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Gorbachev and Eastern Europe Gorbachev and Eastern Europe Vladimir V. Kusin hen Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet party ment to increasing the bloc's "defensive capacity."2 leader in March 1985, most Western observ- Yet, in his March 13 funeral oration for Konstantin W ers anticipated that he would provide a more Chernenko delivered from atop the Lenin mausoleum, imaginative and dynamic guidance for Eastern Gorbachev revived some of the old stereotypes: Europe than his immediate predecessors had exer- cised. At the same time, observers were divided as to Faithful to the principles of socialist internationalism, whether this imagination and dynamism would trans- our party will continue to do everything for broader late into greater uniformity in Eastern Europe or interaction between the fraternal countries and for the whether Gorbachev would allow the individual states enhancement of their position in international affairs.3 greater latitude. The official proclamation of Gor- bachev's accession was cast in a continuity mold, On the same day, the new Soviet leader met briefly promising that Moscow would go on "doing everything with bloc leaders in Moscow for the Chernenko funer- possible and necessary to strengthen the socialist al. According to private East European sources, a 1 community." By contrast, Gorbachev's maiden cool and detached Gorbachev simply told his lesser speech as leader (at a Central Committee meeting) comrades to get on with the business at hand with and a Pravda editorial two days later contained turns greater application and consistency. Henceforth, he of phrase that raised the expectations of those desir- indicated, the emphasis would be on economic effi- ing reformist change. Instead of advocating "strength- ciency and tighter coordination of the bloc's external ening the might of the socialist community," the Gen- actions. All should strive for a lessening of tensions eral Secretary pledged "fraternal friendship" with it. vis-a-vis the West, but only on the basis of bloc unity Missing also were such ritual catchwords as "socialist directed by Moscow. A Warsaw Pact summit would be internationalism," "cohesion," and even "Marxism- held in due time to extend the treaty. Hungary's Janos Leninism," not to mention the once obligatory commit- Kadar reportedly sought to pose as the bloc's elder statesman paternally accepting Gorbachev into the family, but the General Secretary remained aloof, ' TASS in English, Mar. 11, 1985, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily gently referring the Hungarian to his proper station by Report: Soviet Union (Washington, DC —hereafter, FBIS-SOV), Mar, 11, 1985, pp. R/2-4. indicating that he would not attend the Hungarian party congress, then only two weeks away.4 Vladimir V. Kusin is Deputy Director of Research and 2 For Gorbachev's March 11 speech, see Pravda (Moscow), Mar. 12, 1985; for the Analysis, Radio Free Europe (Munich). Formerly asso- editorial, ibid., Mar. 13, 1985. 1 TASS in English, Mar. 13, 1985, in FBIS-SOV, Mar. 13, 1985, pp. R/2-3. ciated with the universities of Lancaster, Glasgow, ' The communique from this encounter appeared in Pravda, Mar. 14, 1985. Western and Hokkaido, he is the author of The Intellectual observers generally interpreted this meeting as an "informal" one. See, e.g., Le Monde Origins of the Prague Spring (1971), Political Grouping (Paris), Mar. 14, 1985. The only specific point apparently mentioned was the possibility (later dropped) that in the Czechoslovak Reform Movement (1972), and the 27th CPSU Congress might be brought forward in time —a sign that Gorbachev From Dubcek to Charter 77 (1978), and numerous may have overestimated his own capacity to break the back of opposition to him within articles on Eastern Europe. (continued on p. 40) 39 PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Gorbachev and Eastern Europe Although the Budapest event might have offered an conciliation with his discontented populace. On the opportunity for a more extensive summit, time was other hand, the Romanians might be brought to heel. too short. Moreover, Gorbachev had to be doubly The Bulgarians might be chastised for economic fail- careful with regard to Hungary. As the new leader of ures and for botching up their involvement in the an empire in trouble, it would be imprudent to be seen papal assassination attempt and for the handling of either endorsing or condemning the somewhat unor- their Turkish minority. The Czechoslovaks, too, might thodox ways of comrades in one of the constituent be unceremoniously impelled to mend their efficiency countries so early in his tenure. Even if he himself had record and to start a reform. Leadership changes in wanted to give his blessing to market-based reform- Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, some be- ism, which—despite considerable conjecture —is by lieved, might be speeded up. In general, languishing no means certain, his own party's Politburo, given its in economic and political