11 numb. 377 443^

SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette Of TUESDAY, the yd SEPTEMBER, 1946 by

Registered as a newspaper

WEDNESDAY, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 The War Office, September, 1946 OPERATIONS IN NORTH-WEST EUROPE FROM 6ra JUNE, 1944, TO 5TH MAY, 1945. The following despatch was submitted to the operation to secure a lodgement on the Con- Secretary of State for War on ist June, 1946, tinent from which further offensive operations by Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery could 'be developed. of Alamein, G.C.B., D.S.O. The troops under my .operational control I'arrived in England on 2nd January, 1944, comprised 21 Army Group and First United after handing over command of the Eighth States Army (General Omar N. Bradley). Army, and immediately started a detailed 21 Army Group comprised First Canadian study of the plans for the assault of the Con- Army (Lieutenant-General Crerar), Second tinent—Operation OVERLORD. British Army (Lieutenant-General Dempsey), The Commander-in-Chief of -the Allied Naval the British Airborne Troops (Lieutenant- Expeditionary Force was Admiral Sir Bertram General Browning), and various Allied con- Ramsay and of the Allied Expeditionary Air tingents. Attached to First United States Army Force, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh- were the American 82 and 101 Airborne Divi- Mallory. There was no parallel appointment sions. of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied land Ninth United States Air Force planned with forces, but General Eisenhower decided that First United States Army, while Second British I should act in that capacity for the assault, Army worked with Second Tactical Air Force, and subsequently until the stage was reached R.A.F. in the development of our operations when a complete American Army Group could be de- THE PLAN. ployed on the Continent. No definite period The intention was to assault, simultaneously, was stipulated for this, but Headquarters beaches on the Normandy coast immediately Twelfth United States Army Group were formed North of the Carentan estuary and between in London and prepared to take command of the Carentan estuary and the R. Orne, with First and Third United States Armies at the the object of securing, as a base for further appropriate time. This Army Group, when operations, a lodgement area: which was to formed, remained under any operational con- include airfield sites and the port of Cher- trol .until ist September: when the Supreme bourg. The left or Eastern flank of the lodge- Commander took over direct control * of the ment area was to include the road centre of land battle. Caen. The assault was an operation requiring a Once ashore and firmly established, my single co-ordinated plan of action under one plan was to threaten to break out on the commander; I Jtherefore became the overall Eastern flank—that is in the Caen sector; by land force commander responsible to the this threat to draw the main enemy reserves Supreme Commander for planning and execut- into that sector, to fight them there and keep ing the military aspect of the assault and sub- them there, using the British and Canadian sequent capture of the lodgement area. armies for the purpose. Having got the main In the initial stages, the object of Operation enemy reserves committed on the Eastern flank- OVERLORD was to mount and carry out an my plan was to make the breakout on the 4432 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, igf Western flank, using for this task the American to command them in battle. This system lafe) armies under General Bradley, and pivoting led to some confusion in the handling of tiu on Caen; this attack was to be delivered South- enemy armour. wards down to the Loire and then to proceed These Army Groups at D Day comprises Eastwards in a wide sweep up to the Seine some sixty divisions, or about one quarter o: about Paris. This would cut off all the enemy the field force of the German army. From th< forces South of the Seine, over which river end of 1943 their strength was conserved, anc the bridges were to -be destroyed by air action. even increased in anticipation of the Secon« This general plan was given out by me to the Front, and in spite of losses in Italy and Russia General Officers of the field armies in London The only formation which left the theatre i on the yth April, 1944. The operations 1944 was an S.S. Corps, which was despatch© developed in June, July and August exactly to Russia in April, but returned to Normand; as planned; I had given D + 90 as a target within two months. date for being lined up on the Seine; actually There was considerable variation in tt the first crossing of the river was made on quality of the German divisions in the wes D+75- The equipment, training and morale of tt The Normandy beaches were selected because S.S. and Panzer divisions was of the highei they offered a better shelter for shipping and order; the infantry formations varied from kr were less heavily defended than other possible quality static co'ast defence troops to full; beach areas along the Channel coast. They established field formations of normal Germa satisfied the minimum requirements of the Air type. Forces, in terms of then- distance from home For several years the 'Germans had bee bases, for the provision of air cover. developing the coastal defence organisatio The absence of major ports was overcome which was known collectively as the Atlanti by the gigantic engineering feat of constructing Wall. The enemy assumed that an invade two artificial ports in the United Kingdom; would have to secure a port either in the initiz these were towed across the Channel in sec- assault or very quickly afterwards, in order t tions and erected, one in the United States land the heaviest types of equipment an sector and one in the British sector. In spite organise maintenance and supply. Port area of considerable damage during the unprece- were therefore given first priority for defence dented June gale, the port at Arromanches and by 1944 had become virtually impregnabl in particular proved a great success. to seaward assault. After the ports, attentio: The invasion operations may be said to have was turned to the Pas de Calais, which borderei begun with the action of the Air Forces. The the narrowest part of the Channel and wa first stage was the gaining of air superiority," considered the most likely area we would choos an essential preliminary always to all major for the assault. offensive operations. This task was admirably Elsewhere defences were on a less organise* accomplished. As D Day drew nearer, attacks scale, for by the beginning of 1944 the enenr were delivered 'against, coast defences' along had not had the resources or transport to pu the whole length of the Atlantic Wall. the whole coast line in a uniform state o Meanwhile, prevention of enemy air reconnais- defence. From March, 1944, however, the* sance during the period of concentration of the was a most noticeable intensification of tin invasion forces was 'highly successful, and defences in Normandy: following a tour o contributed towards the gaining of tactical sur- inspection by Rommel. prise. The coastal defence of the Baie de la Seine Combined naval and air operations were in- was based on a system of linear defences tensified against E-boats and U-boats as the arranged in strong points which were manned great day approached. chiefly by static coastal troops of low category The gun positions and localities were protected The Enemy Situation. by concrete and armour from naval gunfire The German commander in France and the and air attack; extensive use had been made Low Countries was Field-Marshal von of minefields, wire entanglements, and othei Rundstedt; his title was Commander-in-Chief obstacles to strengthen the layout. Extensive West. Under his command were two Army flooding of the low-lying areas in the coastal Groups: the larger comprising .more than two- belt had been effected, particularly in the thirds of the operational troops available, was marshy country round the Carentan estuary. Army Group " B ", commanded by Field- Existing sea walls had been strengthened and Marshal Rommel, which consisted of Seventh prolonged to form anti-tank obstacles behind Army (Normandy and Brittany), Fifteenth the beaches, which themselves were extensively Army (Pas de Calais and Flanders), and mined. On the beaches, and extending ovei 88 Corps (Holland). Rommel was appointed varying distances below high water mark, were to this command in February, 1944, at the belts of under-water obstacles, the purpose ol direct instance of Hitler. It was his first opera- which was to halt and impale landing craft and tional command since he had left Tunisia to destroy or cripple them by means of explo- nearly a year previously. sive charges attached to the individual obstacles, Army Group " G ", commanded by types of under-water obstacles included " Ele- Blaskowitz, had the First and Nineteenth ment ' C ' " with Tellermines on the forward Armies, stationed on the Biscay coast and in face, the ramp type wooden obstacle with Teller- the Riviera respectively. mines on the top of the ramp, wooden post? There was a third headquarters in France of with Tellermines attached, steel hedgehogs an< Army Group status, called Panzer Group steel tetrahedra. West: tinder General Schweppenburg. It was The enemy artillery defence consisted of lonj responsible for the administration and training range coast artillery and field artillery. Th< of the Panzer formations while they former was 'sited well forward, covering in par- were operationally under command of the ticular the entrances to Cherbourg, th* rther Army Groups. It was originally intended Carentan estuary and the Seine. Heavy gui SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 4433 batteries located in "the Cherbourg area and estimated that the enemy could concentrate up round Le Havre almost overlapped in range, to twenty divisions (including eight Panzer and presented the gravest danger to the divisions), in the Normandy area by D + 6. approach of all large vessels to the transport This contrasted with the previous estimates of area off the Normandy beaches. Behind the twelve divisions. By D + 20, under the worst coast artillery, some two or three miles inland, conditions for ourselves, we might expect oppo- field and medium artillery units of the divisions sition from some twenty-five to thirty diviv occupying the coastal sectors were sited; the sions, of which nine or ten would be armoured task of these guns was to bring fire to bear on formations. It was necessary to- anticipate the craft approaching the beaches and'on to the possibility of the enemy having up to fifty beaches themselves. In all there were some divisions in action by D + 60. thirty-two located battery positions capable of It was appreciated that the Germans would firing on the assault beach areas. be alerted in the NEPTUNE area on the night After Rommel's inspection there was an D-i as our seaborne forces approached the acceleration in the construction of under-water Normandy coast, and that by the end of D Day obstacles, and these were developed at increas- the enemy would himself have appreciated that ing distances below high water mark; the OVERLORD was a major operation delivered number of coastal batteries increased and the in strength. In accordance with his expected construction of casemates and overhead cover policy-of defeating us on the beaches, it was was undertaken on a wider scale. Flooding probable that he would summon initially the became more extensive. Anti-air-landing nearest available armoured and motorised divi- obstacles commenced to appear on our air sions to oppose us, and that in the first stages photographs in the most suitable dropping and we should have to meet immediate counter landing areas; they consisted of vertical poles attacks designed to push us back into the sea. and stakes, and in some cases were fitted with Having failed in this purpose it was appre- booby traps. ciated that the enemy would concentrate his Rommel and von Rundstedt were not in forces for major co-ordinated counter attacks agreement on the manner in which invading in selected areas; these might develop about forces 'should be dealt with. Rommel, who D + 4 or D + 5, by when it was estimated that was no strategist, favoured a plan for the total he might have in action against us some six repulse of an invader on the beaches; his theory Panzer divisions. By D + 8 it was reasonable was to 'aim at halting the hostile forces in the to suppose that, having failed to dislodge us immediate beach area by concentrating a great from the beaches, the enemy would begin to volume of fire on the beaches themselves and to adopt a policy of attempting to cordon off our seaward of them; he advocated thickening up forces and prevent expansion of the bridgehead. the 'beach defences, and the positioning of all For this he would require to bring up infantry available reserves near the coast. Von in order to relieve his armoured formations, Rundstedt, on the other hand, favoured the which would then be concentrated for a full- " crust-cushion-ihammer " plan; this implied out counter-stroke. It was tor be expected, a " crust " of infantry manning the coast line, then, that there would be an initial concentra- with a " cushion " of infantry divisions in tion against the bridgehead of armoured and tactical reserve in close in rear, and a motorised divisions, followed by the arrival of " hammer " of armoured forces in strategic infantry formations. reserve further inland. The cushion was There were encouraging factors in the Intelli- designed to contain enemy forces which pene- gence appreciations in April and May. Whereas trated the crust, and the hammer was available in January, 1944, it had been appreciated that for launching decisive counter attacks as re- within two months of the start of OVERLORD quired. These differing theories led to a com- the enemy would be able to move as many as promise; the armoured reserves were generally 15 divisions into Western Europe from other kept well back, but the majority of the infantry theatres, the corresponding estimate in April divisions was committed to strengthening the was six: as a result of 'the mounting successes crust. The result was that, in the event, the of the Soviet forces on the Eastern Front and Panzer divisions were forced to engage us pre- of events in Italy. By D Day the Allies had maturely and were unable to concentrate to captured Rome and Kesselring's forces hi Italy deliver a co-ordinated blow: until it was too were in retreat, while in Russia the Crimea late. had been cleared and the Germans were ner- In the NEPTUNE sector it was anticipated vously predicting an all-out Russian offensive. that the enemy garrison would consist of three Identifications on the Eastern Front and in coast defence divisions supported by four re- Italy received in the immediate pre-D Day serve divisions, of which one was of the Panzer period gave an increasingly encouraging picture type. In the last weeks before D Day, how- of absorption of German armour on fronts other ever, there were indications that some redistri- than our own. bution of enemy forces was taking place in France, but in the event the appreciation of Topography. the resistance proved substantially correct. The inundations behind the selected beach The. estimated rate of enemy build-up and areas, and particularly in the Varreville sector the probable..development of his defensive at the base of the Cotentin peninsula, created strategy were constantly reviewed during the a grave problem in ensuring the creation of planning period. The, speed .of concentration adequate exits from the beach areas to the of enemy reserves was largely dependent on the hinterland. In the Varreville sector it was of success of our air operations designed to reduce the utmost importance for us to