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Assessing the Progress of Pakistan's South Waziristan Offensive DECEMBER 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 12 the Moroccan government to initiate Al-Qa`ida has thus far not officially Assessing the Progress a similar process.37 In Mauritania, 23 commented on the LIFG revisions. imprisoned Islamist militants issued a According to Benotman, al-Zawahiri of Pakistan’s South statement in late November rejecting is maintaining a strategic silence Waziristan Offensive violence against the state.38 The because he does not want to draw more breakthroughs could further isolate al- attention to the document since he fears By Rahimullah Yusufzai Qa`ida in North Africa. the consequences.41 For al-Qa`ida, the revisions are even more problematic in october 2009, after approximately The LIFG peace process may also have because several of its top leaders four months of preparations, Pakistan’s had implications in the West. Despite operating out of the Afghanistan- armed forces launched a highly early opposition to the talks, the Pakistan border region are former anticipated ground offensive against approximately 30 LIFG members living members of the LIFG. For Abu Yahya Taliban militants in South Waziristan in the United Kingdom threw their al-Libi, currently al-Qa`ida’s chief Agency of the Federally Administered weight behind the shura council in July. propagandist, the rebuke from the LIFG Tribal Areas (FATA). The objectives of Their number included several senior was personal because his brother, `Abd the mission, called Rah-e-Nijat (Path members of the group and 12 individuals al-Wahhab Qa’id, is one of the authors. to Deliverance), are to clear the area of once subject to UK government “control Mid-level LIFG commander Tarek terrorists and militants and stabilize orders” because of their threat to Durman said that he expects Abu Yahya the region.1 The current offensive in national security. As a result of the to “not react to this event,” something South Waziristan marks the largest Libyan peace process, all but one of the which may weaken al-Qa`ida’s ability military operation to date in both FATA “control orders” were dropped.39 The to counter the LIFG’s arguments.42 and the North-West Frontier Province support for the peace process by UK- (NWFP). based leaders signals that al-Qa`ida Benotman predicts that al-Qa`ida will be has lost the battle to win the hearts and finished as a force in the Middle East and Pakistan’s government considers South minds of LIFG members worldwide.40 North Africa within the next half decade, Waziristan the primary source of in no small part because an increasingly recent terrorist violence targeting the critical mass of jihadists agrees with state. It alleges that 80% of terrorist the initiative taken by the LIFG: “We attacks in Pakistan have been organized are starting to see statements from the by militants from Tehrik-i-Taliban Islamic fighting groups themselves. Pakistan (TTP), a conglomeration of 37 “Jihadist Salafi Prisoners Value Reviews of Libyan They are supporting the idea. A couple Pakistani Taliban groups headquartered Islamic Group,” statement by Mohamed Abdel Wahhab years ago they were completely against in South Waziristan.2 Government Rafiki, September 30, 2009; Personal interview, Noman that…Now I hope we will start to see a officials finally came to the conclusion Benotman, December 2009. Not all Moroccan jihad- new era.”43 The Libyan revisions, said that it was essential to destroy the TTP ist prisoners have endorsed the revisions. On October Benotman, will “challenge terrorists for network, which is currently led by 20, 2009, the London-based Egyptian militant Hani al- a generation.”44 Hakimullah Mehsud.3 Siba`i posted a statement claiming that another Moroc- can prison faction opposed the revisions. Paul Cruickshank is a Fellow at the This article will offer an account of the 38 The Mauritanian prisoners appear to have been in- NYU Center on Law & Security and the offensive thus far, identify its successes fluenced by the Mauritanian cleric Muhammad Hasan Producer of “The Jihadi Code,” a recently and failures, and finally look at the Ould Dado, a key supporter of the LIFG revisions. See aired CNN documentary on the Libyan government’s strategy moving forward. “Imprisoned Mauritanian Salafis Reject Anti-State Vio- revisions. During the last two years, Mr. lence,” Middle East Media Research Institute, November Cruickshank and CNN Senior International The Offensive Begins 26, 2009. Correspondent Nic Robertson gained South Waziristan, spread over 2,419 39 Control orders are a British administrative measure exclusive access to the main players in the square kilometers of vast and rugged placing severe restrictions on the movement and com- peace process and this past summer filmed terrain, has been under the effective munications of individuals judged to pose a potential interviews with leading figures of the LIFG control of Pakistani Taliban militants threat to national security. Around a dozen