Summary 7 (2017)
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
When Fear Is Substituted for Reason: European and Western Government Policies Regarding National Security 1789-1919
WHEN FEAR IS SUBSTITUTED FOR REASON: EUROPEAN AND WESTERN GOVERNMENT POLICIES REGARDING NATIONAL SECURITY 1789-1919 Norma Lisa Flores A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY December 2012 Committee: Dr. Beth Griech-Polelle, Advisor Dr. Mark Simon Graduate Faculty Representative Dr. Michael Brooks Dr. Geoff Howes Dr. Michael Jakobson © 2012 Norma Lisa Flores All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Dr. Beth Griech-Polelle, Advisor Although the twentieth century is perceived as the era of international wars and revolutions, the basis of these proceedings are actually rooted in the events of the nineteenth century. When anything that challenged the authority of the state – concepts based on enlightenment, immigration, or socialism – were deemed to be a threat to the status quo and immediately eliminated by way of legal restrictions. Once the façade of the Old World was completely severed following the Great War, nations in Europe and throughout the West started to revive various nineteenth century laws in an attempt to suppress the outbreak of radicalism that preceded the 1919 revolutions. What this dissertation offers is an extended understanding of how nineteenth century government policies toward radicalism fostered an environment of increased national security during Germany’s 1919 Spartacist Uprising and the 1919/1920 Palmer Raids in the United States. Using the French Revolution as a starting point, this study allows the reader the opportunity to put events like the 1848 revolutions, the rise of the First and Second Internationals, political fallouts, nineteenth century imperialism, nativism, Social Darwinism, and movements for self-government into a broader historical context. -
The Purpose of the First World War War Aims and Military Strategies Schriften Des Historischen Kollegs
The Purpose of the First World War War Aims and Military Strategies Schriften des Historischen Kollegs Herausgegeben von Andreas Wirsching Kolloquien 91 The Purpose of the First World War War Aims and Military Strategies Herausgegeben von Holger Afflerbach An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of libra- ries working with Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality books Open Access. More information about the initiative can be found at www.knowledgeunlatched.org Schriften des Historischen Kollegs herausgegeben von Andreas Wirsching in Verbindung mit Georg Brun, Peter Funke, Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, Martin Jehne, Susanne Lepsius, Helmut Neuhaus, Frank Rexroth, Martin Schulze Wessel, Willibald Steinmetz und Gerrit Walther Das Historische Kolleg fördert im Bereich der historisch orientierten Wissenschaften Gelehrte, die sich durch herausragende Leistungen in Forschung und Lehre ausgewiesen haben. Es vergibt zu diesem Zweck jährlich bis zu drei Forschungsstipendien und zwei Förderstipendien sowie alle drei Jahre den „Preis des Historischen Kollegs“. Die Forschungsstipendien, deren Verleihung zugleich eine Auszeichnung für die bisherigen Leis- tungen darstellt, sollen den berufenen Wissenschaftlern während eines Kollegjahres die Möglich- keit bieten, frei von anderen Verpflichtungen eine größere Arbeit abzuschließen. Professor Dr. Hol- ger Afflerbach (Leeds/UK) war – zusammen mit Professor Dr. Paul Nolte (Berlin), Dr. Martina Steber (London/UK) und Juniorprofessor Simon Wendt (Frankfurt am Main) – Stipendiat des Historischen Kollegs im Kollegjahr 2012/2013. Den Obliegenheiten der Stipendiaten gemäß hat Holger Afflerbach aus seinem Arbeitsbereich ein Kolloquium zum Thema „Der Sinn des Krieges. Politische Ziele und militärische Instrumente der kriegführenden Parteien von 1914–1918“ vom 21. -
When Diplomats Fail: Aostrian and Rossian Reporting from Belgrade, 1914