secure the 9 his mobility, together with the effect of sabotage causeways across the flooded areas if we were * activities of the French'Resistance organisation. to, avoid being pinned by relatively .minor Events showed that a degree of 'success was 'enemy forces to the very narrow beach strip. achieved in this direction, far greater than In the yierville-Caen sector beach exits tended hoped. At this stage of the planning, it was to canalize through small coastal villages, which A 2 4434 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 were in a state of defence and had been pro- which were essential for the operation of rail- vided with extensive obstacles and which would ways in northern and western France, the Low require speedy clearance by our assaulting Countries and western Germany. In full opera- troops. The system of water lines, inundations tion iby D-6o, the programme brought attacks and marshes "behind the Carentan estuary was closer to the NEPTUNE area as time grew extensive and there were few available routes shorter, and the result was a shortage of loco- crossing these 'barriers; the seizure of these motives and stock, repair facilities, and coal routes intact was of the utmost importance. over a wide area, while 74 bridges and tunnels The hinterland behind the beaches generally on routes leading to the battle area were im- favoured defensive tactics and was on the whole passable on D Day. Reports on 7 June unsuitable for the deployment of armoured showed that all railway bridges over the Seine forces. between Paris and the sea were impassable, Apart from the open rolling plain to the and also one of those on the lower section of south-east of Caen, the area was covered to a the Loire. Road bridges were also attacked depth of up to 40 miles inland by " ibocage " with most successful results; the 13 bridges —pasture land divided by unusually high ibetween Paris and the Channel, and the five hedges, banks and ditches into many small main road bridges between Orleans and Nantes, fields and meadows. In such conditions, were either destroyed or damaged. observation was extremely limited, and move- Attacks prior to D Day on coast defence ment off the road defiles was very restricted: batteries in the NEPTUNE area were worked not only for wheeled transport, but often for into an overall plan of action against the whole tanks. On the other hand it was ideal infantry length of the assault coast, in order to mislead country; there was excellent concealment for the enemy about our intentions. These opera- snipers and patrols, while defensive positions tions retarded the construction of overhead dug into the -banks were well protected from cover for major batteries covering the Baie ianks and artillery. de la Seine, and at the same time served to The Normandy highlands ran from south-east increase the enemy's fears that it was intending to north-west across the assualt frontage, at a to assault in the Pas de Calais: astride Cap depth of up to 25 miles inland. The country Gris Nez. This was a matter of first import- was broken and irregular in parts, with steep ance in our plans. hills and narrow valleys. The dominating Preliminary naval operations included sweeps feature of the northern ridge was Mont Pingon, against enemy U-boats, R-boats and E-tooats, some 18 miles south-west of Caen. and minelaying designed to afford protection to the sea passage across the Channel. Preliminary Operations. In the broad strategic sense, preparations for The Assault. the assault of north-west Europe 'began at sea My plan of assault, as approved by the and in the air many months before D Day. Supreme Commander, provided for simultane- Winning 'the Battle of the Atlantic was essential ous landings by eight equivalent brigades—of .to ensure the passage of the vast volume of which three were British and' two were personnel and stores from America and Canada Canadian brigades, and three were American to the battle front. The strategic ah- offensive combat teams. With the assaulting brigades, gainst Germany had a vital effect on the war two battalions of U.S. Rangers and portions of by strangling the whole economic structure of two British Commando Brigades took part. .the country. The Americans assaulted on the right flank as An essential preliminary to the assault was they would ultimately require direct entry of the reduction of the German Air Force to the personnel and stores from the Atlantic. degree required to ensure mastery in the air Airborne forces were used on both flanks. over our seaborne forces in the Channel, and On the right, 82 and 101 U.S. Airborne Divi- over the beaches on the assault coast. The sions dropped at the base of the Cotentin Penin- next army requirement was the interdiction of sula to assist in capturing the beaches and rail and road communications, with the object isolating Cherbourg. 6 British Airborne Divi- of delaying the movement of enemy troops and sion was given the task of seizing the crossings supplies to the battle area. It was desirous also over the Caen Canal and of operating on our to mislead the enemy about the sector selected extreme left. for the assault, and, lastly, to pave the way First United States Army was to assault •for our actual landing operation 'by pre-D Day astride the Carentan estuary with one regi- air attacks against coast defences and instal- mental combat team between Varreville and lations. Other preliminary air tasks of direct the estuary (Utah beach), and two regimental importance to the army were the flying of combat teams between Vierville and Colleville •reconnaissance missions over a wide area, and (Omaha beach). The initial tasks were to the prevention of enemy reconnaissance over capture Cherbourg as quickly as possible, and •our centres of concentration and embarkation. to develop operations southwards towards So admirably were these commitments St. L6 in conformity with the advance of rcanied out by the Air Forces that we were Second British Army. afforded immunity from enemy air recon- Second British Army assault was to be de- naissance during the vital period, a factor of livered with five brigades between Asnelles and •first importance in the design for achieving Ouistreham (Gold, Juno and Sword beaches), tactical surprise in our assault operation; more- with the intial tasks of developing the bridge- over, there were only one or two attacks by head south of the line St. L6—Caen and south- •the German Air Force on the assault forces east of Caen, in order to secure airfield sites during the sea passage or at any time on the and to protect the eastern flank of First United •beaches during D Day. States Army while the latter was capturing The interdiction of rail communications was Cherbourg. •.effected as a result of a detailed plan for During the night preceding D Day, while ^destroying the servicing and repair facilities the naval assault forces made the sea passage, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 4435 the programme of intensive air action against also affected -the decision on the tidal conditions the enemy defences was to begin with opera- required at the time of commencing the assault, tions by Bomber Command, while airborne because no extensive clearance could take place forces were to be dropped on the flanks of the whilst they were covered by the tide. assault area. At H Hour, supported by naval bombardment and air action, and by the guns, The Joint Fire Plan. rockets and mortars of close support craft, the The purpose of the Joint Fire Plan was to- leading wave of troops was to disembark and allocate tasks to the resources of the three force its way ashore. Services, with the object of assisting the Army The total initial lift in the assault and follow- to get ashore. The chief requirements were to up naval forces was of the order of 130,000 destroy or neutralise the enemy coast artillery personnel and 20,000 vehicles, all of which batteries which might interfere with the were to be landed on the first three tides. In approach of the naval convoys or bring fire addition to the, basic eight assaulting brigades/ to bear on the anchorages, and to neutralise the regimental combat teams, a variety of attached enemy strong points and defended localities troops were required in the assault including that were sited for the immediate defence of special assault engineers, amphibious tanks, our assault beaches. and other detachments which varied for the It has been shown that preliminary air different beaches according to the specific attacks were delivered against enemy coast " menu" (i.e., composition of the assault defence batteries in the preliminary operations wave) decided upon by the subordinate forma- prior to D Day. The Fire Plan proper -was- tions. to begin on the night preceding the assault, Priority of air lift was given to American air- when the heavy bombers of Bomber Command borne forces owing to the vital tasks of securing were to attack in great strength the ten most the beach exits and facilitating deployment important batteries; this operation was to be from the Utah beach. Main bodies of both timed as late as would be consistent with the 82 and 101 United .States Airborne Divisions return of the aircraft to England by daylight. were to land in the general area of Ste. Mere Following the Bomber Command operations., Eglise on the night D—i/D, the latter to assist attacks were planned by medium bombers, the seaborne assault on the Utah sector and using special navigational devices, on a further the former to guard the landward flank and six coast defence targets; this phase was to prevent the movement of enemy reserves into begin at civil twilight, and about the same the Cotentin peninsula. The remaining air lift time the naval bombardment directed by spot- was allotted to Second British Army for 6 Air- ting aircraft and culminating with close support borne Division (less one brigade) which was to fire from assault craft carrying various types land before H Hour east of Caen, with the of armament was to commence, and about half- tasks of seizing the crossings over the Orne at an-hour before H Hour* the heavy bombers Benouville and Ranville and, in conjunction of the Eighth United States Air Force, and with Commando troops, of dominating the area medium bombers of the Ninth United States to the east of Caen in order to delay the Air Force, were to begin action against coast movement of enemy forces towards the town. defence artillery and enemy beach defences and American Ranger units were to land in the localities. Included in the naval assault forces assault on the west of Omaha beach, and had was a variety of specially fitted craft carrying the task of attacking enemy defences on the 4.7 inch guns, 4 inch mortars, barrages of 5 east side' of the Carentan estuary. One British inch rockets, Centaur tanks fitted with 75 brigade of two Commandos was to link the millimeter howitzers, 17 pounder anti-tank assaults on the Juno and Sword sectors. A guns, as well as ordinary self-propelled field second Commando brigade was to land behind guns of the assaulting divisional artilleries the assaulting division on the Sword Sector which were to be embarked in' tank landing and while one Commando dealt with Ouistre- craft and to work as regimental fire units. ham, the remainder of the brigade was to cross The Fire Plan aimed at building up the the Orne at Benouville and attack the enemy supporting fire to a tremendous crescendo which coast defences of the river up to Cabourg would reach its climax at the latest possible inclusive. moment before the leading troops waded ashore, in order to give the defenders the mini- The Assault Technique. mum time to recover before being set upon. Prolonged study and numerous experiments The heavy air bombardment was timed to com- had been devoted to the development of the mence on the beach frontages to within ten technique of assaulting a defended beach. As minutes of H Hour, and from this time fighters a result, various types of specialised military and fighter-bombers were to take up the air equipment were available by D Day, including offensive, and in particular undertake the task assault engineer tanks, tank-carried bridges for of neutralising the enemy field batteries located crossing anti-tank ditches, mat-laying tanks inland. Air support tentacles were to accom- for covering soft clay patches on the beaches, pany the assulting troops, and fighter-bomber ramp tanks over which other vehicles could squadrons were to be at hand to answer calls for scale sea walls, flail tanks for mine clearance, close support, while the medium and heavy and amphibious assault tanks. These devices bombers returned to their bases to refuel and were integrated into the specially trained re-arm in readiness for further missions. No assault teams which led the assault forces. fewer than 171 Allied fighter squadrons were to The development of under-water obstacles be employed in the overall assault phase, and in on the assault coast has already been men- the event the Allied Air Forces flew some 11,000 tioned, and it was necessary to include in the sorties on D Day. assault some teams of sappers and naval * On the day 'ultimately selected H hour varied obstruction clearance units trained in clearance between 0630 for the Western Task Force to 0745 of this type of obstruction. These obstacles on the Eastern sectors. 4436 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946

Direct Air Sitpport. armoured brigades and a proportionate number The joint army and air forces organisation of American tank units. Between twenty-three for direct air support becomes a complicated and twenty-four basic divisions were due in machinery in major amphibious operations. Normandy by D + 20. Comparison with the Special arrangements were necessary to cover estimated enemy strength was difficult to make; the period before the army and air force head- some types of enemy divisions, were organised Portsmouth and which, therefore, were not apparent in the during the assault phase. It thus became neces- divisional figures of the build-up table. sary to set up the army component of Air Planned build-up tables are inevitably Support Control at Uxbridge, together with a suspect; it was impossible to estimate the delay- special intelligence staff which was charged with ing effect on the enemy build-up of our air supplying the air staff with information con- action. In our estimates, the effect of weather cerning the progress of operations. The Anglo- on cross-channel movement and beach working American army staff at Uxbridge was controlled was a major imponderable. from my main headquarters at Portsmouth, and In order to make our build-up flexible, a worked in matters of immediate air support on special inter-Service staff was organised called general directives, which denned the military " Build-up Control " (BUCO). This body was plan and priorities for the application of the formed, as a result of Mediterranean experience, available direct air support. Under the condi- to organise the loading and despatch of craft and tions of the initial stage of amphibious opera- ships from home ports, and was the agency by tions it was necessary to move the focus of which changes in priority were effected. •control of army/air operations back to Army It is of interest to record that in order to fit Group level, because of the necessary centralisa- the assault force into the available craft and "tion imposed on the Air Forces and because the shipping, British divisions were limited to 1,450 normal point of control (Army Headquarters) vehicles in the initial lift, the corresponding had no Air Force counterpart with it and no air figure for armoured brigades being 320. No for- iormations within reach or communication. mation was to be made up in excess of 75 per Special assault tentacles were allotted to all cent, of its War Establishment in transport until •assaulting brigades and were to provide the after D + 14. Similar limitations