■ First Published in Pacific Affairs, Vol.46, No.1, Spring 1973 6 Continuity and Change in Japanese Foreign Policy a riting in October 1960, Edwin Reischauer1 painted a rather alarming picture Wof the state of Japan-American relations as revealed by the political crisis in Tokyo over the renewal of the Security Treaty in May and June of that year. It will be recalled that the Japanese Prime Minister of the day, Nobusuke Kishi, had spent some two years of hard bargaining with the Americans in order to renegotiate the original Security Pact drawn up while Japan was still under military occupation. He had fi nally obtained a revamped Mutual Security Treaty (to run for ten years) which included a number of signifi cant concessions by the Americans. The fact, however, that the revised Treaty represented a continuation of a military linkage with the US, and that the American Government appeared to see it as in some sense a link in a chain of anti-Communist alliances around the rim of Asia, gave rise to a concerted campaign by the forces of political opposition in Japan to prevent—usually in the name of neutralism—the Treaty from going into effect. There were endless debates in the National Diet about the precise geographical delimitation of the curiously Eurocentric term “the Far East” in the Treaty (as though the participants had forgotten that the world was round). There was also much argument about whether the “prior con- sultation” clause would give a Japanese government the right of actually vetoing the deployment of American troops stationed in Japan to a theatre of war elsewhere in Asia, or whether the Americans would be able to slip nuclear weapons into Japan without the Japanese Government being able (or willing) to stop them. Nevertheless, Kishi had suffi cient votes in the Diet and it would have appeared logical to assume that he could have overridden the Opposition forces easily enough. The reasons why he ran into such trouble were complicated, and involved a curious combination of circumstances that happened to coincide: the U2 Incident; the break- down of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit meeting; the opportunities open to the Opposition to delay and even block the passage of bills by physical obstruction; the fact that Kishi had unwisely timed the coming into effect of the Treaty to coincide with 54 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY Eisenhower’s visit to Japan (which meant that he could not afford to have the passage of the Treaty delayed in the Diet); the fact that in order to ensure passage he brought police into the Diet and was thus pilloried as “anti-democratic”; the fact that he had been a member of To¯ jo¯ ’s War Cabinet; and fi nally, the circumstance that some fac- tions in his own party wanted to dump him as Prime Minister. Consequently, a major political crisis ensued, which took everybody, including the American Government, by surprise. Reischauer, refl ecting on the crisis in his Foreign Affairs article, wrote: The rioting crowds that clamored at the gates of the Japanese Diet building in May and June and the throngs of Zengakuren students who snake-danced wildly down the streets of Tokyo and swarmed over Hagerty’s car at Haneda Airport have given pause to many persons in both the United States and Japan. To Americans, who saw these scenes on their television screens, it seems that Japan stands irresolute at a way- station between the Communist camp and the free world. Many Japanese . feel even more strongly that their country stands at a crossroads of history—but to them, the diverging roads lead, not to Communist or democratic camps, but to somewhat vaguer goals labelled “peace” and “war” or “democracy” and “Fascism.” It is perhaps this sharp contrast in images of the situation between Americans and Japanese that is the most alarming feature of the recent crisis. Never since the end of the war has the gap in understanding between Americans and Japanese been wider than over this incident. Almost to a man, American observers express baffl ement over the violent Japanese reaction to the revised Security Treaty with the United States and Eisenhower’s scheduled visit, while Japanese intellectuals appear frustrated over their inability to explain their attitude to American friends. After 15 years of massive contact, Americans and Japanese seem to have less real communication than ever.2 Whether or not it was as a result of writing this article, Reischauer was subse- quently picked by President Kennedy to be his Ambassador in Tokyo, a post which he fi lled for some years with distinction. Since about 1971 there has been another “crisis of communication” between Japan and the United States. The issues are somewhat different; there have been changes in the nature of the relationship between the two countries, but there was the same sense that they were closely linked and yet not really comprehending each other. Of course, the issue is not merely one of communication, since major clashes of interest have now arisen, particularly in their trading relationships. (Yet, it was also true that there was a signifi cant difference of interest over the Security Treaty in 1958–60.) It is thus interesting to note the prognostications of another American scholar, a political scientist who has been involved only recently in the study of Japan, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who wrote in Jaunary 1972: It is now customary for both Americans and Japanese to reiterate on every major occasion the overriding importance of the ties binding America and Japan. There is much talk of partnership, of close consultations, of common interests and of friendship. Yet for a close relationship between two major powers—which the American-Japanese relationship undoubtedly is—there are disturbing imbalances in it which portend some diffi cult years ahead.3 Neither Reischauer nor Brzezinski need be regarded as infallible guides to the turbulent waters of Japanese-American relations that had to be navigated in 1960 55.