WHEN DIPLOMATS FAIL: AOSTRIAN AND ROSSIAN REPORTING FROM BELGRADE, 1914 Barbara Jelavich The mountain of books written on the origins of the First World War have produced no agreement on the basic causes of this European tragedy. Their division of opinion reflects the situation that existed in June and July 1914, when the principal statesmen involved judged the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Habsburg throne, and its consequences from radically different perspectives. Their basic misunderstanding of the interests and viewpoints 'of the opposing sides contributed strongly to the initiation of hostilities. The purpose of this paper is to emphasize the importance of diplomatic reporting, particularly in the century before 1914 when ambassadors were men of influence and when their dispatches were read by those who made the final decisions in foreign policy. European diplomats often held strong opinions and were sometimes influenced by passions and. prejudices, but nevertheless throughout the century their activities contributed to assuring that this period would, with obvious exceptions, be an era of peace in continental affairs. In major crises the crucial decisions are always made by a very limited number of people no matter what the political system. Usually a head of state -- whether king, emperor, dictator, or president, together with those whom he chooses to consult, or a strong political leader with his advisers- -decides on the course of action. Obviously, in times of international tension these men need accurate information not only from their military staffs on the state of their and their opponent's armed forces and the strategic position of the country, but also expert reporting from their representatives abroad on the exact issues at stake and the attitudes of the other governments, including their immediate concerns and their historical background. -
The Problem of War Aims and the Treaty of Versailles Callaghan, JT
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by University of Salford Institutional Repository The problem of war aims and the Treaty of Versailles Callaghan, JT Titl e The problem of war aims and the Treaty of Versailles Aut h or s Callaghan, JT Typ e Book Section URL This version is available at: http://usir.salford.ac.uk/id/eprint/46240/ Published Date 2 0 1 8 USIR is a digital collection of the research output of the University of Salford. Where copyright permits, full text material held in the repository is made freely available online and can be read, downloaded and copied for non- commercial private study or research purposes. Please check the manuscript for any further copyright restrictions. For more information, including our policy and submission procedure, please contact the Repository Team at: [email protected] . 13 The problem of war aims and the Treaty of Versailles John Callaghan Why did Britain go to war in 1914? The answer that generated popular approval concerned the defence of Belgian neutrality, defiled by German invasion in the execution of the Schlieffen Plan. Less appealing, and therefore less invoked for public consumption, but broadly consistent with this promoted justification, was Britain’s long-standing interest in maintaining a balance of power on the continent, which a German victory would not only disrupt, according to Foreign Office officials, but replace with a ‘political dictatorship’ inimical to political freedom.1 Yet only 6 days before the British declaration of war, on 30 July, the chairman of the Liberal Foreign Affairs Group, Arthur Ponsonby, informed Prime Minister Asquith that ‘nine tenths of the [Liberal] party’ supported neutrality. -
Conrad Von Hötzendorf and the “Smoking Gun”: a Biographical Examination of Responsibility and Traditions of Violence Against Civilians in the Habsburg Army 55
1914: Austria-Hungary, the Origins, and the First Year of World War I Günter Bischof, Ferdinand Karlhofer (Eds.) Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. (Guest Editor) CONTEMPORARY AUSTRIAN STUDIES | VOLUME 23 uno press innsbruck university press Copyright © 2014 by University of New Orleans Press, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to UNO Press, University of New Orleans, LA 138, 2000 Lakeshore Drive. New Orleans, LA, 70119, USA. www.unopress.org. Printed in the United States of America Design by Allison Reu Cover photo: “In enemy position on the Piave levy” (Italy), June 18, 1918 WK1/ALB079/23142, Photo Kriegsvermessung 5, K.u.k. Kriegspressequartier, Lichtbildstelle Vienna Cover photo used with permission from the Austrian National Library – Picture Archives and Graphics Department, Vienna Published in the United States by Published and distributed in Europe University of New Orleans Press by Innsbruck University Press ISBN: 9781608010264 ISBN: 9783902936356 uno press Contemporary Austrian Studies Sponsored by the University of New Orleans and Universität Innsbruck Editors Günter Bischof, CenterAustria, University of New Orleans Ferdinand Karlhofer, Universität Innsbruck Assistant Editor Markus Habermann -