were im- initial means for requesting air support, pending posed on the American units. the landing of the normal detachments. These tentacles worked to Uxbridge, while on the Planned Development of Operations. same network were included Divisional and Once the troops were ashore it was necessary •Corps headquarters ships as well as Army and for them to " crack about"; the need for sus- Army Group headquarters. Army headquarters tained energy and drive was paramount, as it were to monitor calls for support, but the re- was necessary to link our beachheads and pene- sponsibility for their submission to the Tactical trate quickly inland before the enemy opposi- Air Forces rested with the Army Group detach- tion crystallized. I gave orders that the lead- ment at Uxbridge. ing formations should by-pass major enemy In order to provide means of immediate centres of resistance in order to " peg-out response to calls for air assistance during the claims " inland. I emphasised to commanders assault, some squadrons were airborne within on all levels that determined leadership would wireless range of divisional headquarters ships be necessary to withstand the strain of the first in anticipation of requests for direct support. few days, to retain the initiative, and to make Requests for pre-arranged air support during sure that there would be no setbacks. Hie assault phase were co-ordinated at main In the planning stages of a major operation it Army Group headquarters, and submitted to is customary to issue for the guidance of subor- "the air forces through the Uxbridge staff. The dinate commanders and staffs, an estimate of latter also co-ordinated the bomblines and the progress of operations. Such an estimate Censured that all concerned were kept informed. normally takes the form of a series of " phase lines " drawn on an operational map to indicate The Build-iip. the positions to be reached by leading troops at The general principles upon which the build- intervals of a few days. I was not altogether up of our forces and material were planned, happy about the phase lines given, because im- •were, first, the provision of the maximum ponderable factors in an operation of the magni- number of fighting formations on the Continent tude of OVERLORD make such forecasting so In the first few days and, secondly, the introduc- very academic. While I had in my mind the tion into the build-up system as quickly as necessity to reach the Seine and the Loire by possible of the maximum degree of flexibility; D + 90, the interim estimates of progress could so that changes in priority of troops, administra- not, I felt, have any degree of reality. The tive, echelons, transport and stores could be predictions were particularly complicated by made as the situation demanded. two major divergent requirements. On the By the end of D Day it was planned that, in- one hand the general strategic plan was to make cluding airborne forces, the Allies would have the break-out on the western flank pivoting the eight divisions ashore together with Com- front on the Caen area, where the bulk of mandos, Ranger battalions and some fourteen enemy reserves were to foe engaged; on the tank regiments. By D + 6 the total forces other hand the Air Forces insisted on the im- would rise to some thirteen divisions, exclusive portance of capturing quickly the good airfield of airborne formations, with five British country south-east of Caen. Though I have SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 4437

never failed in my operations to exert my August. Some allowance was made in planning utmost endeavour to meet the requirements of the rate of administrative build-up for days the Air Forces, in planning these operations the when the beaches would be working at low over-riding requirement was to gain territory in capacity; but the risk had always to be^ faced the west. For this reason, while accepting an that any serious or prolonged break in the estimate for seizing the open country ibeyond weather, particularly during the first two weeks, Caen at a relatively early date after the land- might have a grave effect on the maintenance ing, I had to make it clear that progress in that of the forces and therefore on their operational sector would ibe dependent on the successful capabilities. development of the main strategic plan. Civil Affairs. Administration. Civil affairs planning initially aimed at The administrative problem facing the British ensuring that the civil population did not im- forces was essentially different from that of the pede troop movements, at preparing for the Americans. The operational plan demanded organisation of local labour and transport, and the very rapid development of lines of com- at setting up the necessary machinery for the munication 'behind the American forces, and control and use of local resources and for the the administrative requirements for opening up 1 replacement of unacceptable local officials. It railways and roads from Cherbourg and the was anticipated that there would be a. large Brittany ports were very large. There was no number of refugees and civilian wounded, and parallel problem foreseen on the British flank. special composite'detachments of Civil Affairs The limiting factor in the build-up of opera- personnel were organised in readiness to deal tional forces appeared likely to be the rate at with the problem, while arrangements were which maintenance resources could be landed. made for food and medical supplies for the The problem therefore was to develop the inhabitants of the bridgehead to be phased in capacity of the beaches to the maximum degree. from D + i onwards. Since there would be no port facilities at all until Cherbourg was captured and opened, and THE BATTLE OF NORMANDY. since in any case Cherbourg would not be able to do more than relieve some of the burden of The Assault. beach maintenance, it was planned to erect two At 0200 hours 6 June, a " coup de main " artificial harbours, together with a number of party of 6 Airborne Division was dropped near breakwaters, in the Baie de la Seine. The com- Benpuville, to seize the bridges over the Canal ponents which made up these artificial harbours de taen and the River Orne. Surprise was were to be towed across the Channel in special complete, both bridges were captured intact lanes through the minefields, and although the and a close bridgehead was established. Half estimated time required for their construction an hour later, 3 and 5 Parachute Brigades was from 14 to 42 days, it was provided that began to drop east of the Orne. as far as possible use would .be made of the On the whole, the drop of 6 Airborne shelter of the outer breakwaters once they had Division was more scattered than had been been completed. The subsidiary breakwaters planned, but one repercussion of this was that were to be formed by sinking 60 iblock ships in the enemy was misled about the area and ex- groups of 12 at suitable sites along the coast. tent of the landings. In spite of enemy counter The British forces were to be maintained over action the division secured the left flank of the the beaches until such tune as sufficient ports Allied beachheads. were captured and developed, and it was 101 United States Airborne Division began assumed that beach maintenance could cease dropping south-east of Ste. Mere figlise at about on the opening of the Seme ports. In the 0130 hours. The division quickly seized the United1 States sector it was planned to open two villages of iPouppeville and St. Martin-de- Cherbourg and subsequently the main ports of Varreville, behind the Utah beaches, 82 •the Brittany peninsula, and in this way to dis- United States Airborne Division landed west pense gradually with the necessity for beach of the Carentan-CherbouTg main road from working. 0230 hours onwards. The division seized the Special establishments were created for town of Ste. Mere figlise and protected the in- operating the British beaches, comprising land flanks of 101 Airborne Division. Beach Bricks, Beach Groups and Beach Sub- While the airborne landings were in progress, Areas. These special units and headquarters over 1,100 aircraft of Bomber Command com- were formed on an inter-Service basis and in- menced the air offensive as planned. Nearly cluded detachments of the various arms. In 6,000 tons of bombs had been dropped on the this way the individual beaches were worked coast batteries by dawn. by self-contained organisations. Meanwhile, the Allied sea armada drew in It was planned to maintain Second British towards the coast of France, preceded by its Army for the first few days from Beach Main- flotillas of minesweepers. Not until the leading tenance Areas and subsequently from two army ships had reached their lowering positions, some roadheads, one of which was ultimately to be seven to eleven miles offshore, and the naval handed over to First Canadian Army; a Rear bombardment squadrons had opened fire on Maintenance Area was to be established as soon the shore defences, was there any appreciable as conditions permitted. In view of the damage enemy activity. caused by our bombing, it was considered During the sea passage heavy seas were necessary to be independent of railways for the running in the Channel, and it was an outstand- first three months of the operation; the lines ing feat on the part of the naval forces that of communication were therefore to be entirely in spite of this every main essential of the plan road operated for this period. was carried put as intended. The administrative planning for the opera- The cloud conditions were not very favour- tions was based on the expectancy of reason- able for bombing when over 1,300 heavy able weather conditions during June, July and bombers of the Eighth United States Air Force.. 4438 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 and eight medium divisions of the Ninth United amphibious regiment), while 27 Armoured States Air Force, swept over the target area. Brigade (with two amphibious regiments) was Meanwhile the heavy ships of the naval bom- under command 3 British Division; both forma- bardment squadrons opened on the coast tions were supported by appropriate detach- defence batteries, while gradually the destroyers ments from 79 Armoured Division. and the great number and variety of support- The two leading Canadian brigades assaulted ing craft successively came into action as the astride Courseulles-sur-Mer about 0800 hours. assault craft ran into the beaches and the -troops Due to the rough sea the landing was behind stormed ashore. schedule (H Hour was 0735—0745 hours). On Utah beach, VII United States Corps The task of 3 British Division was to assault assaulted on a front of one regimental combat the beaches just east of Lion-sur-Mer and team. The progress of the assault was greatly advance on Caen to secure a bridgehead there assisted by thirty amphibious tanks, launched over the River Orne. The leading brigade was five thousand yards offshore, which arrived on to secure a firm base on the P^riers-sur-le-Dan the beach with the loss of only one. Casualties feature, through which the following brigades were not excessive, and movement ashore pro- were to advance on Caen. The division was ceeded well; a second Regimental combat team to link up with 6 Airborne Division on the was soon disembarked, and a beachhead was bridges over the canal and river at Bdnouville. secured on a four -thousand yard front. During The plan provided for troops of 4 Commando the day in some places the troops made contact Brigade clearing up the area between 3 Cana- successfully with 101 Airborne Division. dian and 3 British Divisions, i Commando On Omaha beach, H Hour for the assault Brigade was made responsible for capturing had been fixed at 0645 hours. V United States enemy .posts on the left flank of the Corps sector Corps assaulted on a broad front with two regi- and the port of Ouistreham. mental combat teams, with the initial objective H Hour for 3 British Division was fixed for of Vierville-sur-Mer, and Colleville-sur-Mer, 0725 hours and the assault waves reached the some three miles to the east. beaches well on time. The leading brigade By nightfall V United States Corps had was soon a mile inland attacking Hermanvolle, secured a beachhead about a mile in depth Colleville, and battery positions on the southern on the line Vierville—Colleville, and some for- outskirts of Ouistreham. The follow-up brigade ward elements were already pushing towards came ashore shortly after 1000 hours and the high ground near Formigny, some two miles reached its assembly positions near Hennan- inland. ville quickly and pushed on southwards. The Second British Army assaulted on the fight reserve brigade of 3 British Division landed in the Gold sector with 50 Division of 30 Corps. soon after midday; it was moved to the left In the centre sector, designated Juno, was 3 of the divisional area owing to the heavy oppo- Canadian Division, and on the left 3 British sition which had been encountered at Douvres- Division (Sword sector): both of which were la-D61ivrande. under i Corps. 50 Division assault was made on a two By nightfall, the division was well estab- brigade front. The intention for D Day was lished with forward elements on the line Bieville to penetrate the beach defences between Le —B6nouville, where contact was made with 6 Hamel and La Riviere, and to secure a cover- Airborne Division. Ouistreham had almost ing position which would include the town of been cleared, but the Commandos had not Bayeux and the high ground in the area of succeeded in capturing the heavily fortified St. L6ger, astride the main road from Bayeux strong point at Douvres. to Caen., The division had under command 8 East of the River Orne, 6 Airborne Division Armoured Brigade, of which two regiments withstood repeated attempts by enemy infantry were amphibious, assault teams of 79 and tanks to capture Ranville and to wipe out Armoured Division, and a Royal Marine Com- the Benouyille bridgehead. The division was . mando; which was to land immediately behind joined during the afternoon by Commandos of the leading right hand brigade and move west i SS Brigade. At 2100 hours the gliders of 6 Air along the coast to seize Port-en-Bessin. Landing Brigade arrived and served to As on Omaha beach, the weather was ex- strengthen our positions on the left flank. tremely unfavourable; it was considered too As a result of our D Day operations a foot- rough to launch the amphibious tanks. The hold had been gained on the Continent of leading infantry touched down within a few Europe. minutes of H Hour—which was 0725 hours. Surprise had been achieved, the troops had The leading brigade moved quickly inland to fought magnificently, and our losses had been its objective on fee Bayeux—Caen road. Mean- much lower than had ever seemed possible. while reserve brigades were landed success- fully and by last light the forward positions of Linking up the Beachheads. 50 Division were roughly on the line Manvieux At first light on 7th June the Omaha beaches —St. Sulpice—Vaux—Biicy—Creully. At were still under close fire from enemy weapons Creully contact was made with patrols of 3 of all calibres, but the American troops fought Canadian Division, but touch had not been steadily and gradually extended their initial gained with V United States Corps on the right. holding. Patrols eastwards along the coast In i Corps sector, 3 Canadian Division made contact with British troops, who captured assaulted with two brigades, and 3 British Port-en-Bessin. Division on a frontage of one brigade. By gth June American troops captured The initial task of these formations was to Isigny with a bridge over the River Vire about secure a covering position on the general line one mile to the south-west. Further east cross- Putot-en-Bessin—Caen—River Orne to the sea, ings were effected over the River Aure, and joining up with 6 Airborne Division on the Colombieres was reached. 