doldrums would no longer composition at Gorbachev's accession, would most be allowed. likely not have allowed him to do so. Also, once he What really came to pass did not quite match ex- took a stand, lesser bloc leaders would have felt pectations, but neither did it depart drastically from obliged either to follow suit or raise objections. The the predictions. Let us review the record nearly a year caucus could have degenerated into a squabble. later, looking first at issues of bloc-wide significance Rather than show himself too friendly with Kadar, Gor- and then at the specifics of Moscow's bilateral deal- bachev needed to demonstrate that East Europeans ings with the East European states. were a priority with the new Soviet chief, but only as a collective entity. By and large, the Western press saw Gorbachev's Renewing the Pact accession as a blessing for the Soviet Union's Euro- pean allies. The Los Angeles Times ran the headline There was never any doubt that the Warsaw Pact "Gorbachev May Be Eastern Europe's Best Hope for would be renewed after its first 30 years, but the Evolution."5 The London Times correspondent in War- precise form of renewal and the nature of Pact obliga- saw, in a piece entitled "Time Ripe for a Strong Hand," tions did evoke some debate among the member reported that "in Poland one senses the desire for the states. It is known that Romania—and possibly emergence of a strong, reform-orientated, non-inter- others—wanted the Pact extended by only five or 10 ventionist leader in the Kremlin."6 The Washington years rather than by 20 years with an automatic Post stressed the economic angle: "Soviet Allies Opti- 10-year further extension. Ceausescu later said that mistic on Modernization."7 The International Herald he had favored setting a shorter treaty duration as an Tribune proclaimed that "East Europe Sees Gorba- act of goodwill toward the West, "to give a new chev as Sign Uncertainty Is Over,"8 and an overview perspective to the peoples, to the struggle for the in Le Soir bore the title "In the East, a Breath of Fresh abolition of military blocs and for peace." In the end, Air."9 he signed the 20-plus-10 extension "to consolidate Many observers further believed that some bloc collaboration and friendship with the socialist coun- countries might fare better under Gorbachev than tries," but the Romanian leader added that he hoped would others. The Hungarians might have their depar- the treaty would not have to run its full course and that it would be terminated earlier, "concomitantly with ture from orthodoxy sanctioned. The East Germans 10 might recover the leeway in dealing with Bonn they NATO." Judging from the perfunctory nature of the April 26 renewal ceremonies in Warsaw and other in- had lost in the late summer of 1984. Poland's 11 Wojciech Jaruzelski might be given a go-ahead for direct evidence, the issue had been resolved earlier in the month. the Soviet party. Gorbachev reportedly asked East European party leaders how preparations were going (or their party congresses and whether the gatherings might be held earlier (this only related to the Bulgarian, Czechoslovakian, East German, and 10 See excerpts from his speech before the Romanian State Council, as reported by Polish comrades, since the Hungarian congress was imminent and the Romanian Agerpres in English at 1732 GMT, May 22, 1985, in Foreign Broadcast Information congress had been held in November 1984). Service, Daily Report: Eastern Europe (Washington, DC-hereafter, FBIS-EEU), ! Robert Gillette, Mar 12, 1985. Attribution of headlines to correspondents can, of May 23, 1985, p.p. H/1-2. course, be misleading, but in the cases cited, the home-base editors did read their man Actually, the Romanian proposal was probably not a major bone of contention. The in the field fairly accurately. Washington Post of Apr. 2, 1985, quotes an unnamed Western diplomat in Bucharest to ' Roger Boyse, Mar. 12, 1985. the effect that the Romanians had "glamorized and promoted their own part in the 7 Bradley Graham, Mar. 13, 1985. renewal ... to reinforce their image with the West as the Warsaw Pact's difficult • Henry Tanner, Mar. 13, 1985. member." The diplomat thought that "there never was any real intention [by Ceausescu] 'Pol Mathil, Mar. 14, 1985. not to renew or not to go along with Soviet terms." 40 PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED Problems of Communism Jan-Feb 1986 At the October 1985 meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Sofia: from left to right, Gustav Husak, Janos Kadar, Erich Honecker, Mikhail Gorbachev, and host Todor Zhivkov. —INTERFOTO MTI from EASTFOTO. Defense funding has been another sore point. A Warsaw Pact countries should now unilaterally commentator speaking on Budapest Radio on the day reduce their defense budgets by 10 to 15 percent an- of the Pact's renewal argued against relying on linear nually "to make the NATO governments as well as growth in armaments as the linchpin of military mod- others follow suit."14 ernization.
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