B33310154.Pdf
L 9fc 31 PISL-14 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA SOM S-6S DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION STATE LIBRARY HARRIS BURH In case of failure to return the books the borrower agrees to pay the original price of the same, or to replace them with other copies. The last borrower is held responsible for any mutilation. Return this book on or before the last date stamped below. Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2014 https://archive.org/details/july1400emil JULY '14 By EMIL LUDWIG Author of "Goethe," "WilheSm HoherjzolJe™," etc. Translated from the German by C. A. MACARTNEY " <5A man need not have been a "Bismarck to prevent this most idiotic of all wars." BALLIN With 16 Illustrations NEW YORK : LONDON G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS JULY '14 ^> Copyright, 1929 by G. P. Putnam's Sons First Printing, Nov., 1929 Second " Nov., 1929 Third " Jan., 1930 e in the United States of America To Our Sons—In Warning 234821 The thanks of the Translator and the Publishers are due to Dr. J. F. Muirhead for reading the translation both in typescript and in proof and for making very many valuable suggestions. FOREWORD THE war-guilt belongs to all Europe; re- searches in every country have proved this. Germany's exclusive guilt or Germany's innocence are fairy-tales for children on both sides of the Rhine. What country wanted the war? Let us put a different question: What circles in every country wanted, facilitated, or began the war? If, instead of a horizontal section through Europe, we take a vertical section through society, we find that the sum of guilt was in the Cabinets, the sum of innocence in the streets of Europe. -
Grandi Battaglie
LLAA BBAATTTTAAGGLLIIAA DDII LLEEOOPPOOLLII 23 agosto – 11 settembre 1914 Dalla Sesta alla Decima Parte Premessa La città di Leopoli si trova oggi in Ucraina (ex-regione dell’URSS ed oggi Stato indipendente) sotto il nome di L’viv. Conta circa 800 mila abitanti. Fondata nel 1256 dal Principe Daniele Romanov, ricevette in dote il nome di Lev (toponimo derivante dal nome del figlio). Teatro di vari scontri, zona contesa dalle potenze continentali, fece parte dell’Impero Austriaco e quindi dell’Unione Sovietica. Vanta un centro storico di tutto rispetto (è patrimonio dell’umanità dell’UNESCO) con edifici di stile composito e fra lo stile rinascimentale e il barocco. Una panoramica di L’viv (l’antica Leopoli) 1 Il centro di L’viv Il Fronte Orientale nel 1914 2 L’Ucraina, oggi Dallo spaccato si deduce che L’viv (Leopoli) si trova nella parte occidentale dell’Ucraina, dove si svolse la celebre Battaglia dell’agosto-settembre 1914 3 Sesta Parte LA STRATEGIA D’ATTACCO AUSTROUNGARICA L’Austria-Ungheria e la Germania hanno stipulato un’alleanza solida, in cui l’Italia rappresenta se non un terzo incomodo nelle “calde nozze”, certamente un elemento infido da tenere sotto stretto controllo, soprattutto per i precedenti non remoti delle Guerre d’Indipendenza, ma anche per le rivendicazioni concernenti le regioni italiane irredente. Della dissonanza italiana all’interno della Triplice sono consapevoli sia la Germania, sia l’Austria-Ungheria. Guglielmo II non manca di lanciare strali polemici contro l’Italia, che aveva aderito all’Alleanza per sfuggire allo spettro dell’isolamento internazionale, cui l’avevano condannata una politica ambigua e le mire espansionistiche che si erano manifestate negli appetiti “colonialistici” in terra d’Africa. -
Experimental Game for the July Crisis of 1914 Author: Heidi Ahlers