2 United States Divi- left. With 3 Canadian Division there was 2 sion came into action in the centre of the Canadian Armoured Brigade (including one Corps bridgehead, reaching Rubercy on 9th SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 4439 June. Meanwhile, on the left of the beach- To implement my instructions for the head i United States Division made good pro- development of the pincer movement on Caen, gress and linked up with 50 British Division Second Army regrouped in order to launch just west of Bayeux on 8th June. 30, 8 and i Corps into this operation. I was By loth June V United States Corps secured determined to develop this plan with the utmost the F6ret-de-Cerisy and pushed patrols into intensity with the whole available weight of Balleroy. Patrols of 29 United States Division the British forces. I wanted Caen, but realised were in contact with 101 United States Air- that in either event our thrusts would probably borne Division and, two days later when Caren- provoke increasing enemy resistance: which tan was finally captured, the beachheads had .would fit in well with my plan of campaign. been securely linked. With the joining of In fact, enemy resistance increased and there V and VII United States Corps, our bridge- were now elements of no fewer than eight head, was made continuous throughout the Panzer divisions on the twenty mile stretch assault frontage. of the Second Army front 'between Caumont The operations for the capture of Caen were and Caen. continued from the North by 3 British Divi- While VII United States Corps was complet- sion, and from the North-West and West by ing the capture of Cherbourg during the last 3 Canadian Division; but it quickly became week in June, the rest of the American Army apparent that the enemy was concerned .for was building up and regrouping. The attack the security of this nodal point, and to prevent Southwards started on 3rd July with a thrust the expansion of our-bridgehead South of the by VIII United States Corps employing 82 Caen—Bayeux road. Airborne, 79 and 90 Divisions. The object While i Corps operations were developing was to converge on Le Haye du Puits, and round Caen, 30 Corps were engaged in heavy on the first day 82 Airborne Division secured fighting hi the Tilly-sur-Seulles sector. The Hill 131 about two miles North of the town. intention was to thrust South-through Tilly- Further progress was made on the following sur-Seulles towards Villers Bocage, .employing day against stubborn enemy resistance. initially 8 Armoured Brigade, which was to be Meanwhile on 4th July, VII United States followed by 7 Armoured Division (then com- Corps attacked South-West of Carentan with ing ashore). 83 Division. Again progress was very diffi- In the morning of I2th June the 30 Corps cult owing to the numerous water obstacles and advance had reached the general line La Belle bocage, but by 5th July the edge of the flooded Epine — Lingevres — Tilly — Fontenay-le- are,a North of St. Eny was reached. Pesnel—Cristot—Brouay. In these villages the Further East, XIX United States Corps enemy had established strong points with a captured St. Jean-de-Daye on 7th July, and co-ordinated system of anti-lank defences, continued its advance to within four miles of backed up by detachments of infantry and St.IA armour. On ist July the S.S. formations made their East of the River Orne our troops were last and strongest attempts against the Second concerned in maintaining the bridgehead in Army salient. All of these attacks were face of continuous counter attacks, and took engaged by our massed artillery with devastat- heavy toll of the enemy. ing effect, and all 'but one were dispersed be- By i2th June the beachheads had now been fore reaching our forward infantry positions. firmly linked into a continuous bridgehead on .Second Army intention now was to continue a front of over fifty miles, varying in depth the battle for Caen by a direct assault from eight to twelve miles. the North. As a preliminary 3 Canadian Divi- sion attacked Carpiquet on 4th July with the Development a/ the Bridgehead. object of securing the airfield and of freeing My orders on i8th June, which were finalized the .Western exits from Caen. the following day, instructed First United States For the direct assault on Caen, i Corps em- Army to ]capture! Cherbourg and iclear the ployed three divisions with two armoured peninsula of enemy. Moreover, operations brigades in immediate support, and a third were to be developed against Le Haye du readily available. Puits and Coutances at the earliest possible In order to help overcome the strong enemy moment without waiting for the fall of Cher- positions I decided to seek the assistance of bourg. As additional American troops were Bomber 'Command, R.A.F., in a close support available, First United States Army was to role on the battlefields. The Supreme Com- break away to the South directed on Gran- mander supported my request for the assist- ville, Avranches and Vire. Second Army was to ance of Bomber Command, and the task was capture Caen and provide a strong Eastern readily accepted by Air Chief Marshal Sir flank for the Army Group: continuing the Arthur Harris. policy of absorbing the enemy reserve divisions The plan was °for the three attacking divi- in its sector. sions to converge on Caen, clear the main Following the isolation of Cherbourg, VII part of the town on the West bank of the United States Corps continued Northwards on Orne and seize the river crossings. The air a front of three divisions. On 20th and 2ist bombardment was designed to destroy enemy June the Corps closed in on the defences of defensive positions and artillery, and to cut Cherbourg itself and began preparations for off the enemy's forward troops from their lines the final! assault, wH^ch commenced in the of supply in rear. afternoon of 22nd June. On 27th June the It was planned that thei bombing attack garrison of the arsenal surrendered. The task should immediately precede the 'ground assault . of opening the port was energetically tackled but, owing to the weather forecast, it was by the allied navies, but it was to be late decided to carry out the bombing on the August before Cherbourg was in a fit state evening before the attack; aircraft were there- to receive heavy lifts alongside berths. fore timed over the target between 2150 and 4440 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, .4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 2230 hours 7th July, while the ground attack divisional sector of First United States Army, was to commence at 0420 hours on the follow- thus releasing American troops for operations ing morning. elsewhere. By nightfall, 8th July, 3 Canadian Division had secured Franqueville, while tanks and The Break-out. armoured cars closed in on the western outskirts On 25th July the weather conditions im- of Caen. In the centre 59 Division cleared proved and the break-out operations began. St. Contest and La Bijude, while 3 Division First United States Army plan was to deliver got into the north-east corner of Caen and a break-in assault against the enemy defensive directed 33 Armoured Brigade to the bridges. positions with VII United States Corps employ- On the morning of gth July, 3 Division ing three infantry divisions. The American reached the dock area and met troops from 3 attack started in the sector between Periers and Canadian Division who had entered the town St. L6. The Eighth U.S. Air Force was em- from the west. The bridges over 'the river in ployed in the tactical role and dropped a carpet the city were either destroyed or completely of bombs immediately in front of the leading blocked by nibble, and the enemy remained troops, as a preliminary to their advance. in occupation on the suburb of Faubourg-de- Twenty-four hours after the VII Corps assault, Vaucelles on the east bank. VIII Corps in the coastal sector was to advance My aim remained to launch the break-out South. XIX United States Corps was also to operation on the Western flank as soon as pos- launch attacks in the St. L6 sector, beginning sible, and meanwhile to hold the main enemy simultaneously with VIII United States Corps. forces on my Eastern flank. On 27th July the decisive actions of the opera- During the period ioth-i8th July, Second tion took place. The enemy began to withdraw Army delivered a series of thrusts, with the along the entire front, and Lessay and P6riers primary object to make progress Southwards were occupied. In the central sector, mobile towards Thury Harcourt: all operations were columns were sent within two miles of related to this task and to the maintenance of Coutances. On XIX Corps front the enemy pressure on as broad a front as possible. was cleared out of the loop in the River Vire Meanwhile First United States Army con- immediately South of St. L6. tinued its advance Southwards; by steady pres- On the eastern flank, an attack by 2 Canadian sure and hard fighting it gradually overcame Corps southwards along the Falaise road started the difficulties of terrain and the increased at 0330 hours on 25th July. Steady progress enemy opposition. was made but as the advance continued enemy On the right VIII Corps made good progress, opposition hardened and it was necessary to dis- and by I4th July had reached the general line continue our thrust during the night 25/26th of the north bank of the River Ay, with patrols July- west of Lessay. While Second British Army was switching its In the centre sector VII Corps made ground main weight to the Caumont sector, the pro- west of the River Taute, and XIX Corps gress of the break-out operation proceeded pushed on between the Taute and the Vire. apace. On 28th July, 4 and 6 U.S. Armoured On i6th July XIX Corps mounted a strong Divisions passed through the infantry on the attack with two divisions against St. L6 and western sector and thrust South towards by the iQth July the town was captured. On Coutances. The town was captured in the the extreme left V Corps improved its positions afternoon and firm contact was established there in conjunction with the XIX Corps operation between VIII and VII Corps. To the South- towards St. L6. East, troops of VII and XIX Corps had got to Thus by i8th July First United States Army within five miles of the main Avranches—Caen was in possession of St. L6, and of the ground road. All reports indicated that West of the west of the River Vire which was required River Vire to the coast the enemy was com- for mounting the major break-out assault pletely disorganised. Avranches was taken on operation to the south. 3ist July. While 12 and 30 Corps operations were in progress west of the River Orne, preparations VIII U.S. Corps, under command of Head- for a major thrust east of the river were com- quarters third U.S. Army (General Patton), pleted with all possible speed. 2 Canadian, was then directed into the Brittany Peninsula. 8 and i Corps were employed in this operation. With the entry into the field of the Third U.S. Army, Headquarters Twelfth U.S'. Army Group As a result of these operations the situation (General Omar Bradley) assumed command of on the eastern flank was now greatly improved, both American armies. The Twelfth U.S. Army and the German armour had been drawn east of the Orne again and heavy losses caused to the Group remained under my operational control. enemy. The enemy was trying to recover his balance My orders on 2ist July were for First Cana- as the powerful American attack pushed back dian Army and Second British Army to de- his left flank and began to swing South-East velop operations in order to secure the line and East. He tried to stabilise a front on along the River Dives from the sea to Bures, " hinges " at Caumont, on the Orne, and on thence along the Muance to St. Sylvain, and the high ground between Caen and Falaise. on through Cauvicourt, Gouvix and fivrecy One by one the hinges, or " key rivets," were to Noyers and Caumont. successively knocked out by the British armies Headquarters First Canadian Army (General working from West to East as the attack of the Crerar) was to take the field on 23rd July, when American armies on the West flank gathered it would assume responsibility for the extreme momentum. left flank sector, taking i Corps under com- Second Army regrouped with creditable- mand. 2 Canadian Corps was to remain speed, and it was found possible to commence under Second Army for the moment. On 24th the thrust southwards from the Caumont area July, Second Army was to take over the left on 30th July. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 4441 The main weight of the attack was to be I ordered the right flank of the Twelfth U.S. developed by 8 and 30 Corps on a narrow front. Army Group to swing North towards Argentan, 30 Corps was to wheel South-West, initially to and intensified the British and Canadian thrusts the line Villers Bocage—Aunay-sur-Odon, while southwards to the capture of Falaise. 8 Corps, in a wider sweep on its right, swung First Canadian Army was ready to launch down to Beny Bocage and on the Vire— its thrust southwards in the direction of Falaise Tinchebray—Cond6 triangle. on the night of 7th August. The object was to The attack started on 30 Corps front at break the enemy defences astride the Caen- 0600 hours 30th July. Falaise road, and to exploit as far as F.alaise. The initial attack was supported by heavy The attack was to take place under cover of and medium bombers which carried out their darkness after a preliminary action by heavy attacks in spite of low cloud and bad weather. bombers; the infantry was to be transported through the enemy's zone of defensive fire and Progress on the 8 'Corps flank proved easier forward defended localities in heavy armoured than on 30 Corps front. By 3ist July 8 Corps carriers. At first light on 8 August the infantry had secured crossings over the River Soulevre debussed in their correct areas after a four and 30 Corps had cleared Cahagnes. Heavy miles drive within the enemy lines, and pro- fighting continued though progress was slow ceeded to deal with their immediate objective. in both 8 and 30 Corps owing to enemy counter The first phase of the operation had been attacks and the great difficulty of the country. During the first days of August 2 Canadian successful. Corps mounted three attacks, east of the Orne While VII United States Corps and 8 British as part of the general programme of maintain- Corps were held -up in their respective sectors, ing pressure in that area. the right wing of Twelfth United States Army Group proceeded with its planned operations. By 6th' August the area Laval-Mayenne- On 7th August XV Corps continued to make Domfront had been reached by the Americans. progress and on the following day entered On the following day First Canadian Army, Le Mans. which had now extended its front to include the Caen sector, was to begin a series of major In Brittany, Third United States Army units attacks astride the Caen-Falaise road, which were engaged in heavy fighting at the had so long been the fundamental aim of our approaches to St. Malo, Brest and Lorient. policy on the Eastern flank. My plan was to make a wide enveloping I was still not clear what the enemy intended movement from the southern American flank up to do. I did not know if the enemy would to the Seine about Paris, and at the same time stand and ibe defeated between the Seine and to drive the centre and northern sectors of the Loire, or whether he would endeavour to the Allied line straight for the river. In view withdraw his forces behind the Seine. There of the Mortain counter attack, I decided to was no evidence to show on what line he was attempt concurrently a shorter envelopment intending to reform his front; it was evident with the object of bottling up the bulk of the from the British and Canadian troops in close German forces deployed between Falaise and contact with the Germans east, south-east and Mortain. It was obvious that if it was pos- south of Caen, that