai Wazirs, the Yargulkhel military launched Operation al Mizan. The and the Kakakhel. The IMU’s initial contact was objective of this operation was “to kill or capture Nek Mohammad, a young Ahmadzai Wazir of militants—especially foreign militants—that the Yargulkhel clan and a Taliban commander in 26 threatened the Pakistani government. This meant South Waziristan. Mohammad joined the Taliban clearing notable portions of South Waziristan of in 1993 and had commanded a Taliban rearguard 27 foreign fighters.”17 On June 22, 2002, eleven against U.S. forces near Bagram Airbase in 2001. Pakistani soldiers and six IMU fighters were killed It is possible that Mohammad hosted the IMU as in a gun battle in Azam Warsak, a village six miles a result of time spent at Kargha, a training camp WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORGWWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG 2 BackGRounDER | UZbek militancy in Pakistan’S TRibal REGion | DaVID witteR | januaRY 27, 2011 near Kabul known for hosting foreign fighters.28 compensation awarded to those hosting the IMU While there, he met Saif Rahman Mansour, the fighters.34 deputy commander of the camp; Mansour is also thought to have commanded the Taliban forces in In addition to harboring the IMU, Mohammed the Shahikot Valley during Operation Anaconda, a and Nazir launched attacks against U.S. and battle in which the IMU participated.29 It is likely Pakistani military forces. Mohammad, assisted by that, given Mohammad and Mansour’s previous local commanders like Haji Omar, Haji Sharif, interaction and the latter’s experience with foreign and Maulvi Abbas, conducted cross border attacks 35 fighters, Mansour helped connect the IMU with on U.S. and Afghan units. Nazir had led raids Nek Mohammad when they arrived in Pakistan.30 into Afghanistan since late 2001, when he attacked Mohammad is reported to have been well-paid by an American base in Machadad and an Afghan 36 al-Qaeda for hosting the foreign militants in Wana, unit in Shkin, a village in Paktika province. Both and as a result rose to a position of prominence of these commanders also sanctioned attacks on within the Yargulkhel clan.31 Pakistani military personnel. In response to the Pakistani military operation in 2002, Mullah Nazir The Kakakhel clan, led by Maulvi Nazir, was also stated that he had “no choice other than to direct initially involved in protecting the foreign fighters. [his] weapons towards the Pakistani Government,” Maulvi Nazir, better known as Mullah Nazir, was becoming such a threat that he was high on the born in 1975 in Afghanistan’s Paktika province and Pakistani military’s most wanted list.37 Similarly, was educated in the central madrassa in Wana.32 Nek Mohammad gave orders in early 2004 to He joined the Taliban in 1996 and fought in at “treat the Pakistani soldiers as legitimate targets,” least eight different battles against the Northern following the latter’s military operations in the Alliance before returning to South Waziristan in region. 2001.33 Under Nazir’s leadership, Kakakhel tribe competed with the Yargulkhels for the financial KEY PLAYERS Juma Namangani – Co-founder and military leader of the IMU until his death in late 2001.
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