Experimental game for the July Crisis of 1914 Author: Heidi Ahlers Content The school students are assigned the task of using peaceful means to resolve the international crisis of July, 1914 and thus of preventing the onset of World War I. The historical circumstances at the end of June, 1914, and the assassination of the two Austrian-Hungarian heirs to the throne in Sarajevo are the starting point. The school students should recognise in the subsequent comparison of the historical and actual decision-making processes which political decisions led to the failure of the historical crisis management. Subjects: History, political science Age group: 14-18 years Level: advanced Duration : approx. 1 school year Tools to be used : TwinSpace, presentation software, videos, photos and drawings, forum, video conference 2 The following country roles are to be assigned: German Reich, Austria-Hungary; France; Great Britain; Russia; Italy; Serbia; (Turkey, Ottoman Empire) Either each participating school shall assume one country role or several roles shall be assigned to one school. Individual roles can be defined within the country groups, and namely: 1st Position: Head of State 2nd Position: Foreign Minister 3rd Position: Minister of Defence 4th Position: Minister of Economics The Head of State is authorized to give instructions when differences of opinion occur inside the groups, but can be dismissed as Head of State with the majority vote of the group members. Educational goals The school students deal with the political situation in Europe in 1914 in an experimental game. The students recognise that political decisions are made on the basis of national interests. -
Russian Origins of the First World War
The Russian Origins of the First World War The Russian Origins of the First World War Sean McMeekin The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts • London, Eng land 2011 Copyright © 2011 by Sean McMeekin All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in- Publication Data McMeekin, Sean, 1974– The Russian origins of the First World War / Sean McMeekin. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-674-06210-8 (alk. paper) 1. World War, 1914–1918—Causes. 2. World War, 1914–1918—Russia. 3. Russia—Foreign relations—1894–1917. 4. Imperialism—History— 20th century. 5. World War, 1914–1918—Campaigns—Eastern Front. 6. World War, 1914–1918—Campaigns—Middle East. I. Title. D514.M35 2011 940.3'11—dc23 2011031427 For Ayla Contents Abbreviations ix Author’s Note xi Introduction: History from the Deep Freeze 1 1. The Strategic Imperative in 1914 6 2. It Takes Two to Tango: The July Crisis 41 3. Russia’s War: The Opening Round 76 4. Turkey’s Turn 98 5. The Russians and Gallipoli 115 6. Russia and the Armenians 141 7. The Russians in Persia 175 8. Partitioning the Ottoman Empire 194 9. 1917: The Tsarist Empire at Its Zenith 214 Conclusion: The October Revolution and Historical Amnesia 234 Notes 245 Bibliography 289 Acknowledgments 303 Index 307 Maps The Russian Empire on the Eve of World War I 8 The Polish Salient 18 The Peacetime Deployment of Russia’s Army Corps 20 The Initial Mobilization Pattern on the Eastern Front 83 Russian Claims on Austrian and German Territory 91 “The Straits,” and Russian Claims on Them 132 Russia and the Armenians 167 Persia and the Caucasian Front 187 The Partition of the Ottoman Empire 206 The Eastern Front 219 Abbreviations ATASE Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Arşivi (Archive of the Turkish Gen- eral Staff). -
Paul Miller-Melamed +1 410-857-2441 (Office) [email protected] Mcdaniel COLLEGE (USA)
2 College Hill Westminster, MD 21157 +1 443-534-5646 (mobile) Paul Miller-Melamed +1 410-857-2441 (office) [email protected] McDANIEL COLLEGE (USA) https://pagesbypablo.com EDUCATION Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D., History (May 1990/1992/1995) Oral Exam Fields: France (1815–Present), Germany (1848–Present), the American West Dissertation: “From Revolutionaries to Citizens: Antimilitarism in France, 1870–1914” Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, USA B.S., B.A. summa cum laude, Zoology, History (May 1987, 1989) Honors College (courses and scholarship); College of Liberal Arts and Sciences Achievement Award; History Dept Outstanding Undergraduate Award; Kertzer Memorial Scholarship; Phi Beta Kappa LANGUAGES Speaking/Reading proficiency Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian (BCS), Latin & Cyrillic alphabets (good) German (good); French (good); Spanish (fair) ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT — TEACHING (syllabi available upon request) Associate Professor of History, McDaniel College, Westminster, MD, USA (1998–) History & Memory (interdisciplinary faculty seminar) The First World War in History and Memory (seminar) Fathoming Evil: Genocide in the Modern World (lecture/discussion; global citizenship) Women in Modern Europe: Sex, Society, and Stereotypes (seminar) Cataclysm: Europe on the Eve of World War I (seminar) France: Ordinary People in the Modern World, 1871–Present (lecture/discussion) Modern Germany, 1848–Present (lecture/discussion) The Third Reich (interdisciplinary faculty seminar) The Holocaust (lecture/discussion); -
The July Crisis: Can You Stop the Great War? Grade 10 Lesson
DOCUMENT RESUME ED 457 056 SO 031 497 AUTHOR Antilla, Madeline TITLE The July Crisis: Can You Stop the Great War? Grade 10 Lesson. Schools of California Online Resources for Education (SCORE): Connecting California's Classrooms to the World. INSTITUTION San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools, CA. PUB DATE 1999-00-00 NOTE 19p. AVAILABLE FROM Schools of California Online Resources for Education, San Bernardino County Superintendent of Schools, 601 North East Street, San Bernardino, CA 92410-3093. E-mail: [email protected]; Web site: http://score.rims.k12.ca.us. PUB TYPE Guides Classroom Teacher (052) EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS Cooperative Learning; Curriculum Enrichment; *European History; Foreign Countries; Grade 10; High Schools; Interdisciplinary Approach; *International Relations; Internet; Role Playing; Simulation; Social Studies; Standards; Student Research; *World War I IDENTIFIERS Conflict Analysis; Europe; Historical Explanation ABSTRACT On June 28, 1914, while visiting Sarajevo in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian empire, was assassinated. The Austrian government blamed Serbia for harboring terrorists and sent the Serbian government an ultimatum with which that country found it impossible to comply. This set in motion a series of alliances. During the month of July, European diplomats debated whether to engage in a war to obtain certain long-sought goals and to justify a huge military buildup. By the end of July all of Europe was poised on the edge of war. In this lesson plan, students, acting as diplomats for the countries involved in the origins of World War I, read and respond to a telegram of July 30, 1914, from Belgium urging the interested countries to avoid war. -
Why 1914 but Not Before? a Comparative Study of the July Crisis and Its Precursors
SECURITY STUDIES https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.1915584 Why 1914 but Not Before? A Comparative Study of the July Crisis and Its Precursors Jack S. Levy and William Mulligan ABSTRACT Why did the July 1914 crisis—but not crises in 1905, 1908–9, 1911, and 1912–13—escalate to great-power war despite occurring under similar international and domestic conditions? Explanations based on underlying and slowly changing struc- tural, social, or cultural variables cannot answer this question. Examining three Balkan crises of 1912–13 and the July Crisis, we refine realist explanations based on power, alliances, and reputational interests by incorporating the impact of changing power distributions and alliances in the Balkans on the great-power security system. A more complete answer to the why-1914-but-not-before question, however, requires the incorporation of Franz Ferdinand’s assassination, which went beyond a pretext for war. It eliminated the most powerful and effective proponent for peace in Vienna and fundamentally changed the nature of the decision-making process in Austria- Hungary. Counterfactually, we argue that a hypothetical crisis with Franz Ferdinand present would probably have ended differently. After a century of debate about the causes of World War I and after new research motivated by the centenary of the war, scholars remain deeply div- ided on the war’s origins.1 Many suggest that some combination of under- lying structural causes, social forces, and cultural attitudes destabilized the European system, making a great-power war highly likely or even inevit- able.2 Lists of long-term causes include hegemonic ambition and the Jack S.