he was definitely holding sible to bring off both these movements the his ground in this sector; he was evidently enemy in Normandy would be virtually trying to pivot on the Caen area. annihilated. On 6th August I issued orders for the ad- On 8th August I ordered Twelfth United vance to the Seine. States Army Group to swing its right flank due north on Alenson at full strength and with all I instructed First Canadian Army to make speed. At the same time I urged, all possible every effort to reach Falaise itself in the forth- speed on First Canadian and Second British coming attack; in -the subsequent advance to Armies in the movements which were converg- the Seine the main Canadian axis was to be the ing on Falaise. road Lisieux-Rouen. On its right I intended Second- British Army to advance with its right By i2th August, on Second Army Front directed on Argentan and Laigle, whence it was heavy fighting was in progress on the high to reach the Seine below Nantes. Twelfth ground three miles south-east of Vire, and at United States Army Group was to approach the same time leading troops were only a few the Seine on a wide front with its main weight miles short of Conde. East of the River Orne on the right flank, which was to swing up to- the bridgehead was extended to the south-east, wards Paris. and also to the north-east to link up with elements of 2. Canadian Division who had Between 7th and nth August it became clear crossed the River Laize. that the enemy had decided to fight the battle of France on our side of the Seine. On the 7th After four days' fighting, on i2th August a major counter attack, employing up to six reconnaissance reports clearly showed a general armoured divisions, was launched on Hitler's trend of enemy movement to the east from orders against the American forces in the area the Mortain area through the corridor between of Mortain. The brunt of it fell on 30 United Falaise and Argentan and on towards the Seine States Infantry Division which held the on- ferries. slaught sufficiently long to enable two American The Allied Air Forces were pounding the divisions who were moving south between enemy in the pocket but the problem of com- Avranches and Mortain to be switched to the pleting the encirclement was no easy one; the danger area. The counter attack was designed Germans realised that their existence depended to cut off the forces operating south of on holding open the corridor, and bitter fight- Avranches by a drive to the sea. In the face ing ensued as a result of our attempts to frus- of this counter-attack the Americans, assisted trate them. On the north side of the corridor by the full weight of the tactical air forces, it must be recalled that the enemy had long stood firm. been in possession of the vital ground north of 4442 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946

Falaise, and had thus had ample opportunity the Seine in the area of Mantes and began to for the development of strong, well sited work westwards along the river towards Elbeuf. defences. The other aimies of 21 Army Group then Strenuous efforts continued to close the cor- began the race to the Seine. The Allied Air ridor between Falaise and Argentan. British Forces throughout the drive to the river had and American forces pressed in from all sides carried out relentless attacks against the ferries of the pocket to annihilate the enemy which it which provided the only means of escape to contained. XV United States Corps was well the enemy. established in the Argentan area on I3th Second Army crossed the River Seine in the August. vicinity of Vernon, and the leading troops were VIII United States Corps advanced north across the river on 25 August. On First from Mayenne to positions on the western flank Canadian Army front, 2 Canadian Corps of XV United States Corps. Meanwhile V and secured crossings about Port de 1'Arche and XIX United States Corps pressed on hi the Elbeuf, astride a sharp bend in the river about extreme western and north-western sectors of eight miles south of Rouen on 26 August. The the pocket. crossings were made in most cases without The main Canadian thrust on Falaise from serious opposition. the north was resumed on I4th August, and In the Twelfth United States Army Group the town fell to the Canadians on i6th August. sector. Third United States Army swept for- The battle of the pocket continued, but by ward to Troyes, Chalons-sur-Marne and 16 August the enemy lost almost all cohesion: Rheims. First United States Army began divisions were hopelessly jumbled up and com- crossing the Seine on 26 August between Melun manders were able to control no more than and Mantes Gassicourt. their own battle groups. The Allied Air Forces The break out was now complete and the were presented with targets probably un- drive across the Pas de Calais was about to paralleled in this war: aircraft formations were engaging endless columns of enemy transport, commence. packed bumper to bumper and rendered im- The outstanding point about the Battle of mobile by the appalling congestion. Normandy is that it was fought exactly as On 19 August the neck of the pocket was planned before the invasion. The measure of finally closed when American troops from the our success was, in the event, far greater than south linked up at Chambois with the Polish could ever have been foreseen, because of the ' Armoured Division fighting with F.irst faulty strategy of the enemy. Canadian Army. The only sound military course open to the The next day the enemy made his last co- Germans at the end of July, would have in- ordinated attempt at forcing our cordon. After volved staging a withdrawal to the Seine barrier this attack, which was unsuccessful, the battle and with it the sacrifice of north-western of the Mortain-Falaise pocket was virtually at France. Instead -he decided to fight it out an end, though the process of mopping up took between the Seine and the Loire. some time. In planning to break out from the bridge- Speedy regrouping on the Twelfth U.S. Army head on the western flank, a prerequisite was Group front, combined with outstanding the retention of the main enemy strength on administrative improvisation, enabled the ad- the eastern flank. The extent to which this vance eastwards of the Third U.S. Army to was achieved is well illustrated in the following continue while the battle of the Falaise Pocket table, which shows the estimated enemy was still in progress. By 20 August, troops strength opposing us in the eastern and western of General Patton's army reached and1 crossed areas of our front during June and July.

Estimated enemy strength Estimated enemy strength opposite opposite Caumont-Cotentin sectors Caumont-Caen sectors

Panzer Infantry Panzer Tanks Infantry Divisions Tanks Battalions Divisions Battalions

15 June ... 70 63 4 520 43 25 June ... i 190 5 530 9 30 June ... 140 6%3 7* 725 6t4 5 July ... * - 215 63 7* 690 64 10 July ... 2* 190 72 6 610 65 15 July ... 2 190 78 6 630 68 20 July 3 190 82 5 560 7i 25 July ... 2 190 85 6 645 92

This result was achieved by the retention set the schedule of our beach working, caus- of the initiative and by very hard fighting, ing delay in the arrival of troops and stores, which enabled us to expand our territorial but also hampered the action of the air forces. gains in the West and to engage and wear down The development of the bridgehead to the tiie enemy strength along the whole of the South-East of Caen was a slow and difficult Allied front. matter. The success of the plan involved pull- The mounting of the break-out operation ing the enemy's reserves against our Eastern suffered considerable delays. One of the main flank, and this was achieved to such a degree reasons was the veather, which not only up- that in spite of all our efforts it was impossible SUPPLEMENT TO. THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 4443 to make rapid headway in the sector which Division closed in on the defences of Boulogne the enemy obviously regarded as the most and Calais on $\h September; reconnaissance vital. revealed that the enemy was intending to fight in defence of both these ports. THE DRIVE ACROSS THE PAS DE CALAIS TO Meanwhile, i Corps advanced North of the ANTWERP AND THE RHINE. Seine on ist September. While the 49 Division On 26th August, I issued detailed orders 'for swung left into the Havre peninsula, the 51 the conduct of the advance North of the Seine. Division went straight for St. Valery and libe- Twelfth Army Group was to operate on the rated the town on 2nd September. Probing on right flank of 21 Army Group, and directed the 3rd September showed that the elaborate First United States Army along the general defences of Havre were fully manned. 51 Divi- axis Paris—Brussels, with the object of getting sion was ordered to take over the Northern established in the general area Brussels— sector of'the perimeter and preparations for Maastricht—Liege—Namur—Oiarleroi. the assault were put in hand. On the I2th On ist September the Supreme Commander September the garrison commander sur- assumed command and direction of the Army rendered. Groups himself, and I was no longer, there- 30 Corps was the spearhead of the British fore, his overall land force commander. From drive to the North. Amiens was reached on now on my despatch wi! be primarily con- 3 ist August, Brussels was entered on 3rd Sep- cerned with 21 Army Group proper, that is, tember, and the city of Antwerp on the follow- with, the British and Canadian forces, to- ing day. This advance imposed a considerable gether with the various Allied contingents strain on administration. Our spearheads were which served with them. being maintained some 400 miles from the tem- In considering the development of the porary base in Normandy. The greatest strain strategic plan after crossing the Seine the was thrown on road transport, because only primary object, of course, was the destruction short stretches of railway were available owing of the German Army. to the widespread demolitions. But all diffi- As a result of discussions between the culties were overcome, and thrt pace of the Supreme Commander and myself, from now on pursuit was maintained. the eventual mission of 21 Army Group became the isolation of the Ruhr. The Advamce to the Meuse and Rhine. The urgent problem was to prevent the The Supreme Commander directed that our enemy's recovery from the disaster sustained immediate aim should be the establishment of in Normandy. A major consideration was the bridges over the Rhine throughout its entire administrative situation created by our ever- length, and that we should not go beyond this lengthening Lines of Communication. My ad- until Antwerp or Rotterdam could be opened. ministrative staff had, however, been building In view of the time factor it was agreed that up reserves during August in order to support 21 Army Group should launch its thrust to the the pursuit. Imports were out by 60 per cent, Rhine before completing the clearance of the in order to release a considerable quantity of Scheldt estuary. transport from beach and port clearance for My intention now was to establish bridge- forward maintenance purposes. heads over the Meuse and Rhine in readiness The immediate tasks of 21 Army Group were for the time when it would be possible to the destruction of the enemy ;Ln -North-East advance eastwards to occupy the Ruhr. I France, the clearance of the Pas de Calais with ordered the resumption of the Second Army its V-bomb sites, the capture of airfields in advance from the Antwerp—Brussels area for Belgium, and the capture of Antwerp. 6th September, and by nth September a bridge- Between 25th and 3oth August, Second head was established over the Meuse—Escaut British Army and First Canadian Army Canal. It was already noticeable that the crossed the Seme, and the four Allied armies enemy was beginning to recover his balance, so now started advances which were eventually that the urgency of launching the thrust to the to bring them to the Rhine on a very broad Rhine was underlined. front. On Sunday iyth September the battle of On the right, Third United States Army, Arnhem began. The purpose was to cross the having concentrated East of Paris (which was Meuse and the Rhine, and to place Second Army liberated on 25th August), was striking East- in a suitable position for the subsequent develop- wards during the first week of September to ment of operations towards the northern face of Nancy and Verdun. Shortly afterwards another the Ruhr and the North German plains. The column was directed South-East towards the thrust to Arnhem outflanked the northern ex- BeJfort area;, to join up with the Seventh tension of the West Wall, and came very near United States Army approaching from Mar- to complete success. seilles. The essential feature of the plan was the lay- The First United States Army advanced ing of a carpet of airborne troops across the over the Aisne with its right flank directed on waterways from the Meuse—Escaut Canal to the the Duchy of Luxembourg and its left flank on Neder Rijn, on the general axis of the road the general axis Mons—Liege. through Eindhoven to Uden, Grave, Nijmegen Second British Army advanced North-East and Arnhem. The airborne carpet and bridge- on Central Belgium, while First Canadian head forces were provided by 82 and 101 United Army was about to sweep up the Channel States Airborne Division and i British Airborne coast. Division, and a Polish parachute brigade. Along On the left, 2 Canadian Division drove the corridor, or airborne carpet, 30 British Corps straight through T6tes on Dieppe; the divi- was to advance and establish itself North of the sion entered the port towards the evening of Neder Rijn with bridgeheads over the Ijssel ist September. 2 Canadian Corps continued facing East. From the start, however, adverse to advance rapidly North of the Somme which weather conditions prevailed, and indeed, during was crossed on 3rd September. 3 Canadian the eight vital days of the battle, there were only 4444 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946