individuals inside Abu Salim prison in Tripoli. since 2003-2004. As a result, Pakistan’s continue to be subject to them. Seven UK-based mem- government does not have credible bers of the LIFG had their control orders dropped after intelligence about the strength of local peace talks were initiated in Tripoli and four had orders and foreign militants based in the area. dropped against them after the revisions were published. British security services distributed copies of the revi- sions to these latter individuals because of their lack of 1 Amir Wasim, “Zardari Writes to NWFP Governor,” access to the internet. Personal interview, Libyan source, Dawn, December 1, 2009. November 2009; Duncan Gardham, “Terrorism Sus- 41 Personal interview, Noman Benotman, Washington, 2 Sajjad Shaukat, “Rationale Behind Waziristan Opera- pects Released from House Arrests after Peace Deal,” D.C., October 2009. tion,” Pakistan Observer, October 21, 2009; Khalid Qayum Daily Telegraph, November 13, 2009. 42 Personal interview, Tarek Durman, Abu Salim pris- and Farhan Sharif, “Bombing Kills 19 in Peshawar as 40 On November 3, 2007, al-Qa`ida released a video- on, Tripoli, Libya, September 2009. Pakistan Captures Taliban Bases,” Bloomberg, Novem- tape in which Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Laith al-Libi, 43 Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, CNN interview ber 19, 2009. a senior figure in the LIFG, announced that the LIFG had with Noman Benotman, 2009. 3 For a profile of Hakimullah Mehsud, see Mukhtar A. formally joined forces with al-Qa`ida, a clear play for the 44 Personal interview, Noman Benotman, December Khan, “A Profile of the TTP’s New Leader: Hakimullah hearts and minds of the group’s rank-and-file members. 2009. Mehsud,” CTC Sentinel 2:10 (2009). 8 DECEMBER 2009 . VOL 2 . ISSUE 12 Pakistan Army chief, General Ashfaq ground offensive followed three routes fighting in Pakistan were entrenched Parvez Kayani, once described the tribal into Mehsud territory. One route in Kaniguram, in particular Uzbek agency as an intelligence “black hole.”4 traveled northwest from the military militants affiliated with the Islamic At the start of the offensive, however, fort of Jandola to the TTP stronghold Movement of Uzbekistan. Although the one government official estimated that of Srarogha via Spinkai Raghzai and military insisted that Uzbek fighters approximately 1,500 foreign militants Kotkai.8 A second route traveled and other foreign militants resisted were hiding in South Waziristan, mixed northeast from Wana and Shakai toward the advancing soldiers, no arrests in with an estimated total of 10,000 Sarwekai onward to Kaniguram and were reported and no bodies were Taliban fighters.5 Ladha.9 The third route left the garrison displayed to members of the media who town of Razmak in North Waziristan were regularly flown in on military For weeks before the start of the ground Agency and headed south to one of the helicopters to survey the offensive. On offensive on October 17, the military major militant strongholds at Makeen.10 a few occasions, however, media teams softened the militants’ positions did report that rockets were fired at the through airstrikes from fighter jets and The November 3 fall of Srarogha, where troops, forcing the military to evacuate helicopter gunships, in addition to long- Baitullah Mehsud, the former head of television crews to safer locations. the TTP, signed his first peace accord with the government in February Overall, there is little evidence that “Overall, there is little 2005 marked a major setback for the heavy fighting occurred during the evidence that heavy TTP. It was in Srarogha that Baitullah entire operation because it appears spent most of his time plotting attacks, that most militants fled in the face of fighting occurred during convening meetings and speaking the government advance. Nevertheless, the entire operation to the media.11 Zangara, the village it was impossible for the media to where Baitullah was killed by a U.S. independently confirm both the military because it appears that aerial drone in August 2009, is also in and Taliban claims of casualties due to most militants fled in the the Srarogha area, as is his ancestral the lack of access to the conflict zone, village. Prior to Srarogha’s fall, the TTP disrupted lines of communication and face of the government also lost Kotkai, the village of current the dislocation of almost all of the advance.” TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud and civilian population from the area. his cousin, Qari Hussain, the latter of whom regularly trains suicide bombers Successes and Failures for TTP operations. On December 9, the Pakistan Army’s range artillery cannons. The airstrikes Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) played a crucial role in destroying the On November 4, the military announced released up-to-date figures on the militants’ resolve. Military officials that they had entered Ladha town, offensive’s successes.
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