two on which the weather permitted even a Army, were engaged in clearing south-west reasonable scale of offensive air support and air Holland up to the River Maas; at the same transportation. As a result, the airborne for- time i Corps was protecting the right flank mations were not completed to strength (indeed of 2 Canadian Corps operating in Beveland and 82 Airborne Division was without a complete Walcheren. gliderborne Combat Team). It had moreover As soon as the Scheldt and south-west Hol- been the intention to fly in 52 Division, but this land operations were completed, First Canadian project had to be abandoned. Resupply Army took over the northern sector of 21 Army missions were repeatedly cancelled, and when Group as far east as Middelaar, which included flown were often on a greatly reduced scale. assuming responsibility for the Nijmegen Had reasonable weather conditions obtained, bridgehead. I believe the Arnhem bridgehead would have This was to facilitate the Second Army opera- been established and maintained. tions which were to line up facing east for the Full success at Arnhem was denied us for two drive to line the Meuse. Tliis regrouping had a reasons. First: the weather prevented the further object: First Canadian Army was re- building up of adequate forces in the vital area. quired to plan the battle of the Rhineland, Second: the enemy managed to effect a very which was to be launched from the Nijmegen rapid concentration of forces to oppose us, and area; Second British Army was to plan the sub- particularly against the bridgehead over the sequent assault across the Rhine. Neder Rijn. In face of this resistance the British By early December, Second 'British Army Group of Armies in the North was not strong was lined up along the River Meuse as far enough to retrieve the situation created by the South as Maeseyck, whence the front crossed weather, by intensifying the speed of operations the river to the area of Geilenkirchen and joined on the ground. It was not possible to widen the the Ninth United States Army. corridor sufficiently quickly to reinforce Arnhem Plans for the regrouping of 21 Army Group by road. for the Rhineland battle were completed by On 25th September I ordered withdrawal of early December. In fact some divisions were the gallant Arnhem bridgehead. actually on the move to their new concentra- The vital crossings at Grave and Nijmegen tion areas, when, on i6th December, the Ger- were retained, and their importance was to be man counter-offensive in the Ardennes broke. amply demonstrated. The Battle of the Ardennes. On the central sector of the Allied front, by the middle of September the First and Third The full weight of the German counter- U.S. Armies were fighting on the Siegfried Line offensive in the Ardennes was not immediately from the Aachen area through the Ardennes to apparent; extremely bad weather had precluded the region of Trier, and southwards along the satisfactory air reconnaissance, and the German general line of the upper Moselle. concentration had been carried out with a high degree of secrecy. However, on the i8th By the third week in September the Sixth U.S. I was considering the possible effects of a Army Group which had landed at Marseilles major enemy thrust -towards Brussels and was firmly deployed on the right of Twelfth Antwerp on our dispositions—for the Army U.S. Army Group; the Allied front was con- Group was at that time transferring the bulk tinuous to Switzerland. of its weight to the extreme Northern flank. Operations to open up Antwerp. I ordered the concentration for the Rhineland The enemy had achieved a measure of re- battle to stop, and had plans prepared for covery. This was clear not only in the Arnhem switching some divisions from the Geilenkirchen operation, but also in his reaction to American sector to the west of the Meuse. thrusts in the Siegfried Line. It was necessary By the igth the full implications of the to prepare for a hard killing match before it German attack were established. It was known was possible to secure the Ruhr and advance that the Sixth S.S. Panzer Army was thrusting into Germany. There was also the task to in a North-Westerly direction towards Liege, open the approaches to Antwerp before winter with the Fifth Panzer Army in a wider wheel set in. on its left. Seventh German Army was in The immediate intention therefore became support. On the same day the Supreme Com- the clearance of the Scheldt Estuary. mander entrusted to me temporary command This task was given to the First Canadian of the First and Ninth U.S. Annies (with effect Army and lasted through October to the first from the 20th), as they were at that time on week in November. The enemy resistance was the Northern side of the German salient, and vigorous, and some very hard fighting took therefore remote from the Twelfth U.S. Army place, leading up to the final operation for the Group axis. capture of Walcheren. The reduction of this On "the igth I ordered General Dempsey to fortress presented many novel problems which move 30 Corps west of the Meuse, to a general were overcome principally by very remarkable line from Liege to Louvain, with patrols for- precision bombing by Bomber Command, ward along the Western bank of the river which breached the dykes and submerged large between Liege itself and Dinant. This Corps areas of the island. The extensive use of was thus suitably placed to prevent the enemy special amphibious devices enabled our troops crossing the river, and could cover the routes to operate in the resulting floods. The naval from the S.E. leading into Brussels. It sub- craft put up a very fine performance in this sequently became necessary in connection with battle, in spite of severe casualties from the the regrouping of American First Army to send coast defences and the rough seas. Walcheren some British divisions east of the Meuse. But was eventually cleared of the enemy by 8th throughout the battle I was anxious to avoid November. committing British forces more than was neces- While the First Canadian Army were clear- sary. Had they become involved in large ing the banks of the Scheldt, i Corps on its numbers, an acute administrative problem right wing, together with 12 Corps of Second would have resulted from their Lines of Com- SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 4445 munication crossing the axis of the two Ameri- First Canadian Army was ordered to launch can armies. Moreover, it was foremost in my an attack S.E. from the area of the Nijmegen mind that as soon as the German attack had bridgehead to meet the Ninth U.S. Army, been defeated the business of the Rhineland whose thrust was developed from the Julich- battle should be returned to as quickly as Roertmond sector northwards. possible. It was originally planned to launch the two The battle of the Ardennes was won primarily operations almost simultaneously, but the by the staunch fighting qualities of the Ameri- southern thrust was delayed. In the event this can soldier, and i-he enemy's subsequent con- proved to our advantage. fusion was completed by the intense air action The date by which the Ninth U.S. Army which became possible as weather conditions could attack was dependent on the rate at improved. Sixth S.S. Panzer Army broke which U.S. divisions could be released from itself against the Northern shoulder of the other sectors of the Allied front, as the strength salient, while Fifth Panzer Army spent its drive of that Army was to toe increased to 12 in the fierce battle which centred on Bastogne. divisions. -Release of these divisions depended Regrouping of the First and Ninth U.S. Armies, on the situation on the rest of the front. assisted by British formation, made possible the "Twelfth U.S. Army Group was still involved in rapid formation of a reserve corps of four U.S. the Ardennes, particularly in thrusting towards divisions under General Collins. The action of the system of dams on the River Roer which this corps, co-ordinated with the drive from the control its flood waters. As long as the enemy south by General Patton's Third U.S. Army, held these dams he was in a position to impose pinched the enemy forces out of the salient and flood conditions likely to impede the crossing began the bitter struggle which was to push of the river. Further south, the heaviest fight- them out of the Siegfried Line. ing was in the Saar and in the Colmar pocket The enemy had been prevented from crossing —in both areas the enemy had achieved local the Meuse in the nick of time. Once the Meuse successes. crossings were secure it became increasingly apparent "that the opportunity had come to turn The weather remained an anxious uncer- the enemy's position to our advantage. Hitler's tainty. The thaw was beginning and, apart projected counter-offensive ended in a tactical from the floods, it was playing havoc with our defeat, and the Germans received a tremendous road communications. battering. As soon as the situation had been The concentration of divisions for the restored I was able to order the British divisions Canadian Army attack was completed in the north again to the concentration areas which first week in February. Elaborate arrange- had been made ready in December. ments were made to assemble the forces em- ployed into the very confined concentration The Battle of the Rhineland. areas, and also to mislead the enemy about our The main objective of the Allies on the intentions. Western front remained the Ruhr. Once the Ruhr had been isolated from the rest of Ger- On 8 February the northern wing of the many, the enemy's capacity to continue the pincer movement started. 30 Corps, under struggle would quickly peter out. Beyond this, command of First Canadian Army, launched the object of our operations was to force mobile its attack into the Reichswald Forest and the war on the enemy by developing operations into northern extension of the West Wall, on a the northern plains of Germany. It was front of five divisions, supported by very con- necessary first to line up on the Rhine; then to siderable Air Forces and over 1,000 guns. This bridge the river and gain a suitable jumping began the memorable battle which, in intensity off position for a mobile campaign in the and fierceness, equalled any which our troops Spring. have experienced in this war. The enemy was in a very bad way; he had The Germans quickly built up to about eleven suffered another major defeat with heavy losses equivalent divisions, including four parachute in men and equipment. Moreover, the great divisions and two armoured divisions; in par- Russian winter offensive was now under way, ticular their paratroops fought magnificently. and we did not wish to give the enemy the Meanwhile the situation was improving in chance to switch forces to the east. other parts of the Allied Front. Operations in The Supreme Commander's orders to 21 the Colmar area had been successfully con- Army Group provided for a line-up on the cluded and the Germans thrown back across Rhine from Dusseldorf northwards. Ninth the Rhine at the southern extremity of the Allied U.S. Army remained under my operational front; the Saar sector had been stabilised. More control. important still, Sixth S.S. Panzer Army was First it was necessary to eliminate the enemy transferred to the eastern front, to oppose the salient west of the R. Rber between Julich and mounting Russian offensive. The concentra- Roermond. Second Army completed this task tion of American divisions into the Ninth U.S. by 28 January. The divisions concerned, less Army was achieved remarkably quickly, over defensive troops left holding the river line, im- long distances, using shocking roads and tracks, mediately started north to join the concentra- and in appalling weather. tion for the Rhineland battle. The launching of the American thrust had The battle of the Rhineland was based on been planned to start between loth and I5th two converging offensives between the Rhine February but at the last minute, before aban- and the Meuse, with the object of destroying doning the Roer dams, the enemy carriedt out the enemy forces masking the Ruhr. It was demolitions which loosed the flood waters. intended, by interdiction from the air and by There followed an anxious period of waiting, employing the maximum available forces on with all the troops teed up for the battle, while the ground, to prevent the enemy withdrawing the water subsided sufficiently to enable the to the east bank of the Rhine; in this, success crossing to be launched. On 23rd February the was largely achieved. Ninth U.S. Army, under command of General 4446 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 Simpson, commenced its attack northwards to- necessary to establish our lines of communi- wards the area where First Canadian Army was cation across the Meuse. and Rhine. Further- fighting a most intense battle. Owing to the more the Second Army depots had been stocked delay in starting the southern thrust, the Reich- with some 130,000 tons of stores for the coning swald battle had drawn enemy strength from the operations. And so 21 Army Group launched Ninth U.S. Army sector. The Americans took the operation for crossing the Rhine a fortnight every advantage of this opportunity and after completion of the battle of the Rhineland. advanced with admirable speed; their action hi The fortnight between the end of the battle its turn eased the pressure in the North. of the Rhineland and the crossing of the Rhine As Ninth U.S. Army swung North, the First was one of intense activity. Formations were U.S. Army was made responsible by the regrouped and lined up in their correct Supreme Commander for the security of its positions, covered by a screen of troops holding southern flank; the thrusts towards Cologne the river bank. Dense and continuous clouds were thus related directly to our operations. of smoke were employed to hide our intentions The keynotes of the battle of the Rhineland and .final preparations. On 9 March I issued orders for crossing the were the intense and fanatical opposition of the Rhine north of .the Ruhr. My intention was enemy who, as we had hoped, accepted battle to secure a bridgehead: prior to developing West of the Rhine, and secondly the appalling operations to isolate the Ruhr and to thrust weather conditions. The northern flank of the into the northern plains of Germany. Reichswald operation was conducted mainly in various types of amphibious vehicles; in general, Outline Plan. the mud and slush were indescribable and In outline, my plan was to cross the Rhine greatly hampered the movement of troops and on a front of two armies between Rheinberg supplies through the heavily wooded areas and Rees, using Ninth American Army on the which are so lacking in roads. right and Second Army on the left. The prin- On 3rd March the two armies linked up; the cipal initial objective was the important com- Americans were in Geldern, and 35 Division of munications centre of Wesel. I intended that XVI Corps made contact with 53 Division in the bridgehead should extend to the south suf- the northern outskirts of the town. But it was ficiently far to cover Wesel from enemy ground not until the ioth that the enemy bridgehead action, and to the north to include bridge sites covering Wesel was liquidated. at Emmerich; the depth of the bridgehead was 21 Army Group was now lined up on the to be made sufficient to provide room to form Rhine as far South as Diisseldorf. up major forces for the drive to the east and The enemy had suffered yet another heavy north-east. I gave 24 March as target date for defeat. He had lost nearly 100,000 men in the operation. The battle of the Rhineland was killed, wounded and prisoners. Eighteen divi- not completed until 10 March, so that the time sions and a large number of hastily formed units • available for preparing to assault across the greatest water obstacle in Western Europe was had been battered. extremely short. The all important factor was THE BATTLE OF THE RHINE. to follow up the enemy as quickly as possible, and it was possible to achieve this speed of On 7th March, following a swift break action mainly because of the foresight and pre- through, First United States Army secured intact liminary planning that had been devoted lo the railway bridge at Remagen and immediately this battle for some months. began forming a bridgehead on the East bank. The width of the Rhine on our front was The importance of this bridgehead to between four and five hundred yards, but at our subsequent operations cannot be over- high water it was liable to increase to between estimated; me enemy reaction to it was immedi- seven and twelve hundred yards. The mean ate, and a considerable number of surviving velocity of the current was about three and a enemy formations soon became committed in half knots. The river bed itself was composed the sector. of sand and gravel and was expected to 'give a Meanwhile, Third United States Army thrust good bearing surface for amphibious tanks and to the Rhine at Coblenz and subsequently trestles. The course of the river was controlled established a bridgehead sou|h-west of the city by a highly developed system of dykes; the over the River Moselle. On 15 March main dyke was generally sixty feet wide at American troops thrust southwards from this the base and some ten to sixteen feet high, bridgehead and eastwards from Trier, while and formed a formidable obstacle. Although Seventh United States Army attacked north- our operations in February had been severely wards between the Rhine and Saarbrucken. handicapped by flooding, the waters were sub- While Seventh Army fought steadily through siding rapidly and the ground was drying the Siegfried defences and pinned down the remarkably quickly. German 'troops, aumoureid columns of Third Ninth United States Army comprised XIII, Army drove into the rear of the enemy XVI and XIX Corps with a total of three positions. Resistance east of the Moselle armoured and nine infantry divisions. In addi- crumbled, the Saar was enveloped, and the tion to 8, 12 and 30 Corps, Second Army in- Rhine cities of Mainz and Worms were cap- cluded for the initial stages of the operation tured. By the third week in March the Allied 2 Canadian Corps and XVIII United States Armies had closed to the Rhine throughout its Airborne Corps; the latter comprised 6 British length. and 17 American Airborne Divisions. The total While the battle of the Rhineland was pro- forces in Second Army were four armoured, ceeding, the details for the crossing of the two airborne and eight infantry divisions, five Rhine were being worked out. Many engineer- independent armoured brigades, one Com- ing and administrative preparations had been mando brigade and one independent infantry initiated back in December, before the brigade. 79 Armoured Division was in support Ardennes counter-offensive. In particular, of the operation with all its resources of work 'had started on the roads and railways specialised armour and amphibious devices. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 4447 A trehendous weight of day and night heavy Twelfth U.S. Army Group. The two U.S. bombeis, medium bombers and Allied Tactical armies proceeded with the clearance of the Air Forces was made available in support of the Ruhr, and at the same time pushed forces operation. Eastwards to the Elbe. At 1530 hours on 23rd March I gave orders The subsequent action of 21 Army Group to laanch the operation, as the weather was may be compared with the drive across N.W.. good France. The German East-West lines of com- The attack began on the night of 23rd March, munication to the coast were progressively cut and by the next morning, all four assaulting and a series of right hooks were delivered to divisions (51 Division, 15 Division and 30 and round up the enemy. The left flank formations 79 United States Divisions) and i Commando drove up towards the coast to complete the Brigade (British) had accomplished their task. initial crossings between Rheinberg and Rees. 8 Corps of Second Army crossed the Weser The key to the* crossing was the important near Minden on 5th April, followed a few days communicating centre of Wesel, which was later further North by. 12 Corps, which then captured by the Commando Brigade after an worked its way along the East bank in an intense air attack by Bomber Command. On advance which brought it to the outskirts of the morning of the 24th, XVIII United States Hamburg. This wide turning movement Airborne Corps, with 6 Airborne Division and loosened the enemy on the left, and while 17 United States Airborne Division, dropped Bremen was masked from the South by 30 on the East bank of the Rhine within support- Corps, a hook further up river came in on the ing distance of our guns on the West bank. city from the East. Bremen fell at the end of The enemy reaction was initially strongest the month. on the Northern flank, where three parachute First Canadian Army made steady progress, divisions had been concentrated. But, generally and by mid-April had liberated most of North- speaking, his power of manoeuvre was greatly ern Holland. By the same time i Canadian. limited by the very heavy air interdiction pro- Corps had safeguarded our flank in Western gramme which had been originated several days Holland and isolated the large enemy garrison before the assault. The airborne troops took there. full advantage of his failure to launch any The main drive to the Elbe continued to- effective counter-attack against them, 'and wards Luneburg, which was reached on the rapidly made contact with the formations cross- i8th, and our forces began to line up on the ing the river. The British and American bridge- Southern bank of the river masking the city heads were quickly joined. Some remarkable of Hamburg. The Elbe was crossed on 29th engineering feats were accomplished in working April and spearheads made straight for Lubeck ferries and bridging the river, and it is interest- in order to seal off the Schleswig-Holstein pen- to note that the Royal Navy was well to the insula. At the same time, moving by road, fore with craft which had been dragged by a U.S. airborne corps of two divisions, together road all across Belgium, Southern Holland with 6 British Airborne Division, formed a and the Rhineland. defensive flank facing East on the line Darchau- We were now in a position to drive into the Schwerin-Wismar. Orice across the river our plains of Northern Germany. It was a matter operations were virtually unopposed. The plan of great satisfaction to see how plans which for outflanking Hamburg 'by a manoeuvre had been maturing back on the Seine were similar to that used at Bremen was actually reaching their fulfilment. under way when, on 2nd May, the Germans came out to negotiate its surrender. Across the The Advance to the Elbe and Baltic. Elbe the countryside was packed with a mass Within four days our bridgehead over the of German soldiers and refugees, fleeing from Rhine had been established, and on 28th our own advance and from that of the March the advance to the Elbe began. Russians: with whom we established contact On the right flank Ninth United States Army on 2nd May. was directed to the sector Magdeburg—Witten- The negotiations which began in Hamburg berge. In the centre Second Army was to led on 3rd May to the despatch by Doenitz of advance with its left flank on Hamburg. On envoys to my Tactical Headquarters, then at the left, 2 Canadian Corps, after crossing Luneburg Heath. By this time I had ordered through the Second Army bridgehead, swung a pause in our advance to be made on a line North along the Rhine to outflank Arnhem and which would cover Hamburg and Lubeck. open up the routes leading Northwards from Some fighting was still in progress with German that area. Later, i Canadian Corps assaulted remnants in the Cuxhaven and Emden penin- across the river at Arnhem and turned into sulas. western Holland to establish a protective flank The German delegation which came to my between the Rhine and the Zuider Zee. Headquarters was headed by General-Admiral The enemy tried desperately to assemble his von Friedeburg, Commander-in-Chief of the remaining forces in opposition to our advance. German Navy. He was accompanied by The core of his resistance formed on the Ems- General Kinzel, Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Dortmund Canal, facing the left and centre of Busch, and by Vice-Admiral Wagner. I Second Army. Bitter fighting ensued; in the quickly established that they had not in fact meantime in the Ninth U.S. Army sector, and come to negotiate the unconditional surrender on the right of Second Army, progress was of the troops on my front, and at once made it rapid. clear that I would not discuss any other G3y 3rd April, Ninth U.S. Army had reached matters. I did, however, take the opportunity the Weser in the Minden area, ana had linked to show von Friedeburg a map of the current up with First U.S. Army advancing from the operational situation of which he was apparently Remagen bridgehead. The Ruhr was enveloped. not properly aware, and this helped to convince Ninth U.S. Army reverted to command him of the hopelessness of the German position. 4448 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 He then returnd to recommend to Doenitz a number of field depots, whence they were the unconditional surrender of all German naval, despatched to the troops. As soon as conditions land and air forces opposite 21 Army Group. permitted, these field depots were concentrated On the evening of 4th May, von Friedeburg into a single organisation called the Rear Main- returned to my Headquarters and signed the tenance Area. instrument of unconditional surrender of those When the break out from Normandy forces. occurred, considerable problems arose because Cease Fire was ordered on 21 Army Group the L. of C. became stretched in a short time front as from 0800 hours 5th May. from Bayeux to Antwerp—that is some 400 REVIEW AND COMMENTS. miles; all bridges over the Seine were de- molished, and the railway facilities extensively I have described the part played by 21 Army damaged. In order to maintain the advance, Group and the Armies under my command from shipping and the discharge of material were cut 6th June, 1944, to the 5th May, 1945, and I well below the figure necessary for the daily should like to take this opportunity of express- maintenance of the force, so as to release every ing my appreciation of the tremendous tasks lorry possible for ferrying stores forward to the accomplished by the Navy, Army and Air troops. This meant eating into the reserves Forces throughout the campaign. built up in the Rear Maintenance Area, and i- Before the operation was launched it was the became a matter of urgency to get bases furthei task of the Air Forces to create conditions forward and shorten the Lines of Communi- favourable to a successful landing and to the cation. We had both feet off the ground, subsequent development of operations inland. relying on opening up the Channel ports, par- Both the Army and the Navy relied on this ticularly Dieppe, before our accumulated stocks being done, and it was done; the heavy bombers became exhausted. But administrative risks of Bomber Command and of the American Air have to be taken in war as well as tactical ones; Force did magnificent work in weakening Ger- the point to realise is that a commander requires many generally, and in particular in destroying a nice judgment to know -when risks are justi- the enemy railway system, which enormously fiable and when they are definitely not so. reduced the mobility of the enemy once opera- Gradually the railway systems were re- tions began. established, and when eventually the port of Until the Army stepped ashore it was com- Antwerp was opened to shipping, it was pletely in the hands of the Navy and Air Forces possible to base ourselves firmly on depots for its sea and airborne landings. established between there and Brussels. Sub- Once the Army was on shore all military sidiary tonnages were continued to be handled operations became combined Army/Air opera- through the Channel ports. tions; the mighty weapon of air power enabled I would mention one very important feature the Army to conduct its operations successfully of administration which has been confirmed and with far fewer casualties than would during the campaign. It is that there is a otherwise have been the case. The Army reasonably constant figure covering the com- relied on the Navy and on the Air Forces for bined ammunition and petrol tonnages re- secure communications across the sea from our quired, though, of course, the split between island base in Britain. these commodities depends on the type of battle I would like to say that the Army owes a that is being fought. great debt of gratitude to the Navy and the Air It is not possible in this dispatch to go into Force and realises fully its complete dependence any detail concerning the vast and compli- on them in all military operations. cated machinery necessary for the support of a In addition I would like to add some remarks modern army in the field. I will, however, concerning the handling of the various arms mention the tremendous importance of Move- within the Army, with particular reference to ments and Transportation. Their problems in the campaign itself. this campaign were immense. There were the Administration. numerous technical and engineer problems of In the early stages of the campaign much repairing and operating the damaged or de- depended on the successful issue of the adminis- molished ports, railways, and inland water trative planning. The task was a formidable transport systems, of four European countries. one, and in plain terms meant the export over- Bridges had to be built over such obstacles as seas of a community the size of the population the Seine and the Rhine. Possibly even more of Birmingham. Over 287,000 men and important was the problem of coordinating and 37,000 vehicles were pre-loaded into ships and allocating traffic over the various means of landing craft prior to the assault, and in the first carriage, and of setting up organisations for thirty days 1,100,000 British and American operating through services over the different troops were put ashore. ^ national systems. There, was the necessity to foresee and provide The " A " services too, were confronted with all that is required for a major static battle special problems. The calculations of rein- quickly followed by a rapid advance of some forcements required, together with a correct 400 miles, which entailed the landing of some balance for every arm and trade, called for 200,000 vehicles and 750,000 tons of stores considerable foresight and experience, and had during the corresponding period. And I can a very direct effect of the success of operations. say that, even in these exceptional conditions, I will also mention Welfare, which had reached planned operations were never held up even a standard in the Army probably never previ- for a single day by any lack of administrative ously approached. resources. Very great praise is due to the various In the early stages the vast quantities of Services and Departments which so successfully stores required were landed over open beaches, overcame their problems "and difficulties, and a task which was greatly assisted by the carried out their functions in such an efficient MULBERRY. The stores were directed into manner. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 4449 Specialised Equipment'. The outstanding point which emerges once Eariy in the planning for D Day it became more is that we require only two basic types evideat that specialised armoured equipment of tank—the capital .tank (for fighting) and the would 'be necessary to overcome 'the beach light tank (for reconnaissance). defences. One of the recommendations made The capital tank' must be a weapon of uni- as i result of the Dieppe raid had, in fact, versal application, suitable not only for work- been that engineers should be carried behind ing with the infantry in the attack and in •armour up to the concrete obstacle which had the dog-fight battle, but also capable of operat- to be breached. This idea was developed so ing in the spearheads of the armoured division that mechanical means could be used for in pursuit. I am convinced, as a result of. placing or projecting charges from tanks with- experience from Alamein to the Baltic, that out exposing the crews. Tank-carried bridges it is fundamentally unsound to aim at pro- for crossing anti-tank ditches were developed ducing one type of tank for co-operation with as well, and were launched mechanically • from the -infantry .and another for "the armoured behind armour. division. We require one tank which will do The study of the particular problems pre- both jobs. I have learnt that the ubiquitous sented by the Normandy beach defences led use of armour is a great battle-winning factor. to the preparation of further specialised equip- ment. Mats laid from tanks were used to cross Artillery. •soft patches of clay on the beaches; a turretless • The Gunners have risen to great heights in tank was used as a means of providing a self- this war and I doubt if the artillery has ever propelled ramp over which other vehicles could been so efficient as it is to-day. scale sea-walls; flail tanks for mine clearing In considering the future of the artillery, and amphibious tanks to lead the assault were it is very important that we should get the employed, and were integrated with the en- organisation right, with the correct balance gineer tanks into well trained assault teams. between tracked guns and towed guns, and Specialised armour made an -important con- so on. tribution to the success of the landings. The The expenditure of ammunition in this cam- beach defences were quickly overcome and the paign has been tremendous, and as a result new technique of landing a great weight of of the experience gained, certain facts have armour early in the assault paid an excellent emerged. It has been found that a large num- dividend. ber of small shells over a given time produces As the campaign progressed the need for a greater effect on the enemy than the same special armoured devices became increasingly weight of larger shells. It is moreover, im- apparent. Against fixed defences such as portant to remember that there is a time limit existed' around the ports, mine-sweeping tanks, for bombardment, after which enemy morale flame-throwers and engineer tanks were invalu- gets no lower and further expenditure of ammu- able. The Churchill flame-thrower was out- nition is wasted. It has been found that our standingly successful throughout the campaign. own casualties rise in direct proportion to the It had a very great moral effect on the enemy distance of the infantry behind the artillery and saved us'many casualties. supporting fire. The D Day technique for the early landing All these facts point to the need for relatively and quick build up of armour was also applied small shells for close support of infantry, where at the crossings of the Rhine and the Elbe. neutralisation and not destruction is the im- This was made possible by the use of amphi- mediate object. The 25 pounder meets the bious tanks and amphibious assault craft carry- case; it must have good fragmentation. ing infantry, light vehicles, and supporting I would mention the fuze problem as this weapons. It was largely the use of these craft requires study and development. It is neces- which allowed operations to be continued sary to have a good proximity fuze and a good throughout the winter over the flooded areas time fuze. between the Maas and the Rhine. Lastly, the Air O.P. The Air O.P. has. Armoured personnel carriers were also found proved its value in this campaign. It has to be necessary, and were improvised from become a necessary part of gunnery and a tanks with the turret removed. Their use gave good aeroplane is required for the job. Very armoured mobility to infantry and enabled good R.A. officers are required for duty in the; them more closely to accompany armour in the Squadrons, and they must be selected with this assault and pursuit. The vehicles, known as in view. Primarily, an Air O.P. officer must "' KANGAROOS," I shall mention again later. be a good gunner—it is not difficult to teach All these various equipments were concen- him to fly. trated, for training and administration, in a special formation: the 79 Armoured Division. The Engineers. They were sub-allotted in support of formations The Engineer problems were unusually for- and units as operations required. The divisional midable, and had to be executed at a great commander was responsible for providing com- speed. petent advisers in the use of the equipment at In the early days the clearance of beach all levels. It was found that centralisation obstacles and mines gave rise to great anxiety under him was essential in order to achieve and called for prolonged and detailed study. flexibility and provide a controlled programme The armoured vehicles R.E. (A.V.R.E.'s) of workshops overhaul, rest and relief. armed with a petard shooting a heavy demoli- tion charge, were landed very early and The R.A.C. operated with great dash and success against The R.A.C. lived up to its highest traditions obstacles and pillboxes. • The problem of plac- in this campaign. It was really properly ing the MULBERRIES or artificial ports was. equipped with adequate scales of reserves, and solved by the excellent co-operation between the fighting gave full scope to its flexibility and the Royal Navy and the Engineers on both .Adaptability. . - sides of the Channel. As the beachhead began. C 4450 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 to expand, demolitions on a grand scale had to Modern infantry is a master of more weapons be overcome—demolition of ports, railways, than ever before, and the infantryman's life bridges and airfields—combined with, extensive depends primarily on the skill with which he and very skilful mine laying. uses them; he must reach an increasingly The repair of well blitzed and intentionally higher standard of training. It has been a war demolished airfields, or more often construction of movement, but although the infantryman' of new ones, was in itself a major task: upon may motor into battle, his training must keep which depended our support from the air. •him hard and tough—a point which must never Twin petrol pipelines were laid from Cher- be overlooked in these days of troop carrying bourg across the Seine at Rouen, and from transport. Boulogne stretching across the Rhine. These The introduction of the armoured personnel were supplied from ships pumping ashore, and carrier is an important innovation in the later in particular from the famous " PLUTO." employment of infantry. It enables infantry The pipelines transported during the campaign to be transported across bullet-swept zones in more than a million tons of petrol. order to arrive fresh at the vital part of the Nearly two thousand Bailey bridges were battlefield. The development of this technique erected, including spans across the Seine, the has already gone far, and done much to enlarge Meuse, the Rhine and the Weser—some of which the scope of infantry tactics. For example, in were nearly a mile long. It has once more the first major attack by the Canadian Army been shown that rivers, even very big rivers astride the Falaise road on 7 August, infantry with complete demolition belts, do not hold up carried in " Kangaroos " were moved by night an army, in spite of the weight of modern traffic. a distance of five miles to their off-loading Armour and the mass of lorries assisting the point; the last four miles of this advance were Army played havoc with the -roads, and the actually within the enemy positions, and the maintenance of them in conditions of continual troops debussed almost on the edge of the traffic, especially in low-lying districts in severe enemy gun areas. They then fanned out to winter conditions, was perhaps the most heart- overrun the belt of country they were attacking. rending task that faced the Engineers. They The tendency to do more and more by night were greatly assisted by the Pioneer Corps, has been greatly facilitated by the provision of which in this task, as in so many others, did a " artificial moonlight ". Artificial moonlight, very excellent job. provided by Searchlight batteries, has now The most determined demolitions were in the become a standard part of our military ports. .But it has been proved that it is im- organisation and has greatly assisted the possible to destroy a port so badly that it cannot activities of the infantryman. It has also be put into some sort of operation by the time proved its value in more rearward areas to the the Navy have cleared the mines obstructing bridge 'builders and administrative echelons. its entrance. It has again been the Infantry who suffered The Sappers were very well equipped; but it the heaviest casualties. I cannot praise too is important to remember that it is the human highly the stamina and persistence which the element—the resourceful officers and skilled and Infantry displayed hi the campaign. Divisions willing men—which is the major factor in en- were called upon to remain continuously in gineering in war. We were often very short of action for many months on end—to this they Sappers, particularly during the big river cross- responded admirably, even during the very ing operations. bitter winter we experienced. Signals. Airborne Force's. It is fundamental that successful operations Airborne forces must now form an essential demand really efficient communications. It is part of the Army, as there will often be therefore worth emphasising that a commander, occasions in which they can play a vital role. at whatever level, must take his R. Signals Apart from their participation in the battle, the adviser into his confidence from the earliest threat of their use can be turned to important stages in preparing a plan. advantage, for experience has shown that Much of Signals' work was of the unspec- thereby the enemy can be led to make consider- tacular, slogging variety which the provision of able and even vital dispersions of his front line a vast network of communications involves. forces. This is in addition to the need to lock The constant aim of Signals was to build up the up troops in rear areas for guarding vital zones solid cable head as far forward as possible, to and installations when the opponent is known provide reliable jumping-off places for com- to have airborne troops at his disposal. munications in the battle area. To serve my The use of airborne forces in highly mobile own Tactical Headquarters, which frequently operations is limited, because the time required moved at intervals of every two or three days, for planning their descents frequently results in use was made of an ultra high frequency wire- the ground troops over-running the projected less of an entirely new type (No. 10 set). This dropping zones. But in deliberate operations, method gave me secure speech communication such as the seaborne assault, or the assault with my armies and my Main Headquarters. across a major river obstacle, airborne troops I think that one of the main Signals lessons have proved to be a battle winning factor. has been the necessity for insisting that the The threat of an airborne operation, in con- officers reach a really high standard of technical junction with other factors, was material in ability. Modern equipment becomes increas- causing the Germans to retain major formations ingly complicated and diverse, and the officers in the Pas de Calais during the initial period must know all about it, if they are to get the after our landing in Normandy. Nearer the best results. •battlefield, uncertainty as to our intentions, The Infantry. combined with the use of dummy paratroops, In spite of predictions to the contrary, the caused alarm and despondency to the enemy. Infantry has lost none of its importance on the This delayed the arrival on the battlefield of battlefield. portions of his forces at a vital time. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 4 SEPTEMBER, 1946 4451 There are a number of limitations in the use who in the last war would have been perma- of airborne troops, chief of which is the uncer- nent invalids, were fit and ready to go back tainty of weather. But I believe this factor to the line within a month of being wounded. will become less important in the future, as To sum up, the doctors were prepared to scientific methods are developed to facilitate the lay 15 to i that once a man got into their use of aircraft under adverse weather hands, whatever his injury, they would save conditions. has life and restore him to health. It is a fine thing that these odds were achieved with The Medical, Organisation. a handsome margin. No account of this campaign would be com- plete without some mention of the truly remark- Conclusion. able success of the medical organisation. But I must emphasise that my despatch has it must be remembered that there were two been primarily concerned with 21 Army Group; factors which contributed greatly to the results but it is well to remember that any complete achieved; probably no group of doctors has history, of the campaign in North-West Europe ever worked on better material, and secondly, would tell more of the tremendous efforts of they were caring for the men of a winning the United States and of the fighting on the army. The men of 21 Army Group were fully more Southerly sectors remote from the 21 Army immunised and fully trained; their morale was Group zone. at its highest; they were well-clothed and well- I would also say that the scope of my fed; they were fighting in a climate to which despatch has permitted only the briefest refer- the average British soldier is accustomed; ence to our great Russian ally. hygiene, both personal and unit, was excep- Events have amply shown that a splendid tionally good; welfare services were well spirit of co-operation was established between organised. The exhilarating effect of success the British and American services, and that, also played its part in reducing the rates of under General Eisenhower a strong, loyal team sickness. was quickly brought into being, while the Commanders in the field must realise that various components of 'the great invasion force the medical state of an army is not dependent were welded into a fine fighting machine. on the doctors alone. Their efforts are im- measurably facilitated when morale is at its It has been brought home to me, not only in highest, and of all the factors which ensure this campaign but throughout the war, that a high state of morale, there is none more the soldier on the battle front, and the worker important than success. on the home front are closely linked members The sickness amongst troops was almost of the same team—neither can achieve any halved as compared with the last war. It is success without the other; both have to stand striking that, as we swept through Germany, firm under fire and both have to see that their liberating prison camps such as Belsen and job is carried out in spite of all the enemy Sandbostel where thousands of persons were can do. dying of typhus, only twenty-five British I do not propose in this despatch to record troops contracted this disease. None died of it. the names of those who have deserved my This was due to preventive inoculations and personal and official gratitude for their services to the adequate supply and use of a powder in the campaign. To name any might seem called D.D.T. to imply some lack of appreciation of others; Air transport has been of great importance where all did so well it seem=> invidious to in the evacuation of casualties. By this means mention names. over a hundred thousand wounded , men were I record my deep appreciation and gratitude evacuated to base hospitals from front line to all who served with me in this historic cam- units. In the sphere of transfusion, great paign: from the highest commander to the quantities of blood and blood plasma were most junior private soldier. used. A co-ordinated service of air transport In conclusion I wish to pay tribute to the and refrigerator trucks ensured that fresh blood splendid fighting spirit, heroism and endur- was always at hand for surgeons working ance of the ordinary soldier. And if I were directly behind the lines—even during the rapid asked what is the greatest single factor which advance into Belgium. contributed to his success, I would say morale. Another interesting fact is that, in the last I call morale the greatest single factor in war. war, two out of every three men wounded in A high morale is based on discipline", self- the belly, died. Field Surgical Units, operat- respect and confidence of the soldier in his ing close behind the lines, greatly reduced this commanders, in his weapons and in himself. danger. In the Normandy campaign two out Without high morale, no success can be of every three men wounded in the belly achieved, however good may be the strategic recovered. or tactical plan, or anything else. High morale The healing of war wounds has been revolu- is a pearl of very great price. Arid the surest tionised by the use of penicillin. Manv men. way to obtain it is by success in battle. LONDON PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE To be purchased directly from H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses: York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; isa Castle Street, Edinburgh 2; 39-41 King Street, Manchester 2; i St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff; 80 Chichester Street, Belfast; or through any bookseller 1946 Price Sixpence net S.O. Code No. 65-37711